
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IMAGES OF THE OTHER IN LITERARY COMMUNICATION



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IMAGES OF THE OTHER
IN LITERARY COMMUNICATION

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A MAGYAR TUDOMÁNYOS AKADÉMIA
IRODALOMTUDOMÁNYI INTÉZETE

БЪЛГАРСКА АКАДЕМИЯ НА НАУКИТЕ
ИНСТИТУТ ЗА ЛИТЕРАТУРА

IMAGES OF THE OTHER
IN LITERARY COMMUNICATION

(1)

Edited
by
Radosvet Kolarov and **György Kálmán**

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ИЗДАТЕЛСКИ ЦЕНТЪР

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PREFACE

GYÖRGY C. KÁLMÁN

There has been a long tradition of consultations, small conferences and personal contacts of the Instiutes for Literary Studies of Bulgarian and Hungarian Academies of Sciences (Sofia and Budapest, respectively); yet the editors are very happy to present here this joint volume of studies, which is published now thanks partly to the exceptionally fortunate financial backing[1] and partly to the ever reducing costs of publication. To be sure, a number of interesting and important studies originated from this fruitful exchange and research project, published separately in scholarly journals; and the editors hope that our forthcoming meetings will also yield book form publications like the present one.

The papers included in this book has been presented at a conference in Sofia, entitled 'Images of the Other in Literary Communication'; or, more exactly, some of the studies were not actually read there but both the authors and the editors felt that they would fit very well to the proceedings. The topic has, of course, several aspects and, as is usual, the participants did not hesitate to exploit the implications of the keyword „the Other" in their own proper field of interest. The organizers had no illusions concerning the restrictability of the conference. It is a quite well known phenomenon that very different aspects, approaches and even topics arise in these sorts of occasions, and it was not the ambition of neither the organizers nor the participants to cut back or even to con-

[1] We must express our gratitude, again, to the generous support of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences as well as to the Hungarian National Foundation of Scientific Research (OTKA, project N T42711)

trol these „digressions". All the less because the concept of „the Other" seems to be getting into the core of our field, literary theory and literary history, in a more and more important way. It has to do with literary history, hermeneutics, translation theory, literary analysis, theories of subject(ivity), and so on; and to confront and contrast our approaches, if there is a serious dialogue between the participants, brings an exciting intellectual discussion.

And so it happened. We have gathered in a relatively small room, in the Sofia building of the Academy which hosts the Institute of Literary Studies, sit round a big table (with no head of the table, practically no formal chairman), only a very few inquirers joining us from time to time; all the participants listened to each other very attentively, searching for the points of connection and those of debate; the whole conference has been characterized by an eager attention and a vivid, informal atmosphere of discussion. Personally, I feel that small conferences like this have far more chance to be successful and interesting than some of those in fancy rooms, with chairmen and co-chairmen, with tens or hundreds of people suffering of boredom.

Since after the conference the participants were given the possibility to work on their papers for this publication, perhaps some elements of the discussion might have been built into the texts. And because some years have passed since the conference, it is also possible that some of the authors would have formulate their studies more or less differently. So this volume should be taken as a snapshot: it reflects a definite state of literary theoretical or historical thinking, a specific range of literary scholars, and particular visions of the concept of „the Other". Also, it gives some information of how a Hungarian scholar feels to call his or her Bulgarian colleague into discussion, and vica versa; that is, what the intercultural dimensions of the discourse on literary theoretical issues are. (To address „the Other"...)

▪

As for the Hungarian preparation for the conference, the topics we had agreed to deal with together with our Bulgarian colleagues has been very close to the project the Department of Literary Theory of the Hungarian Institute for Literary Studies has dealt with in the first

years of the 2000's. That is, the project of the Department was centered around *dialogue*, in a lot of senses of the word. It covered, thus, the very concrete dialogic structure of the drama as well as the dialogic nature, in Bakhtin's sense, of layers or "voices" or sociolects of the speech in literature. It also included dialogue among critical stances or interpretive communities - and so on. This project has ended in several papers and a special issue of the Hungarian scholarly journal *Helikon*, with the subtitle "Variations on Dialogue". So the topic of "otherness" seemed to be quite close to our interests of those years (and, to be sure, this is an ongoing, continuous interest).

Some practical remarks: Gábor Bezecky's „Metaphor and Narrative" and Gábor Bolonyai's „Lyric Genres in Aristotle's Poetics" were not read at the conference; Ferenc Odorics was not present either, but his text ("Images of the Other – Figures of the Text") was read by Tamás Medgyes, PhD, a former disciple, colleague and friend of Odorics, not only the English translator of the text but actually its co-author.

The editors of this book are absolutely determined that by putting the words *"Volume 1"* in the subtitle a beginning of a series of the cooperation is signalled. Not as if the cooperation itself were something new – but now it is time to publish, in a form of book series, the products of this fruitful and harmonious work. Thus, on the last page of this book there should be written a promise (not a warning!), "to be continued..."

RADOSVET KOLAROV

This book contains articles read out as papers at the joint conference between representatives of the theoretical departments at the Institutes for Literary Studies at the Hungarian and Bulgarian Academies of Sciences, held on 28 and 29 November 2002 in Sofia. This book marks a peculiar double jubilee: 20 years from the first Bulgarian-Hungarian collective study, published in 1986 in Sofia and respectively 25 years of the first joint conference of the two institutions. A quarter of a century (!) – this is a too long period in the unsustainable, dynamically changing and unpredictable picture in the life of the modern academic community, in particular in the situation of cultural and political changes. It may be said, not only with a sense of humor, that over this unstable soil the Hungarian – Bulgarian academic cooperation turned out to be something like a constant, a milestone which survived the change of the political regimes; by the way, it can be said that in a sense it arose as a reaction to the political status quo, on which I would like to say a few words.

The idea of cooperation between the literary institutes of the former socialist countries arose at the end of the seventies of the last century. This multinational partnership was designated with the abbreviation "MPC-9" (Multilateral Problem Commission, the figure determined the number of the participating countries). This abbreviation resembled the designation of a coded military operation; by the way, the resemblance to a military operation was not contained solely in the title – there was subordination and discipline in this association, over which the Soviet Institute kept a watch. The consensus amongst "the nine ones" was in

practice solved by means of dictate once in a while. This was true for the allocation of the topics and spheres of research, which were assigned to each country. Prof. Atanas Natev, who was then Head of the Bulgarian Department of Literary Theory was "assigned" to run a project with a research topic not hermeneutics as his wish was, but the national issue. Prof. Natev liked saying that there were two things they could never make him do by force – make love and write. And he proved this view of his in practice by deciding to split off from MPC-9, proposing to his Hungarian colleague prof. Lajos Nyirő, Head of Hungarian Department of Literary Theory, a bilateral agreement for joint research on topics preferred by the two sides.

The escape from MPC-9 was officially marked during the autumn of 1981 with the organization of a Bulgarian – Hungarian conference, which was held in Varna under the heading "Boderlines and Possibilities of Literary Theory". The domination of hermeneutics was obvious at this conference. To outline the investigated topics, I will quote the titles of the papers: Lajos Nyirő, "Literary Theory as Meta-Discipline", Atanas Natev, "Improvisation and Evidentiality in Literary Criticism", Nikola Georgiev, "Hermeneutic Circle Quadrature", Endre Bojtár, "New Phenomena in Literary Studies", Gábor Bonyhay, "Leo Popper and Modern Hermeneutics", Svetlozar Igov, "Critique as Hermeneutics", Radosvet Kolarov, "Perceptivity of the Literary Text (in View of its Phonic Level)", Angel Angelov, "Literary Work in the Methodology of Emil Staiger", György Tverdota, "Literary Work Origination Factors". The papers were comparatively few in number, but the discussions were too extensive and not restricted to any conference standard, they stretched on till late in the evening and when once the power was cut off they continued by the light of candles. This was a gathering place attended on the Bulgarian side by philosophers, culture critics, estheticians, cinema experts as well as a lot of university students. Spirit of intellectual challenge and partaking reigned there as well as the mischievous, enchanting sense of freedom, atmosphere, in which the academic disputes were mixed with political comments and witticisms. In 1986 Sofia Academic Publishing House issued a volume, containing proceedings from the conference preserving its title. It was sold out in a few days. It is a pity that the book came out only in Bulgarian, so that it could not make its impact on the Hungarian readers.

I recall this story because the spirit of discussability and improvis-

ability, freed of any official inhibitions, was preserved as a style at the subsequent meetings held between the two institutes and it was also dominating at the conference held in Sofia during the autumn of year 2002 under the heading: 'Images of the Other in Literary Communication: Dialogues, Interferences'. It was manifested, of course, not solely as conference atmosphere but also as an approach and a point of view, rather as a multitude of points of view with regard to the problem under research. The discussions behind the texts contained in this book slipped by in time, the texts, however, contain inalienably the desire to experiment, to search for unexpected approaches and aspects of the topic.

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The problem of otherness, which the book deals with, is in the core of the studies in modern humanities. As it is known, it is a key concept in philosophy, cultrural studies, psychoanalysis, ethics, post-colonial studies, gender studies. The authors in this book adopt the approach of stratifying aspects of 'otherness' in constituting identities in the field of literature and the literary theory. At the same time they also investigate aspects of otherness which are centrifugal in relation to the literary criticism specifics.

Moving from the outer problem circles towards the core of the literary critical othernesses in the poper sense, I should first mark two articles which deal with the problem, 'sameness/otherness in the field of culture.' A. Angelov's article '(Without) Borders: Leo Spitzer's European Historical Semantics' treats Leo Spitzer's etymological investigations during the thirties and forties of the past century as a cultural and filled with humanity gesture of upholding the unity of Europe on the moral lines of Judaic-Christian and humanist tradition of St.Augustine. Leo Spitzer's philological analysis is an instrument of rejecting the ideology and practice of nazism in Germany; showing for instance that the etymology of the word *race* derives from '*ratio*', Spitzer opposes to Europe of destruction and mass human sacrifice Europe of logos, love, and idea. At the same time he performs a familiar act of repression/isolation of the alien,of others, paying no atten-

tion to the Bysanthian world and Orthodox Christianity, and turning down the exchange and interaction with the Mozarabic linguistic and religious experience

The geo-political Other – the Balkan nations in the aspect of their post-modern literatures is subject of research in D. Kamburov's article 'The Weakness of Being Man, the Sickness of Being Woman: Balkan Postmodern Roles and the Curse of Inbetweeness' The author points out that the doom of being neither the Self (as the Occident) nor the Other (as the Orient) has made out the Balkans the ultimate space of inbetweeness. Gender roles 'femininty/masculinity' provide a language to address this geo-political reality. Kamburov shows how the postmodern Balkan literatures apropriarte and substantiate these roles, locating modern Balkan men's weakness and women's sickness in the ambiguous perspective of self-discovering.

An anthropological point of view towards the other presents R. Kolarov's article 'Hesitation, Uncertainty, and Desire for the Other'. According to the main thesis of the author in every act of hesitation apart from the selective deficiency as a reason for hesitation there exists a second blured motive of it. It consists in the unwillingness, refusal of choice – in order for the packet of possibilities to be kept open and the self to have an access to the other so that it did not lose sight of the other attendant alternatives of a given situation.

Starting the survey of the literary critical aspects of otherness I should first mark György Kálmán's article 'The 'Other' In/Of Literary History'. For Kálmán the other in the broad sense is something fundamentally different from the perceiving self; facing literature (and giving account of literary history in particular) is allways an act of facing the otherness. To understand it we need narrative, i.e. a form in which to mould the strange and the unfamiliar, to dissolve, to smooth it away; we need to understand (hi)story as story. Bearing in mind that forging narratives is a deeply embedded cognitive mechanism in humans Kálmán put the stress on the ideologically loaded nature of narrative, the exclusion of the contingent, the peripheral, the 'other' to get into the story. He recommends a radical subverting the narrative, namely displacing the categories of 'character', 'event', 'chronological order', 'setting', 'causal relations' etc. and shares the experience in writing a new history of Hungarian literature.

Close to the ideas of this essay is A. Kiosev's article 'The Appro-

priation of 'ours': The categories 'Ours', 'Bulgrian' and 'Here' in the First Bulgarian Literary History'. It presents in fact an illustration of the manipulation character of the literary-historical narrative, displaying an analysis of the rhetorics in constructing national identity in the first history of Bulgarian literature written by Bulgarian academician Balan. Kiosev shows how the book by Balan leans to 'nationalize', pre- and trans-national, local and tribal phenomena, how it builds by connecting, typical of a coherent story, group of characters with no relation between themselves around the fairy hero Krali Marko, in order to materialize Bulgarian culture's famous dream for an epic of its own, how it ontologizes the folklore, and constructs imaginary geography, in favour of the Bulgarian national idea.

Gábor Bezezky's article 'Metaphor and Narrative' stretches a dialogic thread with Kálmán's essay with regard to its subject of research. It considers metaphor and narrative as having some kind of common structure and examines Mikhail Bakhtin's view on the dialogic novel and Max Black's view respectively on metaphor.The article discovers a common conceptual structure in both works-opposing to structures with established meanings in favour of structures, creating new meanings. Black contrasts the substitution view of metaphor to the interaction view, while Bakhtin contrasts the monologic novel to the dialogic one.The two theories are in interrealtion of reciprocity, of mutual elucidation. Black's theory of metaphor is thoroughly dialogical, Bezezky argue, and points out , on the other hand, that when Bakhtin describes Dostoevsky's novels, his key concept is also interaction.

Whether to be faithful to the original, or create a well formed text according to the rules of the target culture is the question A. Kappanyos deals with in his article 'Notes On the Untranslatable'. Translation makes available something which is alien," "other", behind one's linguistic barriers. The article considers three cases of untraslatability offering solutions to them: the text contains inherent ambiguity, engendered by a trope; the information cannot be transferred as the needed linguistic element is missing from the target language; the source text itself is defective in terms of good continuity.

Further on three articles discuss the problem of otherness in connection with the work of great figures of artistic and theoretical thought. Commenting on almost complete lack of an analysis of lyric genres in Aristotle's 'Poetics', G. Bolonyai's article "Lyric Genres in Aristotle's

Poetics' finds out that 'the very same categories which are subordinated in the analysis of tragedy can provide or could have provided, the fundamental concepts for the analysis of lyric poems'. Performing a subtle close reading of passages from 'Poetics', going deep in contextual nuances in the use of terms and discovering semantic niches in their volume as well as using etymological arguments, Bolonyai comes to a conclusion that 'Poetics' contains an 'implicit theory' of lyric genres. According to him 'lyric genres are there, lurking as it were in background'.

The Other as a way towards one's own self-construction is a subject of research in Raya Kuncheva's article "Observations on Paul Valéry's Spiritual Situation'. Valéry builds himself in the construction of the spiritual portraits of great figures of art and thought: Decartes, Baudelaire, Degas and Mallarmé. The poet puts himself into the place of the Other, finds the spirit of his in himself on the level of the spiritual values but this close communication does not mean depersonalization of himself. As Valéry puts it: 'be a great poet, but neither Lamartine, nor Hugo, nor Musset'.

Paul de Man's view on relation between rhetoric and grammar is scrutinized in M. Fadel's article "Paul de Man's Concept of the "Other". Following the train of de Man's thought the author points out that rhetoric is the difference, situated in the very texture of language, the dissimilarity of language with itself. According to Fadel, language appears as "other" towards us in the sense that it has its own mechanisms of producing meanings which are out of our control. This is the area of impossibility in language, the area of 'inhuman'. An opportunity for a new avenue to the idea of autonomy of the subject is outlined which regards this autonomy as not fixed but shaken by the linguistic structures that makes it variable.

Trying to answer the question 'what is a text' Ferenc Odorics's article 'Images of the Other – Figures of the Text' starts from the statement that the text is always accompanied by the 'Other', the context, and gives arguments in favour of the expanding nature of the text – as a signifier it incorporates the signified, the meaning, the socio-cultural sphere, the convention system of culture. Odorics reasons on the problematized materiality of the signifier (expressed by Paul de Man) and argues that the text reflects the dynamics of the prosopopeia, in its aporetic motion between taking the face of the Other (during the inter-

pretive movement, during its transformation from the material to the phenomenal) and losing its face.

Two articles at the end search for the otherness in analyzing particular literary works. Péter Hajdu's article 'Narrative and Linguistic Devices of Creating Opposite Chronotopes 'investigates the double-plot novel 'The Siege of Beszterce' by Hungarian novelist Kálmán Mikszáth. A peculiar paratactic construction of narration is typical for this writer, which boils down to creating two different, having nothing to do with each other parts of the work which however at the end turn out to be connected. Hajdu studies these opposing artistic worlds on the lines of dichotomy 'cyclic – linear time' 'village – town', 'Middle Age – modernity', 'harmony – disharmony' as well as on different use of the author's point of view, the signals of fictionality, etc. and tries to read each world in the light of the other. The dialogic reading, Hajdu argues, does not result in a demonstration of unity or harmonic order but demonstrates that the incompatible elements can be understood in comparison, interpreting each other.

M. Dachev also explores the dialogue between two artistic worlds in his article 'Word and Image: Semiotic Reading (On a Dialogue from Bulgarian Modernity)'. The difference is however in that it is a dialogue between different semiotic systems. Dachev reads in parallel the poems in the book by the Bulgarian symbolist Teodor Trayanov 'Bulgarian Ballads' and the illustrations accompanying them, drawn by the eminent artist Sirak Skitnik. Dachev's reading tries in its turn to deepen into the artist's reading of the texts. The drawings interpret the ballads and create new meanings by the rhetoric of the iconic gestures. The case of 'Bulgarian Ballads' is particularly complicated in Dachev's view, to the extent that the illustrations of the first edition are absent in the reprint, where the visual decisions in question act as speaking absences.

▪

The problem of otherness has interesting implications referring to the field of the literary theory itself, perceived as institutional, authoritative knowledge. Literary theory is by presumption an international discipline, but it is unavoidably a national phenomenon as well– it develops in a certain cultural and scientific tradition, in touch with the

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literary practice, which may exert an inspiring impact (for instance the connection between Russian formalism and the futurism), it is related to a certain language doctrine, to a nationally built-up idea of the connection of literature with society and so on. We speak about French, or German literary theory with the clear conviction that we mark spiritual territories with their specific physiognomicity, preserved parameters and lasting presence in the field of literary research.

What images of Hungarian and Bulgarian literary theory do the articles in this book contain? I think that these are images of characters in the "story"of literary theory, and not voices from outside, (from the "other side"), with the self-confidence to search for original solutions, to propose constructions, built up over the national background of the theory of literature, which is also a strategy of the articles in this volume – namely, collision of languages, experiments with the models of our experience, creation of new connections between theoretical views and so on. Something, which seems symptomatic to me – the articles in this book lean on literary works by Hungarian and Bulgarian authors - writers and poets (Kálmán Mikszáth, Teodor Trayanov, Jordan Yovkov…), and literary scholars (Zoltán Kanyó, Árpád Bernáth, Alexander Balan, Dimitar Avramov…) Thus the book tries to send a message in its own voice, in the bitonality of two scholarly traditions.

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GYÖRGY C. KÁLMÁN

THE "OTHER" IN/OF LITERARY HISTORY

There are several dubious categories in the title of this paper. I have to confess, that in what follows, I will use the term "other" in a pretty loose way, meaning something more or less fundamentally different from the perceiving self; something which implies a sort of obstacle for the perception, something resisting to a smooth way of appropriation. In a general sense, "other" is whatever is not *us*; it is an object vis-à-vis to the perceiving subject. All these loose formulations deserve quite a lot of qualifications, and I hope at the end of my paper at least some aspects of "otherness" will be somewhat clearer. Literary history is, again, a rather fuzzy expression. In what follows, I will reflect on some of its possible uses and meanings.

In this paper, I could address two levels (or rather two interpretations) of otherness, both in connection with literary history. What I will in fact focus upon is the "other" as the literary work itself, the literary historical process, the proper subject of literary history as a sort of the "other", as something strange to be interpreted. The other issue of otherness could be the "other" as represented in literary works and as posing a task of interpretation for the literary historian. Although I will drop this latter problem, let me note, in parentheses, some interesting issues to be treated in this connection. The "other" is an ancient *topos,* especially, of course, in narratives: the fool or the wise old man, the prophet or the fortune teller, the magician or the witch, the wandering Jew or the Gipsy – all these figures appear in a narrative (in a tale or in a novel) as turning points: although they are marginal (usually not the leading figures of the narrative, but episode characters), they play

a decisive role in the line of the story. The archetypical "other" within the narrative is the stranger, and she or he is a stranger because there is something secret in her/his history: there is one (or there are several) obscure point in their life, something unexplained and perhaps unexplainable. Their very function in the narrative is that they cannot be fully understood, that they remain strange. They do not completely fit into our world; they are beyond or beneath or beside the norms of ordinary human life.

There is something similar to this function of the "other" in confronting literary work itself. So let us start with the more general problem, that of facing literature as the other. Literature here means several things: the individual literary work, our vision of literary history (whatever it is), intertextual clusters of literary texts, and, of course, our reading something *as* literature. Literature is always something other inasmuch as it is *not* our own text: it is something clashing with our familiar tacit knowledge, with our horizon of expectations; it is in conflict with whatever we know of our own world. It represents a *different* seeing of the world, an unexpected grammatical form, something that does not fit. It is something inappropriate, surprising, shocking. (It is the case even if the text is fairly simple, if on the surface there is nothing special, if it is decidedly everyday, ordinary, factual – then the *otherness* lies in the fact that in the process of communication it is presented *as* something literary, *as if* it pointed towards something transcending the phenomenon of the text.)

Giving account of literary history is also always facing something other: the history of literature is clearly not our history – neither our personal nor our family nor our group history. We have to understand another age, the thinking, categories, logic of the people of another age – moreover, since literary history is always a history of its reception, the task is to understand the readers of perhaps several ages. We have to face quite a number of other minds, and not only that of the author (which in itself would mean quite a lot of headache). Similarly, interpreting the individual work of art is clearly an encounter with the other, during which we construct a voice, and try to understand what it tells us, and why.

Generally speaking, whenever we experience *the other* our strategy of understanding it will not rely merely on the phenomenon. We try to understand its history; we need a narrative behind it. It can be supposed

that whenever we face a text, in understanding and interpreting it, the moment of narrative cannot be excluded. Narrative on several levels: we forge, we construct a narrative of the author; a narrative of the series of texts the text in question will fit (that is, a narrative where the leading figure will be the text in question); a reconstruction of a narrative inherent in the text, that is, the narrative told or referred to by the text; and so on. Even if the reader does her best to concentrate on "the text itself", she cannot help placing it in a specific history.

This is the case even if the text is definitely strange, in cases of extreme otherness. Ignoring any sort of information about the author will not exclude suppositions of her or his age, gender, nationality, historical, social and geographical context, and so on. The reader will – perhaps tacitly – include in her interpretation presuppositions of these sorts. Moreover, she will have a narrative governing her interpretation as far as the historical position of the text is concerned. And, of course, the world represented by the work is reconstructed as part of a narrative pattern. The reader will – perhaps tacitly – include in her interpretation presuppositions of these sorts. Our interpretations are thus penetrated with narratives.

Shortly, then, even the naïve reader will face the "new" text, the text different from her "own", personal texts, the "other" text in the framework of history or narrative: she will place some texts into the position of "old" and respectable pieces of literary history, others as unreadable (because they are too old or too new), and since in her socialization process she had mastered some cornerstones of the canon, she will try to construct a *story* of the text she encounters.

Now let us turn to the professional interpreter of literature. She will, quite consciously and on theoretical grounds, either ignore the narrative behind the text, or sink into it; she will avoid telling a story, or accept that this is the only way to give account of her understanding of the given "other". Is there a proper, adequate, "good" or appropriate way of facing the other? If so, is it centred round a narrative, or is it an attempt to get rid of it? And what are the ways of handling narratives in either case?

As a starting point, let us go back to the early seventies. Hans-Robert Jauss, on the first pages of his seminal "Literary History as a Provocation of Literary Studies", has two interesting remarks. The first is a reference to Wellek and Warren's *The Theory of Literature*, the pas-

sage where the authors condemn histories of civilization (or histories of ideas) as well as collections of critical essays, claiming that the former is not the history of *art* whereas the latter is not a *history* of any art. The other remark is a critical assessment of the old, traditional chronology, where Jauss quotes, with great sympathy, Georg Gottfried Gervinus, who as early as in the eighteen-thirties told that these discussions of literary history cannot be regarded as (hi)stories, hardly even sketches of (hi)stories.

Jauss' standpoint is clear: however he criticises and however radically he revises literary history writing, he is *for* a history of literature; one of the real problems of literary history, for him, throughout very different schools and trends and literary historians, is that it is not history enough: that is, following Gervinus, what he is looking for is the real story, and not just sketches of story. And, on the other hand, with his agreement with Wellek and Warren, he presupposes a clear and long lasting (if not perpetual) concept of both literature (or art) and history. This obviously contradicts his own vision of what literary studies should be. In other words, a firm foundation is invoked, an idea of literature and history, on which literary history can be based. Thus, instead of a critique of the narrative and of the allegedly eternal bases it is built upon, within the framework of the very influential and fruitful aesthetics of reception, Jauss involuntarily reproduces some old concepts. One can then conclude that traditional writing of literary history is not at all excluded from this framework, it is allowed or even encouraged to tell a round and "classical" story of what is *known* to be literature.

Second, and even more important point is that Jauss takes story or history as something being by its inherent properties what it is – that is, he seems to overlook the fact that even if some accounts seem to be rudimentary, and even if they do not deserve the honorific term "story" (or the even more honorific "history"), they *function* as stories, they are used this way, their position in the *praxis* is that of a story. They are tools used to give account of the "other". Genealogies cannot be said to have any plot or event, still, they serve as parts of the narrative of the past. So what Gervinus and, following him, Jauss has to say about "sketches of history" do not really count once we really come to their operation.

Another case *for* narration as a proper form of literary history is of course the recent tradition from Collingwood through Hayden White

to the present day, which proposes that a self-conscious and controlled involvement in telling the story is both indispensable and useful part of history writing. We all know the lesson of these debates, so I will not go into details. Just let me also mention New Historicism which has an aim to modify the narrative structure so that it could include the contingent, the marginal, the anecdotic. And let me add David Carr's argument about narrative: for Carr, narrative is always already there in our perception of the world; causal structures, chronology, characters will preform our sensation. Even if it is not an anthropological given, it must be with us inevitably from a very early period of socialization. We cannot do without history, Carr suggest.

Translating all these considerations into the problem of understanding the other, we could speculate that even perhaps narrativization is not anthropologically wired within our human system; in confronting with the "other" we always make use of it anyway. We try to solve, to dissolve, to smooth away "otherness" by narrativizing it; we try to understand the "otherness" of literature (and the "otherness" of literary history) by forging any sort of narrative for it.

However, there are arguments against the narrative nature of our understanding the other, and there are three cases against narrative forms of literary history writing – or there may be more but here I mention three of them. First, the ideological nature of narration; second, the anthropomorphic metaphors penetrating every inch of this narration; and third, they are by nature exclusive, closed, they do not allow the contingent, the peripheral, the ephemeral to get into the story. These three may overlap.

As to the ideologically loaded nature of the narrative, just let me remind you that narratives of the other will imply a value sequence, a progress or a climax, and represent heroes (more likely than heroines) who achieve or miss their goals. Literary histories, in particular, are formed in order to satisfy certain ideological needs of those maintaining the canon (and the whole system of literature): they may serve as a story of where we came from, where we are going to, who we are (that is, national identity); or it may propose role models, etc. In most cases it is clear that the subject behind these stories is an European male, with a clear national identity. It is not evident just because the *thematic* nature of the texts and characters included but also as regards the value preferences: an agonistic, fighting hero is narrated about, going out to

the dangerous world, leaving his family behind, and manifesting all the masculine virtues. Counter-narratives may satisfy the needs of the society, non-narratives possibly will not. By the ideology of the narrative, identification with the other becomes possible: it is not only ours, but we are it, in a sense: we have the illusion that we can bridge the difference.

As to the anthropomorphic metaphors, here I would like to just mention the metaphors of seeing and memory. The presupposition lying behind traditional literary histories is a sort of personification. Literary historical "facts" are things remembered of the past of mankind or of the nation, whereas forgotten events and persons reflect the working of the collective memory (or forgetfulness). As if memory on the local, national, international, human level worked the same way as it does on the individual human level. Again, the remembering and forgetting subject posited behind this conception is a self-sufficient, coherent, even self-conscious one, and he (most probably *he*) does not have any lapses, momentary losses of memory or contingent associations. Seeing, again, implies a fixed focus, negligible peripheral movements, foreground and background, and, of course, a given point of view, an aspect. In writing literary history as understanding the "other", a very human way of seeing is presupposed; as if it were universal and original (something behind which one cannot possibly go back). These anthropomorphic traits, seeing and remembering, are very forceful metaphors which shape our concept of writing (or reflecting on) literary history. However, just because the idea of the subject inherent to them, they are rather suspicious. Just as in the case of the ideological nature of the narrative, there may be a need to replace them or to get rid of them. In this case the other is represented as something factual and present (even if present only in the past): something given which can be seen or remembered; and not only *it* is an object, but we who wish to understand the other are *personified:* quite ordinary human actions (seeing and remembering) are attributed to the far more complex functioning of understanding it. Just as in case of the ideological nature of narrativization, this may lead to a simplification, to a smoothing away of the obstacles and difficulties of understanding the other.

And third, another case against narratives of the other is that they are closed, they exclude a number of interesting alternatives, that due to their chronological and causal order they will not allow certain phe-

nomena surface or intrude, or even they will sanction them. Just think of the sad fate of the Avantgarde in certain East European countries; they did not fit into the round, closed, teleological narrative, into the story what is told of the "other" – it was an other of the other. The advent of Post-Colonialist criticism is another point in case, for it shows that there are quite a number of texts, events, even narratives suppressed in or by a master narrative. It is, then, a logical step to oppose or subvert these powerful narratives in order to open them, in order to give place for all sorts of forgotten, ignored or hitherto unperceived texts. But focusing on these, hitherto excluded narratives of the "others" of literary history, on the alternative faces of this other, may have the effect of excluding, again, other others.

So there are some arguments against the narrative conceptions of literary history writing, and there are some alternatives of understanding literary history or literary works as something "other" in respect to our own self or our own world. But are there really any ways out? What could be the "simple ways" of pursuing alternative literary histories of literature?

There are no simple ways, as we all know. The starting point of the provocation of literary history is that literary history is a form of reification, an objectivation of ideology, and real literary studies should avoid this dangerous area. It is a function quite different from and even parasitic upon literary studies proper.

Although we know very well that all these horrible things literary history is accused of are the *function* of its use, it is not the narrative to be blamed for being ideological, but the ideology produced through it, there is a desire to challenge the narrative based concepts. Perhaps it is not the narrative which could be used as the best instrument for understanding the other. Theoretical possibilities are to displace the categories of "character", "event", "chronological order", "setting", "causal relations", etc. Or, if we take the texts of the past as manifesting the language of the other, to replace the "grammatical categories" of that language, to construe a break, a discontinuity between our own language and the language of "the other". That is, it may be possible to write literary history without important elements of narration (or important elements of "grammar").

Perhaps we can make it without characters, if by characters we mean authors in the biographical sense, but it is more difficult if the

characters of the story are *the texts*. Still, literary history without *names* is an old and interesting topic. Also history of "forms" (genres, figures, structures etc.) would be a sort of realization of this project. To have a history without names may count a lot. Characters or heroes of literary histories are regularly not only active in the field of literature, but they are also represented as heroes of social, intellectual, family life, heroes of politics and ethics. We may hope that we can concentrate on their proper function.

As to *events*, it is far more complicated. But remember Foucault in his *The Order of Things:* in each section, there is no beginning, no end; it is not structured as having a beginning, a middle and a conclusion. Foucault tries to eliminate the causal steps of leading from one episteme to the other; he represents, instead, ruptures; and the elements of his structure – either we take them as *events* or *characters* – tend to be on the same level, rather than subordinated to one another. Foucault's description is far more structural than narrative, it *is* historical, but it tries to escape the causality as well as *essential* events or figures. He leaves some room, then, for the contingent. Sade, for instance, appears several times (usually at the end of the chapters) as a *character* unexpected, untypical, transgressing epistemes. As to events, a story, we are told by narratology, must have one event minimum. If it has more, they are coordinated or subordinated one way or another. Still, we may choose, instead of trying to eliminate events, to multiply them, to make a jungle or a rhisomatic complex structure of events, thus making room, again, for the contingent, for the minor or unexpected. This is one of the strategies of New Historicism.

Of course, Foucault did not abandon the chronological order (though *within* the epistemes it does not count too much – and note that his use of *data* [years] is almost parodic). He refuses to fix the threshold of the episteme, but sometimes he insists on quite unexpected data of publication of some books, invention of something etc. Anyway, for the anachrony Foucault is perhaps the best example.

To provoke chronological order, there are basically two ways. One is to proceed in a capricious way, or starting from the present and going back, or just by some sort of non-temporal logic, or simply by association. These methods are not necessarily bad, and they may have very good educational purposes, as well as they may discover hidden similarities or differences. Another way is not to proceed at all – to stop.

We hope to avoid chronology if we just stick to a synchronic investigation.

A promising example of this synchronic work is that of Bourdieu. Although I have some reservations – I think that gathering data of all sorts concerning the literary field of an age is far too close to the Classical Positivism – it is a very interesting *structural* history (instead of being narrative). When Bourdieu sets out to map the context of Flaubert's work, it is a sort of inquiry into the episteme of that age. No doubt, one *must* have the historical training and even the historical perspective to do this – but the undesirable side-effects of the narrative are over, we hope. Bourdieu's work is something like reconstructing the grammar of the other, thus trying to understand the text of the other – to re-invent the language on which these texts have been written.

But *point of view* is something that we cannot possibly do without. Only Positivists believed we could. But what we can do is to multiply the focuses, standpoints, angles and voices, so that they work, as it were, simultaneously, and without hoping that we can get to the *totality*, we can freely alternate among the aspects. This is something shared by cultural criticism, Feminism and Post-Colonialism. This could also be a reaction to the worries that by understanding the other the subject/object confrontation is reproduced: as if both the other, the object, and the "we", observers, subject, remained the same, fixed, ahistorical, unified, single and unmovable.

But telling stories of literature is clearly not an ahistorical phenomenon. Historically speaking, writing literary history is a product of a specific period (an episteme, if you like). Literary history is as old as the *reflection* on literary history; it is far too obvious that literary history as an institution is itself a manifestation of reflecting literature as something having a history. But why does literature as an institution (probably a product of the last five centuries) need a history at all? Is it not a legitimization via its genealogy? A demonstration of its sources, its origins, its noble heritage?

The problem of the narration of the history of literature is its ideological nature. A narration of this history will necessarily ignore several respects and set them aside as contingent, irrelevant, obscure episodes. It will sketch a line of development, a vision of origin and *telos*. Moreover, it is very often attached to practical social functions: they have a

didactic character, strengthening the national identity and self-esteem, either through education or in other sites of social life. It is not an exclusive characteristic of developing and nationalistic countries: a strong knowledge and awareness of the origins, of the historical path and the possible future of the culture is part and parcel of every national culture.

Thus, the provocation of this tradition of literary history writing has been signalled, on the one hand, by confining traditional histories within the walls of didaxis (preserving them as useful but not too interesting remnants of the past). Literary history is just a form of reification of the ideology, real literary studies should avoid this dangerous area. It is a function quite different from, and even parasitic upon, literary studies proper.

As I have just said, literary history is as old as the reflection on literary history, and literature is as old as reflection on literature; it is an *other* ever since it has been acknowledged to be literature, something different. It is far too obvious that literary history as an institution is itself a manifestation of reflecting on this other; but maybe telling narratives is not the only way of understanding it, although it may be unavoidable. We can, for instance, proliferate, multiply and dive deep in narratives, thus relativizing and even ironizing them. There may be ways of concentrating on the legends, tales, cultic series and anecdotes of some figures of literary history; collecting all the unreliable data, rumours, fairy tales and literary historical constructs attached to the work or the author (to the *name* of the author) and instead of desperately looking for the truth elements or trying to discredit the apparently legendary and anecdotal stories, we may concentrate on the working of this whole complex. Or another way to understand the other may be *cult studies*, which, similarly, do not at all reject the network of stories and anecdotes woven around major figures and their work; it tries, instead, to examine how this network is inherited and used, recycled and modified. The stories, including the inherent subjects telling them, will shed light on the literary history of reception, on the history of literary conventions, and, ultimately, on the subject appropriating the other. The teaching is that understanding the other is always a question posed for the understanding subjects, it is about the *subject's* position, and not merely a simple appropriation.

We may be interested in specific poetic patterns no matter in what

age or geographical region they appeared, giving the impression that the subject of the inquiry is not certain authors or ages and perhaps not even texts, but forms; a realization of the old Russian Formalist claim for a historical poetics. There was a huge project in Hungary to write a new history of Hungarian literature, but in a way that is far more resembling linked websites than history. Historical figures should appear in the chapters as myths or legends or archetypes of their age: beyond factualism or the pursue of historical truth, these portraits would consist of the *stories* of these authors as told by tradition. On the other hand, texts would relate to each other freely and perhaps even capriciously: constraints of period, school or influence relations do not count at all, concepts of progress or development are eliminated. There were several preliminary works made for this big project, but it did not get too far. The reasons are partly organizational and financial, but it can be added that the rejection of the narrative may have been one of the obstacles. Those in charge of money for human sciences may encourage a new, alternative history of literature, but certainly a *history;* even if the heroes will not be the same, and the plot will be either replaced or displaced, what is needed is something which can be told, which gives a coherent story of the national identity.

The most promising is the subversion of the fixed canonical order of what is in the focus and what is suppressed (in the margin or the background). This operation (which can be traced back as far as the concept of canon of the Russian Formalists) allows an insight into the nature of what is taken to be "normal" and "transparent" – in the nature of the subject(ivity) present in literary history writing (although childishly pretending not to be there). No wonder that challenging traditional ways of literary history writing (as of the sixties of the last century) was paralleled not only by de- and re-forming narrative structures but also by an interest in canonicity.

So what can we do if we are pressed by an interest in subverting time structure, in a revision of the role of main characters or heroes (histories without names), in an emancipation of the anecdote? The concepts of "contingent" and "essential" surely have to be reassessed, the anthropomorphical metaphors of "memory", "happening" (and narrating), or "seeing" must be reflected upon.

As to memory, the presupposition lying behind traditional [literary] histories is a sort of personification: literary historical "facts" are things

remembered of the past of mankind, whereas forgotten events and persons reflect the working of the collective memory. As if memory on the local, national, international, human level worked the same way as it does in the individual human. (One may also speculate on the implicit nature of this very human subject – *he* is, most probably, a *European* and *modern* individual etc.)

As to happening and narrating, writing literary history relies, as a rule, on the structure of the narrative: *events* are brought about by the *actions* of some *characters*, they are ordered in a *chronological* and *causal* pattern. Moreover, against the background of this structure, certain events etc. are dismissed as merely contingent, ephemeral, marginal, peripheral. The presupposition behind all this is a narrative as told by a self-sufficient, reliable and coherent subject, with a transparent and evident point of view and a "natural" logic (of causes, effects, time and action). (Cf. also Carr's notion that sensation itself is prefigured in terms of narrating.)

As to seeing, this structure itself is also based on the metaphor of seeing, with a fixed focus, negligible peripheral movements, foreground and background etc. A human way of seeing is presupposed, as if it were universal and original (something behind which one cannot possibly go back – cf. Dilthey's foundation of Geisteswissenschaften.)

Both seeing and remembering are very forceful metaphors which shape our concept of writing (or reflecting on) (literary) history. Their alternatives may appeal to other (equally anthropomorphic) metaphors such as blindness or the unconscious. Challenging the narrative based concept, however, seems to be a perhaps more fruitful way, placing the specific narrative devices into their proper historical and poetical context (cf. H. White), and also transforming them. Theoretical possibilities are to discredit the central position of specific texts ("events"), of authors ("characters" or "heroes"); to relativize the relation of "main course of events" to what is regarded as anecdotic (cf. Greenblatt); to appeal to an alternative logic of causes and chronology (through either giving them up or finding/creating surprising constellations of remote texts); and also, most importantly, to deconstruct the central/peripheral dichotomy.

I have promised to give you some illustrations of the different solutions offered in the Hungarian context. I will not go into details. As

to the one side of the spectrum, just let me mention some recent works concentrating on the legends, tales, cultic stories and anecdotes of some figures of literary history. There has been, for instance, a book length study on a late eighteenth century novel, collecting all the unreliable data, rumours, fairy tales and literary historical constructs attached to the author (or to the name of the author), and instead of desperately looking for the truth elements or trying to discredit the apparently legendary and anecdotal stories, the analysis has concentrated on the working of this whole complex. Other studies, which regard themselves as representatives of *cult research*, similarly, do not at all reject the network of stories and anecdotes woven around major figures and their work; they try, instead, to examine how this network is inherited and used, recycled and modified. The stories, including the inherent subjects telling them, will shed light on the literary history of reception, on the history of literary conventions, and, of course, have serious sociological teachings.

On the other extreme, I refer again to the attempts at breaking with the conventions of time structure, influence patterns, or the concept of individual author as the main character of the literary history, and to the project of the middle of the nineties to write a new history of Hungarian literature. And finally, some words on the subjectivity implied in (or embodied in or derived from) the specific canonical structures, referring back to the metaphors of seeing and memory (canons are taken as traces or documents of [national etc.] memories; and they represent a vision of the field). For instance, in Feminist terms, most recent European canons can be characterized as having a dominant *male* as a speaking/viewing/remembering subject, very simply because of some *thematic* traits of the texts (and characters) included. However, there may be some more intricate and interesting approaches: eliminating (or, conversely, emancipating) the minor, the strange, the "parasitic", the "perverted", the "untimely" or premature will shed light on the culture fostering the canon, and also circumscribe its virtual subject. (But do we not express a specific subjectivity in assigning a subjectivity to the canon?)

ALEXANDER KIOSEV

THE APPROPRIATION OF 'OURS': THE CATEGORIES 'OURS', 'BULGARIAN', AND 'HERE' IN THE FIRST BULGARIAN LITERARY HISTORY

A textbook is an institutional text. It is generically obligated – by virtue of being *a textbook* – to convey the feeling that the knowledge it offers is stable and manifest. The textbook is impelled to do so even when this knowledge is neither indisputable nor secure: otherwise its user (a high-school or university student, that is, a reader in the subordinate position of a learner) may begin to doubt its authority.

The task undertaken by the first Bulgarian serious literary history[1] – Alexander Teodorov Balan's *Bulgarian Literature: A Short Guide for Medium and Special Schools* (Plovdiv, 1896) – is to convince its audience that it is offering precisely such unproblematic knowledge about "Bulgarian literature". It is true that Balan's text does not refrain from expressing reservations or noting problems. Nevertheless, its obvious message from the outset is that there must be no doubt on three essential points: a) that there is such a phenomenon as Bulgarian literature b) that it has a tradition which merits historical description and c) that this tradition is unquestionably "ours", "Bulgarian". Moreover, the very fact that a book entitled *Bulgarian Literature* has been written and published makes such claims incontrovertible. So,

[1] Earlier attempts to write literary-historical works were made by V. Stoyanov, G. Teoharov, K. Velichkov, and I. Vazov. The first literary histories were written by Georgi Popov (*A Historical Survey of Bulgarian Literature from the Earliest Writings to the Present, Plovdiv: Edinstvo, 1886*) and Dimitar Marinov (*History of Bulgarian Literature, Plovdiv: Hr. G. Danov, 1887*). None of these earlier attempts managed to reach the standard of an academic textbook.

should any doubts emerge on these points, the specific genre, style and rhetoric of the book will recruit their energies towards the single aim of putting an end to the problem, of representing what in other genres of public discussion might seem shaky and questionable as stable and incontestable knowledge worthy of the learner's unqualified trust.

The present paper represents an attempt to analyze the rhetorical techniques used by Balan's textbook to defend one of its three basic assumptions, namely, that the literary facts it describes are Bulgarian, "ours". How does the book do this even in borderline cases whose "Bulgarianness" is at the very least debatable?

FOLKLORE AND "OURS".

Is Bulgarian folklore Bulgarian? The question may surprise only those naïve patriots who know nothing about the confused relations between regional and national, about traveling motifs, plots and narratives, or about the endless borrowing, variation and migration that constitute the very essence of oral folk traditions.

Certainly, Balan is not among those people whose patriotism is based on ignorance: he stands among his contemporaries as a scholar of superb erudition. Besides, he uses the empirical methods of comparative folklore study, which is heavily influenced by the migration theory. It is therefore not surprising that he often speaks of the influences of foreign models on "our" folklore, discusses traveling motifs and the borrowing of tales and songs. His book is full of sentences such as *The song contains features borrowed from the Greek heroic legend* (42), *Indian tales entered our folklore through Byzantium, while our moral fables can be traced to the medieval remolding of Aesop's classical fables* (61), or *As we did not develop our own myths, we have no mythical tales either; and though we may find mythic features at the root of some of the tales, they are not always genuine Bulgarian folk creations but more often borrowed ones* (58). In spite of such qualifications, however, the exposition is structured in such a way that none of the admissions about the intervention of the "foreign" into Bulgar-

ian literary history can undermine the original thesis that this folklore is Bulgarian, "ours". [2]

The devices recruited for this goal are not Balan's original invention but are part of the rhetorical repertoire of Slavic studies. Having developed as a system of related yet clearly identifiable "national" philologies, Slavic studies are institutionally incapable of presupposing the existence of verbal and artistic facts which are not indigenously Czech, Polish, Russian, Serbian, Croatian, etc. The emerging Bulgarian philology, with such a faithful defender as Balan – the first Rector of the University of Sofia,[3] the first head of the Department of Bulgarian Studies, the first Bulgarian academic bibliographer[4] – makes no exception from this patriotic tradition. For all the qualifications and reservations, the Bulgarianness of the "gathered substance" (in Balan's own characteristic expression), is shown to be self-evident. This is due to a textbook rhetoric that will be described below.

* * *

In the first place, "the Bulgarian people" and the tradition of its oral "verbal works of art" are in this book removed from their concrete historical times: their origin is presented as timeless and comparable to that of man and language. An interesting and symptomatic aspect of the first Bulgarian work on literary and cultural history is that it departs from the well-known hypotheses, which one finds in most 19th-century histories of Bulgaria, concerning the beginnings of Bulgarian history. According to them, Bulgaria was born in the 7th century A. D. with the synthesis of "the proto-Bulgarian" and "the Slavic". The first Bulgarian cultural history, however, adopts a different approach: it does not deal with such "niceties" as the number of the Slavic tribes and whether they were "liberated" or "conquered" by the nomadic Turkic horde.[5] Instead, it places its own "Bulgarian

2 All references are to the 1896 edition. Page numbers follow quotations.

3 He was elected Rector three more times (1888-1889, 1896-1897, 1902-1903).

4 *A Hundred Years of Bulgarian Books 1806-1905.* Sofia, 1909.

5 See Hranova, Albena. *Hybrid Discourses and Their Institutional Matrix:*

БАН БИБЛИОТЕКА

beginning" much further back, at a hypothetical "pre-time". The birth of language, the birth of humankind and the birth of song are welded together at this mythic point of origin:

> *Man created speech under the impetus of his vivid impressions; in the sounds of language he expressed the meaning of these impressions, and that is why language, as a material image of man's abstract emotions, is the first poetry. Language is the greatest poetic work of every nation, in it are sealed all, even the innermost, stirrings in our souls; it is the unique poem of a world that has traversed our hearts* (13).

Balan uses only singular forms: *language*, *man*, *song*, and so the question whether the birth of the linguistic ability takes place in one or more languages never arises. The implication is that "Bulgarianness" was somehow born together with this primitive speaking and singing man. A learned man unlike his predecessor Rakovski, Balan cannot openly articulate the question "Was this original language-song Bulgarian?" Nevertheless, his textbook subtly blends the hypothetical primordial language-song with Bulgarian folklore, thus representing the former as the latter's ancestor. Even the structure of the book itself, with its division into parts such as "Introduction", "Oral Literature", "Written Literature", seems to imply that the primordially human is somehow "Bulgarian". The grounds for such a suggestion can be found in an unproblematic evolutionary line which necessarily and irreversibly connects the hypothetical primitive song with later events that are "ours" – first with "our" songs and tales; through them – with "our" historical time, with "our" medieval literature, and ultimately with "our" modern national literature.

Though he never mentions Herder, Balan in fact uses Herderian notions that indirectly pervade his rhetoric in spite of the traditions of Slavic philology into which he was educated. In this theoretical framework, each nation and each language represents a spiritual individuality; this spiritual-verbal identity has a similarly primordial, prehistoric status; the question about language is a question about its prehistoric origin. Thus "ours" becomes anchored in *illo tempore*: it

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was born together with the birth of time and will obviously last as long as time itself.

Secondly, the status of "ours" is not only primordial but expansionist as well: everything that is not Bulgarian but comes into contact with "the Bulgarian" stands a chance of becoming "ours". The book does not pose the question whether and how the Indian folk tale that "*entered our folklore*" became Bulgarian, nor whether and how what was borrowed from other nations and cultures became incorporated into the "treasure house" of Bulgarian spiritual culture. It is true that Balan often mentions borrowings and migrations, but the instances of such positivist clarification do not undermine the dominating status of "the Bulgarian". He seems to find it quite sufficient that the other nation's tale is told by the Bulgarian people in the Bulgarian language, that the other nation's song has managed to "capture" the people's soul (always presumed to be Bulgarian), that elements from other nations' folklore were sung and told not only in their language but in the Bulgarian one too. Thus, everything that travels along this all-assimilating road towards appropriation automatically becomes "ours".

Thirdly, in Balan's *Guide* the notion of "the Bulgarian" is simultaneously clear and vague. Seen under the fine lens of logic, it is a category that ought to show a weak discriminating power. The book does not even formulate the question how the folklore facts found all over the Balkans can be separated, how they could be divided into Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, Croatian, or other ones – especially when these facts show great similarity. If Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, and Greeks all have the same song, then how can we decide whose it is? Balan's textbook simply blocks out such questions and in this way makes the usage of "ours" unproblematic. Under the force of the book's rhetoric, therefore, the meaning of this possessive pronoun becomes plain – the *Guide* is blithely confident that "ours" is the converging point of obvious meanings shared by author and reader alike.

THE KRALI MARKO SONGS CORPUS AND THE BULGARIAN ILIAD

As regards the "Bulgarianness" of the Krali Marko songs, Balan does not even deem it necessary to make any qualifications. Several times he defines them as Macedonian; there is also the clear awareness that they are widespread among all southern Slavs. At first glance, the writing shows no trace of patriotic appropriation. The evidence the author adduces is detailed and objective, and not always flattering to the clichéd patriotic image of Marko:

> *... the well-known ruler of one part of western Macedonia, between the river Vardar and the Albanian mountains, with Prilep as its capital city. At first Marko was independent, "in the name of Christ a good and faithful King," as is written on coins minted in his name, but then he became a vassal of the Turks. His father Valkadin, despot of Prizren and then King, fell in the battle against the Turks at Chirmen on the Maritsa river in 1381; Marko himself also ended his life in battle but as a supporter of the Sultan; this happened in the plain near Rovine in 1394. The region ruled by Marko was, with a few interruptions, within the borders of old Bulgaria, then it became part of the Great Serbian state of Stefan Dushan. As the last independent ruler, Marko has woven the memories of the local Bulgarian people into a special kind of song... The events when he acted in defense of his independence won the sympathies even of the Bulgarians from more remote regions, the people in which felt the burden of Turkish oppression after the destruction of the Bulgarian Kingdom. The Macedonian songs about Marko were created and began to circulate even before this catastrophe; later they matched the mood felt among the whole Bulgarian people. It therefore mixed songs about its own personages and events related to places within Bulgaria with the Macedonian songs about this hero and from the regional "prince, king or despot of Bulgaria," as he is called in the annals of foreign historians, he turned into an embodiment of the figure of a Bulgarian hero whose historical personality recedes into the sublimity of a poetic type ...*
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> *The Macedonian songs transferred Marko into Serbian folk songs which had kept rich memories of the kingdom of Stefan*

Dushan, of one of whose heirs Marko was Regent. Marko's epic glory passed to the Croatians and settled even in the legends of the non-Slavic Arnauts: the times and the scene of his historical activities were well-suited to such a goal and such a scope. To this day, Kralevich Marko occupies the center of the Bulgarian heroic epic; none of the more memorable historical events can do without him regardless of whether the hero was alive at the time or whether he could have taken part in them; his name and his spirit live in famous places all over the Balkan peninsula – his teeth can be seen on Stambul Kapiya in Vidin and his footprints on a rock above Kalofer, near Tryavna lies Marko's Plain, in the Ihtiman Pass are Marko's Gates, and to the west of Prilep there still stand the ruins of Marko's Fortress (36-37).

This long excerpt offers a good illustration of how Balan fails to notice that the facts he adduces do not necessarily lead to the conclusions that he makes but to rather different ones. The latter might be formulated in the following manner: "Marko is not a specifically Bulgarian hero but a Balkan one. As a historical personality he bears no relation to the purely Bulgarian – from a political perspective, he is at one time an independent ruler and a vassal at another; from a military point of view, he switches allegiance and from an opponent to the Turks becomes their ally. His territories were ruled now by the Serbs and now by the Turks. Neither can the folk legend linked to this controversial historical personality be characterized in terms that belong to a single nationality: while it is true that Marko won the admiration of "the Bulgarians", which means the Bulgarian people living near and far from Prilep[6] (and so they preserved him in their songs), the same happened with the Serbs and the Croats. The Macedonian songs about Marko can thus be treated as a generative core from which sprang versions and further elaborations that settled in and migrated to other parts of the still nationally undifferentiated Slav and Christian populations on the Peninsula. The logic of folklore as a pre-modern form of oral culture does not allow it to be approached

[6] Did they really in those days have a "Bulgarian" consciousness in the sense of a modern national belonging or was their identity perhaps Christian and tribal, vacillating in its loyalty between one Christian ruler and another? Contemporary theory and history of nationalism feel some doubts on this issue.

from the point of view of assumptions about nationality, as the scope of its life does not coincide with the future national borders – it is either smaller than them (local folklore), or goes beyond them (distant migration of motifs and songs).

Yet Balan arrives at no such conclusion, nor does he touch upon the possibility of its being drawn. Instead, he makes the categorical statement that "*/t/o this day, Kralevich Marko occupies the center of the Bulgarian heroic epic*." In his usage the word "center" therefore acquires two meanings: compositional-epic and geographic. In what follows I will examine them in this order.

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According to Balan, Marko's place is central from a compositional point of view – *the main hero of the Bulgarian heroic songs is Kralevich Marko* (36). Around him are "arranged" other heroes, more or less notable. Without specifying the relationship among them, the book gradually draws the picture of a circle of secondary heroes: Marko's enemies (the Black Arab, Mustafa Kelesh, Mussa Kesedji, Philip the Magyar) and his companions and helpers (Yankula, Sekula the Child, The Child Golomeshe, Gruitsa the Child, Doichin the Hero). Yet in the process of introducing the names of his comrades, Balan performs a subtle rhetorical move. As detailed and thorough in his enumeration as ever, he never denies that in the different songs Marko in fact enters into separate, we could say "bilateral" relationships now with one, now with another "hero", "child", "bazirgyana", "ban" or "sworn brother". That is, Balan never makes the explicit assertion that the heroes form a unified group because he is aware that they come from different songs sung in different places, by different peasant communities and on different occasions. Judged by the standards of each local folklore grouping, the relationships between the characters of these songs could also be contingent, unsystematic and diverse. At the same time, the philological focus of the book combines narrative and classification,[7] and for its purposes their typological,

[7] For further elaboration on this point, see my other study of A. T.

supra-contextual likeness (the fact that from the positivist observer's point of view they appear together with Marko as his rivals or helpers) is sufficiently covert to allow them to be placed within a system, however loose it might be. The piling up in the course of the story of hero after hero, sworn brother after sworn brother, rival after rival, together with the support offered by the paradigmatic coincidence of plot situations and episodes – all of this slowly creates the impression that there is a unified and coherent system of characters – Marko's circle, Marko's band – or implicitly, "our heroes". Such is the impact of the rhetoric of the exposition that the reader becomes less and less inclined to assume that the characters are in fact autonomous and unconnected to Marko, or that the "secondary" characters (actually local heroes, known only to the people of specific regions), do not stand in any mutual relations. Little by little, the reader builds up an image of the individual characters as tightly bound to one another, by virtue both of their psychology and of the forces created by the plot. Meanwhile Balan never fails to lend his helping hand as he draws lines that connect these personages on the principles of hierarchy, antagonism, or mutual assistance – that is, he suggests that they stand in relationships typical of a coherent story. The tendency towards covert unification of the system of characters comes out with particular clarity along the line of contrast: when Balan tries to show someone as different and specific, he describes him or her as an exception.[8] Parallel to this is the impression he creates that "Marko's circle" is somehow self-created, that it has an objective existence in the context of Bulgarian heroic folklore and not that it originates in Balan's own classifying meta-glance.

Once constructed, the unity of the characters implies that "behind" it there must necessarily be a similarly constructed cause to which it owes its existence. It also creates the presupposition that such a systematic group of heroes can exist only in a systematic corpus of songs

Balan, *The Positivist Romanticism of a Textbook*, forthcoming.

