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Teresa Dobrzyńska, Raya Kuncheva

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I.
Anthropological and linguistic aspects

Антропологические и лингвистические аспекты

JAN KORDYS

THE GAZE OF MEDUSA

I

From the moment of our birth we are defined by gazes. We are entangled by them – we gaze at others, they gaze at us. In the public space ("the free market of casual gazing," as Peter Sloterdijk puts it) casting a glance and fleetingly being seen do not superimpose, they do not threaten our subjective autonomy. There, glances pass each other, sometimes they cross. But acquaintance or other interpretable elements do not explain their prolonged meeting; while a fleeting message (a smile, for instance) may materialize, this moment of intimacy will be concurrent with a fundamental foreignness. The state of an intersubjective "short circuit" (and not a crossing of the border between 'foreignness' and 'familiarity') lasts a second; presently, we turn our heads away and reassume our previous roles. Without these boundaries – which are as necessary as the border between the world of the living and the world of the dead – a social world could not have come into being. Within it, we can fulfill both our desire to be with others (intimacy) and our need to be separate from them.[1] Sometimes the distance is effaced. The gaze pierces the

[1] F. Flahault, *Face à face. Histoires de visages*, Plon, Paris 1989, p. 103.

invisible halo (of not seeing, of being unseen), it progresses towards us, creating a "unique intersubjective state" (Sloterdijk), so that we distinguish ourselves within it. We discover ourselves in the eyes of others, who are transformed into our "mirrors." Subjected to the gaze, we are no longer in command of ourselves, our faces merge in an "intimate bipolar universe." Reflection co(i)nstitutes identity. Our very sense of existence is associated with the face and with the exchange of gazes.[2] It is the optical version of the requirement of complementarity (of being complemented by others). While we ourselves are the creators of our image, the only way we can perceive it is through the impression it makes; feedback is essential. François Flahault notes that the statement 'I exist in the gaze that another casts on my face' can be reversed: 'I exist in the face that another offers to my gaze.'[3]

It is the face that reveals a human being's (emotional, intellectual) activity in the fullest extent, therefore it has to be processed (read) by the gaze with particular care. It is here that both the strength and the fragility of the face spring from. The strength is associated with the fact that the face bears a metonymic relation to the rest: equivalent to the person, it yields his or her image. The fragility of the image, its susceptibility to the slightest defect, is a consequence of the standards being set thus high. An injury to the finger does not disqualify the hand, yet a wound or even the slightest deformation of the face affects the whole. No other body part displays such profound connections between the elements that constitute it.[4] The face as 'faciality' (*visagéite*)[5] would appear to

[2] Ibid., p. 12–14; P. Sloterdijk, *Bulles. Sphères, Microsphérologie*. Tome I, Pauvert/-Fayard, Paris 2002, p. 154–156, 218.

[3] F. Flahault, *Face à face*..., op. cit., p. 60.

[4] Ibid., p. 54–56, 130.

[5] It was Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (*Mille Plateaux*, Minuit, Paris 1980; *A thousand plateaus*, transl. B. Massumi) who coined this term, untranslatable into Polish (though there is the adjective *twarzowy* 'facial, becoming'); see P. Sloterdijk, *Bulles*..., op. cit., p. 178–179. A late

be even more thoroughly intertwined with anthropogenesis than brain development or hand asymmetry. It represents the primordial revelation of bodily individualism and expression, the echo of emotion. An examination of the descriptions of facial expression given by ethologists (starting with Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 1872) reveals that the form emotions take in apes is situated somewhere halfway towards human faciality. Like in us, in apes the recognition of other individuals is grounded in facial features, but only humans consider the face to be *their very own* unique attribute: an inalienable possession, the home of intentions and desires, the source of language, the area where the visible is offered to others, in a response to the call of the gaze. When the face becomes independent from animal form (in a process motivated by both biology and culture), a transitional zone is created, "a chink of Being in the face" (Sloterdijk), an opening to the other, effected in a common space – thus, the history of Being can be described as (also) a carnal event. Turning *one's own* face toward another is an act of choice, but furthermore – a forging of one's identity: faces beget one another. In the process of anthropogenesis and sociogenesis they gradually establish one another in mutual contemplation, in the light beaming from the epiphany of their meeting (Levinas)[6].

It is impossible to consider the face without giving mention to the meanings ascribed to the eyes (to the beholder, the face is "preeminently expression," it becomes a word, a radiant sign – "as eyes that look at you," writes Levinas). We pay special attention to them, we perceive their slightest motion, we notice a 2 mm movement from the distance of 1 m. As a manifestation of conscious activity, they bring the subject forward, they reveal the subject's relation to things and people, linking directed movement (attention)

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result of the process of the elevation of the face to representation is the art of the portrait.

6 Ibid., p. 159, 188–189.

with the visible world. When we say that "the eyes are the mirror of the soul," or "the secret bond between us and the inner life of the other," we presume that the exchange of gazes is linked with mental states and their modes of interpretation: when tracking someone's gaze, we enter, as it were, the realm of that person's thought.[7]

The journey of *homo sapiens* towards faciality had already begun in prehistory and the participation of the individual in the faces of others was part of a "domain that did not allow representation [of faces] and did not require it."[8] In early civilizations, the gaze of the other created a frame of reference that made self-perception possible: the face belonged to the group. The nexus of gaze and countergaze is written into the face; and in turn, the face, offered to another, sees itself in the other's eyes.[9] For Sloterdijk, the problem of the face as "ID" (sign to be recognized by) acquired significance only by the beginnings of (European and Asian) Antiquity, when communities consisting of familially unrelated and unacquainted

[7] F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 15, 73. When Dupin 'reads' the thoughts of his friend (at the beginning of *The Murders in the Rue Morgue*), a sequence of gazes constitutes the 'text.' In *The Purloined Letter* gazes are the structural matrix of the text (see Wincenty Grajewski's extraordinary analysis of Poe's story: W. Grajewski *Jak czytać utwory fabularne?* KAW, Warszawa 1980, p. 29–50).

[8] P. Sloterdijk, *Bulles...*, op. cit., p. 180–182. In Upper Paleolithic cave painting human figures are rare and figurine heads do not contain any detail (A. Leroi-Gourhan, *Le geste et la parole* II: *La mémoire et les rythmes*, Albin Michel, Paris 1965, p. 227). Flahault (*Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 141–142) describes the La Marche cave (Lussac-les-Châteaux, Poitou; late Paleolithic Magdalenian culture) with its more than 60 faces etched in profile.

[9] P. Sloterdijk, *Bulles...*, op. cit., p. 211. The mutual shedding of light between faces, the mutual forging of identities are elements of a set of innate intersubjectivity patterns perfectly observable already in the interactions between a mother and her newborn child, for whom "the face is the nipple of the visible" (F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 92–95, 123).

individuals began to develop new cognitive orientations in a new social and cultural reality. Life demanded a reading of the face that would seek out analogies between (a possible) kinship and individual features; curiosity is linked with a necessity to identify. The individualization of the face is also dependent on a transformation of subjective space, a transformation associated with the idea of autonomy. The subject constructs an external point of view, and thus he or she can observe him or herself from without (can become "an inner witness of his or her own life").[10]

Greece has bequeathed us exceptional symbolic material connected with these kinds of visual-cognitive categories ('see,' 'be seen,' 'recognize oneself' in the other) – categories as vital as breathing, categories that shape the social structure and the forms of human interaction. The word *prosōpon* means 'that which appears to the eyes, which offers itself to the gaze,' 'figure,' 'person,' but most of all: 'the face,' offered to others as a sort of 'seal,' an identity-confirming sign. The individual exists in the gaze of other members of a community who are his or her equals and are similar to him or her. All the planes of reality, and all the acts wherein these planes are apprehended, are regulated by a unity of seeing and being seen, by the superposition of the rays sent by the eye and those emanated by the object (the gaze is not only linked with a desire to possess, it is also an emission). Seeing becomes equivalent to the gaze, it is a sort of distance touch; the subject and object complement each other, apprehension is linked with its result, and this renders the physical-mental opposition void.[11] Reciprocality is the source of self-knowledge (I see myself in the eyes of my *vis-à-vis*, my *vis-à-vis* – in mine), the eyes of another person are the miniature mirror in which I perceive myself. Pliny, in his *Natural History* (book XI, chapter 55) calls the eyes a perfect mirror that is capable of reflect-

10 Ibid., p. 220.

11 J.-P. Vernant, *Entre mythe et politique*, Seuil, Paris 1996, p. 91, 221–222.

ing in the pupil the image of a human being in its entirety.[12] Plato is the first to reflect on the space between faces as a reality with its own specific rules. That space is not an emptiness or a neutral middle ground. Surfaces of faces cooperate in it in such a way that they open up to the other in their own being-a-face. In the dialogue *First Alcibiades,* Socrates asks this question: "Let us then consider, by looking to what of things existing we can see both it and ourselves?" His interlocutor answers without hesitation: "It is evident, Socrates, (by looking at) mirrors, and other things of the like kind." We can see in them our face, otherwise unperceivable, and eyes peering at us. In a face-to-face relation, the 'mirror' of the pupil is the surface that reflects our gaze:

Soc. You have observed then, that the face of him, who looks at the eye of another, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror, which we call the pupil, being the image of the person, who looks in it.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. The eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking at that, which is the best part of itself, with which it sees, may thus see itself? [...] the soul likewise, if it would know itself, must look at soul, and especially at that place of the soul where wisdom, the virtue of the soul, is inherent, and to that other thing, to which it happens to be like?[13]

We discover (ourselves) by looking at the eyes opposite to us; we discover (our own) soul in the crossing of gazes and in dialogue. The eye sends a ray which is reflected in the pupil of the *vis-à-vis* and then returns to its source, and the soul gets to know itself by observing a cognate being that remains outside of it. Since in the

12 F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit. p. 124.

13 Plato, *First Alcibiades*, transl. by G. Burges, in: *The works of Plato*, vol. IV, London: Henry G. Bohn 1851, p. 365–366.

gaze the activity of perception is transferred to another person, the subject cannot grasp itself within itself – like the eye, which cannot see itself when it directs its rays outward. Introspection is impossible, knowledge is acquired from the perspective of another being, another soul. Man, then, perceives himself as pure intellect – a reflection is free of all that is bodily, accidental, external.[14] But does that model pertain only to Greek culture? Don't we encounter it in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, as read by Jean Hyppolite? The drama of the subject's self-consciousness is a system of mirrors (Hyppolite alludes to Lacan and his "mirror stage"): self-consciousness requires a doubling, the ego can only exist insofar as it perceives itself within the self-consciousness of another (Hegel writes of a "duplicated self-consciousness"). "Self-consciousness [...] finds itself as an *other* being" (transl. J.B. Baillie); it makes no sense to speak of an ego outside of the relation between two consciousnesses that not only gaze at each other, but see each other gazing at each other. In order for me to recognize the other as an "*I*" I need to see the other performing in relation to me what I can see that I am performing in relation to him or her. An interplay of reflections is thus the fundamental constituting experience of self-consciousness; but even though consciousness is born and truth is revealed in that intersubjective relation, being a subject *also* means confronting images of what is totally foreign (the power of destruction, aggression, death): "the essence of man is madness, that is: being oneself in the other, being oneself through that very alterity".[15]

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[14] J.-P. Vernant, *Entre...*, op. cit., p. 215–216, 414–415. Describing the birth of the concept of the subject, the author cites Jacques Brunschvig who defines the Greek 'paradoxical *cogito*' thus: « I am where I see myself, » « I am that projection of the ego which I see, » as well as Bernard Groethuysen: « self-consciousness is the grasping within oneself of a certain *he*, but not quite an *I* yet . » (quoted by J.-P. Vernant, *L'individu, la mort, l'amour. Soi-même et l'autre en Grèce ancienne*, Gallimard, Paris 1989, p. 224–225, 227).

[15] J. Hyppolite, *Figures de la pensée philosophique* I, PUF, Paris 1971,

Greek anthropology fuses seeing and life; the loss of life is the loss of sight and of the attribute of being visible, it is a departure to the kingdom of Darkness where man becomes a nameless, faceless shadow. Therefore, the elements of the 'see-be seen' opposition show up in various configurations; the ideal model presumes a (re)-cognition through a crossing of gazes, which allows one to reach the light of truth beyond the world of appearances – even though knowledge may also be connected with not seeing.[16] Mythology conveys an image of the exchange of gazes conceived as a field of tension, conflict, catastrophe. The (self-)reflexive relation of the myth of Narcissus (who does not recognize himself in his reflection, does not understand that he is looking at his own face. And if he is not identical to himself, he cannot love someone who is truly different)[17] and the annihilating gaze of the Gorgon Medusa are both lethal. For the gaze can never be completely tamed. It is (also) a lustful wandering, unpredictable and fearsome; I cannot grasp

p. 218–222; "l'essence de l'homme c'est d'être fou, c'est-à-dire d'être soi dans l'autre, être soi par cette altérité même" (s. 222); see also P. Legendre, *Le Point fixe. Nouvelles conférences*, Fayard, Paris 2010, p. 52.

[16] The breaking of social bonds – as a condition for acquiring knowledge – has dramatic consequences. The price that wise men have to pay for the gift of opening up realms closed to others is the loss of sight, « blind to light, they see the invisible » (J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Etudes de psychologie historique* I., François Maspero, Paris 1980, p. 82; idem, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs...* II., p. 107–109).

[17] F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit. p. 168. According to Sloterdijk (*Bulles...*, op. cit, p. 217), the myth of Narcissus should not be treated as an early trace of man's natural relation with his reflection, but rather as an allusion to the disturbing and uncanny character of the phenomenon, formulated there in the terms of a fledgling reflection about the face. The version passed down by Ovid comes from a time when « the face-as-subject and the face-as-object were being linked in a new way. » Denis Knoepfler reconstructs the origins of the myth of Narcissus: Denis Knoepfler, *La Patrie de Narcisse. Un héros mythique enraciné dans le sol et dans l'histoire d'une cité grecque*, Odile Jacob, Paris 2010.

it within any relation, it undermines the foundations of the world (my world)[18]. If someone (persistently) gazes at me, this does not only constitute a riddle – it situates me in the position of a (lonely) victim. Then, the gaze is not given as speech/an appeal, it turns into an act of aggression: captive, I stand in the face of a power that wants to annihilate me. The experience we gain in the "visual school of terror" (Sloterdijk) provides us with instruments that enable an assimilation of the foreign, and with rules of defense against the (evil) gaze: I put on a shield (mask) for protection against that which deforms and negates the face. The mask becomes a means of defense in a war of gazes.[19]

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II

We are influenced by the face of the other – it inspires our admiration, sometimes it fills us with fear; it is also a boundary. And not just between what is within and without the body. The surface of the skin insulates and separates as well, but the face does it in a far more meaningful way (an intact body without a face may be taken for someone else's).[20] Not only do we identify eye movement with life, we also automatically include it in the domain of the face (person). Eye movement communicates the uncountable modulations that we follow in order to grasp the relation between the

[18] F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit. p. 15, 104–105. The belief in the evil eye is well known to etnographers and folklorists (it is mentioned in a Sumerian text from 3 or 4 thousand years BC, and in St. Augustine). According to Flahault (p. 82–84, 87), it is linked with the belief that whatever approaches perfection must be protected « like the pupil of your eye. » The evil gaze is the effect of a paradoxical association: the emptiness that pulls the object toward itself and the emission directed towards it.

[19] P. Sloterdijk, *Bulles...*, op. cit., p. 205.

[20] F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 66–67.

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whole and the details that express it. When someone looks at us, we associate that gaze with intentions (which should be assessed), expectations, wishes (which should be fulfilled). The pupils are a condensed 'negative image' of the person observed. Children (or enamoured grown-ups) are fascinated with finding themselves in the gaze of their *vis-à-vis* – when faces come close to one another and gazes are united. We then perceive our own image – as in a mirror – in the eye of the other person, in the dark spot of the pupil. We behold ourselves seen by another person and at the same time we see in their pupil the image that they see. Seeing oneself converges with the abyss of the other's gaze.[21] In many languages, this phenomenon (the image of the miniature person perceived in the 'mirror' of the pupil of the eye) is referred to when describing that which is little ('a child') or unique: in the Twi language of Ghana *ani-wa* 'child eye' denotes 'one eye' as opposed to a pair of eyes conceived as a whole. *Ani-wa* has a formal counterpart in the Chinese complex character 'pupil of the eye,' or 'to be reflected in the eyes (of another person),' which combines two characters: 'eye' and 'child.' We can find a similar conjunction in the Japanese word meaning 'pupil of the eye,' in Egyptian (*hwnt imj.t ir.t* 'pupil of the eye = little girl in the eye'), Latin (*pupilla* 'little girl, pupil of the eye'; cf. modern European languages: Italian *pupilla*, Spanish *pupila*, French and German *pupille*), Classical Hebrew (*iyšōn* 'little man > pupil of the eye'), Old Indian *kanīnaka* ('boy, pupil of the eye'),

[21] A configuration found in Flemish painting might be a transposition of this experience: a spherical mirror in which one can discern the figure of the painter (ibid., p. 125). We can find a slightly grotesque description of such a situation in Flaubert: "Seen thus closely, her eyes looked to him enlarged, especially when, on waking up, she opened and shut them rapidly many times. [...] His own eyes lost themselves in these depths; he saw himself in miniature down to the shoulders, with his handkerchief round his head and the top of his shirt open." (G. Flaubert, *Madame Bovary*, transl. E. Marx-Aveling, New York: Simon and Schuster 2007, p. 46).

kanīnakā ('little girl, pupil of the eye').[22] Classical Greek presents a similar case. The image on the fundus of the eye (*eidolon*) was associated with a female figure, and the pupil, the most beautiful part of the eye, was denoted by the word *koré*, 'little girl.'[23] In preserved pottery, we are presented not only with a mask of the Gorgon Medusa surrounded by enormous eyes (which protect from sickness), but on one of the vases we can also find the image of the Gorgon in the very center of an eye, where it takes the place of the pupil = 'a little girl.'[24]

An expressionless gaze, on the other hand, denotes silence – a waiting for words. When the other thrusts us into empty duration, we perceive his or her very existence as pressure. Captivated by the other's silent presence, terrified, we become victims of nothingness. Flahault writes that no other object of the visible world represents Nothingness aiming at the Being opposite to it better than the blackness of the pupil. He quotes Hegel (*Jenaer Realphilosophie*, 1805–1806) who, comparing man to night or nothingness, adds: "In phantasmagorias, when night is around us, there suddenly appear and disappear just as quickly – a bloody head here, a white figure there. One can see such a night when looking someone in the eye – one can see a night that becomes *terrifying*, the night of the world coming down on you".[25]

The reciprocality of seeing and being seen is possible only in

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[22] V. V. Ivanov *Semanticheskaia kategoriia malosti-velichiny v nekotorykh iazykakh Afriki i tipologicheskie paralleli w drugikh iazykakh miṛa*, in: *Problemy afrikanskogo iazykoznaniia. Tipologiia, komparativistika, opisanie iazykov*, red. N. V. Okhotina, B. A. Uspienskii, "Nauka", Moskva 1972, p. 85–86.

[23] F. Frontisi-Ducroux, J.-P. Vernant, *Dans l'œil du miroir*, Odile Jacob, Paris 1997, p. 66.

[24] J.-P. Vernant, F. Frontisi-Ducroux, *Figures du masque en Grèce ancienne*, w: J.-P. Vernant, P. Vidal-Naquet, *La Grèce ancienne* 3. *Rites de passage et trangressions*, Éditions Points, Paris 2009, p. 300.

[25] Quoted in F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 73–74.

the human world. For we cannot contemplate the visages of gods or of death. In meeting, their gaze does not express feelings or thought. These beings, regardless of the qualities that are assigned to them in myths or belief-systems, share one common feature: they dwell beyond the boundaries of the everyday world. In folklore, we often encounter characters possessed of a lethal gaze.[26] In Greek (and Roman) mythology, there exists a character in which all these elements create a unique configuration. It is the Gorgon Medusa (Γοργών, Γοργόνα; Γοργόνες/Γοργοῖ). She was represented in the form of a female head surrounded by snakes, endowed with a gaze that changes the beholder into stone. She was the mortal among the three Gorgons (the other two are Stheno 'Forceful' and Euryale 'She whose voice travels far'). She was killed by Perseus who, acting on Athena's advice, directed her gaze toward the shield (mirror). Medusa has no 'face' in the meaning of *prosōpon*, she is described using the word *kephale* 'head'. Her 'anti-face' is a recurring motif in the visual arts, but contrary to the figurative conventions of archaic painting, where characters are shown in profile, in situations reminiscent of a dialog (in vase painting, for instance), the Gorgon was shown full face; one looks at her as one would at the image in the mirror – crossing gazes with her is unavoidable. Medusa is the impossibility of seeing, she is a figure of chaos, of regression to formlessness.[27] Her image, unlike the countenances of those who dwell on Olympus and mortals, annuls the opposition between male and female, old and young, beautiful and ugly, human and beastly, heavenly and hellish, outside and inside (she does not hide her tongue in her mouth, but instead she sticks it out like a male reproductive organ). A bodiless monstrosity, she is situated

[26] Cf.: "after seven years, out of a (black) rooster a dragon or basilisk is hatched, a beast that kills with its gaze everyone that it looks at, even itself, when it sees itself in a mirror" (H. Biegeleisen, *Wesele*, Nakładem Instytutu Stauropigjańskiego, Lwów 1928, p. 11).

[27] J.-P. Vernant, *Entre...*, op. cit., p. 420.

in a middle zone, between the worlds of gods, men, and animals. In her depictions, flat, devoid of depth, merging terror and the grotesque, "the face is more a grimace than a countenance (*visage*)."[28]

In the dual form of either a mask [*gorgóneion*] or a female figure, she appears on vases, and starting with the 7th century BC – on temple pediments, shields, articles of everyday use, coins, in workshops. When she is depicted as a woman's visage, the pleasure it arouses is the pleasure of fear, the ecstasy of seeing the intangible grasped in symbolic representation – the all-powerful face of destruction, caught motionless for a moment.[29] The silent presence of the deformed image creates a sense of foreignness in *my* world, a world brought into being *by us*, in facial expressions, gestures, speech. Medusa, reduced to a lethal gaze, embodies the absolute threat. She is at once a real presence and a presence devoid of any (palpable) identity.[30]

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[28] J.-P. Vernant, *La mort dans les yeux. Figures de l'Autre en Grèce ancienne*, Hachette, Paris 1985, p. 31–32, 35, 79–80; J.-P. Vernant, *L'individu...*, op. cit., p. 122.

[29] J.-P. Vernant, *La mort...*, op. cit., p. 31–32, 35, 79–80; J.-P. Vernant, *L'Individu...*, op. cit., p. 122; F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 72. I am not alive, therefore I do not perceive; this ostensibly obvious statement reminds us that the hypothesis of one's mortality cannot be verified from a first-person perspective. From that perspective, death can only be grasped as a symbol. The Gorgon structures perceived space, she reveals herself as a symbolic sign of the discreteness of the moments of time which form a chain that can be broken at any moment (M. Mamardashvili, A. Piatigorskii, *Simvol i soznanie (metafizicheskie rassuzhdeniia o soznanii, simvolike i jazyke)*, "Maler", Jerusalem 1982, p. 221).

[30] F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 74. Two scenes from films by Hitchcock can be interpreted using similar categories (leaving aside an analysis of the function of the gaze in the entire corpus of his films; such as *The Birds*, where the face and eyes are an object of aggression): the final scene of *Vertigo*, when a figure clad in black (a nun) emerges in the bell tower, and upon seeing her, Judy Barton (earlier Madeleine Elster – both played by Kim Novak) lunges into the abyss. In *Psycho*, again in the final

Medusa – that which is forbidden and available to sight only in the form of a visual substitute – instills a fear that does not spring from anything external, a primordial fear of the unimaginable. To meet her, especially on the battle field, when she is accompanied by 'Rout and Panic', is to see oneself in the gaze of the mask, to experience a fearsome alienation.[31] The meeting involves an extreme aspect of the sacred – and contact with that causes an indelible stain, or tears one out of the realm of human existence. Like Cerberus, she guards the entrance to Hades. Passing through those gates, man assumes an ephemeral, shadow-like shape. In this aspect, *eikon*, the reflected image of the Gorgon, comes close to *eidolon* – a double, a phantom, an actualization of the supernatural, and at the same time a misleading illusion. Jean-Pierre Vernant cites two other characters reduced to heads; the *Praxidikai* goddesses had temples, and ritual

scene, we see, from behind, the mother of the main character, sitting in a chair (in an underground room). Suddenly, the chair turns toward us, revealing the face/mask/countenance of death. The dead woman speaks through her son, thus abolishing genealogical distance and the boundary between life and death. Jacques Lacan writes: "Hence there's an anxiety-provoking apparition of an image which summarises what we can call the revelation of that which is least penetrable in the real, of the real lacking any possible mediation, of the ultimate real, of the essential object which isn't an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety *par excellence*." J. Lacan *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, ed. by J.-A. Miller, Book II: *The ego in Freud's theory and in the technique of psychoanalysis, 1954–1955*, transl. S. Tomaselli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988, p. 164.

[31] J.-P. Vernant, *Entre...*, op. cit., p. 416–417; J.-P. Vernant, *La mort...*, op. cit., p. 12. The power of the gaze (of the other) is imposed upon us before our bodily identity is fully stabilized. This is why the dependence on the gaze resting on the subject oscillates between two opposite poles: on the one hand, we cannot exist without this life-giving «umbilical cord,» the gaze of the other person. On the other, the power of the (evil) gaze destroys the foundation of our existence (F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 114).

functions connected with acts of vengeance and the guarantee of oaths. Giving one's word fills with fear, as it is a calling forth of the world of the dead; and not keeping one's word leads to insanity. An equivalent of the Gorgon in children's imagination is *Mormo*, the ghastly head that abducts and devours.[32]

Even though the image of Medusa may have the form of a mask, one does not wear it to imitate the deity; with her eyes, the Gorgon turns the face into a mask, appropriates the gaze. By crossing gazes with her, for a moment the beholder situates him or herself in a symmetrical position, and – fascinated – cannot turn away. The face (mask) on the opposite side is a shadow, an *alter ego*, a Foreign Being, similar to a mirror reflection that remains in a relation of terrifying reciprocity; at the same time it is a sign of the supernatural world. The image is not a reflection however, it points to the monster; the beholder, fused with it, turns into stone. The misleading proximity causes a projection into radical foreignness, a negation of intimacy and contact. The individual loses the ability to see, and at the same time – his or her identity. The Gorgon peers at the mortal who is engulfed by the world that she reigns.[33]

Let us return to names. *Medusozoa*, jellyfish (cf. Polish *meduza*, French *méduse*, German *Meduse*, Italian and Spanish *medusa*) are sea animals with a jelly-like body (of the phylum Cnidaria), they owe their name to Linnaeus who wanted to bring zoology and mythical imagery together. The Latin *Medusa* is a loan word – it comes from the Greek feminine adjectival participle (*Medousa*) of the verb *medein* ('to reign' or 'to meditate'), meaning 'the (female) one who reigns,' or 'the (female) one who meditates.' Françoise Frontisi-Ducroux writes succinctly: 'The Mistress (*La Maitresse*).'[34]

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32 J.-P. Vernant, *La mort...*, op. cit., p. 61–62, 66–67.

33 Ibid., p. 79–81.

34 S. Détoc, *La Gorgone Méduse*, Édition du Rocher, Paris 2006, p. 58, 62–64; F. Frontisi-Ducroux, *Du masque au visage. Aspects de l'identité en Grèce ancienne*, Flammarion, Paris 1995, p. 11, przyp. 20, p. 131.

The etymology of Gorgon, on the other hand, was sought for a long time, and eventually it was established that the most likely explanation is of the word being an «expressive duplication,» or in other terms: a «primitive onomatopoeia».[35] In 1962 however, Vladimir Toporov suggested an answer to the riddle of the monster's name. He showed (on the example of Slavic languages) the relative character of concepts such as 'beautiful' and 'dreadful,' and their ability to transform into their opposites. He cited the Lithuanian *gražus* 'beautiful,' the Slavic grozьnъ (*groza, groziti*, cf. Polish *groźba*) 'terrible, menacing, repulsive' (both come from the Indo-European root **grog'- / *gorg'-* of the same meaning), and the Classical Greek γοργός 'terrifying, dreadful.' We find a similar distribution of meanings in other languages of the region: the Bulgarian *грозен* is 'unfair, ugly,' yet the Slovene *grozen* means 'beautiful' (= *gražus*), as well as 'terrifying,' the Latvian *gražîtiês* – 'to threaten,' but also 'to vaunt (one's beauty).' The author highlights the "striking similarity" between the Lithuanian *gražiaakis* and the Classical Greek γοργωπις (cf. Γοργώπα); "they come from the same prototype," but take on polarly opposing senses: the former means 'having beautiful eyes,' the latter – 'having terrible eyes/gaze.'[36]

The origins of the representations of the Gorgon that archaic Greece assimilated through the Cretan civilization should most likely be sought in Asia Minor.[37] Excavations at Çatalhöyük (Ana-

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[35] S. Détoc, *La Gorgone Méduse...*, op. cit., p. 65–66.

[36] V. N. Toporov, *Issledovaniia po etimologii i semantike*. Tom 2: *Indoevropeiskie iazyki i indoevropeistika*. Kniga 1, Izd. Iazyki Slavianskikh kultur, Moskwa 2006, p. 55–58.

[37] In the description of Agamemnon's shield ("a Gorgon's head, fierce and grim, with Rout and Panic on either side", *Iliad*, XI, transl. S. Butler) we can find the archaic phrase Γόργω βλοσυρωπις 'the vulture-eyed Gorgon' (βλοσυρός < **gwlturos*, related to the Latin *vulturus*); Ivanov sees a parallel to an image of a raptorial bird on a Cretan shield from 8th century BC (V. V. Ivanov, *Kategoriia « vidimogo » i « nevidimogo » w tekste: ieshche raz o vostochnoslavianskikh folklornykh parallelakh k*

tolia, 7,000–6,000 BC) have revealed the ceremonial functions of the female deity of fertility (represented as a girl, or else as a woman in labor); her cult also involved a complementary image, that of death – the goddess Old Hag. She was accompanied by the symbol of a bird of prey. The uncovered frescoes contain a depiction of Egyptian Vultures with enormous wings and human limbs, holding a headless being. This image seems to refer to a burial ritual – performed by priestesses wearing costumes made out of bird feathers. The flesh was separated from the bones, the skeleton was covered with skin and immured in the wall of the building (temple). Ivanonv cites the pair Anguish and Terror from the Hattic ('pre-Hittite') myth about the Moon god who fell from the Sky (Heaven). In the Middle Hittite *Hymn to the Sun*, "*Horrors*" and "*Terrors*" run along with the Sun god, and in the *Iliad*, "Mars [Ares]... gave orders to yoke his horses Panic and Rout" (XV, transl. Samuel Butler).[38]

It is precisely burial ritual (described in Hittite texts) that allowed Toporov to explain the ambiguity of the witch's attitude towards the hero in folk tale narratives: she can be the helper as well as an incarnation of evil (let's not forget that the plot of the story of Perseus is reminiscent of the magical folk tale).[39] The contradictions disappear when we accept the hypothesis that there is a genetic link between the fairy-tale Baba Jaga and the Hittite priestess ^{SAL}ŠU.GI, mistress of the burial ceremony, who helped the deceased to cross to the other world. After cremation, ^{SAL}ŠU.GI takes scales (with her face turned toward the Sungod, she recites a magic for-

gogolevskemu « Viiu », in: *Structure of texts and semiotics of culture*, Mouton, The Hague-Paris 1973, p. 164).

[38] V.V. Ivanov, *Istoriia slavianskikh i balkanskikh nazvanii metallov*, Izd. «Nauka", Moskva 1983, p. 62–68; V.V. Ivanov, *Izbrannyie trudy po semiotike i istorii kultury*. Tom V. *Mifologiia i folklor*, Znak, Moskva 2009, p. 164–169.

[39] R. Caillois, *Méduse et C^ie*, Gallimard, Paris 1960, p. 131–132; a full and precise analysis is given in: E. Pellizer, *Voir le visage de Méduse*. "Mètis. Anthropologie des mondes grecs anciens" 1987, vol. 2, nr 1, p. 45–61.

mula): on one pan she places silver, gold and precious stones, on the other – a lump of clay. She summons the god of the dead. ^{SAL}ŠU.GI cleansed unclean persons and participated in rituals that freed from the evil gaze (evil eye). A comparison of ^{SAL}ŠU.GI and Baba Jaga reveals common attributes: similar age, a similar duality of behavior (sometimes she is a lethal threat while at other times the hero gains her support in peregrinations that suggest a primal image of the soul's otherworldly journey).[40] "Baba Jaga is death itself and at the same time the cause of death," writes Toporov (note such features as blindness or a crumbling body), as he emphasizes the similarity between the tools used in Hittite burial rituals and Baba Jaga's shovel. The point is that ^{SAL}ŠU.GI is associated with the ceremonial *ukturi* fire, used for cremation, and that a silver spoon (tongs?) was used to gather up the bones. In altered form, this action returns in the folk tale, when Baba Jaga attempts to push the hero into an oven.[41] The positions of the main characters are therefore reversed: the hero becomes the performer of the ritual, and the witch becomes his sacrificial offering (victim). The functions remain unchanged, but the actants swap places. Baba Jaga may play the role of both the subject and object of the same predicate ('to put to death'), and the inversion of roles brings to mind the 'paradoxical' logic of folk tale narratives, which describe the adventures of a hero who returns to the community of the living. Burial ritual, however, remains the primary source; and it is through the concept of rebirth, of new life, that the fear of death is to be overcome. The fairy tale does not mirror the rite of initiation (as was claimed by Vladimir Propp in his *Historical roots of the wondertale*), but primarily – it mirrors the burial ceremony, and Baba Jaga is the primordial image of Death, the first deceased and first sacrificial offering, the creator of the

[40] V. N. Toporov, *Khiettskaia ^{SAL}ŠU.GI i slavianskaia Baba Iaga*, Slavianskoie iazykoznanie nr 38, Kratkie soobshcheniia, Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moskva 1963, p. 28–37.

[41] Ibid., p. 34.

burial tradition and the renewer of life.[42]

Vyacheslav Ivanov devotes two texts to analyzing the mythological layers of Gogol's short story *Viy* (Ukrainian common noun *вія* 'eyelash'), which match the archaic Indo-European beliefs described above. He stresses the significance of the motif of the 'evil eye,' of 'seeing-not seeing', and of the raising of eyelids (eyelashes) with an iron pitchfork.[43] Seeing becomes synonymous with a recognition of the protagonist: against a warning (of his inner voice), he looks at the Viy. An important part is played not only by the predicate 'to be seen', but also by its inverse 'to see' ('to look into the eyes of'):

> All these monsters stared about seeking him, but they could not find him, since he was protected by his sacred circle.
>
> "Bring the Viy! Bring the Viy!" cried the witch. [...]
>
> "Don't look!" an inner voice warned the philosopher; but he could not restrain from looking.
>
> "There he is!" exclaimed the Viy, pointing an iron finger at him; and all the monsters rushed on him at once.
>
> Struck dumb with terror, he sank to the ground and died.[44]

Propp perspicaciously demonstrated the ceremonial and mythological sources of the 'seeing-not seeing' motif in *Viy*; he linked (after Potebnia) Baba Jaga's blindness with the animal world and with death. He also formulated the rule of 'mutual invisibility':

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[42] V. N. Toporov, *Issledovaniia po etimologii i semantike*. Tom 2: *Indoevropeiskie iazyki i indoevropeistika*. Kniga 2, Izd. Iazyki Slavianskikh kultur, Moskva 2006, p. 231–234.

[43] V. V. Ivanov, *Ob odnoi paralleli k gogolevskemu « Viiu »*, Trudy po znakovym sistemam V (=Uchenye zapiski Tartuskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, vyp. 284), Tartu 1971, p. 133–142; V.V. Ivanov *Kategoriia « vidimogo » i « nevidimogo »*....., op. cit., p. 151–153.

[44] Ibid., p. 154. N. Gogol *The Viy*, in: *The Mantle and Other Stories*, transl. C. Field, New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1916, p. 246–7.

the monster does not see the hero, who in turn cannot look at the monster; if he does, he will find himself in the kingdom of the dead. Here, blindness is not an immanent feature, but rather it is a not seeing something (living beings do not see the dead, the dead do not see the living).[45] The Eastern Slavic sources of the image of the Viy are a reflection of ancient Indo-European traditions, as well as a reflection of mythological universals. Ivanov cites Indian myths from both Americas, where the gaze of otherworldly creatures (such as gorgons – female beings who take on the form of a bird of prey) is a lethal threat. This motif is associated with another – that of the blessings resulting from covering one's eyes. Rituals emphasized the role of 'the guardians of the gaze' – during ceremonies to celebrate the catching of the first salmon, these guardians would hit with long poles anyone who dared to open his or her eyes (= raise his or her eyelids). Though the role played by these tools is opposite to the function ascribed to them in Slavic folklore, they reveal parallels in the deep structure of myths and rituals:

1. mythical creature – tool to open eyelids;
2. human being – tool to keep eyes closed.

The uncovering of eyes is connected with the state of sleep, as analogous to death. The lethality itself of the gaze can be derived from the following parallel:

3. opening of the eyes – death (or sleep);

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45 V. V. Ivanov, *Kategoriia « vidimogo » i « nevidimogo » w tekste...*, op. cit., p. 155–156; Cf. the mutual invisibility cited by Henryk Biegeleisen: a "ciota" or witch "is recognized in the Poznań region by the 'koziołki' ('little goats') in her eyes instead of 'panienki' ('little girs, pupils'), because while in the pupils of an ordinary person we see the reflection of a human figure, in the pupils of a witch one can discern little goats with horns and a beard, the reflection of the devil who – as is known – appears in the form of an old buck or billy-goat. For this reason, witches cannot see the host or the altar in a church, while a priest will spot a 'ciota' when looking through the monstrance" (H. Biegeleisen, *U kolebki. Przed ołtarzem. Nad mogiłą*, Nakładem Instytutu Stauropigjańskiego, Lwów 1929, p. 234).

4. covering of the eyes – life.

In these cases, blindness is the binary relation of 'being invisible' (between the one who is invisible and the one does not see the one who is invisible).[46] However, when the mythological being is benevolent, closing one's eyes ('being blind') enables one to acquire goods (Ivanov draws a parallel: in hide-and-seek we hide from the monster who could see us; when a child expects a gift, we tell it to close its eyes).[47].

In mythology, the eyes have a paradoxical status: as an organ (a part of the body), they are an inalienable possession of the subject; at the same time, myths show that eyes can break away from the person. The lack of eyes or the blindness of a mythological being mean protection from danger – consistently with the rule of 'mutual invisibility.'[48] Jakov E. Golosovker analyzed this motif in the context we are interested in: "Whoever has the Helm of Hades becomes invisible whenever he or she turns the helm on their head. Hades means 'invisible': a folk etymology. In fact – death. Death comes invisible. Myth does not explain how an object becomes invisible. While the change of the visible image into an invisible one can be represented (when Perseus wears the Helm while approaching Medusa, for example), there is no causal relation, the change is incomprehensible. [...] Let us not forget that the Gorgons are deities: two of them are immortal, and yet, to them, the immortals, Perseus becomes invisible."[49]

From another point of view, Sylvain Détoc emphasizes the chthonic aspect of Medusa (her connection with the underground world) in the context of the *nékuia* ritual (a sacrifice to summon

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[46] V. V. Ivanov, *Kategoriia « vidimogo » i « nevidimogo » w tekste...*, op. cit., p. 170.

[47] Ibid., p. 171.

[48] Ibid., p. 172–173.

[49] Ia.E. Golosovker, *Logika mifa*, Izd. "Nauka", Moskva 1987, p. 27.

the souls of the dead from Hades; book XI of the *Odyssey*).[50] In many Indo-European languages, words derived from the root **nek-* (< *-k-/-ek-* 'night') are opposed to words derived from the root **dei-* (that which is shiny, visible – 'sky,' 'day').[51] Toporov suggests that **nek-* could have also meant 'underground kingdom,' in opposition to 'heavenly kingdom'; 'inhabitant of the underworld' – in opposition to **dei-* 'god,' as the one who lives in heaven (cf. Old Indian *Dyáus*, Classical Greek *Ζευς*); and also death itself.[52] If the Classical Greek *Αιδης* (*Αιδ-* **n-vid-* 'invisible') refers to the world of the dead, the underworld, synonymous to the kingdom of night, then **nek'* is associated with the idea of death in suffering – in opposition to the idea of eternal life, associated with the kingdom of heaven. 'Death' and the underground 'kingdom of death' suggested the invisible, darkness, night. Another Indo-European root of a similar sense is **mer-/*mor-* 'to die.' The Slavic material gathered by Toporov provides for a reconstruction of its earliest Indo-European meaning. **Mer-* ('to disappear' > 'to die') emphasizes the engulfing darkness, the loss of sight. Death and dying are connected with an annihilation (disintegration) of the physical and spiritual particle, and this process encompasses the realm of *semeiosis*. This is because in one of its variants **mer-* encodes the notion of the sign itself (cf. the meanings retained in the German *merken* and other related words: 'to signify,' 'distinctive feature,' 'stigma'). The semantics of the Indo-European roots seem to emphasize the visual dimension of death; what is destroyed is that which is connected with seeing and being

[50] S. Détoc, *La Gorgone Méduse...*, op. cit., p. 123–125.

[51] Day is luminous and comprehensible by reason, night "does not see, but is itself invisible," unpredictable, dangerous, it instills fear, it is a child of Chaos; V.N. Toporov, *Issledovaniia po etimologii i semantike*. Tom 2, Kniga 2..., op. cit., p. 166–197.

[52] V. N. Toporov, *Mirovoie derevo. Universal'nye znakovye kompleksy*. Tom 1, *Rykopisnye pamiatniki Drevnei Rusi*, Moskva 2010, p. 102–103, 106 (n. 24), p. 242; V.N. Toporov, *Issledovaniia po etimologii i semantike*. Tom 2, Kniga 1..., op. cit., p. 37–54.

seen, the power of the gaze, the energy of light[53].

Finally, let us take note of the evolution of the image of Medusa. At the beginning of the 12th century BC her fearsome countenance had male features (a beard, thick eyebrows). Gradually, it acquired female qualities, and in the 5th century BC Medusa becomes beautiful and alluring. In this transformation from extreme ugliness to fascinating pulchritude one characteristic has remained unchanged however – the link with the function of the irresistible gaze. Even severed off, the head of Medusa remains deadly, the eyes slay anyone who will risk to look at them. I have written of her intermediate status between gods and demons. She is a guardian on the boundary between worlds: the domain of the living and of the dead, the visible and the invisible, she is situated in the fissure dividing life from death. She is attractive and repelling, she fuses male and female qualities. Eléonore Pardo stresses that this merging of opposites reveals the substitution that is effected in every representation (re-presentation) – the desire to see may be assuaged through a reflection, or a mirror. The grasping of reality by an artist – re-presentation – arrests all motion, brings it to a halt.[54] This is the procedure employed by Perseus: he arrests the (Gorgon's) gaze in the mirror (shield). When we want to sever the head, we have to see it in order to efficaciously operate our weapon. But we cannot look at the head. Athena's advice is as follows: one's gaze has to be turned away at the moment of delivering the blow. In order not to miss, one needs to have access to the current image of the target. The deity suggests this answer to the paradox: one should not look at Medusa herself, but rather at her reflection (and the reflection of the sword which is to hit) in the mirror of the shield. Medusa as death represents monstrosity, the unthinkable. But man,

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53 Ibid., p. 310–314.

54 E. Pardo, *« Le regard medusé »*, Recherches en Psychanalyse 9 | 2010 : Les origines grecques de la psychanalyse; http://recherchespsychanalyse.revues.org/index554.html

image, painting, sculpture manage to disarm the dreadful force of that head to some extent – at least to the point where it can be shown (Athena shows it on her shield). It is a sort of meditation on the relation between image and reality. The motif returns at the end of the story. Perseus arrives on Seriphos, the island from which he started on his journey to procure the deadly trophy for the tyrant Polydectes, its ruler. Polydectes prepares a magnificent feast. The hero enters the room, sees the multitude of guests, and brings Medusa out of his bag, turning it every which way. The onlookers are transformed into an image: they become stone statues – a depiction of a feasting multitude. Like an artist, Perseus has rendered the spectacle before his eyes motionless, he has turned it into an image.[55]

From a synchronic perspective, the image of the Gorgon had always been dual: at once human and beastly, female and male, hailing from the world of the living and from the kingdom of the dead. It is the negative image of a face beaming with sunlight: a blackness that spits chaos and death. The image of the Gorgon as a non-face is not the result of an ordinary deformation, but of a blurring of boundaries between fundamental opposites, and also between the observer and the observed. It is not just an encounter with the world of the dead, but with the power of death – the most radical sort of foreignness that man may encounter. To see oneself in her eyes is to be plunged with her into an abyss; the gaze of the Gorgon transports one into that realm between life and death that we all carry within ourselves. Man turns away from it, but the moment of confrontation is imminent. An image that is not a reflection, that

[55] *La mort de la Méduse*, par Jean-Pierre Vernant; transcription par Taos Aït Si Slimane de l'émission « Les grands entretiens », du 18 avril 2002, consacrée à « La mort de la Méduse » pour laquelle la journaliste Catherine Unger recevait Jean-Pierre Vernant. Cette transcription a été réalisée grâce aux © 2007 Archives TSR; zob. V. N. Toporov, *Issledovaniia po etimologii i semantike*. Tom 2, Kniga 1..., op. cit., p. 310–317.

signals a dreadful monstrosity; the beholder is fused with it and loses the attributes of a living being, turns into stone.[56] Flahault wrote that the gaze usually concentrates on the lips. Words are a sign of communication, and the gaze modulates them, by incorporating the play of eyelids, eyebrows, facial expression. The eyes communicate consent, they encourage, they demand, they ask, and, most of all, they require the body to be a confirmation of the speaker's identity. They are not satisfied with signs, they want the body to be an image of the person.[57] The Gorgon Medusa negates that relation: we see a head, and beastly teeth; speech is replaced by the presence of a naked physical organ – the tongue; and inhuman sounds emanate from her mouth.[58]

(translated by Maciej Mrozik)

Отправной точкой статьи является анализ феномена обмена взглядами, в котором воплощаются как наше желание быть с другими (сближения), так и потребность дифференциации себя от них. Отображение в их глазах участвует в создании нашей индивидуальности, само чувство существования связано с лицом и обменом взглядами. Можно сказать, что это оптический вариант описанного философами требования дополнения (другими). Греческая антро-

[56] J.-P. Vernant, *La mort...*, op. cit., p. 47–48, 61–62, 66–67; J.-P. Vernant, *Entre...*, op. cit., p. 78–79, 83–84, 89; J.-P. Vernant, *L'individu...*, op. cit., p. 121, 128–129.

[57] F. Flahault, *Face à face...*, op. cit., p. 16, 48.

[58] W.J. Smith, J. Chase, A. K. Lieblich, *Tongue Showing: A Facial Display of Human and Other Primate Species*, "Semiotica" 1974, 11:3, p. 201–246. The comparisons have an introductory character and comparative studies are required; the following paper devoted in its entirety to the semantics of the gesture of sticking out the tongue is an example of a (diachronic and synchronic) analysis: I.A. Morozov, M.L. Butovskaia, A.E. Makhov, *Obnazhenie iazyka. Kross-kulturnoe issledovanie semantiki drevnego zhesta*, Izd. Iazyki Slavianskoi kultury, Moskva 2008.

БАН - Институт за литература БИБЛИОТЕКА

пология передала нам исключительный символический материал, связанный с визуально-познавательными категориями ('смотреть', 'быть видимым', 'распознавать себя' в других), формирующими социальную структуру, формы общения. Индивидуум существует во взгляде членов сообщества, равных ему и подобных ему. Идеальная модель предполагает распознавание в скрещивании взглядов, чтобы через мир видимости достичь мира истины. Мифология, однако, даёт иную картину: обмен взглядами – это область напряженности, конфликтов, катастроф. Смертоносна как обратная (само)реакция в мифе о Нарциссе, так и убийственный взгляд Медузы-Горгоны, воплощающий невозможность видения, образ хаоса, регресса к тому, что бесформенно. В дальнейшей части статьи я обращаюсь как к работам Вячеслава В. Иванова, Владимира Н. Топорова о ближневосточном (хеттском) генезисе символики Медузы-Горгоны, так и работам исследователей архаической культуры Греции (Жан-Пьера Вернана, Франсуазы Фронтизи-Дюкру) определяющим образ монстра в широком иконографическо-мифологическом контексте.

АЛЕКСАНДР ПАНОВ

СМОТРЕТЬ И ВИДЕТЬ

«Смотреть» и «видеть». Еще в мифологии эти два глагола образовывали оппозицию, намечающую предельную амплитуду активности взгляда. С одной стороны «смотрю» – это деятельность человека, направляющая глаз к миру и отмечающая все, что появляется на его пути. Смотрение ничем не ограничено, кроме физической невозможности человека видеть – слепоты. Ни одно внешнее обстоятельство не может ему помешать смотреть. Даже абсолютная темнота т.е. отсутствие физических условий осуществить процесс «гляденья» не в состоянии ограничить волю человека наблюдать мир – он смотрит, но ***не видит***.

А почему человек не видит? Потому что есть причина вне его или у него внутри, мешающая ему воспринять оптический образ и регистрировать его. Или эта причина мешает ему прочитать оптический образ, осмыслить его, дать ему содержание, отнести к знакомой системе образов и таким образом осознать его с каким-то значением. Иными словами, еще здесь мы сталкиваемся с фундаментальным противопоставлением друг другу двух полярных значений взгляда. С одной стороны, мы имеем дело с чистой оптической ***физичностью,*** проявляющейся в такой же чистой ***субъектности*** и воле – я смотрю, и ничто не может помешать мне смотреть, кроме отсутствия физического

органа. С другой стороны, перед нами чистая ***объектность***, зависимость взгляда от каких-либо внешних или внутренних обстоятельств, позволяющих или мешающих оптическому образу быть воспринятым, регистрированным и осмысленным, и таким образом дающих или не дающих ему возможность занять свое место в ***ментальности*** человека.

Таким образом оппозиция приобретает уже вид противоречия между физичностью и субъектностью – с одной стороны, и ментальностью и объектностью – с другой. Но если всмотреться в основные сюжетыг мифологии древних, где эта оппозиция проявляется, мы увидим, что там она интерпретирована немного по-иному. Один из этих сюжетов даже ставит ее в центр своего проблематирзирования мира. Речь идет об Эдипе. Его судьбой древние выразили существующее противоречие между «смотрением» и «видением» как способность или неспособность проникнуть за видимую сторону окружающего мира и проникнуть в его суть. Именно так человек может достичь мудрости. А она ему необходима, чтобы выжить. Во множестве древних сюжетов, в том числе и в сюжете об Эдипе, центральное место занимает решение какой-нибудь загадки, требующей от человека проникнуть за черту видимости и дойти до сути. Если человек не разгадает ее, он погибает. Эта агональность ситуации подсказывает, что для древних вопрос о «видении» сущности имел роковое значение, от него зависело сохранение и существование жизни вообще.

Сюжет, однако, продолжается. Эдип, мудрый и прозорливый царь, спасший Тиву от чудовища, разгадывая его загадку (и доказывая этим, что может дойти до сути мира), понимает, что несмотря на все это, он не сумел «увидеть» правду о свой собственной жизни. Тогда, в своем отчаянии, он поднимает руку и выкалывает себе глаза. Этим Эдип наказывает свои глаза за то, что смотрели, но не видели сущность. Но он вводит и новый мотив в мировую культуру – мотив зрящей слепоты.

Только тот, кто предохранен от видимости внешнего мира, может по-настоящему видеть. И если мы вернемся к нашей оппозиции, мы сможем добавить еще парадокс: Единственное, что может помешать человеку ***смотреть*** – физическая слепота – оказывается важным условием того, чтобы он начал ***видеть.***

Чтобы мог видеть, однако, человеку необходимо что-то еще. Аристотель в своей «Поэтике» говорит, что основным двигателем действия трагедии являются так называемые перипетии и узнавания. Чтобы осмыслить оптический образ и постичь суть мира, человек нуждается в знаниях, пережитом опыте, где он может разместить образ и прочитать его значение. От того, в какой пережитый опыт, идеологическое осмысление мира или семиотическую систему попадет оптический образ зависит, как он превратится в смысл. Таким образом, всущности, становится возможной и художественная коммуникация – отдельные образы, построенные словом или средствами уподобления иконам, становятся понятными настолько, насколько в памяти воспринимающего существует уже определенная и осмысленная система подобных образов, благодаря которой может быть прочитан новопоявившийся образ.

Эта необходимость, однако, является одной из серьезных проблем, стоящих перед человечеством. Потому что она, всущности, лишает отдельного человека способности «видеть» что-нибудь иное, отличающееся от того, что диктует ему память. А память сохранила четко построенный образ мира. И не может быть иначе, поскольку, если он беспорядочен, он распадется и исчезнет. Тогда возникает вопрос слишком существенный: А кто, на самом деле, видит? Вопрос не касается смотрения – при нем, понятно, смотрит субъект. Но может ли отдельный субъект «видеть»?

В своей статье «Существует ли коллективная память?» Райнхард Козелек касается именно этой проблемы. Кто является субъектом памяти? Разве воспоминание не является пре-

жде всего чем-то личным, возможным только в ментальности индивида? Ответ Козелека следующий: «Моя теза заключается в том, что, хотя в действительности и нет коллективных воспоминаний, все-таки существуют коллективные условия возможных воспоминаний. Коллективные условия возможных воспоминаний имеют религиозный, социальный, политический и экономический характер. Потоки моего опыта прошли через шлюзы экономических, политических, религиозных, социальных, церковных, партийных, национальных и языковых, заранее данных, условий. Прежде чем приобрести какой бы то ни было опыт, я зависим от тех условий, которые определяют раму моих восприятий».

А, если нужно выразить ту же мысль языком поэзии, я мог бы привести в качестве примера хайку эстонского поэта Юри Юди:

Смотрел я многое,
Но позже выбралось
Увиденное.

Субъект взгляда размывается. Он уже не «я». Трудно, однако, утверждать, что он «он», «мы» или так популярные в эпоху социализма «они». Потому что, ни «он», ни «мы», ни «они» могут увидеть то, что вижу «я». Но я ли это вижу, или оно как-то само видится?

Вот мы и подошли к сути нашей проблемы. Может ли отдельный человек «видеть» сущность мира, раз он смотрит при помощи одной уже упорядоченной оптической системы? Захочет ли он освободиться от системы, он опять не сможет видеть, потому что «видение» – это ментальная, а не оптическая деятельность и образы должны быть осмыслены при помощи заранее заданного кода – социального, идеологического или символьного. Это на самом деле апория. И решить ее возможно только тогда, когда человек всмотрится не во что-нибудь

другое, а в свою собственную способность видеть, т.е. в способность узнавать одни и те же образы, применяя разные коды.

Эта операция еще более интересная и поучительная, если образы не настоящие, физические, а символьные, несуществующие в реальном мире, но зато, создающие основы ментального. Иногда бывает интересно проследить за развитием какого-нибудь мотива в мировой поэзии, чтобы посмотреть как его интерпретируют разные поколения, разные художественные и идеологические системы. Мы можем условно назвать эту операцию *«еще один взгляд на ...»* Это выражение заимствовано из эстонской поэзии – я имею ввиду заглавие стихотворения Паула Эрик Румо «Вариация: еще один взгляд на дорогу в Аркадию» Всущности, именно это стихотворение может послужить конкретным материалом, на котором можно показать, как происходит проблематизирование взгляда, о котором было сказано выше.

Существует несколько причин моего выбора именно этого примера. Первая, конечно, состоит в том, что в этом стихотворении мы находим идеальное соотношение между сетивностью визуального, выраженной активностью взгляда, и пространством символов, введенным обыгрыванием мотива Аркадии – одного из наиболее стойких и, в то же время, наиболее разнообразных символичных пространств мировой культуры. Вторая причина моего выбора связана с тем, что это стихотворение убедительнейшим способом демонстрирует процесс проблематизирования и преинтерпретации взгляда – взгляд в стихотворении Румо видит что-то иное, хотя смотрит на то же самое, на что смотрит и взгляд в стихотворении, чьей вариацией является. Но давайте коротко объясним, о чем идет речь.

Стихотворение Паула Эрик Ремю «Вариация: Еще один взгляд на дорогу в Аркадию» опубликовано в его сборнике стихов «Колючка времени», вышедшем в 1985 году. Оно на-

чинается с мотто-цитаты из стихотворения другого эстонского поэта – Карла Ристикиви, звучащей так:

> Я был на дороге в Аркадию,
> Хотя родился в хижине.

Эта мотто-цитата, однако, ничем не похожа на мотто, использованное самим Ристикиви, в начале его стихотворения об Аркадии.

> *Sing me a song of a lad that is gone,*
> *Saw, cold that lad be I?*

Это мотто, заимствованное из одноименного стихотворения Роберта Льюис Стивенсона, только вводит разработанную в произведении эмоциональную тему. У Румо, ссылка на Ристикиви, всущности, означает, что он на самом деле пишет вариацию на его стихотворение – слова обоих текстов почти полностью совпадают, только кое-где выражения разные. Этого, оказывается, было достаточно, чтобы целостное послание стихотворения зазвучало по-новому, преинтерпретируя значения ключевых смыслов и визуальных мотивов оригинала. Чтобы убедиться в этом, лучше прочитать оба стихотворения в параллели, по строкам:

V	VARIATSIOON: VEEL ÜKS VAADE ARKAADIA TEELE
Sing me a song of a lad that is gone, *Saw, cold that lad be I?*	*Minagi olin Arkaadia teel,* *kuigi ma sundisin saunas.* *(Karl Ristikivi)*
Minagi olin Arkaadia teel, kuigi ma sündisin saunas.	Õhtu on vaikne, ei isegi tuul Sahista sasitud aunas.

Mõnikord mõtlen: ma lähesin veel,
muretu nooruk Arkaadia teel,
marssalikepike paunas.

Aga ma tean, et kaotsin käest
tee juba enam kui ammu
ja et ma üksinda enese väest
leiksin tee, mille kaotsin käest,
selleks ei ole mul rammu.

Kuhu ka lähen, seal vesi on ees,
vesi ja kõledad kaljud
Lahkunud viimne kui lootsikumees,
lahkunud lauldes, et vesi on ees,
nii nagu laulvad paljud.

Nõnda ma istun ja tõesti ei tea,
vanduda ennast või saatust.
Ärge vaid õelge, et nõnda on hea,
nõnda on elu... Sest teie ei tea,
ei tunne mu isamaatust.

Keegi ei käi veel Arkaadia teel,
käijad – kas ongi nad sündinud veel
või alles lootuste paunas?

Keegi ei käi veel Arkaadia teel,
olgu ta lossis voi saunas.
Ajad – kas ongi nad alanud veel
keegi ei käi veel Arkaadia teel,
tõesti – ei üheksi suunas.

Kuhu ka vaatan, seal kaljud on ees,
kaljud ja virvendav vesi.
Kas olen mina see ronijamees,
who'il overcome, kui kaljud on ees,
ning kes ei väsi, ei küsi?

Nõnda ma seisan ja ise ei tea,
kuis hinnata oma staatust.
Ärge vaid õelge, et nõnda on pea,
et nõnda ei tohu – sest keegi ei tea
maailma lõpikku saatust.

V

Sing me a song of a lad that is gone,
Saw, cold that lad be I?

Аз бях на пътя за Аркадия,
макар че се родих в колиба.
Понякога мисля: да приближа
още,

ВАРИАЦИЯ: ОЩЕ ЕДИН ПОГЛЕД КЪМ ПЪТЯ ЗА АРКАДИЯ

Аз бях на пътя за Аркадия,
макар че се родих в колиба.
(Карл Ристикиви)

Тиха и спокойна нощ е
даже вятър не шуми в купите.
Никой вече не върви по пътя за
Аркадия.

безгрижен юноша по пътя за Аркадия,
с маршалски жезъл в раницата.

Но аз знам, че загубих се сега

отдавна вече пътят се не вижда

но аз самият пълен съм със сили
търся загубения път,

и от лутането губя сила.

Накъдето да тръгна, там има само вода,
вода и ръбести камъни.

Отивайки си последният лодкар,
отивайки си пее, защото отпред е само вода,
пее, както пеят мнозина.

Тъй сега седя и сам не зная,
кълна се в себе си и във съдбата.
Само не казвайте, че така е добре,
че такъв е животът... защото не знаете,
не чувствате моето отечество.

Пътници – дали се раждат те все още
или само носят в раница мечтите?

Никой вече не върви по пътя за Аркадия,
все едно в дворец или колиба той роден е.
Времето ли е в такова запустение –
никой вече не върви по пътя за Аркадия,
даже не в такова направление.

Накъдето да погледна – все скали,
все скали и водна пустош пепелива.
Тъзи катерач дали съм аз, дали,
който ще се върне пред високите скали,
който нито пита, ни се уморява?

Тъй сега стоя и сам не зная,
как да проумея свойто състояние.
Само не твърдете, че това така не е,
че така не бива – никой тук не знае
на света последното послание.

Стихотворение Ристикиви подхватывает тему потерянной молодости, заимствованную из песни Стивенсона – мотив, прошедший через многочисленные вариации в мировой лирике. Новое здесь во введении трех дополнительных мотивов – Аркадии, к которой когда-то стремился „беззаботный юноша с маршальским жезлом в мешке», потерянной дороги и отече-

ства. Последний мотив – мотив потерянной родины – можно легко объяснить эмигрантской судьбой поэта. Карл Ристикиви покидает Эстонию накануне 1946 года, после того, как его отечество было оккупировано Советским Союзом и практически включено в границы ссоветской империи. Лирический герой сидит на берегу и смотрит на воду, отделяющую его от родины, и выплакивает свою ностальгию. В чем, однако, значение мотива, связанного с Аркадией. Можно ли его воспринять как синоним отечества? По-видимому, нет, особенно в его сочетании с мотивом рождения и потерянного пути.

Как раз мотив Аркадии – это то, что вызывает наш интерес, когда мы исследуем разные значения взгляда. В этом образе-пейзаже мифической страны Аркадии, вечно воспринимавшемся как визуальный образ, в разные времена открывалось и интерпретировалось множество значений. Давайте их проследим.

Из географии и истории знаем, что Аркадия – это область посреди Пелопонесса, харектеризующаяся горным рельефом, что предопределяет пастушеский образ жизни ее коренных жителей. Аркадийцев считают самыми древними среди греков. На них в наименьшей степени повлияло развитие остальной части греческой территории, что и позволило им сохранить самобытный характер жизни Во время эллинизма именно этот пастушеский образ жизни воспринимается как особую ценность – он освобождает человека от его будничных обязанностей и позволяет ему отдаться радостям жизни – любви, песням, играм. Идиллическое представление об Аркадии возрождает миф о Золотом веке, взятом поэтами-эллинами и прежде всего Вергилием в его эклоги. Тот же мотив был возрожден позже литературой Ренессанса и Барокко.

Этот смысл понятия об «Аркадии» сохраняется и в разнообразных дальнейших литературных интерпретациях и оформляется как неизменное, хотя и подчиненное значение этого слова. Бесспорно, и у Ристикиви упоминание об Арка-

дии содержит подобный смысл, присоединяющийся к понятию о родине – лирический герой воспринимает и чувствует родную страну именно как Аркадию.

В то же время, однако, мы не можем утверждать, что это основное значение понятия. Оно в намного большей степени перекликается с более поздними интерпретациями мотива, введенного в европейскую культуру латинской фразой – Et in Arcadia ego – а взята она из пятой эклоги Вергилия. Этот мотив становится популярным в период Классицизма е не благодаря литературе, а живописи. В творчестве французского художника Никола Пуссена есть две картины пад общим названием „Пастухи Аркадии», на которых изображено несколько пастухов, собравшихся вокруг саркофага с черепом на нем. На крышке саркофага видна именно эта латинская фраза.





Толкование этого мотива встречает серьезные трудности из-за возможного двухязычного перевода с латыни. Согласно правилам латинского языка эта фраза может функционировать как в настоящем «Я в Аркадии», так и в прошедшем времени – «Я был в Аркадии». Глядя на картины Пуссена логичнее предположить, что речь идет о прошедшем времени – «Я был в Аркадии», поскольку субъект речи – череп давно умершего человека. Здесь уже интерпретации расходятся.

Согласно книге Бехт-Иорданесса и Веемайера одна из пастушьих фигур, а именно женская, является аллегорией живописи или искусства вообще. В этом смысле понятие «Аркадия» осмысливается не просто как страна Золотого века, а искусства. По мнению Панофского, слово же «Аркадия», связанное с черепом и саркофагом, предсавляет аллегорию человеческой тленности и недолговечности, которой не миновать даже рожденный в Аркадии. Какой из двух смыслов нам выбрать, читая стихотворение Ристикиви?

Выбор труден, если перейти ко второму стиху – «Я был на дороге в Аркадию, хотя родился в хижине». Мотив рождения здесь направляет наше внимание к другому популярному употреблению фразы „Et in Arcadia ego", возникшей в эпоху Штурм унд дранга и раннего немецкого романтизма. Стихотворение «Резигнация» Фридиха Шилера начинается с предложения „Auch ich war in Arkadien geboren" – «И я родился в Аркадии».

Здесь уже смысл понятия об Аркадии однозначен – он связан именно со страной поэзии и искусства, предопределяющей судьбу художника. Если ты родился в Аркадии, это значит: ты наделен судьбой служить музам. В этом же значении мотив развит Новалисом в двух сонетах под общим названием «Аркадия» и посвященных Августу Шлегелю.

Оба сонета начинаются с одного и того же знакомого нам предложения, взятого из произведения Шиллера „Auch ich bin in Arkadien geboren". Замена прошедшего времени настоящим достаточно показательна, так как отправляет значение не к какому-либо имагинерному обществу поэтов, а к точно определенному собеседнику – человеку, которому адресовано поэтическое послание. И поскольку он конкретно назван (an A. W. Schlegel) – это предрешает понимание общности рожденных в Аркадии – обоих поэтов соединила в духовное братство сама природа (Zu Brudern hat uns die Natur erkoren). Последующий стих, однако, непосредственно вводит мотив родины.

Все упомянутые до сих пор смыслы мотива «Аркадия» и встречаемые в эклогах Вергилия(Аркадия как мифическая страна беззаботности и Золотого века), в картинах Пуссена (Аркадия как страна поэзии, но и тленности человека), в стихотворениях Шилера и Новалиса (Аркадия – родина поэтов) раскрываются во всем своем многообразии в первых двух стихах Ристикиви – в их смысле понятие «Аркадия» содержит в себе все упомянутые уже значения.

И в то же время вводится новое – противостояние обусловленного природой назначения поэта – «Я родился в Аркадии» – просветительскому мотиву человека, сам себя создавшего – «Я был на дороге в Аркадию, хотя родился в хижине». Иными словами, поэтического призвания могут добиться не только те, кто с ним родился (рожденные в Аркадии), но и те, кто родились в убогой хижине, если они решатся ступить на дорогу в Аркадию и обладают достаточной решимостью пройти ее до конца.

Мотив дороги является центральным мотивом в поэзии Карла Ристикиви. Хотя и считают его крупнейшим эстонским поэтом, сам он издает за два года до своей кончины всего один сборник, собравший все его поэтическое наследство. Название сборника «Путь человека». А как мы видим в рассматриваемом нами стихотворении вопрос о пути, о дороге – вопрос центральный. Основная причина ламентации лирического героя – не столько потерянная навсегда молодость, как в песнях Стивенсона, сколько потерянная дорога.

Без дороги судьба героя достоина сожаления, потеря дороги – основная проблема его жизни. Производит впечатление, однако, отсутствие одного из ведущих мотивов в произведении Стивенсона – я ли тот молодой человек, который ушел – мотив, вторично подхваченный в вариации Румо. У Ристикиви разница между беззаботным юношей с маршальским жезлом в мешке и зрелым человеком, заблудившимся и ищущим дорогу, вызвана не временем, а потерей пути.

Эта проблема связана и с мотивом потерянной родины – в произведении дискретно намекается на то, что потеря пути, дороги – следствие потери родины. Во второй строфе два раза использовано выражение „kaotsin kaest", в буквальном переводе «потерял руку». Всущности, упоминание здесь о руке не имеет никакого лексикального значения – выражение означает только «потерял», но слово «рука» усиливает значение по-

тери. Когда хотят подчеркнуть, что потеря слишком большая, эстонцы говорят „kaotsin silmist" или „kaotsin kaest", т.е.»потерял глаз» или «потерял руку».