[8] The subtle suggestion that there is a fundamental connection among the protagonists of Bulgarian folk songs can be found even in the rare cases when Balan, contrary to his own assumptions, specially notes the "separate" position held by a hero: *From the circle of heroes who, together with Marko make up a band of seven or 'seventy' kings or bans, Bogdan the Fierce stands somewhat apart...".* Bogdan must be an exception – none of the rest "stand apart" (47).

about them – and such a corpus begins to look as ***given*** and ***natural*** as the team itself. In other words, it begins to look as if it were not only an epistemologically but also an ontologically constructed class. That Balan does not use modern-day terms such as "corpus" but expresses himself in a characteristically vague language when speaking of "our heroic songs", "the heroic song", "the songs about Marko Kralevichi" further deepens the confusion of cognitive classification procedures with ontological givens and local with national categories,[9] but it also allows the construction of a supra-local and supra-contextual field of folklore facts – that of the heroic songs centered around the "protagonist" Marko. The paradox which the book fails to notice is that the construction of the corpus as systematic, ontological and "ours" in fact distances it from the authentic features of folklore: it is a corpus unified by distinct non-folkloric criteria (supra-localization, intensive narrative and intertextual coherence, supra-situativity, nationality). This becomes particularly obvious when Balan states that what distinguishes heroic songs from non-heroic ones is that in the former *the significance of the deed performed serves* ***a common, tribal interest*** and that they *express* ***huge tribal power*** (emphasis added). By saying so, Balan pronounces them songs not of this or that rural community but of the whole Bulgarian "tribe" ("tribe" in Balan's post-romantic rhetoric is merely a synonym for the Bulgarian People which has not yet become conscious of itself). In other words, literary history builds heroic songs of a "tribal" significance along the pattern of the national cultural heritage. It constructs their corpus, after which it claims that it has found it in the "treasure house" of the Bulgarian past history and culture.[10]

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[9] Here the pronoun "our" formulates the scope of the imagined national entity in the sense given by Benedict Anderson as a horizon that is foreign to the local, closed pre-modern cultural communities. That is, such an expressive means represents as ontological an entity which is in fact a complex construct that emerged from pre-modern folklore elements together with certain cognitive operations with a national perspective attached to them.

[10] Being indirect, this last impression is extremely powerful and a special effort is needed to realize that constructions similar to the Marko corpus ('corpus' is a more adequate term than 'cycle') are sometimes the product of the cognitive techniques of folklore study rather than of the song practices of folklore itself. It is therefore necessary to emphasize once again that in regional, illiterate folk cultures different songs are sung, that each singer has a finite

Through his story, then, Balan dresses up epistemology as ontology: he presents the classifying positivist external observer with the narrated classes as if they were a natural phenomenon of folklore itself. However, his next step in the rhetorical unification of the corpus is not disguisedly scientific but openly artistic. The *Guide* starts welding the corpus together not by implication but directly, through the overt fictional temporalization and emplotting of the Marko songs. Throughout the whole section devoted to the legendary "Bulgarian" hero, Balan's gives up the neutral, objective, scientifically distanced stance of a literary historian. He changes the expository style used in other chapters and all of a sudden starts speaking mimetically, like a writer; he begins to stage-manage and to create the fictional illusion of a unified plot developing in the epic preterite.[11] Ostensibly commenting on various songs and geographically disparate folk-song versions of the Marko legends, he in fact retells them as a novelist instead of describing them in the appropriate categorizing scientific terms. And as he does so, he manages to arrange and connect the incoherent, disseminated regionality of the Marko songs and motifs, implicitly weaving an epic whole linked together by biography and plot. What is more, the meta-plot created in this manner seems to be brought to

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and concrete repertoire and that even specific "schools" of professional mendicant-singers do not remember or sing all songs (let alone control them as their "spiritual property", the way the nation controls its literary heritage. (See *Lord, Albert Bates. The Singer of Tales*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960.) For the folk collectives themselves, the connections between motifs, characters and plots are loose, varied and unsorted, except when they are associated with the rules involved in concrete rites and rituals. In general, the situation of oral and local communication does not allow an objective, superordinate learning position which can create fact fields, which knows, remembers, compares, classifies and unifies all songs, which, in short, controls the corpus and describes the supra-situational and systematic relationships between its elements. Classification corpora do not exist in folklore; they are a characteristic product of modern science and are accessible only to the scholar and the taxonomic meta-glance of folklore study and literary history.

[11] The epic preterite, according to Käte Hamburger /*Die Logik der Dichtung*, 2., stark veraenderte Aufl. Stuttgart, E. Klett, 1968/ is a paradoxical temporality which both takes place "here and now" and refers to a fictional past: it blends in a contradictory manner characteristics of 'the present' and 'the past', thereby demonstrating its fictional character.

life right before the reader's eyes. Turned into a story, the corpus now has a beginning (*Marko is sitting in his fortress in Prilep, he has a horse called Sharkoliya, he is armed with a mace, an iron club and a Damascus sword; at first he is invincible*); a well-developed middle (*in the fields and in the forest Marko is the sworn brother of nymphs and fairies, he defeats dragons and evil witches, he liberates three chain gangs of slaves, he fights Mussa Kesedji, etc*); a love intrigue (*the infidelities of Elena his wife*); a climax-hubris (*Marko tries to lift the Earth but God takes away half of his strength)* and an end (*the decline of Marko's heroic strength, Marko retreats from the world).* The rhetorical switch of verbal tense and mood in this section of the book (from the renarrative mood and tense through the past simple to the historical present) clearly demonstrates Balan's abovementioned mimetic and stage-managing ambitions: the dispersed Marko songs are not examined from the point of view of folklore studies but are retold and recreated and their coherence is enacted on the stage of the literary-historical metatext.

All of this pushes the *Guide* one step further towards an indirect assertion which is never articulated but must have in those days appealed to the heart of the patriotic reader who, since the times of the National Revival, had felt somewhat mortified at the absence of a Bulgarian classical ancient heritage[12] similar to Homer's songs. But if we, too, have such a corpus, unified both by its circle of heroes, by common temporality and the biographic peripeteia of its plot, then we, too, ***have long had*** our own Iliad – that is, the Marko cycle. The logical operator that has enabled the unification – Marko himself – finds himself in the central and hierarchically supreme position relative to the other characters. Similar to Achilles in the human world of Homer's poems, Marko is ***the centre***, the Bulgarian hero. The corpus narrates his long and glorious life about which so many songs have been sung and around which various human lives and conflicts are "grouped". Considering this covert presupposition of an integrated corpus, it is not difficult to see Marko as the unifying core of the Bulgarian epic – he is everywhere, he is recognized as a hero in diverse situations and in general, all the important events in Bulgarian heroic songs feature him as a participant *regardless*

[12] Lilova, Desislava. *The Meanings of the National Name during the National Revival.* Sofia: Prosveta, 201-208.

of whether the hero was alive at the time and whether he could have taken part in them (37-38).

With these last rhetorical steps, yet without any naïve patriotic swagger, the book in effect joins the project for the realization of Bulgarian culture's famous dream for an epic of its own. By metaliterary means, the first Bulgarian literary history accomplishes the same epic synthesis that Homer's cycle did in the times of Peisistratos, and was in much later days and under quite different circumstances performed by activists of the Finnish national revival with the Kalevala. It is also the same synthesis that Verkovich and Gologanov attempted, though in a different way, through their "Veda Slovena" hoax.

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The second meaning of the word "center" is a geographic one. As pointed above, Marko was active everywhere, which leads to the conclusion that other nations (Serbs, Croats, or Albanians) could have developed their own Marko-iades. There is a risk therefore that the dissemination territory of the Marko cycle might not coincide with the territory of "ours". As conscientious as ever, Balan himself states that Marko's *name and spirit live in famous places all over the Balkan Peninsula* (38). In spite of this statement, however, the detailed exposition of Marko's exploits in Balan's literary history confines them to the Bulgarian lands. How does it manage to do so and how can this act be explained?

Again, the reasons must be sought in the textbook's institutional assumptions. There might be other versions of the Marko songs in other Balkan nations, but the *Guide* does not trace the logic of the "object of investigation" (the dissemination of the Marko songs) because it is not concerned with foreign affairs. Pedagogy requires that they should be left to others, to the foreigners themselves. From the point of view of geography, the book admittedly follows and recreates in great detail the fate and fortunes of the Marko songs "here" but its main business is the image of Marko's Bulgaria alone and not a possible Serbia, Croatia, or Albania. The book is, after all, about "Bulgarian literature" and not about another or other countries' history – which implicitly draws the

institutional boundaries on the space that Balan's *History* finds worthwhile.

These boundaries are not necessarily just the geographic ones that delimit the scope of investigation of a migrating folklore motif (its destiny is traced only until it arrives "here"). The style of the exposition itself, together with the selection of details, leads to a kind of ontologization of folklore, to a fusion of the songs with the Bulgarian nature and landscape. The motifs do not merely traverse the Bulgarian space in their wanderings: they remain in it in order to blend with the native and authentic land, as if they were sinking into the soil and the rocks. They settle in the national space. According to Balan's book, the Marko songs and the Bulgarian landscape have coalesced into an epic-geographic synthesis; with regard to the hero, folklore has turned into a part of the toponymy and legendary geography of Bulgaria. It is precisely in Bulgaria's *most famous places* that Marko has left his remarkable imprints and traces: *his name and his spirit live in famous places all over the Balkan peninsula – his teeth can be seen on Stambul Kapiya in Vidin and his footprints on a rock above Kalofer, near Tryavna lies Marko's Plain, in the Ihtiman Pass are Marko's Gates, and to the west of Prilep there still stand the ruins of Marko's Fortress* (36-37).

Whether Marko did not leave similar traces elsewhere, in Serbia or Albania, for example, we never learn. The implication is that there, in foreign lands, the Marko songs merely "spread"; here in Bulgaria, however, they have become one with the motherland. The book incessantly recreates a sacred literary territory which plays the role of an all-encompassing frame of reference for the whole exposition. And although other peoples may lay claim to these lands, the territory in question is and remains mono-national, purely Bulgarian. Its borderlines are disturbingly vague but its centrality is inviolable. Nothing can affect it – neither the fact that the location of Marko's capital city is de-centered with regard to the vague borders of the Bulgarian lands (at the time of the *Guide* but also afterwards, Prilep was outside the Bulgarian state), nor that the distribution of the Marko songs across Bulgaria is far less even than might be supposed. Balan himself notes that in southern and northern Bulgaria other heroes (Momchil in the south and Stoyan in the north) are better known and more typical but this does not seem to affect his claim concerning the "ubiquity" of Marko's spirit all over the country. What matters is the parallelism: the book seeks to convince its

readers that Marko the hero has managed to center both the epic corpus and the territory.

All this enables the successful cohabitation of positivism and patriotism. As shown above, through a variety of informed qualifications the book pays its due to the detailed knowledge about the migration of motifs and the pre-national mobility of folklore beyond national boundaries. This kind of knowledge, however, peacefully coexists with a totally imaginary song-ography and geography, which are national and patriotic in their essence and totally unrelated to any critical factology. Within it, "the songs of the people" and "the land of the people" are united into a natural entity. The latter prohibits the formulation of the question whether Marko is a ***Bulgarian*** hero – he is Bulgarian by presumption, by virtue of the fact that he has "*woven the memories of the local Bulgarian people into a special kind of song*," that he has "*won the sympathies*" and is "*close to the people's soul*," that he has left his trace on the sacred Bulgarian land, and so on. The supra-national facts, collected and conscientiously reported, the knowledge about migration theory neither aid nor hamper the exposition, as the latter simply follows its own institutional and patriotic impetus. They cannot problematize such a national "belonging", since it is a precondition of the research which precedes them.

THE BULGARIZATION OF THE ECUMENICAL

A similar technique of rhetorical appropriation of what is dubiously "ours" is applied not only to folklore. Other parts of the book, those dealing with the written element of literature, also appropriate cultural massifs which, unlike folklore, have a better-defined cultural "owner" or are far more universal than any claims to national ownership. When in Part II, entitled *Written Literature*, Balan begins his account of medieval religious writing, he boldly confronts the obvious obstacles. Can a literature and a standard language, whose function is by conception supra-tribal and Slavic and by dialectal origin local and Macedonian, be nevertheless defined as "Bulgarian" and "ours"? In their religious content, the earliest Bulgarian written records on Bulgarian lands are less Bulgarian than Christian and make supra-tribal ecumenical claims

to being institutionally clerical rather than *reflecting the spirit of the people*; their political function is dangerously intertwined with Byzantine imperial interests. Doubtless, Balan is well aware of this all. Still, he does not use his erudition to pose problems disconcerting to "the Bulgarian"; nor does he do so even as he tackles his favorite topic of the language of these records.

Balan is fully acquainted with all the details of this issue: he knows that the term "Bulgarian language" began to be applied to the Slavic dialects long after (in fact centuries after) the "Golden" 9th century A.D.; that the legitimacy of the concept "Old Bulgarian" was subject to a heated argument among his contemporary Slavic scholars and linguists and that some of them were trying to replace it with "Old Slavonic", "Church Slavonic" or other such terms. He does occasionally admit that "ours" is in fact "common": "*Many of our and of the Serbian manuscripts*," he writes, "*were taken to Russia, while Russian works came from the north. The common religious faith of the brethren by language and the identical form and purpose of the manuscripts led to the opinion that they belonged to all Slavs and not to any one tribe* (75). But in spite of such admissions, for Balan, as well as for his patriotically-minded implied readers, it becomes somehow self-evident that Cyril and Methodius's works are … Bulgarian, as is the subsequent Christian liturgical and exegetic literature in its Old and Middle Bulgarian versions. The text does not expunge knowledge and facts but they carry no argumentative weight when the unquestionable functioning of institutional classes such as "ours" is at stake. The implication is that one cannot ask ***when*** Bulgarian literature came into being (which for Balan and for the whole academic institution is the really important issue) and at the same time doubt that what is accepted as ***its beginning*** may not be ***its*** beginning, that is, "Bulgarian". And if such questions happen to be formulated outside Bulgaria and its scientific community, there is a rhetorical remedy for this too: "ours" becomes a readily shared conventional notion, presumed by science and imposed by pedagogy: "*In those days the language of the Macedonian Slavs was not used by the other Slavs on the Balkan Peninsula who were related to them; nevertheless this language and that of the Slavs within the Bulgarian Kingdom belonged to the same entity which was later called Bulgarian language; in the same way the Macedonian vernaculars form one whole with those used in Bulgaria along the Danube coast and in Thrace. On the basis*

of this ***we consider*** (emphasis added) *the "Slavonic language" of Cyril and Methodius to be* ***Old Bulgarian*** (original emphasis) ***and include*** (emphasis added) *their works and the works of their disciples into* ***Bulgarian literature*** (original emphasis) (73).

What we see here is that for his practical pedagogic purposes Balan projects (by using words like *consider* and *include*) "our – Bulgarian" onto the phenomenon of medieval Slavonic literature without finding a problem with such a retroactive operation. In this way, he creates the following logical regime for the adjective "Bulgarian" and the pronoun "our": what "our" originated in is ours regardless of the possibility that this generative core might not, in its factually verifiable origin, be Bulgarian and "ours". This kind of logic can be presented in formal terms as follows: if the phenomenon A originates something (B) (implication), then A is B (equivalence). "We "propose" (consider, assume, introduce) that between them there is a historical causal relation and continuity,[13] an equivalence of certain qualities regardless of other possible genealogies: we simply find the latter uninteresting, not "ours".

Yet A could yield other historical connections and produce quite different and heterogeneous consequences and results (consequences that we could here conventionally denote with the symbols C, 88, Ć, Ł, ů, ξ). Neither the admission that "ours is common", nor the distinct possibility that others could also lay claim to a similar retroactive operation (of the kind A ≡ C, A ≡ 88, A ≡ Ę, A ≡ £, A ≡ ů, A ≡ ξ) has any significance for the Bulgarian literary history created by Balan. What matters is that "we" (B) ***can*** find our origin in A and therefore A is B; consequently the sacred Slavonic language of the medieval manuscripts is in fact Old Bulgarian. Thus the rhetoric of the literary history learns

[13] Here Balan's rhetoric obscures a logical error – the erroneous supposition that implication (the logical expression of causality) runs both ways. The cause produces the effect and if the cause is present, then the effect is present as well (a⇒b). a⇒b, the so-called *modus ponens*) but not the other way round – the presence of the effect gives no indication of the cause. That is, the predicates of the effect, which include "Bulgarian", yield no logically necessary conclusions: from "Bulgarian" in the cause-language it does not follow "Old Bulgarian" in the effect-language. The conclusion about the absence of a cause can be drawn only from the absence of an effect: (a⇒b). not-b ⇒ not-a) */modus tolens/*. I owe these observations to my colleague, the philosopher Dimitar Vatsov.

to "nationalize" pre- and trans-national, local and tribal phenomena. Slavic studies, Alexander Teodorov Balan's ultimate authority, has submitted an example of how the "common" (the common language, the common manuscripts, the common written records) can unproblematically be included into "ours", even when their "commonality" is openly admitted.[14]

"HERE"

As has several times been noted, Balan's textbook constructs imaginary geographies. The imagined national space forms a basic referential system which supports "ours". There is, however, a paradox: a critical examination also reveals such a system as ambivalent. Balan's exposition does not make it clear whether the frequently used adverb "here" refers to the Bulgarian state, to the unrealized San Stefano Bulgaria, to all possible lands inhabited by Bulgarians, only to the areas with a predominantly Bulgarian population, or to something else. The imagined "here" readily places "the Bulgarian" into real territories where other peoples and cultures predominate and then just as readily declares that it refers only to the present Bulgarian state. The imagined territory thus pulsates and can unproblematically be conceived as both Bulgarian and non-Bulgarian.

The scientific style of schoolbook as a whole indicates that the author does not reflect on the possibilities for such heterogeneous readings of the phrase "the Bulgarian lands", nor on the play of geographic and non-geographic designations of the word "here". For him such possibilities are simply non-existent: "here" is applied to some seemingly obvious spatial boundaries within which events in literary history take place. Balan says, for example, that "*/such/ editions expanded the Russian Slavonic language here*" (74). It looks as though "here" represents a self-explanatory and unproblematic space; yet its real geographic referent is more than vague.

[14] Another example is Balan's use of sentences such as this one: *The common religious faith of the brethren by language and the identical form and purpose of the manuscripts led to the opinion that they belonged to all Slavs and not to any one tribe* (74). Balan can make such statements and unproblematically incorporate them in a work entitled "Bulgarian literature".

ЧИТАЛНЯ

The book cannot, of course, fully obfuscate the problematic status of such a referent, and so it circumvents it in the familiar manner – by institutionally ignoring the logical possibilities inherent in the statements. Balan often speaks of how "the Bulgarian people" is settling in its "present" homeland and of how neither in the past nor today all of "our lands" were or are accommodated within the state borders. In other words, he is fully aware that the facts defining the territorial parameters of the "Bulgarian" are subject to change. Since the book was published at a time when the national ideal of uniting Macedonia and Bulgaria along the model of the unification with Easter Rumelia was still very much alive, it can be assumed that Balan includes Macedonia and Aegean Thrace into the referential meaning of "here". Yet his awareness of the facts is of little significance – the text does not make it clear whether "here" includes all the lands inhabited by Bulgarians or other ones too. Does it include, for example, lands where Bulgarians live but are not a demographic and cultural majority? Or lands with a Bulgarian population but non-Bulgarian cultural institutions and political authority? Or perhaps "here" has no clear spatial parameters because it is "internal", that is, it signifies "what takes place within the soul and the life of the People"?

Again, such questions regarding the geographic, demographic and cultural projections of "Bulgarian literature" never arise. "Here" serves as a marker of stable identity with seemingly transparent spatial implications, although these are never articulated (repeating the typical insinuations made by every kind of nationalism – that there is a natural coincidence between cultural, political and geographic borders and that this is self-evident).[15] On the semantic level the adverb blends an indefinite geography with even less definite "internal" spiritual spaces; on the pragmatic level, however, the clichéd and conventional usage of "here" articulates an institutional security that feels no need to problematize itself. On the latter level the adverb serves for obvious "appropriative" functions: everything that happened "here" can be considered part of Bulgarian cultural and literary history irrespective of the possibility that it could have been triggered by non-Bulgarian cultural agents, not accomplished in the Bulgarian language or that whether it happened on Bulgarian territory might be questionable. If someone, Bulgarian or

[15] On this issue see Gelner, E. *Nation and Nationalism*. London, 1982.

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not, did something that was Bulgarian or not, but something that was done "here" in any one of its many meanings, then in some sense it is "ours". At worst, the action or event does not have to be clearly defined as "ours" because its foreign origin is well documented; however, we include it into "our" history because it is important for it. We thus make it "ours": "here" turns out to be an unproblematic container which appropriates everything that happens to have found its way into it.

CONCLUSION: A TEXTBOOK POSITIONED BETWEEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF LOGIC AND OF INSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC

Though positivist in spirit, Balan's *Bulgarian Literature: A Short Guide for Medium and Special Schools* does not apply its conscientious and meticulous critical discrimination evenly to all facts. Whole categories fall out of the scope of the scrupulous but doubting observation that is such an important aspect of the spirit of European science. Whereas regarding other facts (one could call them "ordinary") Balan is accurate and even hypercritical, when dealing with framing categories such as "ours" and "literature" he does not seem to show much respect either for the law of non-contradiction, for the Cartesian methodical doubt, or even for simple critical incredulity. Definitions of these global categories are either missing (as in the case of "ours' and "Bulgarian"), or are to the maximum extent broadened and confused[16] (as in the case of "literature); on the verbal level these concepts are used as if they were self-explanatory in spite of the numerous problems such usage entails.

The reason for all this is quite simple: in the textbook such categories cannot in principle be compromised by suspicion because the facts they incorporate are not actually facts. In spite of their apparent factuality, their status is epistemological and not empirical. The role they play is that of institutional framing conditions, a cognitive web for the institution (in this case, academic Bulgarian philology) that enabled

[16] More analysis of the nature of Balan's definitions can also be found in my forthcoming paper referred to earlier.

the existence of the textbook. As it has repeatedly been demonstrated above, the textbook ignores all the uncomfortable questions regarding "the Bulgarian" and "ours" that it could have addressed to itself. Similarly to other rhetorical "pre-arguments", "ours" is not subject to problematization and doubt; the status of belonging or not belonging to it cannot be verified or falsified through the use of facts because it is what constitutes their field, including, therefore, the facts themselves. Even when it is subverted by facts and rationalization, the field retains its primordial and invincible status.

At the same time, however, this undisputed "ours" turns out to be an ambiguous logical operator which cannot referentially delineate a categorical factual field with well-defined boundaries. As has already been shown, "ours" includes folklore, medieval literature and the "Bulgarian lands" – though from the perspective of traditional logic the Bulgarianness of each of these phenomena is arguable and the boundaries of each of them are blurred. Thus, folklore is characteristic of non-national, local cultures, the greater part of medieval literature comes from other sources, the lands have no clear borderlines and it is far from clear whether the principle of their mapping is political, linguistic, cultural, or statistical and demographic.

The first Bulgarian literary history, however, manages to skip over all these inner contradictions. The field of "ours", even when its semantic scope is vague, acquires clarity by the sheer force of its self-evident usage. "Ours" and/or "the Bulgarian" thus function more as a consensus device, a repertoire of identification markers, than a predicating referential act (of the type "X is ours") capable of selecting real "facts" on the basis of their category and of incorporating them into the "actual" set of "ours". The style of the exposition presupposes that between author and reader there exists such an obvious and habitual consensus concerning the markers and the fields of "ours" that they do not need to be discussed at all. That is, from a logical and a semiotic point of view, the status of "ours" belongs to pragmatics (the way signs are used by the participants in the act of communication) and not to semantics (the way these signs refer to reality).

The overall result is that objections and counter-definitions of "ours" simply do not arise: they are blocked out by the rhetoric. And since this rhetoric belongs to an academic book, the fundamental restrictions set by it can be regarded as the enunciations of the anony-

mous national and scientific authority, stabilized and habituated into an institution and impressing on the minds of the young and not fully socialized readers three secure and inviolable truths: that we have a literature, that it is valuable, that it is Bulgarian. They serve as the reliable framework indispensable to all scientific research. Such is the power of their cool conviction that all possible doubts, objections or counterarguments either become invisible or seem fabricated.

And in a sense, they are not even possible: after all, what is "ours" is "ours".

GÁBOR BEZECZKY

METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE

"The same key would not open both,
though a 'master key' might"[1]

Due to the traditional views on metaphor and narrative, they are usually discussed in different contexts as if they had nothing in common. However, during the last decades the theories of metaphor and narrative underwent a number of changes, and what was taken for granted in traditional literary criticism is no longer evident. In particular, it should be investigated whether metaphor and narrative are wholly unrelated or they have some kind of common structure. In this essay, the possibilities and difficulties of comparing metaphor and narrative theories are illustrated with the example of Max Black's theory of metaphor and Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of the dialogical novel.

INTRODUCTION

If literary scholarship has evergreen topics, metaphor and narrative will certainly be among them, and there are only a handful of similarly general categories. Despite their unique importance and universal applicability, the relationship that may or may not exist between them has not attracted the attention it deserves. While the number of publications on metaphor and narrative is now in the tens of thousands, and a reason-

[1] J. Hillis Miller "Optic and Semiotic in Middlemarch" in Jerome H. Buckley (ed.) *The Worlds of Victorian Fiction.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1975. 125-145. p. 140.

ably comprehensive bibliography could fill dozens of volumes, a bibliography relevant to both topics would probably need little more than, perhaps, a dozen pages. This is probably due to the fact that the contexts within which they emerged and are usually discussed are somewhat isolated from one another. Whatever the reason for this neglect may be, it seems that all aspects of their relationship should be scrutinized in the minutest detail. Even their unrelatedness, should they turn out to have nothing in common, would be interesting and ought to be discussed extensively: "In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things which you choose, - to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train perfectly and see the real truth."[2] Plato's requirements might prove to be somewhat impractical (even Parmenides is not so keen on wading through "an ocean of words"[3]), but his claims are tunelessly valid.

Herbert Read's argument against any close relationship between metaphor and narrative is a suitable point of departure. Should they prove to be unrelated, it will be possible fall back on an updated version of his statement. Read restricted the function metaphors can fulfill to poetry: "The ability to invent new metaphors is a sign of a poetic mind; and the main use of metaphors is always poetical."[4] He distinguished two types of metaphor: "[...] we may divide all metaphors into the *illuminative* and the *decorative.*"[5] From this he drew the conclusion: "In narrative prose [...] there is no need for either illumination or decoration; metaphors would merely impede the action and are properly discarded."[6] It is, indeed, difficult to see why metaphor, conceived of as exclusively poetic, illuminative or decorative and narrative prose, conceived of as action, should deserve our undivided attention.

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[2] Plato "Parmenides" in *The Dialogues of Plato.* Tr. B. Jowett. New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1892. Vol. 4. 45-106. p. 57.

[3] Ibid. p. 58.

[4] Herbert Read *English Prose Style.* London: G. Bell and Sons. 1952 [1928]. p. 23.

[5] Ibid. p. 25.

[6] Ibid. p. 26. Read thought narrative prose "implies ready-made materials; words stacked round the builder, ready for use." p. xi.

However, it does not seem easy to return to Read's position. Since the time his book was published both the study of metaphor and narrative has undergone a series of changes, and what he took for granted is no longer evident. There are few critics who would accept Read's statement according to which the main use of metaphors is always poetical. The distinction between the illuminative and the decorative metaphors has also been shaken. The main use of metaphor is now seen as the cognitive function it performs. Metaphor is no longer restricted to poetry and to the level of individual words. Read's other assumption, according to which narrative is primarily action, seems to be equally untenable. With their apparently inherent limitations removed, both metaphor and narrative have become to be seen as wellnigh omnipresent and ubiquitous. But if this is the case, their relationship ought to be clarified. In particular, it must be seen how narrative (and the theory of narrative) can share the 'virtues' of metaphor as the new approach established them - and vice versa.

Prompted by Wayne C. Booth's comments on Warren Shibles' bibliography of 1971, Mark Johnson coined the term 'metaphormania.'[7] Shibles' book was followed by two similar bibliographies – with probably more titles, covering shorter periods.[8] The second and the third volumes can prove that the mania is still as contagious as ever: serious scholarly journals publish serious scholarly articles on the metaphorical

[7] Warren Shibles *Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History.* Whitewater, Wisconsin: The Language Press. 1971; Mark Johnson "Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition" in Mark Johnson (ed.) *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1981. 3–47. p. ix. Booth says: "The bibliographies show more titles for 1977, for example, than for - well, the truth is that I refuse to do the counting to make this point, but I'll wager a good deal that the year 1977 produced more titles than the entire history of thought before 1940. We shall soon no doubt have more metaphoricians than metaphysicians - or should that be metamorticians, the embalmers of dead metaphor? I have in fact extrapolated with my pocket calculator to the year 2039; at that point there will be more students of metaphor than people." Wayne C. Booth "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation" *Critical Inquiry* 5 (1978) 49-73. p. 49.

[8] Jean-Pierre Noppen et al. (eds.) *Metaphor: A Bibliography of Post-1970 Publications.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1985.; Jean-Pierre Noppen and Edith Hols *Metaphor II: A Classified Bibliography of Publications, 1985 to 1990.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1990.

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nature of man, woman, time, space, basketball, illness, and drug-taking. There are also books and articles to argue that disciplines such as economics, history, law, musicology, psychology, philosophy, physics, sociology, theology can and should be regarded as metaphorical. Manias, after all, are not supposed to be rational. But there is some reason to suppose that certain aspects of this particular 'mania' represent more than a fad which temporarily attracts everybody's attention, and then disappears unceremoniously. At the very least, it seems likely that, mixed with the short-term fashion, long-term forces are also at work.

Are there analogous developments in the theory of narration? Is there such a thing as 'narrationmania'? When there are far more books and articles on narrative than on metaphor, and when the problems posed by narration are discussed by historians, philosophers, linguists, psychologists and economists, these are hardly more than rhetorical questions. But, due to the combination of a number of factors, what can be called 'narrationmania' may be less spectacular than metaphormania. It seems that the majority of the publications on narration discuss individual authors, show little or no theoretical interest and can pass as case studies.

Both metaphor and certain forms of narration have occasionally been attacked for their supposedly false claims to truth: "fables make one imagine many events possible which in reality are not so;"[9] "all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move passions, and thereby mislead the judgement, and so are perfect cheat."[10] Despite the similarity of the charges, their treatment was rather different: for example, it has sometimes been discussed whether metaphor is exhaustively paraphrasable in non-metaphorical terms, and those who think it is, usually have reservations against it, and tend to prefer, at least as a theoretical position, the literal mode of expression. However, nobody, as far as I know, has ever stated that the content of the narratives should be expressed in non-narrative terms. Certain forms of narration may be fashionable or practically obsolete, other forms may be associated with

[9] Rene Descartes "Discourse on Method" in Rene Descartes *The Philosophical Works of Descartes.* Tr. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T Ross. Cambridge: University Press. 1968. Vol. I. 79-130. p. 84.

[10] John Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.* 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1894. Vol. 2. p. 146.

high or low social status, rural or urban culture, some of them may be favored or frowned upon by this or that social group, but it has never been suggested that narrative as such, and as a unique way of referring to certain states of affairs, could or should be replaced by something else. It is possible that it is precisely the proliferation of narrative genres and forms that prevents any such statement from being formulated, and makes it unnecessary to justify, on philosophical grounds, either the existence of narration or the interest in it. Unlike metaphor, narration was not discovered suddenly as an important and fundamentally misunderstood aspect of language. This can explain why 'narrationmania' is less conspicuous than 'metaphormania.'

The similarity of the suspicions concerning the 'cognitive function' or 'epistemic status' of metaphor and narrative is quite remarkable. Descartes' and Locke's statements can be transferred from their original field of application: they might as well have said that metaphor makes one imagine many events possible which "in reality are not so," and that narrative insinuates wrong ideas, moves passions, and thereby misleads the judgement. If the similarity of metaphor and narrative includes the impossibility of paraphrasing narrative, then the consequences of the indispensability of metaphor must be true for narrative as well, and this conclusion can in itself justify their parallel or simultaneous investigation. Descartes and Locke seem to suggest that 'fables' and 'eloquence' are bound to be wrong in whatever circumstances. Even when thinking in terms of a neat dichotomy of reality and language, it is worth re-formulating these statements as saying that in some respects both metaphor and narrative offer richer structures than reality, i.e., the fact-stating potential of language and the fact-generating potential of reality are not strictly co-ordinated. On the one hand, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to create a language in which all the sentences (both the analytic and the synthetic) can only be true, and in which the false sentences are, even before being uttered, automatically blocked. The idea of such a perfect language would imply the perfect knowledge of reality. On the other hand, a proposition according to which reality may in some unfathomable way resist all the resources of human language, and each and every possible sentence can only be false, would be truly embarrassing. Although this might be the case, fortunately it is difficult to see how this could be proved with what then should be regarded as our limited linguistic capabilities. And if it could be proved, then we

would be able to produce at least one true sentence. Finally, even the idea of the dichotomy of reality and language can only be based on the perfect knowledge of reality which no human being seems to have.

But is there, in a deeper sense of the word, a real metaphormania and narrationmania going on? Wayne C. Booth seems to have thought that the metaphormania was a relatively new development in philosophy and literary criticism. Mark Johnson in the "Introduction" to *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor* makes similar statements. But even a careful browsing of Warren Shibles' bibliography will show that it contains a great deal of late 19th century German books and articles, the products of a previous metaphormania. Indeed, unless we are willing to regard Rousseau, Vico, Hamann, Herder, Coleridge, Shelley, Feuerbach, Novalis, Nietzsche, and Croce as marginal figures in European cultural history, we have to admit that the excessive interest in metaphor is not entirely unheard of. Unfortunately but understandably, we have no history that would connect these (and many other) names with one another, i.e., there is no history of metaphor theories. One feels tempted to say that the story of metaphor is untold. The interesting snapshots, e.g., Paul Ricoeur's discussion of Aristotle and Fontanier, Paul de Man's analysis of Locke, Condillac and Kant, Terence Hawkes' short book should not by any means be mistaken for a history proper.[11]

From the perspective of the mid-20th century analytic philosophy, metaphor may have been seen as a marginal, unattractive phenomenon, not worthy of the attention of the philosopher. In 1955 Max Black began his essay on metaphor by saying "To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him – like praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting."[12] Due to the current metaphormania, no such claim would be accepted today. By now, "X and metaphor," where X can be any major philosopher (e.g. Hobbes, Kant, Wittgenstein, etc.), has become a legitimate genre in respectable philosophical

[11] Paul Ricoeur *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language.* Tr. Robert Czerny. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1977; Paul de Man "The Epistemology of Metaphor" *Critical Inquiry* 5 (1978)13-31; Terence Hawkes *Metaphor.* London: Methuen. 1972.

[12] Max Black "Metaphor". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 55 (1955) 273-294. p. 273.

journals. Black's statement explains why Wayne C. Booth and Mark Johnson thought that the current metaphormania is unprecedented. But the difficulties of writing a coherent history of metaphor theories are much too obvious in terms of periods, disciplines and languages. To give only a few more, random examples: the author of such a history should be reasonably familiar with the Neoplatonic tradition, the literature of medieval mysticism, Byzantine iconoclasm, the works of Blaise Pascal, Robert Lowth, Jean Paul, Jeremy Bentham and, say, Bela Balazs. The task is not only difficult, but seems quite impossible. By juxtaposing things not normally associated with one another, metaphor, as usual, upsets normal categorization and suggests a new one. To put it another way, people are not trained to study the history of metaphor.

While the current form of metaphormania was brought about by the tension of philosophy (i.e., analytic philosophy) and literary scholarship (i.e., New Criticism), the theory of narrative, as one aspect of narrationmania is called, is the product of various groups of literary scholarship. First of all, the work of the Russian formalists and French structuralists should be mentioned, but the contributions of, say, Henry James and Mikhail Bakhtin are just as important, and the ancient origins of narratology in the study of Homer and the Bible should not be forgotten. If, in comparison with the genres and conventions of narration, most of us know very little about the classical and medieval 'theory' of narrative, this is obviously not the fault of the classical and medieval authors. What is more, most of us tend to think that the theoretical interest in the novel, a genre that assumed its present forms within the last three hundred years, is relatively recent, the product of, say, the last hundred years. But this statement, again, says more about the limitations of our perspective than about the history of narrative theories. To be sure, we know a great deal about the history of the novel, and even more about the individual novels of individual authors. We know, however, comparatively little about the 'theory of the novel' prior to the 20th century. While the demand for the history of metaphor theories needs little or no justification, the history of narrative theories might be thought of as less important than the study and history of novels. Ideally, there should be no real boundary or opposition between them, and their relative importance, so long as both are practiced, could be a matter of opinion. When,

however, the works discussing the history of theory exist as exceptions, it might prove useful to start thinking about reversing the priorities. Not only the story of the story, but the story of the story theory should be narrated. This does not mean that there are no problems with the 'story of the story.' Many of the histories of the novel suffer from the lack of a coherent story. Karl Kroeber's question: "How can one prove without reference to evidence outside the novels themselves that George Eliot's fiction was written after Charlotte Bronte's?"[13] seems to be as relevant today as it was when it was formulated. Well, maybe, there is not one coherent story of the novel, and its development should, perhaps, be regarded as more discontinuous than continuous, or it might be argued that only multiple and heteroglott (in Bakhtin's sense of the word) narratives can capture its essence, but, so far as I know, the nature of the literary historical narrative is not at the top of the literary critic's agenda, and what most histories of the novel offer as histories is "little more than chronological ordering."[14] In general, it does not seem entirely unfair to say that, in presenting coherent (or apparently and subtly incoherent) stories to the reader, the historians of the novel are incomparably less resourceful than the novelists. Hayden White and a number of other historians initiated (or, to be more precise, re-introduced) a most interesting and useful dialogue about the nature of narration in historiography. In contrast, literary critics and literary historians show hardly any interest in such fundamental operations of their profession. (There are, again, memorable exceptions.)

The difficulties are not over when we decide that the relationship between metaphor and narrative (both the metaphoricity of narrative and the narrativity of metaphor) should be investigated. Both metaphor and narrative can be imposed as the principles of understanding and explanation on the investigation. *Explanans* and *explanandum* will be the parts of a single continuum. That they can function as principles of explanation is evident in books like Hayden White's *Metahistory* and in Donald N. McCloskey's *The Rhetoric of Econom-*

[13] Karl Kroeber *Styles in Fictional Structure: The Art of Jane Austen, Charlotte Bronte.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1971. p. 3.
[14] Ibid.

ics[15] Paul Ricoeur also mentions this "perplexity"[16] or "paradox":[17] "[t]here is no non-metaphorical standpoint from which one could look upon metaphor, and all the other figures for that matter, as if they were a game played before one's eyes."[18] This is not surprising if we consider the alleged universality of metaphor and narrative. But which should be *the* principle? Metaphor or narrative? Shall we investigate them consecutively or simultaneously? The consequences of this situation are not entirely clear. Is there, can there be any discourse free from metaphor? Do we still know what the opposite of metaphorical is? And what is the opposite of narrative? Do we adopt a narrative method if we discuss them consecutively? Does consecutiveness imply such a consequence? Do we adopt a metaphorical method if we discuss them simultaneously? Does this mean we identify them metaphorically? Does this imply a common essence, partial identity, resemblance? Or is this simply a category mistake? Is it a mistake to speak of narrative in terms of metaphor? And is it a mistake to speak of metaphor in terms of narrative? Does narrative or consecutiveness imply a different kind of identity? Can we tell a story in which metaphor turns into narrative (or the other way round)? And if there is some common ground between them, will this mean we may not have to face an unpleasant alternative?

In some cases it does not seem hopeless or ridiculous to find a structure common to both metaphor and narrative. Paul Ricoeur elevated metaphor from the level of the word to the level of the sentence. Gerard Genette, on the other hand, argues that narrative is "the expansion of a verb," and a sentence like "I walk" is a minimal form of narrative. In this sense, one of Max Black's examples: "The chairman plowed through the discussion" can be regarded as instances of both metaphor and narrative.[19] Even the boring, textbook example, "John is a lion" can be transformed into such minimal narratives with

[15] Hayden V. White *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973; Donald N. McCloskey *The Rhetoric of Economics.* Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press. 1985.

[16] Ricoeur *The Rule of Metaphor* p. 17.

[17] Ibid. p. 18.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Black "Metaphor" p. 274.

ease: "John was not always a lion," "John has become a lion," "John is a lion now" or perhaps even "John is a lion." It is not too difficult to imagine contexts in which these sentences imply or tell a story about how a shy boy turned into a fierce and courageous man. In general, the sentence type "What was X is Y now" seems to satisfy the requirements of identification and consecutiveness.

MAX BLACK AND MIKHAIL BAKHTIN

I shall illustrate the possibilities and difficulties of comparing metaphor and narrative theories with an example. I have chosen Mikhail Bakhtin's *The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* and Max Black's "Metaphor" because not only are they regarded as classics in their respective fields but are well known outside these fields as well. Bakhtin and Black, at the time of writing their works, had most probably not heard of one another, and were, thus, not influenced by one another. If they shared common sources, traditions, etc., then they are not overtly obvious. Finally, if there is a degree of similarity in their conceptions despite all this, it will be all the more remarkable.

First, I will point out the most conspicuous similarities of the book and the essay. Then, bringing in further material and further points of view, I will consider whether these similarities are more or less accidental or are the consequences of a deeper affinity between them. The 'common essence' of the book and the essay can be compressed in a succinct form: they describe and contrast two types of structure. While the first structure uses established meanings, the second structure creates new meanings. I shall try to keep the exposition of what this deceptively brief formula implies as simple as possible.

Black contrasts the substitution view of metaphor to the interaction view; Bakhtin contrasts the monologic novel to the dialogic novel. The substitution view and the monologic novel rely on fixed, existing meanings, the interaction view and the dialogic novel are concerned with emerging meanings. Further similarities:

(a) Black and Bakhtin, respectively, regard the substitution view

and the monologic novel as inferior to the interaction view and the dialogic novel;

(b) they are not primarily interested in how established meanings are used, but in how the new meaning comes into being;

(c) they find the new meaning to be a product of the interaction of contextually opposed factors;

(d) they think the new meaning cannot be separated from the form in which it is realized;

(e) the opposed factors undergo change during the interaction;

(f) while the role of the interaction view and of the dialogic novel expands, the role of the substitution view and of the monologic novel diminishes;

(g) both Black and Bakhtin waver between two possibilities: between 'substitution-metaphor' and the 'substitution view of metaphor,' 'interaction-metaphor' and the 'interaction view of metaphor,' 'monologic novel' and the 'monologic interpretation of the novel,' 'dialogic novel and the 'dialogic interpretation of the novel;'

(h) they explicitly discuss and reject the impoverishment of meaning, i.e., the substitution view of the interactive metaphor and the monologic interpretation of the dialogic novel;

(i) they do not emphasize overinterpretation, i.e., the interaction view of the substitution-metaphor and the dialogic interpretation of the monologic novel.

Black says that metaphor, according to the substitution view, "is used to communicate a meaning that might have been expressed literally."[20] To explain the literal interpretation of metaphor, Black introduces two similes: "Understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a code or unravelling a riddle."[21] Black's explanatory similes are fairly enigmatic. Riddles can be extremely complex, with several layers of gradually comprehensible, figurative meanings. The observation that heaping metaphor on metaphor can result in riddles is as old as Aristotle's *Poetics*.[22] Then it is doubtful whether the sentence: "Understand-

[20] Ibid. p. 280.

[21] Ibid.

[22] "A whole statement in such terms will be either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle if made up of metaphors, a barbarism, if made up of strange words." Aristotle "Poetics" (Tr. Ingram Bywater) in Richard McKeon (ed.) *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. New York: Random House. 1941. 1455-1487. p. 1478

ing a metaphor is like [...] unravelling a riddle" can explain how we understand metaphors. Rather than being a "simple" simile, it is much too close to a statement of identity. The first simile is equally paradoxical. The heart of the paradox is that a code can be defined as a function which maps the elements of the intended message into the coded message unequivocally. Deciphering is the recovery the original message. The metaphorical expression could be equated with the coded message, the literal expression with the original message. When understood literally, this would be the theory of the literally interpretable metaphor that the substitution view holds. Black, however, packaged this in the form of a simile. The sentence as a whole is an instance of multiple self-reference: the allusion to the code would establish an unambigous correspondence, while the simile creates a relationship that resembles the unambiguous correspondence. But then what is the metaphorical interpretation of the literally interpretable metaphor *like?*

Black's other simile is also a predication of resemblance bordering on literal identification. But can something be both literally and metaphorically identified with both the metaphorical riddle and the literal code at the same time? This begins to sound like a riddle. And what does "or" mean? Black, it should be added, believes only half-heartedly that the substitution view is tenable. On top of all this, he speaks of "deciphering a code," i.e., breaking a code, which in most cases should be distinguished from using the code. But later in the essay Black will say that, according to the substitution view, obtaining the original meaning of the metaphor, i.e., *understanding* the metaphor, consists in applying the inverse of the function used by the creator of the metaphor.[23] Thus, deciphering the code and using the code are not treated as fundamentally different in the essay. Circumscribing the meaning of the phrase "the meaning that might have been expressed literally" is quite difficult. Usually, the literal is not supposed to pose an insurmountable problem, but, as it turns out, it is anything but simple.

The problem of the literal meaning has its counterpart in Bakhtin's book. The characters in a monologic novel are "fixed ele-

(1458a 24-26).

[23] Black "Metaphor" p. 282.

ments"[24] whose "semantic boundaries are strictly defined,"[25] and whose lives are "finalized in their meaning,"[26] and one can add that, if this is so, the adequate interpretation of a monologic novel ought to recognize these limits. First, it should be noted that Bakhtin speaks of the characters in semantic terms, as if they were units of meaning, words or sentences. Is this because they are in fact parts of novels which are made of sentences, or is this a metaphor? Second, if there is such a thing as the "monologic novel," then its existence requires an explanation, because it systematically sabotages the most fundamental characteristic of language as Bakhtin understands it: "Dialogic interaction is indeed the authentic sphere where language *lives*. The entire life of language [...] is permeated with dialogic relationships."[27] If this is true for Bakhtin, he must probably look upon the monologic as a lifeless abstraction of or a simplifying deviation from the dialogic. Bakhtin, in fact, often remarks that the fault with monologic discourse is that it is reification, finalization, abstraction. To continue the image one could say: you will get monologic discourse when you kill the dialogic interaction. In contrast, the characters in the dialogic novel have properties only live people can possess. They are said to participate, as fully valid consciousnesses of equal authority, in a dialogue with the author and the reader. Bakhtin seems to use the word "dialogue" in literal and metaphorical senses: as a reader, I cannot reasonably (or literally) expect Dmitry Karamazov to answer the questions I have. Still, the book suggests that a character is pure voice, and my questions will find an answer in a way which is somehow the same as questions are answered in real life situations. Bakhtin does not consider the "literal" and "metaphorical" senses of the word "dialogue" to be different. He derives them directly from the superimposed "dialogue." The dialogues with real and fictitious people are manifestations of the same possibility. Bakhtin replaces the ordinary "dialogue" as occurring between live people with his own "dialogue": "dialogic relationships are a much broader phenomenon than mere rejoinders in a dialogue, laid out compositionally in the

[24] Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin *Problems of Dostoevsky 's Poetics*. Tr. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1984. p. 7.

[25] Ibid. p. 52.

[26] Ibid. p. 69.

[27] Ibid. p. 183.

text; they are an almost universal phenomenon, permeating all human speech and all relationships and manifestations of human life – in general, everything that has meaning and significance."[28] When interpreted in this manner, the various applications of the word "dialogue" will be equally literal. If one speaks the right language, if one has the interpretive "master key," it will open both what seems to be literal and what seems to be metaphorical, without any change in its structure. When considered from the point of view of other languages, this language may appear sometimes literal, sometimes metaphorical, but this is only a question of perspective. Here again, a number of questions, potential paradoxes arise that will have to be left unanswered. (E.g.: Does dialogism as an almost universal phenomenon apply to the relationship of monologic and dialogic discourses? Or are they opposed to one another rigidly, without the mediation of dialogism? Are they opposed monologically? If dialogism applies, will it follow that dialogism opens up what was or seemed to be originally monologic? Can we then say that characters in a monologic novel are finalized in their meaning? And if dialogism applies, can we oppose the monologic to the dialogic at all? Is the monologic a special case of the dialogic?) The monologic novel, when examined through the medium of the dialogism, seems to be either impossible or a reduced version of the dialogic novel. The problem is roughly the same as that of literal language.

The interaction view of metaphor holds that, as a result of the interaction of "frame" and "focus," the focal word "obtains a *new* meaning, which is *not* quite its meaning in literal uses, nor quite the meaning any literal substitute would have."[29] Black accepts I. A. Richards' statement that the reader is forced to connect two ideas represented by the "frame" and the "focus," and adds: "In this 'connexion' resides the secret and mystery of metaphor."[30] In addition to "frame" and "focus," Black introduces the terms "principal subject" and "subsidiary subject." The subsidiary subject implies a "system of associated commonplaces,"[31] while the principal subject has "a corresponding system of implications." Thus, not only two ideas or two words interact in a

28 Ibid. p. 40.

29 Black "Metaphor" p. 286.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid. p. 287.

metaphor, but two distinct sets of "implied assertions."[32] This, again, goes back to I. A. Richards's book: "What a word means is the missing part of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy."[33] It follows that what is usually regarded as metaphor should be seen as the "minimal form" of a conflict that breaks out between two contexts, two sets of ideas and assumptions, two sets of actual and possible statements. To use J. Hillis Miller's metaphor about the battleground, metaphor is the place where the representatives of the conflicting sets of assertions, with their armies left behind, intersect. The emerging new meaning of the metaphor is a rapprochement between them, following a temporary cessation of hostilities. In this sense, Richards' and Black's theory of metaphor is thoroughly dialogical.

When Bakhtin describes Dostoevsky's novels, his key concept is also interaction. In a dialogic novel "the interaction of full and autonomous consciousnesses is the fundamental event."[34] The consciousnesses are pulled "into interaction with other consciousnesses;"[35] "the heroes' worlds interact by means of the event."[36] During this "intense relationship with another consciousness," "thought [...] becomes itself part of the event and takes on that special quality of an 'idea-feeling,' an 'idea-force,' which is responsible for the unique peculiarity of the 'idea' in Dostoevsky's creative world."[37] That words can represent missing parts of the context, is certainly nothing new to Bakhtin: "When a member of a speaking collective comes upon a word, it is not as a neutral word of language, not as a word free from the aspirations and evaluations of others, uninhabited by others' voices. No, he receives the word form another's voice and filled with that other voice. The word enters his context from another context, permeated with the interpretations of others."[38] The interaction or dialogue (of ideas, consciousnesses, contexts, words, etc.) leads to an unpredictable change: "the genuine life of the personality takes place at the point of non-co-

32 Ibid. p. 288.

33 Ivor Armstrong Richards *The Philosophy of Rhetoric.* New York and London: Oxford University Press. 1936. p. 35.

34 Bakhtin *Dostoevsky* p. 73.

35 Ibid. p. 32.

36 Ibid. p. 26.

37 Ibid. p. 10.

38 Ibid. p. 202.

incidence between man and himself."[39] This non-coincidence can be nothing but a change of meaning, if the characters are controlled by ideas which never stop interacting with others' ideas.

The strength of Bakhtin's fundamental or "root" metaphor, i.e., dialogue and dialogism, lies in the fact that its inner logic drives it toward (a) the search for real or imaginary dialogues; (b) deciding the ways in which contexts, statements can interact, and produce new meanings; (c) establishing the underlying ideological and social differences which determine the modes of expression or the characteristics of speech. On the other hand, the weakness of this conception is that it creates the vacuous entity of "monologism" as its opposite. The opposite of dialogue is probably not anything verbal, but the refusal to say anything, absolute silence. Even the most "monologic," "finalizing" verbal or logical operation or abstraction can be regarded as an attempt to present powerful arguments or counterarguments in an ongoing dialogue. In this respect even Bergman's book *Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber,* is only a narrow interpretation of and brief chapter in dialogical philosophy.

The theories of Richards, Black and Bakhtin may seem so similar now that I must turn in the opposite direction and point out their differences in order to arrive at what is truly shared by them. First of all, I do not by any means wish to suggest that the similarities of Richards', Black's and Bakhtin's approaches follow from their identical positions and would automatically have the same consequences. Bakhtin's fascination with dialogue in all its senses lead him to study such phenomena as the heteroglossia in life and the heteroglossia in the novel. The idea of dialogue which is not hopelessly meaningless in the medium of potentially divergent languages was so radically new (and so productive) that it is no wonder that neither Richards, nor Black, nor indeed anybody I know of went in this respect so far as Bakhtin. So, it is necessary to take a look at their conceptions of language.

[39] Ibid. p. 59.

BLACK ON LINGUISTIC HOMOGENEITY AND HETEROGENEITY

The discussion of linguistic problems is absolutely natural in the philosophical tradition to which Black belongs. This tradition has quite a few fundamental and subtle differences within itself, but if there is one thing in common among its representatives, then it must be the belief that the analysis of linguistic problems can, in one way or another, contribute to philosophical knowledge: "they agreed on the importance of language, though their views differ widely as to what this importance is. Some of them insist that common usage should serve as a touchstone of meaning and truth; some of them, on the contrary, find the roots of philosophic confusion in taking common usage too seriously; some of them exercise their patience and ingenuity in trying to construct an ideal language."[40] Black said that "[philosophical linguistics may be expected to provide nothing less than a pathway to the nature of that reality which is the metaphysician's goal. To this very day the hope persists that '...with sufficient caution, *the properties of language may help us to understand the structure of the world.*'"[41] Russell also thought that "[t]he study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers. Although a grammatical distinction cannot be uncritically assumed to correspond to a genuine philosophical distinction, yet the one is *prima facie* evidence of the other, and may often be most usefully employed as the source of the other."[42] This program immediately lead to the quest for an "ideal language" which is free from the defects of ordinary language, and which can prevent logical mistakes by corresponding to the facts of the world through the correlation of elements and the identity of structure. Black adds that it is by no means certain that Russell "ever seriously supposed that the ideal language could be

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[40] Brand Blanshard *Reason and Analysis.* La Salle: Open Court. 1962. pp. 94-95.

[41] Max Black "Russell's Philosophy of Language" in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell.* Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press. 1944. 229-255. p. 230. Black's italics. Black quotes Bertrand Russell *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.* London: George Allen and Unwin. 1940. p. 341.

[42] Bertrand Russell *The Principles of Mathematics.* London: George Allen and Unwin. 1903. p. 42.

realized."[43] It is, however, absolutely certain that he always mistrusted ordinary language. He said there was a fundamental disagreement between him and some other philosophers, including P. F. Strawson: "They are persuaded that common speech is good enough not only for daily life, but also for philosophy. I, on the contrary, am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax."[44]

In similar vein, Gilbert Ryle discussed the "systematically misleading expressions" which are "couched in a syntactical form improper to the facts recorded."[45] A. J. Ayer said that the purpose of philosophy is to "dispel those confusions which arise from our imperfect understanding of certain types of sentence in our language."[46] But it is perhaps even more important that through the investigation of the alleged defects of language, the study of ordinary language became respectable. George E. Moore's strategy was different from that of Russell. He usually pointed out that some of the supposedly "philosophical" puzzles are meaningless because they conflict with ordinary language: "The philosophizing of most of the more important philosophers has consisted in their more or less subtly repudiating ordinary language. Moore's philosophizing has consisted mostly in his refuting the repudiators of ordinary language."[47] In one way or another, what was supposed to be ordinary language, meaning and the conditions of meaningfulness were part and parcel of the philosopher's investigation. Thus, when Max Black decided to discuss metaphor, he only extended the investigation to a field which was relatively neglected by other philosophers. And we should not forget that when he wrote his essay, topics like translation, synonymy and paraphrase were widely discussed by philosophers. The only thing that may have shocked the fellow-analytic-philosophers like

[43] Black "Russell's Philosophy of Language" p. 253.

[44] "Mr. Strawson on Referring". *Mind 66* (1957) 385-389. p. 387.

[45] Gilbert Ryle "Systematically Misleading Expressions". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 32 (1932) 139-170. p. 143.

[46] Alfred Jules Ayer *Language, Truth and Logic.* London: Victor Gollancz. 1936. p. 62.

[47] Norman Malcolm "Moore and Ordinary Language" in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore.* Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press. 1942. 345-368. p. 365.

Donald Davidson and Arthur C. Danto was Black's conclusion, according to which interactive metaphors are not translatable or paraphrasable without some loss of their cognitive content.[48] It is certainly true that it could not have been easy for Black to reach such a conclusion.[49] This is simply not within the horizon of an ordinary analytic philosopher. Such a claim, if true, can wreck the whole enterprise of analytic philosophy.

With the passage of time, Black's views on metaphor and language changed considerably. It is worth taking a brief look at his statements from the perspective of linguistic differentiation. The basis of the following discussion is his *Critical Thinking* (1946), "Metaphor" (1955), *The Labyrinth of Language* (1968), and "More about Metaphor" (1977) which span more than three decades.

In *Critical Thinking,* he did not grant metaphor any important function in language. Quite the contrary, he warned the reader that metaphor "however legitimate, is no substitute for clear ideas."[50] While some of the statements of the essay of 1955 can be traced back to *Critical Thinking,* Black left out this warning from the essay.