Несмотря на то, однако, что для эстонского языкового сознания упоминание о руке в данном случае ничего не значит, двойное повторение выражения все-таки подчеркивает его смысловой акцент. И если сопоставим его с одним из популярнейших в мировой литературе образов «Если я забуду тебя, Иерусалим, пусть забудет меня моя правая рука»(Псалом 136), мы увидим, что здесь индиректно снова присутствует мотив связи между потерей дороги и потерей родины.

В заключение, давайте обратим внимание на третью строфу, ради которой мы начали это путешествие по истории образов и мотивов. Здесь создан визуальный образ, раскрывающийся перед лирическим героем, образ, который стремится внушить ощущение тупика, невозможности продолжить путь, отдаленности от мечты-родины. Элемента этого образа – два: вода и камни. Приоритет, однако, имеет вода – отделяющая, но и связывающая стихия. В ней логично возникает образ лодочника, который о ней поет, который может ее пересекать, который чувствует себя в ней хорошо.

Хотя герой отдален от своей родины водой, эта преграда не естественная, а социальная, пришедшая извне, преодолимая. Мир построен правильно, лишь судьба героя перепуталась и не позволяет ему достичь своей желанной цели, объединяющей представления об Аркадии и родине.

И еще. Если мы обратим внимание на глаголы, которыми вводится поведение лирического героя, то увидим, что они в большей части активные – ищу, подхожу, думаю, даже стою, т.к. стоять – это потенциальная готовность двинуться, пойти. Герой не созерцает, он пытается каким-то способом решить свою судьбу, даже и тогда, когда он заблудился и потерял дорогу. Ситуация в вариации Румо совершенно иная. В его сти-

хотворении все активные глаголы заменены пассивными. Еще в заглавии подчеркнуто, что речь идет не о ходьбе по дороге в Аркадию, а еще об «одном взгляде на дорогу в Аркадию».

Вместо активного «Я был на дороге в Аркадию», первый стих вариации сообщает о непрозрачности и неизменчивости мира – ночь тиха и спокойна, даже ветер не шумит в стогах. Вторая строфа, которая у Ристикиви говорит о потере дороги и метаниях – бесплодных, но все-таки активных действиях, у Румо заменена всеобъемлющим отрицанием – «никто уже не идет по дороге в Аркадию, время в запустении, никто уже не идет по дороге в Аркадию, даже туда не стремится». В третьей строфе глагол, вводящий образы воды и скал, не глагол «пойти», а глагол «посмотреть» – «куда бы я ни посмотрел...». А в четвертой строфе, в которой описывается состояние неподвижности и нерешительности, как будто незаметно глагол «стоять» заменен глаголом «сидеть»

Как бы ни казались синонимами, эти два состояния совершенно разные – первое – это потенциальная активность, другое – принятая уже пассвность – герой сидит и смотрит – классический образ бездействия. Активность действия заменена пассивностью смотрения. И по этой причине, то, что видят обе пары глаз, разное.

Разница самая значительная в образе Аркадии. Для Ристикиви Аркадия все еще реальная цель, хотя герой его потерял туда дорогу. Он не только смотрит на нее, но и видит Аркадию во всей полноте и сложности ее символических смыслов. Герой Румо смотрит не на Аркадию, а на дорогу в Аркадию. И видит, что по ней никто не идет. Аркадия перестала быть целью, она исчезла. Память о дороге все еще существует, но и она скоро растает, потому что никто уже Аркадией не интересуется.

Самое большое изменение, однако, наблюдается в визуальном образе третьей строфы. С первого взгляда кажется, что перед нами простое обращение. Вместо «воды впереди и ребри-

стых скал», у Румо: «Куда бы я ни посмотрел, повсюду скалы и пустошь водяная как зола». Выведение камней на передний план достигает противоположного эффекта при восприятии пейзажа. Нет уже отделяющей, и вместе с этим связывающей стихии воды, где кое-где видны камни. Здесь перед нами вызывающие ужас и служащие преградой острые скалы, среди которых кое-где виднеется водяная пучина. И вполне естественно образ лодочника заменен образом скалолаза-человека, чья участь – взбираться по скалам наверх и снова возвращаться обратно, ни о чем не спрашивая и не уставая. Схожесть с бесплодными усилиями Сизифа очевидна. И еще. Здесь, в третьей строфе, Румо начинает развивать один из главных мотивов песни Роберта Льюса Стивенсона – «не я ли тот скалолаз, не я ли?», дискретно напоминая мотто к стихотворению Ристикиви. Таким образом вводится мотив раздвоения – того , кто смотрит и другого, кто действует. Но являются ли они, в действительности, одним и тем же человеком? Так же как герою Стивенсона не верится, что пожилой мужчина может оказаться тем самым мальчиком, котрый ушел. Между смотрением и действием произошел разрыв, и герой не знает видит ли на самом деле то, на что он смотрит.

Всеми этими, с первого взгляда, незначительными изменениями Паул Эрик Румо решительно меняет целостный образ Аркадии, снимая все накопление смыслов, которое мы встретили в стихотворении Ристикиви – Аркадия – мифическая земля свободы, радости и любви, воплотившая в себе воспоминание о Золотом веке, Аркадия – земля искусства, Аркадия – естественная родина художника, Аркадия – мечтанное отечество. На смену всего этого приходит несуществующая реальность, фикция, к которой никто уже не стремится и к которой не идет, потому что дорога туда проходит через острые скалы и водяную пустошь и любое усилие по-сизифовски обречено.

Трансформированный таким способом образ Аркадии в

корне меняет мотив человеческой судьбы. В четвертой строфе тоже наблюдаются небольшие, но целиком переворачивающие смысл сказанного перемены. Мы уже отметили замену слова «стоять» словом «сидеть». Во втором стихе мы встречаем еще более интересное обращение – герой Ристикиви клянется в себя и в судьбу. В то же время герой Румо не можеть понять свое положение.

Здесь необходимо сослаться на эстонский оригинал, потому что смысл сказанного трудно перевести. У Ристикиви в конце второго стиха стоит слово „saatust" – судьба, у Румо на том же месте слово „saatust" –положение, статус.

И это не пустая игра слов, потому что в слово „staatust" поэт вложил два разных значения. С одной стороны, это психологическое состояние, с другой – статус, место человека в мире и жизни.[1] Что это за место? Созерцателя, активного деятеля,

[1] О том, что подобная игра слов характерна для поэзии Паула Эрик Румо свидетельствует и следующее объяснение, данное им в интервью, которое я взял у него в 1986г.(ж.»Факел»р номер 3 за 1988г.). «Так как речь пошла о переводе, я хотел бы прокомментировать сделанный вами перевод моего стихотворения «Мечтаешь». Для меня ваш выбор был неожиданностью, поскольку стихотворение построено в большей своей части на непереводимой игре слов.

Читателю этого перевода я хотел бы дать некоторые пояснения: через все стихотворение насквозь проходит глагол мечтать в форме 2л.ед.ч. – «мечтаешь».По-эстонски эта форма звучит «унистад», что похоже на звучание и написание какого-нибудь испанского или немецкого города(ср. Дармштадт, Сиудад, Либертад). По этой причине во второй половине стихотворения эта глагольная форма приобретает окраску имени нарицательного, что, из-за содержащегося в нем значения «сон»(эст. «уни»), дает основание толковать ее и как «город сна». Но в то же время это слово может означать и «город единства», поскольку мы вправе взять ставшее международным латинское значение частицы «уни». Подведя итоги этому процессу, драматическая и меланхолическая мечтательность начала стихотворения превращается одновременно в критическое

победителя, жертвы? Ясность в стихотворении Ристикиви, где герой оплакивает свою несчастную судьбу человека, потерявшего дорогу в Аркадию, но прекрасно знающего куда и зачем ему надо идти, здесь заменена образом полной растерянности. Поэтому в последних трех стихах смысл иной. Герой Ристикиви обращается к окружающим и заклинает их не успокаивать его, не уговаривать, что и так жить хорошо, что жизнь такова, потому что они не знают и не могут почувствовать его отечества. В то же время герой Румо обращается к окружающим, которые хотят убедить его в том, что так не должно быть, поскольку не только они, никто не знает, какова судьба мира. Образ родины уступает место образу всего мира (в эстонском языке оба слова образованы от одного и того же корня – „maa"- земля), а судьба человека заменена судьбою мира. В построении мира уже нет стройности, нет в нем ясных правил и отношений, среди которых человек должен искать свое место и стремиться к идеальному состоянию, символом которого является Аркадия. В подобном мире сам этот образ неуместен и ненужен, поэтому на дороге в Аркадию уже никого нет, она пуста. Вот что видит Паул Эрик Румо после еще одного взгляда на нее, полностью меняя таким образом смысл и сущность мотива.

Чтобы ориентироваться в мире, человек смотрит. Но настоящее понимание зависит от того, что именно он видит, от того, подчиняется ли человек закрепленным уже образам с утвержденным смыслом, или стремится проникнуть вглубь и обнаружить другие значения того, что появилось перед его взглядом. С другой стороны, человек не может обойтись без утвердившихся образцов, в которых тысячелетнее развитие культуры накопило символические значения, благодаря которым регистрированное органами чувств приобретает смысл.

осуждение современной пустой траты времени и в патетическое представление о сне – как об единственной реальности, где все едино».

Иными словами – смотреть глазами других людей. Это, однако, может поставить его в ситуацию Эдипа – смотреть не видя, потому что конкретная ситуация требует, чтобы вещи осмысливались по-иному. В этом отношении человеку поможет лишь операция «еще один взгляд на...» И литература – один из самых эффективных механизмов совершения этой операции. Дело в том, что она, в отличие от обычной жизни, в которой мы смотрим своими глазами, но видим глазами других людей, заставляет человека смотреть чужими глазами, но видеть – своими. Я надеюсь, что приведенный и рассмотренный нами пример, показал, как это происходит.

When modern theory of art came into being in the 18th century, the first problem before it became the boundary between the different types of arts and more specifically the one between visual and verbal arts. This problem has been solved by G. E. Lessing in his treatise "Laocoon': An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry'. In the 20th century though, the development of art itself and the forming of new types of arts such as cinema and television, where the visual and verbal principles combine, the necessity of new theories arose – of ones that would explain the manifestation of pictorial and constructive principles in the same type of art (visual or verbal), that are intrinsic to the opposite artistic type. One of these is P. P. Pasolini's theory of indirect free subjectivity, which tries to explain the advent of purely verbal approaches in the midst of the visual element of a type of cinema that became popular as 'the poetic cinema'. This theory explains the possibilities for achieving visual metaphor by applying the 'outsider's glance' approach – the visual equivalent of the 'outsider's speech', invented by Bakhtin. This article traces the development of the same plot by two different works of art by using this approach. The plot is the city of Rome itself as a specific cultural text. The two works are Federico Fellini's film *Roma* and Matia Bazar's song *Vacanze Romane*. The detailed analysis of the two opuses shows how, by applying the 'outsider's glance' approach, art manages to reach new constructive principles – first

in the framework of art itself by keeping the border between the fictional and the real world (*Roma*) and then by building a new, purely virtual reality where art and real life interconnect and complement each other (*Vacanze Romane*). Thus the artistic practices of the 20th century reach a new type of artistic reality – one that is much closer to the ancient rituals than to the detached world of art. This is how, with the help of the outsider's glance, the boundary between the visual and the verbal principles becomes diluted and the idea of purity of art, preached by the theorists of the Enlightenment, is overcome.

ANNA PAJDZIŃSKA

FROM SEEING AND VISION TO OTHER DOMAINS: EVIDENCE FROM POLISH

People not only provide linguistic labels for their ability to receive and analyze stimuli but also use the ability to conceptualize whole classes of phenomena not delimited by experience to the same degree of clarity. The direction of semantic development from concrete or "physical" to abstract or "psychological" meanings was observed long ago, but it is only within the framework of cognitive linguistics that the observation has become an element of a coherent theory: thought is embodied, the structural core of our conceptual system is shaped by our bodily experience. This type of experience constitutes a direct basis for concrete concepts and indirectly, via metaphorical extension, for abstract ones. Thus, in the cognitivist approach, metaphor has a much higher status than before: it is a cognitive phenomenon, a universal instrument in acquiring knowledge about reality and frequently the only way of expressing novel meanings. In the present work, I analyze linguistic metaphors (word-formational and semantic derivatives, phraseological units, stereotyped comparisons) as manifestations of conceptual metaphors in an attempt to discover the non-physical phenomena conceptualized in terms of visual stimuli. Therefore, I will not be dealing with e.g. synesthesia, in which case both the source and the

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target domains contain sensory stimuli. My goal is to unravel the regularities which shape conceptual structures so I will concentrate on capturing the relevant systematic correlations, rather than fully describing all linguistic facts.

Polish data leave no doubt: the most important sense for humans is vision. The multitude of expressions which reveal a close connection between seeing and knowing[1] proves that vision is the main source of knowledge about the world. Nearly all verbs referring to visual perception are also used to refer to people's intellectual activity (which may or may not be indicated in dictionaries), e.g.:

patrzeć 'look'

- 'to have an opinion about something, view something in a certain way' (*Jak patrzysz na tę sprawę*? 'How do you view (lit. look at) this matter?');
- 'to regard as, treat in a certain way' (*Patrzą na niego jak na następcę dyrektora* 'They regard (lit. look at) him as the manager's successor');
- 'to pay attention to, take note of' (*Studiował, nie patrząc na trudności* 'He continued with his college education regardless of (lit. not looking at) the difficulties');[2]

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[1] According to Brückner (1985: 615) the connection can also be found in etymology: *wiedzieć* 'to know' contains "the same root as *widzieć* 'see', where the *i* sound evokes only 'seeing' and the *ě* (*oi*) sound only 'knowing'".

[2] Looking is also a component of phraseological units, e.g. *patrzeć na kogoś/coś łaskawym/życzliwym okiem* (lit. 'to look at somebody/something with a gracious/well-wishing eye') 'to treat somebody/something favourably; to approve of something'; *patrzeć na kogoś/coś krzywym/złym okiem/koso/zezem* (lit. 'to look at somebody/something with a crooked/bad eye; to look askance; to cast cross-eyed glances') 'to treat somebody/something unfavourably; to disapprove of something'; *patrzeć na coś przez palce* (lit. 'to look at something through one's fingers') 'to treat something leniently, to tolerate wrong-doing'; *patrzeć na coś z boku* (lit.

widzieć 'see'

- 'to have an opinion about something, to view something in a given manner' (*Czarno widzi przyszłość* 'He is pessimistic about the future' (lit. 'sees future in black'));
- 'to realize, take note of something' (*Zobaczył psychiczne konsekwencje rozwodu* 'He saw the psychological consequences of divorce');

rozejrzeć się 'look around'

- 'to become or make oneself acquainted, familiarize oneself with something' (*Rozejrzę się w nowych przepisach* 'I'll familiarize myself with (lit. look around) the new regulations');

przejrzeć 'see through something'

- 'to judge someone/something properly' (*Przejrzał jej zamiary* 'He saw through her intentions');

przeoczyć 'overlook'

- 'not to notice something, fail to take into account, fail to take advantage of' (*Przeoczył związek między tymi faktami* 'He overlooked the connection between these facts');[3]

'to look at something from the side') 'to judge something objectively, without personal engagement'; *patrzeć przez różowe/czarne okulary* (lit. 'to look through pink/black glasses') 'to be optimistic/pessimistic'.

[3] A peculiar replica of *przeoczyć* (cf. *oczy* 'eyes') is the verb *przebaczyć* 'forgive', formed on the basis of *baczyć*, which according to Brückner (1985: 10) is derived from *baka* 'eye', and according to Sławski (1952, I: 24) "has the same root as *oko* 'eye'". Brückner claims that "*przebaczyć* in the work of Jakub Lubelczyk (1558) means 'overlook', which gave rise to a new meaning 'forgive' (Pol. *odpuścić, darować* or *wybaczyć*)". Although etymological hypotheses are diverse, they all link the word to the organ of vision. If so, the same relationship can be recognized in the whole series of words, including *baczny* 'watchful', *baczenie* 'attention', *baczność*

oglądać się na kogoś/coś, lit. 'look around to someone/something'

- 'to hope for help from someone; to count on someone/something; to regard or consider something' (*Już nie oglądała się na nikogo, sama walczyła o przetrwanie* 'She no longer hoped for help from anyone and struggled for survival herself');

przyjrzeć się 'look (carefully) at'

- 'to consider, analyse' (*Przyjrzyjmy się zagadnieniu* 'Let's look at/consider the issue');

dopatrzyć się 'notice, detect or find'

- (*Nie dopatruj się w tym złośliwości* 'Don't try and find anything malicious there/Don't (purposefully) consider it malicious').

Sometimes a peculiar semantic specialization takes place: only some forms of the verb are used in reference to thinking. Examples include imperfectives *upatrywać* 'regard as; blame' (*Przyczyn swego niepowodzenia upatruje w braku zdecydowania* 'He blames his failure on indecision') and *zapatrywać się* 'have an opinion; regard, consider' (*Jak się na to zapatrujesz?* 'What is your opinion about it?') or the genetic iterative form *podejrzewać*, used in the sense 'suspect somebody' or 'presume'.[4] The metaphorical meaning may also replace the original meaning so the verb can lose its link with visual perception – this is what happened to the verb *rozpatrzyć*.

'attention' (in the general sense and in the expression *stać na baczność* 'stand at attention'), *zobaczyć* 'see-PERF'.

[4] The two meanings are correlated with two meanings of the noun *podejrzenie*: 'suspicion' and 'presumption'. The derivatives *podejrzany* 'suspicious' (adj.) / 'suspect' (n.), *podejrzliwy* 'mistrustful' or *podejrzliwość* 'suspiciousness' are motivated by the verb's first meaning.

About a hundred years ago, *SW* (1900–1927, V: 664) defined it as "look at something carefully, from every side, look around" and metaphorically it was interchangeable with *rozważyć* 'consider' or *roztrząsać* 'discuss, debate', whereas now only its inner form links it with looking.

But the domain of visual perception supplies other items, apart from verbs, for referring to mental processes: they include derivates of the previously mentioned items (*przeoczenie* 'oversight', *zapatrywania* 'views, opinions') and even units morphologically unrelated to them, e.g. *obraz* 'image, picture', *perspektywa* 'perspective', *punkt widzenia* 'point of view'. Sometimes the link with the source domain is completely obliterated and is only genetic. For example, an average speaker of Polish does not realize that words such as *ogląd* 'vision, view', *pogląd* 'opinion, view', *wzgląd* 'regard', *oględny* 'moderate, cautious', *względny* 'relative', *bezwzględny* 'ruthless' etc. are etymologically related to the verb *ględać* 'look, look for' (Sławski 1952–1982, I: 152). Only *ogląd*, which derives from *oglądać* 'watch', belongs in its primary sense to the semantic field of visual perception.

The same conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING is the basis of a dozen or more phraseological units which contain the name of the body part used for seeing:

przejrzeć na oczy (lit. 'to start seeing with one's eyes') or *komuś otworzyły się oczy* (lit. 'someone's eyes opened') – 'to realize something' ('someone realized something')

otworzyć komuś oczy (lit. 'to open somebody's eyes') – 'to make someone realize something'

zamykać/przymykać na coś oczy (lit. 'to close one's eyes on something') – 'to pretend not to see something'

mieć bielmo na oczach (lit. 'to have leukoma on one's eyes') – 'not to realize or understand something'

komuś spadło bielmo z oczu (lit. 'somebody's leukoma fell from their eyes') – 'somebody started to realize or understand something'

mydlić komuś oczy (lit. 'to put soapsuds in somebody's eyes'), *puszczać komuś dym w oczy* (lit. 'to blow smoke into somebody's eyes'), *sypać komuś piasek/piaskiem w oczy* (lit. 'to throw sand into somebody's eyes'), *świecić komuś w oczy* (lit. 'to shine light into somebody's eyes') – 'to try and fool somebody, try to make them unable to see or realize something'

The link between seeing and knowing or understanding is clear in each case: if a person is not looking, if someone or something makes it difficult or impossible for them to see, they do not know how things are. The same link is capitalized on in the expressions *z zamkniętymi oczami* 'with one's eyes closed', which refers to automatic, unpremeditated and well-rehearsed behaviour or action, and *stracić kogoś/coś z oczu* 'lose sight of somebody/something', i.e. 'not know any longer where somebody or something is, what is happening to them'.

The noun *oczy* 'eyes' also motivates the adjectives *oczywisty* 'obvious, unquestionable' (about a success, claim, misunderstanding etc.) and *naoczny* 'convincing, doubtless' (about a fact, example or evidence), as well as their derivatives. These cases, too, code the conviction that seeing conditions knowing. However, the knowledge so obtained is not always reliable, as evidenced by the expressions *na oko* 'more or less, approximately' (lit. 'according to the eye') and *widocznie* 'apparently', which is an exponent of epistemic modality of probability, morphologically related to *widzieć* 'see'.

Metaphorical extension has also taken place in the case of words originally referring to problems with seeing, *dalekowzroczność* 'long-

sightedness' and *krótkowzroczność* 'short-sightedness', as well as to the lack of the ability to see, i.e. *ślepota* 'blindness'. Interestingly, in the first of these the process of metaphorization has been accompanied by re-evaluation: from negative (the word *dalekowzroczność* first referred to a state in which a person can see well only distant objects) to positive, from 'long-sightedness' to 'far-sightedness'.[5] The adjective *dalekowzroczny* may mean 'forward-looking, thinking of (distant) future', while *krótkowzroczny* may mean 'not looking forward, taking into account only the nearest future' and *krótkowzroczność* – 'the inability to foresee or look forward'. Figurative usages also contain the noun *ślepota* 'blindness', which in such cases denotes a total inability to recognize and judge a given situation. More frequent, however, is the adjective *ślepy* 'blind', also meaning 'unable to think and judge matters independently, acting under an influence' (*ślepy naśladowca/wykonawca* 'blind follower/executor', *ślepy z nienawiści* 'blind with hatred') or 'being a result of such dependence' (*ślepe posłuszeństwo* 'blind obedience', *ślepa miłość* 'blind love'). There also exist expressions such as *być ślepym na coś* 'to be blind to something', i.e. 'not to notice or pay attention to something' (e.g. someone else's disloyalty) or *na ślepo* 'blindly', i.e. 'instinctively, automatically, spontaneously, without consideration'. From the point of view of word-formation, the adjective *ślepy* is connected with the verb *zaślepić* 'to blind', which in the context of emotions means 'make someone unable to objectively judge; deprive them of common sense, caution or prudence'. The verb moti-

[5] It was also important in this instance of metaphorization that temporal relationships in Polish are modelled, among others, as spatial relationships: Polish speakers talk about future as something in front of them. As far as the verb *przewidzieć* is concerned, which means 'guess what will happen' or 'plan, assume', it is worthwhile to consider its internal form, which clearly relates to the verb *widzieć* 'see'. The link must have been active already in early 19th century because in Linde's dictionary (*SL* 1807–1814) *przewidzieć* is defined as 'see forward, see into the future'.

vates the participle/adjective *zaślepiony* 'blind, infatuated; unable to see someone's vices or the objective state of affairs' and the noun *zaślepienie* 'blindness, infatuation; lack of critical attitude towards someone or something, usually caused by strong emotion'.

Reference to understanding can also be effected by means of adjectives primarily denoting visual impressions, such as *jasny* 'light, bright' and *ciemny* 'dark',[6] or linguistic exponents of the perception of light, such as *przejrzysty* 'transparent, clear, making it possible to see through', *klarowny* 'clear, without impurities, sediment or slurry in a liquid', *mętny* 'turbid, murky'. For example, *jasna wypowiedź* 'a clear statement' is easier to understand than *ciemna wypowiedź* 'an obscure statement'; *przejrzysta aluzja* is an allusion that can be 'seen through' or comprehend, while *mętna argumentacja* 'vague/opaque (lit. murky) argumentation' contains elements which render it difficult to follow.

Because KNOWING IS SEEING, and seeing requires light, the role of the LIGHT-DARKNESS opposition in the metaphorical system of Polish is especially pronounced. The first element designates the realm of knowledge, the second the realm of ignorance. Let us consider:

wszystko stało się jasne 'everything became clear (lit. light/bright)'

coś jest jasne (jak dzień) 'something is clear (light/bright) as a day'

mieć jasność w jakiejś sprawie 'to have a clear picture (lit. lightness/brightness) of a matter'

[6] In Polish, obstacles to seeing are connected with *ciemny* 'dark' and not with *czarny* 'black', therefore the words *czarnowidz* 'prophet of doom, pessimist' (lit. 'black-seer') and *czarnowidztwo* 'doom and gloom, pessimism' (lit. 'black seeing') are not semantically symmetrical to *jasnowidz* 'seer, clairvoyant' (lit. 'bright-seer') and *jasnowidztwo* 'clairvoyance' (lit. 'bright-seeing'). Negative connotations of blackness underscore an emotional and evaluative attitude towards reality, whereas lightness or brightness connote an above than average ability to (fore)see.

objaśnić/wyjaśnić 'explain' (lit. 'to make something light/bright')

komuś rozjaśniło się w głowie 'someone began to understand something' (lit. 'it became light in someone's head' – in the Polish linguistic worldview the head is the container for reason and knowledge)

rzucić światło na coś 'to shed light on something'

przedstawić/ukazać kogoś/coś w jakimś (dobrym/złym) świetle 'portray/show somebody/something in a certain (good/bad) light'

zobaczyć coś w jakimś świetle 'to get to know or realize something from a certain perspective' (lit. 'to see something in a certain light')

ujrzeć światło dzienne 'to see the light of the day; become known'

w świetle czegoś 'in the light of something'

naświetlić komuś coś 'to shed light on something for someone'

w ciemno 'without recognition of the situation' (lit. 'into darkenss')

ciemny człowiek/ciemniak 'blockhead' (lit. 'a dark person')

ciemna masa 'stupid people; ignoramuses' (lit. 'a dark mass')

ciemnota 'stupidity, obscurantism, backwardness' (lit. 'darkness; dark quality')

ciemnogród 'backwardness; backward people' (lit. 'darkburgh').[7]

The examples above show that good visibility can be not only metaphorically extended onto the domain of knowledge, comprehension or clarity, but it also entails positive valuation. Valuation

[7] The process of metaphorization in Polish also includes units in which the components 'light/bright' or 'dark' can be found in the semantic structure, e.g. *coś komuś świta* (*w głowie*), lit. 'something dawns in somebody's head' (i.e. 'somebody begins to understand, recall or have a sense of something'), *mrok przesądów/nieuctwa,* lit. 'the darkness of superstition/the lack of education'.

is present both in the opposition LIGHT–DARK and CLEAR–MURKY/OPAQUE, but the former is used more frequently, which may perhaps be explained by the importance in human life of the cyclicity of day and night (brightness/light and darkness). Valuation may but need not concern cognitive processes, which is manifested in the following expressions: *jasna postać* 'a bright (i.e. positive) figure', *jaśniejsza dola* 'a brighter (i.e. better) fate', *jasna strona czegoś* 'the bright side of something', *ciemne sprawy* 'dark (i.e. mysterious, perhaps illegal) matters', *czarny charakter* 'a villain' (lit. 'a black character'), *zostawić coś na czarną godzinę* 'to keep something for a rainy day' (lit. 'for a black hour)', *czarny rynek* 'black market', *mętny facet/interes* 'a suspicious (lit. murky) guy/business'. Evaluative units, genetically related to visual perception, are naturally more numerous. Some of them are no longer used in their original meanings, but the meanings disappeared not long ago and their motivation is still recognizable: *świetny* 'fantastic', *światły* 'enlightened', *świetlany* 'bright' (e.g. future) (all three from *światło* 'light'); *błyskotliwy* 'witty, brilliant' (from *błyszczeć* 'shine, glitter'); *olśniewający* 'dazzling' (from *olśniewać* 'dazzle, blind'), *oświecony* 'enlightened' (from *świecić* 'shine').[8] It is only in some cases that the motivation has been obliterated and the connection with visual perception can only be revealed through etymological research. Let

[8] For example, *SW* (1900–1927) as the first meaning of the adjective *świetny* gives 'shining majestically, glittering wonderfully, bright, radiant', *światły* is considered a synonym to *jasny* 'bright', *blady* 'pale', *biały* 'white' – the metaphorical meaning 'enlightened, being aware of everything, educated, reasonable' appears on a more distant position. *Błyskotliwy* 'brilliant' is characterized only as 'lustrous, glittering, glossy, sparkling, shining, flickering'; *olśniewający* 'dazzling, brilliant' is linked to *olśnić* in the literal sense: 'to dazzle with intense light, to obscure vision with great brightness', and to the metaphorical 'to strike as extraordinary, captivate, charm, turn someone's head'; *oświecony* is above all derived from *oświecić* 'to shine light around, make something bathe in light', and secondarily it means 'enlightened, learned, educated, intelligent'.

me illustrate this with the adjective *rzetelny* 'reliable, honest, dependable', from the now archaic *źrzeć* 'look'. In *SL* (1807–1814, V: 195) the adjective is defined as 'noticeable, visible, obvious'; the information that it can be used instead of *nieobłudny* 'not two-faced or duplicitous', *niełudzący* 'not deceptive', *szczery* 'honest' appears later. The original meaning is considered obsolete at the beginning of the 20th century.

Also, speakers of contemporary Polish do not perceive the genetic relationship between visual perception and such words as *dozór* or *nadzór* 'supervision, surveillance', *pozór* 'pretence, appearances', *wzór* 'pattern, model' or *przezorny* 'far-sighted, foreseeing' or 'cautious, prudent', as well as units deriving from them,[9] although a few centuries (or even a century) ago the link was clear. For example, *przezorny* was in the 17th century commonly used in the sense 'possible to be seen through' (Buttler 1978: 123). Also Linde's definition of the related noun *przezorność* makes use of the concept of looking: "looking into the future, thinking; penetration into future needs" (*SL* 1807–1814, IV: 615). The noun *pozór* was used in the sense 'appearance, esp. impressive' as late as in the 19th century, although already at the turn of that century it acquired a new meaning 'superficial impression, esp. deceptive', probably on the basis of "contexts in which reference was made to the appearance of something contrary to the nature of that thing" Buttler (1978: 56). The new meaning has ousted the old one and now motivates phraseological expressions such as *na pozór/z pozoru* 'judging from superficial appearance', *stwarzać pozory* 'to try and make something appear differently than it really is', *zachowywać pozory* 'to try and create the impression that everything is all right'. The adjective *pozorny* 'apparent, seeming' underwent similar semantic shifts (from 'drawing attention due to its appearance' to 'only looking to be in a certain way, deceptive, deceptively similar') almost a century later:

[9] The recurring sequence *zór/zor*, according to Sławski (1952–1982, I: 159), is a continuation of Old Slavic *zьrěti* 'look'.

the first records of the new meaning, included in *SJPDor*, come from the late 19th c. However, *niepozorny* (*nie* 'not' + *pozorny*) has preserved its original meaning 'inconspicuous'.

The nouns *dozór* and *nadzór* 'supervision, surveillance' denote particular kinds of control over somebody or something. Although their word-formational structure has been obliterated and the derivational bases are no longer in use (Linde explains *dozór* by referring to *dozieranie* 'reaching with one's eyes or vision; seeing', *SL*, I: 52), their motivation can easily be reconstructed: the connection between looking at and knowing an object, which makes it possible to compare the real status quo with an ideal, to see to something or prevent something from happening, is obvious. The same kind of dependence is the basis of other expressions, such as the verb *doglądać* 'to tend; to supervise' or the phraseological units *być/pozostawać/robić coś pod czyimś okiem* 'to be/stay/do something under the care or control of somebody else' (lit. 'under somebody else's eye'), *mieć kogoś/coś na oku* (also *mieć oko na kogoś/coś*, *nie spuszczać z kogoś/czegoś oka*) 'keep an eye on something/somebody' (lit., respectively, 'to have somebody/something on the eye', 'have an eye of somebody/something' and 'not let somebody/something go off one's eye'), *patrzeć komuś na ręce* 'control somebody, make sure that they do not steal anything or do anything improper' (lit. 'look at somebody's hands').

Fully motivated are also contemporary meanings of the noun *wzór*: 'a drawing or motif impressed, embroidered, etc. for decorative purposes or made to be reproduced in a copy, needle-work, etc.; pattern', 'a drawing of a model or the model itself to be multiplied in mass production; a prototype', 'someone or something to be followed, a role model' – but only if we take note of the original meaning 'that at which one looks'. The noun serves as the basis for deriving *wzorować* 'make something on the basis of a pattern or model' (now more frequently: *coś jest wzorowane na czymś* 'something is made on the basis of a pattern/model'), *wzorować się* 'fol-

low, act like someone else; create something according to a pattern', *wzorowy* 'exemplary, one that can serve as a model', *wzorowo* 'in an exemplary manner', *wzorzec* 'a model or schema representing a category of objects or phenomena, a norm for other objects or phenomena of this type'. The noun also functions as a component of numerous fixed collocations, e.g. *na wzór czegoś* 'following the example/pattern of', *wzorem czyimś/czegoś* (the same meaning, lit. 'by the pattern of somebody/something'), *brać wzór z kogoś* 'to follow somebody's example' (lit. 'to take the pattern from somebody'), *brać kogoś/coś za wzór* (the same meaning, lit. 'to take somebody/something as a pattern'), *dawać wzór komuś* 'to set an example' (lit. 'to give a pattern to someone'), *mieć wzór przed oczami* 'to have a model (lit. pattern) in front of one's eyes'), *trzymać się jakiegoś wzoru* 'to follow an example/pattern/model closely' (lit. 'to hold on to a pattern'), *iść za czyimś wzorem* 'to follow somebody' (lit. 'to follow somebody's pattern').

* * *

The data discussed above clearly show that human conceptualization is closely connected with somatic processes and more specifically with visual stimuli. It is especially in the historical context that one can see the gradual development of abstract reasoning, generalizations across features typical of specific phenomena, recognitions of similarities between apparently diverse phenomena, which are therefore named with the same term. Several dimensions of metaphorical extension can be noticed: the sense of vision constitutes the basis for expressions referring to knowledge, control and to following a pattern or model. The first category is especially numerous: it is interesting to consider why seeing rather than hearing became the basic source of metaphors in the domain of knowledge. After all, auditory stimuli are an important source of information about the world. In some situations (in darkness or

from a distance) hearing is even more useful than seeing; it is also fundamental for verbal communication, especially for the process of speech formation. Why, one might ask following Heraclitus, are the eyes more exact witnesses than the ears?

It appears that there are several causes of why vision has become the basic metaphor and model for knowledge acquisition. Vision allows one to receive much more information than hearing (the possibilities of short-term memory and the acoustic code are, in the light of neurophysiological research, much more limited); it makes it more possible to select the perceived object and establish the distance between the subject and the object; finally, it is the least subjective: one can assume that persons with unimpaired vision, looking in the same direction from the same vantage point, can basically see the same. The hearer, on the other hand, is limited in his or her agentivity in two ways: the sounds are not actively selected but reach the hearer regardless of their will, they disturb or even attack them; visual stimuli can also be blocked from reaching a person more easily then auditory stimuli.

Language codes an evaluation of the cognitive value of sensory experiences – lexical data suggest that vision does not present irrefutable evidence, as apart from *oczywisty* 'obvious' and *naoczny* 'convincing, doubtless' (from *oczy* 'eyes'), there also exist the lexemes *widocznie* 'apparently' (from *oczy* 'eyes' and *widzieć* 'see'), *na oko* 'more or less, approximately' (lit. 'according to the eye') and *pozorny* 'apparent, seeming' (cf. *zor* < Old Slavic *zьrěti* 'look').

Many of the units in this domain have a descriptive-evaluative nature, which is another indication that our experience of the world is permeated with valuation. Usually, axiological overtones can be found in items with specific meaning, the one exception being the adjective *rzetelny* 'reliable, honest, dependable' (from archaic *źrzeć* 'look').

It may seem surprising that the linguistic metaphors based on the source domain of vision also include names of emotions:

nienawiść 'hatred', *zawiść* and *zazdrość*, both meaning 'envy, jealousy, invidiousness'. Let us note, however, that these are names of emotional attitudes, not affects. They are highly complex in that they contain a significant portion of intellect and/or volition. The first of the three, accompanied by the verb *nienawidzieć* 'hate' (and the now archaic *nawidzić* 'see willingly'[10] 'love'), is linked with visual perception, but the second one is not, for the verb *zawidzieć* 'look from behind, "from below the head"' (Brückner 1985: 614) is not in current use any more. The third item, originally *zazrość*, without the epenthetic *d*, comes from the verb *zaźrzeć* and is also fully lexicalized. Therefore, even in such a small set of data one can see the need for historical and etymological considerations, which complement synchronic analyses, making it possible to reveal the conceptualization and understanding of the world typical of a given language.

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[10] Let us appreciate the fact that the same connection between looking at something and feeling about this thing is present in phraseological units *ktoś nie może/nie chce na kogoś/coś patrzeć* 'someone can't/doesn't want to look at something/someone else', i.e. 'they approach them reluctantly or with contempt, can't stand this thing or person; someone bears a grudge against someone else'.

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SW – Karłowicz J., Kryński A., Niedźwiedzki W. 1900–1927. *Słownik języka polskiego*, vols. I–VIII. Warszawa. [the so called *Słownik warszawski – The Warsaw Dictionary*]

Предметом рассмотрения являются языковые метафоры в польском языке (словообразовательные и семантические дериваты, а также фразеологизмы, например: *przeoczenie, pogląd, oczywisty, naoczny, ciemniak, ciemnota, widzieć* 'zdawać sobie z czegoś sprawę, uświadamiać sobie co; przekonywać się o czym, stwierdzać co, zauważać', *ktoś przejrzał na oczy, na oko, ktoś nie spuszcza kogoś z oka / z oczu, wszystko stało się jasne, w świetle czegoś, w ciemno*). Цель анализа – установить, какие нефизические явления получают в польском языке концептуализацию в категориях зрительных впечатлений. Обилие выражений, в которых проявляется тесная связь между видением и знанием, доказывает, что, хотя мы воспринимаем мир с помощью нескольких органов чувств, то зрение представляет собой главный источник познания. Однако, зрение кладется в основу не только языковых единиц из области знания, но также из области контроля, подражания, а даже чувств (nienawiść 'ненависть', *zawiść* 'зависть', *zazdrość* 'ревность').

II.
Vision and literary text

Взгляд и литературный текст

TERESA DOBRZYŃSKA

METAPHOR AND GLANCE: THE 'COLUMN OF AZURE' IN C. MILOSZ'S POEM *REFLECTIONS [ODBICIA]*

The topic of these present deliberations is the content of a certain metaphor which, together with its closest context, creates a poetic image that reveals a particular vision of the world. Interpretation of this image and of the vision recorded in it reconfirm that looking and cognition are strictly associated. This association is visible in the language itself – in the semantics of lexemes from the area of visual perception. It moreover constitutes an essential trait of meaning-generating mechanism in metaphor and of operation of a poetic imagination.

Let us first take a look at some facts in the semantics of language. Our contemporary meaning of the word 'insight' [Polish, *wgląd*] combines an element of visual perception, viewing or inspection, with a cognitive element ('familiarising oneself with something')[1]. Perceiving with one's eyes is now only present in the etymology of the word 'vision' [Polish, *ogląd*], which nowadays re-

[1] *Mały słownik języka polskiego* (S. Skorupka, H. Auderska, Z. Łempicka, eds., Warsaw 1969: PWN), a concise dictionary of Polish, provides the following definition of *wgląd* [insight]: "sight into a thing made in order to get acquainted with the same, investigate the same, opportunity to visually ascertain something, penetrate into sth."

fers to a cognitive act targeted at an object or phenomenon (as e.g. in phrases like "Insight into those actions in their entirety makes one conclude that ..."). Such significative construction of both words in question has resulted from a semantic evolution that took place across a group of lexemes such as 'to see' [Polish, *widzieć*], look [*patrzeć*], notice/catch sight of/spot [*dojrzeć*], see/catch sight of something' [*zobaczyć coś*], etc., where, in parallel with the basic sense which originally expressed visual perception, derivative meanings have emerged to embrace cognitive consequences of optic or visual sensations, and moreover, various mental acts related to acquisition of knowledge. To 'see something' therefore means: (1) 'to perceive something with one's sight' (e.g. "I (can) see (a/the) light!"; (2) 'to realize/understand sth based on what is (being) perceived with one's sight' (e.g. "Can you see how nice this is!"); (3) 'realise sth' (e.g. "Look how strange it is!"; "I can see that this affair is beyond my capacity"). The third mentioned meaning embraces cognitive acts not conditioned by visual perception, as even a blind person could utter phrases illustrating the meaning no. (3).

The word 'insight', whose meaning reveals an association with cognition, stands for an act of recognition/identification of a thing, understanding its internal entanglements and penetration through its nature. Act of visual perception is not a prerequisite there, although there are such types of insight that are based upon visual contact with the object of cognition. The condition of being evident is revealed in uses of the word 'insight' such as those being the case in phrases 'insight in(to) the files/company's accounts', whereas 'insight in(to) the way someone is being parented/brought up' does not determine a visual control of the educational process whilst referring to a possibility of supervising the pupil or ward, getting acquainted with educational methods applied with respect to him or her. This can be done without the pupil/ward being actually seen with the eyes of whoever is after such insight.

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The notion of insight – in-depth vision of an object, one that reveals essential yet heretofore-not-realised aspects of a given phenomenon – perfectly explains the purpose, course and outcome of metaphorisation. The notion was seemingly first used in a metaphorology context by M. B. Hester[2], whose analyses referred to L. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*[3] where the issue was considered of 'seeing something as something else' – e.g. a rabbit as a duck. It is in the use of metaphor that perception of a given object may be discovered through the prism of a different imaginarily evoked phenomenon. This is a revealing process. By initiative of the world-cognising subject, objects enter into new reciprocal relationships, new images of reality appear, and interactive nature becomes apparent of phenomena emerging at the contact point between the subject and its surrounding world.

Regardless of the linguistic shape of a metaphorical utterance, metaphor is always a sort of less or more unusual predication that reveals new aspects of a given object.[4] Mental operations occurring with use of metaphor encompass the act of perception, or rather suggestion, of a similarity. We thus deal here with a penetrating analysis of an object, a vision (as a mental action) that reveals or attempts at superimposing in a given phenomenon certain traits of another phenomenon. Such a metaphorical vision may be indi-

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[2] Cf. M.B. Hester, *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor. An Analysis in the Light of Wittgenstein's Claim that Meaning is Use*, The Hague 1967: Mouton and Co.

[3] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* [*Philosophische Untersuchungen*], transl. into English by G.E.M. Anscombe, Prentice Hall, 1999, or, Blackwell Publishers, 2001.

[4] For a more minute analysis of the phenomenon of metaphor, see my monographs: T. Dobrzyńska, *Metafora*, Wroclaw 1984: Ossolineum; *idem*, *Mówiąc przenośnie... Studia o metaforze*, Warsaw 1994: Institute for Literary Studies (IBL).

vidual and unique or, as it occurs with conventionalised figures-of-speech – be a frequently repeated mental operation: a stock stylistic gimmick elaborated in a certain type of discourse. In any case, application of a metaphor alters the image of an object and highlights certain of its characteristics not noticed or perceived before. It is a cognitive act in which unusualness of the perspective being employed is disclosed – a kind of revealing insight, of looking at a thing through the prism of how it relates to another thing.

It has to be stressed that although the above analysis of metaphor's operating mechanism, descriptions were used such as 'vision', 'insight', 'looking at sth through the prism of sth else', 'seeing sth from an unusual perspective', the phenomena being described are conceptual/notional transformations in the first place, albeit they may associate with actions based on visual perception – with pictorial representations or visualisations. Metaphor is, above all, a cognitive phenomenon. In a sense-generating process triggered by use of a metaphor, figuring something out in a certain peculiar manner occurs, which is primarily based upon projection of features, creation of new conceptual or notional configurations.

The projection in question is describable (and this is in fact the way I present it in my relevant works[5]) as instance of transferral of certain connotations of the metaphor carrier (auxiliary theme) to the tenor (main theme), which takes place in the predication act. Connotations being referred to form a collection of features ascribed to a given object and fixed in the memory of speakers of a given language together with its name, and sometimes getting reflected in the language's lexical system – in the meanings of words and phraseological collocations.[6]

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[5] See, in particular: T. Dobrzyńska, *Mówiąc przenośnie...*, *op. cit.*, chapter on interpretation of metaphoric(al) utterances (*Interpretacja wypowiedzi metaforycznych*).

[6] The notion of connotation was analysed by: Y. Apresyan (Ю. Апресян, *Прагматическая информация для толкового словаря*, in:

When analysing conceptual/notional processes taking place in metaphor, Paul Ricoeur's considerations on the role of imagination in the act of metaphorisation are worth recalling.[7] Explaining Aristotle's opinion that creating apt metaphors is based upon spotting resemblances, the French philosopher analysed the operation of imagination in the course of such 'spotting of resemblances', that is, a peculiar way of seeing. He emphasised a dual nature of the insight taking place, stating that "This insight into resemblance is thinking inasmuch as seeing". "This way of thinking entails structural changes in semantic fields. [...] Yet, this way of thinking is a way of seeing to the extent that insight consists in instantaneous grasp of combinatory options. [...]"[8]

In his earlier-dated reasoning, Ricoeur referred to the Kantian concept of imagination. Kant deemed imagination to be a creative mental power and emphasised its operational nature as a "factor that schematises synthesising actions"[9]. Ricoeur thus argues that operations of this sort occur in metaphor, whilst "imaging of a sense owing to presenting images conceived by the cognitive process and controlled by the same" [10] is also present there.

Let us notice that description of metaphor in terms of a *sui generis* vision or insight reveals the same fusion of visual percep-

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Прагматика и проблемы интенсиональности, Н.Д. Арутюнова, ed., Москва [Moscow]: Наука 1988) and L. Yordanska and I. Melčuk (Л. Иорданская, И. Мельчук, *Коннотация в лингвистической семантике, Wiener Slawistischer Almanach* 1980, no. 6).

[7] See P. Ricoeur, *The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling, Critical Inquiry*, Autumn 1978; reprinted in: *On Metaphor*, ed. S. Sacks, Chicago 1979. [Translated into Polish by G. Cendrowska, as *Proces metaforyczny jako poznanie, wyobrażanie i odczuwanie, Pamiętnik Literacki* 1984, vol. 2.]

[8] Ricoeur, *Proces metaforyczny...* [Polish translation of *The Metaphorical Process ...*], *op. cit.*, p. 274.

[9] *Ibidem*, s. 273.

[10] *Passim*, p. 281.

tions and cognitive acts as is dealt with in our contemporary meanings of the verbs 'to see', 'to look', 'to catch sight of/spot' [*dojrzeć*], 'to see/catch sight of' [*zobaczyć*] and the lexemes 'vision' and 'insight'. An image based on visual perception is combined there with a conceptual analytic action.

Analysis of 'vision' and 'insight' – as notions explaining the operation of the metaphor – leads to the idea of 'imaging'. This term was used to describe metaphor and other tropes as well as – more generally – ability to evoke an image of the world using linguistic means. Similarly as explained by Ricoeur with regard to metaphor, poetic imaging appears not to be limited to a method of evoking substitutes of sensual impressions – including, *inter alia*, visualisation of objects or phenomena; it is, actually, a conceptual operation not associated – as it usually happens – with a complete concretisation of the appearance of the situation being described. If poetry triggers upon its recipient any specific visual or, more broadly speaking, sensual representations, it is an accidental effect – a reader's or listener's individual inclination – rather than a regular property of a poetic text's influence. What remains as the rule is, in turn, complex notional/conceptual operations on meanings of words, ones that accompany interpretation of the text.

These issues have been discussed by poetry theoreticians in association with theory of mimetism and the *ut pictura poesis* programme. The idea claiming that it is feasible to evoke exact images or phenomena in pieces of poetry was challenged in 18th century by the British philosopher Edmund Burke[11]. According to H. Markiewicz, Burke argued that "poetry does not draw its value from a power of evoking sensory images; what is more, imagination-based realisation of certain poetic texts would be detrimental to them, as some absurd and chaotic representations would then occur."[12]

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[11] E. Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Idea of the Sublime and Beautiful*, ed. J. T. Boulton, London and New York 1958, p. 173.

[12] Quoted herein is a summary of Burke's views in: H. Markiewicz,

As thus can be seen, a whole set of analytic notions referring to visual perception – including notions such as 'insight', 'poetic image', 'imaging' – reveals its predominantly notional nature. Insight is a cognitive act, in the first place. As an instrument of such insight, metaphor enriches conceptual complexity of an image of reality in human consciousness. It is an attempt at understanding the world, one of the limitless series of such attempts.

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Let us take a look at notional or conceptual relations hidden in poetic images of the opening fragment of Czeslaw Milosz's poem *Odbicia*[13].

The poem presents various forms of annihilation, in a microscale (a trampled ant, dead mouse) and in a macroscale (destroyed city, subjugated tribe). It speaks of analogies taking place between phenomena in both of those orders. Identical relations reappear on various levels of existence: the weaker one perishes whilst the stronger one unscrupulously deals him/it a death, to complete indifference of the environs or entourage. What is more, it seems that the way of acting in the microscale (against animals and insects) settles the behaviours in the macroscale (against people and whole communities). Such a state of affairs is disturbingly recorded by reflections in the water, the latter revealing across many cultural texts its symbolic meanings as a mirror of nature, or even (as romanticists believed) a prefiguration of human consciousness.

The poem by Milosz, constructed according to the rule of symmetry and projections, expresses – by means of its construction, to start with – cool rationality, a paralysing consequence or rules

Ut pictura poesis... A history of the topos and the problem, in: *Words and Images. Iconicity of the Text – Слова и образы. Иконичность текста*, T. Dobrzyńska, R. Kuncheva (eds.), Sofia 2008.

[13] See Appendix for extant text of the Milosz poem.

dominating in the world, where indifference to death and destruction, the stronger ones triumphing over the weaker ones, is a standard.

The piece's opening two lines, on which I should like to focus, yield a dry account of facts and sketch an image free of any comment whatsoever. The image unfolds vertically: there is an ant on the bottom and above it, clouds or – in the subsequent depiction – a 'column of azure':

> A trampled ant and clouds above it.
> An ant that's trampled and above it, a column of azure.

Frigid ascertainment – stating the facts – which characterises the entire poem's emotional tinge is also visible in the above-quoted fragment. However, a certain discreet expression of the observer's emotions can be spotted there – of the speaker making his utterance. The plotting of the vertical axis between the ant and the sky ('azure') seems in itself to express emotion.

The vertical axis, constituting the image's central constructive rule, links a petty and not-quite-significant creature with phenomena observable in the skies. At the bottom end of the axis, there is an ant: one of the smallest insects, living in large colonies where a single member does not mean anything; a creature triggering a liking, as it is recognised as a symbol of diligence, yet ranked low in the hierarchy of beings of the animate world (insects being situated in natural taxonomy and common consciousness much lower than fishes, birds, reptiles, amphibians or mammals). At the axis's upper end are clouds or blue sky: objects from a different scale, the scale of almost cosmic phenomena, those observed above the earth.

Upward shifts – from an ant to clouds and from the ant to the azure – are derived in this poetic image from the direction of the observer's glance. The movement of his eyes also motivates, to an extent, the use of the metaphorical carrier 'column', as it singles out a vertical shape in the azure.

Turning one's eyes to the clouds and delineating the vertical shape of a column is associated with the image of a trampled ant, and is a response to what happens to the ant. Turning one's eyes to the sky, which may be deduced from the way the images are juxtaposed, is not a meaningless act. The azure being referred to is synonymous to sky/heaven, the latter being – according to the Christian vision of the world, and in other religions too – the abode of God.

Indeed, the move encoded in this image is a conventionalised prayer gesture, confirmed in several compositions of sacred painting[14] as well as in phraseology of the language. Polish expression *wznieść oczy ku górze/do nieba* ['raise the eyes upward/to the sky'] means 'to send a prayers'. In the poem under analysis, looking up to the sky may be understood as a question, expressed non-verbally, God is being asked – a question or reproach asking why reality is based upon such rules, why killing is possible at all, why those doing it get away, why is there no response 'from the above' to evil, thoughtless harming of others and bestiality present in the world.

Setting an image of trampled ant – an ant that whose life has been taken by someone – against an image of clouds and sky becomes particularly meaningful if we refer to G. Lakoff and M. Johnson's considerations on orienting metaphors.[15] The cognitive theory elaborated by these scholars reveals conceptual metaphors created around spatial notions. Among others, being above, high up there is subject to such metaphorisation. It is there that values, the sphere of the sacred and the sphere of morality are situated.

[14] Raising the eyes to the sky/heaven is demonstrated in several images of saints and is a convention in sacred painting; cf. e.g. St. Sebastian's martyrdom scene painted by Sodoma (G. A. Bazzi); *The Immaculate Conception* by B.E. Murillo.

[15] G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, *Metaphors we Live by*, Chicago 1980: The University of Chicago. The authors take note of the following orienting metaphors associated with comprehension of high-up location: GOOD IS UP and VIRTUE IS UP.

Elevating the sight, from an ant to the sky, also gains a meaning of moral judgement. It is an act of seeking justice where the symbolic good is located.

The upward move of the eyes, ensuing from mere juxtaposition of images on the 'under' and 'above' axes, is complemented by the image of a column – in the 'column of azure' metaphor. The column is a virtual extract of the sky. It has no precedent in a common image of the world and is a product of the poet's imagination.

The poetic image used here activates an archetypal religious symbolism whose manifestations are to be found across cultures. Column is a functional counterpart of a sacred tree, mountain, temple, or even raised-up priest's hands. All those objects form a vertical axis linking the earth with heaven and ensuring communication with extraterrestrial powers, with a transcendental dimension of reality, with God. Drawing such a line from an ant to the sky/heaven sacralises the death of such a tiny living thing. Thus, a common idea claiming that the value of death is dependent upon the size of dying creature or the place it occupies in the hierarchy of beings is undermined. Loss of life and, all the more so, any cruel and thoughtless act of taking someone's life (e.g. trampling an ant), is a sad and disturbing event; one that challenges a harmonious order of reality.

By far, we have been dealing with consequences of drawing a vertical axis in the image by the direction of the observer's glance. The metaphor of 'column of azure' used for the purpose carries richer meanings, though, ones that emerge owing to the use of the word 'column' [orig., *kolumna*]. The related connotations encompass, *inter alia*, non-definitional characteristics of column which ensue from its functions in architecture and culture. Not only do columns decorate presentable buildings but they are also erected to honour outstanding historical personages and commemorate events of importance (Traian's column, the columns in Place Vendôme or Trafalgar Square). They are inherent structural elements of antique temples and palaces

and, together with other antiquity stylisations, have become a means of expressing sublimity and majesty. This function is used for funeral structures where a single column erected on a tomb is a form of honouring the deceased.

A glance shifted from a trampled ant toward the sky, drawing a column in the space of azure, is a sort of gravestone epitaph for the killed insect. It adds weight to that apparently unimportant death and is a form of its commemoration. If there is no response to bestiality other than one of a tacit observer, in a world where annihilation spreads, then at least the observer is ready to revere the perishing being and await some response to the event happening.

The Milosz poe m does not resolve whether the ant's tragedy takes place in a world with a transcendental dimension to it (a divine Providence, the Creator being responsible for an order of the world). Humans raise their eyes to heaven not knowing whether any assistance can be obtained from there, or at least, explanation of an order which admits evil and suffering. But the very fact that suffering exists in the world incites one to ask questions about presence of a transcendental dimension in reality, the nature of God. As Milosz wrote in an essay: "Appearing under a starlit sky or compassion with sufferings of a fly is a phenomenon that underlies the conception of faiths and rites [...]"[16]. An act of looking up, encoded in the above poetic images, is a glance chasing a sense, justice and compassion in a time of extermination.

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Analysis of the poetic image drawn in the Milosz poem makes one conclude that its sense emerges through a complex interpretation process where an essential part is played by the way the world

[16] Cf. C. Milosz, *Religijność Zdziechowskiego*, in: *idem*, *Legendy nowoczesności*, Krakow 1996, p.114.

is seen, as recorded in combinations of phenomena and metaphor construction rules. Introduction of an innovative perspective of vision triggers the speaker's cognitive activity where 'to see' turns into 'to know'.

APPENDIX

Czeslaw Milosz

REFLECTIONS

A trampled ant and clouds above it.
An ant that's trampled and above it, a column of azure.
The Vistula or the Dnepr on its bed of granite
Marks its blue steps, a faraway stayer.

That's the image reflected in the water.

A town destroyed and clouds above it.
A town that's destroyed and above it, a column of azure.
A history remainder or the springtime of a myth
Goes past its blue thresholds far away there.

A dead harvest-mouse, sexton-beetles
On the lane where seven-year joy runs forth a-rumble.
A ball's rainbow in the garden, facial idylls
And a yellow glare shines of a May or April.

That's the image reflected in the water.

A tribe subdued, armoured grave-diggers,
Thousand years' joy dashes forth along the lanes,
Fire over, bluebottle bloom triggers
And there's silence, the common and blue one.

That's the image reflected in the water.

ODBICIA

Mrówka zdeptana a nad nią obłoki.
Zdeptana mrówka a nad nią kolumna błękitu.
A w dali znaczy niebieskie swe kroki
Wisła czy Dniepr na łożu z granitu.

Taki obraz odbija się w wodzie:

Miasto zburzone a nad nim obłoki.
Zburzone miasto a nad nim kolumna błękitu.
A w dali mija niebieskie swe progi
Dziejów ostatek, albo wiosna mitu.

Mysz polna martwa i żuki-grabarze
Na ścieżce, którą biegnie radość siedmioletnia.
W ogrodzie tęcza piłki, roześmiane twarze
I żółty pada blask maja albo kwietnia.

Taki obraz odbija się w wodzie:

Plemię podbite, pancerni grabarze,
Drogami biegnie radość tysiącletnia,
Pole bławatków kwitnie po pożarze
I cisza jest niebieska, powszednia.

Taki obraz odbija się w wodzie.

1942–1948 (from the collection *Światło dzienne* [*Daylight*])

Темой рассуждения является содержание некой метафоры, скрывающей особый способ видения мира. Интерпретация этого образа и запечатленного в нем видения подтверждает связь между смотрением и познанием. Эта связь существует уже в самом языке, в семантике лексем зрительной перцепции.

В статье рассматривается стихотворение Чеслава Милоша *Отражения*.

Первые две строки этого произведения обрисовывают образ, развивающийся по вертикали: внизу растоптанный муравей, а над ним облака или, в следующей строке, „колонна лазури". Вертикальная ось соединяет существо мелкое и малозначительное с явлениями, наблюдающимися на небе. Перемещение снизу вверх в этом поэтическом образе является производным от направления взгляда наблюдающего.

Сопоставление образа растоптанного муравья с образом синего неба приобретает значение моральной оценки. Туда, где размещено символическое добро, можно обратиться за помощью в поисках справедливости. Закодированный в этом образе молитвенный жест, который мы наблюдаем во многих произведениях сакрального искусства, находит свое подтверждение во фразеологических единицах типа 'поднял глаза к небу'.

Движение глаз вверх, возникающее из самого сопоставления образов на оси 'под' и 'над', находит свое дополнение в образе колонны в метафоре „колонна лазури". Колонна – это виртуальный отрезок неба. В использованном здесь поэтическом образе активизируется архетипная религиозная символика.

Метафора „колонна лазури" несет в себе и другие значения. Взгляд, переведенный с затоптаного муравья на небо, намечающий в пространстве контуры колонны синевы, предстает в некотором смысле надгробным памятником для муравья, придает неважной смерти важность, является формой почтения.

Анализ поэтического образа, созданного в стихотворении Милоша, приводит к выводу, что взгляд выполняет познавательную роль. Выступая орудием взгляда, метафора „колонна лазури" обогащает понятийные составные образа действительности в сознании человека, является попыткой понимания мира, одной из бесконечных серий таких попыток.

MACIEJ MROZIK

NABOKOV'S DISEMBODIED SPY

Sight, vision, point of view appear to hold special significance in Vladimir Nabokov's oeuvre. All of his narrators are extremely receptive to sensual stimuli, and sight seems to be one of their favored senses. It is interesting to note, for example, how much attention they pay to color, or to the quality of light and its interplay with objects (which so often "shimmer", "glitter", are "glossy", or "brilliant" etc.). The titles of some of the writer's novels also hint at his preoccupation with the human visual faculty: *Camera obscura*, *Laughter in the Dark, Pale Fire, Transparent Things, Look at the Harlequins!*

"See" may also mean 'understand', it can be a mental predicate. In Nabokov's works the interest in seeing, transparence, light is inseparably connected with an interest in blindness, opaqueness, darkness – of both the eyes and the mind. One of the central themes of *Invitation to a Beheading* is a specific sort of metaphysical blindness. Many of Nabokov's central characters experience a kind of "double" mental blindness. On the one hand, they are blind to their own flaws and vices, to the moral ugliness of their deeds. On the other, they fail to correctly perceive and assess the reality around them (among other things, Albert Albinus/Bruno Krechmar is blind to Magda's/Margot's infidelity, Hermann – to his wife's, but that is one of various planes of error, Humbert – to Lolita's flirtations with Quilty). In one case a central character also

becomes literally blind (Albinus/Krechmar in *Camera obscura/ Laughter in the Dark*) – this shows how Nabokov connects the two domains, the senses and thought (knowledge, truth, ethics).[1]

Another recurring characteristic of Nabokov's oeuvre is his use of themes and devices prevalent in popular literature (or more broadly: popular culture). For example, Nabokov's plots often incorporate elements well known from adventure histories, mystery novels or crime fiction (from murder plots in *King, Queen, Knave* or *Despair* and many other novels and short stories, to an oblique take on the detective novel in *The Real Life of Sebastian Knight*).

A text where both these characteristics are clearly present is the early Russian work *Sogliadatai*, later translated into English under the author's supervision as *The Eye*.[2] Published in 1930 as his fourth novel (after *Mary*, *King, Queen, Knave,* and *The Defense*), *The Eye* is perhaps Nabokov's first truly "Nabokovian" work, in the sense that it his first book "about reading."[3] The text's artistic ef-

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[1] I have given a much more detailed analysis of the interrelation of ethics, epistemology and aesthetics in Nabokov's art in the first two chapters of my doctoral dissertation: M. Mrozik, *Opowiadania Vladimira Nabokova w języku angielskim na tle jego pozostałej twórczości. Idee i poetyka*, Warszawa: IBL PAN 2008 (unpublished ts.).

[2] The English translation of the book does occasionally diverge from the original, but the differences are not fundamental from the point of view of the analysis presented here. See discussion in J. Grayson, *Nabokov Translated: A Comparison of Nabokov's Russian and English Prose*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977, p. 82–89, recapitulated in D.B. Johnson "Eyeing Nabokov's *Eye*", *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 19, No. 3 Fall 1985, p. 340–342.

[3] Johnson gives *The Eye* similar status, and for related (though not exactly the same) reasons. See D.B. Johnson, p. 350. So does Nina Berberova: according to her, *Sogliadatai* is a turning point in Nabokov's artistic growth and marks his coming of age as a writer. See Н. Берберова «Набоков и его *Лолита*», *Новый журнал* (New York), No. 57, 1959, p. 92–93.

fects depend in great part on getting the reader truly involved, on manipulating and confronting him. In that sense, *The Eye* is much more "interactive" than traditional novels, especially those by 19th century realists.

This article will explore the connections between Nabokov's short novel and spy fiction in the context of the faculty of sight. It will also touch on the problems of identity and theatricality of life, often present in the spy genre.

SMUROV THE SPY

A preoccupation with the faculty of sight is present quite ostensibly in the book's very title. Sight is also one of the work's central concerns on a narrative level and a large part of the story is devoted to the theme of "observation".

While not as ostentatious or self-evident, the presence of popular fiction motives is again fairly obvious. Nabokov alerts the reader to their existence even before allowing him to peruse the actual novel – he mentions it in his 1965 "Foreword" to the English translation. About the meaning of the original title we are told that: "It is an ancient military term meaning 'spy' or 'watcher.'" (Foreword)[4]. In conjunction with this explanation, the title of the book becomes less straightforward. It is not "the eye" meant as an optical organ which sends impulses to the brain. It is a person. A spy, as we are told. We are therefore given hints that what we are about to read might in some ways be similar to spy fiction.[5]

[4] V. Nabokov, *The Eye*, transl. D. Nabokov in coll. with the author, New York: Vintage International 1990. Further references accompanied by page number in brackets directly in the text. The 4-page "Foreword" has no pagination, therefore I refer to it simply by title.

[5] The title may also refer to someone who watches, a *private* eye. Detective fiction is another important source of motives and literary devices we may find in *The Eye*. But, save for one reference, I will not touch on that subject here.

What follows is an attempt at pinpointing the specific traits of Nabokov's novel that have an affinity with spy fiction. It is not a reading of *The Eye* "as" a spy narrative, but rather an attempt to answer the question: in what sense is the subject of espionage "present" in Nabokov's *The Eye*? Why did the author give his novel a title which may mean 'the spy'? What are the intertextual games that Nabokov engages in? And who is the spy in this book? Or is there perhaps more than one?[6]

There are several ways of answering this last question, depending on how far we would be willing to go or rather how wide a net we would be willing to cast. In other words: the word "spy" may be treated more or less metaphorically, and this "less" and "more" is what our reply depends on.

The most obvious answer, and the one I would like to concen-

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[6] I use the word "spy" in the sense 'literary spy'. There is of course an enormous overlap with real life spies, but I would like to emphasize that it is *literary* spies, *represented* spies who are my main interest and concern. I should also explain why I will not be using a dictionary definition of the noun *spy*. It is because all the definitions I was able to find are too general for this sort of application. As a result, they are also too vague. As an example, let me quote two definitions supplied by the *Wordsmyth Dictionary-Thesaurus*: "1. a person employed by a nation's government to secretly observe and gather information about another nation's activities, plans, defenses, and the like. 2. a person who secretly observes and gathers information about others, usu. for pay or profit." (http://www.wordsmyth.net/live/home.php?script=search&matchent=spy&matchtype=exact accessed 25 Feb. 2010). It is neither clear how these two meanings can be differentiated in practice (what is described in the second definition can easily form part of the tasks performed by the spy described in the first one), nor what a spy actually does, or how. I should also mention that when Phaedra first published the English translation of Nabokov's novel, it was advertised as "a spy story in Ian Fleming and John Le Carré tradition." This description did not meet with the author's approval. See B. Boyd *Vladimir Nabokov: The American Years*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991, p. 501.

trate on here, is that the "spy" of the novel is the narrator of the story. Of course, he is not a spy in the sense that he works for a government agency (or an international secret service of some sort).[7] He is a spy in several other senses, though. He conceals his identity. He has a "subject", whom he follows and investigates ("Smurov"). He does so in secrecy (he conceals the nature of his actions from others). He spends most of his time gathering information, using methods such as observation, casual conversation, direct interrogation, interception of correspondence, or even a secretly conducted apartment search. This may all seem vague and inconclusive, but then part of the spy's job is to appear innocent...

From a very early point in the story, even before his suicide attempt, the narrator can be described as having "a spy's consciousness", a certain inner tension, a state of constant vigilance: "I was always exposed, always wide-eyed; even in sleep I did not cease to watch over myself" (7). The use of the word "exposed" is especially striking, since exposure is precisely what a spy fears.[8] His complaints about loneliness ("And how lonely I was!" 8) may also remind one of the situation of a spy. Of course, these phrases are primarily straightforward presentations of existential angst. And they may also reflect a sense of constant endangerment common among émigrés. Not just because of their materially uncertain situation, but for political reasons as well: some of them were indeed spies, therefore many of them were being spied on. But on another plane there seems to be a suggestion here that already at this point

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[7] We should note, however, that the narrator's imagination is open to possibilities of entanglement in undercover work. After the fateful call from Matilda's husband, he speculates about the caller's identity. One of the versions he considers is: "a Communist agent" (11).

[8] In his book about the semantics of spy narratives Allan Hepburn writes that "Fear of death and fear of being caught motivates spies' actions." (A. Hepburn *Intrigue: Espionage and Culture*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press 2004, p. xvi; further references marked as "Hepburn", followed by page number).

there is something spy-like about the narrator.