In the first essay, Black introduced the distinction between the interaction view and the substitution view of metaphor. The concept of interaction, however, is more or less confined to his first and second essays on metaphor, and has no role whatsoever in Black's other books and essays. When Black mentions linguistic cooperation in *The Labyrinth of Language,* this should not be mistaken for interaction. Black says that "the roles of speaker and hearer are interchangeable: we know what it would be like to be receiving the same that we send."[51] Inter-

[48] See Donald Davidson "What Metaphors Mean". *Critical Inquiry* 5 (1978) 31–7; Arthur C. Danto "Metaphor and Cognition" in F. R. Ankersmit and J. J. A. Mooij (eds) *Knowledge and Language.* Vol. 3. *Metaphor and Knowledge.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1993. 21–35.

[49] Black's remark concerning I. A. Richards and W. Bedell Stanford ("Unfortunately, both writers have great trouble in making clear the nature of the positions they are defending." Black "Metaphor" p. 285) shows how difficult it must have been for Black to accept statements as reasonable which were couched in a language upon which analytic philosophers looked, at best, with suspicion.

[50] Max Black *Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method.* New York: Prentice-Hall. 1946. p. 197.

[51] Max Black *The Labyrinth of Language.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1968. p. 61. See also pp. 16-17 where Black speaks of "speech as interaction."

action and cooperation are different: the success of interaction in the medium of linguistic heterogeneity must be much less predictable than the success of cooperation could be in the medium of homogeneity. The fact that interaction is not one of Black's fundamental concepts is very important both when we compare Black's ideas with those of Bakhtin and when we study the role of the essay in Black's thought. Mark Johnson states that Black's first essay on metaphor "is perhaps *the* landmark by which we may orient ourselves in attempting to understand recent work on the subject."[52] Although this is not entirely untrue, it should not be forgotten that the single most important concept of Black's essay (i.e., interaction) does not in any way follow from his own ideas. He borrowed it from I. A. Richards. Accordingly, I shall try to show that there are two distinct sets of assumptions at work in Black's writings. The analytic philosophers usually relied on the assumption of linguistic homogeneity, while the concept of interaction presupposes the assumption of linguistic heterogeneity. Both assumptions are present in Black's first essay on metaphor, and there appears to be some kind of balance between them.

Black claims that "the literal uses of the word normally commit the speaker to acceptance of a set of standard beliefs [...] that are the common possession of the members of some speech community," but the meaning of the words "literal," "normally," "standard," "common possession," "speech community" is not sufficiently clear.[53] The words "normally" and "standard" seem to imply some statements about the nature of language and exclude some other statements in this context. "Normally" implies that beside the circumstances which are regarded as "normal" there can be circumstances in which the literal uses of the words are not related to the set of standard beliefs. These circumstances are not considered "normal," and the expression "normally" seems to exclude the plurality of normal linguistic circumstances, which in other words means that, when speaking literally, the whole speech community is supposed to use words in the same way. Similarly, the word "standard" implies that the literal uses of the word can be connected with beliefs which are not standard within the community. Both "normally" and "standard" presuppose statements which would deny the

52 Johnson "Introduction" p. 19.

53 Black "Metaphor" p. 287.

homogeneity of linguistic phenomena. The expression "common possession" implies a potential contrast between common and private possession. On the other hand, the function of these expressions is precisely to create homogeneity – by excluding some phenomena which can be regarded as abnormal, nonstandard and private. "Normal language" will be the abbreviation of the language which is circumscribed by the expressions "normally," "standard beliefs" and "common possession." The expression "normal language," like any other expression or word, distinguishes the possible range of its referents from everything else, so there is nothing odd about it. And it can legitimately imply that language is not homogeneous while saying that normal language is homogeneous. What is odd about it is the fact that the expression "normal language" can only have meaning within the confines of a theory of language which accepts language to be larger than it can deal with. This theory looks upon language as an object obviously given and sufficiently defined by common sense views and it tacitly accepts that "language" cannot be equated with "normal language." In this theory, abnormal, nonstandard and private languages are still recognized as instances of language, nor is their existence and meaningfulness doubted, but normal, standard and common language is seen as displaying the characteristics of language proper. Although this situation is somewhat strange, it can be tolerated, if the theory remains what it is: a theory which can discover the homogeneity and order it presupposes, a theory of normal language as distinct from a theory of language which would include everything that can regarded as linguistic. However, these tacit assumptions tend to be forgotten. Where can normal language exclude its opposite, the abnormal, the nonstandard and the private when the theory of normal language forgets its own limitations and aspires to be a theory of language? A theory of normal language as a model of language can still be useful for various purposes but one thing is certain: it cannot do justice for what it considers as its opposite. Normal language is a synecdoche when it stands for language like sail when it stands for ship. The expression normal language implies that there are some phenomena which are linguistic and which do not follow the rules and logic of normal language whatever they may be.

When speaking literally and normally, using the standard beliefs, speakers could not avoid understanding each other mutually and unconditionally. Understanding is guaranteed by the reciprocal mecha-

nism because – within the confines of this language – the sentences that can be produced will normally have the same meaning for everybody. Black's sentence describes a literal language by means of which the shared standard beliefs about the speech community's world can be expressed, though it is not absolutely clear how many such worlds can exist. Black's sentence seems to imply that the sum of the utterances which are possible under the conditions specified (literal uses, normally, standard beliefs, common possession) can refer to only one world. This will be called the standard world. From the perspective of nonstandard worlds (or from the perspective of nonstandard views about the world), Black's sentence may then imply two different statements: (1) it may either imply that these worlds, if they are possible at all, cannot be expressed literally within the confines of normal language, or (2) it may imply that the beliefs about these worlds are not common possession of the speech community. Since Black is considering metaphor's role in philosophy, he would have a very strong case for metaphor, if any expression of the nonstandard views about the world had to resort to metaphor. This would mean that nonstandard worlds cannot be expressed in normal language. To put it another way, Black could have said that any new view of the world must seem metaphorical from the perspective of normal language. But it is not clear from Black's statement whether the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical uses of words has anything to do with the one between normal and abnormal language. If normal language contains only the literal uses of words, the first interpretation will mean that metaphors are necessary when the views about nonstandard worlds are expressed. If, on the other hand, both the literal and the metaphorical uses of words are somehow included in normal language, the indispensability of metaphor will require a different argument. Black does not pursue this argument to its logical conclusion. It is not evident what would follow from his position with respect to the new metaphorical meanings which come into being through the metaphorical interaction. But it is certain that his solution is not as radical as it could be: unlike other philosophers, he does not draw the conclusion that the new and original world views must be metaphorical in the common language.[54] He finds the proof of metaphor's indispensability in

[54] Stephen Coburn Pepper *World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1942; Edward B. Costello "Metaphors and Metaphysics". *Journal of Thought* 3 (1968) 141-151.

the paraphrased metaphor's loss of cognitive content. Although the status of the metaphorical meaning is somewhat uncertain, Black's theory seems to remain within the confines of homogeneity. But this is only a part of the full picture.

When discussing the sentence "Man is a wolf," Black says: "Literal uses of the word 'wolf' are governed by syntactical and semantical rules, violation of which produces nonsense or self-contradiction. In addition, I am suggesting, literal uses of the word normally commit the speaker to acceptance of a set of standard beliefs about wolves (current platitudes) that are the common possession of the members of some speech community."[55] If Black is right, then the sum of the true sentences (which are accepted as true in the speech community) consisting of words in their literal senses will express the worldview or ideology of the community. Black does not say that each and every member of the community must always and necessarily comply with this ideology. It is possible to violate the syntactic and semantic rules of the language they speak, but, according to Black, the violation results in what is regarded by the community as nonsense or self-contradiction. To deny the "accepted commonplaces" ("current platitudes" or "standard beliefs") is to produce an "effect of paradox" or to provoke a "demand for justification."[56] It is quite interesting that Black seems to suggest that there is such an intimate relationship between the syntactic and semantic rules on the one hand and the conditions of meaningfulness on the other that they are just different aspects of the same thing. This is remarkable because it highlights a point the importance of which is usually ignored or downplayed by linguists. Concealed in the assumption of linguistic homogeneity is some kind of ideological uniformity. But does Black speak of linguistic homogeneity? After all, the expression "some speech community" can be interpreted as referring to a segment of the total speech community. "We recognize that to call a man a 'cesspool' is to use a metaphor, without needing to know who uses the expression, or on what occasion, or with what intention. The rules of our language determine that some expressions must count as metaphors; and a speaker can no more change this than he can legislate that 'cow' shall mean the same as 'sheep.'"[57] The function of the compelling example in the first sentence is to illustrate a conclusion Black does

55 Black "Metaphor" p. 287.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid. p. 277.

not fail to draw. His statement means that the speakers of a language can only accept what is "determined" by the rules of the language. In other words, it is impossible for the speakers to change the literal or metaphorical status of sentences. But if the speakers cannot change the meaning of words, who or what can? Black was both aware of the vulnerability of meanings to changes and was at the same time wary of these unpredictable changes. He implies that the "rules of our language" constitute an impersonal force that "determines" the way certain expressions must be interpreted. It is the "rules" and not by any means the individual speakers that determine whether or not a certain context has changed the meaning of words, whether or not a sentence should be regarded as metaphorical or as literal. Black's essay is built on two not very obvious assumptions:

(i) individual speakers cannot change the meaning of words;
(ii) meaning can still change – according to its own rules.

It will be noted that the first assumption is related to linguistic homogeneity while the second can be related to heterogeneity. In the first essay, Black found both assumptions equally appealing and without either (i) or (ii) his essay would be entirely different. Without assumption (i), "human communication would be a more chancy, a less tightly organized, affair than it is."[58] Without assumption (ii), without the possibility of change, Black would have to give up the interaction view of metaphor. In order to describe language as a tightly organized affair, Black is willing to sacrifice some of the variability of language. On the other hand, Black is undoubtedly aware of both linguistic and ideological heterogeneity. Although he says it is the rules that "determine that some expressions must count as metaphors," he shows how to undo metaphors. With respect to the example "Man is a wolf," he makes three devastating remarks:

(iv) "the metaphorical sentence in question will not convey its intended meaning to a reader sufficiently ignorant about wolves;"
(v) "From the expert's standpoint, the system of commonplaces may include half-truths or downright mistakes;"
(vi) "Men who take wolves to be reincarnations of dead humans

[58] Black *Labyrinth* p. 56.

will give the statement 'Man is a wolf' an interpretation different from the one I have been assuming."[59]

The reader who is ignorant about wolves is just the opposite of the expert, while the men who believe in reincarnation know differently. Is it possible to speak the same language while knowing almost nothing, almost everything, or while having different opinions about wolves? So far as everything else is concerned, it may be possible. But when it comes to wolves, the same sentences will be interpreted entirely differently. For different reasons, the sentence 'Man is a wolf' will not be metaphorical for the ignorant, for the expert and for the heretic. Is it true then that the rules of our language determine that some expressions must count as metaphors? This can be true only if the word "our" does not mean "our common possession." But then in order to find out whether a sentence is metaphorical one must know who uses the expression, on what occasion, with what intention. The metaphorical status of sentences cannot be derived from the "rules of our language." But Black is certainly right in saying that the literal uses of words commit speakers to beliefs about the world. However, if the literal uses are different, then they will commit them to different worlds. This is the reason why the metaphorical or literal status of sentences cannot be established in abstraction from the context in which they occur.

If we turn to Black's *The Labyrinth of Language,* we shall find a very different conception of language. In the book, Black offers, as a parable, the game of bridge: "The very definition of the game guarantees that the play will proceed according to predetermined rules and conventions, known to all the players and accepted by all of them as binding."[60] He finds the authority behind the force of linguistic rules in the "reciprocal demands of the language users."[61] This is quite close to some kind of extreme linguistic homogeneity. Although Black identifies linguistic rules with the predetermined rules of games, although he believes in the force and authority of impersonal mechanisms which are supposed to guarantee the operation of language, he makes room for devation in his conception. Misunderstanding can occur if speakers

59 Black "Metaphor" p. 287.

60 Black *Labyrinth* p. 56.

61 Ibid. p. 58.

"deviate from the norm of correct usage."[62] He thinks that deviation introduces a degree of uncertainty into the message, and speaks of "irresponsible divergence" from the norm.[63] He mentions that "incorrect and careless speakers" tend to "corrupt and degrade language" even though they could have observed the norms of correct usage.[64] Deviation, as Black describes it, seems to be an irrational and irresponsible revolt against the "integrity and efficiency of the linguistic institution."[65] Some of Black's statements seem to represent perfect homogeneity: "the rules of the language institution define what the speaker's words 'mean' and how, by convention, they are to be understood, regardless of what their users would like them to mean."[66] The expression "language institution," written perhaps as Language Institution is like a government agency where the "users" (what a strange word for speaker and hearer) can take those chunks of language which are suspected of causing trouble, and where, after minute scientific tests, their meanings are defined by the burocrats of the Language Authority in a completely objective manner. In any case, Black's sentence implies that the speaker's and the hearer's meaning can diverge from the meaning defined by the rules of the language institutions. If there is any difference between the two meanings, this conception will deny that words mean what their "users" think they mean. All users can do is accept what is defined by the impersonal rules. This must be quite difficult if the speakers agree that they understand one another - regardless of the rules that may or may not operate in their language. If Black's suggestion were true, then in extreme cases it would be possible for each and every member of a speech community to misunderstand each and every utterance, even their own utterances, and still have no idea about any misunderstanding taking place.

By saying: "[a] competent speaker of the language knows in advance how to understand indefinitely many sentences that he never considered or met," Black accepts Katz's and Fodor's views on semantics.[67] But he leaves out two important details from his paraphrase. Katz and

62 Black *Labyrinth* p. 58.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. p. 59.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. p. 18.
67 Ibid. p. 50.

Fodor are describing an ability "which enables speakers to apprehend the semantic structure of an infinite number of sentences without information about setting and indepedent of individual differences between speakers."[68] The expression: "indepedent of individual differences between speakers" refers to the homogeneous nature of the language they have in mind (Black would agree with this), while "without information about setting" excludes the introduction of new meanings in any context. This is, in fact, exactly what they say: "[i]n encountering a novel sentence the speaker is not encountering novel elements but only a novel combination of familiar elements."[69] In their theory, the meaning of words in any context must be selected from among the meanings they have in isolation. Understanding indefinitely many sentences in advance can only be possible if words do not acquire new meanings in unpredictable circumstances. It is no wonder that Black is concerned with "rule-governed innovation" and more or less ignores the "rule-changing innovation."[70]

Black's statement about the "competent speaker" contradicts the essence of the essay of 1955. Had Black always relied on this conception of language, he could not have written the essay. He ought to have agreed with Donald Davidson who, in order to refute Black's claims, said: "metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean and nothing more."[71] But, of course, Black's essay was written before, and his book after, the onset of generative grammar. Black, in his essay, had a different view. He described metaphorical "focus" as obtaining a new meaning in the context of "frame." The interaction view of metaphor would be absolutely meaningless if the meaning of metaphors could be predicted.

It is not surprising that Black accepts "global translatability" in the book, and says that "anything that can be said can be said in any language."[72] While pointing out the weaknesses of Whorf's statements,

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[68] Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor "The Structure of a Semantic Theory" *Language* 39 (1963) 170-210. p. 176.

[69] Katz and Fodor "Structure" p. 171.

[70] *Black Labyrinth p.* 51.

[71] Davidson "What Metaphors Mean" p. 32.

[72] Black *Labyrinth* p. 49. "As to denotation, whatever can be said in one language can doubtless be said in any other: the difference will concern only the structure of the forms, and their connotation." Leonard Bloomfield *Language.*

as Black does, does not automatically mean that languages are translatable, it is difficult to see how global translatability or its opposite, linguistic relativity, could be studied. Do we need bilingual linguists and philosophers? How many sentences of how many languages have to be investigated before "global translatability" can be accepted as a factual statement?

It may prove useful to discuss the problem of translatability in a different frame of reference. If Black is right, if anything that can be said can be said in any language, then everything must be translatable. If, on the other hand, the resources of expression are limited, if there are black holes in the universe of monolingual discourse, then translation must be - at least in some cases - quite impossible. Strange as it may sound, some of the problems of translation can be approached in a monolingual context. When Black speaks of language as an open system, he echoes Chomsky: "There is no upper limit to the length or complexity of grammatical sentences. [...] From a finite number of words (or morphemes) infinitely many grammatical sentences can be constructed."[73] If infinitely many sentences are possible in a language chosen at random, then there is a chance that these sentences can be correlated with the sentences of another language in an orderly manner. Black, however, admits that vocabularies of languages are limited, and it is also possible that they are limited asymmetrically, which in other words means that the fact and fiction stating possibilities of different languages do not match one another very closely. There are lacunas, gaps among the meanings of the words. To express everything, these lacunas will have to be filled by using words outside their "established senses."[74] The rules of syntax will also have to be distorted, i.e., the existing selection restriction rules must be violated if words are used improperly. This, however, would lead to a paradox in Black's theory. Both "using words outside their established senses" and "violating the selection restriction rules" are different definitions of metaphor. To express everything is to create metaphors. But are metaphors translatable? If we express everything within the confines of one language, can it remain the same? If everything is translatable, metaphors must be translat-

New York. Holt. 1933. p. 278.

[73] Black *Labyrinth* p. 50.

[74] William P. Alston *Philosophy of Language.* Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. 1964. p. 97.

able, too. If the speakers cannot change their language, then they are not in a position to create new meaning through metaphors. If it is possible to know in advance how to understand infinitely many sentences, then the meaning of metaphors must be predictable. What does Black say? How does he describe metaphor in *The Labyrinth of Language?* Does Black modify the position he held in the essay? There is no answer to these questions: Black does not discuss the problem of metaphor in the book.

In his second essay on metaphor, Black seems to give up much of what he stated in the book, and seems to return to his position in the first essay.[75] He says, for instance, that the meaning of an interesting metaphor is "not inferrible from the standard lexicon,"[76] which means that no speaker, however competent, can be capable of knowing in advance the meaning of an interesting metaphor. Or, he says that "a metaphorical statement involves a *rule-violation:* there can be no rules for 'creatively' violating rules. And that is why there can be no *dictionary* [...] of metaphors."[77] This most probably means that he looks upon metaphor as involving "rule-changing innovations." These statements would make no sense within the context of generative linguistics which dominates his book of 1968. In 1977, Black seems to adopt a different approach, although his position is not absolutely clear: "I use 'meaning' here for whatever a competent hearer may be said to have grasped when he succeeds in responding adequately to the actual or hypothetical verbal action consisting in the serious utterance of the sentence(s) in question."[78] Does this mean that "words mean whatever the speakers think they mean," or does this mean that the allusion to generative linguistics (i.e., "a competent hearer") should be taken seriously? Within generative linguistics a "competent hearer" can only grasp what any other replica of the ideal hearer-speaker can grasp, and nothing else. And what does the "adequate response" imply? Is there just one adequate interpretation of an interesting metaphor? Who or what determines what words mean? The language institution or the speakers?

Black seems to answer these questions when he rewrites one part of the first essay: "Although I speak figuratively here of the 'subjects'

75 Max Black "More about Metaphor" *Dialectica* 31 (1977) 431–57.

76 Ibid. p. 436.

77 Ibid. p. 438.

78 Ibid. p. 437.

interacting, such an outcome is of course produced in the minds of the speaker and hearer: It is they who are led to engage in selecting, organizing and projecting."[79] Does Black suggest that the speakers of the language are not very tightly controlled by the rules of the language institution, or, on the contrary, does he imply that they all follow the same unwritten linguistic manual when they select, organize and project? Black adds: "In 'Metaphor,' I said – to the scandal of my subsequent critics – that the imputed interaction involves 'shifts in meanings of words belonging to the same family or system as the metaphorical expression.' I meant, of course, a shift in the *speaker's* meaning – and the corresponding *hearer's* meaning – what both of them understand by words, as used on a particular occasion."[80] Here, again, one has to wonder what the meaning and function of the word "competent" can be. But whatever it is, Black treats the speaker's and hearer's meaning as if it could be taken for granted that they are exactly the same: "what both of them understand by words." Thus, Black seems to suggest that linguistic homogeneity reaches a degree that – even though the meaning of a metaphor is not inferrible from the standard lexicon, and even after a metaphorical change of meaning – the speaker's and the hearer's interpretation of the words used will still coincide.

BAKHTIN (AND HIS CIRCLE) ON LINGUISTIC HOMOGENEITY AND HETEROGENEITY

Bakhtin's intellectual background was markedly different from that of Black. He was naturally attracted to thinkers like Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Martin Buber and Hermann Cohen who do not seem to be mentioned in Black's *The Labyrinth of Language*. Although it is rarely emphasized, Bakhtin was most probably deeply influenced by the German and Slavic mystic traditions. As opposed to Black's restricted scope of interest, Bakhtin's perspective was much wider. In general, he was in a unique position to re-evaluate the history and significance of linguistic differentiation. His views on dialogism and heteroglossia allowed him to occupy a place at the crossroads of linguistics, philosophy,

79 Ibid. p. 442.

80 Ibid. p. 443. He quotes Black "Metaphor" p. 292.

aesthetics, literary scholarship, sociology and psychology (to mention only what is most obvious) and whichever direction he chose, he was bound to come up with interesting insights and valuable contributions. This is remarkable because there are not very many thinkers who can, and actually do, successfully use the same set of basic ideas in different disciplines. The reverse may also be true: Bakhtin's familiarity with these disciplines may have confirmed his belief in dialogism. Both the assumptions of homogeneity and heterogeneity are, in various forms, present in Bakhtin's, Medvedev's and Voloshinov's books and essays.

V. N. Voloshinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language

Voloshinov opposes "two trends of thought in philosophy of language," that is, he opposes what he calls "individualistic subjectivism" and "abstract objectivism." By choosing a particular perspective (i.e., Sprache als Schopfung), Voloshinov made an important decision that will have an effect on his arguments and conclusions. The perspective he adopted is absolutely justified, at least as far as the first trend is concerned. And he is right when he points out that the role of creativity in language is regarded by "abstract objectivism" as irrelevant. However, the focus on creativity in language restricts the scope of Voloshinov's book. In particular, although linguistic homogeneity and heterogeneity are undoubtedly present in the book, they are touched upon only tangentially. Some (or probably most) of the expressions and oppositions Voloshinov uses can be readily rephrased in terms of linguistic differentiation. To give just one example, there can be no room for the newly created meanings, forms and rules in a conception which is exclusively based on the assumption of homogeneity. Although the expressions like "normatively identical linguistic forms" imply a dilemma between homogeneity and heterogeneity, Voloshinov did not fully recognize that the concepts of heterogeneity and linguistic creativity presuppose and support one another. Voloshinov's argument cannot be but one-sided when he accepts that creation is possible but does not, at the same time, investigate what this implies and does not discuss the effect the continuous creation has on the system(s) of language. It might be argued that this criticism of *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* is anachronistic and involves a great deal of hindsight wisdom. How could Vo-

loshinov have anticipated the arguments some of which were put forward by dialectologists and sociolinguists decades after his death? I do not deny that there is truth in this, but only a few years later Bakhtin already concentrated on "heteroglossia." Voloshinov seems to have taken a position which was uniquely suitable to develop a thorough critique of the assumption of linguistic homogeneity. If he missed the chance, then he missed a chance which was within his reach.

When Voloshinov says that "The meaning of a word is determined entirely by its context,"[81] his statement is comparable to I. A. Richards' context theorem of meaning . Voloshinov finds the explanation for the contextual determination of meaning in dialogism: "In the alternating lines of a dialogue, the same word may figure in two mutually clashing contexts."[82] Although Richards does not use the word "dialogue," he discribes a similar situation. Voloshinov then goes on to ask a fairly obvious question: "How can the fundamental polysemanticity of the word be reconciled with its unity?" and he adds "It is a problem that can only be solved dialectically."[83] Voloshinov thinks he solves the problem by introducing two new terms, "meaning" and "theme." The latter is "individual and unreproducible, just as the utterance itself is individual and unreproducible. Theme is the expression of a concrete, historical situation that engendered the utterance."[84] Meaning, on the other hand, is defined as "those aspects of the utterance that are *reproducible* and *self-identical* in all instances of repetition."[85] It is quite clear that "meaning$_1$" and "meaning$_2$" should not be confused. "Meaning$_1$" occurs when Voloshinov says that the meaning of the word is wholly determined by the context. "Meaning$_2$," on the other hand, is opposed to "theme." It is not entirely clear why Voloshinov's explanation should be seen as superior to the ones he criticizes. Theme and meaning only express polysemanticity and unity in more general terms, and Voloshinov fails to provide answers for a number of questions. What guarantees reproducibility and self-identity? How can we ascertain that "meaning$_2$" is in fact the same whenever the word is repeated? Where do reproducibility

81 V. N. Voloshinov *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* Tr. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik. New York and London: Seminar Press. 1973. p. 79.

82 Ibid. p. 80.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid. p. 99.

85 Ibid. p. 100.

and identity reside? Voloshinov mentions that these aspects are abstract and "have no concrete, autonomous existence."[86] But then how can we be certain that the same abstractions are accessible to everybody? Or, if they are available to every speaker in some unexplained way, new questions will arise. How long is "meaning$_2$" available, reproducible and self-identical? How do these aspects come into being? Are they eternally present? Are new meanings possible at all? Or, should we explain "new meanings" in terms of the "theme"? If new meanings are possible, how can they emerge from what is self-identical? Not only does Voloshinov fail to provide the answers to these trivial questions but even adds to the confusion when he remarks that "there is no reason for saying that meaning belongs to a word as such. [...] Meaning is the *effect of interaction between speaker and listener*"[87] How can reproducibility and identity be the effect of interaction? Or is the interaction between speaker and hearer predetermined by what is reproducible and self-identical?

Voloshinov's vision of objectivity is similarly disappointing: "From a truly objective viewpoint, one that attempts to see language in a way completely apart from how it appears to any given individual at any given moment in time, language presents the picture of a ceaseless flow of becoming. From a standpoint of observing a language objectively, from above, there is no real moment in time when a synchronic system of language could be constructed."[88] First of all, the sentences quoted are contradictory: how could anyone view any kind of phenomena "completely apart" from how they appear to any individual? Or, if objectivity is different from its appearances to anyone at any time, then the way it appeared to Voloshinov should be dismissed as another unreliable appearance. If Voloshinov refers to human beings by the expression "any given individual," then the condition specified by the expression "completely apart" can never be satisfied. For human beings there is no privileged standpoint "above" the "ceaseless flow of becoming." Secondly, is the language of objectivity metaphorical? And is the existence of language, when viewed objectively, comparable to a river?

The opposition Voloshinov sets up between the two trends in linguistics is too neat in the sense that it misrepresents the authors he

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid. pp. 102-103.

[88] Ibid. p. 66.

discusses. The most obvious example is Meillet: "We shall not dwell on a characterization of Meillet's views. They fit entirely within the framework of the basic principles of the second trend. For Meillet, too, language is a social phenomenon, not in its aspect as process, but as a stable system of linguistic norms. The compulsory nature of language and the fact that language is exterior to the individual consciousness are for Meillet its fundamental social characteristics."[89] However, Voloshinov is mistaken. For a number of reasons, Meillet's views do not *entirely* fit within the framework that Voloshinov defined. Firstly, it was not Meillet but Saussure who opposed the history and the system of a language. Meillet thought that system and history are complementary. Secondly, Meillet did not completely rule out the possibility of individual creation. All he said was that it may be very difficult for an individual innovation to find its place in the system if it does not fully comply with the general rules of the language.[90] Thirdly, Meillet, as opposed to Saussure or Voloshinov,[91] did not consider the lexical units of a language parts of its system. He thought individual words can come and go without having an effect on the general system of language. On the other hand, Voloshinov seems to forget that Karl Vossler, one of the main representatives of what he calls individualistic subjectivism, while constantly emphasized the role of creation, mentioned the role of another factor: the cooperation of the members of a linguistic community. This cooperation, according to Vossler, is motivated by the need of comprehensibility.[92] These two examples show that Voloshinov slightly simplifies both trends so that they fit his conception. The trend that he calls individualistic subjectivism is not altogether blind to the social aspect of language and, on the other hand, abstract objectivism did not completely ignore individual creation. Still, Voloshinov outlined a con-

[89] Ibid. p. 61.

[90] Antoine Meillet *Linguistique historique et linguistique generale.* Paris: E. Champion. 1926-1936. p. 16.

[91] Voloshinov *Marxism* p. 52.

[92] "Also kommt eine Nationalsprache in ihrer Gesamtheit und Gemeinsamkeit nicht durch geistige Passivität, sondern durch Tätigkeit, und zwar nicht durch individuelle, sondern durch kollektive Tätigkeit zustande: durch Zusammenwirken." Karl Vossler *Positivismus und Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft: Eine sprach-philosophische Untersuchung.* Heidelberg: Carl Winter. 1904. p. 90.

flict of linguistic theories in which the individual is opposed to the society and the creation is opposed to the stable system. This is precisely the situation in which he could have invoked linguistic heterogeneity.

There are quite a few passages in Voloshinov's book which suggest that he could have chosen another approach. When he describes the way abstract objectivity looks upon language change, he borrows an example from Saussure: "At any one period of time only one linguistic norm can exist: either 'ich was' or 'ich war.' A norm can coexist only with its violation and not with another, contradictory norm (for which reason there can be no 'tragedies' in language)."[93] This is probably not Voloshinov's view, even if the remark in parentheses was provided by him. Then it is all the more surprizing that he never says that Saussure cannot be right. If Saussure were right, then it would be possible to mark the day when *was* stopped and *war* began functioning as the norm.

The second example concerns the social embeddedness of the speech acts. Voloshinov is quite right in pointing out that "Each person's inner world and thought has its stabilized *social audience* that comprises the environment in which reasons, motives, values, and so on are fashioned."[94] From this he draws the conclusion that "A word is a territory shared by both addresser and addressee, by the speaker and his interlocutor." The common territory will later in the book be called "meaning$_2$." Voloshinov does not point out that, in addition to their stabilized inner social audiences, the addresser and the addressee may have very different, stabilized linguistic norms. Should he have considered this? Let us see the next example.

The third passage is even more intriguiging. Voloshinov talks about the nature of a social norm: "It exists only with respect to the subjective consciousness of individuals belonging to some particular community governed by norms."[95] This is, perhaps, not very exciting, but then he adds: "Of course, these norms vary: their obligatory nature varies, as does the breadth of their social compass, as does also the degree of their social significance determined by their proximity to the basis, etc." This, in other words, means that when investigating the norms, one has to investigate the compass of the linguistic norms as well. It is quite unclear why Voloshinov failed to do so.

93 Voloshinov *Marxism* p. 56.

94 Ibid. p. 86.

95 Ibid. p. *66.*

P. N. Medvedev 's The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship

Medvedev criticizes the formalists for their "futurist" belief in the "possibility of a new, special poetic language, which would be another language linguistically."[96] He seems to be right when he states that "Language acquires poetic characteristics only in the concrete poetic construction. These characteristics do not belong to language in its linguistic capacity, but to the construction, whatever its form may be."[97] Medvedev's argument is similar to that of Stanley Fish. This argument can be effective against a conception that looks upon literature as a distinct language or dialect. It is, however, less useful as a critical tool against "literature as deviation" or against the conception Jakobson expounded in his "Linguistics and Poetics." But, it seems, Medvedev anticipated them. He says that the formalists regard poetic language as a "parasite" because it relies on the vocabulary, grammar of what he calls "practical" language. Although the attacks on "poetic language as a distinct language" and on "poetic language as a parasite" are not formally compatible, this inconsistency is less interesting now than Medvedev's insights concerning deviation. He is right when he says that the formalists "only provide the basis for an explanation of regroupings, transferences, and recombinations of material that is already present and completely finished. Not one qualitatively new feature is added to the world of language and literature as given."[98] This penetrating criticism applies to Jakobson's "Linguistics and Poetics" so perfectly that one can but admire Medvedev's (whoever he may be) acumen. He adds that deviation, labelled by the formalists as "deautomatization," "making-it-strange," "deformation," has only to do with "external arrangement and localized transference," while the content is "assumed to be at hand."[99] It is, again, somewhat unfortunate that Medvedev did not associate his "sociological poetics" with a sociolinguistic perspective.

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[96] Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics.* Tr. Albert J. Wehrle. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978. p. 81.

[97] Ibid. p. 84.

[98] Ibid. p. 97.

[99] Ibid.

Mikhail Bakhtin's Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics and "Discourse in the Novel"

In the last chapter of the 1963 edition of his book on Dostoevsky, Bakhtin mentions two kinds of linguistics.

(a) Linguistics proper studies language "as the specific object of linguistics, something arrived at through a completely legitimate and necessary abstraction from various aspects of the concrete life of the word."

(b) Metalinguistics, on the other hand, studies "precisely those aspects in the life of the word that linguistics makes abstract." The subject of metalinguistics is dialogism in language.

Bakhtin adds that "Linguistics and metalinguistics study one and the same concrete, highly complex, and multi-faceted phenomenon, namely, the word – but they study it from various sides and various points of view."[100] While linguistics studies only certain aspects of language and ignores others completely, metalinguistics does not only recognize the results of linguistics, but has access to those aspects of language which are unavailable to the first approach. He concedes that both linguistics and metalinguistics are "legitimate," which basically means that he is willing to look upon linguistics proper as legitimate. The relationship of the two linguistics, as described here, is not simple opposition but a kind of harmonious complementariness.

The relationship of these approaches is somewhat different in Bakhtin's "Discourse in the novel." In his long essay he describes linguistics as turning language into a unitary and homogeneous object: "Philosophy of language, linguistics and stylistics (i.e., such as they have come down to us) have all postulated a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular 'own' language, and have postulated as well a simple realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the individual. Such disciplines actually know only two poles in the life of language, between which are located all the linguistic and stylistic phenomena they know: on the one hand, the system of a *unitary language,* and on the other the *individual* speaking this

[100] Bakhtin *Dostoevsky* p. 181.

language."[101] The common unitary language is, according to Bakhtin, "a system of linguistic norms."[102] Bakhtin maintains that within the boundaries of this unitary language, there is a multitude of "social" or "ideological" languages, and adds: "this internal stratification present in every language at any given moment of its historical existence is the indispensable prerequisite for the novel as a genre. The novel orchestrates all its themes, the totality of the world of objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by means of the social diversity of speech types."[103] It is surprising that while he points out the undesirable consequences of the hegemony of the unitary language in philosophy and stylistics, he does not attack the assumptions from which they follow.

Bakhtin contrasts the common unitary language, conceived as an abstract system of general norms, to a language "conceived as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion."[104] He holds that the diversity of ideological languages "does not exceed the boundaries of literary language conceived as a linguistic whole (that is, language defined by abstract linguistic markers), does not pass into authentic heteroglossia and is based on an abstract notion of language as unitary (that is, it does not require knowledge of various dialects or languages.)"[105] A social or ideological language "frequently does not admit a strict linguistic definition."[106] Language and "language" (he usually used the word "language" in quotation marks to refer to "language as ideology") do not have the same status and are based on different assumptions. This explains why Bakhtin does not oppose the two conceptions of language as necessarily contradicting one another: "Language – like the living concrete environment in which the consciousness of the verbal artist lives – is never unitary. It is unitary only as an abstract grammatical system of normative forms, taken in isolation from the concrete, ideological conceptualizations that fill it."[107]

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[101] Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin "Discourse in the Novel" in M. M. Bakhtin. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays.* Tr. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1981. 259-422. p. 269.

[102] Ibid. p. 270.

[103] Ibid. p. 263.

[104] Ibid. p. 271.

[105] Ibid. p. 308.

[106] Ibid. p. 350.

[107] Ibid. p. 288.

But even language as ideology can encroach upon the supposedly common and unitary language. It is worth quoting a few examples which will show that the relationship of language and "languages" is less than perfectly clear-cut. Once Bakhtin mentions that the norms of the common unitary language "do not constitute an abstract imperative."[108] When comparing poetic and prose styles, he says that "the possibility of another vocabulary, another semantics, other syntactic forms and so forth, to the possibility of other linguistic points of view, is equally foreign to poetic style."[109] Later he remarks that the social languages are "pregnant with possibilities for further dialectological individuation: it is a potential dialect, its embryo not yet fully formed."[110] Finally, he admits: "Thus double-voicedness in the novel [...] always tends toward a *double-languagedness* as its own outside limit. Therefore novelistic double-voicedness cannot be unfolded into logical contradictions or into purely dramatic contrasts. It is this quality that determines the distinctiveness of novelistic dialogues, which push to the limit the mutual nonunderstanding represented by people *who speak in different languages.*"[111] On the basis of these remarks, Bakhtin could have said that it is always possible to specify the criteria (lexical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) which separate the different social languages from one another, and he could have argued that different ideologies tend to manifest themselves in different languages (as opposed to different "languages.") If the criteria are valid, it matters very little whether they are accepted as linguistic by linguists.

Although it seems Bakhtin was aware of this possibility, for some reason which is not altogether obvious, he did not take this line of argument. Probably he was not interested in discovering more than one "abstract" system of linguistic norms. He may have thought that the number of such systems is quite irrelevant from the perspective of dialogism. Whatever he thought, he seems to have missed a chance for a thorough criticism of the assumption of the homogeneity of language. This is of crucial importance. There is a decisive difference between a language teeming with ideological "languages" which can exceed the boundaries of the "common unitary language" only accidentally, and a

108 Ibid. p. 271.
109 Ibid. p. 285.
110 Ibid. p. 356.
111 Ibid.

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diversity of full-fledged languages which accomodate different ideologies, but can, perhaps most of the time, exploit the same linguistic possibilities. The first conception assumes that language is a neutral means of communication that can be used to express whatever its speakers wish to say. This conception does not have to explain why speakers can understand one another. Mutual understanding is presupposed in the common structures they employ; only misunderstanding has to be explained, most probably in psychological or pragmatic terms. If we adopted this conception, we would have to say that there is only one linguistically correct interpretation of any novel, poem, etc. The second conception assumes that language and ideology are so intimately related that the ideological differences are bound to surface sooner or later as linguistic differences. Although this conception does not have to exclude that the various languages can overlap and have a considerable common core, it cannot take for granted that understanding is an almost automatic affair following from the identically defined, shared linguistic structures. Understanding and misunderstanding have the same status: both are contingent.

Despite certain explicit reservations and misgivings, Bakhtin's "Discourse" creates the secondary structures of ideology and of social languages within the confines of the first conception. Had he adopted the second conception, he could not have looked upon linguistics (with its abstract, unitary system of norms) as legitimate. Dialogism seems to be more naturally compatible with the second conception. If it is defined as a part of the first conception, this can only lead to an unresolvable conflict between linguistic homogeneity and ideological variability.

COOPERATION AND INTERACTION

An aggregate of sentences ("text," for short) can be called monolingual if they are produced by the same set of rules. If the text cannot be regarded as the product of the same rules, it can be called plurilingual. The sound-shape (or the written form) of texts produced by different rules can coincide, or, in other words, different rules can produce what appears on the surface as the same. This can be called textual homonymy. A text, in this sense, does not presuppose one sin-

gle speaker (or author). A plurilingual text requires at least two languages.

If one set of rules (e. g., the established rules) and meanings (in the same or in different set of rules) are sufficient to explain a text, the relationship among its constituent parts will be called cooperation. If the available rules or meanings cannot explain a text, and new rules or meanings have to be employed to explain it, the relationship among its constituent parts will be called interaction.

When these distinctions are combined, four possibilities seem to be open:

(i) monolingual cooperation;
(ii) monolingual interaction;
(iii) plurilingual cooperation;
(iv) plurilingual interaction.

(i) *Monolingual cooperation.* The first possibility is most probably necessary for any kind of speech activity and verbal exchange. But its role and proportions in speech and literature have been entirely obscured by the assumption of linguistic homogeneity which suggests that this is the only possible and reasonable type of linguistic behavior. Monolingual cooperation is a language game which can foster a sense of community (from a very general sense of the word to intimacy). Monolingual cooperation is the basis of deviation, some forms of irony, some of the riddles, allusions, jokes and puns. It is also the basis of the comparison-metaphor and the comparison view of metaphor.

The game of monolingual cooperation does not have to be simple. Quite the contrary, it can be intellectually satisfying and stimulating. When it is established, or thought to be established, it will allow gaps among the various parts of the text. The speaker then can reasonably assume that the gaps will be filled by the hearer. In addition, this game will allow apparent contradictions and inconsistencies which, when the text is correctly interpreted, must disappear. But while they are there, they can be very effective for various purposes. Black describes a similar situation:

> The view that a metaphorical expression has a meaning that is some transform of its normal literal meaning is a special case of a more general view about "figurative" language. This holds that any figure of speech involving semantic change (and not merely syntactic change, like inversion of normal word order) consists in some transformation of a *literal* meaning. The author provides, not his intended meaning, *m,* but some function thereof, *f(m);* the reader's task is to apply the inverse function, f^{-1} *(f(m)), i.e., m,* the original meaning. When different functions are used, different tropes result. Thus, in irony, the author says the *opposite* of what he means; in hyperbole, he *exaggerates* his meaning; and so on.[112]

However, when monolingual cooperation is at work, when both *f(m)* and f^{1} *(f(m))* are available to the speaker and to the audience, it is not necessary to suppose that any semantic change has taken place. H. P. Grice's "Logic and Conversation" is relevant in this context. His "cooperative principle" and "maxims" presuppose the game of monolingual cooperation,[113] and his examples can work only if speaker and hearer rely on the same language. This is especially true in the situations in which the maxims are "exploited" or "flouted." For "irony," Grice offers this example:

> X, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A says *'X is a fine friend.'* (Gloss: It is perfectly obvious to A and his audience that what A has said or has made as if to say is something he does not believe, and the audience knows that A knows that this is obvious to the audience. So, unless A's utterance is entirely pointless, A must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting forward. This must be some obviously related proposition; the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward.)[114]

This is precisely the situation Black describes, without, however, the supposed change of meaning.

[112] Black "Metaphor" p. 282.

[113] H. P. Grice "Logic and Conversation" in Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds) *Syntax and Semantics.* Vol. 3. *Speech Acts* New York: Academic Press. 1975. 41-58. pp. *A5-A1.*

[114] Ibid. p. 53.

In some cases, the message or the pattern communicated can be extremely difficult to grasp. Both the technique of gaps and that of the apparent inconsistencies (contradictions, absurdities, etc.) require confidence. When the cooperation of the hearer cannot be taken for granted (e.g., in a hostile situation), or when the speaker feels insecure for some reason, it should not be assumed that the intended message will come across. These techniques (gaps, contradictions, etc.) will lead to the need for explanation when any explanation can sound suspicious. From a logical point of view, monolingual cooperation cannot be inconsistent if inconsistence is considered to be a consequence of incompatible meanings and rules. The disagreements among speakers about factual or theoretical problems which are eventually resolved without recourse to new meanings and rules are only apparent contradictions.

(ii) *Monolingual interaction.* It is, by definition, impossible.

(iii) *Plurilingual cooperation.* The expression "plurilingual cooperation" refers to a language game involving more than one language, none of which undergoes change during the process. Plurilingual cooperation includes several possibilities.

Plurilingual cooperation is the basic formula for some forms of popular fiction (detective, spy and science fiction novels). Commenting on the archetypal detective C. Auguste Dupin, the narrator of Edgar Allan Poe's "The Murders in the Rue Morgue" remarks: "the analyst throws himself into the spirit of the opponent, identifies himself therewith."[115] Ever since Poe, this has remained one of the fundamental conventions of the detective novels. The better the detective, the more easily he can identify with the villains. If necessary, he can even impersonate them, as Philip Marlowe does occasionally. Sherlock Holmes is, among other things, a master of disguise: he can assume different identities at will without being detected. Spies, according to the conventions of spy novels, can easily pass as native speakers of languages other than their own. But the art of deception and appearances is not restricted to popular fiction.

[115] Edgar Allan Poe. "The Murders in the Rue Morgue" in *The Complete Poems and Short Stories of Edgar Allan Poe with Selections from His Critical Writings.* 2 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1958. Vol. 1. 315-341. p. 316.

Deciphering coded messages also requires the form of plurilingual cooperation. To quote Poe once again: "The 'good glass,' I knew, could have reference to nothing but a telescope; for the word 'glass' is rarely employed in any other sense by seamen."[116]

Certain forms of historicism are also based on case plurilingual cooperation. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren summed up this position: "We must [...] enter into the mind and attitudes of past periods and accept their standards, deliberately excluding the intrusions of our own preconceptions."[117] Erich Auerbach also says: "the historian - whose task it is to define the place of a given work in a historical continuity – must endeavor insofar as that is still possible, to attain a clear understanding of what the work meant to its author and his contemporaries."[118] R. G. Collingwood made similar statements: "how does the historian discern the thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only one way in which it can be done: by rethinking them in his own mind"[119]. Collingwood calls re-enactment this method of discovering the thoughts of "past periods."

This similarity among the "omniscient" narrator, the great fictional detectives, the literary historian and the historian is created by the act of throwing themselves into the spirit of the opponent. This obviously requires a great deal of imagination and interpretive skills. It cannot be simple, if possible at all, to enter the mind of a past period, and to master the language(s) it speaks. The purpose of this is to reduce the plurilingual situation to a monolingual one. When successful, it will necessarily imply that one of the speakers is, at least passively, bilin-

[116] Edgar Allan Poe "The Gold Bug" in *The Complete Poems and Short Stories of Edgar Allan Poe with Selections from His Critical Writings* 2 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1958. Vol. 1. 449–76. p. 474.

[117] Rene Wellek - Austin Warren *Theory of Literature.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 1956 [1942]. p. 40.

[118] Erich Auerbach *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* Tr. Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1953. pp. 353-354. Auerbach adds a few lines later: "no matter how painstakingly I have tried to do as little interpreting as possible, I yet cannot help feeling that my thoughts about the book often go far beyond Cervantes' aesthetic intention."

[119] Robin George Collingwood *The Idea of History* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1946. p. 215. "History cannot be scientifically written unless the historian can re-enact in his own mind the experience of the people whose actions he is narrating." Collingwood 1946. p. 39.

gual. This bilingualism is supposed to enable the person who studies the past period to understand it on its own terms, without any interference from the language(s) of the present. Besides, it has to be assumed that there is bilingualism without interference. When Wellek and Warren say that our own preconceptions should be deliberately excluded, they specify this condition. (This assumption is also true for the great detective and the omniscient narrator.) Then what is understood in the language of the past has to be translated into the language of the present. Thus, this case can be analyzed into non-interferential bilingualism and the assumption of "global translatability."

Plurilingual cooperation can also be useful for describing parallel events or the activities of opponents. In general, this case is perfectly suitable for guessing and second-guessing. Some forms of this relatively simple but effective structure are, again, quite common in popular fiction: "They are lying and we know it – but they don't know we know. And we're lying, and they certainly suspect it, but not why we're lying."[120] The good and the bad are usually distinguished unmistakably, and the evaluation is fixed throughout the text. If the evaluation of the characters, living in parallel worlds, is balanced, the same structure can be the source of pervasive irony. The type of parallel structure that switches back and forth between good and evil is a compositional device, presenting the preparations for the main battle. The languages involved in the conflict are not supposed to change. Beside popular fiction, this non-interactive conflict between good and bad, "us" and "them" tends to dominate political speeches. "We" know what "they" want. But "they" cannot teach "us" anything "we" did not know without "them." The common formula of these types of political speeches and popular fiction often is: "We must stop them before they get us." In popular fiction, the parallel structure allows a kaleidoscopic narration of the events the meaning of which can be suspended until the very end. In retrospect, however, all the questions should be answered and all the ambiguities should be removed. This is the reason why it is almost impossible to re-read such a text.

(iv) Plurilingual interaction. Bakhtin conception of language presupposes and, at the same time, supersedes plurilingual cooperation.

120 Tom Clancy *The Hunt for Red October.* 1985. pp. 170-171.

The multiplicity of social languages with their distinct world views leads to a "tension-filled interaction"[121] among them. The process of interaction inevitably produces new meanings. Bakhtin, in fact, remarks that "nothing new can be introduced" into the discourse without dialogical interaction.[122] Verbal interaction is, for Bakhtin, a give-and-take affair: the speaker makes an attempt to apprehend the relevant aspects of the languages and world views of others in order to get his point through to them: "The speaker strives to get a reading on his own word, and on his own conceptual system that determines this word, within the alien conceptual system of the understanding receiver; he enters into dialogical relationships with certain aspects of this system. The speaker breaks through the alien conceptual horizon of the listener, constructs his own utterance on alien territory, against his, the listener's, apperceptive background."[123]

What does this imply for the theory of metaphor? From the speaker's point of view, the creation of metaphor is necessary when the available resources of language are insufficient to express the state of affairs the speaker considers to be relevant. From the speaker's point of view, the interactive interpretation of metaphor is necessary when the available linguistic resources (i.e., whatever is available through monolingual and plurilingual cooperation) are insufficient to explain an utterance. The way an utterance makes sense to the readers depends on the meanings they can attach to its constituents. In this sense, metaphor is a semantic phenomenon – even for those who think it belongs exclusively to the domain of pragmatics. Words are permeated with interpretations and their meaning depends on the contexts from which they have been extracted and which they cannot help dragging along. When the implied assertions are in harmony, there is no need for the creation of new meanings. If we apply Bakhtin's conception of language to metaphor, we shall locate it in a plurilingual space. Bakhtin's description of the "hybrid construction" seems to fit metaphor perfectly: "What we are calling a hybrid construction is an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two 'languages,' two semantic and axiological belief

[121] Bakhtin "Discourse in the Novel" p. 279.

[122] Ibid. p. 281.

[123] Ibid. p. 282.

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systems. We repeat, there is no formal – compositional or syntactic - boundary between these utterances, styles, languages, belief systems; the division of voices and languages takes place within the limits of a single syntactic whole, often within the limits of a simple sentence. It frequently happens that even one and the same word will belong to two languages, belief systems that intersect in a hybrid construction – and, consequently, the word has two contradictory meanings, two accents."[124]

This theory places metaphor in the plurilingual space of the novels. But novels are more than minimal narratives and minimal conflicts between contexts. Temporality, repetition, focalization and other factors also have to be considered. In this sense the analysis presented above satisfies only the minimal requirements of a sociolinguistic approach to metaphor and narrative.

[124] Ibid. pp. 304-305.

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ANDRÁS KAPPANYOS

NOTES ON THE UNTRANSLATABLE

Talking of translation involves talking of two different subject languages, plus the meta-language in which we are actually talking. In our case, talking of either a Hungarian work translated into Bulgarian, or the other way round, would involve Hungarian or Bulgarian as source language, Bulgarian or Hungarian as a target language, and English as a meta-language to describe the process. Clearly, the majority of us (including myself) possess only two of these.

But let's imagine the ideal situation: all the participants of the conversation possess all the three involved languages. In this case we could even reduce the number of languages to two: we could use either Bulgarian or Hungarian as a meta-language. But even then, our linguistic competence would be radically different, as well as our expectations towards the translation. Some of us would (and definitely could) consider the text's semantic faithfulness to the, say, Bulgarian original, and some of us would (and could) judge its syntactic faithfulness to Hungarian grammar, style, rhetoric. As these aspects often contradict each other, we might say that the only people who could adequately discuss a translation are the very rare real bilinguals. The ones who don't need translations at all.

Translation (unlike literature itself) is a process with a practical end: it makes available (or even familiar) something that is alien: something that is behind one's linguistic barriers. Basically there are two methods for doing this. We can present the alien as something familiar (sparing the reader the shock of the new but considerably distorting the

subject in the imitation) or we can present a linguistic interface to the alien (keeping it intact but giving the reader a much more difficult job to do). This dilemma is very similar to the imaginary debate between those Arab and Hungarian scholars over the Hungarian translation of a Bulgarian text.

There seems to be a vague line of historic development from the "imitation" method towards the "interface" method. In the 18th and partly in the 19th centuries not only the names of the heroes were translated (or simply changed) to Hungarian, but also that of the authors. Even in my childhood I considered Karl May and Jules Verne Hungarian writers, as in my parents' generation still everybody referred to them as May Károly and Verne Gyula. In the 20th century however Hungarian authors of cheap criminal or soft erotic adventure books take English or French names to make their stories feel more exotic, as if they were translations. But even in high culture if someone publishes a book on English literature, s/he often tries to make it look like an English book, e. g. puts the list of contents to the front instead of at the end.

Independently from these historical changes, this dilemma (how transparent should the process be) is in fact the main practical question before beginning any translation. The examples I will present involve only two of the above mentioned three languages: I speak of translations between Hungarian and English. To make my points clear I will try to translate the Hungarian versions literally, thus illustrating the thesis that not only translation itself, but also talking of translation is completely impossible.

The best examples of this methodical dilemma can be found at the untranslatable places. We know some books that are particularly rich in such places, and one of them, James Joyce's *Ulysses* has two complete Hungarian translations that demonstrate this difference brilliantly.

In the second chapter Stephen asks a student, what does he know about Pyrrhus. The answer is this: "Pyrrhus, sir? Pyrrhus, a pier." It is clear that the student knows nothing substantial about Pyrrhus, so, in his misery, he tries to associate freely on the word's acoustic form. The problem is that the word "pier" is very rarely used (though not unknown) in Hungarian. This makes this place almost untranslatable. The first translator uses the original word, hoping that readers of Joyce

will be able to understand it. He also keeps the English word "sir", so the reader is warned that this scene takes place at a culturally far away land. The second translator refuses to use an alien word in a rather familiar school scene, so he changes the word "pier" to its Hungarian equivalent, which is "myly". Thus he manages to keep the linguistic integrity of the passage, but loses the structural-logical integrity of the narrative. The reader understands the word "myly", but s/he has no idea why would someone associate it with Pyrrhus.

The par excellence case of untranslatability is when elements of the target language appear in the source text. We cannot familiarise something that is already familiar, neither can we create that aura of foreignness around it that is so clearly present in the original. The Hungarian fragments of *Ulysses* are available for everyone, except those who read it in Hungarian. The first translator gave it up: he ignores the fact that these texts are in Hungarian in the original. The damage is considerable, though the structure and logic of the narrative is saved. The second translator enjoys the Hungarian fragments so much that he tries to save them for the Hungarian reader. (They are funny indeed, especially the "százharminc borjúgulyás dugulás", meaning approximately "hundred thirty calf stew constipation".) So he equips these phrases with metalingual signposts, like "has been heard in Hungarian". The problem with these is that nobody tells the reader that these are metalingual signposts provided by the translator, and not parts of the original text faithfully interpreted by the translator. (This would require additional meta-signposts, and so on, ad infinitum.) So this translator risked the damage of the original structure in trade for the doubtful possibility of saving the original local effect.

So far I have presented two "untranslatable textual events", both with two apparently imperfect solutions. I call these cases untranslatable because we cannot avoid a substantial loss in the process of translation, either in terms of information, or in terms of *vraisemblance*. The first translator made a compromise in both cases in which the *vraisemblance* was spared in trade for important pieces of information (the meaning of the word "pier" and the presence of Hungarian elements in the original), while the second translator tried to keep all the information, so he had to sacrifice *vraisemblance*, or "good continuity".

Their treatment might be similar, but the two untranslatable events are radically different. In the Pyrrhus/pier case we see a rhetoric structure that is probably best described as a fake etymology. This structure is quite easily recreated in any language that is capable of word puns. This is exactly what translators usually do with puns: they re-create the structure in the target language. But this pun cannot be replaced with another, as both its elements take place in the *sujet*, they have narrative consequences. The case of the calf stew is different, as there is no structure that could be re-created. There is simply a substantial gap in the code system of the target language. The meaning of the source text aims at something, but there is no equivalent, there's nothing to hit. For the time being I call these structural and substantial untranslatabilities respectively.

For a structurally untranslatable textual event my best example is the North Pole of Winnie-the-Pooh. The whole narrative is led by a childish misunderstanding that is based on a homonym. The acoustic form "pole" has an abstract meaning: the end of an axis; and a concrete one: a stake, a rod. The identical form of these two meanings is purely accidental, as etymologically they are also different: the first is a Latin, the second is a Germanic word. But accidentally they have a metonymical connection: the places of geographic poles (first meaning) might be signed by poles (second meaning) stuck in the ground. This is what completely misleads poor Christopher Robin, making him think that the North Pole should be "stuck in the ground".

It is clear that this structure cannot be transferred to another language. The Hungarian word for pole(1) has no homonymic potentials, though it is polysemic: its form is shared with the words meaning "heel" and "corner". So Winnie-the-Pooh finds a rod that has a big corner at one end so it can be stuck in the ground. A bit awkward solution, but it keeps a good part of the information (that there is some misunderstanding around the notion of a pole), and it does not damage good continuation very badly.

This kind of untranslatability arises from a linguistic ambiguity. For our purposes we might modernise the definition of William Empson: *Ambiguity arises when a linguistic element has functions in more than one subsystems, and these functions (which are usually absolutely coherent with the subsystems they belong to) interfere with each other.*

In this respect a homonym in itself does not constitute an untranslatable event: the phenomenon of homonym can be considered a subsystem in itself. There are homonyms in each language, and one homonym can be substituted to the other. But in the above case the translator ought to translate not only the homonym, but the narrative as well, that is actually led by the homonym.

In this case the problem is caused not by the connotative function (as usually in translation), but by the metalinguistic function. This utterance implicitly states that the acoustic form of the notion "end of an axis" and that of "rod, stake" are the same. And this statement is false for all the languages except one. We can see this better on an easier example: let's translate to other languages this self-referent sentence: "There are seven words in this sentence". In Hungarian it's only six, in French eight, in Russian five. So if we translate faithfully, we will be liars; we make a lie of a truthful statement. To keep the truthfulness of the original we have to be unfaithful to it.