The affair with Matilda can be figuratively conceived of as a "clandestine operation" of sorts (in that sense, Smurov later becomes a double agent, courting Vanya and simultaneously bedding her maid).[9] If so, then one could say that the novel begins with a "spy" being exposed. Which would be a classic spy story opening: the failure of an operation is the departure point of spy narratives quite often. Works from the strict canon of the genre come to mind, such as John le Carré's *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* or Robert Ludlum's *The Bourne Identity*.

In this context, the way the narrator acts in reaction to being discovered is also telling. He flees, leaving everything behind, just like an exposed secret agent. A spy's escape route almost invariably leads to death. For instance, he may be obliged to commit suicide in view of the danger of leaking classified information.[10] This sort of backup plan has to be prepared beforehand, it is no wonder then that the narrator writes: "I had decided all this not today but long ago" (17).

The suggestion that Smurov might be a real spy is brought up twice in the novel, both times in connection with Weinstock. The narrator first considers the possibility after relating Weinstock's conviction that "They [secret agents] are everywhere" (42). And then again, during one of the shopkeeper's *séances*, when the ghost of the infamous *agent provocateur* Evno Fishelevich Azef – "the terrible name", "a singularly vile life" (52) – attempts to "denounce" Smurov (or so it seems, the name of the "small man in black" is never relayed to the reader). On both occasions this suggestion is disregarded.

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[9] Here, the word "spy" is treated metaphorically. The analogy is dubious, of course, grotesque and even tasteless. It portrays a wicked act (adultery) in the positive light that is usually associated with spying protagonists in spy fiction.

[10] Hepburn writes about the "sacrificial logic of espionage" (Hepburn 18) and notes that, more often than not, the result of involvement in clandestine operations is death (see Hepburn 15, 18).

At one point Smurov actually thinks of himself as a character in a narrative of intrigue. He supposes that Uncle Pasha's letter might be coded: "if it was coded, then I did not know the key" (58 – this is clearly ironic on Nabokov's part, but probably not on Smurov's). Indeed, Uncle Pasha does function like an enemy spy, disseminating false information, pushing Smurov to the verge of exposing himself, and then promptly, suddenly, magically disappearing.

This shows that if we were to treat *The Eye* as the story of an agent, it would have to be the story of a failed agent. Almost all of Smurov's "espionage" endeavors are failures (but then, this book isn't generally a chronicle of his successes). The discovery of his affair with Matilda is only the beginning. Here are some more examples: Mukhin reveals Smurov's tales of bravery for the sham that they really are (something similar happens at the end, when it transpires that Mukhin was a secret witness to Smurov's last conversation with Vanya). The search of the sisters' apartment is fruitless, Smurov loses track of time, and stays inside too long (59), and the eavesdropping session which follows is an even greater failure (60–61). As mentioned, he falls prey to Uncle Pasha's gossip. And most important of all, he fails to notice and take account of Mukhin's constant presence around Vanya (even though he is apparently aware of it, since he does write near the end that "this was the first time I found her at home alone." 91).

But these are all minor points of convergence between Nabokov's novel and spy fiction. The readings presented above are only a game with the text, and a rather extravagant one. The passage from the author's "Foreword" which I have quoted earlier does give us licence for this sort of behavior (after all, Nabokov read *Don Quixote* as a tennis match!), but these similarities are superficial and not especially striking. They are slight intertextual traces which one may find enjoyable but ultimately they do not lead far.

However, there are two areas where Nabokov's book comes

into a much more intimate contact with what is the heart of espionage narrative. This affinity does not spring from sharing literary conventions or plot devices, but from an interest in similar philosophical questions. I have in mind a preoccupation with, on the one hand, identity, masks, acting, and on the other, the title theme of *The Eye*: that of watching, vision, observation, of the gaze. Both these themes are inseparably connected in the punning title (the homonyms "eye" and "I") and they are without doubt central to the novel.

THE WATCH

It would seem appropriate at this juncture to remind our readers that both of the senses of the title provided by Nabokov, 'spy' and 'watcher', are similar in meaning. By dint of profession a spy does a lot of watching and as a verb the word may mean 'to catch sight of something, to notice, to discover (by watching)'. As in the guessing game: "I spy with my little eye..." (which, incidentally, contains all three words that Nabokov puns on: "I", spy" and "eye"). And if we delved deep enough in the history of the noun, it seems that we would eventually reach the PIE root **spek-* 'to look'.[11]

Watching, looking, spying is one of the central themes of Nabokov's book. Indeed, "the watch" is one of the terms the narrator uses in relation to his own actions: "was it not high time to abandon my enterprise, to call off the hunt, the watch, the insane attempt to corner Smurov?" (83). The watch in question does not begin until after the narrator leaves the hospital subsequently to his failed suicide attempt (as if in a dream state). To be more precise, it does not begin until he visits Weinstock's bookshop. We may jest about the affair with Matilda being a covert operation, but this visit is the moment the metaphysical spy of the story is actually born.

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[11] See http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=spy accessed 25 Feb. 2010.

That visit is a pivotal scene, both in terms of plot and narrative technique. One could go so far as to metaphorically call it a recruitment scene. In several senses. Most importantly of all, this is the point where the "spy" (the narrator) begins to observe his subject ("Smurov" – himself). All the "spying" that he subsequently does is connected with this change. And then, the narrator does indeed begin working for Weinstock (in the bookshop). Apparently, he also starts to frequent Weinstock's *séances*, and Weinstock arranges lodgings for him (one could say that Weinstock arranges Smurov's "deployment"). Incidentally: Weinstock is a perfect "mentor" since unlike the narrator he manages to keep his love affair completely secret.

Perhaps emphasizing one single point in the plot is oversimplifying things. Perhaps the change in the narrator (in the nature of his activity) should be conceived of as a process, beginning with the preparation for the suicide and ending in the first scene which involves "Smurov". The visit to Weinstock's simply happens to occupy a central position in this sequence.

What precedes the change is very important too: having been humiliated, the narrator gets rid of all his earthly possessions and attempts to kill himself. This conforms perfectly with what Allan Hepburn writes about secret agents. According to him, a spy is "Disburdened of material possessions, stripped of dignity and attachment" and in a sense "incarnates the death drive" (Hepburn 174).

The main reason why we can say that this whole sequence illustrates the birth of a spy is that the visit marks a change in the narrator's attitude towards himself, the world around him, and his story. He comments: "This conversation with Weinstock turned out to be the beginning of a new life for me. In respect to myself I was now an onlooker." (27).

Indeed, it is beyond this point that the name "Smurov" is introduced. The whole "idea" of the novel springs out from here – in

terms of narrative technique (the device of referring to one and the same character in both first and third person), as well as storyline (the narrator's "dissociation", which he *openly* announces here).

Of course, the reader is wont to miss the line just quoted or not grant it the import it deserves. Hence the deceptive aspect of the novel, the appearance that it is all just a meaningless "narrative trick" and nothing more, while in fact this "trick" is used descriptively, as a means of accurately portraying the narrator's experience. The narrator does not conceal the true nature of his actions and he is not unaware of it. The dissociation is not a sham, it is not something "imposed" on the reader. In a sense, the "trick" is actually an element of the poetics of realism.

It is testimony to Nabokov's mastery that he does manage to set up such an (ostensibly) conspicuous trap for the reader.[12] How does he make us fall for this ruse (so obvious once we're aware of it)? Is it because of our laziness, our habits of mind and of reading? Is it because of the readers' empathy, an important factor in understanding narrative, which Nabokov so effectively manipulates? Perhaps part of the answer lies in Nabokov's ability to manage the reader's interest, to enchant the reader into dismissing the most important clues and paying too much attention to false leads. The technique might remind one not only of professional magicians (who also perform their tricks in plain view), but of detective fiction writers too.[13]

It is difficult to explain exactly how Nabokov's "trick" works. Its mechanism seems to depend on the fact that proper names don't mean anything and the meaning of pronouns is vestigial, highly

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[12] As Johnson writes, "[Nabokov's] feat is all the more remarkable for the illusion-shattering counter-evidence is in open view of the reader." (D.B. Johnson, p. 338).

[13] Victor Shklovsky described this method as a major element of Arthur Conan-Doyle's technique. See В. Шкловский «Новелла тайн», in: Шкловский *О теории прозы*, Москва 1929.

contextual – the former are indices, the latter are indexical symbols.[14] While we may associate them with something deeply personal, intimately "ours", they of themselves, paradoxically, are not semantically rich. The pronoun "I" can refer to anyone who chooses to speak. Here, the author constructs his first person narration in such a way that while the reader is aware of the narrator being part of the narrated world, he does not realize that the narrator is actually one of the characters who are mentioned by name.

There is, of course, nothing surprising in that. Normally, the same speaker cannot use the first person pronoun "I" and the third person pronoun "he" in reference to one and the same person. It would be illogical and, in a sense, ungrammatical. Nabokov's narrator, however, does not abandon using "I". And at the same time, he starts to speak of himself using (most notably) the name "Smurov". As if he and Smurov were two different people. The natural implication would be that the "I" and "Smurov" (or third-person pronouns) do in fact refer to two different beings. But here a natural implication does not apply.

The narrative effect is rather striking. While all of the story is actually narrated by Smurov, the reader may remain completely oblivious to this until near the very end of the book. This is only possible thanks to the fact that during the opening sequence of events we are never told the name of the narrator and protagonist. So when the name is finally introduced, we have no way of knowing who it really refers to (unless, of course, we are extremely diligent readers who are willing to accept and take to heart the full consequences of that passage, quoted earlier, in which the narrator declared that he had become an "onlooker" in respect to himself). Ostensibly nothing (except for shared lodgings, perhaps) connects the man whose suicide attempt was related earlier to the person named "Smurov".

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[14] See R. Jakobson "Shifters, verbal categories and the Russian verb", in: Jakobson *Word and language*, The Hague: Mouton 1971.

The way the first and third person forms used in reference to Smurov are distributed is not easy to grasp in a simple formula.[15] The narrator's/Smurov's dissociation from himself is, at least in part, of a visual nature. He appears to be trying to shed his point of view, trying to free himself from it, thus freeing himself from all subjectivity. This would partly explain why he is hiding his identity: point of view is, to a large extent, rooted in identity. As long as he is Smurov, his point of view is perforce Smurov's. The dissociation of identity seems to be a consequence of the shedding of point of view. He starts to think of himself "from the outside" instead of "from within", he becomes interested in himself (almost exclusively) as a projection into a world of other people, other perceivers, other minds. He seeks to discover their points of view, the images of him that they attain. And not just the points of view of his living contemporaries – there is also the urge "to see Smurov through the eyes of future centuries" (78).

Is there some sort of dividing line which would let us understand who "Smurov" is in relation to "I"? In point of fact, they are not the same "person" – neither of them really is a full person, "Smurov" is more of a mask, a persona. A mask that the "I" wears. "I" says so directly in its (his?) final conversation with Vanya: "I wear a mask – I am always hidden behind a mask..." (93).

The word "image" returns in the novel several times. Smurov's name or the third person pronoun is used in sentences describing his outward appearance, the impression he makes on other people: "Smurov is comparatively a newcomer, although he hardly looks it." (32), "he certainly did not show it" (33), "His plain black suit and black bow tie seemed to intimate (...) some secret mourning"

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15 The difficulty of description is evidenced well by one of Johnson's sentences: "It will also be noted that no character speaks with the narrator in scenes where Smurov is (also) present." (D.B. Johnson, p. 336) – since Smurov and the narrator are one and the same person, this statement is confusing.

(33) "the perceptive observer could distinguish in [his face] the traces of sorrow and experience" (33).

Conversely, "I" appears whenever mental predicates are called for, whenever there is talk of inner sensations (as opposed to outward *signs* of inner sensations): "I learned" (40), "I soon began to suspect" (43), "I believed" (60), "I imagined" (62). Tellingly enough, these hardly ever have anything to do directly with feelings. The narrating "I" is more or less devoid of emotion: "Personally, I viewed Smurov without emotion." (54). It is obsessed with outward appearances and what other people think, with pronouncing "judgements"; it has no feelings (other than, perhaps, pride and contempt). Therefore it is used in assessments of Smurov's appearance: "I must say that he made a rather favorable impression on me those first evenings." (33), "None could discern in him the shyness that makes a person so conspicuous among people who know each other well" (32), "I liked him. Yes, I definitely liked him" (37).

Most of the time its approach is indeed quite detached, emotionless, purely analytical ("I could already count three versions of Smurov" 53). There is perhaps even a bit of cynicism to it, since it views the whole project as a sort of enjoyable game: "I was beginning to enjoy this game. (...) I regarded Smurov, without any aesthetic tremor; instead, I found a keen thrill in the classification of Smurovian masks" (54).

All this, both the "I's" detachment and its infusion with "society" values, is perfectly in line with what Hepburn writes about secret agents: "The agent defies, through the emptying out of individuality, the notion of character as destiny or character as psychological complexity." (90).

However, the clear division between the "public" persona of Smurov and the emotionless inside of the "I" is only a construct, an ideal – another mask, so to speak, a façade which begins to crumble during Smurov's search of the sisters' apartment and continues to fall apart during the incident with Uncle Pasha. It is through these

failures that identity begins to manifest itself and the problem of the body is introduced into the narrative.

THE SPY'S BODY

In order to have no defined point of view, one would have to shed not just one's identity, but also the body which naturally comes with it and which anchors our point of view in the world. To shed one's point of view, one would have to become a sort of emptiness, not an ineffable, bodiless "eye" floating in space. But, as it turns out, one's body cannot be abandoned while alive. The mind cannot transcend it yet.

There is a paradox in this desire to see without a point of view, a paradox inherent in the very problem of consciousness and identity. I would suggest that this duality, along with the apposition of reality and representation, consists one of the main philosophical themes allegorized in *The Eye*, and that it lies at the roots of the motif of doubling so prevalent in this novel.

But let us return to the body. When emotions are relegated to the nether regions of the mind, it is the body that will remind us of their unfulfilled existence. Body can't be erased from mind, just as thinking can't be separated from feeling. Their insistent connection makes itself apparent when the narrator discovers that Smurov's image has been removed from a photograph that Vanya keeps beside her bed: "On Vanya's lace-covered pillow there suddenly appeared a star-shaped hollow – the violent imprint of my fist" (58–9). While the "I" continues to strive for detachment, the body gives away the truth of emotions. The "I" and "Smurov" cannot be severed, because they are in fact one (on the other hand, Vanya and Smurov can be severed all too easily).

Identity is also, history. And here again, by perpetually bringing the past before us, the body thwarts all attempts to erase identity; the body is where history may reside. In Smurov's case, this

return takes on the form of pain. Pain becomes the embodiment of history. Smurov is forced to visit the doctor because of "a strange discomfort in [his] bullet-punctured chest, a sensation resembling a draft in a dark room" (62). Hepburn writes: "In spy novels, the body that disappears comes back as a warning that death cannot be outrun." (Hepburn 76), and further: "the body signifies pain, death, and history. (...) The ultimate code of spy fiction may therefore be the body itself: indecipherable, multiply storied, costumed, scarred, agonized, kinetic. The body, as a container of personality, allows emotion to register on its surface." (Hepburn 76).

The search of the sisters' apartment is not the first instance of the "I's" revealing of its bodily existence. Earlier on the narrator explains how he came to know the tenants of the house at Peacock Street, relates conversations with several of them, and his bodily presence is implied at one of Weinstock's *séances*. But the search is the moment when this existence slips out of control and imposes itself uninvited. The "spy" continues to insist on his imperceptibility (despite the fist in the pillow, he describes his investigation as "discarnate flitting from room to room" 59), but memory is always with him, proffering unwanted emotions: "at the merest thought of her, a moaning, awful, salty night would well up within me." (69). Through bodily secretions the "I" betrays and reveals itself. It is not disinterested – it is overcome with emotion. The most extreme example of this is the dream "about Smurov" that the narrator has after reading Roman Bogdanovich's letter. Against the narrator's strongest wishes the connection with Smurov surfaces when he would like it to submerge. There cannot be two sane consciousnesses in a single body.

This (lost) fight with the body and identity is precisely what brings Nabokov's novel so close to spy fiction, to the heart of what spy fiction is most concerned with. Despite the narrator's fantasies, he is not a ghost, he is not dead. And he cannot get rid of his body. This is a typical problem in spy narratives. As Hepburn writes: "The

spy's body is (...) a site of contradictions. Visible to narrative, the spy should, by all accounts, remain invisible." (Hepburn 9). And elsewhere: "The initial trauma in narratives of intrigue may be the shock of recognition that the body cannot be relinquished. Whatever invisibility a spy may have or may desire, he can never disappear entirely. He is spectral, but he is not dead." (Hepburn xv-xvi).

A novel which shows remarkable affinities with *The Eye* in respect to problems of body and identity is Robert Ludlum's famous spy thriller *The Bourne Identity*.

BOURNE AND "I": THE SPY'S IDENTITY CRISIS

The "quest" that our narrator embarks on is of a very unusual kind. It is a search for identity (paradoxically, since he pretends to shed all identity), an attempt to solve the "riddle" (51) of Smurov. The narrator calls it "this house-to-house search, this quest of mine for the real Smurov" (89). He also says: "I resolved to dig up the true Smurov" (54).

Jason Bourne of Ludlum's famous novel embarks on a similar quest; he too wants to find out the truth about who he is. The comparison is illuminating.[16]

The protagonists of the two stories are both in search of information about themselves. In Ludlum's novel, unlike in Nabokov's, there is no narrative sleight-of-hand. The narrator of Bourne's story is open about the goal of Bourne's quest and he does not engage in large scale manipulation of the reader (though, of course, the very production of thrills inherent in a spy thriller is already a manipulation of sorts, primarily an emotional one). But then, while his point of view is largely close to that of Bourne himself, this is not, strictly

[16] One thing I do not want to engage in here are speculations about possible "influences" and "borrowings" (which I doubt exist). My interest here lies strictly within the realm of poetics, structural affinities, general semantics of genre.

speaking, *Bourne's* story – it is a story *about* Bourne. Smurov's story, on the other hand, is all his own. He perpetrates it, he relates it and he is the one who mystifies the reader by making it difficult to apprehend (the passage about turning into an "onlooker" is, as I've already mentioned, rather elusive). This difference of literary device, the fact that the narrator of *The Eye* conceals (for a long time) *his* role in the story, is very important. In a sense, one could perhaps say that *The Eye* is *The Murder of Roger Ackroyd* of spy fiction – with the proviso that it is actually not spy fiction at all. But the difference should not let us ignore the equally important similarities.

A suicide attempt, an attempt to kill himself, a symbolic death is what marks the beginning of Smurov's dissociation process. The main character of Ludlum's novel kills Jason Bourne and subsequently "becomes" him. He sheds an old identity (that of David Webb) and assumes a new one (Jason Bourne), thus committing a symbolic suicide (or perhaps David Webb was *murdered* through the death of his family?). But identities in Ludlum's novel are constantly changed, fickle, nothing one can rely on (the phrase "To clean a slate somewhere", used by Philippe d'Anjou,[17] comes to mind). So at the beginning of *The Bourne Identity* the same thing happens one more time: the main character loses the new, assumed identity and thus begins his quest to uncover it. And once again, a death-like experience is part of the incident.[18]

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[17] R. Ludlum, *The Bourne Identity*, in: Ludlum, *The Bourne Trilogy*, London: Orion 2003, p. 324. Further references marked as "Ludlum" followed by page number.

[18] This is not the place for a prolonged discussion of the phenomenon (its mythological roots, its symbolic meaning), but it seems that a death-like experience is almost an obligatory prerequisite to the spy's embarking on his main mission. Bourne is shot at and virtually drowned in the sea. Leamas goes through a serious illness. The first chapter of John Buchan's *The Thirty-Nine Steps* is symptomatically entitled "The Man Who Died": Scudder (who has already staged his own death) is murdered, Hannay manages (narrowly) to escape. The actual plot of many (though not all)

During his quest, Bourne is a man without identity. The story is built in such a way as to question the very idea of identity: "I was and I *was* not! I am and I *am* not!" (Ludlum 398) cries the protagonist on the final pages. The situation seems similar in *The Eye* where the "I" has no identity either, it doesn't seem to be a "real I", a real entity, but a sort of empty space.

Jason Bourne *is not* David Webb (as we are repeatedly reminded in Ludlum's *The Bourne Supremacy* and *The Bourne Ultimatum*). It is not as if David Webb is disguising himself as Jason Bourne. Jason Bourne is a valid, separate, new identity which comes into being once David Webb has been shed (disposed of? disappeared? appeased?). What is more, in the two sequels, there is a "new" David Webb – someone who does not share an identity with the David Webb of Saigon (for the simple reason that he *cannot* fully share it: he doesn't remember it). The chronological list is even longer then: David Webb I, Delta, Jason Bourne, Cain, the man searching for identity in the first novel, and finally: David Webb II.

Similarly, Smurov's existence ceases when he is humiliated in front of his two pupils. What surfaces next is difficult to capture in words. The "I" is not Smurov. It is an attempt at a new existence, at a whole new consciousness, a new identity. Here again we have two distinct conscious beings united in sharing a continuous fate and body.

The body is the key here, the body is what stays the same – it is the only stable element a mind can rely on (Bourne's plastic surgery only changes the outside, the appearances, what the world perceives, it does not change the inner reality of identity)[19]. Behind the

James Bond films is preceded by a narrow-escape prologue, where the agent's life appears (at first) to have been forfeited.

[19] In *The Bourne Supremacy* Ludlum continues to explore the possibilities of this subject. The premise is turned on its head. Where once we had a multiplicity of identities assigned to one body (Webb, Delta, Bourne, Cain), we now have two bodies claiming the same identity (Bourne's) – a doppelgänger motif.

many identities of Bourne there is one body but not one memory. And in one case, there's even an *identity* without a consciousness (Bourne decides to give his body to a fiction, to Cain).[20]

Similarly to the narrator of *The Eye*, Ludlum's Bourne has a memory which reveals what is concealed or repressed. It is memory that originates and experiences returning memories – the memories do not, at least at first, belong to the character as a person, since to him they are meaningless. The protagonist of Ludlum's novel has no identity but he does have the feelings of David Webb, which are emanated by his memory. To him these feelings are (at least initially) a mystery with no discernible source. A good example is his experience while witnessing Villiers's meeting with the French officers:

> What disturbed him so? Why was he suddenly swept by feelings of anger and futility? What triggered the revulsion he felt so strongly? (...) He hated a man like André Villiers, despised the men in that room. They were all old men who made war, stealing life from the young... and the very young. (Ludlum 267–268)

The character is deeply moved but he does not know or understand *why* he is moved (he does not remember the family he lost). In other scenes he experiences the feelings of Jason Bourne/Cain: a mysterious urge to find and kill Carlos the Jackal.

There are, of course, great differences between the two stories themselves (and not just in their principles of narration). They are similar and dissimilar at the same time. For instance, both are sto-

[20] This is a perennial motive of spy fiction. Alfred Hitchcock's *North by Northwest* is based on the same premise: a fictional creation and an actual body summoned to fill it. It could be interpreted as a specific realization of the "wrong man" theme – someone taken to be someone else (quite prevalent in Hitchcock's films, cf. for example *Saboteur, The 39 Steps, To Catch a Thief, Frenzy, The Wrong Man, Dial M for Murder, Spellbound*).

ries of dying and rebirth. The characters enter their new life in a "newborn" state. Before trying to commit suicide, Smurov destroys all of his earthly possessions. We could therefore say that he enters life completely naked. Bourne does have a bank account, but he is naked in another sense: limited memory (Smurov, on the other hand, does remember what happened to him, he even visits the "site of the crime" for reassurance). While Bourne enters the world with nothing but a bank account, Smurov does not even have those monetary vestiges of existence...

Clearly another of the major differences is how the authors approach their subject. In Ludlum, death and rebirth are taken quite seriously. In Nabokov, they are treated parodistically. Smurov's destroying of the watch is a symbolic destruction of time (life) at the moment of death. But instead of it happening at the moment of death itself, it is performed as a conscious act in anticipation of dying. It is not "automatic" but willful. Bourne lost identity due to amnesia. The narrator of *The Eye* has no identity due to a conscious effort of dissociation. His drama is a sham.

Bourne's identity has been taken away, the narrator of *The Eye* is trying to shed his. Bourne would like to go back to "the original", but is unable to. Smurov would like to escape from "the original" (his existential angst!) but cannot. In the end, both stories seem to communicate an odd message: that one's identity is beyond one's control, that a person does not construct it at will. Herein lies another duality: while an identity is the "innermost" component of the human being, it is formed and conceived by outside forces too and may be, formed in the consciousnesses of the people who perceive us.

"Smurov" may seem similar to Bourne because he too appears to be a "Chameleon". Both *The Eye* and *The Bourne Identity* are stories of the forging of identities (in both senses of the word "forge" – 'create' and 'make with intention of deceiving'). In the case of Bourne this is a special ability, in the case of Smurov it is the consequence of the author's beliefs about how the world works. In

Nabokov's world everyone is a chameleon, because we make a different impression on each of the people who perceive us. Each one of us is an actor on the world's stage.

THEATRICALITY OF SPYING

The theme of vision is closely connected to that of theatricality. Despite his repeatedly declared dislike for social themes, few authors could be compared to Nabokov in respect to a rarefied sensitivity to the social aspect of the self. In his world everyone is constantly being observed (an extreme example is the short story *Signs and Symbols* where even nature is an observer of humanity).[21] And since we all constantly watch each other, therefore the world can be thought of as a stage, people as actors – our behavior is to a great extent determined by our being aware that we are (or could be) observed.

In the case of the spy, this sort of theatricality becomes part of his métier. A spy is never himself, he is constantly performing a part. Nabokov is quite consistent in associating espionage with acting. In his 1943 short story "The Assistant Producer" the two main characters are spies and many of their actions are described in terms of actors' performances (though in that case, in film rather than theater).[22]

By dint of his profession, a spy has to be an impostor, he has to always pretend that he is someone else (upon hearing the disfigured story of how Kashmarin beat him up, Smurov feigns amusement). If all people are actors, then spies especially so. Or maybe: if all peo-

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[21] Interestingly enough, Weinstock "believed (...) in the secret power of symbols and signs" (38) – "Symbols and Signs" was actually the original version of the title of Nabokov's famous short story.

[22] Cf. "the spy, speaking a foreign tongue, is never just himself, but an unrecognizable alien lodged within a recognizable body." (Hepburn 13). Hepburn also says of spies that they are "Acting a part" (Hepburn xiv).

ple are actors, they are also all spies – always in search of information, always pretending before others to be someone else in order to gain something, to attain their goals.

Nabokov seems to be, on the one hand, an heir to the age-old tradition of the *theatrum mundi* trope, on the other, one of the literary forerunners of Erving Goffman's dramaturgical sociology: "*qua* performers, individuals are concerned not with the moral issue of realizing (...) standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression that these standards are being realized".[23] And another similar quote: "the 'true' or 'real' attitudes, beliefs, and emotions of the individual can be ascertained only indirectly".[24]

The dissociation described in *The Eye* can be interpreted as a dissociation between the actor and audience-member in all of us. The book relies heavily on the *watching – being seen* dichotomy. Smurov is the actor, the "I" is the audience (or even the critic). This role of the "I" is directly suggested after the scene at the doctor's office. The "I" exits without actually visiting the doctor and comments: "now the performance was over and I could leave" (63). There is also something extremely theatrical in Smurov's search of the sisters' apartment – as if he was part of the play they just left to see.

It is also clear that Smurov is a rather bad actor. His belief that others perceive him as bold and foolhardy is verified in the con-

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[23] E. Goffman *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, excerpted in: S. Appelrouth, L.D. Edles *Classical and contemporary sociological theory: Text and readings*, Pine Forge Press 2008, p. 504. (At the moment of writing this I do not have access to the full text of Goffman's book in English.)

[24] Goffman, p. 492. As Hepburn says: "Repeatedly, intrigue narratives try to determine whether action can be categorized as authentic or inauthentic." (Hepburn 22). A close comparison between depictions of social interactions in all of Nabokov's oeuvre and Goffman's observations (as noted in *Behavior in Public Places*, but also *Interaction Ritual* and *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*) would probably be very fruitful.

versation with Evgenya who has no doubts about his shyness ("In the first place there is his shyness" 55). Her other remarks about him seem to be similarly perceptive – she singles out his "sensitivity", "youth; and lack of experience with people" (56). This is the exact opposite of the effect Smurov has been striving for. In fact, *The Eye* can be read as the touching story of a timid young man who admires bravery and dreams of it, but despite sincere efforts is incapable of meeting his own overambitious (and slightly one-dimensional) standards.

But let us get back to the problems of theatricality. One author whose hypersensitivity towards the social aspect of identity was in some ways similar to Nabokov's is Witold Gombrowicz. A nuanced and revealing reading of this aspect of Gombrowicz's writing (utilizing Goffman's dramaturgical sociology) is offered in Zdzisław Łapiński's book *Ja, Ferdydurke* (*I, Ferdydurke*).[25] It is fascinating to note the various surprising affinities between the theatricality of the world in *The Eye* and in Gombrowicz. I would point to the role of shame as a "controlling sanction,"[26] an ambiguous yearning for social acceptance experienced by the characters, a reversal of the 19th century *material world – social world – conscious subject* hierarchy,[27] and finally, a consciousness of the gaze as a source of theatricality.[28] Many of these traits carried over into Nabokov's later works.

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[25] See Z. Łapiński *Ja, Ferdydurke*, Kraków 1997, esp. chap. I "Wstęp do metody: *Tancerz mecenasa Kraykowskiego*" and chap. II "Akcje i interakcje." Another work that should be mentioned in this context is Livio Belloï's book on Marcel Proust (especially in view of the aesthetic affinity of Nabokov and Proust): L. Belloï *La scène proustienne. Proust, Goffman et le théâtre du monde*, Paris: Nathan 1993.

[26] Łapiński, p. 57.

[27] See Łapiński, p. 42. Note Smurov's words: "life did make one last attempt to prove to me that it was real" (90).

[28] "Upon meeting somebody's gaze, Gombrowicz's characters know that they have entered the realm of another's consciousness, that they have become an object to a certain subject, that they can and should make the

He may have been more concerned with masks and personae than with mutual manipulation, but the social entanglements of the self always held great interest for him.

THE FAILURE OF A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIMENT

The ending of *The Eye* is in many respects similar to the ending of Nabokov's much later first English novel, *The Real Life of Sebastian Knight,* with the "I" taking in relation to Smurov the position of V. in relation to Knight. Here is *Sebastian Knight*:

> I have learnt one secret too, and namely: that the soul is but a manner of being – not a constant state – that any soul may be yours, if you find and follow its undulations. (...) Thus – I am Sebastian Knight. I feel as if I were impersonating him on a lighted stage, with the people he knew coming and going (...). They move round Sebastian – round me who am acting Sebastian (...). And then the masquerade draws to a close. (...) but the hero remains, for, try as I may, I cannot get out of my part: Sebastian's mask clings to my face, the likeness will not be washed off. I am Sebastian, or Sebastian is I, or perhaps we both are someone whom neither of us knows.[29]

And here is *The Eye*:

> Kashmarin had borne away yet another image of Smurov. Does it make any difference which? For I do not exist: there exist but the thousands of mirrors that reflect me. With every acquaintance I make, the population of phantoms resembling me increases. Somewhere they live, somewhere they multiply. I alone do not exist. Smurov, however, will live on for a long time. (102–3).

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effort of imposing themselves as persons, that they have the possibility of becoming somebody." (Łapiński, p. 42–43, footnote omitted).

[29] V. Nabokov, *The Real Life of Sebastian Knight*, in: Nabokov, *Novels and Memoirs 1941–1951*, New York: Library of America 1996, p. 159–160.

At first, it seems that the "I" has more personality traits, while "Smurov" is just a projection. The above passage shows how this conviction is reversed in the end. Projections are the only reality.[30] "Personalities" are fictional (because they are subjective?). There is no "I", only an illusion in the eye of the beholder. An illusion that may be called "Smurov".[31]

Many interpreters have problems with interpreting this ending because its sincerity seems doubtful in view of everything that preceded it (how can Smurov say that watching is "happiness"?). But in fact the doubts only arise if we consider this declaration to be an affirmation of the narrator's preceding actions. I believe it is not. I think it is the expression of a new state.

What happened earlier in the novel was indeed a failure (or even a series of failures). But the narrator's new (and first!) success is the acknowledgment and acceptance of that failure. His plan for the future is not a search for the "true Smurov" anymore – he mentions no such thing. The new knowledge he has attained is that he would never be able to find the "true Smurov", because no single "true Smurov" exists ("Smurov" is reflection, not reality).

This is a surprising conclusion. One would certainly expect a negative outcome of Smurov's quest, but probably along different lines. Smurov seemed to believe that finding out how he is *perceived*

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[30] Similarly, at the end of *The Real Life of Sebastian Knight* the elusive, "ghostly" Sebastian Knight becomes more real, or no less real, than the narrator.

[31] In point of fact, the "I's" status is perhaps more enigmatic than that. As I've noted earlier, the "I's" stance is rather judgemental and not entirely friendly. It does not make Smurov happy: "At this moment one could have noted in Smurov's face a most violent desire (...) that I – the cold, insistent, tireless eye – disappear." (66). Is it perhaps a figure of Death? God? The Other? Is it simply consciousness? Perhaps it is conscience? An allegory of objectivity? There seems to be no single easy answer. But then: "The spy's appeal is in his ambiguity, his articulation of doubts, violence, and mixed motives." (Hepburn 13).

would eventually lead him to certain knowledge about who he *is*, and that reasoning is clearly fallacious (at least as far as "certain knowledge" is concerned). Also, until the end he remains a step away from discovering something that many of Nabokov's other characters do eventually discover: that the impressions others may have formed of him are not available to him, or at least no more available than many other truth (at best, he is projecting his own fantasies onto others).

But apart from that revelation something else happens. The philosophical quest Smurov embarked on early in the novel was one for objective knowledge (mainly about himself, but also about the world).[32] Identity, point of view, *subjectivity* may all be impediments to attaining that sort of knowledge. Smurov's was a dream of observing the world in a way uninhibited by the constraints of identity. To overcome the obstacles, he tried to eschew subjectivity, he tried to dissociate himself from himself. The novel shows the absurdity of such an attempt. Shedding one's identity is impossible. At best, it is bound to be just self-deception, and at worst – pure madness. But then, perhaps point of view does not make objective knowledge impossible after all...