It is evident that elements of language usually belong to several subsystems, though fortunately these are not equally relevant for translation. When translating a rhyming poem, the translator should save as much information as possible, while re-creating all acoustic equivalence. Fortunately we don't have to re-create semantic equivalence on the level of words: this would make translation of poetry impossible. We use bigger semantic units (typically lines or phrases) that give way to some combinative efforts. Shorter rhyming lines are more difficult to translate, and we can imagine a rhyming pair of lines that consists of the two meanings of the word "pole". So from the practical point of view there is no clear border between the "very difficult to translate" and the untranslatable.

My favourite example of the translator's awkward situation is somewhere around this border. The Cheshire Cat is an important character in Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*. It comes from an English saying "Grins like the Cheshire Cat". So the Cheshire Cat grins, but also acts as a cat: sits beside the fireplace and climbs to trees. When translating this passage the translator should find something that fits into the "grins like..." phrase and also similar to a cat. Unfortunately in Hungarian the "grins like..." ends with a wooden dog. So in the Hungarian book a wooden dog sits beside the fire and

though it doesn't climb a tree, it appears among the trees instead. It is quite funny that even such an illogical book can suffer from damaging its logical narrative structure, or its good continuation. What is even worse, the Hungarian edition cannot use John Tenniel's congenial illustrations, as they depict a cat, not dog.

What makes it even worse, the expression "wooden dog" will not evoke from the Hungarian reader's mind the picture of a dog carved of wood, but a winter sports device, a chair equipped with skates, that is traditionally used on the ice of the lake Balaton. This thing definitely never grins. The saying comes from an old household device that was once used for removing tight boots: its form resembles a grinning mouth. But this motivation is lost from the common linguistic sense. The problem is even more complex with the film versions as: here the translator used a much newer (thus anachronistic) idiom: "grins like a sour apple". Though we still see a cat on the pictures, its proper name becomes Sour Apple. Better than nothing.

The example of the Cheshire Cat leads us through to the other category which I called substantial untranslatability. We can imagine translation as a transcoding process. We identify the elements of a code system, find the equivalents of these elements in a code table and recombine these equivalents to a message according to a given syntax. The phenomenon of substantial untranslatability appears when the code table proves to be empty at a given place: there is no equivalent to a certain code element. E. g. there is no cat in Hungarian that grins. In this case the translator could invent such a cat; fabricate a mock saying instead of using the existing ones that bring their unfavourable connotations with them.

But there are cases when linguistic forgery won't help. In *Ulysses* people use a very peculiar Irish English idiom. In Moliere peasants use Patois-French. Many contemporary novels distinguish several kinds of slang from Bronx to Cockney. Shall we substitute an existing sub-variation of the target language? That will bring all the unwanted cultural connotations. Or shall we fabricate a non-existent idiom, like the one used in Clockwork Orange? It will always stay artificial. There is no good solution; we usually simply camouflage the problem.

Similar problems can appear on every level of the cultural message we try to transcribe to another language. Certain systems of versifica-

tion can have radically different connotations in certain languages. But the clearest examples are on the level of vocabulary.

For evident reasons, the Hungarian vocabulary of sailing and navigating is very poor. It is a real pain for the translator to substitute vocabulary for all kinds of vessels, parts of vessels and devices used at the sea in the simplest adventure books. The translator can use either circumscription or forgery. But even circumscription can be dangerous at times: in a South American Indian language there was no word for donkey, as nobody has ever seen one there. So in their Bible Jesus marches into Jerusalem on the back of a small, long-eared animal. The readers couldn't avoid associating it to a rabbit. This example supports the view of Hjelmslev: even if the denotative meaning is kept intact in the process of translation, it will lose its original connotations and will appear among new connotators.

But even if the new connotators are not this troublesome, the loss of the original ones may cause serious problems. In a text I had to translate I met a very idiomatic word: whiteskirt. I couldn't find it in dictionaries, and after consulting several native speakers I learned that this word denotes the broad white rubber line on the side of car tyres that were so fashionable in the fifties in America, in the subculture we know from the James Dean films. So we are able to transmit the denotation with a circumscription, but completely lose the idea that in this subculture this thing was so important that there was a separate word to denote it.

I shall mention one more special case of substantial untranslatability: the case of nonsense text, where the original contains no or very little denotative meaning. The translator has nothing to translate: s/he has to re-invite and re-create those connotations in the target language. This is not impossible (the famous Jabberwocky has more than 60 translations including Latin, Esperanto and Klingon!) but the process is different from what we call translation.

It can bee seen from these examples that the distinction between denotation and connotation is not a very strong operator in analysing problems of translation. The anomaly of the denotation (e. g. its double folded nature or its absence from the target language) leads to anomalies in terms of connotation as well. Imitated or forged connotations may solve some problems but in turn they raise other questions. In these

situations the translator is bound to choose between the priorities of saving all the (denotative) information or keeping up good continuity. To put it bluntly, the *question is whether to be faithful to the original, or create a well formed text according to the rules of the target culture.*

As a general rule, wellformedness is more important feature than faithfulness. The general reader of the target language can easily realise any linguistic, stylistic or other errors, while s/he is usually unable to locate errors in faithfulness. Finding of these usually takes an expert reading. A newer, more faithful translation can displace an older one only if it fulfils the basic criteria of well-formedness. We prefer a 14 line, rhyming translation of a sonnet, however free, to a precisely accurate prose paraphrase. So, well-formedness is more basic criterion than faithfulness. That's why most translators prefer their mother tongue as target language; they translate "homeward" instead of "away from home". Many classic translations were made by poets who didn't even understand the source language; they worked from raw translations: their competence in the target language was much more important. So discussing the Hungarian translation of a Bulgarian literary text, a Hungarian native speaker is more competent than an Arab.

But this gives rise to another question. What shall the translator do when the source text is not well-formed? If we translate the error of the original, our text in the target language will seem corrupted. We cannot explain the reader that we are not responsible: they want well formed text from us. But then, if we correct the errors, we lose a great deal of information, distorting the original. The question is more serious than it looks at first sight. A translation can never have the integrity of the original; the translator never can have the authority of the author. A translated text cannot have an invulnerable aura: editors, correctors, lectors can "correct" without any permission from the translator. An error in a text of a classic author is "protected": we try to explain it with stylistic, poetic, referential or other reasons. Although technically the error can be kept in the translation, the aura of intentedness is usually lost. And without it an error is simply an error; nothing can save good continuity; and the reader, trying to save the integrity of the classic author, blames it on the translator.

The most dangerous are those errors which interfere with a special competence of the readers of the target language. I translated a story by Ken Kesey, in which at one point we see the car of the nazi general, Rommel, and there is a double-headed eagle on the front. For an American reader, even an editor, it might be all the same, but the average Hungarian reader knows very well that this eagle cannot be double-headed. In this case I considered this error non-intended, so I silently corrected it. In the Hungarian phrase used in *Ulysses*, Joyce misspells the word "borjú" (calf) for "brojú". Again, nobody would realise it, except the Hungarian reader.

There are many kinds of possible errors, and the subsystems of a text are not equally sensible. Grammar or versification seems to be "hard" systems, that do not tolerate divergences, while stylistics is much more tolerant. And the sensitivity of subsystems might be different in particular languages. Inversion of word order, for example, is a very strong "connotative" poetical device in Hungarian. Translated to Latin inversion becomes completely ineffective, while translated to English it might change the denotative meaning (e. g. from affirmative to interrogative). I've got several examples to this category, but their majority concerns the untranslatability of Hungarian originals to other languages – in accordance with what I said about the different competencies. I'd rather sum up the findings.

Translation is a continuous compromise between the requirements of transferring information with the biggest possible efficiency and the demands of good continuity. These two can get in an insoluble conflict three ways.

1. Rhetoric untranslatability: The text contains an inherent, reflected ambiguity, a trope where an arbitrary linguistic feature, specific to the given language, governs the flow of communication. In this case the translator either tries to imitate the original trope and gives up good continuity, or "jumps over" it, sacrificing valuable information.
2. Information incompatibility: The information cannot be transferred as the needed linguistic element is missing from the target language. This usually means that a certain denotatum is missing from the experience of the community. Imitation is especially dangerous here due to the incalculable connotations.

3. Continuity error: The source text itself is defective in terms of good continuity. The translator either corrects the error (losing information) or takes the blame (losing both good continuity and information.)

So why would one venture the impossible task of translating a text? We can answer with the words of Edmund Hillary, when they asked him about his motives of climbing the Mount Everest. He answered: "Because it's there."

RADOSVET KOLAROV

HESITATION, UNCERTAINTY, AND DESIRE FOR THE OTHER

The modern literary studies are obsessed by metaphors like *floating*, *fluctuating*, *oscillating,* etc. Rather than grasping the concept, the state by a hard-and-fast definition and staying with it, the thought both of the recipient of art and its student, according to this model, wavers in the space in-between, between alternative concepts, states. This idea has an earlier forerunner in the face of "ambiguity' in the New criticism; in newer time we may refer to it Paul de Man's understanding of rhetoric as a simultaneous existence of literal and figurative meaning, 'when it is impossible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two meanings (that can be entirely incompatible) prevails'[1], Riffaterre's idea of 'intertextual unconscious' – the 'dual action of the sign', pointing to the sub-text as a repressed other of the text[2]; W. Iser's concept of the 'imaginary' inscribed in the present 'as its transition to otherness'[3], the 'coexistence of the mutually exclusive' which 'give rise to a dynamic oscillating resulting in a constant interpenetration of things'[4]; Jacques Derida's conception of 'indécidabilité',

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[1] Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading. New Haven and London. Yale University Press. 1979, p. 10

[2] Michael Riffaterre, The Intertextual Unconscious – Critical Inquiry, vol. 13, N 2, 1987.

[3] Wolfgang Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary. Baltimore and London, 1993, p. 211.

[4] Wolfgang Iser, Towards a Literary Anthropology. In: The Future of Literary Theory. Routledge. New York and London. 1989, p. 218.

of the 'double scene upon a double stage'[5], 'the infinitely rapid oscillation between the performative and the constative, between language and metalanguage, fiction and non-fiction'[6], as well as Geofrey Hartman's 'hermeneutic hesitation', his idea of indeterminancy as a 'traffic sign warning of an impasse', as a 'conflict of interpretations or codes'.[7]

The commom denominator of such ideas is undecidability, the existence of the absent 'other' entering an interplay with the present entity which consists in crossing and blurring but never deleting the boundary between the two terms.

This mode of mind, no doubt, has to do with the modern scientific theories, has been formed in the climate marked by indeterminism and relativism, connected with quantum mechanics, Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle in particular.

Attempts have been made to regard creative thinking, artistic experience and language in a broader sense as quantum phenomena[8]. According to quantum theory matter exists simultaneously in two forms, wave and corpuscular, which mutually complement each other, forming some confused mixture of the two known as a 'wave packet'. According to the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, however, we may not observe the two forms simultaneously – we may either measure the precise position of the electron when it emerges as a particle, or we may measure its so called 'momentum' (velocity), when it manifests itself as a wave but never the two of them together, at the same time. The electron and other sub-atom elements are never fully waves or fully

[5] Jacques Derrida, The Double Session. In: A Derrida Reader. Between the Blinds. Ed. by Pegy Camuf. Harvester Wheatsheaf. New York and London, 1991, p.207.

[6] Jacques Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other. In: Derrida Reader, p. 207.

[7] Geofrey Hartman, The Criticism in Wilderness: The Study of Literature Today. Yale University Press. New Haven and London. 1980, p. 32, 265.

[8] Robert de Beaugrande, Quantum Aspects of Perceived Reality – Journal of Literary Semantics, XVII, I, 1989; Yuri F. Orlov, The Wave Logic of Consciousness: A Hypothesis – International Journal of Theoretical Physics, vol. 21, N 1, 1982; Danah Zohar, The Quantum Self. Human Nature and Consciousness defined by the New Physics. Bloomsbury, 1990; Arkady Plotnitsky, Material Events. Mineapolis, 2001 (see the chapter "Algebra and Allegory: Nonclassical Epistemology, Quantum Theory, and the Work of Paul de Man).

particles: their dualism is expressed in the blured registration both of their position and their momentum. Quantum world is undetermined, a world of probabilities.

The event when without any external reason the electron spontaneously leaves its orbit and in the guise of a probability wave starts for another orbit (i.e. to another energy level) is of more particular significance for this article. What is important here is that it conducts simultaneous tests with regard to its future stabilization, as if putting out 'temporary feelers' (I will make use of the vivid presentation of this transition by Danah Zohar), concurrently trying all possible orbits, being through 'mysterious omnipresence' all together over them, leaving as if 'smeared' trace 'over a large region of space'[9]. These reconnaissance 'feelers' are called 'virtual transitions', to be distinguished from the real transitions when the way function 'collapses' and the electron settles onto the orbit taking the guise of a particle. What is also of significance: according to quantum physicist David Bohm the so called virtual transitions have a real effect over lots of physical processes.

Can quantum indeterminism be the key to things traditionally standing as if immeasurably far from the abstract physical theories? The connection between quantum and mental processes was percived by David Bohm over fifty years ago. The later on specified analogy between the dual behavior of the electron, its simultaneous presence in various spaces and the creative thinking of man launched by the Russian physicist Yuri Orlov, quoted by Zohar, is important for the present study. According to him, 'the described mechanism [quantum indeterminism] .... gives a key to the understanding of *creative thinking*, when a person states or depicts 'what in fact does not exist ..., [he] potentially 'sees' several versions simultaneously without completely realizing any of them, and then one version 'pops up' (materializes) as a result of free choice.'[10] In other words, 'in much the same way that we might try out a new idea by throwing out imaginary scenarios depicting its many possible consequences'; 'quantum indeterminism and superimposed probability states (virtual states) must be playing a role in the brain's openness to all the potentialities latent in consciousness.'[11]

There exists a gap between the physical world we live in, and the

9 Danah Zohar, op. cit., p. 15.

10 Yuri Orlov, op. cit. p. 45.

11 Dana Zohar, op. cit., pp. 15, 62.

quantum reality; the creative thinking is supposed to be, according to the aforesaid hypothesis, a bridge between the two realities[12]: the restriction on simultaneity of worlds, on connection between all sorts of times and spaces, between the real and hypothetical, the manifest and imaginary, the certain and uncertain, is concealed in imaginary scenarios of our creative thought and the experience of art.

As it will be maintained a little later, 'traces' of the bridge between the physical and the quantum world exist in our everyday behavior – a thesis which has common grounds with the ideas of Danah Zohar about the 'quantum self' and her philosophy of simultaneous living in different worlds.

Further on the present text is going to focus on *hesitation*, considered not as a phenomenon of art or as hermeneutic mode in critical study, but rather under the most general anthropological angle, as a psychological state taken in its everyday pragmatic understanding and to find in it, sucked in, the duality 'determinacy/indeterminacy' in the aforementioned sense: being a kind of behavioral filter processing the contact with the outer reality, hesitation at the same time conceals something of its 'shadow' wave logic.

In our everyday life we inhabit the world of classical physics, i.e. of unique actualities, where we have to deal with actual things with 'firm' boundaries and respectively to make 'unique', 'right', 'firm' decisions concerning the choice of situations and manner of behavior.

The very condition of hesitation is the possibility of one to manifest his/her free will to choose between different alternatives. My main point is that by saying the 'right to choose', or 'possibility to choose' one, even if not realizing it, says two quite different things. He/she either puts the stress on 'right', or 'possibility' (*right* to choose, *possibility* to choose), or on 'choose' (the right to *choose*, possibility to *choose*). In the second case the possibility is a prerequisite for the choice itself

[12] Although an even more elementary bio-physical channel of this connection exists: it was established over fifty years ago in connection with investigations over the retina that nerve cells in the human brain are sufficiently sensitive to register the absorption of a single photon, reflecting the passage of an individual electron from one energy level to another; later experiments proved that quantum indeterminism is in the basis of the functioning of the brain itself, through random changes in the chemical concentration surrounding the nerve junctions (neurone synapses).(See Danah Zohar, op. cit. p.61).

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whose completion is the end; in the first case it matters that possibility be kept open, and one never loses the alternatives. The paradox consists in that the possibility of choosing is being lost in the very act of choice itself. Obviously these two meaning aspects go in two opposite directions and can never be reconciled except if we regard them in the state of complementarity.

I am going to concentrate first on the second mode of hesitation which I shall provisionally call 'selective deficiency'. Usually hesitation is seen as a 'battle of motives' on the stage of consciousness with a hindrance in decision making in general or in case of complicated problem situation. From this zone one should first discard the myriad of semi-automatic 'petty' choices, choices 'on a small scale' of semi-reflective actions – when, for instance we are making our way through a crowd or crossing a street. (By the way, we hardly realize that taking this and not that turn, we chose one and abandon alternative, parallel forms of our live, that if we had taken the other turn, our live could have passed in quite a different way.). On the other pole of these myriad 'petty' decisions is the sphere of 'quasi-decisions' pertaining to the high moral values where the choice has been taken beforehand. Strictly speaking, there is hardly a matter of choices in such unalternative cases.

Between the extremes in question there lies the vast area of actual choices (and respectively of hesitation). Hesitation is a psychological projection of the probabilistic map of happy/unhappy outcomes to a given situation. It serves as a filter through which pass the possibilities in question and in this sense it does not need the parameter of time, should not be conceived by all means as delay or postponement (although it may contain them). Every choice includes hesitation, thought of as a selective operator putting out 'fillers' and travelling over different possible versions and situations.

On the other hand, we can not isolate hesitation from the time factor[13] – the prolongation of the decision on the axis of time is a mark of difficulty, a deficit of the selective capability and precisely in this narrower sense lies the widespread understanding of hesitation.

[13] Even in immediate blinking when a bright light suddenly comes into the retina, some time does elapse, a very brief fraction of a second between the stimulus and response which can be measured by a sensitive instrument (Leonard Doob, Hesitation, Impulsivity and Reflection. Greenwood Press, New York, Westport Connecticut, London, 1990, p. 2.)

The reason for the deficit in question consists in that, simply put, probabilistic calculation which the hesitation attempts to make, is practically incalculable. Investigating the problems related to decision-making, S. Karlin notes that 'the strategies available in the dynamic situations are usually complicated functions of information received and actions undertaken in the preceding stages'; 'multistage decision problems sometimes called dynamic programming, are problems involving a number (usually an infinite number) of decisions made in the course of time. Each decision depends on all past decisions and in turn affects all future decisions.'[14]

According to Paul Ricoeur 'the motivational field of man does not constitute a system and a totality' – it is open towards an indefinite horizon whose clarification infinitely engenders new horizons. The self is embarrassed by the obscurity of his/her own motives. When one hesitates, searches and chooses, one resides in 'atemporal identity'; 'doubt about some project is doubt about myself'; being in difficulty to solve the project, I remain 'undecided'; I sketch my multiple self in the mode of 'may-be'(peut-être); I am both a plurality and nobody, 'my self is not joint to any of those selves which float before me' and which hesitation travels over. Hesitation, Ricoeur maintains, puts me back into the state of my 'shapeless subjectivity'. This feel of undermining my identity is painful, 'perplexing'. It causes 'conscience malhereuse'.[15]

John Caputo indicates such a painfulness, substantiating the so called 'cold hermeneutics', examining in detail the connected with it principle of undecidability and the 'Socratic effect' ensuing from it. 'Unable to decide between what come by nature and what was acquired, between piety and impiety, a good state and a bad, justice and power', we feel 'disconcertion, being shaken by a cold hermeneutic shiver, *sollicitare'*, divested of our comfort, robbed of our sleep.[16]

There is a negative nuance of the painfulness in the phenomenology of the hesitation, which remains more or less beyond the attention of researches and which I would like to substantiate in greater particu-

[14] S. Karlin, Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games – Programming and Economy, 5, London, 1959.

[15] Paul Ricoeur, La volontaire et l'involontaire, éd. Montaigne, Aubier, 1967, pp.131, 133-34, 136 –137.

[16] John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project. Bloomington, 1987, pp. 188-189.

lars. The painful questioning of deep orientational schemata in the experience of the individuals is not directly engendered by the experience of alternativity. We could ask ourselves if residing 'in-between', hanging between different possibilities, is in itself, for certain physiological reasons, unpleasurable. Evidently not. The state of 'formlessness', 'dissolvedness' could, on the contrary, be experienced ecstatically, as claims the 'Dionysian aesthetics' If they are to have an aesthetic potential in art and literature (and they apparently have), the ambiguity, undecidability, and wavering between two states which was the starting point of the present text, have to be enjoyable. Why so? Precisely because *the mind is not impelled to make a choice*, but can delightfully and freely roam in the state of indefiniteness, experiencing the alternatives in parallel, in their simultaneousness. In this sense, provisionally speaking, the aesthetic experience is a ceaseless hesitation, not seeking resolution.

It is the main thesis of the present text that the tormenting quotidian experience of hesitation is paradoxically engendered not only by the *difficulty* of choice but also by *reluctance to make it.* Put simply in other words, one *does want to make one's choice* (one is compelled to make it) but at the same time *wishes to preserve the possibility of choosing* (i.e. does not want to make it).

Investigating the motives of this unwillingness we may distinguish two kinds of alternatives, which hesitation wanders between, refusing to make a decision. We may call the one type of alternatives *contradictory* – the choice is between mutually excluding each other possibilities, at which the choice of each of them strikes off the other, negatively activating it. Such is the hesitation between duty and love, paternal feeling and statesmanlike interest, revengeful jealousy and adoring, suicide and endurance of the "and slings arrows of outrageous fortune". The standing on the edge between two possibilities or two worlds may be explained both by the unwillingness to lose any of the two contending values, and by the unwillingness to identify yourself with each of the equally unacceptable worlds. There is also a second type of alternatives, which are of main interest to this text, and may be called *compatible* or *additive*. Unlike the standing between two poles on the principle "either … or …" they form an open set and cover a non-contradictory space of synonymous possibilities on the principle "either(and)… or(and)… or(and)…." Such are the situations in designing each desired idea. The

unwillingness to remain solely with one version is determined by sui generis "greediness" in the preservation of the overall paradigm, which the hypothetical variants of the idea are located in, the possession of the "possibilities of the world". Ricoeur marks this nuance of the "possibility to be possible through choice" accompanied by the feeling of "super power" engendered by the "undecided abundance"[17] in its profound investigation over hesitation, but he refers it to a "too peculiar" and "naive" situation of hesitation, whilst in the understanding presented herein, it is its constantly concomitant phase.

I would like to demarcate this phase of hesitation from externally similar but fundamentally different motives of indecision. The comparison with scales has been brought up as an example in connection with proving the correctness of the negative reply of a question asked since Plato's time: as precise scales remain in balance when equal weight is placed on their pans, so a definite decision may not be made when two aspirations are equally strong.[18] It is easy to understand, (beyond the slippery idea for "equalization of the desires" by itself"), that in this case the rejection of choice has selective motivation and not a desire for preservation – figuratively speaking, of both pans – the situation of the measurement by itself excludes this – it presumes "counterbalance", understood both in the direct and in the figurative meaning of the word. The idea of rejection from a decision because of the equalization of the choices exists in another allegorical form as well. In the anecdote about Buridan's ass, attributed to the stoic Jean Buridan, the donkey starves to death because it has no reason to choose between two equidistant and equally tempting piles of hay placed in front of it and may not make a decision which of them to start with. The case presented in the anecdote is a mirror-image opposed to the case with the additive alternatives. Buridan's donkey in principle possesses both possibilities (the two piles

[17] Paul Ricœur, op. cit., p.131-132. The idea of Georges Poulet about the 'undetermined thought' (la pensée indéterminée) related to the sense for 'unlimited possibilities, detained in status of indeterminance, in anticipation of our being pushed into one or another direction', is in a more different context but in a similar mental perspective. (Georges Poulet, La pensée indéterminée. I, De la Renaissance au Romantisme, Presses Universitaires de France, P.,1985, p.6).

[18] See Вильгельм Виндельбанд, Избранное. Дух и история. Москва, 1995, с. 536.

of hay); its selective function referring to the time of starting, is grotesquely rendered absolute in the hesitation, owing to which both possibilities are lost – the donkey remains without any of the two piles of hay. In the case which the present text deals with, vice versa, nothing is given beforehand; the rejection of the choice is aimed in the possession of two and more possibilities; the copied duplication of a possibility (in the example with the hay), on the other hand, would not be of any value and motivation for hesitation – motivation for preservation, as it was said, is the difference, the different value, which the various variants of the idea have, the mentioned "undecided abundance".

Literature may provide us with examples of similar unwillingness of man to part with the "abundance of possibilities". Yordan Yovkov's character from the "Song of Wheels" Sali Yashar wants to make "sebap", i.e. some great benefaction, which may affect more people, survive lots of generations. Carried away with his thoughts, the character considers diverse variants in his imagination, without being able to select any of them."And he remembered Mourad Bey of Surneno who built the famous fountain at Karalez. What a fountain and what a place! Nineteen stone troughs, and in front of them a pavement like the yard of an inn, three spouts that gurgle and pour out water as cold as from a mountain pool, as clear as the tears of a maiden. And all about is a dreary plain, parched and cracked, and a heat like that of a desert. And here come flocks, here come people, they go to the fountain, their eyes inflamed by the stifling heat [...] Such was the good that Sali Yashar wished to perform. But it was not possible to build a fountain anywhere – there was no proper place. He thought of making a well, or a bridge at a dangerous spot, an inn where belated travelers might pass the night. But all this seemed to him insufficient, and he would struggle with his thoughts, powerless to solve the problem."[19] A key word, throwing light over the status of "indecision", which Sali Yashar is in, is the word "*insufficient*". Each individually taken idea, however enticing it may seem, is insufficient. The character hardly weighs all "for" and "against" and tries to choose the most expedient variant: simply the wish of the cart master to do good is insatiable except in the aggregate of the multiple and imagined its realizations.

[19] Short Stories by Jordan Yovkov, transl. By Marko Minkov ans Marguerite Alexieva. Foreign Languages Press, Sofia, 1965, pp. 231-32

It is in a similar manner that we observe in Shakespeare's tragedy "Othello" how the tempestuous desire for revenge of the hurt Moor wanders about in search of appropriate death for his unfaithful wife, not being satisfied with any idea, until his instigator, Iago, puts an end to his hectic tirades, almost imperiously suggesting him the idea to strangle her in bed. It is of interest that the two types of hesitation combine in Othello's torments – of the contradictory and of the compatible alternatives: nearly each his cue is divided between the voice of love and revenge, the "party" of revenge forming a hesitant sequence of variants on its part; hesitation is not in finding the best of them but in the insatiable desire simultaneously to live through all the variants, filling up the space of anger: visualizing himself in a specific role of revenge, the character in no time jumps in his thoughts into another role:

"Othello: Ay, **let her rot and perish, and be damn'd** to-night; for she shall not live. No, my heart is turn'd to stone; I strike it, and it hurts my hand. O, the world hath not a sweeter creature; she might lie by an emperor' side and command him tasks.

[...] **Hang her**! I do but say what she is: so delicate with her needle, an admirable musician – O, she will sing the savageness out of a bear! – of so high and plenteous wit and invention.

[...] O, a thousand, a thousand times – and then so gentle a condition.

[...] **I will chop her into messes**. Cuckold me!

[...] **Get me some poison**, Iago – this night. I'll not expostulate with her, lest her body and beauty unprovide my mind again – this night, Iago."

Embedded deep in human nature is the need to keep always an exit in reserve, a space somewhere else where one could find oneself in parallel with the place one inhabits at the moment. As Derrida points in connection with divisibility as a strategy of self-keeping: 'There is always another place, there is not just one side, just one place; there are always several places, and this differentiation is a protection, a strategy of the living.[...] I remain free, I am not just there, you will see that I am also elsewhere, and thus that I have resources, I still have a reserve, some life, and that you will not kill me so quickly.'[20]The

[20] Jacques Derrida, Points. Interviews, 1974 – 1994. Ed. by Elizabeth Weber. Stanford University Press. 1995, p. 147.

self resists to be compressed in a single place, in a single role and this resistance, respectively, founds expression in desire for a choice[21], most interestingly, very often this desire has no pragmatic function and motivation at all.[22] Very often radical changes in life, concerning its entire role spectrum – from marriage partnership and work to preferred hobbies – have seemingly no preconditions in real frustration of the individual about his/her preceding life and appear inexplicable unless we use the 'quantum formula'- it is just unbearable for one to know that having taken a path, he/she is denied the possibility of trying other paths as well.

The English physiologist Charles Scott Sherington, a Nobel Prize laureate, quoted by L. Vygotsky, has found out that human nerve receptor field surpasses manifoldly the effector executant neurons, owing to which man's organism perceives much more drives and irritations than it can fulfil. The human nervous system is compared with a funnel put with its wide end towards the world and the narrow end towards action. The world pours into humans via the wide opening of the funnel, engendering countless calls, drives, irritations, a negligible portion of which finds realization and seems to flow out of the narrow opening. The unfulfilled part of life, according to Vygotsky, is lived through in art.[23] W. Iser in his book "The Fictive and the Imaginary' has nicely considered how the fundamental need of man of 'being above and outside oneself' is lived through in fictionality[24].

It is my view that hesitation is indicative of such a compensatory striving, although it fails. It displays deterministic and 'wave' logic simultaneously. According to the first logic hesitation is instructive of hindrance of choice which, however, ensues exactly from the intention that it be complete. According to the second logic, on the contrary, hesi-

[21] Wolfgang Iser presents human beings as 'traveling between their roles that supplant and modify one another.'(Wolfgang Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary', p. 81).

[22] As D. Hofstadter notices 'people are remarkably fluid of seeing themselves in roles that they self-evidently would never fill' (Douglas Hofstadter, Metamagical Themas. Questing for the Essence of Mind an Pattern. Harmondsworth, Viking, 1985, p. 253).

[23] See Л.С. Выготский, Психология искусства. Изд. "Искусство", Москва, 1968, с. 313 – 314.

[24] Wolfgang Iser, op. cit., p. 84.

tation is marked by the intention of self not to give up the alternatives, to keep the 'packet' of coexisting potentialities open.

In order to separate selection-striving from choice-resisting modes of hesitation, we could discriminate between choice and decision, meaning by decision the choice as an act of its performativity, very much like tossing dices which is by the way a model in information theory. One could have done one's choice (knows the 'right' decision) and still hesitate (delay the decision, in the meaning of action). From this point of view we could say that Hamlet has no doubt about what he has to do, he has made his choice (to kill Claudius and to revenge his father) but hesitates in making decision (to complete the action).

At every point of a situation of choosing one experiences, although for a while, the liberty[25], the illusion of possessing all the potentialities; the subject, figuratively speaking, sojourns temporarily 'in a wave state' on all the 'orbits' – modalities of his/her possible being before the wave function collapses, and he/she 'solidifies', takes the corpuscle form and settles definitely on one of them.

Two kinds of impulses and desires strangely counterbalance in man. The one is directed toward explosive diversity, prospectively referring to the variants in solving of every problem situation. The other, on the contrary, seeks after keeping the individual, after copying reproduction, 'photographing' (in the proper and figurative meaning of the word) moments of past experience, to which memory is coming back, trying scrupulously to restore. Dorian Gray's wish to imprint the moment of contemplation and to stop its time is paradoxical manifestation of the second type of desire.

On the atemporal axis of hesitation one experiences a state of *dispersion*, of possession – not as happily as in art – of his/her multiple selves. On the axis of time he/she, conversely, carefully (in the double meaning of the word) *gathers,* recollects his/her many selves in seeking identity, repeatedness in difference. Not being always painful, it is, in any case, problematic. To quote Wordsworth (opening paragraph of the Prelude, book 2):

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[25] The circumstance that he may choose suggests to him [man], Windelband states, the joyful sense of freedom, and the fact that he is obligated to choose, causes him the unpleasant feeling for lack of freedom' (Виндельбанд, op.cit. p. 531).

> … so wide appears
> The vacancy between me and those days,
> Which yet have such self-presence in my mind,
> That, musing on them, often do I seem
> Two consciousnesses, conscious of myself
> And of some other Being.

We could name, adapting Kant's terminology to the case, the two kinds of desire respectively *productive* and *reproductive*. The impulse of the first one is centrifugal, it bursts as a desire for otherness in dreams, art, and in the second blurred phase of every act of hesitation. The impulse of the second is centripetal – it copes with elaborating 'sameness', identity of the subject.

DIMITAR KAMBOUROV

THE WEAKNESS OF BEING MAN, THE SICKNESS OF BEING WOMAN: BALKAN POSTMODERN GENDER ROLES AND THE CURSE OF INBETWEENNESS

Before 1989 few people were aware of being Balkan and even fewer realised that this matters. This dual and ambiguous insight came later. Whether this awareness is a local construct or a foreign affair is not clear, yet the Balkans did re-emerge, and very much as a unity, despite the conventional usage of the term 'Balkanisation'. The USSR was no longer in existence and therefore able to be held responsible for the poverty and lack of sense of national identity in the modern world, so the Balkans had either to confront themselves or to look westward for a culprit. Furthermore, the nature and the essence of the West also became an issue. The Schengen restrictions worked as a geo-political mirror stage: the Balkans saw themselves as different from the 'others over there', whilst also being other to themselves.

Thus, despite the wars, during the 1990s the national cultures within the Balkans encountered their neighbours and got to know each other. The function and experience of the postmodern in the Balkans was analogous to that of the Third World in its postcolonial situation: by avoiding the clichés of nationalistic mythology, it has been providing a broader regional picture, neglecting antagonisms and functionalising differences (and experiences). What brought this about was, in part, the international success of certain works of art, mostly cinematic ones, but also literary and musical works. A pioneering role in the emerging literature of the region's cultural specificity was played by Pavic's

Dictionary of the Kahazars. The novel has been hailed in the West for its technical novelty, whereas in the region, it was valued for its Balkan revelation. Up until then, the Balkans as culture had been restricted to the values of Medieval literature (the Byzantine legacy) and folklore (the Ottoman heritage). The region by no means conveyed a sense of shared identity, of self-acknowledged belonging. Pavic's novel, at least for the intelligentsia, had the effect of offering an initiation: it made its readers feel that they were Balkan, whatever that might mean.

In traditional thinking, woman is considered to be marked as in opposition to man: the fair sex, yet also the weaker sex. Furthermore, femininity has often been associated with sickness. Of course, masculinity, whilst conventionally equated with strength, is also frequently presented in terms of gradations of weakness. Indeed, much modern literature plays precisely on the incommensurability of the sexes. Freud's view on the sexes might be seen as a paradigmatic literary instance:[1] As he usually does, he first questions sexual essentialism, but only ultimately to reaffirm it. This Freudian double term, however, did not remain unaffected and the male association with male strength has repeatedly been questioned. Within the same tradition, women are often portrayed as doomed to lead a longer fight for the stability of their personality, which, once achieved, causes psychological stagnation and the inability to change, "as if the tormenting formation of female nature has exhausted the capacity of the person".[2] Freud implied that male weakness is a promise for development and change (for instance, with the help of psychoanalysis), whereas women are naturally and irremediably ill. Thus, if we can continue to think from Freud via Lacan, women appear to be structurally coerced either to invest themselves in reaffirming reproduction of the phallogocentric symbolic order from outside (*there is no such thing as woman*) or via Kristeva, to realise themselves within all-encompassing semiotic subversion of the imposed order through the situational gestures of their given condition: motherhood, love, body life, Emma Goldman's 'dancing',[3] wrenching or swallowing the order, speaking and writing as an act of periodic disarmament of inscriptional instruments, etc. It was Kristeva again[4] who, by disassociating femi-

1 On Freud as literature, see Bloom (1994) and Brooks (1993).
2 Freud (1932)
3 Derrida (1982)
4 Kristeva (1986)

nine and masculine writing from belonging to a particular sex, launched a deconstruction of the hitherto dominant essentialist binary divisions and forced a traversing of the politics of gender. Work done in the fields of feminism and men's studies, gay and lesbian, straight and queer studies contributed to a more slippery, unstable approach to gender as a matter of complex and permanent negotiation, whereby it was only partly defined by sex and sexual orientation choice, whilst also being affected by identifications regarding class, race, ethnicity, culture, region, religion, etc: race, region and religion affect the gender perception, whereas sex influences one's projection on race, religion, class and values. However, outside the psychoanalytic tradition, modern gender perception is generally different. Amongst other definitions, modernity might be viewed as an intentional act of selective feminisation, usually to do with values, but also to do with goals. Modernity appropriates the features of 'eternal femininity' and replaces these with the weak features of traditional masculinity, thereby creating the modern human. Indeed, one might argue that feminisation can be taken as a structural change which masters the destructive drives in masculine claims for essential power. The bourgeois economy of all-encompassing exchange would not be possible without both the emancipation of women and the harnessing of 'feminine' qualities and values within the modern model man of practical magic, consumerist fantasy, corporeal desire and materialist idealism.[5]

Modernity emerges then as a mannishly functionalised femininity under the imaginary auspices of universal humanness. Modernity has thus undertaken a double gesture: it first turned the myth of men's and women's weakness upside down: man's strength has been revealed as rigid, i.e. fragile; woman's weakness has been praised for its resil-

[5] The French Revolution, like any other Revolution may be seen as a 'fair sex affair', both literally and figuratively. The birthmark of the Russian Revolution is that it was a regressive, counter-modern, quasi-aristocratic elitist project that suffered from a shortage of "femininity" in its devices and goals. The American revolution of globalization promised success till it got entangled in a pseduo-heroic western-like global activism. As Heidegger had predicted, American totalitarianism might only work out to the extent it suppresses the heroic model of boosting ideology and making history; unfortunately or rather luckily, Bush's administration does not seem to be versed neither in Heidegger, nor in D. Bell, nor even in Fukuyama.

ient plasticity and thus acknowledged as sound, sane and efficient. The strategy of such a turn was to engineer a modern humanness, aggregating the would-be female *practical magic* of bricolage with the allegedly male activism into a kind of *constructivism*.

Of the various Foucauldian definitions of modernity, the passion for taxonomy is perhaps the one which seems most unappealing.[6] According to statistics, women age and lose interest in sex earlier; they have a shorter life, a less active and attractive maturity, and a long old age in full consciousness. Indeed, it is a common place that women, the 'weaker sex', are more resilient than men and die later. They are healthier, at least physiologically, or seem so, and in fact become so, since they visit the doctor more often. Even although traditionally the mythological systems locate them closer to malady and death (or perhaps because of this?), women live longer. Many men continue to live on the verge of death: it is manly to live recklessly, regardless of the dangers of alcohol and tobacco, drifting into criminal activities, dealing with weapons, waging wars, hunting and killing each other. The male way of living is unhealthy both for men themselves and for women. In giving birth, women may be said to sentence to death, in that their offspring will ultimately die; men, however, are an agency of death, an artificial cause of demise. Men emerge therefore as executors of a female verdict.

Although a possible version of modernity would be that the men's world of strength and power progresses to the feminine sanity of negotiation and agreement, the reverse side of modernity would see female emancipation as giving way to male deficiencies. As a reaction against modern man's 'sissification', a regressive slip into masculine models periodically takes place in culture and media: macho-like masculinity becomes the last refuge from the exigencies of modernity.

Modernity might then be reconsidered as a selective feminisation with regard to manners and devices, while being a low-class masculinisation with regard to aims and ideals. Men have sacrificed their trade-mark spiritual and speculative claims to the *vita contemplativa* in order to master the pragmatic attitude of the fair sex and embark on the modern cult of the *vita activa*.[7] Modernity has harnessed feminin-

6 Foucault (1966)

7 Arendt (1958)

ity into a lowbrow second-rate masculine cause. How is it, then, that women are considered weaker? The question is serious since, due to prosthetic extension of the body, [8] telegraphing, [9] and deterritorialisation,[10] modernity has undone the apparent reason for characterising femaleness as the locus of physical feebleness: behind the console, the forces become level. An answer might be that we have never been modern.[11] Modernity merely reinvents and reformulates the 'eternal' truths of female frailty and sorrow, i.e. of masculine domination, rather than shifting fundamentally the traditional gender economy. Thus it is not clear whether the paradigmatic reflections on female fallibility made by men from Shakespeare[12] and Racine[13], via Freud[14] and Lévi-Strauss[15], to Lacan[16] and Bourdieu[17] should be assigned to an exemplary modernity or seen as a pre-modern residue, since the issue of the fair sex puts even the most advanced in defiance of their own essentialist state of mind.

Literature and the arts, particularly those relying on narrative, as well as pop culture activities such as fashion, TV shows and sports have substantially changed the gender policy of late modernity.[18] Femininity has become a key figure within the poetics of contemporary critical thinking on politics: while reflecting the issue of women, these poetics rarely confine themselves to it. Femininity has offered a way to talk about the seductive complexities of order and power, of the sense and sensibility of modernity, providing a language to address geo-political reality. Orientalist critiques, for instance, have demonstrated the intimate liaisons between territorial invasion/invention and sexual imagi-

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9 Todorov (1995)

10 Lyotard (1988)

11 Deleuze and Guattary (1991)

12 For a particular take on this issue, see Latour (1991)

13 In *Hamlet* and other cases

14 In *Phèdre* among other cases

15 Freud (1932)

16 Lévi-Strauss (1958)

17 Lacan (1977)

18 Bourdieu (1998)

John Searle once suggested that Madonna has contributed to the sexuality of contemporary teenagers more than all feminist writings. One might wonder whether she would bet on her eroticised model if feminism had not already made inroads into everyday practices, linguistic routines and common beliefs.

nation,[19] and both Eastern and Western Europe have been revisited from the perspective of their innately gendered partnership.[20]

What then is the contemporary local vision of the Balkans and how does it fit with overarching frameworks? First and foremost, this vision is located both within and without, i.e. it takes the risk of identifying simultaneously with the external glance and with internal self-reflection. Indeed, a particular algorithm is detectable. The first step is to show that the people of the Balkans are the same as other Europeans, particularly where differences have been previously suspected; the next step is to suggest that they are not exactly the same, yet these differences occur in unexpected domains; the third step is to promote their difference as a preserved quality, which modernity has eradicated from the West: a kind of down-to-earth spirituality, a mythological stamina, a festivity within daily routine, etc.[21] In brief, Balkan modernity refuses the standard fate of modernity, i.e. to be disenchanted and demystified. The ideology of the Balkans being part of Europe goes through broadening its outlook by discovering a way back to its own offsets. The Balkans assign to them the role of the custodians of the temple of Europeanness.

Such a strategy has proved ultimately inadequate however, so art and literature have looked for more efficient constructions. Balkan artistic culture has a difficult task: it has to claim a European belonging whilst pleading for regional specificity bound up with the essentials of a civilisation that continues to question whether the Balkans are or are not part of Europe. The game is difficult, since the strategy is neither to accept nor to refuse European perceptions and suspicions but to rewrite

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19 Said (1978)

20 Kambourov {forthcoming}

21 The local ideology of Balkanness is based on the symbolic geography of the region as simultaneously being and not being Europe: the Balkans know and possess Europeanness where Europe is not aware of the my(s)thical peculiarity of its beginnings. The agenda is to respond to the geo-cultural curse of the Balkans as the locus of inbetweenness, a neither/nor interstitial space between the Occident and the Orient, a mongrel place derived on discernibility, physiognomy, identity. Instead of the perception of the Balkans as underdeveloped, a backward agent of trouble whose only chance is to catch up with the instances of modernity, Balkan high culture responds with the myth of origin: i.e. that the Balkans are not entirely susceptible to the exigencies of modernity in that they are not capable of sacrificing the European foundations.

them in an evaluation-free manner. The intention is to challenge the vertical, identitary, binary logic of modernity and to respond to it with a logic of difference, allegedly also pertinent to the (European) civilization in question. Instead of a head-on challenge to the Western perception of the Balkans, the strategy is to rewrite this perception as correct and justified yet wrongly interpreted by the West.

The logical questions are "Which are the qualities ascribed to the Balkans as European essentials?", as well as "How does the rewriting of the western perception of the Balkans take place?". An ensuing difficulty is that the language used to respond to the above questions is inevitably borrowed from the critique of western metaphysics itself: it is an open question whether such a critique is *immanently* western and modern or, rather, whether its agency is to be sought in the margins of modern western mentality as an internal other. The hypothesis of this text is that although the discursive language on the Balkans is borrowed, Balkan art has in some particular cases found a way of becoming an incarnation of inbetweenness, i.e. it rests on being within and without at the same time. That relative originality of solving such a (non)-identity problem will be illustrated here.

This essay will consequently step aside from what might be described as the 'orientalist' perspective of reading the Balkans. Over the last decade or two, a curious exchange has taken place. On the one hand, the Balkans have been revisited by the West with a mixture of awakened prejudices and clichés:[22] on the other hand, the region's writing back has denounced western orientalism.[23] By the very logic of denial, however, the region has remained within the same old orientalist paradigm, reproducing it in the very moment and process of criticising it. I would argue that literature and art are perhaps better equipped to provide such a version than academic writing: the Humanities are almost entirely entangled in the western practice of displacing one ideology by blindly replacing it within another, no less rooted in the same physical soil. This is not to suggest that Balkan literature is immune to ideology. On the contrary, its ideological efficiency is perhaps even higher than that of modern western literature. Nor are Balkan literatures thorough-

[22] Kaplan (1993). Perhaps the most notorious example of warm welcome in the West while provoking sound and fury in the European Southeast.

[23] Bakic-Hayden (1995) and (1992). Todorova (1997), Mocnik (2001) Golsworthy (1998)

ly original or free of western influences. Their advantage consists in a more developed ability to respond to western ideologies through assimilating and reshuffling them rather than simply overthrowing them. No less ideology, such a response is perhaps so in a more ingenious way, opting for the spatial figuration of inbetweenness rather than the temporal imagery of backwardness. The point is not that such a literary ideology has more to do with truth, but instead that it might be effective as a cultural policy, or rather as a political culture, were the regional political elites better culturally versed.

The thematic format of Pavic's book illustrates such a general view of the literary role for a Balkan self-awareness through the figures of sexuality, gender and health. In the 19th century, the region under Ottoman rule was characterised by the West as the sick man of Europe, the expression being used to formulate the necessity of taking urgent measures with regard to the political organism of an empire. By prescribing medical treatment, the political language opened up the options of whether to undertake a surgical operation of cutting off the atrophied (i.e. the Turkish part), thrusting it out of Europe, or to attempt to heal the whole body by modernising its physiological functions. In both politics and medicine, it is common sense not to allow the disease to spread over the entire body, which in this case had grown too corpulent to be healthy. The use of medical metaphors is rarely innocent: it implies a rational scientific approach, which is at the same time reassuringly humanistic, rescuing, without neglecting to appropriate the role of healer. The image of the sick man suggests that once upon a time the political organism in question was sound and indeed may even have been healthier than the physician, yet the clinical picture has changed. The sick man of Europe because he has aged, i.e. through modernisation Europe has regained its use, whereas some other nations or cultures may have chronic and incurable obsolescence.

Of course, the future Balkan states, including modern 'Young Turkish' Turkey, perceived themselves as the healthy body parts and organs which had to be rescued for the good for the totality of the European body. "We die then or we live – for her (Europe) it is the same/ As if we were no part of her living flesh", was the plea made to Europe by the Bulgarian poet Vazov a year before the liberation of 1878. However, the ongoing modernisation of the region has remained for ever under the sign of retardation, if not of degeneration. The term Balkanisation

usually refers to (too) many (too) small emergent states warring and feuding; this western meaning of the term is, I would argue, organically bound up with the imagery of sickness, from which, ironically it was supposed to rescue the various parts of the Balkans: the sick man of Europe was too old to survive, whereas the new states of the Balkans were considered to be endemically too young and too small to be viable. Thinking in regional terms in fact required transgressing national borders. The common Ottoman past prolonged in the grand ideologies and humbler realisations of the Balkan federation was and still is the most substantial form of regional imagination. The relics of the Ottoman past form the foundations of a Balkan identity, which is, according to Maria Todorova, doomed to vanish. Here, this Bulgarian historian, writing for a western audience, symbolically repeats the political imagery of illness and possible cure.

The Byzantine/Ottoman *chora* provides the grounds for a regional literary imagination as well, not as a curable past but rather as a vibrant symbol of freedom of bodily and spiritual mobility: the wide spaces of the empire with loose borders and mingling cultures guaranteeing all forms of exchange within the Balkans and beyond. The Ottoman past under the auspices of mythology emerges as a safe berth for a postmodern literature whose quasi-historicism is furnished with a regional agenda.

In the field of literature, postcolonial literature is particularly well advanced in articulating the gender issue,[24] although in striving to es-

[24] Before approaching the postmodern literature of the Balkans, a comparative remark about western and different non-western literatures is needed. The Southeast European part used to be a second world, beyond which the third world used to expand. Such a comparison a dozen years after the great political change in Europe easily demonstrates that spatial proximity, civilizational closeness or geographic imagination are misleading. Exchange seems to be much more feasible and productive in the case of the ex-colonies and ex-parent states than it is between the West and the European Southeast, which never made it to a colonial love/hate affair with the West. To be treated as "the Orient" then might not be the worst mishap for a region, and perhaps a better lot than being systematically deprived of cultural visibility. To be appointed a legitimate Other might be a preferable fortune than to be permanently omitted and overlooked. The doom of being neither The Self (as the Occident) nor The Other (as the Orient) made out the Balkans the ultimate space of inbetweenness, dropping below the phenomenological horizon of the West, the Real South and Genuine East. A theory of inbetweenness (not to be mixed

cape from the lure of western gender models of interpretation, it increasingly seems to get stuck in shifting sands. As for Balkan literature, it seems to be both naively straightforward and cunningly evasive when addressing gender, which paradoxically makes it rather unpredictable. Despite, or rather due to the fact that Balkan literature has a relatively vague and unlearned attitude towards feminism and gender theory, it more easily avoids the idiomatic schematism of the marketable options. The traditional stereotype is that Balkan men have to be strong while Balkan women are and should be healthy in all respects: physically and psychologically, morally and spiritually. A partial synonymy between strength and health claims men and women to be both healthy and strong. Yet the nuances matter: the accent on strength assigns the greater part of public power to men, whereas healthiness assigns family affairs to women's integrity. Male strength suggests much more deviation with regard to a kind of zero level of sound propriety: if anyone is allowed to go beyond the norm, to transgress the order, this is man led by his strength, i.e. by his power to impose new rules. Female integrity is to work as an isomorphic reinforcement of the already existing order; women are supposed to reproduce the cosmos, incarnate its healthy cohesion, and perform its efficiency and reason; they are supposed to represent a common sense authority, a conservative, reproductive power of repetition and sameness. On the contrary, men are granted the conditional right to modify and develop the social contract, to take care of the cautious development of a traditional society under permanent threat from outside and above. Male strength involves a transgressive residue within patriarchal power; female healthiness implies the self-similar recurrence of a crypto-matriarchal authority; maleness is potentially centrifugal whereas femaleness, being implicitly marginal, is restoratively centripetal. The latter is the general picture of gender casting in the traditional societies.[25] The Balkans do not pretend to a gender particularity. The mentioned crypto-matriarchy within the family structure is a feature traditional in the southern cultures in European peninsulas. Yet the accent on strength, with regard to will and body, at the expense of reason and rationality, is different from what is found in the hegemonic

with Bhabha's pattern of hybridity) is actually needed so as to account for interstitial phenomena like the Balkans, a project that will need more time and space.

[25] Bourdieu (1998)

masculinity(ies) of western modernity. This is strength always already pregnant with weakness. Women's authority in turn relies on the patriarchal order, i.e. the crypto-matriarchy is not an instance of gender subversive resistance or communal change. Modernisation has resulted in changes in gender role distribution. The impact of the growing awareness of western perception of the Balkans has induced ambiguous reactions. The local myth of man being above the law or procedure has led to a particular model of *heroic masculinity of the outlaw.* The western interpretation of the latter casts the Balkan man as being in a (mental) institution, as being wild, backward, under-developed, irrational, uncultivated – this in turn often being generalised under the banner of mental illness, madness and often accompanied by criminality.[26]

This essay has neither the time nor the space to do more than propose a hypothesis of the structural role distribution between Balkan postmodern literature compared with the Balkan festival or art cinema launched by Kusturica's huge international success.[27] Those movies from and on the Balkans that are most acclaimed in the West adhere to the western perception of men on the verge of madness: Kusturica's *Underground*, Milchevski's *After the Rain*, Paskalevski's *Gunpowder Keg*, Vulchanov's *The Patent Leather Shoes of the Unknown Warrior*, Angelopulos's *The Gaze of Odysseus* and others. Balkan cinema responded to western stereotyping by reproducing this, be it with a reproachful or a pardoning smile. The myth of the Balkans as a profoundly masculine space has been continuously repeated. However, masculine strength, will and potency has assumed a pre-modern form of aggressive, savage, beastly, irrational, suicidal machismo in the grip of passions and drives.[28] Interestingly, women are seen as both custodi-

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[27] In his time Milosevic passed the casting for all these roles.

By proposing such a simple perspective towards the arts selling best the region's myths and self-representations, the text's furthest hope is to attract a somewhat belated interest towards a particular Balkan artistic production: unlike the cinema, the regional fame of the pieces of literature commented here has by no means provided them with a particularly wide international credit.

[28] One might find examples in: Theo Angelopulos's *Ulysses' Gaze*; in everything made by Emir Kusturica (*Do You Remember Dolly Bell?, When Father was away on Business, Time of the Gypsies, Underground, Black Cat, White Cat*); Milcho Manchevski's *Before the Rain* and *Dust*; Rangel Vulchanov's *The Patent Leather Shoes of the Un-*

ans of reason and common sense as well as the conventional victims of men's frenzy.[29] By contrast, it is surprising to discover that cinema and literature sell the Balkan gender models in different ways. Whereas cinema accepts to play to on western exotic expectations, Balkan postmodern literature promotes an ideology that is neither an expected response nor an overturning of western assumptions. I shall attempt briefly to describe the politics of gender prevailing in postmodern fiction. What does the Balkan postmodern do with the figures and metaphors of gender and health? How does it engage these in creative (inter) play? How do the figures of healthiness and sickness operate on the field of gender exchange? What are the cultural implications for a region with a somewhat strange gender perception?

As mentioned above, contrary to the structural inscription of the marginal other in the gender pattern of femininity, the Balkans are firmly perceived as incurably male. The latter is not a premise for pride or satisfaction as Balkan maleness has usually been accompanied by perceptions in the direction of wildness, blackness and/or animality. It neither complies with the local myth of the strong man and sound woman nor with the western(ised) counter-myth of the mad suicidal men and subdued diffident women. Literature locates modern Balkan men's weakness and women's sickness in the ambiguous perspective of self-discovering. Literature suggests a gender counter-projection: coping with life by complying with it. To men literature prescribes the antidote of refreshing weakness endowed with imagination and situational inventiveness, whereas women are bound to take advantage of their subversive susceptibility.

I would argue that literature plays a crucial role in negotiating and engaging with gender as a way of coping with the predicament of being Balkan. Such a role has little to do with national pride; what constitutes a significant difference between postmodern literature and that of high modernity is that the former thinks in *regional* rather than national categories. Not all postmodern literary works, however, are regionally

known Soldier, *Last Wishes*, *Where are you travelling for?*; Danis Tanovic's *No Man's Land*; Goran Paskalevic's *The Power Keg*; Ljubisa Samardzic's *Natasha* and *The Policeman's Daughter*.

[29] The films in question are mostly made for export, yet this only partly explains their use of western stereotypes. Being mainly the type of festival cinema, it seems all too tamed when ushering male suicidal madness.

sensitive, nor do those which have a national focus eschew completely a regional vision. This essay will restrict itself to works that are endowed with what I shall call a Balkan liturgical dignity, i.e. the right to speak for the region. The latter is an overt claim for Pavic's novels, for example *Dictionary of the Khazars* or *Last Love in Constantinople,* both of which symbolically come to an end in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. A Balkan focus is not detectable, however, on the surface of Pamuk's opus magnum Black Book: located in Istanbul, it takes the responsibility to speak about Turkey's faith rather than about the Balkans. Yet being obsessed with the Ottoman past and its living traces over the mental body of modern Turkey, the novel apparently obtains the quality I call *Balkan liturgical dignity*. One is entitled to insist that despite the fact that there is no such thing as Balkan literature, the meeting point between such different pieces of writing as Pavic's Dictionary of the Khazars, *Last Love in Constantinople, The Glass Snail*; Danilo Kiś's *The Encyclopedia of the Death*, Orhan Pamuk's *Black Book*, Dubravka Ugresic's *The Museum of Unconditional Surrender*, *The Fording of Stream of Consciousness*; *In the Jaws of Life* or Georgy Gospodinov's *Natural Novel* is, I would argue, the gender politics of men's weakness and women's sickness. The narrative schemes involve male protagonists who become weaker, whereas the female characters achieve fulfilment by playfully and mischievously exploiting strategies of sickness. Weakness makes men flexible, i.e. able to look back and calmly acknowledge their crush, reflect on their illusions of strength and power. As for the female characters, their way to cope with male weakness within an entirely men's world is to use the power of sickness, of being out of order by enlarging the territories of normality. Instead of reducing the Balkan people to local myths and western apprehensions, literature tells the long, usually tormenting story of acceptance, through which men and women learn to live with their faults and failings, in order to achieve their relative deliverance from the fears and complexes of their genders, classes, ethnicities, values and their ensuing delusions.