To the I, the perseverance of identity confirms the reality of the mask: "all these people I met were not live beings but only chance mirrors for Smurov" (89). There are no real people, everyone is just a mirror – everyone including the "I" itself; the only thing that does exist is the mask, the persona, "Smurov". There is no truth about the human being outside that which can be found in the mirror of another human being: "Because there is no escape from the

[32] This concern with knowledge is another similarity between *The Eye* and spy fiction. As Hepburn writes: "the reader, like the spy, possesses imperfect information about plots, counterplots, and laws that circumscribe subjectivity. Secret agents (...) are figures who *do not know* or do not know *enough*. Through their ignorance, they challenge epistemology. One never possesses enough knowledge, yet one is forced to act nevertheless." (Hepburn 23).

mug, other than into another mug, and from a human being one can only take shelter in the arms of another human being."[33]

But one can't run away from one's identity any more than one can run away from one's life. Before he meets the divorced Kashmarin, Smurov's life is in fact a perpetual flight, in both a real and metaphysical sense. He flees from Petersburg, from his job as a tutor, and even attempts to flee from himself (both through suicide and "dissociation"). Now he appears to have decided to stop running.

"I" and "Smurov" are both confirmed and doubted. So who is speaking? And that question elevates our reading to another level, that of the author and reader. Like many of Nabokov's narratives, this is a story of epistemological blindness. The character's and the reader's. The reader, while reading about the duped Smurov (who is deceived by no one else but himself), is himself duped (also by himself) into believing that Smurov and "I" are two different beings. His and Smurov's situations are nearly identical.[34] Both have access to all the necessary evidence, and both make epistemological shortcuts leading to epistemological dead ends.

This sort of construction, where the situation of the reader mirrors that of the character, points towards the author, implicitly suggests his presence (as do the fortuitous coincidences, especially the "heavenly" appearance of Kashmarin in the book's finale).[35] This presence does, to some extent, guarantee that "true" knowledge and identity in fact exists. However, it does not supply a method of reaching it.

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[33] W. Gombrowicz *Ferdydurke*, transl. D. Borchardt, New Haven & London: Yale University Press 2000, p. 281.

[34] A clear example of *mise en abyme*. See L. Dällenbach *Le récit spéculaire. Essai sur la mise en abyme*, Paris 1977.

[35] The author sometimes absent-mindedly gives himself away, as in the passage where we read: "said Smurov misquoting with a smile from a famous poem" (34) – which is something that Smurov could not have written, unless he was misquoting deliberately.

Данная статья является попыткой поиска элементов со ссылкой на поэтику и идею шпионской повести (идентификация, театрализованность, познание) в ранней повести Владимира Набокова *Соглядатай*. «Шпионом» можно считать Смурова, скрытого наблюдателя за реальностью. Эту роль берёт он на себя в ключевом моменте – в сцене «вербовки» у продавца Вайншток, в которой открыто заявляет, что будет „по отношению к самому себе посторонним». Смуров пытается отказаться от личности за счёт отказа от точки зрения. Приводит это к странному перераспределению: избавленное от личности «Я» становится центром новой мыслящей и чувствующей личности, для которой «Смуров» в третьем лице – это всего лишь маска. Расщепление между «я» и «Смуровым» является одной из областей неудач героя: несмотря на своё стремление, «я» не может избавиться от личности, а значит и от истории, чувств, которые определяют личность. Виднеется сходство между *Соглядатаем* и *Идентификацией Борна* Роберта Ладлэма – оба романа о закреплённости личности в теле, о её особой «неманипулированности», её автономии. Другой аспект существования шпиона заключается в театрализованности жизни: шпион – это актёр. Это приводит на мысль концепцию общественной идентификации Эрвинга Гоффмана, а также литературный подход к этой проблеме в творчестве Витольда Гомбровича. Таким образом заключительная часть повести *Соглядатай* аналогична окончанию *Подлинной жизни Себастьяна Найта*, она вносит новую концепцию идентификации и «наблюдения». Личность оказалась иллюзией, «истина» оказалась недостижимой. Если читатель знает об этом, то должна появится какая-нибудь инстанция, гарантирующая такого рода объективные знания – автор, однако, не указывает пути достижения этих знаний.

[пер. А. Никитина]

RADOSVET KOLAROV

THE THEME OF VISION IN GOGOL'S WORKS

The motif of the glance is present in Gogol's works as a motif of the unusual sight – both as a range , as a supernatural panoramic point of view and as a psychological phenomenon, as a supernatural force, capable of striking and returning in reply upon the one who is looking. The glances in Gogol's works cross, exchange their energies, and form what could be called a visual dialogic field. The impact of the eyes is one of the magnetic themes in Gogol's oeuvre. The glance sets the parameters of space and time, becomes part of the intrigue, a moving charge of the plot.

Leo Stilman was the first to note the theme of 'magic, lethal power of a glance', or the fear of being seen and the theme of vision which encompasses very large, boundless spaces and resembles the vision of an 'all-seeing divinity'[1]. In this article I will subscribe to this view by developing it an adding to it my observations.

The devastating force of the look is presented most vividly in two of Gogol's short stories. In the short story 'Vyi' the student of theology Homa Brut is reading priers in church at the coffin of a dead young girl who in fact turns out to be a witch. He wards off diabolic powers by uttering incantations and by tracing a magic

[1] Leon Stilman, The "All-Seeing Eye" in Gogol. In Robert Maguire (ed.), *Gogol from the Twentieth Century*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p. 382.

circle around himself. On the third night the church is filled with demons and monsters who intend to kill Brut but can not cross the circle he had drawn. And then they summon Vyi, the chief of gnomes, a monster with a face of iron and 'long eyelids that reach down to the ground'. He has to discover Homa Brut, and with this end in view he asks them to lift his eyelids. Despite his fear and inner feeling which whispers to him not to look at Vyi, Brut does just that. In that instant the monster notices him and reaches out to him his iron finger with the exclamation: 'Вот он!'('Here he is!'). The whole host of demons attacks Brut and his sole departs.

The motif of the lifting of the iron eyelids has been documented in eastern Slavonic folklore in the myths of ethnic communities. It is associated with the motif of vision and blindness, symmetrical to the 'life – death' opposition. What stands out is the blindness of the living in relation to the dead and vice versa. It is interesting that non-looking means to be invisible, while the look of the person betrays him, making him seen. The look of the chief of gnomes kills Brut not directly but through the identification of the victim. In Russian and Byelorussian tales however after the lifting of the eyelids by Vyi's aides with iron pitchforks one dies directly just from the power of the look.

In a different sense the lethal force of the glance is manifested in the short story "Portrait". The painter Chartkov acquires a portrait of a man with unusually expressive vivid eyes. It turns out that in the portrait and particularly in the eyes is incarnated the uncleanly evil force of the sitter – a mysterious money-lender. The portrait's eyes exert a terrifying impact on people. It seems to Chartkov that "два страшные глаза прямо вперились в него, как бы готовясь сожрать его."[2] In the course of the plot it turns out that possessing the portrait endangers the possessor's life; in the end the main character gets mentally disturbed, is stricken by fever and dies in

[2] Н. В. Гоголь. Сочинения в двух томах, том I, Государственное издательство художественной литературы, Москва, 1962, с. 501.

torment in a fit of frenzy and delirium. Until his final hour the portrait never lets him off:

„Все люди, окружавшие его постель, казались ему ужасными портретами. Он двоился, четверился в его глазах; все стены казались увешаны портретами, вперившими в него свои неподвижные, живые глаза. Страшные портреты глядели с потолка, с полу, комната расширялась и продолжалась бесконечно, чтобы более вместить этих неподвижных глаз"[3]

The panoramic sight, the unusual point of view of the lyrical speaker or of the characters extraordinarily expanding space is an original motif of Gogol's. . Emblematic for this point of view is the landscape in the first lyrical digresssion of Chapter Eleven of 'Dead Souls': "Русь!Русь! вижу тебя, из моего чудного, прекрасного далека тебя вижу [...] Открыто-пустинно и ровно все в тебе; как точки, как значки, неприметно торчат среди равнин невысокие твои города."[4] According to Weiskopf "... дело идет [....] о расширении пространства, созерцаемого поетом с беспредельной высоты"; "Перед нами плоскостная картина – икона – или даже карта России, своей графической стороной ("точки", значки")[5].

A similar landscape with an extraordinary panoramic depth is revealed in front of the sight of the Cossacks in part VIII of "Taras Bulba": "но загадался они – как орлы, севшие на вершинах обривыстых, высоких гор, с которых далеко видно расстилаюшееся беспредельно море [...] огражденное по старанам чуть видными тонкими поморьями, с прибережными, как мошки, городами и склонившимися, как мелкая тровка лесами."[6] In Gogol's time as it is known there were no air-planes.

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[3] Ibid., c. 527.

[4] Н. В. Гоголь, Сочинения в двух томах. Том II, Государственное издательство художественной литературы. Москва, 1962, с.463

[5] Михаил Вайскопф, Сюжет Гоголя, Радикс, Москва, 1993, с.397.

[6] Н. В. Гоголь, Сочинения в двух томах, том I, с. 314.

But even from an air-plane one cannot see towns which look so distant as to resemble flies.

In some case the panoramic expanse of space is explained by a miracle as is in the short story "Terrible Vengeance". ("Страшная месть": "Все панны и гетманы собирались дивиться сему чуду: вдруг стало видимо далеко во все концы света. Вдали засинел Лиман, за Лиманом разливалось Черное море. Бывалые люди узнали и Крым, горою подымавшийся из моря, и болотный Сиваш. По левую руку видна была земля Галическая"[7].

Connecting normally incompatible objects can be an effective aberration as a result of stress or mental illness. For example in the sick, dizzy vision of Poprishchin in long short story "Записки сумасшедшего" space curves , there appears geographically impossible view: "с одной стороны море, с другой Италия; вон и русские избы виднеют"[8]

The fear of being seen is a motif accompanying that of the devastating power of the glance but occurs also beyond it where the glance without being destroying, is hostile. In 'The Diary of the Madman' in the penultimate entry of the diary we find the clerk Poprishchin in the insane asylum huddled under the table to escape the gaze and the rod of the 'Grand Inquisitor'.

An interesting combination of the character's evaluated position in a spatial and axiological aspect , as the point of view of a prophet on the one hand and on another hand the sense of vulnerability under the impact of the glances directed at him is present in Gogol's works.

In the scene of Taras's execution in the long short story "Taras Bulba" the character is elevated on high. In the first edition *бревно* (the tree trunk) is fixed high up the fortress wall, in the second edition he is elevated and nailed to the tree – in both versions with

7 Ibid., , c.173.

8 Ibid., c. 606.

the same end of view: "Чтобы отсюда был виден казак"[9]. In the first edition the explication is still fuller: "как победный трофей удачи"[10]. Here the punishing gaze in the "Записки сумасшедшего" seem multiplied in a number of gazes in a scene of public execution. That scene sustained in a different modal key but expressing the same state of particular lonesomness of the character, *being looked at* and representing a focal point, *a target of many hostile gazes,* reverberates in the scene of Ostap's execution: "И повел он очами вокруг себя: боже, все неведомые, все чужие лица!"[11] The point is however, that Taras Bulba's position is ambivalent. Being raised upwards, above the high rock, he can not only be seen by the others, but he himself can see better: "ему с высоты все было видно как на ладони"[12]. The motif of seeing is halved its trajectory, is refracted into two modes: to be seen by the others and to be able to seem them. Taras's panoramic vision, conditioned by his elevated point of view, seems to be reflected in the panoramic view in time, in the framework of history. As if anticipating the finale of 'Dead Souls' he pronounces visionary words about Russian might and orthodox faith: "Постойте же, придет время, узнаете вы, что такое православная русская вера!"[13] The transformation of the spatial point of view into a prophetic one in time occurs elsewhere in the story:"Как орли, озирали они вокруг себя очами все поле и чернеющую вдали судьбу свою." ("Тарас Бульба")[14]

The dissociation between the position of seeing all from on high and of being seen by all is present in an interesting way in the novel "Dead Souls". It has already been mentioned that the Russian land is observed from a very high point and is more like a geo-

9 Ibid., c. 347.

10 Н. В. Гоголь, Собрание сочинений в семи томах. Художественная литература, 1976, с. 295.

11 Н. В. Гоголь, Сочинения в двух томах, том I с.342.

12 Ibid.,, c.347

13 Ibod.,., c. 348.

14 Ibid., c. 314.

graphical map. Let me cite another, not used example. The famous phrase "зачем все что ни есть в тебе обратило на меня полные ожидания очи?"[15] presupposes an elevated position of the speaking subject. To be seen from all sides, to be the focus of gazes of everybody, one has to be high above them. This is the position of the spiritual leader, the seer who can judge and show the right way. To that position corresponds the ability of the narrator for supernatural vision, lit up by demonical sheen: "Неестественной властью осветились мои очи"[16].

The idea of elevated position (the „all seeing eye") is persistently repeated in Gogol's correspondence, auto-commentaries, and confessional texts: "Я стал думать о том, как бы выбраться из ряда других и стать на такое место откуда я мог увидеть всю массу."[17]; "Положим я в гордости своей, основавшись на многих достоинствах, мне приписанных всеми, мог подумать, что я стою выше всех и имею право произносить суд над другими"[18].

In these statements there sounds the note of megalomania. Here we get to the problem of the prorfound dualism in Gogol's personality. His fascination with ranks, the climb up the ladder of the administrative hierarchy is a caricature image of the service to lofty ideals . On occasions this note becomes a clearly articulated voice.

In a paradoxical contradiction to that feeling however is the sensation of vulnerability, Gogol's discomfort at being observed. The point is that the position of the lyrical speaker in 'Dead Souls" in psychological perspective is ambivalent: as we know, in Gogol's work the position of being seen by many eyes carries negatve con-

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15 Н. В. Гоголь, том II, с. 463.

16 Ibid., с. 464.

17 Н. В. Гоголь, Авторская изповедь, Собрание сочинений в семи томах, том VI, с. 437.

18 Ibid., с. 453.

notations. "Русь! Чего ж ты хочешь от меня?"[19] – a question asked in 'Dead Souls' paradoxically recalls Poprishchin's exclamation: "чего хотят они от меня, бедного?"[20].

Let us attempt an insight into the traumatic nature of the elevated position. Gogol felt a guilt for the world he has created in 'Dead Souls' – "всю страшную, потрясающую тину мелочей"[21], "тьму и пугающее отсутствие света"[22], he perceives "болезненный упрек себе во всем, что ни есть в России"[23]. The exchange of sights – of the illuminated 'with supernatural power' eyes of the lyrical speaker and the hopeful and trusting eyes of Russia towards him – can change its direction. The one passing judgments could be judged. The motif of the trial over the writer appears persistently in 'Dead Souls' and in "Авторской исповеди". "Но когда выставишься перед лицом незнакомых людей, перед лицом всего света (...) и посыплются съ всех сторон упреки впопад и невпопад, ударят и с умыслом и невзначай по всем чувствительным струнам твоим (...) ты точно свихнешь с ума."[24]

Situated at his favorite elevated spot, commanding a panoramic view before the „all-seeing eye", Gogol at the same time experienced exhilaration and trepidation, a la Poprishchin, at the glances directed at him. This duality of reaction depending on the subject/object position of the vision permeated the whole of Gogol's work. „At the origin of the Gogolian creation and pervading it is an impulse to simultaneous exhibition and concealment" as Donald Fanger[25] well notes. This dual impulse determines also the behav-

19 Н. В. Гоголь, Сочинения в двух томах, том II, с. 463.

20 Н. В. Гоголь, Сочинения в двух томах, том I, с. 606.

21 Н. В. Гоголь, Сочинения в двух томах, том II, с. 378.

22 Н. В. Гоголь, Выбранные места из переписки с друзями. В: Н.В. Гоголь, Собрание сочинений в семи томах, том VI, с. 261.

23 Ibid, c.257.

24 Ibid., c. 451.

25 Donald Fanger, *The Creation of Nikolai Gogol*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. And London, 1979, p. 255

iour of the writer's actual, empirical personality. His wish to become an actor as well as his attempt to university career can be seen as an expression of his desire to be the focus of attention actualized even in spatial elevation above the rest, from the level of the stage and the teacher's desk. At the same time Gogol had a fear of the audience, of being exposed to others' glances. Aksakov witnesses that he traveled in the coach „with an upterned collar of the overcoat above his head (this was his favorite posture)"[26]; in the theatre hall, when attending shows of his own works, his posture is described in baignoire almost reclining so as not to be seen in his seat. Particularly characteristic are Gogol's panic escape from the theatre at staging of 'Ревизор' ('The Government Inspector') – we can note at least two – at the production on 19 April 1836, of the first night of the play in St Peterburg, and on 17 October 1839 in Moskow. We can imagine he felt uncomfortable under the numerous glances and the escalation of tension reached braking point. Remarkable in connection with the thesis of the dejected spirit of the narrator in 'Dead Souls' is Gogol's fleeing – his departure from Moskow just when his work after long vicissitudes and expectations, come out of print. The first copies of 'Dead Souls' were ready on 21 May 1842 and two days later, on 23 May, Gogol takes his seat in the coach to take him to Petersburg on the way, ostensibly, for the Holy Land (by that date Gogol did not yet intend to go directly there). That sudden, unexplicable depature, which embittered his friends can obviously be interpreted as a Gogol's atempt to avoid meeting his readers.

Evidently, the theme of vision is a connected to in-depth psychological mechanism in Gogol's personality, in poetics it is manifested as a structural and semantic indicator, involving the char-

[26] С. Т. Аксаков, История моего знакомства с Гоголем. В: С. Машинский (ред.) Гоголь в воспоминаниях современников. Государственное издательство художественной литературы, Москва, 1952, с.138.

acters in conflict situations, expressing an axiological standpoint, connecting space and time in models of prophecy. This paper attempted to discuss some of these functions.

В статье исследуются различные ракурсы темы о видении в творчестве Гоголя – тема о необычном зрении, о взгляде, несущем сверхъестественную силу, об обмене энергиями между взглядами героев, образующими визуальное диалогическое поле.

Рассматриваются магическая, убивающая сила взгляда, панорамное видение, пророческое созерцание будущего, глубинный психологический комплекс в личности Гоголя – мегаломания и позиция „всевидящего ока", и в то же время страх быть увиденным.

PETYA ABRASHEVA

LOOK AND NARRATION IN "YOUR FACE TOMORROW: FEVER AND SPEAR" BY JAVIER MARIAS

"Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear" by Javier Marias is a book which has a special sensitivity towards look and narration. The look is given the priority of a more profound and penetrating kind of knowledge which has the capacity even to envisage the future of human personality. In comparison to it, narration is shown to be a much more complicated activity. It is also a source of knowledge, but it often could be deceitful and misleading, because it is connected to some kind of distortion from reality. In this respect the look is much more powerful – is reveals what is actually there and if we are able to look well enough we will have the power of real seers.

The beginning of the book is quite challenging. It states that a man should tell nothing to nobody to disprove itself right after that, offering the reader its own version of a fictional narrative. Narration, in the mind of Javier Marias, gains some kind of independent power - it detaches from the discursive field and begins its own life, which interferes in the field of reality. "Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear" is sensitive about the value of words, about what has already been said and thus forever present in the world. Words are ineffaceable, they mark our life, our own destiny, our memory

and that is why they are dangerous arms, which everyone of us has at his/her disposal.

In this sense language is the main tool, which a person has no matter of his/her origin, environment, sex and race. It is something that we all posses. At the same time, this typically human device for communication becomes extremely dangerous in certain situations and could cost even your own life. This is the meaning of the campaign "Careless talk costs lives" – its main aim is to warn against the threat of language. During the war people have been notified that every word they speak could be heard and used against them or against other people. Every word could turn into a weapon pointed towards innocent people because language is a treacherous instrument and strikes unexpectedly. It is especially valid for a military situation, but it concerns also peaceful times when language may be used for the unriddling of human personality, thoughts and intentions. This is what the main character of the novel Jack Deza uses the language for in the building without signs; he has to read on people's appearance and words; to guess their secrets; to penetrate beyond the borders of the visible. That is why vision and language are so important for the novel. They are the main tools which a person has in order to understand and control his/her environment.

Actually part of the distrust towards narration for Marias is a result from the ability of the consciousness to doubt in the authenticity of what has been seen, to oppress certain memories and to make a person question their existence. Traumatic images lead to transformations of memory, veil certain sensations and distort reality after being narrated. In this case memories appear to be a kind of a translation in which part of the already existing data is lost and transformed, but this is a natural way of protection, which reconfirms the untrustworthiness of every narration. A person shows selectivity in his/her memories, they are never a direct record of what has happened, but a translation of his/her own fears and anxieties. In this sense we never possess our past, but always a distorted ver-

sion of it, which makes our images somewhat different in comparison with reality. This mobility of memories is due to the fact that they are an object of constant transformation in the consciousness, and every time they are summoned in a new way, connected with new sensations and impressions. The past is never plain; it is always contaminated with the present and carries its imprints. In this sense images are heterogeneous in regard to time; they are a combination of present and past that is why every time they re-appear in a new way. We are the ones that can make them show different sides from themselves and reveal new meanings and values to us.

The inability to narrate life is also connected to the invisibility of many incidents. Not everything that happens is sensuously perceivable, that is why it stays inaccessible to us. The question is whether it exists if it remains hidden; whether it has exerted influence in some secret way and has determined our destiny. It is exactly because of this invisibility that life can not be narrated– at least not entirely. Life is something which is not reducible to language because narration turns out to be also connected to visibility. In order something to be narrated, it should be seen first, it should find its sensory expression. In this sense visual image is determining for the existence of the verbal one. And since there are some areas of life, which are invisible, their narration turns out to be pointless. It is better if they are left to themselves – with their own gaps and voids. Memory keeps too many pieces, but they are too chaotic and dispersed, it is difficult to be arranged in a coherent narrative, still more because of the existing gaps. This is one of Marias' consecutive arguments against narration, although he continues to practice it regardless of everything else.

To narration Marias contrasts two different things – silence and look, although they are significant in rather different ways. Marias' characters seek access to the essential space of silence, which sometimes reveals much more than language. Silence contains the inexpressible and it is even richer and more multidimensional than

speech. Silence is a potency, which unrolls towards a more peculiar and essential kind of knowledge. It is not a lack of language, but an ability to overleap it, to present the unrepresentable, where words are powerless: *"...sometimes it's impossible to explain the really important things, those that have affected us most deeply, and keeping silent is all that saves us in difficult times, because explanations almost always sound so lame with respect to the pain we have inflicted or that others have inflicted on us..."*[1] Silence is a specific kind of expression, which belongs to a different realm and can reach areas, which are hardly approachable for language. That is why it turns into a precious alternative and replaces speech, bringing a new kind of meaning.

The other rival of narration, according to the novel, is the look. Knowledge bifurcates – it is visual (that, which the face reveals) and verbal (that, which words express). The two can coincide or contradict radically, but in anyway, they act together in their function as an instrument of knowledge. The language in the novel is doomed to some kind of insufficiency – it stutters, stammers, collapses and thus puts a barrier in front of people and their communication with the world. Language turns out to be an unreliable tool, which is inadequate and weak. On its part, the look is something, which helps language, but at the same time, it is opposed to it. It helps language because like language it is used as an instrument for penetration in the secrets of human personality, but it is also contrary to language, because unlike it, the look is reliable and steady in its work. That is why the novel pays particular attention to the eyes and eyesight. Marias attaches great importance to the look and it seems that his secret aim is to teach his readers how to enhance their ability to see of seeing, because according to him they have lost it: *"It is, of course, rare in England, where ancient tradition requires the gaze to be veiled or opaque or absent; but it's just as rare*

[1] Marias. Javier, Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear, Vintage Books, 2006, pp. 108

in Spain, where it used to be commonplace, and yet now no one sees anything or anyone or has the slightest interest in seeing, and where a kind of visual meanness leads people to behave as if others did not exist, or only as shapes or obstacles to be avoided..."[2]. In "Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear" the characters' personality is hidden in their eyes and could be found only there. But the look reveals also the person who looks as if it reverses the direction of looking and uncovers some additional space; it allows reverse looking by giving access not only to the view, but also to the one who is viewing. In this sense the look in Marias' novel is a two-way look.

Human faces are particularly important for the novel as they are the most characteristic feature for identification and it is through them that we receive information about their owner. Faces hold a special kind of knowledge, specific features of individuality, which can be distinguished only there. The face shows something fundamental, something which stays invariable and static to the end in comparison with feelings and thoughts. That is why not only the characters, but the novel itself tries to read on the face, because it hides the innermost essence of its owner. And again, the face is the area of the visual; that is why it is given additional importance and significance in the novel.

According to Marias the face of man hides different layers and the surface not always reveals the real measures of character. In spite of all this, it contains certain signs, which speak about the nature of man. That is why the face, which we will see tomorrow, could somehow be foreseen from today. It forms beneath the layers of external form, as if there is another more crucial form beneath it, and it is this other form that human look should reach in order to distinguish real features of man. In a sense, the upper layers are permeable; they bring information about what happens beneath because every layer is produced by one and the same firm core, which

[2] Marias, Javier, Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear, Vintage Books, 2006, pp. 52

keeps the essence of human character. As a whole, human personality is built of many layers and only the most inner - that of the past, which defines us, keeps the truth about us without any delusions and misrepresentations. All the other layers – set up on the surface or not – contain some kind of diversion, conceal reality and bring deceitful features. Practically human nature is hidden behind many masks which try and reveal different notions about personality. In spite of all this, the real face is constantly present and could be recognized with a closer look in depth.

The aim of Jack Deza, Tupra and the rest like them is exactly this - to decipher what the face of the person will be tomorrow; to envisage it through associations and to understand what stands behind the ostensible appearance. This is a rather risky initiative still more that the characters never learn if their predictions have turned out to be true. There is always the danger of unjust accusation of innocent people, moreover, according to Deza's words one gets indifferent with time to what he is doing. People usually don't admit what they see; they have the need to fool themselves, to distort images, because they don't like reality. Others like Jack Deza, however, have the gift to understand the others in depth and to decipher their appearance as their look penetrates under the surface and gets to the bottom of things. Only in this way one's personality could be read and revealed thoroughly.

The composition of the book is very well considered. The novel is divided in two parts, which are interconnected. The first part "Fever" is a preparation for what is going to be the theme of the second part "Spear" while in the beginning the work comments very often problems of language and eyesight and the second part turns them in a basic tool for surveillance and revealing of the nature of human personality. The work of Jack Deza includes the construction of narratives about the examined individuals on the base of what he has seen and heard. In a sense, the novel tries to train the senses of the readers, so that the latter can learn how to look steadi-

ly, to adopt the insight of the character and to enhance their understanding for the world. As a matter of fact, every person takes from life as much as he/she succeeds to see and going into its depths, we enlarge our horizon.

On the other bridge of human consciousness stays oblivion, which erases the marks of the past. According to Marias existence is always trying to preserve itself in some way, to provide us with proofs that it has been present at some point. Things resist to oblivion and they have their own mechanism for preservation. They take part in the present and leave marks in order to be recognized, they fight for recognition in spite of their existential fragility and instability. Real oblivion, according to Marias, is not possible. Memories can sink in consciousness to reach some distant and intangible corner, but even there they continue to live and can be summoned back: *"Oblivion is always blind in one eye"* thinks the author, because what has once been perceived could be brought back to visibility. Memories leave their marks and even when they have sunk deep or are pushed out by the subconscious, they mature in us and could be revived again if the eye of oblivion opens towards them. In other words oblivion is never full and what has been forgotten, hasn't been erased from the consciousness, just calmed in its womb so that it could raise again and traverse the regions of visibility: *"Not that anything that happened is ever completely erased, not even the bloodstain and that stubborn ring rubbed and scrubbed away, in time an analyst would have doubtless found some microscopic trace on the wood, and in the depths of our memory too — those rarely visited depths — there is an analyst waiting with his magnifying glass or his microscope (which is why oblivion is always blind in one eye)."*[3]

Furthermore, the strength of the things that we see is in their inability to be erased. The look reveals different sights – some joyful, others unbearable, but all of them are ineffaceable from mem-

[3] Marias. Javier, Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear, Vintage Books, 2006, pp. 170

ory no matter how deep we will bury them. Exactly because of this a person should be very prudent and choose his/her sights very carefully. What troubles consciousness is much stronger if there is a visual image of it. Of course, we can not always stop images, but we could try to alienate them; not to turn them in an object of a special exploration. A person should protect himself/herself from some images which can offend him/her. The look in this sense should be tamed; to be navigated so far as images, which we perceive, remain in our memory and take part in the building of our own past. In this sense it becomes clear why dead people are usually covered with a shroud. This takes away visually their death from us, from the world of the living, but at the same time, it is a sign that the image of death could not be taken.

One of the important messages of the novel is related to the question of the preliminary knowledge of death. This is not exactly an intuition, but some kind of specific ability for penetrating in the secrets of the incomprehensibility and inaccessibility. Such a piece of knowledge is not a usual type of foresight, a run on the surface of future, but a deep penetration in the unimaginable. Nobody knows what death looks like; nobody knows its face, because it is unrepresentable. Hence our wish to turn our look at it and capture it. In "Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear" the main character finds a picture of the brother of his mother who has been killed in the Civil war in Spain. His first reaction at the look of the dead is to cover the picture in order not to let the image close to him because images are ineffaceable and a person can never stand the look of death: *"My first impulse was to cover it up again with the little piece of satin, like someone protecting a living eye from seeing the face of a corpse, and as if I were suddenly aware that one is not responsible for what one sees, but for what one looks at, that the latter can always be avoided — you always have the choice — after the first inevitable glimpse, which is treacherous, involuntary, fleeting, and takes you by surprise, you can close your eyes or immediately cover them with your*

hands or turn away or choose to pass swiftly on to the next page without pausing."[4]

The mother of Jack Deza has taken from the police the same picture of her 18-years old brother, who has been killed, because to leave it among so many similar pictures would be equivalent of leaving his body unburied. Thus, the image takes away the symbolic capital of the body; it turns out to be a substitute of the dead body. But what is this image? This is the image of the corpse – of that, which according to Blanchot[5] is in the border situation of being neither here, nor anywhere else. At the same time the grave has the aim of hiding the corpse by leaving a visible trace of its presence. In the same way the photograph of the brother is covered in the novel with a piece of satin; the picture is a substitute of the corpse exactly because the corpse is so much like the image. The covering of the photograph is equivalent to the burying of the dead man, whose body was never found and thus stayed unburied. This is another sign for the real significance of image.

At the very end of the novel the wife of Jack Deza pays a visit to him, but we never understand anything about their conversation. In this way the author denies for the last time the necessity of narration. In fact there are no events in the work; it is built on thoughts and memories about the recent past. It seems that the plot is reduced precisely because of the distrust in the act of narration. In this way the novel shows respect for its own prescriptions and closes as a narrative space, disproving the theory about the obligatory role of narration in literature. This is the final mark of the victory of the look in the novel of Javier Marias.

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[4] Marias. Javier, Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear, Vintage Books, 2006, pp. 194

[5] Бланшо, Морис, Литературното пространство, ЛИК София, 2000

В центре исследовательского внимания текста находится отношение взгляд-нарратив в романе Хавьера Мариаса "Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear" – их связь, противопоставление, отталкивание. Произведение демонстрирует особую чувствительность к ресурсам взгляда, так как по его идее нарратив никогда не представляется объективным и способным повторить реальность в ее аутентичном виде. Взгляд превосходит нарратив постольку, поскольку нарратив может выразить лишь то, что взгляд уже зарегистрировал. В этом смысле визуальный образ обладает особым видом силы, которая надстраивает язык и компенсирует нехватку вербального образа.

Роман Мариаса указывает на две альтернативы нарратива – молчание и взгляд. Молчание превосходит нарратив обилием значений, которые оно несет в себе, отказом фиксировать определенный смысл и ограничивать содержание. Взгляд со своей стороны является мощным инструментом познания, который дополняет нарратив и который часто противопоставляется ему проявлениями отсутствующих в рассказе силы и устойчивости. Имея все это в виду, настоящий текст является попыткой исследования ресурсов взгляда и языка при раскрытии сложных проявлений природы человека, изображенных в романе.

III.
Visuality and meaning: literary image, painting and fotography

Визуальность и значение: литературный образ, живопись и фотография

ANGEL V. ANGELOV

„AUF EINE LAMPE" VON EDUARD MÖRIKE: AUTONOMITÄT UND HETEROGENITÄT DER „KLASSISCHEN" FORM

Eduard Mörikes Gedicht „Auf eine Lampe" ist das am häufigsten besprochene seines gesamten lyrischen Werkes, worauf sich aus der Bibliographie zu den kritischen Ausgaben seiner Werke schließen lässt. Aufgrund des Disputes, der mit einem Brief Martin Heideggers an Emil Staiger[1] begann, hat „Auf eine Lampe" eine zusätzliche kulturhistorische Signifikanz erlangt und ist in die Geschichte der Literaturwissenschaft der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts eingegangen.[2] Die Geschichte der Interpretationen dieser

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1 Später schlossen sich zunächst der stets zu Polemiken aufgelegte Leo Spitzer an, kurz darauf I. Appelbaum-Graham und dann erneut Spitzer, W. Schneider, W. von Nordheim, H. Politzer, S. Burckhard und R. Guardini – alle in den 1950er Jahren.

2 Erörterte man „Auf eine Lampe" früher lediglich als ein Werk Mörikes unter anderen, wurden dem Gedicht nach diesem Disput zahlreiche spezielle Untersuchungen gewidmet. Sie boten neue Interpretationen, die die vorausgegangenen dementierten. Auch in Monografien, die sich mit dem Gesamtschaffen Mörikes befassen, wird in der Regel auf den Disput verwiesen, wenn es um die Interpretation von „Auf eine Lampe" geht. Der Disput ist prägend für das Forscherinteresse; während das Geschriebene über „Auf eine Lampe" in den Mörike-Monografien von Ben-

Verse könnte im Kleinen zeigen, wie sich in den vergangenen sechzig Jahren die Herangehensweisen sowohl an den lyrischen Text, als auch an die deutsche Literaturgeschichte verändert haben[3]. Bis in die achtziger Jahre war man vor allem bestrebt, die poetischen Besonderheiten des Gedichtes herauszuarbeiten, wie auch seine Zusammenhänge mit anderen Werken der Dichtkunst – von Mörike selbst, von Goethe, Schiller, Keats und hellenistischen Dichtern. Seit Beginn der neunziger Jahre rückt das Augenmerk mehr in Richtung der sozialen Funktion des Bildes der Lampe sowie in Richtung des Verhältnisses zwischen der Lampe und der Stimme, die die Verse spricht. Die wesentliche Änderung besteht jedoch nicht darin, dass neue Deutungen angeboten werden, sondern in der sozialkritischen Analyse der Herangehensweisen Staigers, Heideggers und Spitzers an das Gedicht. (Lindenberger 1990, S. 398–408)

Im ersten Teil des hier folgenden Textes werde ich einige Interpretationen der Verse analysieren, die repräsentativ für eine gewisse moderne Grundhaltung zur Literatur sind. Diese Grundhaltung erhebt das literarische Werk in den Rang eines heiligen Textes, und

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no von Wiese und von Herbert Meyer (die im gleichen Jahr erschienen, in dem der Disput stattfand (1950) in der einschlägigen Forschungsliteratur selten zitiert wird, werden die Herangehen und Thesen – vor allem der ersten Disputteilnehmer stets herangezogen. In seiner Monographie über Mörike bezweckte Benno von Wiese unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg Werte zu aktualisieren, die die deutsche Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts hervorgebracht hat, die auf die Gegenwart heilend und vereinigend wirken und eine Stütze sein können, wie sie es seiner Meinung nach auch in der Vergangenheit waren. Dem Gedicht „Auf eine Lampe" wird genauso viel Platz eingeräumt, wie den übrigen Gedichten. Es findet sich in dem Teil mit der Überschrift „Die Schönheit" (von Wiese 1950, S. 216, 221–223).

[3] So schrieb auch Albrecht Holschuh: „Die gesamte Forschung zu diesem Gedicht aufzuarbeiten, bedürfte es einer Monographie." (Holschuh 1991, S. 576).

der Verfasser der Interpretation spielt die Priesterrolle, die Rolle des Herrschers über das heilige Wissen, in welches er die nicht Eingeweihten einweiht. Die künstlerische Form ist wie eine Gottheit, und die, die sie auslegen, sind ihre Kultdiener. „Die ideale Kunstgestalt steht wie ein seliger Gott vor uns da", zitiert Heidegger zustimmend aus Hegels „Ästhetik" (Heidegger 1971, S. 31). Die von mir analysierten Interpretationen sind scharfsinnig, einige durchaus auch virtuos. Was ich in Frage stelle, ist nicht die Scharfsinnigkeit oder die Sensibilität für den poetischen Text, sondern die Werte und die soziale Funktion dieser Auslegungen.

Ferner möchte ich versuchen, die Instabilität der klassischen Form der Lampe zu begründen, wie auch ihren nicht einheitlichen Ursprung, in dem sich antike, orientalische und Elemente des 19. Jahrhunderts mischen. Des Weiteren werde ich die soziale Funktion der klassischen Form erörtern.

I

Im Jahre 1950 hielt Staiger in Amsterdam und in Freiburg im Breisgau den Vortrag „Die Kunst der Interpretation" (Staiger 1971, S. 7–28)[4]. In ihr wird das Gedicht „Auf eine Lampe" als methodisches Beispiel analysiert:

> Auf eine Lampe
> Noch unverrückt, o schöne Lampe, schmückest du,
> An leichten Ketten zierlich aufgehangen hier,
> Die Decke des nun fast vergessnen Lustgemachs.
> Auf deiner weißen Marmorschale, deren Rand
> Der Efeukranz von goldengrünem Erz umflicht,
> Schlingt fröhlich eine Kinderschar den Ringelreih'n.
> Wie reizend alles! lachend, und ein sanfter Geist
> Des Ernstes doch ergossen um die ganze Form –

[4] Der Vortrag bildet den Titel des Buches mit Analysen der deutschen Literatur des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, das Staiger 1955 veröffentlichte.

Ein Kunstgebild' der echten Art. Wer achtet sein?
Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst.
(1846)[5]

Martin Heidegger wohnte dieser Vorlesung bei; ohne sich an der im Anschluss aufgekommenen Diskussion beteiligt zu haben, schilderte er in zwei Briefen an Staiger seine Interpretation des Gedichts (Heidegger 1971, S. 28–42). Leo Spitzer machte sich mit dem veröffentlichten Briefwechsel zwischen Heidegger und Staiger vertraut und bot eine weitere, eigene Interpretation (Spitzer 1951, S. 133–147). Alle drei halten daran fest, dass das Gedicht vom Wesen des Kunstwerks als solches „redet". Seine Besonderheit besteht darin, dass es seine eigene künstlerische Form schafft, indem es eine sinnliche Form beschreibt und wertet – nämlich die Lampe, der es gewidmet ist. In Vers 9 wird die Lampe als „ein Kunstgebild der echten Art" definiert. Kunstgebild ist in diesem Falle der Schaffensprozess, dessen Ergebnis sich in eine vollendete und vollkommene plastische Gestalt „ergossen" hat.[6] Ein derartiges Wortverständnis verdeckt jedoch das Vorliegen einer ideologischen – harmonisierenden – Haltung, auf die ich später noch eingehen werde. Die Unstimmigkeiten beginnen mit der Diskrepanz in der Auslegung eines Wortes im letzten Vers, machen aber schon bald die Unterschiede der drei Hermeneutiken bezüglich der Frage sichtbar, worin das Wesen eines Kunstwerks besteht.

Die grundlegende These in Staigers Interpretation ist, dass die Zeit, in der der Dichter gelebt hat, gegenüber dem Ideal der klassischen Schönheit und der klassischen Kunst gleichgültig geworden ist. Die Entfernung vom Klassischen als Äußerung des Gemeinschaftsideals sieht Staiger auch in der Ähnlichkeit des Schicksals

[5] Der Text ist der Ausgabe von Göpfert entnommen (Göpfert 1964, S. 85).

[6] Zur Bedeutung von „Gebilde" als etwas, das von innen nach außen geschaffen wird, sich entfaltet und schließlich seine eigene Gestalt erlangt, s. (Gadamer 1986, S. 358).

Mörikes und dem von Poeten der hellenistischen Epoche bestätigt. Sein Augenmerk ist auf die individuellen poetischen Schönheitsbezeugungen und auf die literarische Tradition, in der sie möglich werden, gerichtet.

Für Heidegger ist der literaturhistorische Kontext nicht wesentlich, während sie bei Staiger eben eine grundlegende Rolle spielt. Die beiden Leitgedanken in der Interpretation des Philosophen sind: die schöne Lampe ist ein wahres künstlerisches Gebilde, das symbolon (σύμβολον) des Kunstwerkes oder, in Hegels Sprache, „des Ideals". Als „ein Kunstgebild der echten Art" bringt die Lampe das sinnliche Scheinen und das Scheinen der Idee zusammen, und das Gedicht ist das in der Sprache ruhende Symbol des Kunstwerkes überhaupt. Heideggers Kardinalfrage ist die nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen der schönen Lampe und der Sprache. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, unterteilt Heidegger das Gedicht in drei Teile; im dritten Teil, den Versen 9 und 10 verschmelzen die sprachliche Form und die Form des „Kunstgebildes der echten Art", so dass die eine zur Voraussetzung für die Existenz der anderen wird. Deshalb stellt Heidegger die These auf, dass das Kunstwerk nur als Folge des Scheinens in sich selbst selig sein kann. Es scheint uns nicht so – welche Meinung Staiger vertrat -, sondern es ist *selig*, es ist ein *Scheinen*. In Heideggers Interpretation nehmen Kunstwerk, Sprache und Schönheit das Wesen einer Epiphanie an. „Das Kunstgebilde echter Art ist selbst die Epiphanie der von ihm gelichteten und in ihm gewahrten Welt." (Heidegger 1971, S. 40)

Der Artikel „Wiederum Mörikes Gedicht ‚Auf eine Lampe'„ stellt das für Spitzer typische Herangehen an eine explication de texte dar (Spitzer 1951)[7]. Um die Bedeutung des letzten Verses zu

[7] Wie aus der Ergänzung zum Artikel (Spitzer 1951, S. 146) hervorgeht, kennt Spitzer lediglich den Briefwechsel zwischen Staiger und Heidegger. Staigers veröffentlichten Vortrag „Die Kunst der Interpretation" las Spitzer erst, nachdem er seinen Beitrag in die Schweiz abgeschickt hatte.

klären, bedürfe es laut Spitzer einer genaueren Sprachanalyse als derjenigen, die der Literaturhistoriker und der Philosoph lieferten, doch dies gelte auch für das gesamte Gedicht. Der künstlerische Charakter der Literatur ist ein Stileffekt, der sowohl auf den Zusammenhängen zwischen den Wortbedeutungen im Werk beruht, als auch auf ihrem Verhältnis zur gegenwärtig gebrauchten Sprache. Ohne Kenntnis nicht nur der deutschen Syntax, Semantik und Phonetik, sondern auch der Eigenheiten des schwäbischen Dialekts können wir das Wesen der poetischen Ausdrucksweise nicht erfassen.

Spitzer erkennt eine Übereinstimmung zwischen der runden Form der Lampe, dem Reigentanz der Kinder, dem Efeukranz aus Bronze und dem Aufbau des Werkes, organisiert in der runden Zahl von zehn Versen. Kreishaft in sich geschlossen, wohltemperiert, lachend-ernst ist Spitzer zufolge das künstlerisch Schöne bei Mörike. Der kreisförmige Reigentanz der Kinder und der Rahmen von goldengrüner Bronze, der die Kinder umkränzt, bilden einen Doppelkreis, heiter und ernst zugleich.

Das Lachen wird vom Geist des Ernstes ausgeglichen, und dieses Gleichmaß gilt auch für das Gedicht selbst. So wird das aus entgegengesetzten Stimmungen stammende, in sich geschlossene, gemäßigte und reizende Ganze in Vers 9 als „ein Kunstgebild der echten Art" definiert. Die Form des Gedichts und die Form der Lampe stellen eine gleichzeitige Überlagerung von zwei in sich geschlossenen Kreisen dar. Die schöne Lampe hat dem Dichter dazu verholfen das, was er für Kunstschön hält, zu definieren. Das einem Gegenstand gewidmete Gedicht (Dinggedicht) gelangt zum Wesen der Kunst, und die Lampe nunmehr als künstlerische Form wird zum Symbol dieses Wesens. Die Wirkung der Lampe wird für „reizend" erklärt, doch fast niemand schenkt ihr Beachtung. Eben die Frage „Wer achtet sein?" bündelt die zeitliche und räumliche Isolation des Kunstwerks, und der letzte entscheidende Vers „Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst" bestätigt die Isoliert-

heit des Schönen, der Kunst. Spitzer analysiert die sinnliche Gestalt der Lampe genauso wie die sprachliche – er sucht nach inneren Wechselbeziehungen, überträgt das Sprachliche ins Visuelle, was er anschließend wieder als Ganzheit innerer Wechselbeziehungen textualisiert.[8]

Die Erfahrungen, die Spitzer in den neuen wissenschaftlichen Kreisen und dem Lebensumfeld in den USA gewonnen hat, beeinflussten seine Interpretationsweise – der Vergleich mit Keats' „Ode on a Grecian Urn" wurde später vielfach verwendet und ausgebaut. Die amerikanischen Erfahrungen regten ihn zur Kritik an der Heideggerschen und überhaupt der deutschen philologischen Grundhaltung dem Text gegenüber an. „Der deutsche Philologen hat hier viel von dem englischen Kulturmilieu zu lernen, in dem „verstehen" als demütiges, „unter etwas stehen, um es zu erkennen" (*to under-stand)* gefasst wird, in dem das *understatement* als Tugend gilt und eine ausgesprochene Abneigung gegen *overinterpretation* herrscht." (Kursiv: L.S.). (Spitzer 1951, S. 143–44)[9] Eine derartige Behauptung lässt sich natürlich leichter aufstellen als beweisen. In diesem Disput offenbart Spitzer das traditionelle Misstrauen eines Philologen gegenüber Verallgemeinerungen, die nicht konkret am Text des Gedichts nachweisbar sind.

Alle drei beschäftigen sich mit Etymologien, jedoch auf unter-

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[8] Auch andere Analysen Spitzers überzeugen von dessen Fähigkeit, sich die materielle Beschaffenheit der aus Worten geschöpfenten Welt vorzustellen und Argumente, die seine Analysen stützen, eben in der wahrnehmbaren Szenografie von Dingen und Situationen zu finden.

[9] Man kann wohl eine politische Dimension in Spitzers Äußerung gegen die deutsche Germanistik sehen. Der Erkenntniswert einer Äußerung, die für *under-standing* plädiert, macht das aber belehrend, *überstehend*, finde ich für fraglich. Diese Kritik schließt vermutlich nicht die deutsche Romanistik und ihre Geschichte. In den Debatten, an denen Spitzer sich in den USA häufig beteiligte, verteidigte er die deutsche romanistische und Denktradition (neo)romantischen Typus des 18.-20. Jahrhunderts.

schiedliche Art: Staiger und Spitzer deuten die Bedeutungen innerhalb des Gedichtes bzw. in Mörikes Werk, während Heidegger Bedeutungen weiter entwickelt bzw. Bedeutungen schlicht erfindet, gleich, ob sie im Gedicht vorhanden sind oder nicht, wie es mit dem Licht der Lampe der Fall ist. Seine Interpretation ist eine Erschließung, er nutzt den Vers als Anlass für Überlegungen, die auch unabhängig vom Gedicht gemacht werden können. Die Rhythmik gehört zu den wesentlichsten Besonderheiten der Poesie. Heideggers Behauptung, in Vers 10 „Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst" liege die Betonung auf ist, zeugen von seinem Unwillen, die Versrhythmik zu berücksichtigen, denn hier handelt es sich um einen Jambus, bei dem die Betonung auf schön liegt, wie Staiger bemerkt. Staigers Interpretation ist eine Wechselwirkung mit dem, und keine Unterwerfung unter das Gedicht; Wechselwirkungen kann es viele geben, und darin, so scheint mir, liegt der prinzipielle Unterschied zwischen dem Herangehen Heideggers einerseits und dem Staigers und Spitzers andererseits. Die Interpretationen der Letzteren brauchen das Gedicht, sie existieren wegen ihrer Verbindung zu diesem.[10]

Die Grundfrage des Disputs ist die (Un)abhängigkeit des Kunstwerks und der Schönheit von der Beachtung durch den Menschen. „...die rechte Art eines Kunstgebildes, die Schönheit des Schönen waltet nicht von Gnaden der Menschen, insofern sie das Kunstwerk achten oder nicht, ob sie, was schön ist, in ihren Genuß nehmen oder nicht. Das Schöne bleibt, was es ist, unabhängig

[10] Fast ein Jahr nachdem ich den Aufsatz geschrieben und an die Zeitschrift „Arcadia" abgeschickt hatte, stiess ich an eine Bestätigung in einem Radiovortrag von Staiger. An einer Stelle begründet er seine Idee, dass die Interpretation selbst eine Art vom Kunstwerk sei, und fährt fort: „Aber dieses Kunstwerk ist nicht wie das dichterische *selig in ihm selbst*. Es bezieht sich auf etwas anderes, auf das interpretierte Werk, und evident ist es nicht an sich, sondern eben in der genauen Beziehung auf das dichterische Gebilde, das sich als ihr Thema darstellt." (Staiger1961, S. 358)

davon, wie die Frage *Wer achtet sein?* beantwortet wird." (Heidegger 1971, S. 39) Diese Unabhängigkeit verleiht der Schönheit und dem Kunstwerk ein göttliches Wesen. Sowohl Heidegger, als auch Staiger stellen die These auf, die Grundstimmung des Gedichts sei Wehmut. „Ich gehe wohl mit Ihnen einig, wenn ich diese [Grund] Stimmung die zurückblickende Wehmut nenne." (Heidegger 1971, S. 37) Für Staiger ist die Wehmut Teil des Gefühls des Dichters selbst.[11], da Mörike sich für einen Epigonen hielt, weshalb er es nicht mehr wagte, sich über die Schönheit mit derselben Entschiedenheit zu äußern, wie es Goethe getan hatte. Staiger bestimmt die Grundstimmung als melancholischen Rückblick auf die hohe Zeit der Weimarer Klassik und auf die Person Goethes, von denen Mörike und seine Zeit unwiderruflich getrennt sind. In Staigers Interpretation „dient Mörikes Gedicht als Allegorie, die das zu jener Zeit übliche Bild der deutschen Literaturgeschichte untermauert. In der Generation nach Goethe konnten laut diesem Bild der Literaturgeschichte auch die begabtesten Dichter nur Epigonen gewesen sein, Nachfolger einer so großen Tradition, dass alles, was auch immer sie schreiben würden, wie ein Niedergang aussehen müsste." (Lindenberger 1990, S. 402)[12]

Alle drei Interpretationen sehen in dem Gedicht das Bild des Endes einer unterbrochenen und beinahe nicht mehr möglichen Kommunikation zwischen Kunst und Publikum. Zur doppelten Geschlossenheit, die Spitzer aufdeckt (die Lampen- und die Gedichtform) kann noch die Geschlossenheit des Raums ergänzt werden (das Lustgemach). Das lyrische Ich betrachtet die Lampe,

[11] S. die Einleitung von W. Wögenbauer zu dem Briefwechsel zwischen Heidegger und Staiger. Wögenbauer 2004: 34–37.

[12] Die Zitate nivellieren alle herangezogenen Verfasser und Texte, deshalb möchte ich auf die sorgfältige und überzeugende Argumentation im Beitrag Herbert Lindenbergers hinweisen. Im zweiten Satz des angeführten Zitats resümiert er das Herangehen Peter Uwe Hohendahls, auf dessen Buch zum Entstehen der deutschen Nationalliteratur er verweist.

erfreut sich an ihr und definiert sie als „Kunstgebild' der echten Art". Es ist der einzige Eingeweihte bzw. gehört zu den wenigen, die eingeweiht sind. Das Sichselbstgenügen des Artefakts und die Eingeweihtheit des Betrachters sind die wichtigsten Botschaften des Gedichtes. Gerade der beschauliche Blick festigt im letzten Vers die selige Selbstgenügsamkeit der Schönheit, so dass letzten Endes sogar die Bindung zwischen Eingeweihtem und kostbarem Gegenstand unterbrochen wird und die Schönheit, die Kunst zu einem für jedermann unzugänglichen Geheimnis werden. Die Lampe wird zwar tatsächlich zum Symbol, jedoch nicht jeglicher Kunst, sondern vor allem der modernen Verselbständigung des Artefakts.

Sowohl Staiger, als auch Heidegger vertreten eine konservative Haltung: das Heutige hat sich entfremdet, ist von der Welt der in der Lampe verkörperten künstlerischen Schönheit abgefallen. Und da sie der Meinung sind, das Schöne existiere unabhängig von der Beachtung durch die Menschen, gehen sie der Frage, wer die in der Gestalt der Lampe verkörperte Schönheit ansieht, nicht nach. Für sie existiert die Schönheit in einem Tempelraum. Das lyrische Ich gibt zwar nicht preis, wer es ist, spricht aber eindeutig aus der Position des Priesters im menschenleeren Tempel der Schönheit. Der schöne Gegenstand wird zum Ersatz für ein religiöses Symbol. Wir dürfen jedoch nicht an wahre Religiosität in der Beziehung des lyrischen Ich zu dem Ding – Geheimnis denken, denn wir wissen nicht, ob das Geheimnis mit anderen geteilt wird. Es gibt keine Gemeinschaft von Eingeweihten, keine Kommunikation, die das Geheimnis sozialisieren würden. Der kostbare Gegenstand, ob als Symbol oder als Sein, wird weder zum Geschenk, noch zum Versprechen, sondern befindet sich im Zustand des Vergessens. Das Kostbare wird nicht geteilt, woraus Isolation und Vergessen folgen, was für Staiger melancholisch anziehend ist, während Heidegger die Existenz des Schönen außerhalb jedweder Gemeinschaft gefällt. Die Interpretationen aller drei werden Mörikes Kunstverständnis gerecht, denn auch andere Gedichte Mörikes lassen ein Bild der in

sich geschlossenen, isolierten Existenz entstehen. Die Selbstgenügsamkeit ist die Ursache der wehmütigen Stimmung. Ob bei einer Änderung der Grundhaltung das Geheimnis der Schönheit nicht zu einem Geschenk werden könnte?

Auch die drei Herangehensweisen sind, jede auf ihre Art, in sich geschlossen. Vor allem Staiger entwickelt kontinuierlich sein Konzept des eigenen Territoriums der Literaturwissenschaft, ihrer Eigenständigkeit gegenüber den anderen Geisteswissenschaften. Dieses Konzept, das die Spezifik sowohl der schöngeistigen Literatur, als auch der Reflexion darüber sucht, scheint mir beispielhaft für die Modernität und ihre isolationistischen Verfahren. In seinen Analysen nimmt Staiger nicht einfach die Haltung eines belesenen Mannes oder fähigen Interpreten ein, sondern die eines Eingeweihten – er lüftet die Geheimnisse der deutschen Literatur des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts. In Arbeiten aus den 1960er Jahren kritisiert Staiger den Perspektivismus und Relativismus der zeitgenössischen Kultur und misst diese an den unerreichbaren klassischen Epochen in der westeuropäischen Literatur. Für die deutschsprachige Literatur ist dies selbstverständlich die Weimarer Klassik. Das, was Staiger liebt und als dessen Repräsentant er sich fühlt, ist die klassische Art von Literatur, deren künstlerische und moralische Werte er vertritt. Das Klassische ist bei ihm nicht institutionell begründet und nicht zu bestimmten, vor allem politischen Zwecken oktroyiert. Die klassische Literatur in Europa ist ein „Gipfel" der Kunst und der Werte, und die (west)europäische ist die Weltliteratur. (Staiger 1979) Seine Analysen einzelner Werke oder Stellen sind eindringlich, sie verleihen seiner Methodologie Überzeugungskraft.[13]

[13] Die meisten seiner Bücher erleben mehrere Auflagen, was für Forschungsliteratur eher ungewöhnlich ist. Er hatte ein feines Gespür für Poesie und ihre Rhythmik, übersetzte Gedichte, vor allem epische Dichtung, aus mehreren Sprachen, und verfasste ein Buch, in dem er Dichtung und Musik miteinander vergleicht. (Staiger 1947)

Die soziale Funktion dieser Position halte ich jedoch für problematisch, denn sie geht von einer Wahrheit und vor allem einer Zugehörigkeit aus. Was die Nationalität betrifft, ist das die zum Deutschen, sozial gesehen – die zum Aristokratischen und Elitären. Die Zusammenhänge, die Staiger zum Schaffen Mörikes herstellt, sind nur in der deutschen Literatur angesiedelt. Der Zusammenhang zu den Dichtern des Hellenismus in der Ähnlichkeit des Schicksals Mörikes und das der Dichter der hellenistischen Epoche begründet. Dieser Zusammenhang mit der Antike wird von Mörikes Leben und Werk selbst erbracht, die Staiger von innen her zu interpretiert. Die sprachlichen Zusammenhänge, die Heidegger für gewöhnlich herstellt, beruhen auf altgriechischen Wörtern. Im Gegensatz zu beiden behandelt Spitzer das Gedicht in einem allgemeineren, westeuropäischen Kontext.

Man kann durchaus sagen, dass jeder sein spezifisches Fachwissen nutzt. Jenseits dieses Wissens jedoch reduziert Staiger die deutsche Literatur an die Werte der Weimarer Klassik, wie er sie interpretiert. Bei Heidegger finden wir auch hier eine konsequente Aneignung des Altgriechischen von der deutschen Sprache; wenn das Altgriechische das wahre Heim des Seins ist, dann bewahrt das Deutsche bis heute noch das Scheinen des Seins. Beide Positionen enthalten sowohl soziale, als auch politische Implikationen – Geschlossenheit und Ausschließlichkeit. Sie bemühen sich, die unwandelbare Größe der Klassik zu manifestieren und die Existenz unabänderlicher sozialer Werte zu vermitteln.[14] Heute jedoch fetischisiert ein derartiges Streben nach Ausschließlichkeit einfach seinen Gegenstand und/oder harmonisiert dessen Zwiespältigkeit. Der Fetisch kaschiert gerade den sozialen Mechanismus, der ihn zum Gegenstand der Anbetung gemacht hat. Der Zweck der Ver-

[14] Eine kritische Übersicht von Konzeptionen des klassischen und Vorstellung einer eigenen Lösung des Problems – s. (K'osev 2008, S. 307–328).

ehrung des Klassischen besteht darin, das Historische in die Ewigkeit übergehen zu lassen.[15]

Ähnlich ist auch die Haltung Hans Georg Gadamers, der „Auf eine Lampe" als methodische Illustration am Ende seiner Betrachtung über Verhältnis von Text und Interpretation verwendet. Gadamer hatte das Gedicht speziell wegen des Streits von Staiger, Heidegger und Spitzer gewählt. Die kurze Interpretation verdeutlicht noch einmal, und zwar am konkreten Stoff, seine Herangehensweise an das Thema der Schönheit und des Kunstwerks. Ohne die Bereitschaft des Aufnehmenden, ganz Ohr zu sein (Gadamer besteht auf dem Hören), würde kein dichterischer Text sprechen. Gadamer scheint seine Interpretation auf die Wechselwirkung zwischen dem gesprochenem und dem gehörten, rezipiertem dichterischen Wort zu begründen, doch es erweist sich, dass das Verstehen (das Hören), das gleichzeitig die Interpretation des Textes ist, im Grunde schließlich verschwinden und den Text sprechen lassen muss; so wie bei Heidegger die Sprache spricht. Der dichterische Text ist eine Autorität, und Ziel der Rezeption ist, die Stimme der Autorität wiederaufleben zu lassen.

„Zum Abschluß mag ein berühmtes Beispiel zur Illustration dienen. Es ist der Schluß des Gedichtes von Mörike ‚Auf eine Lampe'. Der Vers lautet: ‚Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst'... Eine Lampe, die nicht leuchtet, weil sie altmodisch und vergangen in einem ‚Lustgemach' hängt... gewinnt hier ihren eigenen Glanz, weil sie ein Kunstwerk ist. Das Scheinen ... strahlt über das Ganze der Erscheinung der Lampe, die in einem vergessenen Gemache unbeachtet hängt und nirgends mehr scheint als in diesen Versen. ... So versteht unser Verstand nicht nur, was da über das Schöne gesagt wird

[15] 50 Jahre nach der Publikation der „Kunst der Interpretation" als Buch, wurde ihm eine differenzierte Analyse gewidmet. (Rickes u. a. 2007). Die Problematik des Sammelbandes ist viel reicher als der Titel denken lässt. Staigers Herangehen an „Auf eine Lampe" wird nur passim erwähnt.

und was die Autonomie des Kunstwerks ausspricht, das von keinem Gebrauchszusammenhang abhängt – unser Ohr hört und unser Verständnis vernimmt den Schein des Schönen als sein wahres Wesen. Der Interpret, der seine Gründe beibrachte, verschwindet, und der Text spricht..." (Gadamer 1983, S. 359–60)

Die ursprüngliche Ähnlichkeit mit der Rezeptions- und Wirkungsästhetik ist sowohl konzeptionell, als auch als soziale Funktion nur scheinbar. Das Kunstwerk, und vor allem das als klassisch erhöhte Werk, ist weder vom Umfeld seines möglichen Gebrauchs, noch von den historischen Milieus seiner Rezeption abhängig. Auch bei Veränderung dieser Faktoren, bleibt es stets unveränderlich, in ein und demselben Licht scheinend. So erlangt das klassische Kunstwerk die Funktion eines heiligen Textes.

Gerhard Storz hält daran fest, dass die Lampe, und also die Schönheit, sich zwischen dem Zustand befindet, beim dem sie zur Vergangenheit wird (Vergangenwerden), in diesem Augenblick jedoch noch nicht unwiederbringlich vergangen ist (Vergangensein). Der Zustand liegt zwischen Noch-Existieren und vorhersehbarem Verschwinden – Vergessen. Gerade weil sie ein Abbild der Schönheit ist, ist die jetzige Existenz der Lampe unsicher – „zwischen Vergangensein und Vergangenwerden" (Storz 1967, S. 322). Wenn ich Storz interpretiere, kann ich zusammenfassen, dass die Kunst der Weimarer Klassik und die Werte, die sie vermittelt und schafft, an Aktualität verlieren und beginnen, der Vergangenheit anzugehören. Das Thema von Zeitgestaltung und Zeiterfahrung wurde von Hart Nibbrig aufgegriffen, der zum Schluss kommt, dass zwischen der Schönheit (der Lampe) und dem sie rezipierenden Bewusstsein dialektische (Un)verbundenheit besteht. Deshalb bezieht er die Bedeutung von „scheint" als „leuchten, glänzen" auf die Lampe, und als „den Anschein erwecken" auf den Dichter, der das Absolute des Kunstwerkes vermittelt.[16] Sämtliche Gedichtanalysen nach der Veröffentlichung des

[16] Auch hier erneut ein Bezug zu allen früheren Interpretationen (Hart

Briefwechsels zwischen Heidegger und Staiger bieten eigene Lösungen der Frage, wie das „scheint" im letzten Vers zu verstehen ist, an. Irmgard Weithase wendet die Sprechaktmethodik auf das Gedicht an, was ihr erlaubt, das Verhältnis von Lautbild, Lautwert, Versbau, Rhythmik und Wortbedeutungen zu analysieren, um zum Sinn des Ganzen vorzudringen. Indem sie sowohl Beispiele aus anderen Gedichten Mörikes heranzieht, als auch Verwendungen von „scheinen" im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, gelingt es ihr, überzeugend zu begründen, weshalb beide Bedeutungen von „scheint es" (*lucet* und *videtur*) präsent sind. (Weithase 1967, S. 69–70) Zur gleichen Schlussfolgerung gelangt Storz, „... dass jenes deutsche Verb die scharfe Abgrenzung des „Leuchtens" vom „aussehen als ob" nicht zulässt". (Storz, S. 323)

II

Die Suche nach Parallelen zwischen sprachlicher und visueller Form bietet mehr Interpretationsmöglichkeiten, deshalb werde ich im Weiteren sprachliche Formen von Lampen mit „echten" Lampen aus der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts vergleichen. Die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Wort und Gegenstand ist begründet, denn „Auf eine Lampe" ist ein Epigramm. Ein Epigramm kann als Kommentar zu einem Gegenstand fungieren, dessen Materialität und meisterhafte Herstellung werden durch den Kommentar betont; der Gegenstand bekommt eine zusätzliche Präsenz in seiner Umgebung, seine Individualität wird verstärkt. Epigramme sind im dichterischen Werk Mörikes keine Seltenheit. Moritz Enzinger verweist auf die Epigramme mit dem Titel „Inschrift...", wie auch auf jene, die Gegenständen gewidmet sind. Er thematisiert ihre Verbindung zur späten altgriechischen Epigrammatik und zur Ek-

Nibbrig 1973, S. 340–344; 428–429) Nicht nur die Interpretation von „Auf eine Lampe", sondern die gesamte Monografie von Hart Nibbrig ist der Zeiterfahrung und Zeitgestaltung im Schaffen Mörikes gewidmet.

phrasis.[17] „Auf eine Lampe" wird als „Dinggedicht"[18] definiert, als eine einem bestimmten Gegenstand gewidmete Versschöpfung. Ob wir es nun als Epigramm oder als „Dinggedicht" definieren - das Wesentliche besteht darin, dass das Gedicht den Gegenstand nicht nur beschreibt und/oder kommentiert, sondern ihn zugleich ganz und gar erschafft, wenn es den Gegenstand nicht gibt, oder ihn als einen anderen als den realen erschafft.

1846 schrieb Mörike zwei Versepigramme: „Inschrift auf eine Uhr mit den drei Horen"[19] und „Auf eine Lampe". In „ Inschrift auf eine Uhr..." sprechen die Horen selbst über sich, in „Auf eine Lampe" richtet jemand, der sich ebenfalls im „Lustgemach" befindet, Worte an die Lampe. Indem das lyrische Ich das Bild die Lampe beschreibend erschafft, bedient es sich dessen, was als Ekphrasis bezeichnet wird. Nehmen wir um der Ekphrasis willen an, dass irgendein Gegenstand die Anregung zu dem Gedicht gegeben hat. Das Wort ist jedoch ein Medium mit eigenen Eigenschaften, so wie auch das visuelle Medium, so dass, auch wenn wir auf der einen Seite das Gedicht hätten, und auf der anderen eine Zeichnung oder Fotografie der Lampe (1846 wäre eine Fotografie bereits möglich gewesen), dies die Erschaffung eines imaginären Gegenstandes durch das Wort im Bewusstsein des Lesers nicht beeinträchtigen würde. Die Ekphrasis beinhaltet auch die Beschreibung imaginärer Artefakte, denn sie hat nicht nur die Funktion zu beschreiben,

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17 Zur einer möglichen Beeinflussung Mörikes durch Herder s. (Enzinger 1965, S. 17–20).

18 Der Terminus „Dinggedicht" wurde 1926 von Kurt Oppert eingeführt. Zu einer ausführlicheren Begründung des Terminus s. Nordheim 1957, S. 76–78. Nordheim verweist an mehreren Stellen auf die Dissertation M. Burgers von 1945 zu Mörike. Die Dissertation ist mir nicht zugänglich. Einige Verfasser von Interpretationen lehnen diesen Begriff als unpassend ab. S. auch: Martini 1958; von Wilpert 1989.