Yet the scheme is by no means obligatory. Men and women in Dubravka Ugresic's novels are almost equally weak and sick, although it is women that usually take advantage of men's vanity and silliness, of their megalomania and infamy. Women seem to be dependent creatures obsessed either by true love or by pure sex, or by the impossibility of telling the difference between them. Although irony and parody control

the descriptive tonality and the narrative stream, men and women are still represented under their banal modern badges with a tendency to exchange their roles: men's weakness brings them to the verge of madness, whereas women's derangement is based on the nexus between sex and death under the banner of an adopted motherhood swallowing men's weakness. Hardly a coincidence, the most renowned Bulgarian novels turn the scheme upside down: both in Georgy Gospodinov's *Natural Novel*[30] and in Emilia Dvorjanova's *Miss G.* the protagonists are portrayed as mad, obsessed or inspired whereas woman are either fragile victims (Dvorjanova) or weak deserters, taking refuge from men's gift of madness (Gospodinov).

Actually the least postmodern writers are the few women among them: the only Balkan female literary celebrity today, Dubravka Ugresic, and the most acclaimed Bulgarian woman writer, Emilia Dvorjanova. Ugresic is exploiting the postmodern techniques to the extent they allow a loose collage-montage assembly of impressions, memories, reflections, quotations and caricatures to be called a 'novel'. Dvorjanova is playing the game of found manuscripts, double talk diaries, etc., yet her narrating authority behind the play of voices and points of views is rather a modernistic one. Balkan women seem to be somewhat more disillusioned than their western counterparts. Ugresic is almost as ironic and scornful towards her female protagonists as she is to her male characters. Dvorjanova's various narrators usually occupy male positions, which allow them a gradual self-subversion, while the feminine characters preserve for themselves the patriarchally phantasmatic places of mystery and transience.

Danilo Kiś could be taken as an overt contrast to his compatriot Pavic in every possible respect: his postmodernism has nothing to do with the mythopoetics of a regionalist manifesto. He is also the writer most indifferent to gender issues. Danilo Kiś creates Borges-like parabolas of human self-destruction and annihilation under the assaults of metaphysical projections and moral phantasms. Danilo Kiś's interest in the human situation of ambition, vanity, envy, competitiveness and morbid imagination, proving senseless and fragile in the face of death, seems universal. Yet it is so to the extent that men represent it: 'Folly combined with the lust for fame is more dangerous than any madness'

[30] Gospodinov (2001). Published in French as *Un Roman Naturel*

(*A story of the Master and the Disciple*). Woman here is crucial as she is the down-to-earth witness to men's spiritual claims verging on nonsense or madness. She is supposed to be deluded most, yet she is the one to elicit a surprising insight from her own delusions. The female characters in the book *Encyclopaedia of the Dead*[31] *are diverse: deprived of vanity and ambition higher than the one of faithful companion (Sophia from Simon Magus)* or witnesses of the male miracle (Priska from *The Legend of Sleepers*, the daughter from *Encyclopaedia of the Dead*) or concrete inspiration for their elect male partners (the lover from *Lenin Red Stamps*), or the universal lover as the prostitute Marietta from *Last Honour*, women are cursed to be (in the) male shadows. Yet their purely personal devotion endows them with a kind of insightful lunacy. They are the ultimate witnesses to male failures, yet their gift is to preserve the remains of dignity saved from men's collapsed bodies and ruined lives. Sophia finds reason to believe in her dead lover's teaching equally when his miracles temporarily work out and when they totally fail. The story's ending reads: "her mortal body returns in the bordello whereas her spirit dwells in some new illusion" (*Simon Magus*). Women's strife for faith makes men's weakness deplorable yet properly lamented. Women make men happen; men make women mean.

It is mainly with Pavic and Pamuk that the gender issue becomes a tool for addressing the geo-cultural imagination and reflection. It is no coincidence that perhaps the three most prominent contemporary Balkan novels are intimately connected with the geographic point where Europe and Asia meet: Pavic's *Dictionary of the Khazars* and *Last Love in Constantinople* both locate their endings in Istanbul, the city that also provides scenery for Pamuk's *Black Book*.

Milorad Pavic is notorious for reproducing a mystical macho ideology through his narrator and male protagonists, the latter entangled in a cunning complacency with his irresistible female characters. Undoubtedly, the rumours about Pavic's nationalism gain certain credence from the analogous rumours of his male chauvinism. However, the judgement is somewhat ironic for an author whose international best-seller *Dictionary of the Khazars*[32], recognised by Robert Coover[33] as the nov-

31 Kiš

32 Pavic (1988)

33 Coover (1992) and (1993)

el of the 21st century is published in two – male and female – versions. Pavic would be the last person to reject, neglect, diminish or bypass gender difference. On the contrary, his imagery is based on revealing difference where modernity would rather find identity; he writes of male and female days, fingers, book versions. In this respect, his acute sexual imagination could be seen as premodern, if not prehistoric. Sex and sexuality are rather part of Pavic's rhetorical strategy of multiplying differences to the utmost in order to challenge the horizon of expected identities and oppositions. Men and women in Pavic's novels never make a couple, i.e. never work for the metaphysics of antithesis, yet always play with sexual difference. Protagonists continually change their sex or lose it without obtaining a new one. A man with an always erect maleness is ridiculed for his femininity; a female poet is punished for forgetting her sex and language and thus her own verses, etc. Yet perhaps the most telling is the difference between the male and female edition of the *Dictionary of the Khazars*. In the former the protagonist, instead of shooting, reads from some sheets of paper and associates humans with a tree:

> The taller we grow towards the sky, through the wind and rain towards God, the deeper we must sink our roots through the mud and subterranean waters toward hell. With these thoughts in my mind, I read the pages.

In the female one the protagonist trembles at the touch of the person who passes the sheets of paper:

> I had the sensation that our past and our future were in our fingers and that they had touched. [...] I lost the train of thought in the text and drowned in my own feelings. [...] In these seconds of absence and self-oblivion, centuries passed with every read but uncomprehended and unabsorbed line. [...] I gained and learned more by not reading than by reading those pages.

A proper comment would have taken a long time. Here we will only note that in the first case the protagonist generalizes for, and in the name of human beings, whose pride and aspiration to God is enabled and sinful, yet she thinks and reads simultaneously caught within

space. In the second case the touch of fingers meets the past and the future; imaginary time passes while she is obsessed by absence and experiences oblivion while (non)reading. One might say that the difference is rather ideologically predictable: recalling a book while thinking abstractly while figuring out while reading – this looks rather man-like; tactile sensation drowning in one's own feelings while experiencing the course of moments and centuries while gaining and learning because of not reading – it sounds like woman. Yet in both cases it is a woman who plays the roles, the protagonist is she. Likewise it is a male character in *Last Love in Constantinople* who is actually the key feminine-like protagonist: a strong father's weak son, defeated by his father's victim's son, yet saved by a woman called "the third shoe", i.e. pertaining neither of "the two female sexes", who finally forsakes him for his father and liberates him from his life long weakness. Thus she delivers him from his keeping an ear to the earth depth and summons him back to a more proper male weakness of directing the nothingness of the universe.

In his *Wedgwood Set*, Pavic apparently chooses to belittle the West, by engaging the characters Balkan and Europa in a love affair, allotting an oddly male part to Balkan. They are students and study together at her home. She takes some examinations; he skips them. She learns that he actually is not studying engineering as she is. She therefore decides that he is wasting his time, because he is in love with her. When she finds him in a village next to Thessalonike, he utters a speech in favour of non-quantitative approaches to the Universe and then seduces her on the back of a white bull. At the end of the day and once again alone, Europe reveals the reason for Balkan's vain efforts to stay and study with her: the daily, cooked food that he could afford. The short story seems informed by a clear-cut ideology of gender and cultural misunderstanding between Europe and the Balkans. Yet the irony is that each of the characters is effectively androgynous: Europe, obsessed by the power of precise, technical knowledge is rational in her attitude of hardly noticing him whilst she is also caring for him; Balkan, devoted to a mystical wisdom so secretive that it is not confided to the reader, is living a double life: a profane life superficially shared with Europa which serves as the enabling cover for his clandestine, mystical life. It is the liaison, the intercourse, however, that makes them find fulfilment, as it summons them back to sexuality. The suggestion is that both Europe and Balkan have interchangeable sexes and genders whilst achieving a new-

born androgyny. Both the intercourse and the separation are deprived of sentimentality, and the mutual exploitation actually points to a shared interest underpinned by a calculated risk. This text is one of the most insightful pieces of writing (en)gendering the East/West partnership.

In this context, Orhan Pamuk appears as a well-balanced combination of Georges Perec, Patric Modiano, Javier Marias and Umberto Eco and the spiritual father of them all, J.L.Borges. Pamuk's manner of dealing with gender is, as with all of his achievements, a sophisticated and perhaps all too successful imitation of the western nostalgia for otherness as a surpassed past. Pavic is obsessed by the tension between the European present and the precious Ottoman past overwhelming contemporary Turkey and therefore evolves a gender model that actually engendered the title and the conceptual framework of this text: a man looking for his wife who left him for her half-brother; the woman's distinctive trait is that she exploits sickness in order both to manipulate and to retain her husband, incapable of both resisting and understanding her flight into sickness which is her feminine form of escapism.

Thus, to conclude, perhaps what characterises the gender approaches of the best known Balkan postmodernists is implied by the title of this chapter: men are represented as too weak to adhere to the western models of active efficiency, of (fragile) rigidity. On the other hand, women are represented as dissatisfied with their condition and thereby choosing to harness strategies of sickness; their incompleteness is usually compensated for by mutual discrepant self-fulfilments, which makes of them conscious schizoid figures. Thus the Balkan female character is usually on the verge of psychological disorder, yet she is usually immersed in total ignorance about her state. In other words, to be a man in contemporary Balkan literature is equivalent to living in a certified yet happy ineptitude, whereas to be a woman is always already a diagnosis, albeit a productive one. Man's weakness is a context and condition enabling women's sickness, whereas woman's fundamental indisposition opens men's eyes to and for the ploys of power and modern order. Balkan literature, although perhaps less so than the western or non-western post-colonial canon, grants its trust to female sickness rather than to male weakness, and this is because it bets on itself. It is a question of its very survival – and, for that matter, a question of the survival of the region.

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LYRIC GENRES IN ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

In the first sentence of his *Poetics* Aristotle promises a comprehensive survey of all kinds of poetry: Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἥντινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει ... λέγωμεν.[1] The reader's expectations, however, are not fully met in the course of his analysis. In the extant first book the focus is almost exclusively on tragedy, while epic receives only minor attention; other genres are usually discussed simply in connection with them. The lost second book was most likely devoted to comedy and there seems to have been very little discussion of other kinds of poetry, the only exception being perhaps the iambus. Genres other than epic and the two forms of drama are presented by less than twenty quotations and references.

The explanation for the distinctive position of these two dramatic genres is fairly obvious: in Aristotle's view they represent the culmination of the gradual evolution of all the innate possibilities in the mimetic capacity of human nature.[2] Nature itself has found in them the forms

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[1] *"Our topic is poetry in itself and its kinds, and what potential each has"*, 1447a8-12. In the following I shall quote the English translation by R. JANKO (Aristotle: Poetics. Indianapolis 1987).

[2] See S. HALLIWELL: Aristotle's Poetics. (Chapel Hill, NC 1986) 279. He convincingly refutes both G. F. ELSE's and I. BYWATER's explanations. ELSE's suggestion (Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument. Cambridge, MA 1957, 15 n. 56) that Aristotle only discusses genres which were still familiar and important in his days simply does not correspond to the facts. The weak point in BYWATER's explanation (Aristotle on the Art of Poetry. Oxford 1909, ad loc. 47a 8) who thought that lyric genres belonged to music rather than to poetry, is that rhythm and tune are among the poetic media.

which render its own functioning perfect and complete. As a result, description is gradually subordinated to evaluation as the treatise proceeds. This approach does not allow for the discussion of a theory of less developed and less refined genres to which lyric poetry too can be assigned. Yet this explanation does not really explain the almost complete lack of an analysis of these genres. It still remains to be resolved whether we can discover any mention in the most comprehensive and non-evaluative system of the genres discussed in the first three chapters of those genres which, although left unmentioned in the treatise, are assumed to have once played an important role in the history of Greek literature. And, above all, where do the genres called lyric genres in modern terms[3] – i.e. solo songs accompanied by a string instrument, choral songs, elegiacs and other songs accompanied by a wind instrument – fit in? Does Aristotle's general approach to poetry account for the fact that he does not even briefly elaborate on them? Are the most fundamental distinctions and concepts for describing poetic activity unsuitable for grasping the essence of lyric poetry?

Taking this as a yes-or-no question, I believe that the answer can hardly be other than assertive. Instead of challenging the truth of this statement I shall in the following attempt to pinpoint which of the categories essential to any theory of ancient lyric poetry are missing and which distinctions are not complete in this respect. My conclusion, however, will not be entirely negative. I would also like to stress that certain categories in the *Poetics* are formulated in a way which allows them to include some of the lyric genres as well. There are certain concepts which play a subordinated role in the theory of tragedy, but which could serve as an adequate basis for characterizing certain lyric genres. Thus, although the *Poetics* does not include even a latent theory of lyric genres, it does offer at least the possibility of describing them with the help of certain categories in the Aristotelian system.

[3] For the theory of lyric poetry in general, see J. Kaiser: De veterum arte... (Diss. Leipzig 1906); H. Färber: Die Lyrik in der Kunsttheorie der Antike (München 1936); C. O. Brink: Horace on Poetry (Cambridge 1963) 162ff; P. Steinmetz: Gattungen und Epochen der griechischen Literatur in der Sicht Quintilians: H 92 (1964); L. E. Rossi: I generi letterari e le loro leggi scritte e non scritte nelle letterature classiche: BICS 18 (1971); W. R. Johnson: The Idea of Lyric (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1982) 76ff. I have not seen A. E. Harvey: The Classification of Greek Lyric Poetry, CQ 7, 1957, 206-223.

Let us start with an overview of how the most fundamental concepts are introduced. One well-known feature of the treatise is that Aristotle applies the very methods he recommends for art, namely a technical study. First, he defines the particular concept which defines the essence of any poetical activity and can serve as a genus concept. This concept is imitation; every kind of poetry (πᾶσαι) τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον.[4] Aristotle does not verify this statement; he simply quotes specific types of poetry as examples which confirm his claim clearly and unambiguously. His statement can also be viewed as an inductive reasoning from six specific cases (epic, comedy, tragedy, dithyramb, auletike for the most part and kitharistike); in any case, Aristotle assumes that anyone can gain an insight into how things are and will thus hardly have any doubts. His initial claim, based on these examples, is clearly a starting point whose truth can be grasped through intuition (νοῦς).[5]

The same path is followed in the discussion of the points in which different types of imitation differ from each other. Aristotle defines three kinds of differences (in regard to objects, techniques and modes), but he does not offer an explanation for his selection of these three differences and his rejection of others: διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν, ἢ γὰρ τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.[6] In the next sentence he refers to painting, but only as a contrasting parallel, as a genre in which imitation is achieved by other techniques than in poetry. Thus the similarities and differences noted by Aristotle underline the importance of technique, but add little to the statement that poetic imitation can be achieved in three different ways. This is also a matter of intuitive comprehension and has to be accepted as an axiom.

Nor does Aristotle offer any arguments when he specifies the possible objects, techniques and modes of poetic imitation. Objects can be noble and good, or base and bad persons (or those in-between like "us"), in other words, persons whose actions can be characterized unequivocally from a moral perspective. The poetic techniques are words, rhythm and melody. The modes can be narrative or dramatic or a combination of the two.

4 1447 a16.

5 *An. Post.* 100 b6-17.

6 1447 a16-18.

But shouldn't these categories and distinctions be challenged? I am fully aware that challenging them is, in a certain sense, rather anachronistic. Nevertheless, we can take the risk of being anachronistic if we seek to determine the points on which Aristotle's theory fails to grasp what we consider to be the characteristics of lyric poetry.[7] I shall therefore consider the following questions:[8]

1. Is imitation as a generic term broad enough to include lyric genres as well?

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[7] I will not offer a comprehensive theory of lyric poetry, although I do assume that certain features are indispensable to any discussion of the genre. These are (i) the personal voice of the poet; (ii) a well-defined and specific relationship with his audience; (iii) a well-defined situation of life corresponding to a certain speech-act, especially if it is an important religious, social or private occasion distinguished from ordinary events of everyday life by certain traditional modes of behaviour; (iv) the prominence of emotions both as a state of mind to be expressed and as a state of mind to be induced in the audience; (v) a way of direct communication with the gods. Obviously, not all of these features must necessarily play a significant role in each and every lyric poern. For these characteristics see R. Pfeiffer: Gottheit and Individuum in der frühgriechischen Lyrik, Philologus 84, 1929, 137-152; E. Staiger: Grundbegriffe der Poetik (Zürich/Freiburg 1946); B. Snell: Die Entdeckung des Geistes (Hamburg 1955, 3. ed.) 83ff; H. Fränkel: Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums (München 1969, 3.ed.) 487ff; F. Cairns: Generic Coroposition in Greek and Roman Poetry (Edinburgh 1972); E.-R. Schwinge: Griechische Poesie und ihre Gattungen. Ant.u Ab. 27, I981, 143-152; H. Maehler: Die Lieder des Bakchylides I. (Leiden 1982) 1-5; T. Todorov: Genres in discourse (Oxford 1990) 1-26; W. Schadewaldt: Die frühgriechische Lyrik (Frankfurt 1989) 9-39.

[8] I will not deal with two related questions. First, I only mention in passing the problem of whether objects, techniques and modes are suitable categories for distinguishing different genres of poetry, since other categories such as the *purpose* of imitation, can also be set up. This category is vital to both the definition and the detailed analysis of tragedy. It is not quite clear why Aristotle failed to take into account the different ambitions of poets composing different kinds of poetry. The absence of this category as a criterion of differentiation is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to find a definite place for lyric genres which were traditionally (and quite naturally) thought to have a different effect on their audiences than tragedies. Neither will I discuss the question of techniques of imitation, i.e. why a few lyric genres are mentioned in the class in which poetic expression takes the form of words, rhythm und melody.

2. Can the objects of imitation as defined by Aristotle be those of lyric genres, too?

3. Is lyric poetry covered by the two techniques of imitation?

1. As regards the general concept of imitation, there are no grounds for challenging its validity. It was a traditional view that poets' activity in a sense offers an imitation of life, even though this imitation was interpreted in various ways. Admittedly, Aristotle does not accept the whole range of possible meanings of imitation and – in contrast to Plato – he uses the word in a much more restricted way; thus, for example, he never applies it to denote a certain relationship between beings of different level.[9] But it is Aristotle himself who makes one think twice before considering every kind of poetry as poetry. I am not thinking of cases when one uses poetic techniques without imitation.[10] The problem is that imitation is not a simple, invariable ingredient that appears in all species of poetry in the same way and to the same extent. Imitation has an innate dynamic; one kind of poetry can be more imitative than the other.[11] This potential is not a consequence of accidental factors, but rather depends on what, how and by what means a poet imitates. Accordingly, we should examine these factors.

2. As regards the possible objects of imitation, there are two basic problems. The first is that Aristotle restricts these objects to the realm of human behaviour. It is a generally accepted assumption that one of the reasons that Aristotle regarded Plato's critique of poetry as irrelevant is that he disagreed with his master on the matter of whom poets were writing about.[12] Aristotle only considers human persons as the proper object of poetry. This statement can be substantiated mainly by arguments ex silentio, for in most cases he simply neglects the gods of the tragedies who appear among the personae dramatis and who govern

9 See 1447 b13; but even his concept of imitation is far from being unambiguous; he prefers dramatic imitation to narrative.

10 1447 b19-20.

11 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστὴς καὶ μιμητής, ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἧττον μιμεῖται. Prob. 918 b28-9. The adjective "imitative" even has the superlative form; Poet. 1448 b7; Rhet. 1404 a22; Prob. 956 a14.

12 Halliwell (n. 2) 229ff.

human action indirectly.[13] His words used for the definition of tragedy are revealing since he does not attach any particular importance to the fact that the characters are usually of divine lineage, and concentrates only on their moral quality and social standing.[14] Nor does he consider the portrayal of the gods appearing in the dramas as the poet's attempt to give a meaningful shape to the powers that limit and determine human actions. Aristotle talks about these representations as if they were simply traditional concepts that a poet should accept and make use of in order to have the desired influence on his audience, but not as if they were genuine parts of the poet's own vision of the realm beyond the human world.[15] Nor does he hesitate to call both hymns and encomia poems depicting magnificent actions, irrespectively of whether they were accomplished by divine or human persons.[16] One consequence of Aristotle's choice of restricting the objects of imitation to human beings only is that it remains doubtful whether his theory is suitable for adequately describing genres such as theogonies and poems written to and named after particular deities: paeans, dithyrambs, mournings for Adonis (ἀδωνίδια), nomoi, hymns, processional odes (προσόδιον), songs accompanied by pantomimic action (ὑπορχήματα), etc. This remains a fact even if we know that in Aristotle's opinion it was the universal and significant imitation of *human action* that made poetry a meaningful and worthwhile activity.

The second difficulty concerns the different elements in human be-

[13] For exceptions see also D. H. Roberts: Outside the Drama: The Limits of Tragedy in Aristotle's Poetics, A. O. Rorty (ed.): Essays on Aristotle's Poetics (Princeton 1992) 133-154.

[14] In contrast even to his pupil, Theophrastus who in his definition of tragedy emphasized the heroic status of the tragic characters (fr. 708 Fortenbaugh).

[15] This is suggested by his answer to Xenophanes's critique of the representation of gods in Homer: οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν· ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν οὔτ' ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνει· ἀλλ' οὖν φασι. ("... *e.g. the [stories] about the gods. These are perhaps neither better [told this way] nor true, but are possibly [lies] as Xenophanes thought; yet people say [it is] so.*"), 1460 b35-61 a1.

[16] οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια. 1448 b25-7. Taking Aristotle's own view seriously about what kind of action a god is (or gods are) supposed to do, such "magnificent deeds" cannot be among them.

haviour. In the most general description Aristotle takes two premises as his starting points: "*those who represent people in action*", and "*these people are necessarily either good or bad*". Therefore, he concludes, the possible objects of imitation are "*either (i) better than we are, or (ii) worse, or (iii) such [as we are]*". (He also introduces two other premises before his conclusion whose truth is also taken for granted: these explain why and why only character – and thus action – is taken into account: because "*characters almost always follow from these [qualities] alone*" and "*everyone differs in character because of vice and virtue*".)[17] From his later analysis it also becomes clear why action (πρᾶξις) is more important than character (ἦθος), especially in poetry: character can hardly be defined or portrayed without a particular action. Character always defines one's actions, whereas action, even if only in extreme cases, can be achieved without representing character.[18] The ultimate object of imitation, therefore, is what a person does and not what he is like. Ideally, a person's moral fibre is also revealed by his decision and motives, yet it is only secondary to what he actually does.

In the case of tragedy, other elements in human behaviour are also subordinated to action: passion or emotion (πάθος) and reasoning or argumentation (διάνοια).[19] Of these, reasoning is the third qualitative

[17] Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας [first premise], ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι [second premise] (τὰ γὰρ ἤθη σχεδὸν ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις [third premise supporting the second premise], κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες) [fourth premise supporting the third premise], ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους [conclusion], 1448 a1-5. (In this passage JANKO dissects the line of arguments in a different way.)

[18] ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ ἠθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν, καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι. (*"without action a tragedy cannot exist, but without characters it may. For the tragedies of most recent [poets] lack character, and in general there are many such poets")* 1450 a23-6. In real life a particular action always originates from and is a direct consequence of a person's innate ethical character, but in poetry the moral assessment of an action is not possible unless his moral decision becomes obvious to the audience (1450 b8 and 1454a18). See A. O. RORTY: The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy, (RORTY n. 13) 1-22; M. W. BUNDELL.: Ethos and Dianoia Reconsidered, RORTY (n. 13), 155-176.

[19] It would appear that in tragedy not only character, but argumentation is also needed to judge an action: πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς

part of tragedy beside plot and character.[20] *Pathos* is twice as far from action as character and reasoning. In the sense of "suffering", *pathos* constitutes but one of the third part of plot;[21] *pathos* in the sense of "emotion" is one way in which a character can influence others by his argumentation.[22] Thus both "suffering" and "emotions" are presented from a perspective which portrays them as "actions". "*Suffering is a destructive or painful action*",[23] with a subtle shift of focus from the sufferer to the perpetrator who, as a matter of fact, is somebody else. "Emotions" too appear from the person's angle who arouses them in others.

The emphasis on action is clearly related to the prominent position of action in his ethical theory and his preference for the corresponding dramatic mode of imitation.[24] Still, it is fairly obvious that the subordination of passions and character to action is hardly a principle which provides a suitable basis for describing most lyric genres. There is a passage in the *Poetics*, however, where action, character and passion are mentioned as possible objects of imitation in a way which does not necessarily suggest a hierarchy between these elements. At the very beginning of the treatise Aristotle refers to dance as one species of poetry which, although offering imitation by using only one of the poetical techniques, is nonetheless capable of representing the same things as the other types: αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ [μιμοῦνται] χωρὶς ἁρμονίας ἡ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν

ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναί φαμεν ποιάς τινας ("*Since [tragedy] ... is enacted by people acting, these people are necessarily of a certain sort according to their character and their reasoning*") 1449 b36-50 a1.

[20] ἃ δὲ μιμοῦνται, τρία ("the objects which they represent, three") 1450 a11.

[21] δύο μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου μέρη ταῦτ' ἐστί, περιπέτεια καὶ ἀναγνώρισις· τρίτον δὲ πάθος. ("*These, then, reversal and recognition, are two parts of plot. A third is suffering*") 1452 b9-10.

[22] One part of the argumentation is τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν ("*the production of emotions (e.g. pity, terror, anger, etc.)*") 1456 a38-56 b1.

[23] 1452 b11.

[24] In this respect his approach is similar to Plato's: πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας, *Resp.* 603 C.

μιμοῦνται καὶ ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις).[25] In this passage these three elements appear to have equal importance without any subordination between them.[26] It would appear that in this respect Aristotle regarded dance as closely resembling music, in which tunes and harmonies were traditionally distinguished from each other according to their capacity to represent *either* character *or* action *or* passion.[27] The question is obvious: is there any trace in the *Poetics* of this sort of equation between action, character and passion in connection with the forms of imitation which use *words*? An equation and distinction of this kind is certainly necessary for dealing with poems which are not more than (a) a direct expression of a particular state of mind or emotion; or (b) simply contain a description or a characterization of a person; or (c) portray a person, often thought to be identical with the poet himself, as trying to influence or persuade others either by arousing emotions or by putting forth rational arguments, especially maxims. Aristotle, however, consistently maintains that action is paramount, and thus the answer to the question above is a very emphatic "no". Still, there is another perspective to this issue. My suggestion is that the very same categories which are subordinated in the analysis of tragedy can provide, or could have provided, the fundamental concepts for the analysis of lyric poems some of which (a) centre around a *pathos*, while others focus (b) on *ethos* or (c) on one's *dianoia*. We can thus claim that as far as the objects of imitation are concerned, some of the most important elements which could serve as a basis for a theory of ancient lyrics *do appear* in the *Poetics*, even if on a subordinated level, and thus Aris-

[25] "*the art of dancers [uses] rhythm by itself without melody; for they too can represent characters, sufferings and actions*", 1447 a26-28.

[26] "in Kapitel 1, I 447 a28 stehen Handlung und Charakter hier noch unverbunden nebeneinander; erst später werden die Charaktere der Handlung als Funktion untergeordnet.", W. Söffing: Deskriptive und normative Bestimmungen in der Poetik des Aristoteles (Amsterdam 1981) 51. A similar, but not identical subordination can be observed in connection with choral songs and dances in a passage of *Laws:* Ἐπειδὴ μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χ ορείας, ἐν πράξεσί τε παντοδαπαῖς γιγνόμενα καὶ τύχαις, καὶ ἤθεσι κ αὶ μιμήσεσι διεξιόντων ἑκάστων, 655D

[27] ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τ ιθέντες, *Pol.* 1341 b32-34.

totle's work does contain an implicit theory of lyric genres. Obviously, a poem which is organized around only one of the elements of the six qualitative parts of tragedy cannot be as important as a tragedy. I am aware that we can, at best, only assume that Aristotle thought that most "shorter" poems – which we would classify as belonging to the lyric genre – could be compared to certain parts of tragedy, but even if he did, he most certainly regarded them as undeveloped and primitive antecedents because as objects they could only provide a significant imitation of life if set into a context which was broader than that of an individual situation, i.e. in a dramatic plot. So even if, as the case may be, Aristotle was insensitive to the lyric genres, I would like to draw attention to the fact that some tracts of archaic poetry could be appropriately described by the categories of πάθος, ἦθος and especially διάνοια as defined by Aristotle in the *Poetics*.

3. The two possible ways of imitation are usually translated as "narrative" and "dramatic", a third type being a combination of the two. The Greek words, however, are far from being so unequivocal. In fact, Aristotle uses only one expression (ἀπαγγέλοντα) which can be labelled as a terminus technicus; instead, he resorts to circumscriptions: ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλον τα, ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον ὥσπερ ῞Ομηρος ποιεῖ ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα ς τοὺς †μιμουμένους†.[28] This raises three related problems, each of which concerns the problems in the classification of lyric poetry. First, Aristotle avoids the term δραματικός; should we attach any significance to this? He prefers ἀπαγγελία to διήγησις, the more common term used by both Plato and later literary criticism;[29] is there, in fact, any difference between these two words or not? These two questions are closely allied to a third-one: how are the two modes of imitation opposed to each other?

At first glance, the omission of the term δραματικός may be of no importance. It seems logical to assume that if a piece of poetry imitates

[28] "*one can use the same media to represent the very same things, sometimes (a) by narrating (either (i) becoming another [person], as Homer does, or (ii) remaining the same person and not changing), or (b) by representing everyone as in action and activity*", 1448 a20-3.

[29] See e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 37-38; Phot. *Bibl.* 319 a9.

"*people in action and acting*", it can, in accordance with the normal usage, be described as "*dramatic*". Moreover, it is Aristotle himself who brings up the question of the origins of drama and its Dorian etymology (1448 a28); and since he identifies the Attic πράττειν with Dorian δρᾶν,[30] it seems highly probable that he perhaps used the adjective form as a collective designation. He uses this form in the *Poetics* twice, and these passages can therefore offer a clue that as to why it was no accident that he did not use it *here*, at a point where he apparently tried to be as clear as possible.

In both cases δραματικός means slightly more and slightly less than what the English word "dramatic" conveys. In the first passage Aristotle praises Homer for being the only one who "*composed not only good, but dramatic imitations as well*".[31] In this case "*dramatic*" obviously refers to the direct speeches and the representation of the heroes from an inner perspective, so characteristic of the Homeric poems; what is unusual, however, is that it is not a neutral descriptive concept, but an evaluative one. In the other passage the meaning of "dramatic" is even more specific. Here Aristotle postulates that similarly to the plot of a tragedy, that of a narrative poem should also be "dramatic", in other words, it should be "*about a single whole action that is complete, with a beginning, middle [parts] and an end*".[32] In this context "*dramatic*" is not simply one of the two modes of imitation, but an essential feature of any plot, be it either of a (traditional) "dramatic" or "narrative" poem. In this sense, "*dramatic*" has an even stronger evaluative force and can be universally applied to any kind of poem with a plot. My point is that one of the reasons why Aristotle may have avoided the use of the word "*dramatic*" was that he associated it with these general requirements so closely that it became unsuitable for neutral description and value-free classification. These requirements can, quite naturally, be met most easily by dramas, but in his comprehensive division of the genres Aristotle perhaps also wanted to include those – from his perspective – rudimentary forms of dramatic poetry in which persons other than the poet also

[30] 1448 b1.

[31] μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν, 1448 b35 (my translation differs slightly from Janko's).

[32] δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις συνιστάναι δραματικ οὺς καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα κ αὶ τέλος, 1459 a18-20.

speak, but which do not contain a unified and organic plot. The most obvious candidates for this category are role-poetry[33] and choral songs[34] where the singers cannot be identified with the poet himself – these genres are today generally categorized as lyric poetry.

If Aristotle had wanted to follow Plato, he would have used the term "μιμητικός" to describe this mode of imitation. This word, however, would have been the source of another type of inconvenience, similarly as for Plato since one technique of imitation would have had to be called with its own adjective: "imitative". As far as the other mode of imitation is concerned, Aristotle could choose between διήγησις (or ἁπλῆ διήγησις) and ἀπαγγελία. Actually, the choice was not as easy as it is generally assumed. Plato uses διήγησις seven times,[35] and ἁπλῆ διήγησις three times[36] to designate one kind of "narration" which is opposed to μίμησις, the other kind. The common concept of "narration" to which both types belong is either circumscribed[37] or is on three occasions referred to by the same διήγησις,[38] although διήγησις is once used to refer to the combined type of "narration"[39] and once to a speech by one of the characters.[40] To complicate matters even more, it is on one occasion ἀπαγγελία which is opposed to μίμησις (quite remarkably in connection with the dithyramb),[41] and finally there is also one passage in which ἀπαγγελία denotes what a character says rather than the poet's opinion.[42]

Since the generic meaning of διήγησις could hardly have been unknown to Aristotle (because in the *Poetics* it is already occupied by "mimesis"), we would expect him to opt for διήγησις.[43] Instead, he

[33] E.g. S. fr. 94 P. (= fr. adesp. P.); Alc. fr. 10 L-P); Anacr. fr. 385 P.; [S.] fr. 137 L-P.; Theogn. 579-82.

[34] E.g. S. fr. 114. L-P.; 140 (a) L-P; Bacch. 18.

[35] *Resp.* 393B 3; D 1; 396C 6; E 4; E 6; 397A 2 and B 2.

[36] 392D 5; 393D 7 and 394B 1.

[37] 392D 2 or 394C 1.

[38] 392D 3; and twice in a phrase διήγησιν ποιεῖσθαι (393C 9 and 394D 3).

[39] 393B 7.

[40] 396B 11.

[41] τῆς ποιήσεώς τε καὶ μυθολογίας ... ἡ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ"εὕροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις, 394B 8-C 2.

[42] 396C 2.

[43] Similarly, for example, to Photios: τῆς ποιτικῆς τὸ μέν ἐστι διηγηματι κόν, τὸ δὲ μιμητικόν, *Bibl.* 239.319a

preferred ἀπαγγελία as the most general term – a term which occurs considerably more rarely not only in Plato's, but in others authors' vocabulary of literary criticism as well. His choice is even more striking considering that it is not a single and isolated occurrence, seeing that it appears in two more passages as one possible mode of imitation as opposed to the other, "impersonating" one.[44] Having said that, I do not claim that the basic meaning of διήγησις is different from that of ἀπαγγελία; rather, my point is that Aristotle tends to use it in a more specific sense to denote a developed and sophisticated type of narration which exploits the possibilities inherent in this mode of imitation. This term, therefore, occurs in connection with epic poetry which makes use of simultaneity in order to enhance its solemnity;[45] it is closely associated with the hexameter as the only suitable metre for narration[46] and with the extraordinary vocabulary that also characterizes the narrative mode of imitation.[47] Thus, similarly to the word "dramatic" which has specific connotations, διήγησις, too, is associated with particular forms of "reporting" poetry which meet the higher requirements for imitation.'Απαγγέλια, on the other hand, tends to cover a wider range of genres and serves as a generic, or at least a

[44] 1449 b11 and 1449 b26.

[45] ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα, ὑφ' ὧν οἰκείων ὄντων αὔξεται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος. ("*But in epic, because it is exposition, it is possible to put in many parts which are accomplished at the same time; with these – provided they are particular [to it] – the weight of the poem is increased*"), 1459 b26-28.

[46] εἰ γάρ τις ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ διηγηματικὴν μίμησιν ποιοῖτο ἢ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο· τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκ ωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν (διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα· περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων), ("*If anyone produced an expository representation in some other verse-form, or in many, it would obviously be unsuitable. Heroic verse is the stateliest and weightiest of the verse-forms. For this reason, it most readily admits exotic names, metaphors and lengthenings – for expository representation exceeds the other [kinds] in this too.*"), 1459 b32-37; see also 1459 a17 for the close relationship between (hexa)metre and διήγησις.

[47] It is also striking that in a very important passage, namely in the definition of the tragedy, Aristotle again avoids the use of "dramatic" as a term and uses ἀπαγγελία instead (1449 b26-2), see also n. 45 above.

more generic, term.[48] I do not want to overstate my point: ἀπαγγελία and διήγησις are used as synonyms by Aristotle inasmuch as both denote one of the two manners of imitation; my point is that they are used in different contexts with different connotations, even if these differences are not explicitly stated.[49]

But why did Aristotle regard ἀπαγγελία as being more suitable than διήγησις for a generic term? To answer this question, we can only rely on assumptions drawn from their etymology and usage outside the *Poetics*.[50] The meaning of ἀπαγγελία, clearly depends on what an ἄγγελος is supposed to do and it is often used to denote the reports or tidings brought by a messenger or ambassador.[51] It can, however, also be used in a much broader sense, with one person "reporting" something he personally saw or heard to another person; in this sense, even a historian's report can be said to be ἀπαγγελία. "Reporting", therefore, always assumes some kind of communication between a reporter and an audience whose personalities are clearly identifiable, and very often explicitly identified. The message can be a whole story or simply one event, but it is never a pure narration, irrespective of whether it is reported by one person or how it is reported. Although the focus occasionally shifts from the reporter's personality or subjective point of view to the message itself, what he says is always regarded as a version of how *he* saw or heard the events. In contrast, διήγησις denotes a narration from a perspective that concentrates on the quality of the narration itself, irrespective of the narrator's personality or his intention to inform others. This quality obviously comes from διά-: a focus on details, comprehensiveness and completeness from beginning to end.

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[48] Admittedly, there is one passage where it is contrasted with the "impersonating" mode in a more particular way, namely that miraculous elements can occur in "reporting" imitations, but not on stage; I will return to this later.

[49] In other words, I can imagine that Aristotle himself used them with different connotations without being entirely conscious of doing so; on this point I disagree with HALLIWELL who is very sceptical about it (n. 2) 281.

[50] There is one piece of evidence where ἀπαγγελία and διήγησις are distinguished from each other. It is not clear, however, on what basis Protagoras made the distinctions between the seven "modes of speech" (πυθμένες λόγων) to which they belong, see D.L. IX 50-4.

[51] This is the first meaning LIDDLE-SCOTT gives for both ἀπαγγελία and ἀπαγγέλλω.

Though neither ἀπαγγελία, nor διήγησις call for an obligatory case, the former is often linked to a dative denoting the speaker's audience, while in the case of the latter the person(s) whom the narrator addresses are not mentioned.[52]

It maybe important, too, that ἀπαγγελία can also mean the "style" or "diction" of what is narrated.[53] This meaning already appears in Theophrastus,[54] and finds its way into the vocabulary of literary criticism both within and beyond the Peripatetic tradition.[55] This change in the meaning can obviously be associated with the fact that a "report" is an account which reflects the speaker's personality, his perspective on events and the diction he considers to be apt for describing what he saw.

It is striking that the single passage in the *Poetics* where ἀπαγγελία is contrasted with "impersonation" is about the technique of narrating unbelievable and improbable events. It is used at a moment when the emphasis is on additions made by the *story-teller* straying from the actual facts in order to produce the desired *effect on his audience*: τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἕκτορος δίωξιν ... ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεσιν λανθάνει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ· σημεῖον δέ, πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι.[56]

In sum, both ἀπαγγελία and διήγησις denote a type of story-telling, but the two words evoke different associations and different contexts behind the stories. In the case of the former, one is reminded of a particular situation in which the speaker addresses an audience and it is always assumed that the speaker's particular personality can be felt throughout his report and can be contrasted with the voices of the characters he is speaking about. In the case of the latter, one is rarely tempted to ask about the person(s) the narrator speaks to, and it is not always

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[52] Taking 50-50 examples at random, I have found that διηγοῦμαι has a dative in 15 per cent of the cases, while ἀπαγγέλλω in 66 per cent of the cases.

[53] This is their second meaning in L-S.

[54] Ὁρίζεται τὸ ψυχρὸν οὕτω· ψυχρόν ἐστι ὑπερβάλλον τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπαγγελίαν, οἷον ἀπυνδάκοτως, Dem. *De eloc.* 94.1.1

[55] Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 20; *Dem.* 25. Also in Philod. *Poem.* II 9; IV 8 and 12; Plut. *Dem.* 2. Used in this sense, the term also appears in later rhetors (e.g. RG VIII 13ff Walz).

[56] "*the passage about the pursuit of Hector ... passes unnoticed in the epic verses. What is amazing is pleasant. An indication [of this is that] everyone narrates [stories] with additions, so as to please*", 1460 a15-8.

clear who the narrator is since the emphasis is on the story itself. I cannot say that these differences are always clear-cut and of great concern since both share a common element, namely that the speaker is outside the story. It nonetheless seems to me that his usage of ἀπαγγελία at the most comprehensive level was not accidental; this expression can also be used to denote genres in which the narrator's voice can be distinguished from his characters, although he himself is characterized and put into a specific communicative situation with a specific audience. Apart from the dithyramb, this description could fit any song centering on a myth or story. Still, in his definition of the different modes of imitation, Aristotle does not name either dithyramb, or any other type. It is thus fairer to claim that the preference of ἀπαγγελία to διήγησις allowed for the inclusion of certain lyric genres and was even sufficient for incorporating them into the system in a slightly more definite way, but it did not accord them a special status. As a consequence, the dichotomy between the "reporting" and "impersonating" mode of imitation is meant to be wider than that of narrative and dramatic and is intended to cover lyric genres as well.

Other factors too may have contributed to this somewhat unclear classification in which lyric genres are there, lurking as it were in the background, but without a secure place of their own. It is quite clear that Aristotle intends to set up a dichotomy between the "reporting" and "impersonating" mode of imitation on the basis of authorial presence. We know that if the poet does not disappear behind the personae he imitates, except transiently, he imitates "by reporting"; if he does not appear at all, but identifies with his characters, he imitates "by impersonating". This "poetic presence" and "transformation" seem to be ambivalent notions. The "poet's presence" can simply imply a different *point of view* than that of his characters. But it can also involve a certain *voice* which can be superior, objective, authoritative, etc. (or not) compared to his characters – and the poet's voice involves a certain *way of speaking* or a *type of discourse* as well, corresponding to different authorial purposes.

Of the three aspects listed in this passage, by far the greatest emphasis is placed on the points of view. The two alternatives he defines at this point, namely representation from an independent authorial perspective or representation of each character from his own point of view, seem to be of equal rank. Later passages would suggest that Aristotle

believed that the poet's perspective rarely has its own peculiar possibilities for imitation[57] and that he regarded it as a less sophisticated form of imitation with more limitations.

Since Aristotle uses striking and forceful expressions to stress the poet's shift from one point of view to another (as if this shift represented a complete withdrawal from his own personality and the penetration of another person), one is tempted to assume that he also meant the poet's voice and the type of discourse he adopted. Yet he does not offer a treatment of these aspects. More conspicuously, he simply disregards the various traditional means by which poets attempt to establish their trustworthiness and claim to derive their authority from divine inspiration.[58] Neither does he attribute any great significance how the speaker represents himself. (It would appear that the poet can represent only others; it is unclear whether cases when he speaks in his own person can be taken as representation or not.) Only the use of the term "reporting" raises the possibility that the poet's voice is considered, although this is only implied.

The third aspect is suggested by the characterization of the poet's activity as "reporting". But it should be borne in mind that similarly to "narrating", "reporting" denotes an "assertion", or rather an account of certain human actions. Admittedly, this reporting voice is not supposed to tell a true story since it is enough if his statements correspond to what is necessary and probable, although the audience is required to compare this fictional account with reality as they conceive of it. In lyric poetry, however, the speaker very often neither reports, nor narrates, but adopts a quite different type of discourse: he expresses a certain state of mind or a mood (congratulates, apologizes, condoles, deplores, thanks, welcomes, etc.), or tries to persuade the listener to do something (orders, instructs, encourages, stimulates, etc.), or expresses his intention to engage in some action, or makes declarations, and sometimes he makes an assertion other than narration or report, such as presenting an argument in favour of or against something, instructs, advises, etc.[59] In connec-

[57] Apart from two exceptions (the imitation of marvellous and simultaneous events, see n. 47 and 57), thc poet's role is merely to prepare his characters' appearance.

[58] See HALLIWELL: The Poetics of Aristotle (London 1987) 71-6 and (n. 2) 284.

[59] Cf. HALLIWELL (n. 2) 281. For a comprehensive overview of speech-acts, see J. SEARLE: A classification of illocutionary acts, Language in Society

tion with "the reporting genres", these classes of speech-acts are not mentioned by Aristotle; he assumes that the poet either makes assertions or does not speak at all. All of the above, however, are possible in the other mode of imitation where emphasis is placed on the fact that the characters imitated *perform an action*,[60] in other words, they perform a speech-act embedded in the context of the plot.

Thus, the reporting mode of imitation is strongly associated with one type of discourse, namely the representation of how things usually/necessarily/presumably etc. happen/happened. It is possible that this was not a direct consequence of his theoretical approach; after all, it was Aristotle himself who stressed elsewhere that the analysis of non-assertive sentences is the task of the art of poetry and rhetoric.[61] But why did he neglect to analyze those genres in which the poet himself utters sentences which are neither true nor false (neither probably, nor necessarily true or false)? The most obvious explanation is the traditional intertwining of the poet's real personality and his poetical alter-ego which were only distinguished in a later period of literary criticism. Thus, in Aristotle's mind, a poet who wrote invectives is not clearly discernible from a person who makes abuses without putting them into verse.[62] As a result, utterances in the first person singular are imitation only in as much they represent others, but it remains doubtful whether self-representation can be viewed as imitation or not.

And this perhaps follows from one of his theoretical convictions: a poem can only have universal validity if all direct connections with real-life individuals are severed. In contrast, lyric poetry is based on a diametrically opposite belief, namely that the individual and the unique may have significance for others exactly because of their individuality and uniqueness. In this respect, Aristotle's insensitivity or indifference to lyric poetry can be paralleled by his distaste towards historiography.

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5 (1976) and H. Haverkate: Speech-acts, speakers and hearers (Amsterdam 1984) 1-42.

[60] πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς, 1448a23.

[61] ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει· οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν, –ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις,– ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας. *Int.* 17a-7

[62] Cf. 1449 b8.

But by the same token, lyric poetry can be compared to the most basic form of imitation Aristotle refers to in his discussion of the two causes that gave rise to the art of poetry. Listening to a poem which focuses on particular individuals as its objects is a clear case of observing and inferring οὗτος ἐκεῖνος[63] where, in contrast with poems with fictional characters and general plots as their objects,[64] the problem of the identification of the represented with the visible original does not arise. Lyric poetry thus resembles the most fundamental and, at the same time, most primitive form of imitation; this, then, is why a theory of lyric poetry, although not entirely against the intention of the *Poetics*, nonetheless remains implicit.

[63] "*that this [particular person] is that*" (this translation differs from that of Janko), 1448 b17.

[64] Cf. 1449 b8.

RAYA KUNCHEVA

OBSERVATIONS ON PAUL VALÉRY'S SPIRITUAL SITUATION

Self-introspection and the tracing of the stages in one's own life are recurring themes in Paul Valéry's prose. With his typical analyticity and inevitable self-reflexion, he builds himself in the construction of the spiritual portraits of the great figures of art and thoughts: Descartes, Baudelaire, Degas and Mallarmé, Goethe among many. These portraits have strong conceptual intensity, which is equally important for both Valéry and the other creative individual, with the same forceful insight and suggestion. Paradoxically, the portrait becomes even more graphic when it is composed with thorough personal introspection. Or, in his own words:

> "Une brève réflehion fait connaître qu'il n'y a pas d'autre parti que l'on puisse prendre. Il faut se mettre sciemment à la place de l'être qui nous occupe… Et quell autre que nous-mêmes peut répondre, quand nous appelons un *esprit* ? On n'en trouve jamais qu'en soi. C'est notre proper fonctionnement qui, *seul*, peut nous apprendre quelque chose sur toute chose."[1]

Nevertheless, the thought that closes the circle by looping on itself is not self-repetition. This is the road to knowledge in the spiritual categories as seen from the angle of personal self-construction. For example, when he writes about the "situation" of Baudelaire, Valéry speaks also about his own formation, although he presents facts and circumstances of somebody else's life, psychological and creative situ-

[1] Paul Valéry, Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924, 209-210.

ation. Edgar Allen Poe is Baudelaire's spiritual twin, and therefore, although not mentioned, he *is* present. Valéry, who is the best interpreter of Mallarmé's poetry, obviously felt distanced from him because of an essential position. Therefore, he perceived him as a problem, regardless of his admiration for him. I am not going to comment further on this complex issue other than to mention that it was successfully explained by the fact, which might seem not related, that the new concept of the text in the exemplary pieces of post-modern theory of literature was based on Mallarmé's poetry, whereas Paul Valéry was relegated to history by comprehensive silence.

According to Harold Bloom, the main theme in Valéry's oeuvre is the influence of Valéry's mind upon itself.[2] He quotes the following passage from *Lettre à Mallarmé*:

> "Nous disons qu' un auteur est *original* quand nous sommes dans l'ignorance des transformations caches qui changèrent las autres en lui; nous voulons dire que la dependence de *ce qu'il fait* à l'égard de *ce qui fut fait* est excessivement complexe et irrégulière. Il y a des oevres qui sont les *semblables* d'autres oeuvres; il en est qui n'en sont que les inverses; il en est d'une relation si compose avec les productions antérieures, que nous nous y perdons et les faisons venire directement des dieux. (Il faudrai, pour approfondir ce sujet, parler aussi de l'infuence d'un esprit sur soi-même, et d'une oeuvre sur son auteur. Mais ce n'est point le lieu.)".[3]

Indeed, Bloom is right to claim that this place is everywhere in Valéry's writings. He has a reason to generalize about the enduring French tradition in this respect. It is as early as Baudelaire's writings about Edgar Allen Poe that offered a new meaning to the term "influence".

Based on our own experience we could also differentiate, as Valéry does, between a personality that is conceptualised as an issue and a personality that we consider as our revelation. But in Valéry's words quoted above, we find another modus of the internal life, when he makes the seemingly paradoxical statement that the idea that he had created of Leonardo da Vinci was one of his main formative factors. The creative

[2] Harold Bloom, Introduction, in: Modern Critical Views. Paul Valéry. ed. Harold Bloom, New York, 1989, 3.

[3] Paul Valéry, Variété II. Paris, 1930, 214.

efforts in the spiritual self-construction choose a given historical figure as suitable match to the cravings, demands and attitudes for which the available abstract concepts seem inadequate. When he wrote in 1894 *L'Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci,* Valéry's aim was not to write a biographical narrative or an academic thesis, his purpose was to create a hypothetical figure that would reveal Leonardo's internal law. Therefore, Bloom's observation could be extended by stating that the influence of the consciousness on one's own self goes through texts, such as the fragments of the *Cahiers*, the poetry, and through the scrutiny of 'de personages de première grandeur', as Valéry put it somewhere else. Finding oneself in oneself and in the other takes place on the level of spiritual values. Alongside the idea of 'pure poetry' (as far as I know the idea of 'pure poetry' as a spiritual value was conceptualised for the first time by Marcel Raymond in his book *Paul Valéry et la tentation de l'esprit*[4]), the universal mind is the other central idea for Paul Valéry's internal formation. This idea underwent certain transformations over the different periods of Valéry's intellectual life; it can explain a series of his statements which, if taken out of context, can be misunderstood. The key tone is given in the essays dedicated to Leonardo da Vinci. The felicitous circumstance of the invitation by *Nouvelle Revue* was the occasion for the publication, but I do not believe that Valéry would have missed to conceptualise this kindred spirit in other circumstances.

Paul Valéry dedicated three essays to Leonardo da Vinci, *L'Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci* (1894), *Note et digression* (1919) and *Léonard et les philosophes* (1928), one foreword and a number of other shorter texts. In 1924 he included the first two in the collection *Variété*, [5]. They are closely linked, as the second essay, as shown by the title[6], is directly addressed to the first. For the re-edition in the 1930s, the texts were accompanied by marginal notes.

[4] Marcel Raymond, Paul Valéry et la tentation de l'esprit. Les Éditions de la Baconnière, 1946.

[5] Paul Valéry, Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924.

[6] The word "digression" is part of the French and the English lexicon. I think that it was chosen deliberately; Valéry rejected the use of the more common words such as écart, détournement, déviation. In both languages the word has a terminological meaning in astrology: the angular distance of the planet from the sun. I hope that the next pages will confirm the actualization of all these meanings.

Here I will try to link Valéry's conception of Leonardo, as formulated in the two essays, with the two stages in his intellectual life, namely his youth, the *fin-du-siecle*, and the 1920's. In a way, this will make it possible to throw some light on Paul Valéry's texts in which he wrote not only about Leonardo but also about Edgar Allen Poe and Wagner.

Before I launch into the analysis, I would like to point out what these dates meant in Valéry's intellectual life. The first, 1894, the year when he wrote *L'Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci*, marks the period after the first publications of his poetry, after meeting Pierry Loüys and André Gide, after the first visit to Stephan Mallarmé and the night in Genoa where he decided to stop writing poetry. Looking at these biographical facts we could see, on the one hand, the work of the young Valéry on building his views about poetry – he made an anthology of his favourite poets, Heredia, Baudelaire, Verlain, Rimbeau, Mallarmé, for himself; he wrote an article on the poetic effect referring to Edgar Allen Poe, – and on the other, that he was strongly attracted to theoretical work in mathematics and physics. He started to be wary and even disgusted with everything that dims the clear thought; he put first concentration and clearing the mind from what he called "idols". Valéry focused on the issues that the workings of his own consciousness put in front of him and not finding answers in philosophy, poetry or mysticism, he abandoned them. He was interested in the discipline with which the mind worked, he looked for ways to cultivate in himself an awareness about the consciousness and having defined thus the task, which remained his overarching priority during his entire life, he dedicated his efforts in an ascetical manner to mathematics, because it could provide the language of pure symbols, the syntax which was as close as possible to the thought. The 'purification' of the language situation, the coinage of one's own terms is similar to making tools for solving specific problems, transferring the image of Robinson onto himself; this is similar to the criticism of the language of day-to-day pragmatic communication. This language is not suitable both for poetry and solving the problems of his cognitive world. One of the distinguishing features of his way of thinking is this delineation of a terminological isle.

As far as Valéry's spiritual situation at the time of writing *L'Introduction...* is concerned, it was marked by the emergence of a parallel creative project concerning the fictitious character of *Monsieur*

Teste. The first publication from the cycle about him appeared in 1896 under the title *The Evening With Monsieur Teste*; it had the motto: "Vita Cartesii res est simplicissima…". In this work, the first-person narrator, who tells about his meetings with Monsieur Teste, brings us back to the ideas of the young Valéry towards asceticism and introspection.

> "Mais je crois m'ôtre toujours bien jugé. Je me suis rarement perdu de vue; je me suis détesté, je me suis adore, puis nous avons vieilli ensemble."[7]

The disgust with publicity and achieving knowledge that need not be shared with anybody else, that does not need human relation, makes the environment for the mind which considers itself an object.

> "C'étaient, invisibles dans leurs vies limpides, des solitaires qui savaient avant tout le monde. Ils me semblaient doubler, tripler, multiplier dans l'obscurité chaque personne célèbre, – eux, avec le dédain de livrer leurs chances et leurs résultats particuliers. Ils auraient refusé, à mon sentiment, de se considérer comme autre chose que des choses."[8]

Monsieur Teste is Leonardo's shady double, who would occupy Paul Valéry's thoughts till his very end. Before his death, Valéry was preparing a new edition of the cycle about Teste, but it remained uncompleted. Fragments and versions created in different periods, including in the end of the 1890's, were published in 1946. Apart from them, there are also some unpublished texts that cast light on the initial idea.[9] Although they have independent lives, the essays on Leonardo and Monsieur Teste must be analysed in parallel, but due to the preliminary nature of these observations this cannot be done here. I will point out only that when in *Note et digression* Valéry recreates the situation of his internal life in its entire complexity, with its multiplicity of divergences, he promotes each of the potential trends and the admiration of the universal mind goes hand in hand with the facing of the void that surrounds

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7 Paul Valéry, Monsieur Teste. Paris, Gallimard, 1929, 22.

8 Ibidem, 333.

9 W. N. Ince, La Promenade avec Monsieur Teste, in: Modern Critical Views. Paul Valéry. ed. Harold Bloom, New York, 1989, 75-89.

the pure ego. Teste is the pure ego, without the creative activity and without the metaphysics.

According to Marcel Raymond, this essay belongs to the highest achievements of French literature and proposes an approach similar to that taken to a literary work. The present observations are limited only to the outlining of a hypothesis and a closer look on the text is not possible. Nevertheless, I would like to quote a passage in which Valéry showed that the possibility of self-destruction is in-built in the mind:

> "Elle voit qu'elle correspond ou qu'elle répond, non à un *monde*, mais à quelque système de degré plus élevé dont les éléments soient des mondes. Elle est capable de plus de combinaisons internes qu'il n'en faut pour vivre; de plus de combi naisons internes qu'il n'en faut pour vivre; de plus de riqueur que toute occasion pratique n'en requiert et n'en supporte; elle se juge plus profonde que l'abîme même de la vie et de la mort animales; et ce regard sur sa condition ne peut réagir sur elle-même, tant elle s'est appliquée à ne jamais figurer dans quoi que ce soit qu'elle puisse concevoir ou se répondre. Ce n'est plus qu'un corps noir qui tout absorbe et ne rend rien." [10]

I could define this style as 'psychologized abstraction' and it is in its own way an expression of the idea for the pure mind.

In these passages the personification of the character of Teste crystallizes in abstract terms together with another figure, also very significant for the self-construction of Valéry, but also realized as a problem; that figure is of course Stephan Mallarmé.

From the late 1890's until 1917 Valéry published almost nothing. But he continued intensively and persistently to work on his *magnus opus*, on the daily notes taken in the hours before dawn, known as *Cahiers*. These thoughts are not systematic but have one single goal: to free the mind of everything that might blur it, and to observe its workings. Sometimes Valéry would say that he was not looking for a single method, but methods; however this is just a matter of wording. He decided to publish excerpts as early as the 1920s. But then André Gide suggested and insisted that the verses scattered in newspapers and journals be collected in one edition; hence Valéry sat to write a farewell-to-poetry poem.

[10] Paul Valéry, Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924, 252.

And once again the creative process surprised him: the work on the poem lasted for four years and thus *La Jeune Parque* became the beginning of Valéry's return to poetry. When writing it, Valéry faced problems for the solution of which the efforts made during the years of silence helped him. And once again, working on the poem he was working on himself. Commentators of this very hard work point out the change in the artistic attitude, which is described as a shift from musicality towards a sensual and imagery-rich intellectualism. During the year when he wrote *Note et digression,* 1919, he also wrote his famous essay *La Crise de l'esprit.* It was followed by a series of studies and essays dedicated to the problems of poetry: the foreword to Lucien Fabre's verse collection *Connaissance de la déesse* (1920), the foreword to Edgar Allen Poe's *Eureka* (1921), the dialogue *Eupalin ou l'architecte* (1921), an article on pure poetry and a few texts dedicated to Stephan Mallarmé, *Situation de Baudelaire* (1924). At the same time, again after a long period of silence, he added new texts to the early *La Soirée avec Monsieur Teste.* In many of them we can find direct comments on the late 1890s. The 1920s saw the publication of the first volume from the five-volume series *Variété.*

I point out here the publication in *Variété*, because there Valéry did not follow the chronology of the writing of the two essays and placed the later text first.[11]

Could we interpret this compositional choice as an expression of doubt in the independent force of the arguments and theses of the earlier essay?

Paul Valéry did not want to correct or to refute himself. To the contrary, he clearly stated that he was not going to succumb to that temptation, no matter how strong it was.

> "Arrivé à l'ennième coup de la partie d'échecs que joue la connaissance avec l'être, ou se flatte qu'on est instruit par l'adversaire; on en prend le visage; on devient dur pour le jeune homme qu'il faut bien souffrir d'avoir comme aïeul; on lui trouve des faiblesses inexplicables, qui furent ses audaces; ou reconstitue sa naïveté."[12]

[11] The essay "La crise de l'esprit" was published in the same volume of Variété, followed by a text with the simple title "Note" which further develops the first one.

[12] Paul Valéry, Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924, 170.

There is a drama between the consciousness and the existence which intrigued Valéry. What does it mean to take on the appearance of one's opponent? What does it mean for the consciousness to take on the appearance of existence, of events governed by chance? Nothing else but to lose one's autonomy, concentration and to be scattered among the variety. A Cartesian, as much as this is possible in the 20th century, he was not going to search for the reasons for the existence of thought. In reply to Descartes, he coined his own formula: I either think, or I exist. Out of Dionysus and Apollo he chose Apollo. Admitting certain ambitiousness in the title of his early work, Valéry confirmed for himself the importance of the topic; the main tone sounds again and again, as a leitmotif in Wagner: which is the internal law, who makes it possible for the consciousness to have its high achievements both in science and art?

> "Je sentais que ce maître de ses moyens, ce possesseur du dessin, des images, du calcul avait trouvé l'attitude centrale à partir de laquelle les entreprises de la connaissance et les opérations de l'art sont également possibles;..."[13]

In this almost portrait characteristic of Leonardo da Vinci, which combines specific detail and the personal admiration one can find the keystone concepts for the method that Valéry was searching. The mastery over techniques, which means the presence of clear consciousness; images, because language with its fixed concepts is a much less perfect tool and because, similarly to Faraday, Leonardo would fill the entire space with figures; potentiality of equal opportunities in different directions – these are some of the characteristics of the work of the mind on which Valéry muses in his two essays.

Not only here, but also in his other variegated work: poetry, philosophical dialogues, essays, critical and theoretical studies, portraits and fictional characters, thoughts and self-observation, he would testify to the mastering of the chaos by harmony, order and clear mind. He would be consistent in these efforts regardless and despite the changing circumstances in art and public attitudes in the end of the 19th century and early 20th century. The method theme is autobiographical.

As mentioned in the literature about Valéry, the drive to start doubt-

[13] Ibidem, 237.

ing fiction and his literary activities actually came from Edgar Allen Poe.[14] Of course, he learned Poe's lessons not only from his art, but also through the image created for him by Baudelaire, and indirectly by Baudelaire's poetry. Following Baudelaire's example, Valéry gave new meaning to the term 'influence' that had been void of meaning. The spiritual double, that Baudelaire saw in Edgar Allen Poe, is the fateful discovery, the meeting and revelation when the creative personality forms itself. In this connection, both parties are active and experience transformation. In his book on Baudelaire, Dimitar Avramov analysed with insight this unique spiritual similarity.[15] Valéry was the one who continued Baudelaire's line, obviously having seen in him a sufficiently strong attitude towards rationalization of the creative process, Mallarmé remained indifferent towards the discoveries of hard sciences.

This is the cautious way in which Baudelaire spoke about Edgar Allen Poe's *Eureka*. Valéry, on the other hand, undertook the analysis in his essay *Au sujet d'Eureka*, also included in the first volume of Variété. This strange philosophical work of Edgar Allen Poe, which he considered to be a poem in prose, while readers considered a scholarly treatise. Unlike Baudelaire, Valéry was not afraid to rationalize this work, because he had already long realized that it had caused a deep change in his spiritual orientation. The terms and concepts, which Valéry applies to Leonardo's 'method', emerge from the scientific research in physics and mathematics, quoted by Edgar Allen Poe in *Eureka* [16].

The essay on *Eureka* was dedicated to Lucien Fabre. It was for this poet that Paul Valéry wrote a preface to his verse collection *Connaissance de la déesse*. Later he published it as an independent text in the first volume of *Variété*. This text had a strange fate; it triggered a lively discussion about 'pure poetry' in the French press, in the process of which, by distancing himself from A. Bremont, Valéry was able to outline his idea of 'pure poetry'. The main points of the discussion are summarized in Dimitar Avramov's book *Estetika na modernoto izkustvo*.[17]

The writing of the essay on *Eureka* precedes the beginning of a

[14] Agnes Ethel Mackay, The Universal Self: A Study of Paul Valéry. 1961, 42.

[15] Dimitar Avramov, Charles Baudelaire. Sofia, 1985.

[16] Reino Virtanen, L'imagerie scientifique de Paul Valéry. Paris, 1975.

[17] Dimitar Avramov, Estetika na modernoto izkustvo. Sofia, 1969, 375-381.

discussion, which although not directly linked to it, bears the same clear massage. Edgar Allen Poe's convincing idea that there is deep symmetry governing the matter, the universe and human mind, unites in one science and poetry. His is the phrase:

> « L'instinct poétique doit nous conduire aveuglément à la vérité.»[18]

Rejecting both deduction and induction as approaches insufficient in themselves to attain truth, he developed a concept of intuition. In its function it can be compared to the ability that Valéry saw in the universal mind as the one of Leonardo – to find continuity where ordinary people cannot.

Baudelaire clarified the meaning Edgar Allen Poe found in the term 'imagination' with view of a new concept of poetry, whereas Valéry saw in *Eureka* an opportunity to find new approaches in knowledge. Poe's universe, with its symmetry, is a vision deeply close to that of Leonardo, and Valéry. In this aesthetically built universe the term 'cause' is freed of its former meaning. (I have always been impressed with the categorical division Valéry made between the pragmatic world and the world of art and poetry. I now realize that in these two different worlds the cause and goal function in completely opposite ways.) The idea of pure poetry is conceptualised in Baudelaire's articles on Edgar Allen Poe, in the reception of his poetry in France. It was extended and developed further by Mallarmé and Valéry. A future study will examine in parallel the ideas of universal mind and pure poetry as mutually informing and having the same spiritual source. At this stage I will only point out this hypothesis. The dedication to Lucien Fabre is a visible sign for the consistency in Valéry's concepts. In this way he is different from the mysticism of A. Bremont, and from the concept of poetry of the surrealists. In fact, one can say that upon Valéry's return to poetry, in the light of the specific experiments with poetics, he concentrated on problems related to the universal mind.

In *L'Introduction*... we can read:

> "venant d'attribuer ces progress à la formation d'images, puis de langages, nous ne pouvons eluder cette consequence

[18] Paul Valéry, Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924, 120.

> que la quantité de ces langages possédée par un home, influe singulièrement sur le nombre des chances qu'il peut avoir d'en trouver de nouveaux."[19]

The use of many languages would make it possible to conceptualize the complexity of the work through the language of another art, and of the different sciences through the language of mathematics, but also it would open the horizons for the creation of new languages. A lot has been said on this issue in the essays dedicated to Mallarmé. As far as Valéry himself, as Geoffrey H. Hartman showed in a brilliant analysis of the poem *La Dormeuse*, the dense metaphoricity of his verse is due to the clear differentiation between consciousness of a homogeneous nature and the world of phenomena which must be preserved as direct visual effect and should not sink into the ready-made schemata of the already given concepts.[20] Hence, Valéry's frequently cited thesis that language is unsuitable for poetry. Valéry's scepticism vis-à-vis language has its reason and depth. It is here that he developed a poetry which is actually a vision of man who surpasses himself, who even stands against himself; a Sisyphus who would not give up on efforts and strictness.

In the essay on *Eureka* we see an insightful description of his own spiritual state at the period of writing *L'Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci*:

> "J'avais vingt ans, et je croyais à la puissance de la pensée. Je souffrais estrangement d'être, et de ne pas être. Parfois, je me sentais des forces infinies. Elles tombaient devant les problèmes; et la faiblesse de mes pouvoirs positives me désespérait. J'étais somber, léger, facile en apparence, dur dans le fond, extreme dans le mépris, absolu dans l'admiration, aisé à impressionner, impossible à convaincre. J'avais foi dans quelques idées qui m'étaient venues. Je prenais la conformité qu'elles avaient avec mon être qui les avait enfantées, pour une marque certaine de leur valeur universelle: ce qui paraissait si nettement à mon esprit lui paraissait invincible; ce qu'il y a de plus clair."[21]

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[19] Ibidem, 246.

[20] Geoffrey H. Hartman, "La Dormeuse" in: Modern Critical Views. Paul Valéry. ed. Harold Bloom, New York, 1989, 7-31.

[21] Paul Valéry,Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924, 115.

Another personality from his youth is Wagner, towards whom he remained ambiguous because he did not accept his emotionality, marked by the romantic attitude to the world. In the book *Paul Valéry and Music*, in the chapter "Theory of composition: Wagner and the Universal mind", B. Stimpson presents the composer as the counterpart of Leonardo da Vinci in 19th century and the artist who is a brilliant example illustrating Valéry's theory about the universal mind.

> "Wagner was not only the predominant musical model, he was a nineteenth-century equivalent of da Vinci, a total vindication of his theory of the universal mind."[22]

The concept of intersection between Wagner and Edgar Allen Poe is the concept of composition. Composition is never a frozen structure with a normative force. It is a process which makes unities, which Valéry calls, following mathematical theories, phases. Composition takes place through the act of analogy. We can find analogy in the unfolding of Valéry's thought. We can find this approach everywhere in his texts whenever he discussed a problem. He would constantly contrast and classify, without starting from a ready-made and cut-and-dried classification matrix. On the contrary, analogy is the tool for the creative process, during which newly discovered structures joining things are being created. In the search for the deepest nature, in his survey of other artists Valéry was convinced that there was a universal principle underlying each activity. And the tool is analogy, because it is nothing but the work of abstraction.

> "Car l'analogie n'est précisément que la faculté de varier les images, de les combiner, de faire coexister la partie de l'une avec la partie de l'autre et d'apercevoir, volontairement ou non, la liaison de leurs structures. Et cela rend indescriptible l'esprit, qui est leur lieu. Les paroles y perdent leur vertu. Là, elles se forment, elles jaillissent devant ses yeux: c'est lui qui nous décrit les mots."[23]

Mallarmé considered this intellectualisation in the form of a

22 Brian Stimpson, Paul Valéry and Music. Cambridge, 1984, 80.

23 Paul Valéry, Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924, 222.

metaphysical objective. But this was an extreme view unacceptable for Valéry. He understood that the ideal was impossible. In his "*Note et digression*", going into the issue of the pure ego and its difference from the personality, he saw the discontinuity of the universe, in counteraction of the early search for continuity. Both Baudelaire and Valéry remained lukewarm towards the metaphysical line of conceptualisation, regardless of the admiration they had for Edgar Allen Poe. Baudelaire appreciated most of all his analytical approach to poetry. He understood that poetry could be rationalized as an intellectual process.

Developing further Baudelaire's ideas, Valéry considered the poem as the rejoicing for the mind. Everywhere we can find the rejection of the abstract notions in order for the personal concepts to be let work, to generate a new concept. The final case is Monsieur Teste's language. The transition from a clear thoughtful image to its realization was always difficult, next to impossible, more often than not destined to fail. The next step was, retaining the state of clear mind, for this problem to be contrasted with its transposition to a higher level of abstraction:

What could serve as a support to help understand the creations of someone else's mind? Similarly to Wittgenstein, Valéry dealt with the impossibility of a personal language. While the former viewed language as a social practice, as a language game, the latter pointed out that in fact it was productivity different from the romantic notion of the creative genius, based on the issues raised by language as a medium of poetry and the fact that it targeted an audience. Similarly to Wittgenstein, Valéry believed that the problems of philosophy were related only to language. Due to the limited space here, I cannot expand on this issue any further. But by raising the issue of the universal mind one steps on the level where the mind can operate with many languages, where the language of music, mathematics, architecture, poetry can be seen as analogous and those who possess them expand the abilities of the human mind. For this reason Valéry sought and saw in the figures of Leonardo, Edgar Allen Poe and Wagner, the artists of analysis and action. Edgar Allen Poe gave him the key to this world and it is not surprising that we find his traces as the inspiration, both for the psychologization of the findings of the hard sciences and a presentation of the problems of poetic art by looking for particular effects in the mind.

> "Dans le système de Poe, la consistence est à la fois le moyen de la découverte, et la découverte elle-même. C'est là un admirable dessein; exemple et mise en oeuvre de la réciprocité d'appropriation. L'univers est construit sur un plan don't la symétrie profonde est, en quelque sorte, présente dans l'intime structure de notre esprit."[24]

Valéry dedicated all his efforts to the search for these laws and he did not make public his activities for twenty years. *Situation de Baudelaire* is of course an insightful portrait of Baudelaire, but also a self-portrait, similarly to "*L'Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci*". After poets such as Rimbeau and Mallarmé, what could Valéry do to be a great poet – this was the question that emerged from:

> " être un grand poète, mais n'être ni Lamartine, ni Hugo, ni Musset."[25]

It is this essay that gives one of the most accurate characteristics of Valéry's idea of 'pure poetry':

> "Il faudrait faire voir que le langage contient des resources émotives mêlées à ses propriétés pratiques et directement significatives. Le devoir, le travail, la function du poète sont de mettre en evidence et en action ces puissances de movement et d'enchantement, ces excitants de la vie affective et de la sensibilité intellectuelle, qui sont confondues dans le langage usual avec les signes et les moyens de communication de la vie ordinaire et superficielle. Le poète se consacre et se consume donc à definer et à construire un langage dans le langage; et son operation, qui est longue, difficile, delicate, qui demande les qualities le s plus diverses de l'esprit, et qui jamais n'est achevée comme jamais elle n'est exactement possible, tend à constituer le discourse d'un être plus pur, plus puissant et plus profond dans ses pensées, plus intense dans sa vie, plus élégant et plus heureux dans sa parole que n'importe quelle personne réelle. Cette parole extraordinaire se fait connaître et reconnaître par le rythme et les harmonies qui la soutiennent et qui doivent être si intimement,

24 Paul Valéry,Variété I. Paris, Gallimard, 1924, 120.

25 Variété, II vol. Paris, Gallimard, 1930, 145.

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> et même si mystérieusement liés à sa génération, que le son et le sens ne se puissent plus séparer et se répondent indéfiniment dans la mémoire."[26]

In his essay *Paul Valéry's lesson* T. S. Elliot gave the key to the true Valéry: every romanticism aspires to become classicism.

Cultural epochs change, Valéry's Europe, as he astutely acknowledged, is dead. But the effort of the mind to remain clear remains. In an analogy to Valéry's image about the language in the language, one could say that the consciousness surrounded by chaos remains some strange substance through the forces of concentration, abstraction and rejection to resist the forces of diffusion. I think that this is Paul Valéry's lesson.

[26] Ibidem,170-171.

ANGEL ANGELOV

(WITHOUT) BORDERS: LEO SPITZER'S EUROPEAN HISTORICAL SEMANTICS

Spitzer's idea of Europe developed as a philological practice.[1] Philological, for it is shaped through an acribic tracing and comparison of the uses and meanings of words and expressions in the Romance and Germanic languages, as well as of Greek and Latin, for the purpose of recreating the common foundations of (Western) European culture; it is only by means of organizing an exhaustive knowledge of linguistic detail that one can ascend to generalizations about its unity. Indeed, this is not philology in the strict sense of publishing and commenting upon texts; this is rather philology in the sense of studying culture through the meanings of the words and thus studying the psychology of historical milieus, in which meanings are formed and changed. A brilliant example of philology as cultural history could be found in Karl Vossler's *Frankreichs Kultur im Spiegel seiner Sprachentwicklung*, a book extensively reviewed by Spitzer.[2]

This practice is humanist, as well, for it is motivated by a certain understanding of the dignity of human beings, as opposed to their dehu-

[1] Both contemplations on the historical unity of Europe and projects for its future understandably proliferate in the 1940s. Spitzer's activity can easily be related to this tendency. In Bulgarian cf. Nevizhdanata Evropa. Dokumenti ot arkhiva na Jean Monnet, Sofia, 2003 (SemaRSh).

[2] Karl Vossler, "Frankreichs Kultur im Spiegel seiner Sprachentwicklung. Geschichte der französischen Sshriftsprache von den Anfängen bis zur klassischen Neuzeit, Heidelberg 1921 (Carl Winters Universitaätsbuchhandlung). The book was finished in 1913. The review of L. Spitzer is in: Zeitschrift für französische Sprache, XLII, 1914, 2. Teil, S. 139 – 150

manisation or destruction. It cannot highlight the positions of the present without deriving them from the past: in this sense historical depth and choice of tradition are its constitutive values. This is a humanism that does not seek for its models in antiquity or the Renaissance and which hardly regards man as the measure of all things. Its models are to be found in the early Latin Middle Ages: the divine is the measure of the human and love is the prerequisite for cognition for it just as well.[3] Emigration in the personal sphere, Nazism and World War II in the social are the foil against which this humanism could be judged, a foil which could be thought of as producing it. Last but not least, Leo Spitzer's historical semantics is one of the final gestures of the great, almost two-hundred-year-long German and European, but also Eurocentric metaphysical philological tradition. Characteristics defined by Spitzer as European delineate historical and cultural – symbolic and real borders that I think are worth discussing, as they concern us (me) quite immediately.

(Without) Borders

Spitzer wrote his studies in the historical semantics of "European" words during the 1930s (on the word *race*) and 1940s.[4] His main goal was to trace the changes in the meanings of words or expressions, common to "the basic Western languages". Such words "are European"[5], for it is impossible to study them within the confines of only one language.

[3] Cf. Ernst Robert Curtius, *Essays on European Literature* (Kritische Essays zur europäischen Literatur), Princeton, New Jersey 1973 (transl. by Michael Kowal), (Princeton University Press), p. 500; p. XVII. In 1932 Curtius formulates a programmatic return to the Middle Ages, to "the glorious founders of our Western civilization from Augustine to Dante" in Deutscher Geist in Gefahr, Stuttgart und Berlin, 1932, (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt). Cf. also the introduction to the American edition: E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and Latin Middle Ages*, Princeton University Press, 1953, (1967, 2. printing), Bollingen Series XXXVI, p. VII – VIII.

[4] L. Spitzer, *Essays in Historical Semantics*. Testimonial Volume in Honor of Leo Spitzer on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday, New York, Vanni, 1948; L. Spitzer, *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963. Later he abandons those occupations of his. Cf. Editor's Note to L. Spitzer, *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony*.

[5] I do not have the original text of L. Spitzer, *Essays in Historical Semantics*; the quotation is from the Italian translation: Leo Spitzer, *Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, Bari 1966 (prima edizione 1954), (Laterza), p. 218.

Spitzer's historical semantics witnesses to an all-European consciousness and a material effort to create a motley, varied, desirable and harmonious image of the European intellectual word heritage. Philology, this essentially European and historical humanitarian discipline is capable of studying the unity of this changing image. It is Alfredo Schiaffini who has most appropriately defined Spitzer's undertaking:

Semantics has become a history of Europe in Spitzer's hands.[6]

Schiaffini does not thematise his definition, which is what I will try to do here. The premise of "European words, European semantics and civilization" gave these Spitzer studies importance and topicality, which they wouldn't have had if they had only been etymological studies of forms and meanings.[7] Guided by an all-humanist impulse, those studies differ from the many other etymologies Spitzer proposed throughout his academic career. They are all permeated by Spitzer's conviction that the unity of Europe is possible again, in spite of the war and demarcation lines, for it used to exist. Thus historical semantics is transformed into a defense of a definite social position. The trait that brings together the various aspects of Spitzer's historical semantics is the conviction in the existence of "European words" that, created or refunctionalised by Christianity, lay the foundations of a unified and indivisible European culture.

I don't think it will be exaggerated to say that so far the history of language has never been compared to the history of ideas on the international scale offered here.[8]

Philologists, probably without noticing it, are more nationalistic than historical fact might permit; Deutsches Wörterbuch would take into account only the German history of "Stimmung", The New English Dictionary – only the English history of "tune", and Littré's Dictionnaire – only the French of "accord" – while the true history of "harmonia" is a Graeco-Latin history, which reaches its maturity during the period that stretches from Plato to Augustine.[9]

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[6] Alfredo Schiaffini, Presentazione – In: *Leo Spitzer, Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, Bari 1966 (Laterza, prima edizione 1954), p. 20.

[7] B. Croce, Terze pagine sparse, v. II – In: Benedetto Croce, *Scritti vari*, v. X, Bari (Laterza) 1955, p. 17 – 18.

[8] Leo Spitzer, *Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, Bari 1966 (Laterza), p. 223.

[9] Leo Spitzer, *Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, Bari 1966, (Laterza), p. 223.

Both in the general perspective of European culture and as regards the knowledge produced by the humanities (and philology) Spitzer privileges the origin – he is convinced that the modern European philologies are doomed to failure unless they do not operate in such a way as to make classical philology their point of departure. Spitzer claims that modern words like "ambiente", "ambiance", "environment", "Umwelt" could be deduced from the Greek idea of *periéchon*, the space or air around us. This ancient idea was picked up and further developed in the New Age first in the Italian Renaissance, and later by Newton and Goethe; actually it was Goethe who coined the word "Umwelt", translated by Carlyle as "environment".[10] According to Spitzer there are four historical styles or semantic expressions of civilisational forms that have been superimposed to create the European semantic koine. Those forms are the Greek, Roman, Hebrew and Christian ones, the first three assimilated and equally preserved by the Christian. Spitzer recreates the memory of Europe through a return to the primeval uniformity of civilitas romana, from which later divisions – linguistic, ethnic, national – have sprung up and with respect to which such divisions are secondary.

The impulse underlying Spitzer's concern with a „European" historical semantics is political rather than scholastic – the rise of nationalism in Germany in 1933. The first word whose origin and uses he studies is "race".

The moment I published my paper (1933) gave me the rare pleasure, mixed with gloating, to introduce Germany to the idea that the word used these day as ***the opposite of*** *(L.S.'s italics) "spirit", can boast of such a high spiritual origin.*[11]

Unlike Salvioni and Meyer-Lübke who derive the etymology of "razza" from "generatio" (birth, descent, generation, from the verb "generō 1"), Spitzer suggests "race" should be derived from "ratio", construed by him as the Latin rendition of the Old Greek "idea" and "logos". To "the stronghold of Europe", in the later Nazi wording, Spitzer opposes another Europe – of the logos. While the modern word

[10] Leo Spitzer, Sviluppo di un metodo – In: *Cultura neolatina*, Anno XX 1960 Fasc. 2-3, p. 116.

[11] L. Spitzer, Storia della parola "razza". – In: Leo Spitzer, *Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, Bari, 1966 (Laterza), p. 230.

"race" in the European languages originates in the Italian "razza", there is scholarly dissent as to the etymology of the word "razza" itself.[12] Which of the etymologies of "race" is correct is of great importance to the discipline of etymology itself. With a view to the problem discussed here, however, what matters even more is the choice of the word, as well as Spitzer's position in the selection and interpretation of sources.

Thus, Spitzer's motive to seek for meaning in philosophical, theological and literary sources is to represent the complexity of the possible all-European learning, whose function is to unite, unlike the learn-

[12] A brief survey of possible etymologies, as well as his own with a view to Spitzer's personality is offered by Gianfranco Contini, Tombeau de Leo Spitzer – In: Gianfranco Contini, *Varianti e altra linguistica*, Torino, 1970 (Einaudi), pp. 651-52. We can assume that Spitzer's refusal to take into account an Arabic source, or a source outside Western European languages, discussed by A. Celli (cf. below) must also have been influenced by the etymology of Austrian racists, "who had staked on the Arabic *ra's*, "head". Gianfranco Contini, ibid., p. 651. G. Contini further discusses Spitzer's historical semantics on p. 657. Here's Spitzer's opinion itself: "Etymological studies should be based on the principle of resorting to an Oriental word to explain a Romance word only if there is no explanation that could be derived from the Latin-Romance material" . L. Spitzer, *Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, Bari, 1966 (Laterza), p. 317. The dictionaries (I give the year of publication rather than reprint) I have consulted give the following etymologies: Duden Das Grosse Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache in 6 Bänden, B. 5: O – So. Rasse < ital. razza, (weitere) Herkunft ungekläert; Wahrig Deutsches Wörterbuch, 1980, Rasse < frz. race < ital. razza zu arab. ra's „Kopf"; Grosses Fremdwörterbuch, Leipzig 1986 Rasse (arab ital franz); Oxford Dictionary of English Language, 1998: "via French from Italian razza, of unknown ultimate origin"; Zingarelli 1988 (razza < antico francese haraz, di etimologia incerta). Български тълковен речник, С.,1994 (Наука и изкуство). Раса от: ар. > фр. Bulgarian Etymological Dictionary (пускам – словар), Sofia,. 2002 does not give the word "pa'ca". (The last volume of The Dictionary of the Bulgarian Language has not gone as far as the letter "p" yet.). Речник на чуждите думи в българския език , С. 2000 (раса – от фр. race от ар.); Georgi Bakalov, A Dictionary of Foreign Words, Sofia, 1949 gives no etymologies. Макс Фасмер, Этимологический словарь русского языка, т. III, Москва 1971 (Прогресс). Из нем. Rasse или франц. race, вероятно от итал. razza. Mrs. Alexandra Mancheva kindly looked up "race" in several French dictionaries; I quote here O. Bloch, W. von Wartburg, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue francaise, 1968, race < rassa (Old Provencal).

ing offered by the champions of the racial doctrine in Germany, whose naturalistic and biological arguments divide races into superior and inferior. The German-speaking etymologists whose approaches Spitzer discusses did not face the same social problem; probably that was the reason why Meyer-Lübke's attention was focused upon *the language of bread* rather than the *language of the heart* cherished by Spitzer.[13]

Spitzer was not a thinker who would have created an utopian concept of Europe's "correct" development through a return to its sources. He seems to have found it sufficient to join the Judaic-Christian and humanist tradition of St. Augustine and Philo, for which man's dignity is inextricably bound with God. At times Spitzer's arguments seem to imply that he does not merely quote St. Augustine in his support, but also "moves" into his own position, in a way reminiscent of Dilthey's assumption of "Sich-hineinversetzen" (moving-into the interpreted object or person). From this internalised Augustinian (and Platonic) stance Spitzer criticises the modern uses of the word "race" – modernity partly allows for the deterioration of the human to the biological and bestial, forgetting that "race" also means ratio, logos, idea. There are times, therefore, when Spitzer's "European" historical semantics takes the form of a cultural critique of modernity, as well as an appeal for a new awareness of Europe's high and unifying descent, obscured and banalised by modernity, as the uses of words have lost their connectedness to the divine. Spitzer's criticism is above all aimed at the proponents of the racial theory in Germany, but also at the modern break in the rapport with the transcendental and the divine. It is surprising that Spitzer should not seek support for this, although undeveloped, anthropology of his in those contemporary religious thinkers for whom faith and love rather than reason would reveal divinity's presence within the human.

Spitzer's central idea of historical semantics is that the closure into one kind of singularity or another (ethnic, national, racial) amounts to isolation from the universally human and hostility to its wealth. Binding the idea of "race' with the rational, the logos is the form of Spitzer's intellectual opposition to the instrumentalised use of a word to divide humans into pure, genuine, and un-human whose extinction is made possible by a conceptual "expulsion" beyond the borders of the human.

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[13] L. Spitzer, *Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, Bari 1966, (Laterza), p. 221.

Thus the German "Rasse" has not undergone any expansion of the concept and has broken all its ties with the universal "ratio".[14]

In Spitzer's argument, as we shall see later, the universal is the European. But "European" is hardly so self-evident a notion: Spitzer's Europe does include Greek Antiquity, but hardly contemporary Greece. He conceives of the European as predominantly the Romance cultures, and of Europe itself as a radiating centre and periphery. It will be an overstatement to say that such a concept only legitimises Europe's division in intellectual terms, separating its western part, a tendency already in progress during the postwar years indeed. Yet Spitzer's concept seems to truly separate and close off a Europe.[15]

Andrea Celli's essay "Sacred Languages. Leo Spitzer on the Arab Sources of European Literatures" seems to be close to the problem of understanding Europe in Leo Spitzer's philological practice.[16] Celli's analysis starts from a statement Spitzer made in a note to his study "L'amour lointain de Jaufré Rudel et le sens de la poésie des troubadours".[17] Here, as well as elsewhere Spitzer objects to the parallels or influence of Mozarabic sources on themes of Spanish and Romance folk poetry; even less justifiable, Spitzer believes, is the claim that the birth of Romance poetry could be associated with certain Arab influences. On the surface such objections are a critique of the positivist theory of sources, popular in the second half of the 19th century. The quotations from Celli, however, reinforce the impression of a stable cast of mind rather than any developed theory of the incompatibility of "the spiritual experience" of the European (Romance) languages with that of the Islamo-Semitic. This cast of mind goes beyond Spitzer's conceptual resistance to positivism and is part of his understanding of

[14] L. Spitzer, Storia della parola "razza". – In: Leo Spitzer, Critica stilistica e semantica storica, Bari, 1966 (Laterza), p. 240.

[15] On the uses of "Europe", geographical as well as cultural, cf. Ivan Bozhilov, "Iztok I Zapad v evropeiskoto srednovekovie" – In: *Srednovekovna hristianska Evropa: Iztok i Zapad*, Sofia,. 2002, pp. 64 – 78 and esp. 65-67 (Guttenberg Publishers).

[16] Andrea Celli, Lingue sacre. Leo Spitzer sulle fonti arabe delle letterature europee – *Lettere italiane* 2003/1, p. 47 – 78.

[17] L. Spitzer, *Romance Languages and Literature* 1944/5, p. 67, n. 37a, University of North Carolina, Chapell Hill, N. C.

Europe, delineating "an unobtrusive, yet distinct boundary between Europe and the Mozarabic Mediterranean"[18]. Tracing the distinction made by Spitzer in a number of texts between 1933 and 1952[19], one cannot but be impressed by how the range of the European itself, when opposed to national limitations might turn out to be quite limited and exclusive if one happens to define it in the terms of just one tradition, the Judaeo-Christian. Thus the European would rise to a larger yet equally closed community mostly of a religious character overcoming conflicts between its nations by means of a denial of difference, since Spitzer's ideal is the Early Middle Ages, before the Great Schism in the Christian church. Meanwhile, the Bysanthian world and Orthodox Christianity have failed to attract Spitzer's attention.

The parallel with Spitzer's contemporaries like Louis Massignon and G. Levi Della Vida enables Celli to map similarities and differences between them with respect to the theory of sources, as well as Spitzer's limitations regarding the loved Mediterranean, identified by him only with the Romance, varied and inclusive as it may be. In Andalusia Celli believes, the European and the Arabic Mediterranean have their immediate geographical and emotional continuity.[20]

Spitzer's founding of philological and humanitarian knowledge upon love could have been motivated by his interpretative sources: the Bible, the Church fathers, Augustine above all. But his choice of these particular sources and interpretation was determined by the situation in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s – by the quest for an ethical grounding of knowledge as creation and act of free choice, as opposed to knowledge as an instrument and destruction compulsion. To what looked like a return of barbarity, destruction and mass human sacrifice, like a fall below a certain threshold of civilised conduct Spitzer responded with the traditional religious and humanist virtue of love, also upheld as a motive for philological activity. We can find a similar explanation in E.R.Curtius: the metaphysical connectedness between love and knowledge (of values) is formative to the humani-

[18] Andrea Celli, ibid. p. 50.

[19] L. Spitzer, The Mozarabic Lyric and Theodore Frigs's Theories – *Comparative Literature* 1952/4, p. 1 -22; L. Spitzer, Zur Literaturgeschichte. Zur Auffassung der Kunst des Arcipreste de Hita – *Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie*, 54, 1934, p. 237 – 70.

[20] Andrea Celli, ibid. p. 54.

ties, where the only method is the mutual give-and-take between intuition and the intellect.[21]

It seems that from the late 30s to the end of the 40s Spitzer was trying to turn his philological studies into a personal lay piety and relate the idea of love and wholeness with the historical fashioning of Europe whose foundations were laid by Christianity in late antiquity and The Early Middle Ages. Spitzer seems to have thought that the awareness of this could contribute to European unity.

The quest for / return to a beginning, the insistence that the begin-

[21] E. R. Curtius, Preface to a Book on Latin Middle Ages and European Literature – In: Ernst Robert Curtius, Essays on European Literature (Kritische Essays zur europäischen Literatur), Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1973 (transl. by Michael Kowal) p. 501 "Through feeling, through preferring, in the last analysis through loving and hating, all intuition and all knowledge of value is built up." Curtius's words reflect the turn to the problem of value in German historiography of the 1920s. The philosophical theorising of this connectedness is Max Scheler's. One could find Scheller's meditations on love in many passages from his ethical writings. I'll quote a passage that , I think, supports Curtius's statement and, indirectly, those of Spitzer. "Aber ich meine, dass dem Akt der Liebe nicht das wesenhaft ist, dass er nach gefühltem Wert oder nach vorgezogenem Wert sich auf diesen Wert „antwortend" richte, sondern dass dieser Akt vielmehr die eigentlich *entdeckerische* Rolle in unserem Werterfassen spielt – und dass nur er sie spielt -, dass er gleichsam eine Bewegung darstellt, in deren Verlauf jeweilig neue und höhere, d. h. dem betreffenden Wesen noch völlig unbekannte Werte aufleuchten und aufblitzen... Insofern kommt ihm zwar nicht für die an sich bestehenden Werte überhaupt, aber doch für den Kreis und Inbegriff der jeweilig durch ein Wesen fühlbaren und vorziehbaren Werte eine *„schöpferische"* Leistung zu. In der Aufdeckung der Gesetze von Liebe und Hass, die hinsichtlich der Stufe der absolutheit, der Apriorität und Ursprünglichkeit die Gesetze des Voryiehens und die Gesetze zwischen den ihnen korrespondierenden Wertqualitäten noch überragen, würde sich daher *alle* Ethik vollenden. – Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Halle a. d. S. 1927 (3. unveränderte Auflage), S. 268 – 69 (Max Niemeyer). Cf. also in a different sense: Max Scheler, Philosophische Weltanschauung – In: Philosophen Lesebuch (hrsg. von Hans-Martin Gerlach) B. 3, Berlin 1991 (Dietz), S. 347. Text nach: Max Scheler, Späte Schriften. Gesammelte Werke, B. 9, Bern und München 1976 (Francke). „...gleichwohl aber zugeben müssen, dass eine Wertordnung ohne einen liebenden Geist in sich widersinnig ist."

ning is most important, even unsurpassable (whether it is to be found in antiquity or The Middle Ages) could be identified as a modern attitude, upheld by a number of European thinkers of the first half of the 20th century. In the narrower and more specialised perspective of philology, Spitzer also practices a return to the life-enhancing sources with a devotion aimed at restoring, irrespective of reception and later uses, the primordial, undistorted meaning of a text or word and to preserve them in their pristine purity. For he thinks that this original meaning emits a unifying power. We have long ceased to believe in our access to the only or best meaning of the text; "ascension" to primeval meaning is an ideological treatment, motivated by a certain contemporary interest to the past.

The religious tradition whose incessant presence, unaffected by historical change, Spitzer tries to register is one, the Christian, and it has assimilated and preserved both antiquity and Judaism.[22] Christianity is read by Spitzer in its primeval meaning of universal, oecumenical, as that "Catholic" thinking has kept "our intellectual vocabulary". Like Auerbach, Spitzer says "our" with regard to the civilisation of Western Europe, meaningfully identifying both his research and himself with it. His harmonising understanding of Europe's historical unity is supported by the divine presence in language; probably that is the reason why the crisis in the humanities is a crisis in our knowledge of the divine. This connection gives Spitzer's understanding a theological character.[23]

Though specialising in Romance literatures, Spitzer doesn't belong in either the ethnic or the national sense with any of the "Romance" countries. His stylistic analyses are not enclosed into a single national literary tradition. Nor do they mean to reproduce it. I would not say that Spitzer denies the national character of language or literature but that in its variety Spitzer's work offers an understanding of (a part of) Europe in which unity and connectedness prevail over national divisions and contrasts. Spitzer prefers to recreate an entity through the analysis of individual works, words, expressions ("The sun is reflected in a water-drop", he would say), instead of writing the history of that entity; evidently to achieve the entity one has to neglect the breaks and fissures – for example modernity as a break in earlier European history.

[22] Leo Spitzer, ibid., p. 224.

[23] Leo Spitzer, Linguistics and Literary History. Essays in Stylistics, Princeton, New Jersey (Princeton UP), p. 24 – 25.

Reinstating a great tradition, "canonising it", Spitzer performs a familiar act the repression/ isolation of the alien, of others, which makes it impossible for him to acknowledge the exchange and interaction with the Mozarabic linguistic and religious experience. "The outlines of the continent are Christian and European."[24]

[24] Leo Spitzer, Critica stilistica e semantica storica, Bari 1966 (Laterza), p. 224.

MAURICE N. FADEL

PAUL DE MAN'S CONCEPT OF THE "OTHER"

The book "Allegories of Reading"[1], signals a major change in the direction of De Man's work, both in its conceptual, and methodological aspects. It is connected with his turning to rhetoric, though the origins of rhetoric in De Man are not rooted in that book. It seems that the change starts with the essay "The Rhetoric of Temporality", written in 1969, and published in the second edition of "Blindness and Insight"[2].

In fact, the orientation to rhetotic is not surprising. During 60-s and 70-s many theorists use rhetorical structures in their investigations, which creates the impression that the long period of neglecting the rhetoric at the expense of grammar and logic comes to its end. "... Recent developments in criticism – De Man writes in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" – reveal the possibility of a rhetoric that would no longer be normative or descriptive but that would more or less openly raise the question of the intentionality of rhetorical figures" (p.p.187, 188).

The cited sentence not only presents certain tendences in literary thought, but also it outlines a project of a different rhetoric "that would no longer be normative or descriptive". However, how is this rhetoric possible? Is there a discoursive field that is neither normative, nor descriptive? How to examine "the intentionality of rhetorical figures"?

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[1] Paul de Man. Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. Yale University Press, 1979.

[2] Paul de Man. Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971, 2nd ed. 1983.

The first essay in the book – "Semiology and Rhetoric" – occupies a more specific place on the background of the remaining texts of "Allegories of Reading". While they are devoted to particular literary and philosophical texts and are strongly committed to the techniques of reading and analysis, "Semiology and Rhetoric" takes greater care of more general problems.

De Man focuses on two notions "old as the hills": *grammar and rhetoric*. The first one has a privileged position in Structuralism. The grammar presupposes rules and norms obligatory for all speakers of a given language. *It disciplines literary theory and provides it with the necessary for every scientific approach level of universality*. The structuralist literary thought considers grammar as an opportunity for reaching the profound linguistic models that govern the literary texts.

What is more, the grammar could be a solution to the tension between poetics and hermeneutics in which De Man is interested during the period from "Allegories of Reading" to his latest works. Poetics is engaged with the formal structures of the text. It wouldn't inform us what the expression "The Sun King" means, it can only say that this expression is a metaphor. The sense is within the competence of the hermeneutics. It is connected with the referenciality. In order to understand what "The Sun King" means, we need knowledge about some historical events.

The relation "poetics-hermeneutics" is one of the points of separation between the thematic and formal approaches in literary studies. It is not quite clear whether these approaches could be unified by the conjunction "and", as the scholars from the so-called "Konstanz School" do in the title of their volumes "Poetics and Hermeneutics". *In the relation between poetics and hermeneutics lies latent conflict.* The models of poetics tend to retience and universality. *Studies of "the formal aspect" of the texts are connected with the conviction that the elements of this aspect are limited number, as well as that they go beyond a particular work and are typical for many works, for literature and language as a whole.*

Hermeneutic approaches, unlike these of poetics, are oriented to wards singularity and infinity. The understanding – an essential category in hermeneutics – reduces abstractions and generalizations. There is no understanding in general, it is allways directed to a conctere object. *The experience of hermeneutic analyses, however, shows us, that,*

concerning literary works, the process of understanding can hardly be completed. The more this process goes ahead, the more meanings the analysed text produces.

In the Structuralist thought the grammar is a category, which serves as a fruitful avenue to the overcoming of the discrepancy between poetics and hermeneutics. This happens because *the grammar is connected both with the form and sense.* On the one hand, it is oriented to the formalization of the language structures. On the other hand, the grammatical elements, in contrast to the phonemes, are meaningful.

The concept of grammar is close to the central Structuralist concept – that of structure. Just like the structure, it deconstructs the old relation between form and content. *The grammar provides the necessary transition from the universal linguistic models to the specificity of the particular texts.* Literary texts could go against the grammatical norms, but they could not be totally non-grammatical. Texts devoid of any grammatical elements do not belong to the area of language and, therefore, to literature. The literary scholar, working on the basis of grammar, could analize concrete works on the background of the abstract linguistic structures. This could give him the self-confidence of a scientist without depriving him from the artisticity and pleasure of interpretation. *By the opportunity to be a passage from poetics to hermeneutics, from form to meaning and vice versa, the grammar seems to draw the Structuralist thought up to the disclosure of the literary riddle.*

In the essay "Semiology and Rhetoric" De Man challenges this opportunity by a juxtaposition of grammar with rhetoric. (In its latest stage the French Structuralism turns to the latter, may be because of the understanding that grammar wouldn't represent exhaustively the specificity of the literary text.) As an empiric material for the comparison are choosen tropes. In them the rhetorical elements interweave with the grammatical ones. De Man considers two types of relation between both elements. He calls these "rhetorization of grammar" and "grammatization of rhetoric". "Rhetorization of grammar" is represented via a study of the rhetorical question, while "grammatization of rhetoric" – through reading of the relations between metaphor and metonymy in a text by Proust. *In these two processes language ascertains both the rhetorical and grammatical approach as not only possible, but also accurate.* However, that dual privilege, that moment of liberalism, which

De Man introduces to his understanding of language, as differentiated from the traditional political liberalism, does not fill us with certainty leading to decision, or action. On the contrary, decision is made problematic, uncertain, by too high a probability of reaching an error: we are equally wrong if we choose to assign privilege to the grammatical approach, or if our preference goes to the rhetorical one. *The confusion is further emphasized by the possibility toward which, by the way, de Man's analysis leads, that it is not so certain whether rhetoric and grammar are clearly distinguishable, that they are not language fields divided by a border that could not be crossed, but quite on the contrary – that they flow into one another.* "To distinguish the epistemology of grammar from the epistemology of rhetoric is a redoubtable task" – De Man writes (p. 7). But the interflow between grammar and rhetoric does not lead to their forming a unity, to their melting into a structure of the type of the "dialectic synthesis". *Rhetoric and grammar produce meanings that do not coincide and require division lines to be drawn between them. These lines, however, are not stable, they are constantly slipping away, regardless of our attempts at grasping them.*

By deducing this strange difference, which both is and is not an actual difference, between the grammatical and rhetorical structures in tropes De Man undermines the stability of the concept of grammar in the literary-theoretical study. Every trope has grammatical form. However, it does not coincide with the figurative meaning of the trope, although this meaning cannot exist without grammatical background. The rhetorical question – one of De Man's examples in "Semiology and Rhetoric" – is organized as a question. But its figurative side is not connected with the act of asking. It differs from the grammatical expression, in spite of the fact that it is impossible without that expression. *Here, the concept of grammar is challenged in its most important point: the transition, that provides it, between form and sense, poetics and hermeneutics, or, in semiological terms, between syntagmatics and paradigmatics. Thus, De Man reaches a more long-term strategic objective: he shakes the concept of structure, which, like the grammar, unifies form and content.*

It is that paradoxical, ephemeral difference between the grammatical and rhetorical elements that, according to De Man, contains the rhetorical. *In his works we can notice a radical change of the notion of rhetoric.* It could be detected only in the process of a careful

reading, because *De Man does not discuss it openly, doesn'tdevelop it into a theoretical construction, does not offer and argue a new project of rhetotic*. In De Man's texts, rhetoric is not some specific language usage, as it has been regarded ever since Antiquity. It comprises all language elements and uses including traditional rhetorical structures and grammar. *What De Man calls "rhetoric" is the place where language makes us absorbed in the infinite, in our eyes, regeneration and segmentation of its constituents, which we can affect in no way.*

That process subverts referentiality. De Man's notion of rhetoric, which in "Semiology and Rhetoric" is explicated by the complex relationship between rhetorical and grammatical elements, represents language as *more than a mediator between the paralinguistic world and ourselves*. But that does not mean that the referential function has been canceled. "Semiology and Rhetoric" claims that it is still valid, although questioned by rhetorical structures. It could also be said that the referential function itself is included in De Man's notion of rhetoric. The meanings produced by the grammatical and rhetorical structures claim soundness and could be tested against certain truth criteria. In this sense, the referential function is doubled. The paradox lies, however, in the fact that this double referentiality doesn't stabilize the referentiality of language as a whole.

How to recognize the rhetoric in De Man's sense of the word? *If it sets obstructions in the path of referentiality, if it does not allow our viewing language as a transparent membrane, which we could lift every time we see fit and take a look at reality, its place then is the place that language takes among the other events of this world*. Consequently, the rhetoric is the happening of language, it defines language, and it is language's final decisive identity. *We say that there is language, that it happens to us when we face the unexpected and shocking uncontrollable transformation of the otherwise familiar and constantly accompanying us language elements. This is the moment when we perceive that language is something more or less different in relation to us.*

The referentiality includes the relation between language and the world. In our understanding of world we include those things that language denotes: the table designated by the word "table", or the window designated by the word "window". Somehow we tend not to place ourselves in this circle of objects. But from the point of view of language we are not so very different from a table or a window. Quite similarly,

word "man" and "woman" designate man and woman. We are part of the world with which language is connected through its referential function. Referentiality defines language as a phenomenon without essence. Referentiality represents language as designating things, which allows language to serve as a medium between reality and ourselves. *De Man's rhetoric puts this stale idea to doubt. It questions referentiality in its dual aspectuality: as a link both between language and environment, and between language and ourselves*. Thus rhetoric turns into an element bringing specificity to language and dismissing its impersonal role of a mediator. It is through rhetoric that language grows to something that could be felt, noticed, differentiated. *Rhetoric is language's dignity; it is a container of language's own energy and power*.

Further on – De Man's rhetoric does not only define the difference between language and the paralinguistic world. As far as it coexists with the referential function in language, and the referential function is included in it, rhetoric is the difference, situated in the very texture of language, the dissimilarity of language with itself. It is in the context of that dissimilarity that language reveals itself as not possessing any stable identity. If rhetoric could serve as an argument that language does possess identity, then this identity proves continually shaken by the referential function. *Language is at the same time a mediator and a non-mediator between the people and the world. It at the same time is and is not human reality*.

But how does "the otherness" of language in relation to us become thinkable? There are two sentences in "Semiology and Rhetoric" in answer to that question: "The grammatical model of the question (meaning the rhetorical question – my note – M. F.) becomes rhetorical not when we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning and on the other hand a figural meaning, but when it is impossible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two meanings (that can be entirely incomparable) prevails. Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration" (p. 10). These sentences contain the essence of everything said up till that moment of De Man's notion of rhetoric. Logic assesses the utterances according to truth criteria, which don't belong to the language as such. They are directed to the referencial function. Unlike them, it is not extralinguistic. There are no totally devoid of referential utterances. No matter whether they are correct or wrong, all our utterances

(even these concerning themselves or other utterances) have referential dimension, because they express something, allude to a certain reality. The truth criteria claim to exert influence on the referentiality, so that the utterances to be in accordance with what they refer to. De Man's rhetoric poses obstacles to that objective. In the case of the rhetorical question we are unable to determine by any linguistic means whether literal or figurative meaning dominates. That circumstance stays in the way of the logical conrtrol on referentiality.

In the above mentioned sentences from "Semiology and Rhetoric" the entire epistemoligical power of De Man's notion of rhetoric is expressed by the word "impossible". This notion designates the area of the impossible in language. We can also say that it is the area of the inhuman. *Man/woman is faced by the inhuman in language, when he/she comes across different meanings and finds it impossible to decide which one of them takes precedence.* Here, as well as in the cited sentences, the word "decide" is synonymous to the word "understand". *We face the impossible in language when we cannot understand language.*

Understanding is the most intimate link between man/woman and language. Language belongs to us because we understand it. Learning a foreign language means learning to understand that language. De Man's rhetoric disrupts understanding. *It is the "crossroad" where language and man/woman take separate directions. It makes language strange, "other" to us.*

The idea of "the other" and "otherness" gains wide currency during the 20th century and ranges over different humanitarian disciplines. It is also included in the political practice. Many significant thinkers like Martin Buber, Mikhail Backtin, Tzvetan Todorov, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida elaborate it. The categories of "other" and "otherness" arise as a critical corrective to the endeavor of modern West to create conceptions, which are able to give overall and systematic explanations of the world. Jean-Francois Lyotard calls these conceptions "great narratives". The categories concerned are based on the question how our explanations are possible. Convincing, as it may seem, the explanation surpasses in itself or leaves beyond it elements, which are not inscribed in it. *These elements that lie under its surface or stay on its borderline are namely "the other" and "otherness".* Their function is double. On the one hand, they support the coherence of the explanation, because to a certain extent it is coherent in relation to them. However,

since some of them could be in contradiction with it, they, on the other hand, threaten to undermine its validity. *"The other" and "otherness" are present not only at the so-called "great narratives", but also at each of our explanations, no matter whether it is philosophical, social, literary or scientific theory, political thesis or statement in the everyday communication.*

Closely connected with these categories is the idea of dialogue, bearing much importance to the Humanities and politics during the second half of the 20th century. The dialogue is a relation between several objects, in which each presents itself as "other" to the rest of them. An authoritative trend in the Humanities, that may be most explicitely expressed by the Gadamerean project of Hermeneutics, attempts to combine dialogue with understanding on the principle of necessity. According to it an immanent characteristic of "the other" is his/her/its openesss to the understanding. Entering into dialogue with him/her/it means understanding him/her/it. Hans-Georg Gadamer connects that process with the language. To him to understand is to appreciate the language of "the other". The understanding is the utmost goal of the intersubjective communication and the interpretation. In the theories of "communicative action" and "lifeworld" Jürgen Habermas shares the same view. Concerning the area of politics, the multiculturalistic line, which many leaders of the today's West declare to follow, is defined by the ideas of dialogue and intercultural understanding.

Paul de Man does not thematize explicitly the problems of "the other" and "otherness". *However, his notion of rhetoric touches them. It represents language as "other" in relation to man/woman. It is typical of this "otherness" that it reveals itself via the link between language and human being.* Undoubtedly, our language is an inseparable part of us. May be the most convincing argument about this is cultures, which no longer exist. Their languages are "dead", devoid of any development.

De Man, however, insists that despite the connection with man/woman, language has its own mechanisms of producing meanings that we are unable to control. In that precise sense it is "other" toward us. Its "otherness" cannot be inscribed in the above mentioned humanitarian and political notion of dialogue which postulates as a characteristic of "otherness" the accessibily to understanding. That notion, influenced by the traditional humanism, could easily

become an object of manipulation. It is most likely, for example, the desire for domination over "the other" to be realized in the form of understanding. De Man's rhetoric presents a different case. *It shows that understanding may not determine the relations between "the same" and "the other".*

To a certain degree De Man's views are within the context of one line in the modern European thinking, in which the autonomy of the subject, i.e. the ability of the subject to exert absolute rational control over his/her behaviour and to be fully clear about its motives, is questioned. In psychology a representative of this line is Sigmund Freud. The category of unconscious in his theory suggests that a part of our behaviour is set in motion by forces in us, which we don't reign. In philosophy typologically similar are Ludwig Wittgenstein's conceptions. He insists that we depend on the sphere of language. De Man continuies this thought in an original way. *He not that much holds that the subject depends on language as that in some measure the language is independent of him/her, that in some respects and at certain situations it is beyond his/her power.*

But De Man doesn't claim to destroy or abolish the autonomy of the subject, although it is problematized in his works. On the one hand, he asserts that the language is radically "other" toward us. However, he also doesn't doubt out connection with it. *To De Man both sides of language – human and inhuman – don't form dialectical unity. They are interwoven in every language use.* Here we can see an opportunity for *a new avenue to the idea of the autonomy of the subject. It cannot be considered yet as a metaphisical category, as something stable and unimpaired as an authoritative tradition in the history of the modern West, begining with René Descartes and continued by Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm Hegel, presents it.* The autonomy of man/woman in the area of language (in so far as, however, the language partcipates in the majority of our activities, that kind of autonomy is to a great extent our autonomy in the world at all) is not fixed. *It is shaken by the linguistic structures which makes it variable, forces it to confirm itself toward the resistance of non-open to the understanding "otherness" of language.* To De Man this non-metaphisical idea of autonomy is presented most clearly by *the relations between man/woman (no matter whether he/she is author, reader, critic or literary personage) and literature and criticism which*

in a large measure are synonims of the notion of rhetoric in De Man's "dictionary". We could decipher the idea concerned in the celebrated last sentence of the essay "Semiology and Rhetoric": "Literature, as well as criticism – the difference between them being delusive – is condemned (or privileged) to be forever the most rigorous and, consequently, the most unreliable language in terms of which man names and transforms himself" (p. 19).

FERENC ODORICS

IMAGES OF THE OTHER – FIGURES OF THE TEXT

> "The arbitrary relation between the meaning
> and the sensory component of the sign implies a moment
> in which the sign stands free of its significations.
> On the other hand, de Man stresses
> that this moment can never exist as such.
> The sign exists only insofar as it signifies,
> enters into a determinable relationship
> or system of relationships.[1]

My presentation is dedicated to the linguistic-rhetoric deconstruction with regard to the basic notions at play in defining the relation between the text and its figures.

The question "what is a text" incorporates a similar problem as the question "what is interpretation". Where is the fine line between the "object asked" and the "question asked", between the thing to be understood and the act of understanding? These questions rewrite the logic of the interpretive dynamic enabling the illimitable play between the "one and the other": in what way does the "other", the "external", the "object of understanding" enter the "internal", the "subject of understanding"? What is the nature of the relation between the materiality of the text and the phenomena of interpretation? Is it possible to keep the text in its textuality? The normative of pure textuality isolates on the one hand the

[1] Cynthia Chase: Giving a Face to a Name. De Man's Figures. In Cynthia Chase: Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition. Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1986. 96.

text from its reference, from its referential other, and, on the other hand, from the subject interpreting the text, from the subjective other – just as it is declared in the program of structuralism.

It is certainly interesting to notice that literary structuralism – a text-centred approach with a pronounced interest in the concept of the "text" – almost never attempts to define the concept of "text" despite its frequent use of the word. Almost never, I've said, but it most certainly does that occasionally. János Petőfi S., perhaps the most competent figure in this respect offers the following definition in his essay entitled *Language as the Medium of Written Communication: the Text*: "when using the term 'text' ... I refer to a dominantly verbal semantic object, to a sign-relation in a sign-model where the vehicle-image and formation together forms the signifier, while the sense and the tenor-image form the signified"[2].

János Petőfi S. defines the text in the classic signifier-signified relation. The signifier is defined in its physical essence and in the convention producing that physicality. The signifier is built up from the sense and from a reality outside the text. Petőfi's model is unable to define the text in its pure textuality. The relational signified is considered as being part of the text, and a "fictive dream", or the "Victorian England" is offered as an example for the relational signified of his example "Alice in Wonderland".

Thus it is clear why György C. Kálmán characterizes literary structuralism in 1992 as text-centred, only to add later that the only object of literary theory (the text) is by far not a sole entity: it is always accompanied by the "Other", the "context". The plurality of structuralism is reflected in the diverse understanding of the term "context": according to Levy-Strauss context incorporates the whole convention structure of the culture, however, to prevent the "whole world" from inflating the concept, structuralism intended to narrow down the idea of context to denotation and identified the meaning of the literary text as its denotation[3]. The "text" is a constant reference point of struc-

[2] János Petőfi S.: Language as the Medium of Written Communication: the Text. In János Petőfi S.: Text, Texttheorie, Interpretation. OPI, Budapest, 1990. 8.

[3] Cf. György C. Kálmán: The Theory of Speech Acts and the Theory of

turalism, which is a result of its oppositional dichotomous method of conceptualization: reality, context, authorial intention and humanism all call for a reference devoid of all of the above – the text in its pure textuality. How does the Other shade the text, and, what shadow does it project onto it?

The most distinguished theorist of Hungarian structuralist narratology, Árpád Bernáth uses the notion of the text axiomatically, without defining the term. As he puts it in his 1978' study *The Literary Explanation of Narrative Texts:* "the world created by the text is a textual world"[4]. The text becomes anthropomorphic: not only does it encompass the meaning and postulates a context, but it also constitutes a world. It is worth paying close attention to the grammatical manifestation of the act of constitution. A past participle characterizes the event as a closed, finished act: the world has already been constituted by the text. The unidentified text grammatically stands for the interpretive agent in the sentence quoted. Such an anthropomorphist practice is widely used in theoretical works on literature: it either implies the hermeneutic notion of lingual precededness or covers the indefinability of the text.

In Zoltán Kanyó's study *Remarks to the Theories of the Text* written in the early 1970's one comes across the following sentence: "most problems are the result of the fact that most theories' basic notion of the text has still not been defined satisfyingly."[5] He does not however avoid using the concept of the text then, but he opposes the linguistic theory, which defines language as an established structure without the socio-cultural bases of interactions. He does not even try to define the text, only marks out the angle from which such a definition might be successfully attempted. "In my view texts are the products of socio-culturally determined lingual interactions,

Literature. In After the Structuralism. Ed. József Szili. Akadémiai Press, Budapest, 1992. 206.

[4] Árpád Bernáth: The Literary Explanation of Narrative Texts. In Árpád Bernáth: Blocks to the Poetics of Possible Words. Ictus–JATE University Press, Szeged, 1998. 141.

[5] Zoltán Kanyó: Remarks to the Theories of the Text. In Zoltán Kanyó: Semiotics and Theory of Literature. JATE University Press, Szeged, 1990. 173.

whose structure cannot be successfully uncovered with the tools and methods of logic only."[6]

On these bases the text is a socio-cultural entity whose understanding needs more than the methods of logic, mathematics or linguistics. "It is culture-specific, that is the text is linked to a historically and socio-culturally specific community, and its inner structure does not necessarily reflect any existing logical, mathematical or grammatical theory"[7] – says Zoltán Kanyó commenting upon Propp's and Bremond's relevant ideas. Surpassing structuralism, as it did in a certain sense empirical literary theory offered an "empty" notion of the text in the early 1980's.

The existence of the text depends upon certain text-conditions: the graphematic-phonematic, the lexical and the syntactic conditions. These conditions more or less reflect the prescriptions of linguistics: they represent the acceptability-conditions of the letter or sound, the word and the sentence. Empirical literary theory states, on the one hand, that meaning is not part of the text, and, on the other hand that it's the meaning that turns a thing into a text. This latter claim implies the semantic condition, and refers to an aporia manifesting itself in the form of a blind spot for the empiricist. Empirical literary theory cuts off meaning from the text and at the same time considers meaning as inseparable from the text. Zoltán Kanyó's text sounds as if it had been written by Cynthia Chase: "The term *hypogram*, in its resemblance to the term *prosopopeia*, suggests (de Man implies) the impossibility Saussure discovered of perceiving the semiotic process, of identifying it as a phenomenon, without *conferring* on some patterns of recurrence (and not to others) the status of meaningful articulations."[8]

It is the aporia of "necessity and impossibility" that structures the text-notion of empiric literary theory: it is necessary to detach the other, the signified from the signifier, so that one can tell what is being interpreted, but it is impossible to separate the two since it is its reference to the other or the signified that makes a signifier. To constitute meaning follows a similar course as the functioning of prosopopeia: it is necessary to lose the face while it is impossible to exist without it; or to rephrase it: se-

6 Ibid., 177.
7 Ibid., 180.
8 Cynthia Chase, op. cit., 100.

curing meanings makes the performance of giving meanings impossible.

So far we have showed the unstoppable, expanding, annective nature of the text: the text as a signifier incorporates the signified (see János Petőfi S.), the meaning (see the empiricists), the socio-cultural sphere (see Zoltán Kanyó) and the convention system of culture (see Levy Strauss), and what we have not touched upon: the text as a general semiotic term refers to all signifiers, including visual signifiers like the picture. Derrida widens the reference-angle of the text: a text is that which needs interpretation, that which is seen as interpreted. Everything is interpreted for deconstruction and hermeneutics, thus the notion of the text is on the level of the universe. The text is not only a world-creating agent but also the world itself – is the universe a text?

From all this one can come to the conclusion that the text is usually a substitute for something else. The play of relocation takes the form of anthropomorphism in Árpád Bernáth's theory: the text is an active agent. The text does not only postulate the other but also incorporates the other. It is not only the object but also the subject of interpretation that come under the control of the text. What is a text? Whose figure, trope is it? What forms, formations does it employ? Does it have a visual form? How is the text visible? We rely on Paul de Man's notion of materiality to address these questions.

A number of Paul De Man's studies problematize the materiality of the signifier. Among those this presentation pays close attention to two works: *Hypogram and Inscription* and *Phenomenology and Materiality.* Paul De Man in his *Hypogram and Inscription* writes about the materiality of the inscription on account of the example "This piece of paper" he finds in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

"Unlike the here and now of speech, the here and now of the inscription is neither false nor misleading: because he wrote it down the existence of a here and now of Hegel's text is undeniable as well as totally blank..."[9]

Cynthia Chase turns her attention to Paul De Man's sentence in her *Giving a Face to a Name.*

"The materiality of an inscription must be distinguished from the

[9] Paul De Man in his Hypogram and Inscription: Michael Riffaterre's Poetics of Reading. In Diacritics 11 (1981, Winter) 28.

phenomenal, sensory existence of a particular piece of writing. By inscription is meant marks or traces that indeed exist and occur, not in a perceptible space, but to a perceiver in the process of reading of rendering intelligible a diffusion of marks or traces."[10] (104.)

This notion of materiality goes against the philosophical notions of perception, since it positions the materiality of the signifier not outside the philological process but inside interpretation: that is, the object of the philology, the text is considered incomprehensible, imperceptible in the text.

Chase then goes on interpreting de Man's notion of materiality and argues that "Such marks cannot be known to *signify* and cannot be said to be *perceived*, since their form, their shape, their phenomenal status, is a function of an intentionality or semiotic status that can only be postulated for them rather than perceived, described, or known."[11] She thus claims the perceptual incomprehensibility of the text, then goes on: "Inscription is the sign cut off from its signification, the trace unprovably a sign."[12]

It is the aporetic movement of the De Manean moment that is seen here: it is a moment that is necessary, due to its crucial role in signification but impossible since it is its meaningfulness, its significance that makes a sign: the sign is inseparable from meaning. It is the aporetic movement of necessity and impossibility that results in the materiality of the signifier.

If the materiality of the text existing as an inscription hinders the perceptual, visual comprehension of the text, then the text might not obtain a material shape in its visual sense: the material text is shapeless. But the claim of shapelessness present in *Hypogram and Inscription* is suspended by the notion of materiality since the conclusion that the material text is shapeless cannot be drawn from the fact that its shape cannot be seen. The text manifests itself in shapes, obtains forms and faces, takes the face of the Other during the interpretive movement: during its transformation from the material to the phenomenal, and loses its face and the other – the motion of the text reflects the dynamic of the prosopopeia.

10 Cynthia Chase: op. cit., 104.

11 Ibid., 105.

12 Ibid.

When employing prosopopeia we give face to an absent, deceased, voiceless or faceless entity. Prosopopeic strategy draws on the postponing power of language, and does not consider the arbitrariness and aggressive nature of signification. Thus working substantially it suspends its own tropologic power. It is for this reason that Chase might consider giving a face as de-facement.

PÉTER HAJDU

NARRATIVE AND LINGUISTIC DEVICES OF CREATING OPPOSITE CHRONOTOPES

(*The Siege of Beszterce* by Kálmán Mikszáth)

Kálmán Mikszáth is nowadays regarded as a major representative of the early modernism in Hungarian prose writing. This is a rather new phenomenon, since his work was previously interpreted in terms of a late "critical realism" that not only preceded the modernist literary revolution of the journal *Nyugat* but also ran contrary to the main characteristics of the so-called precursors of *Nyugat*. Mikszáth's experiments in parataxis of two stories, which he was doing both in shorter and longer texts in the 1880s and 1890s, also can be regarded as a modernist break with linear story telling and unitary plot.[1] I think his novels *Beszterce ostroma* [The Siege of Beszterce] and *Szent Péter esernyője* [St. Peter's Umbrella], which he wrote one after the other in 1894 and 1895, can be classified as such experiments. In both novels we find a shift in story telling at the end of "Part I". With the beginning of "Part II" the whole story told in the first one disappears and a new story begins with different characters, in a different setting, in a time one cannot relate to the time of the first story. This phenomenon might embarrass the readers; the paratext "Part II" clearly suggests that what will follow is the continuation of the same novel, which raises expectations the text will not satisfy. You cannot find any link to the previously told events either in space, or in time, or in personage. An order that fits the genre conventions is to be re-established at the end of the "Part II" when the two stories meet and start coalescing.

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[1] For more details on this topic see Hajdu 2000.

Mikszáth's readers usually find this structure difficult and problematic. A contemporary critic, for example, found the composition of *The Siege of Beszterce* wrong because he thought the change of the central character in "Part II" hindered a reading of the later parts that should focus on the central character of "Part I" (Lázár 193–194). This means the composition obstructs a traditional unitary reading by challenging the attitude that tries to focus on one central character continuously. But the composition also challenges the concept of linear time usually associated with nineteenth-century novel. The last moment of "Part II" is identical with the last moment of "Part I". However, this does not become clear until the end of "Part II". Nothing indicated or suggested a step back in time at the beginning of "Part II", and the text scarcely anywhere revealed any connection to "Part I". The reader cannot recognise any connection until much later. The experience gained by previously read novels of any sort, however, raises expectations of some connections between the parts, but such connections cannot emerge from the plots. In *Szent Péter esernyője* an umbrella plays a role both in "Part I" and "Part II", but nothing suggests that it is the same umbrella in both parts—apart from some literary conventions, i.e. previous reading experience. But how these umbrellas can be identical, and how this identity can create a connection between two groups of characters acting in different places remains a mystery for a long time.

Frigyes Riedl described the composition of *St. Peters Umbrella* as representing one of the basic forms of novels that he calls "the system of two columns" and associates with "English novelists" in general. He describes this scheme of composition as follows:

> The narrative takes a direction and goes a while, then suddenly stops. We do not hear anything of those any longer as if a completely new novel started. This plot also goes up to a point where the first and second columns meet and unite. (...) *English novelists like* this way of composition; in their writing you can find not only two but three or four such columns. Always a new plot, a third, a forth, even a fifth one; you read it with a sort of hesitation. Suddenly you see an unexpected trick and the events are connected. (Riedl 82—83, my translation, italics in the original.)

This hint at the English novel seems appropriate if it refers to Victorian fiction because the multiplot novel was characteristic of that period, and Charles Dickens is known to have been one of Mikszáth's favourite authors. *Little Dorrit* might be a suitable example to demonstrate both similarities and differences between Dickens' and Mikszáth's narrative techniques. When writing the first chapters, Dickens described his plan of the novel as follows:

> It struck me that it would be a new thing to show people coming together, in a chance way, as fellow-travellers, and being in the same place, ignorant of one another, as happens in life; and to connect them afterwards, and make the waiting for that connection a part of the interest. (Forster 2: 182)

Dickens explicitly reckons upon waiting for the connection of actors or different groups of actors as a feature for increasing interest. I am not sure that the interest is really increased and not reduced by the fact that the actors are shown together at the beginning, although they meet each other quite accidentally. This opening tableau, however, is the second chapter of the novel; in the first chapter another group of actors is presented in another place, and as the narrative goes on, this group is also to be connected with people of the second chapter.

This way of beginning embodies a double suggestion. Readers will more carefully observe the analogies of the different plots or groups of actors, in other words they will be more open to metaphorical reading strategies. Two actors of Chapter 1 are imprisoned in jail in Marseilles; the wealthy travellers of Chapter 2 are quarantined before landing in Europe. The Dorrit family living imprisoned in the Marshalsea is introduced in Chapter 6. These plots are narrated in a paratactic order without any possibility of their integration on the level of narrated events. This very separation, however, might highlight their connection by the jail metaphor that imbues the novel.

On the other hand, this beginning raises some eagerness for the narrative connection of the separate plots, which is suggested by Dickens as well. This expectation is also increased by the narrator's and the actors' intensive discourse on the topic that every event of the world is connected, all the travellers wandering in quite different roads are go-

ing finally to the same place.[2] As if the working of the narration would mimetically mirror the working of the world, conceptually described in the narrator's and the actors' discourse. This suggestion of the existence of hidden connections between all the seemingly disparate phenomena is also made by the mystery structure of the novel.[3] McLennan is continuously investigating a secret or the prints of a previous sin which he intuitively suspects must connect his family to the Dorrits.

The mystery plot, however, has a rather uncertain conclusion. The secret is revealed in such a confused scene that hardly any reader can understand exactly the situation, and Clennam is absent at that time; the actor who was most interested in the secret past will never be informed of it. (Garrett 74-78) The secret that seemed to be the organizing feature of the story turns out to be completely irrelevant, or rather the hypothesis of a secret was an activating factor for Arthur Clennam, but the actual content of this secret does not matter either in the development of the story or in its conclusion. Although the connection of different story lines seemed adequate to the necessities both of the narration and the world, this very connection organized around the secret turned out to be weak, superficial and irrelevant. This fact, however, does not affect

[2] "In our course through life we shall meet the people who are coming to meet us, from many strange places and by many strange roads, (…) and what it is set to us to do to them, and what it is set to them to do to us, will all be done. (…) Your pretty daughter (…) starts to think of such things. Yet, (…) you may be sure that there are men and women already on their road, who have their business to do with *you*, and who will do it. Of a certainty they will do it. They may be coming hundreds, thousands, of miles over the sea there; they may be close at hand now; they may be coming, for anything you know or anything you can do to prevent it, from the vilest sweepings of this very town" Miss Wade says (I 2). "Strange, if the little sick-room fire were in effect a beacon fire, summoning some one, and that the most unlikely some one in the world, to the spot that *must* be come to. Strange, if the little sick-room light were in effect a watch-light, burning in that place every night until an appointed event should be watched out! Which of the vast multitude of travelers, under the sun and the stars, climbing the dusty hills and toiling along the weary plains, journeying by land and journeying by sea, coming and going so strangely, to meet and to act and react on one another; which of the host may, with no suspicion of the journey's end, be traveling surely hither? Time shall show us" the narrator says (I 15).

[3] For Šklovskij *Little Dorrit* was an exemplary case of mystery novel.

the necessity to make metaphorical connections; the ironic deconstruction of the causal and narrative connections strengthens the appeal for metaphorical reading.

Many features of this description of Dickens' narrative strategies can be applied to Mikszáth's double plot novels. However, we find a remarkable difference in the proportions. In *Little Dorrit* a new plot starts after a relatively short first chapter, and the whole novel is rather long, which suggest that there is enough time or space to connect the plots. In the critical edition of *The Siege of Beszterce* 174 pages contain the main text, and the second, independent plot starts after 45 pages, and this plot meets the first one after 36 pages. *St. Peter's Umbrella* is 192 pages long, and the first plot is shifted after 29 pages, to be returned to on the page 104 of the novel. In both cases the first plots have enough place to suggest that they are the only topic of the given novel, and the second plots are independent long enough to challenge this suggestion.

After such skilfully raised expectations how does Mikszáth finally connect the plots? In *St. Peter's Umbrella* the quest for his father's umbrella necessarily introduces György Wibra into the other world; the encounter of the two plots in *The Siege of Beszterce*, however, seems rather accidental or improbable.[4] This accidental way of connecting, however, may suggest that we should look for a connection deeper than what is displayed in the plot. The fact that both narratives turned out to be parts of the same story afterwards, might be regarded as a statement that they are—at least partially or in some aspect—identical. This is a metaphorical statement; a declaration that two different things are identical. If we try to analyse this narrative structure as metaphorical, we

[4] This feature was also described and (as the whole composition I am discussing) condemned by Riedl (95): "the narrative suddenly stops and we are in Zsolna, listening to the story of a young girl, Apollónia. Then Mikszáth connects the two plots with a not at all probable incident." But he raised the same objection against the story of the umbrella; since György Wibra encounters Veronka not even because of the umbrella, but because of a lost ear-ring (Riedl 83). The quest for the umbrella as the motivation for the hero and for the narrator following the hero to go from one world to the other does not imply any necessity in terms of the narrated—only in terms of the narration. What connects the two worlds is a completely accidental object, an umbrella, or rather the rambles of the insane Jónas Müncz. Can we imagine a more accidental connection than one created by the rambles of a lunatic?

will not necessarily focus on their similar features, since in the work of the metaphor differences may have even greater importance than similarities. If by connecting two different phenomena metaphor suggests two points of view from where we should consider them (Ankersmit 209-220), we will be able to realise differences rather than similarities.

The first chapter of the novel takes place in Nedec, in the world of István Pongrácz, the second chapter in Zsolna. I will analyse the differences of these worlds, or rather the traits of these worlds that are highlighted by their juxtaposition. If both the first and the second chapters belong to the same plot, they are identical in one way or another. Nevertheless their connection seems completely external, since it is only created by the fact that Count Pongrácz's way to Beszterce passes through Zsolna.

On the other hand, if both stories are to create the same story, they must be comparable. This comparability can mean nothing else but the possibility of reading both stories from the viewpoint of the other. I think it is worth emphasising at the very beginning that comparing the stories cannot be based on the problem of Count Pongrácz's insanity. In the novel both the narrator and the agents enthusiastically discuss whether the protagonist is insane or not; as if the decision of this question was the only stake of the narrative. I regard this question so much overemphasised by the narrator as a bait of sorts. And the interpreters of the novel usually nibble at it; they love continuing this discourse of the narrator's, weighing the pros and cons again and again. They seem to regard the solving of this question as their most important task. But the fact itself that the narrator's discourse on insanity can be continued might raise our suspicion. The narrator always avoids answering the question; the discussions on the problem usually lead to aporias in the novel. We repeatedly read the conclusion that insanity lacks general standard.

A reading process that applies the viewpoint of the other world of the juxtaposed ones might result in a much more complicated image of Pongrácz's world than a simple classification on the basis of a normal–insane dichotomy. I am not speaking of a reciprocity of this question. If we were to ask if Zsolna is insane, we would still remain in the realm of the problem I have called a bait, i.e. we would still assume that there must be a standard or normal behaviour in the represented world(s), and agents that behave differently are insane. By the

fact, however, that a behaviour is described as insanity or abnormality it ceases to be a problem. If we manage to demonstrate that a person is mad, we can lock up him or her in a lunatic asylum, i.e., we can eliminate him or her from our world, and we do not need to care about his or her behaviour and ways of thinking. This actually happens to the hero of *The Sipsirica,* a later novella of Mikszáth which can be read as a new, critical elaboration of *The Siege of Beszterce*. Their connection is emphasised by a set of repeated motives and intertextual links. (Fábri 103-104; Eisemann 82-84) When a despotic government violently locks up professor Druzsba in an insane asylum, the very fact that he is in a lunatic asylum seems to guarantee that his statements are false and not worth taking seriously:

> A few days later an official announcement appeared in the press, to the effect that the sensational news items concerning the manor-house at Zsám, which had recently been given currency, and which contained disagreeable imputations affecting an eminent and respected figure in our public life had originated in the deranged mind of a certain Mr. Tivadar Druzsba, a schoolteacher, who had since been declared insane. The allegations, which were *of course* entirely without foundation, had leaked out from a report submitted by him. The schoolteacher concerned was at present receiving treatment in the Lipótmező lunatic asylum. (Mikszáth 405–406, emphasis added)

The fact that professor Druzsba is in a lunatic asylum guarantees that he is insane; the fact that he is insane guarantees that the perspective from which he describes the count (as an immoral being who has bought a young girl from her mother to keep her in remote castle) is inadequate and untrue. The same way of reasoning is applied by his previous friends to reject his interpretation of Jahodovska's (who is the young girl's mother) personality:

> "Why, of course it's not true," cried Mr. Mliniczky in a shocked tone of voice, gesticulating heatedly. "How could it possibly be? Only some crazy person is inventing that." (Mikszáth 410)

Druzsba's story, however, clearly demonstrates that the decision

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upon insanity is simply a question of power. One representative of the rival interpretations has the power to lock up the other one in a lunatic asylum and to declare by that that his interpretation (or *Weltanschauung*) is nonsense. *The Sipsirica*, however, displays a privileged narrative position; the narrator can see this debate from a superior point of view, and in full possession of the truth he can decide which interpretation is true and which is false.

In *The Siege of Beszterce* there neither is such a position, nor is Pongrácz's environment able to isolate and deactivate him as insane. Michel Foucault thought that in the history there is always a position outside the common conceptual system, which was opposed to the common self and therefore useful for self-understanding; this position, nowadays assigned to the insane, is therefore both interpreted and interpreting.[5] This means, that the imposition of the common conceptual system depends on power relations. A community needs to have the power to isolate what it regards as being outside its conceptual system and to make it the point of reference for its own self-understanding. A point of reference dominated and controlled this way cannot be regarded as interpreting the common conceptual system on its own right, but by its difference. It does not matter what an insane says of the world; it is enough that he or she says something different from what those in power say. Only the conceptual system in power has content. An insane person as a point of reference is controlled by the victorious opponent, who regards himself as normal and is strong enough to enforce this claim.

The question of Pongrácz's insanity remains a problem for the characters throughout the novel precisely because nobody has the power to eliminate him as an insane. And the question is important also for Count Pongrácz because he discerns the efforts for his isolation, moreover he seems to co-operate in this activity. It is, however, not easy to handle him as an insane man because his wealth, social position, family connections and last but not least the strength of his personality enable him to force his will upon his environment or to repel any intervention from outside.

Reality and illusion become completely relative in sentences such as:

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[5] For the possible connection of Foucault's theory and the interpretation of Mikszáth's novel see Eisemann 76.

> Instead of the make-believe with which he had surrounded himself since his youth, here for the first time was reality. Yes, this, this pack of lies. (Mikszáth 132)

For Pongrácz the submissive legation from Beszterce seems more real than any of his previous experiences, when he had to hire the enemy for his own war games. But he achieves real glory, since he managed to impose his conceptual system upon the environment, and everybody adapts to his point of view. The commanding officer from Budetin states one should talk to the count "in his own language". In this "pack of lies" the Zsolna society admits that his language is an alternative one of equal rank and it is willing to speak that language. It is true, however, that the mayor of Zsolna is actually forced to play this game by Károly Pongrácz, a military officer, who has strong family connections with the count.

Since the situation is so well balanced, Count Pongrácz remains a problem for his environment. The narrator displays a non-committal attitude; he gets involved in this discourse many times, but hardly ever qualifies Pongrácz as insane. The narrator's declarations are usually ambiguous, like the following example shows:

> Mad as he was, in him, just as there is a streak of madness in every great man. (Mikszáth 37)

On this ground criticism does not need to continue the discourse of the novel's voices on the possible insanity of the hero. A much more fruitful method would be a metaphorical, or dialogical, reading of Pongrácz's and Zsolna's worlds respectively, based on their balance of power and the structural juxtaposition of the first two chapters. We can find hardly any textual sign to suggest a point of view for this collation. Therefore I will try to base my reading on the analysis of time structures, which is generally accepted as an important aspect of meaning making in novels. I have chosen this point of view not because time – as theme and problem of twentieth-century novel – seems important on its own right, but because I think the different attitudes towards time can clear up the basic difference of these worlds. This – as it seems at the moment—purely intuitive statement might be supported by Mikhail Bakhtin's description of different worlds of

novels as different chronotopes, an issue to which I shall return a bit later.

To be able to confront two different times we need to discuss the notions of narrative time applied by theoretical discourse that might be a major obstacle to such an approach. Narratology is generally based on a linear concept of time. A linear time progresses homogeneously: always in the same direction and at the same speed. From its unidirectionality it follows that the same event cannot be repeated. The principle of causality presupposes this linearity; an event can only cause other events that follow it in the linear time. Narratology postulates that the time of the narrated world is necessarily linear. The order and duration of the narrated events can be fixed and described in comparison with this homogeneous and linear time. The narration of these events, however, rarely conforms either to this "real" order or to these relations of duration.

Russian formalists described the difference between the order and duration of the narrated world and the narration with the notions of *fabula* and *suzjet*. Since they regarded the *suzjet* as "a specific property of literary work (Èjxenbaum 16) and their claim was to describe the literariness of literature, the difference between *fabula* and *suzjet* became the main tenet of their approach to narrative texts. But how can we experience the *fabula*, which is not, of course, directly present for a reader? A special activity of readers is needed to construct for themselves the *fabula* by selecting and interpreting information given in the *suzjet*. After this, however, they should define the differences of the *suzjet* in relation to the *fabula* in order to be able to describe the narration and to evaluate its quality. It might seem a vicious circle that first we need to construct the *fabula* on the ground of the *suzjet*, then we compare them to define the *suzjet*. We should, however, remember why story-telling, i.e., the development of the *suzjet* was so important for formalist scholars; it was in this sphere that they found the gesture of defamiliarization, which results in a destabilisation of the everyday perceptive strategies. Just like poetic language may be opposed to practical language, *suzjet* is opposed to *fabula*. (Jefferson 38–39) Or at least the world of the *suzjet* is opposed to the world of the *fabula*. Just as readers approach the language of poetry with possession of practical language, they find poetic language difficult due to the gesture of defamiliarization, i.e., due to the difference between poetical and practical language; so also readers approach the narrative

in possession of an everyday or a practical perceptive strategy and experience of time, and they are faced by a different and defamiliarized experience. When readers construct the *fabula*, they impose the everyday experience of time on the narrative.

On the one hand, readers quite naturally make use of their previous experiences when interpreting literary texts and the constructed *fabula* might be regarded as a realisation of their own experience of time, which is opposed to the otherness of the *suzjet*. On the other hand the notion of *fabula* is problematic because it is regarded as a reality of the narrated world and not as something belonging to the world of the reader. Therefore it is theoretically impossible that a time different from the reader's experience could be a part of the narrated world; experiencing such a time cannot be but a characteristic of the act of narration as a sort of poetic licence. The pair of notions *fabula* and *suzjet* was originally created to describe the process when a reader is faced by an experience of time different from his own; nevertheless they ascribe such a privileged position to the reader that the different experience cannot be taken seriously.

This concept can be regarded as a foundation for structuralist narratology, which has chosen the linear and homogeneous time as the base of comparison for the description of narrative. This comparison needs a recurring reference to an everyday experience or to common sense, or to the real condition of nature. These are in a sense identical, since nature cannot be experienced directly, but through the concepts of common sense. And where does the linear time, the base of reference for narratology, exist? Gérard Genette explains the general possibilities of recurrence as follows:

> An event is not only capable of happening; it can also happen again, or be repeated: the sun rises every day. *Of course, strictly speaking,* the identity of these multiple occurrences is debatable: "the sun" that "rises" every morning is not exactly the same from one day to another (...) The repetition is *in fact* a mental construction, which eliminates from each occurrence everything belonging to it that is peculiar to itself, in order to preserve only what it shares with all the others of the same class, which is abstraction. (Genette 113, emphases added)

He is not speaking of literature here, but of the everyday experience expressed in everyday speech that some events may recur. He finds this experience problematic, since the concept of the linear time simply excludes the possibility that the same event would recur again. The solution is provided by a separation of reality and human reasoning; there is no "real" recurrence, but a "mental construction" existing in us, not in reality. Readers of fiction can disregard the "fact" that there is no recurrence in the reality, and they can accept the reality of recurrence as a mental construction, but they should know that it is not a "real" reality. What is able to recur is a general scheme that is the result of a human act of abstraction, i.e., disregarding details. This way of thinking we have already met when speaking about *fabula* and *suzjet*; we have an axiom that in reality (as well as in the narrated world) a linear time is working; if one experiences recurrence, it cannot be but his or her own mental construction (or that of the act of narration).

Another problem is caused by the hypothesis that recurrence necessarily means the repeated occurrence of an abstract scheme without minute details, since in literature the recurrence of scenes rich in detail is a quite common feature. Genette tries to solve this problem through inducing the notion of pseudo-iterative narration:

> [there are] scenes presented, particularly by their wording in the imperfect, as iterative, whereas their richness and precision of detail ensure that no reader can seriously believe they occur and reoccur in that manner, several times, without any variation. (Genette 121)

Such presentation is "literary convention", "narrative licence"; (Genette 121) every reader "naturally interprets this as hyperbole", and instead of the literally written "this happened every day" they will read "every day something of this kind happened". (Genette 122)

Narratology has elaborated a complete methodology and a closed logic construction to eliminate non-linear time concepts from the narrated world. This construction, however, has the shortage that it regards the basic linear time concept both as an eternal reality and at the same time an attitude construed by the common sense. But this common sense cannot coincide with the readers' primary experience, which is necessarily influenced by their mental constructions as well. A vast ma-

jority of human beings do experience recurrence in nature. But it is their mental construction; using their common sense they should know that such a thing does not exist. Human thought, however, evidently changes in history. Where can we find the eternal standard of common sense with linear time as a part of it? I think we can do this in the case of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century science. At that time reason seemed able to know reality independently from the historically changing mental constructions, and simultaneously notions of linear time were also flourishing.

Concepts of time are, of course, changing in history. Christianity has erased the mostly cyclic time concepts of Antiquity. This development has usually been ascribed to St. Augustine, who had elaborated the linear concept of time because sacred history contains events such as the Creation, Fall, and Salvation in a fixed order that can never recur. (St. Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei* 12.13–14; cf. Turetzky 56.) Linear time seems to have become homogeneous with the development of precise, mechanical clocks that have made time something objective and independent from human perception. (Turetzky 68-69) Newton based his physics on this time concept. From the constancy of time and space the relativity of speed necessarily followed. The concept, however, was not compatible with the constancy of the speed of light. With the theory of relativity modern physics has renounced the concept of the homogeneous time, and some scientific theories nowadays seem to experiment with some restrictions of the linearity of time, which does not necessarily mean the return of cyclic time concepts, rather the "no boundary condition". (Hawking 115-141) Twentieth-century philosophy does not favour the concept of linear and homogeneous time either. Narratology therefore makes use of the time concept of an outdated scientific paradigm.

I think we have good reasons to reject the time concept that was the base of the comparison of narratological analysis. First, the concept is itself a historical phenomenon and should not be regarded as an eternal standard; second, the rude oppositions of perception and common sense, reality and mental constructions, or reality and language are not supportable in a post-modern context any longer.

Gilles Deleuze differentiates between two archetypes of repetition that he calls Platonic and Nietzschean, respectively. The first one presupposes a pre-established identity in the world on the basis of which

one can perceive difference, while the second one thinks "of similitude and even identity as the product of fundamental disparity." (Deleuze 302, cf. Miller 5-17) The narratological concepts of repetition evidently belong to the second type that Deleuze – for one reason or another[6] – calls Nietzschean, and they are so closed because they subordinate identity, which they regard a mental or linguistic construction, to difference, which they regard as reality. It is, however, not at all evident that one cannot choose another identity concept to approach literature. (Bezeczky 2000, 56-57[7]) Cyclic time concepts, of course, belong to the "Platonic" identity concept. If we supposed that the time of the represented world does not necessarily work in harmony with our own time concept (of whatever type it is), we might experience more interesting readings.

After this long, but necessary theoretical excursion let us turn back to the time concepts of *The Siege of Beszterce*. The first part of the novel takes place in Pongrácz's world. One of the peculiarities is that the rules of linear time are not or are hardly effective there. Time is standing, or cyclically recurring. If we imagine history in accordance with nineteenth-century scientific worldview as something happening in linear time, we should deny the possibility that different people live in different ages at the same moment, or that history stops at some places. The narrator declares something like this about Count Pongrácz and his environment.

> This is a perfect setting for a castle, and for a feudal lord. Here live the monsters of olden times, not those of today. The snorting of the steam engine is not to be heard here; instead you hear the coughing of Jarinkó, the spirit of the woods. (Mikszáth 11)

> Hush! The nineteenth century shall not elbow its way in here. (*ibid.*)

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[6] Nietzsche could have given the name to a concept of eternal, unchanging recurrence as well.

[7] For the application of his theoretical insight into the societal nature of time conceptions to the reading of literary texts see Bezeczky 1998/99, 180-190.

These declarations, of course, can be interpreted figuratively; they might describe not the historical time or the natural rules actually working in that area but the beliefs of the Slovak inhabitants. We can reformulate this figurative meaning as 'both the infrastructural modernization and the population's thinking are undeveloped'. However, the enlightenment rhetoric and an anthropology "as an allochronic discourse", a "science of other men in another Time" (Fabian 143), which stigmatise "undeveloped" areas, tend to suggest through the identification of history and time that different times may coexist. This concept regards the existence of other times as a pathological anomaly of time/history, which must be cured. On this ground one should identify in Mikszáth's text the age with the worldview of the population. The opposition of the nineteenth century steam engine and the prehistoric Jarinkó as two monsters (who snort and cough, respectively) cannot be formulated but from the viewpoint of the "undeveloped" local population. It is to them that a steam engine could appear as a monster.

No matter which solution we choose, the history that plays in a linear and scientific time is not valid in castle Nedec and its environment. If we accept the narrator's statements, history has stopped here, and the rules of a former historical age are here still valid; time passes at different speeds at different areas, moreover it can stop. If we interpret the narrator's statement figuratively, history is independent from linear time and it is identical with the changes of the community's worldview; scientific time concepts, of course, cannot clarify the changing attitudes. According to the narrator's declaration, Count Pongrácz even more clearly denies the conception of history as a process in linear time:

> I don't want to live in the nineteenth century. I'll return to the seventeenth, since that's what appeals to me. Time may come and time may go, but it won't carry me with it; I'll put myself where I want to be. (Mikszáth 20)

One can even move backwards in this history if one really wants to. In order to be somewhere in the time instead of being carried by it one has to stop one's own time or to be outside of the movement of the time. Pongrácz achieves this by making each day the same. The whole "Part I" emphasizes uniformity, especially in the recurrent narratorial remarks:

> Everything went to schedule. (Mikszáth 16)
>
> When the roast appeared István Pongrácz rose to his feet and proposed the health of Franz Josef, the King (the *same*, and only, toast *every day*). (Mikszáth 17)
>
> *Every day, whatever day it was,* he beckoned to his castellan, saying: "Be good enough to bring the treasure-chest." (*ibid.*)
>
> …to await the *daily* distribution of largess. (*ibid.*)
>
> "The servant of the Lord shall not enter the haunts of the Devil," Count István would *invariably* remark. (*ibid.*, emphases added)

The actors are not only doing the same in a given hour of each day, but they are also using the same words too. We should interpret this phenomenon as a signal of the pseudo-iterative, or we should accept that Nedec is a special world where the same events recur each day.

We read of a place that is cut out of its surrounding and where a different time works. This time is historically different, and in contrast to the environment it is staying, or it exists in the cyclic recurrence of exactly the same days. If we describe the world of the first part in such an inseparable coalition of time and space, it suggests something like a chronotope in Bakhtin's sense. And we can really find a novel-chronotope in Bakhtin's writing, which is quite similar to the one described above. I mean the chronotope of the castle.

> The castle is saturated through and through with a time that is historical in the narrow sense of the word, that is, the time of the historical past. The castle is the place where the lords of the feudal era lived (and consequently also the place of historical figures of the past); the traces of centuries and generations are arranged in it in visible forms as various parts of its architecture, in furnishings, weapons, the ancestral portrait gallery, the family archives and in the particular human relationships involving dynastic primacy and the transfer of hereditary rights. And finally legends and traditions animate every corner of the castle and its environs through their constant reminders of past events. (Bakhtin 245-246)

Bakhtin associates this chronotope with the English gothic novel and with the historical novel, especially with its version developed by

Walter Scott. The narrator of Mikszáth's novel clearly refers to that tradition of European novel when he traces back the peculiarities of the time in Nedec or Pongrácz's concept of time—we have seen that it is not so easy to differentiate between them—to the time that is objectified in the castle and its furnishings, and that is present in the family tradition and in the legends told around the castle. The war games presuppose the great amount of medieval weaponry stored in the castle, and Estella's role as mistress of the castle presupposes the many medieval costumes. (Mikszáth 13 and 15) The connection between the family tradition and Pongrácz's behaviour, so strange for outsiders, is already made in the "Introduction"—in a rational manner, of course, which is characteristic of the narrator:

> The history of the Pongrácz family is full of mediaeval brilliance and splendour: Pongrácz of Szentmiklós, to whom princes paid tribute; Péter Pongrácz, handsomest of knight, object of a queen's unhappy love; Pál of the great broadsword, who reaped a harvest of Turkish heads; and to match these valiant forbears, as many stately, soft complexioned Pongrácz damsels, with their plumed hats and little golden slippers – later to become the mothers of great historical figures, and, later still, white-robed phantoms in the castles where they had once lived... The history of this family is like a bottomless lake. If you gaze into it too deeply you become dizzy, unless you have a strong head. Count István did not have a strong head, and he gazed very deeply indeed... (Mikszáth 8)

This connection is even more clearly formulated in the narrator's comments on Pongrácz's ritual before falling asleep.

> The page massaged his legs while the clerk read chapters from the history of his ancestors. The ancestors lulled their extraordinary grandchild to sleep, and in his sleep he continued to weave the fabric of their adventures, putting his dreams into practice when he awoke next day. (Mikszáth 19–20)

I have already mentioned the legends told in the castle's environment. The narrator also tries to make a connection between the environment and Pongrácz's behaviour.

> This is a perfect setting for a castle, and for a feudal lord. Here live the monsters of olden times, not those of today. (Mikszáth 11)

The isolation of the given place and the limitation of the agents' movements logically must play some role in the creation of so static a chronotope. In "Part I" they actually do, although isolation does not seem a presupposition, but the result of a longer process. However static a world Nedec is, the singular mood of narrative is important despite the predominance of static descriptions and the iterative. The singular events, however, all contribute to the increase of isolation. To Pongrácz's behaviour his wider social environment (the local gentry) reacts with an attempt at isolating him; to these attempts he reacts with such unusual actions that, as a final result, increase his isolation. When he has a broken leg, he forbids the doctor to reduce the bones; he becomes lame and excludes himself from any sort of hop. After war games "magnum áldomás"[8] follows, which contains a ball for the gentry, but "the titled families were reluctant to allow their wives and daughters to visit Nedec castle", because there was no lady of the house (Mikszáth 14) Therefore Count Pongrácz buys Donna Estella, the equestrienne of a circus company, to have a lady of the house. Her person is, of course, not at all suitable to attract gentile ladies to Nedec, and she also increases the count's isolation through preventing him from visiting his high-born neighbours. It makes his isolation perfect; nobody visits him, and he cannot go anywhere. Nothing can bother the daily cycle of Nedec's time any longer. The elimination of movement makes the chronotope completely closed; the lack of movement, of course, does not dissolve time, but makes it hardly perceptible. Interventions from outside do not seem able to cause essential changes in Nedec. When Estella arrives there, we are informed that the count "continued to devote himself to his singular pastimes" (Mikszáth 15), and not even the hard training before the war against the professional soldiers in Budetin can change the daily routine: "But, apart from that, life flowed in its usual channel."

[8] The half Latin, half Hungarian phrase is a quotation from the Latin *Gesta Hungarorum* 16; the quotation attaches Pongrácz's martial victory to the Hungarian conquest of Hungary, and highlights the fact that Pongrácz's world, or at least the narrative of it is structured by history or by the narratives of historiography.

(Mikszáth 36) The narrator concludes his description of the life in Nedec, or rather that of the stability of this world as follows:

> No, there probably never would have been any change in the count's way of life, in which case I would never have written this tale, if he had not had neighbours as mad as Baron Pál Behenczy and his son Károly. (Mikszáth 22)

What follows is the description of the life-style of the two barons Behenczy. Two plots might be said to be present in "Part I" as well. The time of the Behenczys is almost as cyclic as that of Pongrácz but its cycles encompass longer periods.

> This income was paid every six months and, as long as it lasted, father and son devoted themselves to the wildest carousals and merry-making. The boy went off to have his fling in Vienna and the father to Pest, or vice-versa; but they never went together. And how long did those five thousand forints last? Between ten and twenty days. By the end of the month penury had already brought them together once more in the ancient Trencsén castle, where, like Miklós Toldi's horse they dragged out a bare existence for five months, until the time came for them to spread their wings again. (Mikszáth 23)

After five months' penury in Northern Hungary they could enjoy a luxurious life for one month in Budapest or in Vienna. Father and son spend five months together, and then one month apart. Periods of penury differ according to the seasons, since penury in summer is much more tolerable, but this difference cyclically returns. This aspect attaches an artificial cycle consisting of a life annuity paid twice a year to the world of natural cycles. As far as I can judge, the Behenczys' world is as static as that of Pongrácz's, which does not mean that they are identical. From the viewpoint of time, they do not differ essentially, but the value systems which their worlds centre around are basically different.

The way the narrator mentions his own narrative (as quoted above) is eye-catching, because it seems to suggest that a narrative presupposes a change. And I dare actually say that there is a tradition of narrative in European literature where a change is needed to make a story

begin from a static and balanced initial situation. The narrator of *The Siege of Beszterce* seems to hint at this tradition of narrative when he declares that the possibility of narrating Pongrácz's world presupposes a change in that world.

Tzvetan Todorov regarded the need of change a quite general rule of narrative. In his narratology a minimal complete plot is a passage from one state of equilibrium to another. In the ideal narrative the initial "stable situation is disturbed by some power or force" and due to this change after a set of incidents a new state of equilibrium will develop at the end. (Todorov 1977, 111) An initial static situation and an intention to change this very situation Todorov calls "obligatory propositions" of any narrative. (Todorov 1977, 117) We should highlight two problems of this concept. First, Todorov wants to write the grammar of narrative in general, but he discusses examples from Boccaccio's novellas in the *Decameron* while the framing plot remains out of his view. He published the French original of the paper I referred to above one year before his book on the grammar of the *Decameron*, in which he explicated his ideas in much more detail but with a restricted claim for generalization. (Todorov 1969) Nothing either in the previous sketch or in the later book proves that the results of the structural analysis of Boccaccio's novellas can be really generally applied to *every* narrative; actually he generalizes the results without reflecting upon the problem of the possibility of generalization.[9] The second problem is the contingency of Todorov's interpretative viewpoints. He seems to regard his inquiry completely objective (and maybe therefore as something that can be generalized without any further argumentation). The interpretation of a text, however, deeply influences the structure of the text, which is to be the result of the analysis, and the interpretation is also preformed from interpretative points of view. For example he declares: "The second equilibrium is similar to the first, but the two are never identical." (Todorov 1977, 111) What is similar and what is identical, however, depends from our choice of viewpoints and culturally determined identity concepts. (Bezeczky 2000, 57–58) And in case of tragic stories, to find an obvious counter-example, which contains a rather important group of European narratives, one would need a quite sophisticated system of

[9] For other theories regarding a change as a presupposition of any narrative see Bremond, Prince, and Lotman.

viewpoints to prove that the initial and the final situations are similar. What is a state of equilibrium and what is not also remains a question of the chosen viewpoints. Todorov solves this problem by regarding the initial state of equilibrium a peculiarity of the *fabula*; his "ideal" *suzjet* corresponds to the *fabula* in this respect. He describes, however, an important group even among the novellas of the *Decameron*, which do not begin with a state of equilibrium, because that initial state of the *fabula* has been already disturbed before the beginning of the *suzjet*. (Todorov 1977, 118)

After these restrictions I dare not say that the narrator in *The Siege of Beszterce* formulates a general rule; nonetheless he refers to an important tradition of European narrative literature when he speaks of a change as a criterion of narration. We cannot, however, easily answer the question of what causes the change in this story. Having mad neighbours is said to be a necessary condition of the change, but from this it does not follow that it is also a sufficient condition. If a mention of a necessary condition meant a necessary and sufficient condition, the narrator's statement would imply that in this narrative world everything necessarily follows from the preceding events. In such a view of narrative one could recognise the Aristotelian requirement of a causality regulating the whole plot, which requirement played central role in the nineteenth-century theory of the novel. In this case the narrator would refer to a tradition of the European novel again, or at least to its dominant reading strategy.

This, however, would be a too long way to go. The narrator does not say that the contact with the Behenczys' world was the only cause of change in Pongrácz's world, but that it was one of its preconditions. If the change, however, has some preconditions, we need to suppose the working of a sort of causality, even if not in the most challenging Aristotelian form. The arrival of the younger Behenczy at Nedec does not cause any change for a while; he is said to conform to the new environment: he "made himself more and more at home" (Mikszáth 36). The direct cause of the change cannot be but the table scene when Behenczy tries to flirt with Estella. If we regard this scene the cause of the change, which really has the precondition of having mad neighbours, we can conclude that a strict causality is working in this world, where a thoughtless movement is enough to cause imprisonment in a dungeon, the organization of the escape, the declaration of war, and so on.

It is important to emphasise that the mention of preconditions does not necessarily imply this logic of causality. And if so, the narrator does not have the hegemony of interpretation in Mikszáth's text; moreover the identity of the narrator in different parts of the text is also questionable. We can detect some contradiction even here, since the narratorial discourse has previously presented Pongrácz's world as a rather stable one which is able to avert, or to integrate any influence from the outside. Why do not work the usual mechanisms in this case? Does the table scene really differ so much from all the previous events? Why exactly is it these neighbours who are able to cause changes in Pongrácz's world?

His men find Pongrácz's reaction to Behenczy's act exaggerated and senseless, and therefore they join with each other in preventing him carrying out his plans, which they have never done before. Some previous changes in his mental disposition might clarify his unusual reaction to this event, since his behaviour became somewhat strange some days earlier. He plucked off the flowers of the apple tree to offend God, and he cancelled the summertime war, about which he had seemed to be so enthusiastic. The passage that described Pongrácz's mental change begun with the following statement of the narrator:

> One day, however, an event of a different sort occurred. The count was walking in his garden when he saw a magnificent rose in full bloom in the greenhouse. (Mikszáth 37)

Might be the "event of different sort" that changes everything is the blooming of a rose in the garden and not Behenczy's thoughtless movement? Count Pongrácz allows his servants to send the rose to Erzsébet Motesiczky, who sends him Cervantes' *Don Quixote,* and this book seems to cause mental changes in the count. The tradition of the European novel enters the story again, this time in the form of an actually denominated piece of central importance.

In order to understand this scene, I think we should discuss in some detail the problem of fictionality in Mikszáth's novel. In the "Introduction" put before "Part I" a narrator tells about the origin of the novel. He declares that it is not a fictive story; Count Pongrácz did live; moreover, he will appear with his real name in the novel. The author further claims that he personally met him once, and he received all data from

the count's relatives. On the other hand the relatives evidently supplied not only data, but interpretations as well:

> Relatives would join us at the table, and they in turn contributed piecemeal to the outline of István Pongrácz. (Mikszáth 7)

> I made many enquiries about him, and probed deeply to uncover the driving force within him. Those who knew him intimately all said the same thing: "Count István had brains, but not many. He had ambition too, overmuch of that. He wanted to cut a figure at any cost, but he realized that he couldn't as an ordinary sensible man, so he tried to as a lunatic." (*ibid.*)

The relatives do not simply inform the author; they offer character sketches (since they are speaking of an outline), and they try to find a psychological explanation for his behaviour. The narrator's activity must rest upon those interpretations. Readers are from the very first page faced by a suggestion that facts (or at least the facts of Count Pongrácz's life) do not exist (at least for the narrator and through him for us) outside of a human perception that implies the act of interpretation. Patterns on the basis of which the interpretations can be construed are, of course, culturally determined. The most obvious pattern is, as we have already seen, that of the lunatic, which is mostly applied both by the novel's agents and the narrator. An interpretation based upon the pattern of a lunatic does not necessarily mean that one is called lunatic, since the act of interpretation may have a negative result ("he is not lunatic") as well. The interpretation, however, can be preformed by many other patterns of the literary tradition as well. In later chapters of the novel, for example, the majority of the agents interprets Pongrácz's attitude towards Apolka with the pattern of the comedy figure of the amorous old man, and this interpretation is supported by the narrator as well. And we have already seen that the narrator's comments imply various elements of the European tradition of narrative: the chronotope of the castle, the tradition of the narrative that presupposes a change, the principle of strict causality. These interpretive patterns are more or less incompatible. Readers must personally decide which attempt at interpretation they will accept as successful and in what degree; and it probably depends also on the readers' interpretive strategies whether they regard

the relationship of the different patterns dialogic, or aporetic (which do not necessarily exclude each other), or dialectic. To take the interpretation based upon the principle of causality as an example, one can ask whether the causes offered by the narrative (mad neighbours, a thoughtless movement, one single rose, reading *Don Quixote*) exclude or complement each other. If they exclude each other, does their co-presence mean the deconstruction of the narrative strategy based on the principle of causality? If they complement each other, does anything guarantee the knowledge of all the partial causes, or does the beginning of a series of partial explanations, which can be continued ad libitum, lead to aporia, just like the system of causes excluding each other does?

Be it as it may, Erzsébet Motesiczky interprets Count Pongrácz through the narrative of *Don Quixote,* and her interpretation enters the story as an active force when it changes the count's behaviour. Since he is told that the book is sent to him as an allusion, he must read it as an interpretation of himself, and the application that he cannot avert in this situation affects him in an extremely destructive way. We cannot have, of course, any idea why exactly this interpretation affects him so much while he could easily reject all the interpretive attempts based upon the pattern of the lunatic. Nonetheless, the cultural allusion is quite important as a *mise en abyme* of the narration. The narrator that makes an appearance as an agent in the "Introduction" cannot experience Count Pongrácz whom he regards reality but only through some interpretations. When agents of the narrative connect their interpretations to a well-known literary narrative, this almost explicitly declares a thought usually associated with modernism or post-modernism that the interpretation of reality is preformed by pre-existent cultural patterns and narratives. And when such an interpretation starts forming the story itself as an active force, this undermines the narrator's suggestion of purely putting data on record, and directs the readers' attention towards the story's poetic formation, i.e., fictionality. The literary influence of *Don Quixote,* however, can be detected also in the poetical forming of the story, which makes Ms. Motesiczky's interpretation of Count Pongrácz a *mise en abyme* of the whole *Siege of Beszterce.*

According to the narrator's comments, Pongrácz seems to have built out a stable world which was existing in a uniformity of cyclically recurring events and in a gradually increasing isolation, until an unexpected event probably from outside disturbed this state of equilibrium.

The narrative offers several possibilities of this event changing everything, but the uncertainty of the actual direct cause does not influence the result that due to the change Pongrácz denounces his tacit agreement with the externals, and what might be even more important, he decides to leave Nedec and to start moving in space.

Count Pongrácz, however, gives a completely different explanation for the genesis of the change:

> I knew that something was bound to happen, I felt it in my bones. For you see, my Polish friend, the world had become very empty and dull; completely stuck in the mud, in fact. I had even been thinking that perhaps it was time for us to part company. (Mikszáth 56)

As if the static nature of the world or the increasing stability itself enforced a change, which therefore cannot be the result of any intervention from outside. Pongrácz might be fed up with the attempts at his isolation, but with the rupture of isolation he necessarily imparts motion upon the time too. Instead of the imitated wars, which were fixed in place and which supported the cyclic time, he has to attempt a real military expedition.

Let us have a look at Zsolna as well, where Pongrácz is going, although neither this fact nor its importance is evident after "Part I". Zsolna is a different world with different rules, and the differences highlight some additional peculiarities of Nedec too. "Part II" is dominated by the singular mood of narrative, the time in Zsolna is linear. Some events recur, nevertheless, and it seems a good idea to analyse those first. For a while the two Trnowszky brothers alternately take the responsibility for Apolka's education; she lives half year in Péter's, half year in Gáspár's house. This half year long cycles might remind one of the Behenczys' lifestyle, but there are two important differences. The cycles work in only a short period of Apolka's childhood, both before and after which she is just tossed about; the relative equilibrium cannot be maintained longer than for two years, which means that one cycle, i.e., a half year in one of the houses, is repeated only once. On the other hand the cycle does not really seem to recur. In the case of the Behenczys' an iterative narrative presented the uncountable set of indistinguishable half years; in Zsolna a continuous contention is going on between the brothers, and

therefore we are only given details of differences. Every period appears in its particularity, and they can be clearly distinguished on the basis of their peculiarities different both from the previous and the following periods. Even the half year long cycles are vehicles of permanent changes here.

We can describe the permanent conflicts and hostilities as another characteristic feature of the life in Zsolna. The two brothers face each other in hostile opposition, and a similar hostility divides Hungarians and Slovaks, or to put it in more exact terms, Hungarian patriots and Pan-Slavists, since ethnicity in Zsolna seems a question of personal decision rather then origin or acculturation. (Kiss 87–91) The middle class agents of some importance in the novel are bilingual, and the example of Miloszláv Trnowszky, who becomes Emil Tarnóczy at a moment in the story, suggests that a shift of national identity is as easy for them as the shift of language. But it does not matter on which side they decide to stand, they behave with hostility against the other side.

We did not read of such ethnic hostility in Count Pongrácz's world. The peasantry and the majority of the count's men are Slovaks, and therefore the language of commands in the everyday war games is Slovak. Pongrácz uses that language without any problem or ethnic conflict. "The peasantry humbly idolised him." (Mikszáth 35) The opponent armies in the "wars" are formed by chance ("*Na dve stránke, chlapci!* [Fall in in two divisions men!]"), and their roles as besiegers or defenders are decided by lots. In Nedec there is a joyful permanent war without hostility, in Zsolna a peace full of hostility.

It happens twice that persons known from "Part One" appear in "Part Two", but their behaviour is different from what one would expect on the basis of the previous experience. We have two possibilities. Applying a usual reading strategy we should suppose that the agents are unique psychic entities, and in this case we should modify our image of them through finding a sort of psychological explanation for their incoherent behaviour. I would, however, suggest the other solution, namely that we give up the identity of persons appearing in different worlds. Exactly like a sign can have different meanings in different contexts, an agent of the novel can behave differently in different circumstances. When Count Pongrácz appears in a world that is impregnated with ethnic hostility he disturbs a meeting of the Matica with a "bad joke". The Behenczys seemed rather harmless rascals.

They provided many little difficulties to the local population, but the wise old men said:

> There's no point in grumbling, you donkeys, about the Behenczy's being poor and hungry and ruining you so that they can eat. That's fine. That's natural. A few wretched chicken don't matter all that much. (Mikszáth 24)

In "Part II", however, Pál Behenczy appears as a really noxious person who wants to take a quite active role in Apolka's education as a would be prostitute.

These passages where persons known from "Part I" are mentioned or appear in "Part II" might make one aware of the need of some relation between the two stories and might excite some expectations of their connection. However, the unusual behaviour of the persons known from a different environment might highlight the difference of the context, the different roles and patterns of behaviour regulating this world.

The permanent changes in Zsolna, however, are not exclusively caused by the tensions between persons and groups. A not less important reason is that people living here always aim for something, they always want to do or to have something, they always have plans. This feature is, of course, connected with the tensions, since the contrary intentions of different groups may lead to hostility. And what brothers Trnowszky generally want is nothing else but to hurt each other. Apolka, the beautiful young girl appears in this world as the symbolic object of desire. Desires do not tend towards her directly, but almost everybody wants to reach their goals through her possession and use. Klivényi wants to get money through her. Péter and Gáspár Trnowszky want to annoy each other through pampering her. The mayor entrust Apolka to Klivényi in order to ensure her Hungarian patriotic education. Emil Tarnóczy's love might be the exemption: a desire that tends towards Apolka herself. She is quite passively standing in the centre of the different intentions. She never wants anything; she only adapts herself to the others' intentions. Her person is not at all interesting for anybody (apart from Emil), which is absolutely evident in the periods when nobody happens to need her.

As a contrast, there are no intentions in Nedec. Count Pongrácz does not want anything, because he is completely satisfied by his static life. All the people around him are interested in maintaining the status quo,

in which they can make their living. Here too a woman is the only exemption. She wants to get married to the count. Her intention, however, does not cause either any tensions or any changes in Nedec. At most it increases the isolation, which supports the stability and uniformity of the life in the castle. We are, however, informed of a little opposition between Colonel Pamutkay and the pseudo-Polish Pruzsinszky. The colonel suggests that the above mentioned rose should be sent to Ms. Motesiczky because he "would have liked to marry off his master to this wealthy young lady." (Mikszáth 37) Pruzsinszky, however, reminds the count that the book sent by her is an insult, because he "didn't want the count to get married (he wanted to live in the castle for the rest of his life)" (*ibid.*). Their opposition does not result in any hostility, and it seems to have little importance. The story, however, is interesting, because it demonstrates another feature of the life in Nedec; if somebody wants something here, he or she wants Count Pongrácz to do something. He really seems to live the life of a medieval oligarch; everything depends on him, and other persons can try to influence him at the most. He is the only one that is able to act, but he does not want to, and therefore no change can occur in his world. This situation is to be terminated by Behenczy's escape, which is the result of cooperation by the whole court, including Estella. This time the people around Pongrácz, after trying to influence him in vain, act autonomously, and by that they take over his freedom of action.

The worlds of Nedec and Zsolna are basically different in many aspects. The time is cyclic in Nedec, but linear in Zsolna, and what is not at all independent from this fact, in Zsolna everything is in permanent movement due to various intentions and tensions, while in Nedec the lack of intentions stops the time. These differences could be described with such dichotomies as village and town, the Middle Ages and modernity, or harmony and disharmony. Signals of fictionality also differ. The "Introduction" declares that the story of count István Pongrácz is not fictive, but the story contains plenty hints at various traditional literary genres and other signals of fictionality. The Zsolna narrative begins like a folk tale (once upon a time there was a man, who had three sons, who learned different professions[10]), but then we are directly introduced

[10] "...many years ago, there dwelt an ironmonger by the name of Trnowszky. He had three sons called Péter, György and Gáspár. When the boys were approaching manhood the old man, realizing that he had not long to live, called them together and told them that they must choose a carrier." (Mikszáth 65)

into a world of facts well-known from the contemporary newspapers. These include the Pan-Slavist movement or meetings of Matica. This "realist" narrative does not display its fictionality as a literary topic.

What will happen when two so different worlds encounter each other? Will they be in conflict or will they compromise? Will one of them change or destroy the other, or will they coalesce in an interaction? The benevolent citizens of Zsolna seem to manage to avert the conflict and restore the previous state through a clever trick. The army returns to Nedec, where they might as well continue their isolated life; and Pongrácz's short visit in Zsolna could not change anything about the town. The count, however, brings Apolka with him as a hostage, and this will inject Zsolna into Nedec. When Apolka substitutes for Estella, everything changes basically. Count Pongrácz's passivity had previously blocked every intention around him, while in Zsolna the similarly passive Apolka had activated all the other persons' intentions. When they live together in the Nedec castle, things work as previously in Zsolna. Apolka remains the only passive figure in the centre of various intentions. Even Count Pongrácz himself starts elaborating some long-term plans. "His ambition" is to provide the finest education for Apolka; he wants to write a book on the intellectual faculty of asses ("Donkeys definitely ought to be reinstated in the eyes of the world" [Mikszáth 142]); he wants to put the things of his estate in order; moreover he wants to get rich.

Estella was increasing the count's isolation, Apolka quickly dissolved it:

> Meanwhile Apolka developed into a lovely, slender young woman. The news of her beauty spread far beyond the borders of Trencsén and even in the rich Nyitra there was much talk of the "Rose of Nedec". Young men descended like swarms of locusts upon the castle. (...) The young men had sisters whom they persuaded (for a sister is a good go-between) to visit Nedec too, and, for their daughters' sakes the mothers began to come also. Soon Nedec Castle, as in times long past, was filled once more with the leading gentry from the neighbouring countryside, young ladies in silk bottines, and stately matrons of haughty demeanour. Instead of the long drinking bouts there were gay balls. (Mikszáth 143–144)

The jovial war games, which had not caused either hostility or danger, because death was excluded, ceased. Instead of them the count fought a duel with pistols, because a young gentleman kissed Apolka's shoulder, and was fatally wounded. The tension around her reappeared in Nedec, especially when Emil Tarnóczy declared himself as a suitor. From that point on Pongrácz had to fight for Apolka, and not only against Tarnóczy but the whole world: Zsolna demanded its hostage back.

Michael Riffeterre thinks that signals of fictionality hint at an important truth by suspending probability. (Riffaterre 33) Probability itself, however, is also artificially construed through the repetition of the tautological derivations of a linguistically given element. (Riffaterre xiv—xv) Not only the direct signals of fictionality can therefore suspend probability. New elements can be made probable by later tautological repetitions with a retrospective effect. When they appear first, they might as well be regarded as signals of fictionality (if everything is a signal, which suspends probability), but they at least may hint at a truth, since according to Riffaterre where probability ceases, truth will take its place. (Riffaterre 46) Emil Tarnóczy's escape from the Nedec dungeon contradicts the previously construed norms of probability in the novel. The only person who had known the underground passage was Commandant Károly Pongrácz. Count István Pongrácz, the owner of the castle and the family history nut, who had known the function of the sling slot in the dining hall, found the disappearance of the prisoner mysterious. Apolka can be said to have liquidated the count's world, and the story of the underground passage made it absolutely clear that this world has disintegrated. A secret passage under the castle should have been typical of Pongrácz's world, but this time such a means is invented against him. He has been integrated in a world of ambitions, tensions and linear time, and he has partly given the accessories of his previous life up. The war games are suspended, although he tells the constable: "The fortunes of war are changeable, my good sir" (Mikszáth 183), and now these accessories are used by others. On the other hand this secret passage dissolves the isolation once and for all. The dominant feature of Nedec previously was the castle wall, which excluded the enemy and ensured defence; this new accessory of the Middle Ages has been invented to admit people from outside. The function of the underground passage cannot be ensuring a way of escape for the defenders in case of

an irresistible siege, since they do not know it. Instead, it is a way from outside into the castle without the defenders' knowledge. And we learn that the passage was also originally built for this purpose:

> István Szunyogh arranged for it to be dug years ago when he wanted to rescue Erzsébet Czobor, Count Nedeczky's beautiful wife, who was held prisoner in the dungeon at Nedec. He brought her out here, the rascal. (Mikszáth 186)

The underground passage dissolves the isolation of the castle, but those in the castle do not know this. We can suppose that the passage has existed all the time, and this fact makes the isolation illusory in retrospect. People outside Nedec could always have intruded the castle, and they were always superior. But until that time they did not make use of their advantage. With this reading strategy, however, which presupposes linear time, we would identify ourselves with the world outside Nedec. The improbability of the event seems to suggest another reading strategy. When Count Pongrácz or Baron Behenczy appeared as quite different personalities in Zsolna from those we have experienced in another context, we did not think it necessary to reinterpret their previous behaviour. In a similar way we can accept that in "Part I" the castle wall is the symbol of the increasing isolation of Nedec, while in "Part IV" the difference of the two worlds disappears, and therefore Nedec is connected to its environment by an underground passage.

Nedec becomes completely exposed because of this connection. Count Pongrácz also understands that the integrity of his world has ceased:

> The prisoner Tarnóczy's escape, which no one among the inmates of the castle was able to explain, completely crushed István Pongrácz. He was gripped by fear, and he began to be tormented by strange misgivings.
>
> "They will take the girl away from me," he murmured, and his teeth chattered. (Mikszáth 187)

The above discussion might suggest that the encounter of the two worlds had led to the complete destruction of one of them without any changes in the other. The recurrent events on the last pages of the novel,

however, might imply that the encounter with Pongrácz's world had left traces on Zsolna too. If we apply Deleuze's typology to these worlds, the Platonic concept of recurrence with the supposition of basic identities will be characteristic of Nedec, while the Nietzschean type with the supposition of basic differences will be characteristic of Zsolna. After both story lines meet and mingle, the singular mood of narrative predominates, and the recurrent events cannot be easily classified with Deleuze's typology. We learn that the cyclic uniformity of the Behenczys' lifestyle has been restored. Estella has assumed the role of the shrewish old housekeeper. The description of their life emphasises the identity of the situations in "Part I" and "Part IV". And the singular event in which the son cheats his father through some pretended indignation because of the violation of family tradition in order to sell Estella alone is the repetition of an event in "Part I" when the father cheated his son in a quite similar way. There are several differences between these events, but the identical traits and the recurrence seem to be emphasised. The Behenczys' cyclic life was characteristic of the world in "Part I", and this feature of that world seems to have survived without any change, or at least to have been restored after Estella grew old.

The novel ends with the second appearance of the false delegation of Beszterce. In what degree is the delegation identical with the first one? The event undoubtedly conforms to the logic of linear time, since they reclaim the hostage they had given. On the other hand, the linear time allows some recurrence. The same persons reunite to repeat or repair a previous dishonesty. The purpose of the repetition of the previous event is to restore an original state so that Estella should be in Nedec and Apolka in Zsolna. The similarity is not only emphasised by the identity of the actors and the accessories, but also by the diction of the director, who speaks in iambic pentameters, like in the first delegation. This metre appears only in these two cases in the novel, while all the other poetic quotations are written in traditional Hungarian metrical forms.

Director Lengeffy tried to interpret the events in the context of Shakespeare's tragedies, but this time the narrator definitely rejected this interpretation; he regarded this genre tradition completely inadequate here. Lengeffy's poetic, or at least metrical, diction was inadequate also in the first delegation, because it caused serious problems of communication. Another actor found it necessary to explain his speech

with an interruption in prose, and Count Pongrácz also needed to ask for the meaning at the end:

> And until then this child remains with me as a hostage, if I have understood you well? (Mikszáth 133)

This time the narrator's discourse emphasises the inadequacy of Lengeffy's utterance; the director is said to utter his pathetic words "with indifference", and the narrator comments the apostrophe of "My lords and ladies" as follows:

> But there being no lords or ladies present to draw the moral from these sad events, it was left to Estella to make the next observation:
>
> "Yes, yes, I know. But now what happens to me?" (Mikszáth 233)

The inadequate poetic speech in iambic pentameters returns, although the delegation itself is cancelled because of Count Pongrácz's death. For the repetition of the delegation all the actors, who had dispersed in the meantime, must have been reassembled, which also might signal some of the remaining influence of the cyclic time of "Part I" in this world of linear time. The story lines, while they were presented in paratactic order, could not interact but in the reading. After they meet and mingle, they can realise the interaction also in the narrative, and the united story line contains characteristic features of both worlds. Although Zsolna basically dominates, the principle of recurrence characteristic of Nedec does not disappear. In the last scene of the novel it happens first that the two emblematic female figures of "Part I" and "Part II" are present at the same place. As usual, the moving centre is Apolka (the whole delegation has been organized because of her), and Estella declares that as an active person she has some intentions. Her intention is rather vague and general, but it is clear that her intention will not be able to make anybody act this time either.

The encounter of the different worlds can hardly be said to create a new quality of harmonic unity. When the stories coalesce and unite as one single story, their incompatible features continue coexisting as

incompatible. The dialogic reading of the novel did not result in a demonstration of unity or a harmonic order of various elements. It did, however, demonstrate that the incompatible elements can be understood in comparison to each other. The paratactic elements interpret each other, and this interpretation is realised in the reading.

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MIROSLAV DACHEV

WORD AND IMAGE: SEMIOTIC READING
(on a dialogue from Bulgarian Modernity)

Whether the word "dialogue" contains a figure or literariness – it is yet to become clear. However, it is extremely suitable for a Bulgarian book of poetry from the beginning of the 20th century – *Bulgarian Ballads* by Teodor Trajanov. The book itself is not only emblematic for the modern époque – it is one of the most effective volumes in Bulgarian literature altogether. The first edition is accompanied by seven illustrations by Sirak Skitnik. The year of the appearance of the book of poetry – 1921 – is typical of this kind of editions, called "luxurious", where word and image coexist in a way left by the canon of the modernity in the very beginning of the 20th century. The reprint of the book of poetry, two decades later, is deprived of illustrations and changes this coexistence. However, the dialogue between the verses and the visual images of the artist continues. The aim of the present article is to tell about this peculiar dialogue in Bulgarian culture, penetrating the first half of the 20th century and symptomatic for the searches in the modern époque in general. The story about the poet and the artist, on its part, will serve for theoretical meditations on the reading of the cultural intersections as well.

The poet is one of the most famous Bulgarian symbolists at the beginning of the century with two published books up to that moment – *Regina Mortua* and *Hymns and Ballads*. They strongly provoke with the usage of unknown to the everyday speech words – to the extent that according to some critics they create a "new poetical grammar". To some he is the founder of Bulgarian symbolism, to

others – its unconditional emblem. In the year of the appearance of *Bulgarian Ballads* the image of the poet as a legislator of the modern in Bulgarian poetry is almost indomitable. His long stay in Vienna and his contacts with some of the most famous German speaking modern poets contribute to that.

The artist does not possess such mythological fame but is also amongst the most respected ones. Graduate of E. Zvantzeva's *Private School for Scene Setting in Saint Petersburg* (1912), he has been close to recognized personalities such as Leon Bakst and Mstislav Dobujinski, Mihail Vrubel, Nikolai Roerich and Kuzma Petrov–Vodkin, Kandinski's colleague, lived in the atmosphere of Alexander Benua's (Benois) *Mir iskusstva* and definitely suggested he will become a phenomenon in Bulgarian culture during the second and third decade of the 20th century. In 1910 he participates in an exhibition of the St. Petersburg School, organized in the editorial office of *Apolon* magazine and gains Roerich's and Benua's (Benois) fondness; member, later president of *Rodno Izkustvo* movement in Bulgaria. Every serious art exhibition in Bulgaria after that is bound to his name. Quite often, the word "expressionist" is associated with his name. In 1923, as a director and scenographer of the play *Monna Vanna* by Maeterlinck put at the most important Bulgarian theatre – The National one, Sirak Skitnik puts it with his own sets; he also draws to Debussy music. And when it comes to illustrations in literature pieces, the name of the artist is usually related to the 20s – then the paintor reaches out to world–famous masterpieces, like Edgar Allan Poe's poems, as well as modern Bulgarian authors such as Chavdar Mutafov, Hristo Yasenov and naturally – Teodor Trajanov.

The second edition of *Bulgarian Ballads* dates from 1941. The first impression is that the poet is sadly alone and the artist from 1921 seems to be forgotten. Moreover, the sense of displacement comes: the poet is strong in his sorrow, the word has taken the vacant places of the drawings. In a noticeable expansion it has been writing both *instead* of them and *on* itself. *Bulgarian Ballads* seem to be different, not only because they are deprived of the authenticity of the drawing but also of the authenticity of the word. The drawings have been overtaken by the fate of the missing structures. Things will be said about them as something that has been, that is meaningful in its silence.

The word, even though being a present structure, is different, too. However, the word has the inevitable fate to exist as something *distinct*, not only because it has changed on the inside as linguistic nature, but also because it has changed as a modus vivendi – at least from the point of view of the syntactic relations in which It has been born. Now, in the reprint it is *alone*, it is missing the Other one, *together* with which it has been generating the meaning. The being of the word in the first edition of *Bulgarian Ballads* is a being of a word, penetrated by the drawings. Expressed as a sign, it is marsupial in the fashion that it carries the sides of the semiotic triangle: each flight of the signifiers to the meaning and of the meaning to the referents passes equally through the semiotic dimensions of the word and those of the illustrations.

In the reprint the word compensates this being by means of tricks as in two different wombs it offers one and the same strategy for reaching the meaning and the referents. It is the same, because it belongs only to the word; because its semiotic energy can *make use* of techniques borrowed from other arts but cannot fully *substitute* them. Nevertheless, maybe unintentionally, it causes a semiotic explosion: the drawings are absent on the paper but present in the reader's consciousness, which has already met and remembered them. Now they start to show through the lyrics as watermarks, to seek their places, to offer their readings. There are reasons for this.

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In 1921, even though the passed road is strewn with a variety of readings, the antimimetic tradition, which modernity remembers from the time of the constituting of the French symbolism, is still quite strong. Trajanov, as well as Sirak Skitnik, begin their way with the fascination and suggestions of the word "symbolism". The symbolic poetry knows that kind of images that count on the artistic inception, and the painting of the symbolists is full of literary allusions, references to ancient and contemporary authors. In their expression searches, as well in the metadiscourses, the two look over their shoulders. This game continues during the first decades of the 20th century.

Goguen calls G.-A.Aurier the only critic who understands artists. The participants in Mallarmé's poetic circle see Gauguin as "their" artist. The leading theoretic of *The Nabis* group – the painter Maurice Denis creates his own theory of the equivalents in analogy with Baudelaire's correspondences. Paul Sérusier, however, in his *Alphabet of Painting*, in analogy with the symbolistic poetry, searching the universal ancient art language, discovers it not only in music, but in mathematics as well.

The trace echoes in the reading as well: Puvis de Chavannes' work is read as an artistic analogue of the Parnasian and the symbolic poetics; in Gustav Moro's art, full of mythological images, we may see the mythological reference of the poetic symbolistic texts. The decorative motives in Moro's art have been compared to those in Mallarmé's poetry. Vuillard's desk-book is Mallarmé's *Retreats*. The critics often compare Vuillard's art itself to chamber music – due to this, analogies with Mallarmé's musical meditations have been sought. Often, it has been claimed that Odilon Redon's method is close to Mallarmé's one. In addition, Mallarmé who highly appreciated Redon's work had been aware of this discoursive proximity. In the readings of the traces the symbolistic critics like to point out the explicit intertextuality as well. In his *Landscape with Green Trees* Denis intertexualizes Baudelaire's metaphor for the nature-temple. Sometimes, the readings exceed and deepen even more the sign aspects of the intertextuality – according to Denis, Debussy music is the new dimension, which geniously sets ajar the world of symbolistic aesthetics, both for poets and artists.

In Matisse's etchings (*The Poems of Stephan Mallarmé*, 1932), Mallarmé's poetry is alive in a new way, examined in a dialogue with the pictorial gestures. From Mattisse's story about these illustrations of his, it may be perceived that the main aspect is not the artist's skill to draw, but his ability to read Mallarmé's poetry, to intervene with the spirit of his word. Matisse achieves the same with Baudelaire's verses as well. Amazed by this, Aragon utters the challenge: Baudelaire must be read while contemplating Matisse's drawings.

There is a hardly visible multitude of sign parallels between poetry and art. It does not begin with Lessing neither it ends with symbolism. However, by looking closely at the sign intensity of these

relations in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, we definitely reach a critical point where the *speech* of one of the arts about the other one is not equal to their *agreement*. The illocutive power and the enthusiasm from the mutual referring in some of the cases are just a ritually put mask during the periodically repeating modernistic games. The fact that verses and drawings, for example, speak *together* on the pages of one and the same book does not mean that they really speak in *harmony*: the first one is explicit of the mechanics of a typographic coexistence, while the second one is a metaphysical sensation.

The fact that the works in the area of one art constitute themselves in analogy with works of another one (they follow its text and meaning-generating mechanisms) must be considered with a certain degree of skepticism. Seurat, who sees painting as the art of "digging the surface", according to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, draws not *on* but *under* it. If we agree and join the described pun, Rimbaud's alchemistry (even to a greater extent this is valid for Rene Gil's alchemical laboratory) is an escape from the surface, but in the opposite direction – exit *above* the language, beyond the possibilities that he has declared up to this moment. Rimbaud's escape is much more a technique-in-the-game, frivolity, than an artistic sorrow, even when (perhaps namely there) it becomes a metalingual emblem for the coming generation young symbolists. Whereas Seurat's escape is more of a game-in-the-technique, an effort reminding that the mastering of each technique is not only an insight but also a craft.

The semiotic interpenetrations, as we may see, transform the chosen dialogue in a part of a huge space, which we unavoidably liken to a labyrinth. Following such dialogue we cannot fail to "hear" other conversations as well.

Through *Bulgarian Ballads* permeable world, we have the chance to feel that we have not escaped very far from the other temptations either; that they have been reflected in a certain way in the volume of poetry. On the pages of leading Bulgarian magazines such as *Vezni*, *Hiperion* and *Zlatorog* the Bulgarian dimensions of Aurier (the critic who understands artists) will appear; the literal fellowship *Hiperion* seeks its artist; fine art seeks its critic among the *Rodno Izkustvo* movement. Debussy's music continues to be thought as a dimension,

which its genius sets ajar for the world both for poets and artists, since they keep drawing to it (*Legend of the Sunk Cathedral*, which Sirak Skitnik draws to Debussy, has been defined as a picturesque harmony of hallucinations, mystics and music). Sirak Skitnik's dialogues with Trajanov, Chavdar Mutafov, Hristo Yassenov and Edgar Poe are to a certain extent disseminations of the dialogue between Mallarmé and Odilon Redon: different, carrying the signs of another, subsequent époque, they bear the marks of the modern Beginning. The ballads' reading may be realized through the contemplation of Sirak Skitnik's drawings if they prompt that they are interpenetrated with the spirit of Trajanov's word.

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The seven drawings in *Bulgarian Ballads* are: *Prophet*, *Death in the Plains*, *Mother*, *Devastation*, *Doom*, *Funeral*, *Conjurations*. The name of each illustration *articulates* the name of a separate work or a cycle in the volume of poetry, while it *converses* with many of the rest. It is a forming polylogue where the directions of correspondence have clearly been led from the image to the word – if at this stage we decide to rely only to their naming.

If each of the drawings has a name that has been given to it by nature (Cratil's thesis), this nature is the essence of the poetic naming and the image is subordinate to the poem: it bears the same name because it has the semantic nature of the verse. The drawing compliments, illustrates; it is not a carrier of disseminations, it does not doubt the identity of the message. As a direction it is centripetal. Its interpretation remains in the framework of the book of poetry.

If each of the drawings has a name that has not been given to it by nature (Hermogen's thesis), the correct name is the one that has been given. The obligation of the image to be subordinate to the poem drops out. It bears its semantic nature in a particular fashion – as it adds, changes, rejects; it is a carrier of disseminations, which disturbs the identity of the message. As a direction it is centrifugal. Its interpretation does not fit in the framework of the book of poetry.

One who is tempted by a rhetoric reading would remember that from the time of Plato's dialogue on names have been used as an information "tool" and a means of division of the essence. Socrates uses the image of the shuttle and the fabric (it is not an accident that in the Greek original the verb *diakrino* has been used. At the same time it means *divide* and *distinct*). Their correctness serves to show what the thing is (Cratil: who knows the names knows the things). Together with this, however, the claim has been stated (Socrates) that the things can be recognized through themselves, rather by their names. Remembering the argument between Cratil and Hermogen and trusting Socrates, in our story we will try to reach the things in two ways: through the speech of the names (directions of fit, the nominative duty of the images to the ballads); Likewise, through the speech of the things themselves (the autonomy of the images and the ballads, projected on their desire and capability to converse between each other, while calling other things with their names).

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A bit more than twenty years ago Paul de Man expressed his conviction that the critic's task in the following years would be *a kind of imperialistic usurpation of the whole literature through the method of the rhetoric reading*. Hillis Miller, in a closer perspective, with a greater or smaller degree of satisfaction, keeps supporting the faith in this credo of the deconstruction. In his article *The Function of the Literary Theory Today*, following the destruction of the old consensus and formulating the consequences for the fate of the canon, Hillis Miller sees the existence of the humanitarian knowledge in the teaching of (rhetoric) reading with a larger awareness of canon and with practice in the reading of all kinds of signs – art of painting, cinema, television, newspapers, historical data, data of the material culture.

Such command of signs (knowledge to have the possibility to read all the signs) is been read parallel to Jonathan Culler's essay *The Future of Critics* and more precisely to the conviction that it is worth teaching critical thinking, close reading, analysis of prose structures and semiotic mechanisms. Thus, the rhetorical reading

penetrates the unavoidable social and historical contexts to create a semiotic perspective not only to the act (of reading) itself, but also to its disposition.

This reading practice of all the signs would hardly achieve its aim – command of the signs – if it does not offer reading paradigms that would show that the different signs do not live in such isolation from each other, as it seems at first. Yes, the sign systems, as the Moscow-Tartu School insists (also Lotman personally in some of his texts) are difficult to compare to one another and the elements of one sign system do not pass in an original form into another but through a translation, transformation which changes – sometimes dramatically – their essence. However, at the same time, taking into consideration their differences, the sign systems live *together* as they demonstrate an admirable permeability. By means of it each one of them fills its sign womb with marks (gestures, quotations) of another system. Sometimes, the receiving party does not hide its fondness during certain periods of development. The word and the image are a good example of such coexistence. That is why, if it is worth teaching critical thinking, close reading and analysis of narrative in literature and semiotic mechanisms; if in this way a semiotic perspective in the reading and its laid is created – therefore it is done to perceive that *together–isolated* living in each moment of touch to the body of the semiosphere. Such reading paradigm that believes that the different signs do not live by themselves, as it seems at first sight, changes not just the opinion about the reader's act, but transforms the interpretative procedure itself. This phenomenon makes me remind that moment of Robert Scholes' study *Semiotics and Literature* where Scholes seeks the place of the semiotic interpretation among the rest of the methods of interpretation. *As interpreters–semiologists*, claims Scholes, *we have no freedom to make meaning, but we do have the freedom to discover it by following the various semantic, syntactic and pragmatic paths that lead to a multitude of directions. In other words,* Scholes continues, *we cannot burden the text with random meanings but we can burden it with all those meanings that we can relate to it, applying a certain interpretative code. And last but not least, we can generate meanings as we put the text among the actual and possible texts to which it may be related.*

Let us make two presumptions in what Scholes says. The first

one is that in the reading of a fictional text the reader does not start from the words in the text to take up different directions, but from the wholeness of the textual space and its present constituents. The second one is that texts in the fictional literature where words do not live peacefully by themselves, are not as many as they seem at first. Nevertheless, such sign anxiety means that there are other gestures marked in the word, other semiotic decisions, for example the visual ones. Since in the word (also with the word) live another type of signs, it cannot continue to be the same – something happens with it and its sign nature, something changes in its reading. The various semantic, syntactic and pragmatic paths that lead to a multitude of directions may not start from the word; they may change their trajectory, nature and acceleration.

After the word has been extracted from its isolated living as an independent sign essence, it is difficult to come back to this state without remembering that it had been extracted and without keeping evidence of the traces of the common, shared living after the extraction. The poetic work where the fine arts have entered as a recognizable, dialogical and meaning–generating gesture can hardly stand an isolated reading and cover the traces of such recognizability and dialogism of the pictorial. It is even harder to formulate who the meanings in the whole entity belong to. These gestures settle on the bottom and one more dramatic reading disturbs the peace and purity – in case that anyone has imagined the non-problematic reader's act as a crystal clear liquid.

The case of *Bulgarian Ballads* is special to the extent that the iconic gestures are present in the first edition and speaking absences in the reprint. In the first edition of the *Ballads* the words – as a sole guide – would mislead because they are explicitly *not* alone; in the reprint they would mislead because they are misleadingly *alone*. The other voice whose timbre we should follow, is that of the drawings. Although the case of the *Ballads* is more unusual: Sirak Skitnik's drawings have not been commissioned as illustration but as drawings. Despite the fact that they accept to act as illustrations, they reject to bear their (genre) name. The visual messages in the *Ballads* have a double being: drawings – as a name, illustrations – as a function, moreover, all this with a complex and controversial nature of the illustrative essence itself.

This understanding may be explicitly expressed or hidden – in the way that Eco classifies the declared and the repressed semiotic theories in his lecture about the history of semiotics at the second of the world semiotic congresses. The rhetoric reading is in fact a hidden semiotic one (in the sense of inevitably *semiotized*). Right in his essay *The Resistance to Theory* Paul de Man leads to the meeting between semiotics and literature, whose results greatly exceed the achievements of many other theoretical models – philological, psychological or classically epistemological ones, which the literary men have tried before. In de Man's vision, as well as Scholes', the pliability of the literary text to the semiotic reading also owes mostly to the language (the semiotic analysis reveals such regularities, which may be described only from the point of view of their own, typically linguistic peculiarities). Furthermore, this urges to a metalingual incrimination: we skip literary periods where the literariness of the work includes not only the word but also the visual message of the illustration. In order not to increase the anxiety in the paradigm, right in the dawn of the semiotic blast (end of the 60s, beginning of the 70s of the last century), Uspenski claims the same as de Man – this time, however, about the fine arts: extremely pliable to semiotic reading.

Anyhow, which reading do we call semiotic? The semiotic reading is not the reading that necessarily uses semiotic terminology. It is, nevertheless, the one that always allows an *aliquo* in the captured meanings in the process of reading. In that sense it is extremely close to Riffaterre's hermeneutic retroactive reading, offered in *Semiotics of Poetry* at the end of the 70s. This inevitable presence of *aliquo* in each captured meaning and more precisely – its valence to be perceived and discovered – gives sense to each intertextual effort. This is what (in our case) the word and the image need.

Again, a bit more than twenty years ago Riffaterre hinted that the act of reading of a certain text is to infer its own theoretical postulates and this is the better version than the intentionally put theoretical frame. Bulgarian Ballads are this type of text. Here word and image interweave in a memorable way, which is able to suggest theoretical decisions for the model, itself, if this particular text becomes subject of semiotic reading. The second edition does not shake, but even reinforces the belief in such possibility, as much as

it catches, in the missing structures of the drawings, dregs of strong rhetorical rushes to the verse of the ballads. The drawings are absent but the signs about them, their meanings and the voice of the once made iconic decisions is here, in the reprint. Moreover, they expect to be felt, revealed and placed in the reading strategies. The drawings as iconic decisions are missing, and present – as a trace.

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As a model of interpretation, our story discusses the separate worlds of the drawings. Not because of them, not even for the explication of their relationships with any specific ballad, but because of their unconditional and curious interrelation with the world of the whole volume of poetry and the formulated literary and non–literary worlds. This bond with the whole message of the book of poetry, however, could not occur without particular vertical holdings. Each model of reading and interpretation, which has asked to speak about the Whole, presupposes instant photographs of separate parts of this whole: some threads may be extracted from them.

First of all, each of the paintings, as a visual message, is possible, thanks to a *visual code*. This code supposes certain articulation and there is no guaranty that all the drawings do that in the same way, i. e. the elements of this articulation have one and the same nature and one and the same behavior. Due to it they generate the meaning in a definitive and repetitive fashion. Besides, the drawings offer different *visual decisions* – some of them defending their originality. At the same time, nevertheless, others insist on the coziness of the shared common place, i. e. we may speak about them through the rhetorics and the stylistics as certain pictorial gestures. Obviously this type of close look at the illustrations would rely on a previous understanding of the semiotic nature of the visual language, of its grammar, so that it could speak (relying on its morphology) about its syntactics and then lead to the dialogue between the drawings and the ballads. In addition, to the previous understanding of the fact whether the term "reading" is applicable to the drawings in the *Ballads* and to the iconic gestures that they offer to the reader.

Secondly, each one of the drawings in the first edition, besides

being an articulation of a certain visual code, is also a way of speaking. As a way of speaking, as an iconic gesture it presupposes a definite direction of fit – in the same way as in the theory of the speech acts, the word (the speech gesture) refers to the world in a certain manner: it comes either before it (*the direction of fit is from–the–world–to–the–word*), or it follows it (*the direction of fit is from–the–word–to–the–world*). Obviously, the question of the "world" view would be put here. Whether this is the world of the book of poetry, to which each of the drawings refers semiotically, or it is the world of the word, to which the drawings refer definitively as illustrations. The direction of fit, which suits the nature of the illustration, is from–the–drawing–to–the–word. Thus, the illustration should refer to the world of the book of poetry in the way that the poetical language does it: if it is after the world, such must be the illustration. Nevertheless, whenever the artist decides to revolt against the text oppression, the direction of fit of the illustration must be changed. Together with this – again as a way of speaking, as an iconic gesture – each drawing presupposes some illocutive power, which helps to express a kind of an attitude towards what has been said (illustrated) – the reading of the drawings cannot remain indifferent.

Thirdly, each drawing has its own structural and compositional organization. There, the visual decisions may be organized in a way that they mostly show their "own" semantic space. To an illustration it means that it should stick to the semantically organized multi–dimensional world of the ballad, whose name it has. In this case each visual decision that does not belong to the world of *this* ballad should be defined as *another's*.

Naturally, the drawings presuppose more models to be looked at and read, as well as an order different from the suggested one. Their aim is to hint that the drawings do not have a paradigm of living – they may fall into different paradigms; it is possible to reorder them by their articulation of meaningful and non–meaningful units, as well as by their direction of fit, as well as by the presence of their own and others' visual decisions. It is obvious that the mobility of the articulations, the unexpected change of directions of fit, the sensed illocutive power, as well as the tangible presence of others' visual decisions in a certain drawing, change the understanding of il-

lustrativity of that drawing. In other words, the drawings start living both by themselves, together – just as the ballads do.

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Moreover, the drawings in *Bulgarian Ballads* represent articulation of a visual code, which, as a system, does not hide its belonging to the modern through a number of decisions, leading to the primitive, the expressionism, the postsymbolism and even art nouveau. This visual code expresses different decisions, leads the reader from drawings with different names, to the world of different ballads. Simultaneously, differences live side by side with repetition and reading has to define the levels of articulation of the visual code in the Ballads, where the differences happen and where – the repetitions. Another task of the process of reading is to determine the levels of the dialogue with the ballads and the levels of the resistance against the illustrative in the drawings.

The drawings presume at least two types of discourse gestures: finishing the writing and creating. The first one generates a discourse that we may call marginal. The ballad resembles a written page and the drawing fills in the margins around the text. The ballad is not transparent; it is fully explicit as a text. The drawing is a translation, which preserves the original and demands an extensive looking. The second gesture generates a discourse that we may call palimpsestic. The ballad is a written page, which is erased to begin the new creation. The ballad shows through different cracks in the reading, it becomes alive and disappears during the reading act, in the drawing it is present as something already mentioned. The drawing is not a translation. It is an association with the original and demands an intensive looking. In both cases we have peculiar transitions of the word into image and vice versa. There, the new code has taken and preserved the previous one in a way that we never have a total, clear limit between the visible and the verbal. Word that is only word (it does not have the trace of the drawings) and a drawing that is only a drawing (it does not have the trace of the word). The regime of transition is visible in the first edition of the *Ballads* and it is almost invisible in the reprint where the linguistic code demands effort, ex-

pressed in consequent text analysis in order to outline the preserved traces of the drawings in the altered and added verses. Moreover, as readers make the effort, they would fall into a really memorable dialogue of Bulgarian modernity. The brief content of the present story does not allow us to follow the dialogue in depth. The choice that always has unexpected risks and sometimes happiness as well, takes us to two of the drawings in the volume of poetry. Their analysis would help me give you an idea of the great dimensions of what we could find while reading the whole book.

■

DEATH IN THE PLAINS

Unlike drawings in the *Ballads*, we cannot find *Death in the Plains* in other editions except the book poetry from 1921. This fact is somehow surprising if we judge by the almost unanimous announcement of the homonymous ballad as one of the best and most impressive works of the poet. I say surprising because if the drawing indeed lives as an illustration, it would have to share the fame of the ballad in its own ways: it has the same name, the same semantic world, to which it adds pictorial gestures.

This surprise may be enhanced by the fact that *Mother* – one of Sirak Skitnik's most preferable works – obviously converses with *Death in the Plains* not only as an iconic gesture but also as a syntax, which is deliberately broken in a point of gradation. Semiotically speaking, as Mayer Shapiro puts it, the frame here is a particular convention, which seems to limit the world of each one of the drawings. In the case of Mother this convention is shown in the cover drawing. The mobility of the frame "cuts" and deprives the drawing from the part that differentiates the two drawings. This particular gesture, which presupposes different variants of conventionality, makes possible the drawing *Mother* to *continue* beyond the frame and to *enter* into the structural and semantic space of *Death in the Plains*. The gesture allows it to become a part of it as a meaning without being its signifier. Besides the ballad, the components of the drawing should also "allow" the interpenetration, i. e., to be organized in a way that the interpenetration of two different drawings to

be a natural transition, regardless of their separate frames. However, another possibility exists: this might be a brilliant technical idea of the artist that the ballad does not suggest. Naturally, these are hypothesis whose answer may be found only in the dialogical reading of the drawings and the ballads in the book.

The components of *Death in the Plains* include an image of a dying soldier in the right bottom part of the drawing. There is only a head and part of the body above the waist, but the kinetic gesture is memorable as far as the body really exists in the form of a cultural code. Also: an image of a skeleton in the whole left side of the drawing, with a cloak, left leg and arm, part of a skull (allegory of death). Furthermore: images of crosses, flames and falling lines as sheaves of light coming out of the halo as well as of the image of death. And last but not least, image of a mother with a black mourning headcloth, in left profile, with her eyes shut, in the top right part of the drawing. A close observation would read as an image coming from the last left representation in the drawing *Mother*.

The ballad *Death in the Plains* is among the few ballads in the first edition without any changes in the text in the reprint. This fact insists on some original, stylistic decision in the poetical expression. By the way it contains a few verses that have a good reason not to be altered – they are in the basis of an effective palinode in the *Ballads'* world. The first two verses of the third stanza – "*What did you see in your dream/ oh, mother – falling stars*" appear to be an epigraph of the ballad *Mother* in *Vezni* magazine (1920, No.1). They appear as an epigraph in the first edition of the *Ballads* in 1921 as well. The difference between the two epigraphs is fine but real: the one in *Vezni* explicitly points out the name of the ballad *Death in the Plains*. Whereas the one in *Bulgarian Ballads* does not indicate the title of the ballad in a way that (through an implication), it seems to "hide" the coming affinity of one drawing to another. In the second edition of the *Ballads* in 1941 the changed text of *Mother* is not deprived only of a drawing but also of an epigraph. Implications are more and more powerful; intertextuality demands a higher tension in the act of reading.

In fact, the implications have an unsuspected profundity even in the first edition, as they do not stop only before the visible – the dialogue between *Death in the Plains* and *Mother*. Two directions

meet symbolically in *Death in the Plains* – death comes from left to right as if it has crossed the frame of another drawing – this time in *Devastation*. While the mother comes from the right as if she has crossed the frame of *Mother*. Nevertheless, as far as she may be seen as coming from another drawing. *Death in the Plains* turns out to be a meeting point of a number of symbolic moves in the *Ballads'* space. Thus, *Death in the Plains* becomes one of the possible centers of the *Ballads* where present (death), left to right, and future that does not forget (cultural memory), right to left, meet.

In such a way the drawing suggests something else. The ballads, as a verse organization, are arranged in two entities with their own succesivity, which the drawings do not follow. To be more precise, they observe the intertexual relations in the ballads and *reorganize* them by the help of iconic decisions, offered by the artist. The drawings are a pictorial form of reading that seeks and achieves its autonomy and each time it accomplishes it, it rearranges the meaning systems and stirs the growing meaning up. Drawings are a sort of "gift to yourself" each time the artist reads the ballads and tries to be their distorted author. Moreover, such distortion for Sirak Skitnik is the compulsory freeing, the "otherwise", which he insists on in his art articles.

The artist has sought this "otherwise" in the ballad as well. It enters the mytho–poetical universe (left by one of the greatest Bulgarian poets Botev) with an intuitive jump. *Death in the Plains* boldly declares its desire to converse with Botev's world and his ballad *Hadji Dimitar*. The first two stanzas of *Death in the Plains* are a close reading of *Hadji Dimitar*. It is a reading–interrogation of Botev's ballad about the inability of the happening now, four decades later. They are also the suffering coming from this inability, which searches compensatorily and still unsuccessfully in the next two stanzas of the work. As a ballad, it is condemned to provoke a story with more pain than resistance; where the mythologized world is demythologizing; the heroic body radiates helplessness and death – something intolerable in Botev's world – has the physiological power. Reading Sirak Skitnik conditions a hard and at the same time challenging task: to feel this exact *rapture* in the balladic (the rewriting of the cultural code) where one genre tradition continues at the price of a changed meaning.

The dialogue of the mytho–poetical universes observed from the position of the lyrical voice is mostly concentrated in the character's body – the body as a posture and heroism, supported by certain culture signs. Left by Botev's ballad, the only thing preserved in the body is what is painful, what physiologically deconstructs the corporal (*and the wound constantly rays*). At the same time, the body is multiplied in its aloneness, which (deprived of mythological and folkloric saving–pleasant touches) is even still (*I lay lonely, still*). The only vocalism that is allowed to the body in this situation is the weak–appealing one. It resembles crying more than a request to the non-existing here and now Other. In such a way, the chorus sound of *Oh, who will bury me?* kills the different voice registers in Botev's ballad, which, stretched between *moans* and *curses*, swallow all speech gestures of the ballad.

Observed from the projections of the sad white moon the dialogue of the mytho–poetical universes rewrites the lines about fairies and the bird–protector as it denies to let Botev's melodic sound (*I can't hear the forest rustle/ nor the caressing wave/ the mermaids watch over me/ night owls don't cry over me/ nor the sad white moon/ oh, who will bury me!*). In addition, all this is done in order to embrace the hero character and to return to the denied universe where the verse *and only canopy clouds hang above the woeful space* is only seemingly a proper substitution of *an eagle keeps him shadow during the day*. The subject–predicate connection in Trajanov's verse includes a verb with a special sounding from Botev's poetry: *hang* has the enormous power of the hanging from *The Hanging of Vassil Levski*. In such a way it erases the few preserving–caring connotations in the analogy between the cloud and the eagle in the two ballads. Besides all this, more than quarter a century ago, Bulgarian literary criticism saw two different models of the gestures of the "heroic" in these works. Hence the question to the ballad *Death in the Plains* – how to be a strong work about the reality of the happening and a suitable answer to the most significant in the tradition.

Furthermore, if Trajanov managed in this decision making Sirak Skitnik has been an extremely brave reading in his drawing. Now, intuitively sensing it, while drawing he reads at least two separate ballads in the book of poetry (*Death in the Plains* and *Moon Ballad*). Whereas through them and because of them – Botev's balladic world

is going beyond *Hadji Dimitar* and reaching the last stanza of *The Hanging of Vassil Levski*. Bravery is supported by the fact that the rupture in the balladic is present in Trajanov's ballad with certain absences of what in Botev's work is a presence. In this way, *Death in the Plains* puts in question one obvious aspect of the mytho–poetical universe – *the missing structures*. The absences in the work organize the functioning of the poetic semiosis and provoke decisions about what the iconic semiosis should look like (the voice and the song are absent; the mermaids as well; the moon that will not rise).

In fact, how do you draw absences? Through contaminations. It is the artist's simple answer with a powerful artistic idea. Absences of the absences are drawn, i. e. the presence of what travesty the world of Botev's ballad. Here come the third and forth lines of the ballad.

If Trajanov's verse *I cannot hear the forest rustle* turns Botev's *forest rustles, wind blows,* later on in the third stanza of Trajanov's ballad we find the verse *Come, oh wind, sacred earth,/ from the north, from your home.* Against Botev's *eyes are dark*, Trajanov puts *icy eyelids weigh*, but only after he offers the mermaid's kiss for that of death: *I feel a cold kiss*. Here are the signs read by Sirak Skitnik that may live as iconic messages. Signs of the north, symbolic transfer of the sacred earth and canopy over the character may enter the drawings from the right – where the figure of the mother appears in the composition *Mother*. In its turn the icy kiss of death must meet the gesture of the desire, i. e. it may come from the left. All this happens in another reality as Trajanov's ballad may dare, exactly as Botev's work does – the reality of the apparition, of the dream.

Verses that later on, as an epigraph, the ballad *Mother* would take as *conditio sine qua non* for its meanings, now open the door for biblical and mythological codes. *What did you see in your dream, /oh, mother! – falling stars?* is a strong line not just to the stars in the sky in Botev's ballad, but more to the function of the star in the biblical and the mythological codes and the related meanings. The birth of the Savior is symbolized by the rise of the Bethlehem star (Mathew, 2:2). Together with this John's Revelation connects the symbolic of dying with falling stars (6:12, 8:10, 9:12). The same gesture is articulated by different cultures through religious or folklore beliefs. Hence, another reason for the image of the mother that ap-

pears in the drawing *Death in the Plains* to be not other but identical to an image from the drawing *Mother*.

In his articles about war, Sirak Skitnik insists on the fact that war is a mystery as well. Here, a sacrament emerges from the innocent, at first sight, image in *Death in the Plains*, to come back in *Mother*, to gather its missing meanings. All figures in the drawing *Mother* have faces. Simply, the face of the forth from right to left mother is in another drawing and the transduction is not just pictorial but mostly it is semantic. This mother's face is in *Death in the Plains*. On the one hand, the point is to balance compositionally the face of death as it encounters life (she has given birth, giving the first kiss) and death (coming to take him, giving the last kiss); desirable and non–desirable, close and alien. On the other hand, however, the reason is the need of the lonely, immovable, dying in the valleys, far from his homeland, Bulgarian soldier. Although in his dream, in the apparition, the mother is always *there*, in the moment of self–sacrifice. *There,* which the transduction of the image turns into *here*, bringing it from *Mother* to *Death in the Plains*. A bringing that has read and understood the meaning of the falling star.

▪

MOTHER

> And one of the elders answered, saying unto me, What are these which are arrayed in white robes? and whence came they? And I said unto him, Sir, thou knowest. And he said to me, These are they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb. John's Revelation, 7:13,14

▪

The reader of *Bulgarian Ballads* would hardly let whiteness in the kingdom of sorrow, as very often the drawing *Mother* is considered. In fact, the drawing has several emblematic presences in other editions, different from the *Ballads* from 1921. One of them

allows whiteness in its iconic world. The first drawing that is a compositional analogue of *Mother* is in *Vezni* magazine (1919, No. 5). It has a title, it contains different components and it specifically denies the presence of the black color. Nevertheless, it and not *Mother*, explicitly takes us back to another drawing from 1926 with the title *Virgin Mary* where in a smaller scale, a detail of the later variations of *Mother* lives. The genealogy of the drawing insists on a curious fact: in the beginning Sirak Skitnik's interest has been rather to the personal, to what most fully expresses the intentional human state – the face (*Virgin Mary*). Later on, the interest moves to what is more active, which hides the intentional state – not only and not to that extent the face, but rather the posture of the whole body, the kinetics.

In *Psychological Aspects of the Archetype of the Mother* Jung clarifies why, similar to many other archetypes, the one of the mother is shown in an almost endless variety of aspects. Moreover, he discusses how next to the archetype of one's own mother stand those that may be named mother figuratively. In the first place this category includes the Mother of God. Reading Trajanov's ballad and Sirak Skitnik's drawing clearly depicts this double articulation of sacred and real. Separating them is easier to be done in the verse than in the drawing. The sacred image and the image–realm are reachable in the verse, hence, they are discernable through evocativity. The *you*–expression unfailingly penetrates the sacred image (*Oh, you, holy Virgin*), whereas the image–realm stays out of the communicative act, it is in the third person (*does one mother listen to misfortunes*). Besides, the two images do not exist at the same time but successively. For their part, the sacred image and the image–realm in the drawing are achievable through the combination of the female figure with a nimbus, whereas the difference may be sought in the compositional order, which takes the uniqueness of the sacred image away at the expense of the variety of the real one.

Indeed, the drawing gives the uniqueness up. It contains three fully visible female figures and a forth one, whose bent forward face cannot be seen. This forth mother figure semiotically contains *figures*, up to the moment that it does not *discover* the missing part – the face – in some of the other drawings. Only then it turns into a *sign*. Therefore, components of this drawing start to speak in contact with another drawing. Moreover, as we already saw, this drawing is

Death in the Plains. Here, in *Mother,* said with the terms of the iconography, the personal is missing and the non–personal (the clothes) is given. The three full figures are seemingly identical but they differ with the pleats of the dress (the white stripes), as well as with the shape of the eyebrows and the face profile. We may define them a difference–that–creates–an–illusion–of–identity. Each element in this drawing lives as an incremental repetition and may be reproduced for ever and ever with insignificant variations – unlike the chorus repetition in the ballad.

Each figure in the drawing is accompanied by nimbus (halo) that gives a sacred sense of the images and doubles the interpretation of the mother as a Mother of God. Moreover, it is a mother–realm, the mother of the possible killed soldier, holy in her pain. The nimbus equals pain and holiness – tradition in Bulgarian literature. It is characteristic that the nimbus accompanies the forth figure as well, which is not fully present in the drawing. Crosses in the space between the figures of the mothers take one space line. It forms a string, parallel to the one of the mothers. Three sintagmas of eight crosses each are expressed and they resemble human figures holding hands in full face.

The drawing offers a variety of parallel lines, organized in blocks (sheaves), which seem to come from the halos and connote the light. These sheaves, together with the halos, give the impression of infinity in many of the drawings. If the forth (from right to left) nimbus suggests the presence of a face outside the drawing (before its left side), the presence of sunrays coming from *behind* and passing *in front of* the first (from right to left) mother figure, on the other hand, presupposes a halo outside the drawing (behind its right side). Thus, readers may build the drawing as much as they want – in both directions, without ever finishing it, i.e. to get a *final*, *complete* variant of the drawing. The white margins with black line in the drawing create an allusion of ground covered with snow, where some of the verses assert (*the deep snow*). They begin immediately before the mothers' images (from the spectator's point of view they are in the front part of the drawing) and end with the crosses. By analogy, the black spaces with little white oval line originate the allusion of a black sky.

These six elements in total are organized in two grounds. The foreground includes the mothers' figures and the nimbuses, i.e. a

complete semantic space – sacred–sorowful. The background, on the other hand, has the crosses, the snow and the sky. The sunrays build a bridge between the fore and background in the drawing, as in the bottom part they touch the crosses (respectively they belong to the background). Whereas in their top part, they touch the halos (respectively they belong to the foreground). Thus, the nimbus connects the mother and the crosses by means of sorrow, while it is presented as sheaves of sunrays.

Trajanov has sensed the symbolic depth of the nimbus, as in the postface/epilogue of the book of poetry, he relates the image of the mother with the one of the Virgin Mary. Let us remind these lines that we had promised in the first part to read in another context. *'Not only the original artistic skill stands out in the marvelous drawings of this book, but the profoundness of the concept as well'*, writes Trajanov. *'The mother of every suffering soldier is a grieving Virgin Mary and her pure look cries not only over the head of the dying son, but also over the full destruction of the home–land'*. What Trajanov does to Sirak Skitnik's drawings with these words, is to read them as complex placing of iconic codes that allow to be symbolically generalized. In other words, Trajanov does what Sirak Skitnik strives for. At the same time, he offers a pattern expression, which fetches down the visual decisions and even "freezes" in the space of certain drawings. As the phrase *'The mother of every suffering soldier is a grieving Virgin Mary and her pure look cries not only over the head of the dying son*' is a definite retort to *Death in the Plains.* However, if we put the whole quotation (I deliberately omit part of it) *cries not only over the head of the dying son, but also over the full destruction of the home–land* then it is a retort to *Mother, Funeral*, *Conjurations*, *Devastation* and *Doom* as well: iconic gestures including either the sacred image of the mother, the death motive, funeral, or the signs of full destruction.

The sacred is immanently present in the mothers' images in the *Ballads* in 1921. It is a happy discovery in the verse and, at the same time, it is before it. Now, however, it may reach new meanings and the artist is determined to take up to that. Now, there are new reasons for entering the world of the drawing *Death in the Plains*, kindly offered by the ballad *Mother*. The first stanza activates the meanings of the biblical code (*Have mercy, oh Mother/ crucified God*). The sec-

ond one activates the signs of the ruthless reality (*sorrowful mothers/ to brother and enemy*) and the third one offers a whole plot cut (*Somewhere hearts die / over my child/ there nobody is watching/.* When in the previous story about the drawing Death in the Plains, we started talking about a curious deictical transduction, we were lacking one of the reasons to transform *here* into *there* and vice versa. Now, we get it from the ballad Mother as its own decision and the drawing is willing to follow it: *nobody watches over my child there!* is the hidden moral imperative, which as a performative, leads the morose string of mothers to the sad *there*. It is extreme as a dimension, proximate as an experience, as a pain. There, where dying has not yet occurred in its might (*the dying suffer*), where suffering is stronger than ever.

The reading of the drawing allows us to notice figures, which it uses in the verse: *sad image* (first stanza, second line), *it is so frightful outside* (second stanza, first line), *shines restlessly/ the deep snow* (second stanza, third and forth line); *somewhere stars are falling/ without trace, all the time* (second stanza, fifth and sixth line); *sorrowful mothers/ to brother and to enemy* (second stanza, seventh and eight line); *somewhere stars are falling/ and not one mother/ listens to misfortunes* (third stanza, second, third and forth line); *the dying are suffering/ over my child/ nobody is watching there* (third stanza, sixth, seventh and eight line). The big rupture in drawing is done here: it would try to *stick* this drawing to another – *Death in the Plains* – led by the dreamt *there* that it cannot express in its *here and now*. This is the direction of the mothers in their sad order to argue with the verse, to deprive it from its *here and now*, to be themselves, the mothers, there, over their dead sons.

The second big rupture in the drawing is that this image of the mother semantically slides into another drawing. It cannot just be either *Funeral* or *Conjurations*. Nevertheless, it lives in both drawings. Sirak Skitnik does not draw the dialogue of the lyrical I with the icon but the directions of this dialogue. He does not draw a plot, a situation, but its intentionality, what the lyrical I's prayer is about. The ballad Mother may be read as a dialogue between the mother and the icon. The drawing may not be read like that. It resembles an action after the communication with the icon. It is the thought projection of the conversation with the icon. In the dialogue with the icon, the

mother is both here, in the sacred space, and there, in her thoughts, somewhere with her dying son. Sirak Skitnik would be able to draw to this plot and we would have a vision of a kneeling woman before Virgin Mary's icon with her face in pain and her suffering but also hopeful look. Instead, the artist presents us a composition of mothers proud in their sorrow. They are rushing towards outside, beyond the coziness of the space with the icon, going to join their beloved sons in the sad world of dying, to share their space. Thus, he does something extraordinary brave – he exteriorizes the sacred, he turns the mothers into icons.

The world in *Mother*, drawn by Sirak Skitnik, is namely a world *outside* (*tell me, oh, mother, what happens outside* – forth stanza, third and forth line). The lyrical I's prayer in front of the icon is *inside*. The artist chooses the semantically charged *outside* where the dying hearts are moaning, where the stars–troubles fall into the deep snow in the background of the huge plain and start provoke doubts about its whiteness. At the same time, the chosen *outside* is tremendously heavy – it leads to the motive of the victim as well as to the image of the cruel Doom. Sirak Skitnik draws both, as one of the works has the same title – *Doom*.

The ballad *Mother* contains four *outside*, four *somewhere* and two *there* in the framework of a few stanzas. Obviously, it does not want to stay in, in the warmth and coziness of the room with the icons. Neither does the drawing. In fact, it is completely deprived of its *inside* – warmth and coziness have been pushed away, and the sacredness of the icon is exteriorized in the walking mothers' figures in their painful world. On the whole, both the ballad and the drawing (as well the whole realm of Bulgarian Ballads), avoid the closed, the chamber, the hermetical space and sounding. Even the intimate has been brought outside in the visionary space of the native. In this respect, the reprint of the ballads, as a mighty mnemotopos, is a step forward.

The rupture leads to the rewriting of meaning in the biblical code. Strongly sensed are the verses *there eyes are dark/ there he is!* These lines, in the context of the falling stars – connote the impossibility of the immortality, of the resurrection. Because immortality – seen as resurrection – in the texts of three of the gospelists (the forth one, John, does not miss this chance in his story. However,

he complexes it and escapes the pattern motive) is seen in quite a symptomatical in its repetitions motive – *He is not here: for he is risen, as he said. Come, see the place where the Lord lay* (Matthew, 28:6). *And he saith unto them, Be not affrighted: ye seek Jesus of Nazareth, which was crucified: he is risen; he is not here: behold the place where they laid him* (Mark, 16:6); *He is not here, but is risen: remember how he spoke unto you when he was yet in Galilee* (Luke, 24:6). *Their eyes are dark* puts together the figures of Botev's message and the message of *Death in the Plains* in order to make the dying son proximate only in and through the apparition (*there he is*). However, it is both dying and self–sacriface.

So the epigraph of the ballads takes us to Death in the Plains and gives the drawing the analogical possibility to embrace two poetical worlds. The drawing takes advantage of this chance in a beautiful way – it combines its own clearly declared allusion of infinity of the string of mothers with a new allusion – that of the drawing Death in the Plains. The two have already become a new drawing, which – somewhere far in the plains, in the sad south – unites and achieves a pictorial wholeness, enriched by new meanings. The morose string of mothers seems to come from the Balkans, from the dreamt, now ignored Bulgarian north, to reach the plains of the sad Aegean south, where their bent faces with unseeing eyes and knowing looks are dashing.

In a long observation the figures in the drawing *Mother* seem to leave the world of the drawing. They pass beyond the frame, search for that point of union where – coming from the big sorrow, to do the great self–sacrifice – they will find their own white change.



The front cover of 'Bulgarian Ballads' by Teodor Trayanov.



'Death in the Plains' by Sirak Skitnik.



'Mother' by Sirak Skitnik.




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IMAGES OF THE OTHER
IN LITERARY COMMUNICATION
(1)

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This volume should be taken as a snapshot: it reflects a definite state of literary theoretical or historical thinking, a specific range of literary scholars, and particular visions of the concept of 'the Other'. Also, it gives some information of how a Hungarian scholar feels to call his or her Bulgarian colleague into discussion, and vica versa; that is, what the intercultural dimensions of the discourse on literary theoretical issues are. (To address 'the Other'...)

György C. Kálmán

What images of Hungarian and Bulgarian literary theory do the articles in this book contain? I think that these are images of characters in the 'story' of literary theory, and not voices from the outside (from the 'other side'), with the self-confidence to search for original solutions, to propose constructions, built up over the national background of literary theory, which is also a strategy of the articles in this volume – namely, collision of languages, experiments with the models of our experience, creation of new connections between theoretical views and so on.

R. Kolarov