19 „Die Horen, Göttinnen der Jahreszeiten, gewöhnlich ihrer drei, seltener zwei oder vier, je nachdem man das Jahr einteilte." (Mörike 1970, S. 930)

sondern zugleich auch imaginäre, nichtstoffliche Dinge und Ansichten mit Worten zu erschaffen. „Die Ekphrasis verwandelt den Leser in einen Bildbetrachter, der doch nur Worte vor Augen hat, und führt ihn durch imaginäre Räume, die doch nur in seiner Vorstellung existieren." (Wandhoff 2003) Die Ekphrasis impliziert eine Distanz zwischen Gegenstand und Blick, die eine Aufzählung der Details und zugleich ein Überblicken des Ganzen ermöglicht. Der Zweck besteht darin, des Gegenstandes Wesen zu erzielen.[20]

Leo Spitzer erwähnte, dass laut Paul Friedländer die Ekphrasis in „Auf eine Lampe" ihr Vorbild in Theokrits Idylle „Thyrsis", Verse 27–56 habe. Dieselben Verse Theokrits verwendete Leconte de Lisle in seinem Gedicht „Le Vase". So bekräftigt Spitzer seine These von dem antiken Ursprung der klassischen Form bei Mörike, wie auch von dem Zusammenhang – aufgrund der gleichen Haltung zur Antike – zwischen Mörike und den zeitgenössischen französischen Dichtern. (Spitzer 1953, S. 33–34) Holschuh schließt sich der These, dass die altgriechische Tradition Mörike beim Schreiben des Gedichts beeinflusst habe, an und zitiert dafür wiederum aus „Thyrsis", Verse 29–33(Holschuh 1991, S. 578, 584)[21]. Es han-

[20] In mehreren Wörterbüchern, die ich wegen „Dinggedicht" konsultierte, ist „Auf eine Lampe" als erstes Gedicht dieses Typs in der deutschen Literatur vermerkt. Das mehrfach neu aufgelegte und erweiterte Wörterbuch von Gero von Wilpert bezeichnet „Dinggedicht" als episch-objektive Beschreibung eines Gegenstandes. Es ist angelegt auf dessen Läuterung von allem Zufällig-Unwesentlichen und Einfühlung in sein Wesen und inneres Gesetz, aus der die Neigung zu symbolischer Ausdeutung entspringt. (von Wilpert 1989, S. 195) Da jedoch die Einfühlung (Sympathie) die Distanz aufhebt und keine episch objektive Charakteristik darstellt, spreche ich lieber von Erschaffung des Wesens der Lampe in Mörikes Gedicht.

[21] In der Tat ist in den Ausgaben mit Übersetzungen griechischer und römischer Dichter, die Mörike überarbeitet und ergänzt, die Ekphrasis keine Seltenheit. In der Ausgabe von 1864 „Anakreon und die sogenannten Anakreontischen Lieder" findet sich der Teil: „Dem Epigramm und

delt sich in Theokrits Idylle um Szenendarstellungen und um den dekorativen Schmuck auf einem Milchbecher aus Holz; die frisch gemolkene Ziegenmilch soll die Belohnung für ein Lied sein. Sowohl der Schmuck, als auch der Duft (nach dem frischen Holz des eben erst hergestellten Bechers sowie nach dem Wachs, mit dem er versiegelt ist) sind Teil der Belohnung. Die Ekphrasis verfolgt hier einen synästhetischen Zweck, sie will nicht nur den Gegenstand in unserer Vorstellung erzeugen, sondern auch seinen Duft, als „sei er in den Quellen der Horen gereinigt" (Vers 150).

Ich nahm an, dass es eine Bleistiftzeichnung einer „antiken" Lampe oder einer Lampe antiken Typs von Mörike selbst gibt, die zeitlich mit dem Verfassen des Gedichtes zusammenfällt. In seiner Mörike-Werkausgabe vermerkt Harry Maync: „Ein Gretchen gewidmetes Blatt zeigt Mörikes Bleistiftzeichnung einer antiken Lampe." (Maync 1909, I. S. 425) Mörike hat zahlreiche Zeichnungen angefertigt, viele davon werden von kommentierenden Prosa- oder Verstexten begleitet.[22] „... in vielen Fällen sind Gedicht und Bild so eng miteinander verbunden, dass das eine ohne das andere nur schwer verständlich wäre." (Reck 2004, S. 10) Ich fragte wegen der Zeichnung einer „antiken Lampe" bei der Mörike-Gesellschaft an. Die Antwort, die ich von dort erhielt,[23] widerlegte die Anmer-

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dem Idyll verwandte Stücke / Bildwerk und Malerei beschreibend". (Mörike 1970, S. 874, 890–893).

[22] Zu Mörike als Zeichner s. Mörike-Handbuch 2004, S. 226–236.

[23] „Sehr geehrter Herr Professor Angelov,

Herr Dr. Wulf von der Mörike-Gesellschaft hat mir Ihre Frage bezüglich Mörikes Gedicht „Auf eine Lampe" weitergeleitet. Da mir selbst nicht bekannt ist, daß eine solche Zeichnung existieren soll und wir hier im Mörike-Archiv auch keinen entsprechenden Nachweis haben, habe ich doch zur Sicherheit die Frage mit dem Mörike-Spezialisten Professor Dr. Hans-Henrik Krummacher erörtert, der in der letzten Woche in diesem Jahr zum erstenmal in Marbach arbeitete. Auch er hat mir bestätigt, daß es eine Mörike-Zeichnung einer „antiken Lampe" nicht gibt. Allerdings hat er in seinen Aufschrieben notiert, daß es eine Zeichnung einer

kung in Harry Maync's Ausgabe. Nachdem eine Zeichnung also nicht existierte, suchte ich nach Lampen und deren Darstellungen aus der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, die zumindest einigermaßen der Beschreibung im Gedicht entsprechen würden.[24] Mir fiel auf, dass im Gedicht nicht nur das Licht fehlt, das die Lampe ausstrahlen könnte, sondern auch das Brennen, begleitet vom aufgrund des Dochtes unvermeidlichen Rauch. Rauch und Brennen als Bilder der Vergänglichkeit werden im Gedicht nicht erwähnt, im Unterschied zur Beschreibung der Lampen in Portici in Goethes „Italienischer Reise". Das Genre der Reiseaufzeichnungen impliziert eine andere Glaubwürdigkeit als die der Dichtung. Bei Goethe lesen wir von Dochten und von einer Flamme, die ein wahres Kunstgebilde, das eine jede Lampe ist, erleuchtet. (Goethe 1993, S. 229)[25]

Obstschale mit Verzierung gibt (SNM Inventar der Bildabteilung Nr. 1770), die früher einmal fälschlicherweise als Zeichnung einer „Öllampe" katalogisiert war. Vermutlich bezieht sich Herr Maync darauf. Diese Zeichnung hat aber lt. Professor Krummacher absolut nichts mit dem Gedicht „Auf eine Lampe" zu tun. Wir hoffen, Ihnen damit weitergeholfen zu haben, Herzlichst Ihr Albrecht Bergold / Mörike-Archiv im Deutschen Literaturarchiv" (10. März 2009). Das Schreiben Herrn Bergolds weist die Möglichkeit eines direkten Vergleichs der visuellen Gestalt (der Zeichnung) und der sprachlichen Gestalt der Lampe im Gedicht zurück.

[24] Bei jeder Ekphrasis ist die Frage (ob ein Gegenstand oder eine Landschaft dafür den Anstoß gab) berechtigt, aber nur individuell zu entscheiden. In ähnlicher Weise hat Mörike bei seinem Kommentar des Gedichts „Aphrodite auf einem Diskos" von „Anakreontischen Liedern" versucht, die genaue Form und die Stelle des Bildes auf dem Gegenstand durch die Beschreibung wiederherzustellen. Für dieses Gedicht s. auch unten. „Da man nicht ohne weiteres annehmen darf, es habe bei dieser Beschreibung kein wirkliches Bildwerk zugrunde gelegen, so ist die Frage nach dessen näherer Beschaffenheit nicht vorweg abzuweisen." (Mörike 1970: 927)

[25] Man erfährt nicht, aus welchem Material die Lampen selbst sind, ihre Gestelle jedenfalls sind aus Bronze. Ausführlicher wird ein Eimer beschrieben, aber auch hier wird die Art des Materials nicht erwähnt.

Darstellungen von glänzendem Öl in der Lampe und brennendem Licht auf den zierlich gebildeten Leuchtern kommen in Schillers Gedicht „Pompeji und Herculanum" (1797) vor. (Schiller 1958, S. 234–36) Mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit sind einige Darstellungen auf Goethes Reiseaufzeichnungen zurückzuführen. Für das Thema ist für mich von größerer Bedeutung, dass die festliche, wie auf einer Bühne präsentierte „Restaurierung", die Schiller – angeregt von den wiederaufgenommenen Ausgrabungen in Herculanum und Pompeji – vornimmt, verlangt, dass Lampen und Leuchter strahlen. Sie sind Bestandteil des wiederauferstandenen Lebens – wären sie erloschen, würde das bedeuten, dass es kein Leben gäbe. Schiller verwendet das Wort „zierlich" drei Mal: als Attribut der Zimmer (die zierlichen Zimmer), des Hermes (der zierlich geschenkte Hermes) und – was einen intertextuellen Bezug zu Mörikes Gedicht schafft – der Leuchter (den zierlich gebildeten Leuchter).[26] In „Pompeji und Herculanum" sind die Szenen in Bewegung, es herrscht sogar geschäftiges Treiben im Unterschied zur Stille in „Auf eine Lampe".

Das Klassische ist nur dann möglich, wenn es die Elemente, die das von ihm angestrebte Ewigkeitsbild stören, verdrängt und vergisst. Die Lampe, die nicht leuchtet, sondern nur das Lustgemach ziert, wird von einem funktionalen zu einem ästhetischen Gegentand, zu einem Artefakt. Die mögliche historische Zeit ist ebenfalls ästhetisiert und damit ihrer Historizität beraubt. Das Schöne ist selig, und der ästhetische Gegenstand erlangt einen zweideutigen religiösen Status, indem er zu einem Gegenstand der Bewunderung wird, beinahe zu einem Fetisch. Lampe und Lustgemach sind Raum einer in der Realität nicht möglichen Harmonie. „Auf eine Lampe" ist die Utopie des Ästhetischen. Offener thematisiert wird die Verbindung von Religiösem und

[26] Als Attribut von Sandalen erscheint „zierlich" auch in der intertextuell bedeutsamen Szene aus Schillers „Braut von Messina", im ersten Aufzug, siebenten Auftritt.

Ästhetischem im Gedicht „Die schöne Buche" von 1842. Hier gibt es sogar mehr Darstellungen des Kreisförmigen als in „Auf eine Lampe": die Buche, der sie umgebende Rasen, das Gebüsch und der äußere Kreis der Bäume werden für ein Heiligtum gehalten, in das das lyrische Ich von der Gottheit (genius loci) des Hains geführt wird. Wie die Lampe erlangt die Natur hier den Rang eines heiligen Artefakts; die Buche und die anliegende Umgebung sind eine isolierte und harmonische Welt, in der das lyrische Ich ganzheitlich und nicht entfremdet ist. Auch in der „Schönen Buche" wird das antike Versmaß, das Distichon (Wechsel von Hexameter und Pentameter) verwendet. Auch in anderen Gedichten findet sich die Verbindung von Religiösem und Ästhetischem – „und wiederum bildet das Erlebnis der Schönheit ... nur das Medium für die Entfaltung einer religiöser Erfahrung." (Nordheim 1957, S. 79) Im Gegensatz zu W. von Nordheim bin ich jedoch der Auffassung, dass die „ewigen Mächte" („An eine Sängerin", Vers 6) nicht nur rettend sein können: das lebensspendende Sonnenlicht (der Sonne liebes Licht, „Verborgenheit", Vers 8), sondern auch archaisch und bedrohlich: Mutter Nacht („Um Mitternacht", Vers 6 – der Mutter, der Nacht).

Unter klassisch verstehe ich in diesem Falle die Ideal- und Normwerte, die seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in Europa entstanden sind, deren scheinbare Unveränderbarkeit in den Wandlungen der Geschichte als Stütze dienen sollte. Die Aktualisierung der Antike ist ein Grundelement des Klassischen, und die Kunst (die des Wortes, die Musik und die bildende) ist ein wirksames Mittel, um diese Werte durchzusetzen. Die erste Anregung dafür kam von den Ausgrabungen in Pompeji (1737) и Herculanum (1748). Zunächst durch die Schriften Winckelmanns, später durch die von Malern und Schriftstellern vermittelten Italienbilder und auch durch die Reisenden der „Grand Tour" wurde die „edle Größe" der Antike als Wissen und als Objekt der Bewunderung in West- und Mitteleuropa verbreitet. Was die deutsche Literatur

betrifft, so wurde die Antike von allem durch die Weimarer Klassik angeeignet und umgestaltet.[27]

Bei seinem Besuch in Portici am 18. März 1787 hielt Goethe seine Eindrücke von den bei den Ausgrabungen gefundenen Lampen fest. „Die Lampen sind nach Anzahl ihrer Dochte mit Masken und Rankenwerk verziert, so daß jede Flamme ein wirkliches Kunstgebilde erleuchtet. Hohe, schlanke, eherne Gestelle sind bestimmt, die Lampen zu tragen, aufzuhängende Lampen hingegen mit allerlei geistreich gedachten Figuren behängt, welche die Absicht, zu gefallen und zu ergötzen, sobald sie schaukeln und baumeln, sogar übertreffen." (Goethe 1993, S. 229) Die Definition der Lampen als Kunstgebilde ist also bei Goethe und bei Mörike die gleiche. Im zitierten Absatz erschafft die Beschreibung, das Wort, ein Bild der Gegenstände, welches, auch wenn es recht allgemein ist, uns die Möglichkeit gibt, sowohl die Nähe, als auch den Unterschied zwischen diesen Lampen und dem Bild der Lampe bei Mörike zu beurteilen. Die Frage, ob Mörike von dieser Passage der „Italienischen Reise" beeinflusst war, führt in eine andere Richtung; für das hiesige Thema ist ausschlaggebend, dass es sich um zwei Bilder antiker Gegenstände handelt – ein dokumentarisches und ein imaginäres.[28] M. Enzinger rekonstruiert überzeugend einen Mikrokontext, in dem Mörikes Gedicht als Anstoß oder Erinnerung entsteht. Enzinger verweist auf die zitierte Aufzeichnung Goethes aus Portici, einen Auszug aus dem Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, der die Ausgrabungen in Herculanum und Pompeji betrifft, Schillers Gedicht „Pompeji und Herculanum", und auch Arbeiten zu Neapel und Italien: die Verse Waiblingers, das zweibändige Werk von Karl Mayer und das dreibändige mit

[27] Zur Rolle der Antike in der Bildung in Deutschland in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts sowie im Werk Mörikes s. Mörike-Handbuch 2004, S. 27–32; 86–90.

[28] Einen Zusammenhang zwischen Goethes Reiseaufzeichnung und Mörikes Gedicht stellte erstmals Enzinger her (Enzinger 1965, 38–39).

Artikeln von Adolf Stahr (Enzinger 1965, S. 36–41).

Das Klassische kommt in „Auf eine Lampe" im Versmaß des Senars zum Ausdruck[29], im Material, aus dem die Lampe gefertigt wurde (weißer Marmor), sowie im Material für die Verzierung (Bronze). Weiß und Marmor wurden gerade vom Klassizismus, der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts seinen Anfang nahm, und seinen späteren Weiterentwicklungen zum Haupterkennungsmerkmal der Antike gemacht. Die weißen Marmorstatuen verkörpern das neue Ideal des menschlichen Daseins.[30] Das Weiße bildet den Kontrast zur stofflichen und farblichen Fülle, zur fehlenden Strenge und üppigen Festlichkeit von Barock und Rokoko. Der Marmor (bzw. Stein) suggeriert Beständigkeit und Unvergänglichkeit, die weiße Farbe bedeutet Reinheit, selbstverständlich moralische. Deshalb stellt das Weiße des Marmors die moralische Lauterkeit des Klassischen dar, doch nicht unbedingt auch der griechischen Antike, deren Marmorstatuen farbig waren. In diesem Sinne ist das Weiße eher für den Klassizismus zwischen 1750 und 1850 kennzeichnend, der seine Inspiration mehr aus der römischen als von der griechischen Antike schöpft. Farbe und Material verknüpfen sich zu einer gemeinsamen Illusion von Wertebeständigkeit, Bereitschaft zum heroischen Widerstand und Erhabenheit und erzeugen so das Bild des Klassischen als „edle Einfalt und stille Größe"[31]. Marmor

[29] Eine treffende Erläuterung der Beziehung zwischen Versmaß und Thema findet sich bei Hötzer 1998, S. 193: „In dem Gedicht „Auf eine Lampe" ... wird die mehrfach gestraffte Durchführung des Themas ausgeglichen durch ein leise und leicht fließendes Versmaß."

[30] Zum Verhältnis von Menschlichem, Göttlichem und der Herausbildung des neuen Ideals durch die Marmorfigur und Gipsbüste im Klassizismus s. Klotz 2000, S. 42–45.

[31] Die allgemeine Charakteristik, die Winckelmann den altgriechischen Meisterwerken beimisst, bezieht sich auf die Kunst der Malerei und der Bildhauerei. „Das allgemeine vorzügliche Kennzeichen der griechischen Meisterstücke ist endlich eine edle Einfalt, und eine stille Größe, sowohl in der Stellung als im Ausdrücke." Diese Charakteristik

wurde auch außerhalb der Skulpturen und Skulpturengruppen verwendet: allein seine Verwendung war bereits ein Idealisieren – die Verkörperung von Ewigkeit, Erhabenheit und Schönheit.

Der Tanz der Kinder in der Lampenform bringt die Vorstellung vom Klassischen als Heroik und Größe ins Schwanken, doch der Geist des Ernstes, der um die Form ergossen ist, stellt das vom klassischen Bild erwartete Gleichgewicht wieder her. Bezeichnend für die Umgestaltung, die der Klassizismus des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts mit dem Erbe der Antike vornimmt, ist die in der Antike unmögliche, im Biedermaier jedoch durchaus mögliche Kombination von Bronze und Marmor in „Auf eine Lampe"[32]. Zwar wurde Bronze auch in der Antike verwendet, doch der Einsatz von Metall (und zwar vorwiegend Eisen) ist speziell für die Moderne kennzeichnend, sowohl bei Hausrat, als auch bei Industriewaren und Großprojekten wie Brücken und Eisenbahnen. Das Klassische ist nicht antik, es ist ein umformendes Erschließen und Aneignen. Bei den in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts hergestellten Lampen sind tanzende Knaben, die an Cupidos erinnern, ein häufig verwendetes Schmuckmotiv. Zu Recht verbindet Rudolf Schier „ergossen" mit dem Gießen der Lampe aus Eisen, obwohl dies praktisch nur für die Ketten gilt, an denen sie aufgehängt ist[33]. Ich möchte Schiers These Nachdruck verleihen, indem ich zwei Verwendungen aus Anakreons Epigramm „Aphrodite auf einem Diskos" zitiere,

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der klassischen Kunst (im Gegensatz zur Fülle an Worten, Gefühlen und Materialien des Barock) gab es bereits, bevor Winckelmann sie auf die altgriechische Kunst anwandte. (Winckelmann 1995, S. 30–32, 444)

[32] Auf der Suche nach Lampen aus der Biedermeierzeit stieß ich auf eine Stehlampe, deren Fuß aus Bronze und Marmor gefertigt war. Sie war nicht genauer datiert, nur als „Biedermeierlampe" definiert.

[33] Schier vergleicht Keats' „Ode an eine griechische Urne" und Mörikes „Auf eine Lampe". In seiner Analyse geht es um die Frage von der Unvereinbarkeit der konstitutiven und der darstellenden Funktion der Sprache. (Schier 1983, S. 37–39) Zu einer gusseisernen Lampe zwischen 1815 und 1825 s. Himmelheber 1988, Nr. 405.

das Mörike in die von ihm erstellte und überarbeitete Anthologie „Anakreon und die sogenannten Anakreontischen Lieder" (1864) aufgenommen hat: „Eine Zauberhand hat Wellen/ *Ausgegossen* auf den Diskos. (Vers 2–3) ... Auf des sanft *ergossnen* Meeres/ Fläche... (Vers 12–13)" Die Wellen und die Meeresfläche sind höchstwahrscheinlich auf das Metall des Diskos gegossen.[34] Simone Weckler ist ebenfalls der Ansicht, dass die Lampe weder ein antikes Vorbild hat noch als antikes Bild gedacht, sondern ein Kunstgegenstand ist, den Mörike nach seinem Geschmack erschaffen hat. (Mörike-Handbuch 2004, S. 148) Mörikes Geschmack stimmt in diesem Fall mit dem Zeitgeschmack überein.

III

In der griechisch-römischen Antike waren die Lampen meist aus Keramik, seltener aus Metall und noch seltener aus Marmor (Der Kleine Pauly 1969, S. 469–470).[35] Es gab Marmor-Kronleuchter, an deren Ecken die Lampen aufgehängt wurden (Rich 1862: Lychnuchus pensilis)[36]. Bei den antiken Lampen stellen die Öffnungen für den Docht und die Luftzufuhr ein wesentliches Funktionselement dar, während für die Verzierung (sofern vorhan-

[34] Das Zitat entstammt der Ausgabe Mörike 1970: 892–93. Zu diesem Vergleich wurde ich durch einen Artikel von Holschuh angeregt (Holschuh 1991, S. 578). Er führt „Aphrodite auf einem Diskos" zur Bekräftigung seiner These von der altgriechischen Tradition an, die Mörike beeinflusst habe und hebt speziell die Worte „Ausgegossen, ergossnen, Kunstgebilde" kursiv hervor.

[35] Von den von mir durchgesehenen Katalogen und Monografien, in denen es keine Marmorlampen gibt, möchte ich folgende anführen: Bailey 1980; Kuzmanov 1992. Eine „künstlerisch bedeutsame" Marmorlampe ist jedoch ausführlich bei Beazley,1940, S. 22–49 analysiert.

[36] In erwähntem Wörterbuch fand ich eine ausführliche Beschreibung mit Illustrationen der in der Antike verwendeten Arten von Lampen, Leuchtern und Kronleuchtern.

den) Geschmack und Vermögen des Besitzers, die Fertigkeiten des Herstellers sowie die Konventionen des historisch-sozialen Umfelds ausschlaggebend waren. Die grundlegende Eigenschaft des modernen Artefakts, einschließlich der Avantgarde bis zum Ende der 1960er Jahre, war eben die fehlende Alltagstauglichkeit – dem Gegenstand wurde die eigene Funktionalität entzogen. Wenn Gegenstände Schönheit und Funktionalität miteinander verbanden, so gehörte dies in den Bereich der Formgestaltung oder des Kunstgewerbes, es wäre so etwas wie Kunst, aber eben doch keine autonome Kunst. Die Frage, ob es in der Antike Marmorlampen gegeben hat, könnte weitere Auskünfte über das Verhältnis des Klassizismus zum gegenständlichen Umfeld der Antike geben. Dabei dürfte man allerdings nicht vergessen, dass sich die Antike über recht viele Jahrhunderte erstreckte, so dass in einer Periode Marmorlampen vorkommen können, in einer anderen geschlossene figurale Kompositionen (wie etwa der Reigen der Kinder) und in einer dritten Periode Kompositionen mit gemalter oder plastischer Dekoration und zwar an der gleichen Stelle einer Lampe, an der sich auch die Komposition bei Mörikes Wort-Lampe befindet. Doch selbst wenn es genau eine solche Lampe gegeben haben sollte, so hätte sie auf jeden Fall eine andere Funktion gehabt. Mörike erschafft eine Lampe à la Antike, die das aktuelle Verhältnis eines bestimmten historischen Umfelds zur Antike wiedergibt. In diesem Umfeld sind Reisebeschreibungen im Gebrauch, dichterische und bildliche Darstellungen von Italien, Kopien von Statuen in tatsächlicher oder verkleinerter Größe, Kopien von Architekturdenkmälern, kurzum – Souvenirs und überhaupt die ganze Produktion, die mit dem „Grand Tour" verbunden war. Es handelt sich eben um Bilder, Aneignungen und Umdeutungen.[37]

[37] Die Publikation, die die Funde in Herculaneum, Pompeji und Stabiae beschreibt, ist im Internet unter der Adresse http://www.coe.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/arc/ercolano/tomo08/frame.html einzusehen. Band Acht befasst sich mit den unterschiedlichen Leuchtkörpern. Nicht zum ersten Mal han-

Einen Abschnitt seines Vortrags widmete Staiger dem Vergleich zwischen Mörike und den hellenistischen Dichtern: „‚Auf eine Lampe'„ legt mindestens einen Vergleich mit griechischer Lyrik nahe. Der Titel meint zwar keine Inschrift. Er klingt aber gleich wie die Überschriften eigentlich epigrammatischer Dichtung. In der „Anthologia Palatina", ... finden wir denn auch geistesverwandte Stücke, und zwar besonders aus der Zeit der hellenistischen Poesie, ..., also aus einer Epoche, mit der sich Mörike gern beschäftigt hat...." (Staiger 1971, S. 24). Staigers Grundgedanke, dass sich ein Vergleich zwischen Mörike und den hellenistischen Dichtern ziehen lässt (das Besingen von individuellen Räumen und edlen Gegenständen, das Fehlen eines politischen Bezugs), kann man bestätigen. Beschränke ich den Vergleich jedoch auf das Bild der Lampe in den Epigrammen der Epoche des Hellenismus (4.-1. Jahrhundert v.Chr.), dann fällt nicht die Ähnlichkeit, sondern der Unterschied auf: bei Mörike ist die Lampe, wie bereits mehrfach erwähnt, ein anmutiges Artefakt von eigenem Wert, während sie in den Epigrammen ihre Hauptfunktion bewahrt, nämlich eine Lichtquelle und nicht Gegenstand einer Beschreibung oder Bewunderung zu sein. Das lyrische Ich verleiht ihr eine Seele und spricht sie meist als Zeugen von Liebesbegegnungen an. In einigen der Epigramme kommen als Leuchter die in der Antike am meisten verbreiteten Keramiklampen vor. Das Material, aus dem die Lampe hergestellt ist, und die Frage, ob sie anmutig ist, sind dabei unwesentlich. Das Wichtigste ist, dass ihr Licht eine Kraft jenseits der physikalischen besitzt. In einem Epigramm von Asklepiades wendet sich das lyrische Ich mit einer Bitte an die Lampe – wenn sie ein Gott sei, so möge sie die untreue Heracleia bestrafen (V. 7). Die Lampe erhellt die Liebesszenen, denn Licht und liebevolles Zusammensein sind Synonyme, ihr Antonym sind Dunkelheit und Trennung; bei einer Trennung flackert die Lampe (der Docht) auf und erlischt. Das Zugießen

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delt es sich hier um eine japanische Initiative zum europäischen Kulturerbe.

von Öl in die Lampe und ihr Licht stehen im Zusammenhang mit Manneskraft.

In den Liebesepigrammen in Buch V ist die Lampe ein Bild der Lebenskraft, die Liebe öffnet sich dem Kosmischen im Grundwiderspruch zwischen Licht und Dunkelheit. Der Wunsch, die Lampe möge erlöschen, wenn sich ein anderer neben Heliodora wärmt, ist auch der Wunsch nach männlicher Schwäche des Rivalen (V. 165). Das Erlöschen der Lampe wird die Geliebte unsichtbar machen und sie vor Untreue bewahren (V. 166). Die Lampe erlischt zum dritten Mal, im Gegensatz zur Leidenschaft des lyrischen Ichs, doch die Geliebte kommt nicht (V. 279). Kein anderer als die Lampe kann Zeuge der Liebesnacht sein (V. 4). In einem Epigramm mit dem Titel „Du wirst für mich der große Apollo sein" (Eris mihi magnus Apollo) von Marcus Argentarius verspricht das lyrische Ich der Lampe mit gewisser Ironie einen Dreifuß, wie ihn auch der göttliche Prophet besitzt, wenn ihm die Lampe wahrheitsgemäß weissagt, dass die Geliebte bald in sein Zimmer kommen werde (VI. 333).[38] Eine ähnliche Symbolik besitzt die Fackel als Attribut des Eros; auch wenn sie nicht unbedingt erwiderte Liebe bedeutet, ist die brennende Fackel ein Abbild der Leidenschaft, erloschen und nach unten gekehrt ist sie dagegen ein Zeichen des Todes. Zwar haben sowohl die hellenistischen Dichter, als auch Mörike eine Vorliebe für private Räume, doch das Bewohnen dieser Räume ist unterschiedlich. Ob die Lampe nun eine Metapher für liebesvolles Zusammensein oder Trennung ist[39], in beiden Fällen (brennend und erloschen) ist sie am Liebeserleben beteiligt, während bei

[38] Angaben aus Graeca 1957. Die römischen Zahlen bezeichnen das Buch, die arabischen das Epigramm. S. auch S. 27–40 der Einführung.

[39] Zur Synonymie von Licht, Lampe und Liebe s. Grillparzer „Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen", 1840, und zum Zusammenhang mit „Auf eine Lampe" s. Politzer 1957, S. 432–437, und hier auf S. 433 die zusammenfassende Formulierung „Darüber hinaus ist sie [die Lampe] das herkömmliche Sinnzeichen der Leidenschaft, die sich in ihrem Licht entfaltet und mit dessen Verlöschen erlischt."

Mörike der ästhetische Gegenstand durch Verselbständigung und Abgeschlossenheit entsteht.[40]

„Auf eine Lampe" kann als Metonymie der sich in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts durchsetzenden modernen ästhetischen Form dienen. Eine starke Legitimation (wenn auch nicht die einzige) ihrer Durchsetzung ist die erklärte Erbschaft der Antike. Deshalb bin ich der Auffassung, dass es historisch durchaus begründet ist, das Gedicht in den Blickwinkel zu rücken, den Schillers „Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen" eröffnete, wie es Ilse Appelbaum Graham tut, während Heideggers These, dass „das Gedicht das in der Sprache ruhende Symbol des Kunstwerkes überhaupt" sei, die Universalisierung einer historischen Leistung bedeutet. Appelbaum Graham verweist auf die Beschreibung, die Schiller (im fünfzehnten Brief) von der Statue der Juno Ludovisi abgibt: „In sich selbst ruhet und wohnt die ganze Gestalt, eine völlig geschlossene Schöpfung ...; da ist keine Kraft, die mit Kräften kämpfte, keine Blöße, wo die Zeitlichkeit einbrechen könnte." (Schiller 1959, S. 618–619) Im zweiundzwanzigsten Brief gelangt Schiller zu folgendem Schluss: „Jeder andere Zustand, in den wir kommen können, weist uns auf einen vorhergehenden zurück und bedarf zu seiner Auflösung eines folgenden; nur der ästhetische ist ein Ganzes in sich selbst, da er alle Bedingungen seines Ursprungs und seiner Fortdauer in sich vereinigt. Hier allein fühlen wir uns wie aus der Zeit gerissen;" (Schiller 1959, S. 637) Das vollständige gegenseitige Durchdringen von Material und Form, wie auch die dadurch ausgelösten Gefühle und das, worin das Wesen der Kunst liegt, entdeckt Schiller bei den alten Griechen. Die Verfasserin vertritt die Ansicht, dass „Auf eine Lampe" Schillers Kunstauffassung bestätigt. (Appelbaum 1953, S. 330–332) Im Bild der Lampe bei Mörike gibt es keine Funktionselemente, denn sie würden das Alltägliche und Vergängliche (die

[40] Eine ausführliche literaturgeschichtliche und psychologische Analyse der Beziehung Mörikes zur Antike s. bei Enzinger 1965, S. 20–26.

Zeit) einbringen, sie würden die anmutige Festlichkeit des Artefakts, sein Dasein außerhalb der Zeit zerstören. Einen Eindruck von Ewigkeit vermittelt auch die runde Form des Efeukranzes aus Bronze, der den Rand der Schale umflicht, und die goldengrüne edle Kupferpatina (patina nobile) bewirkt Ähnliches – der Zeit zu widerstehen, und mehr noch, sich über sie zu erheben. Der Efeu ist wie alle immergrünen Pflanzen ein Sinnbild der Ewigkeit. „Schlingt fröhlich eine Kinderschar den Ringelreih'n." Es fragt sich, was unter „fröhlich" zu verstehen ist – ein braves Sich-im-Kreis-drehen, wie es Spitzer annimmt, oder ein lebhafterer Tanz. Im einen Fall hätten wir es mit Ausgewogenheit, Gleichmaß und Feierlichkeit zu tun, mit etwas, das die Kinder zum Ausdruck des Gedankens der Klassik machen würde, im anderen Fall mit Lebhaftigkeit, Unbändigkeit, mit all dem, das Heidegger mit dem Dionysischen in Verbindung bringt (obwohl er das Dionysische in der goldengrünen Farbe des Efeukranzes sieht).Wenn der fröhliche Tanz der Kinder nicht ganz artig ist, sondern eher wild, würde dies das Gleichgewicht der klassischen Form ins Wanken bringen. In Spitzers Interpretation werden das Exzessive, das Korybantische zwar benannt, jedoch als negative Eigenschaften, die nicht zur klassischen Form gehören. Sowohl Spitzers, als auch Heideggers Assoziationen sind jedoch auf die Antike ausgerichtet, wenn auch auf zwei entgegengesetzte Darstellungen von ihr, die aber nicht weniger der Moderne angehören.

IV

Das Ruhen in sich selbst und die Loslösung von der Zeit können außer einem Ideal der ästhetischen Form und der Schönheit auch den Verzicht auf Kommunikation, auf Vitalität bedeuten – ein seliges Verweilen in Selbstgenügsamkeit. „Die Götter der griechischen Kunst sind selig, insofern ihr Gefühl Gestalt geworden ist. Dies ist die Seligkeit, die Mörike der – personifizierten –

schönen Lampe zuspricht; die Seligkeit eines jeden, von äußeren Bezügen losgelösten, in eignem Gleichgewichte sich erhaltenden Kunstwerks." (Appelbaum 1953, S. 332) Doch eben diese Selbstgenügsamkeit und der darin verborgene Anspruch auf ewige Gültigkeit bergen die Gefahr, dass die ästhetische Form, die Lampe, zu einem Idol und/oder Fetisch wird. Und nicht von ungefähr wirft ein Religionsphilosoph wie Romano Guardini die Frage auf, was mit der Existenz des Dinges, mit seiner Schönheit geschieht, wenn es nichts mehr mit Menschen zu tun hat, was das einsame Seligsein in sich selbst zu bedeuten hat. Ist die Schönheit anfangs anziehend, so bleibt das Ding mit der Zeit nicht mehr „selig in sich selbst", weder im Gefühl des Betrachters, noch in der Offenbarung seines eigenen Wesens, sondern es wird erschreckend. An einigen Stellen seiner Überlegung spricht Guardini vom Unheimlich-Drohenden als dem Zustand eines Wesens, das jeglicher Verbundenheit beraubt ist, und sogar vom Magisch-Drohenden der Schönheit, sofern sie selbstgenügsam ist. Guardini spricht zwar nicht vom Idol, doch ich glaube, dass es das ist, was er als „magisch" bezeichnet. Für ihn bedeutet es die fehlende Beziehung zu Gott (offenkundig dem christlichen). (Guardini 1957, S. 30–33)

Da ich der Auffassung bin, dass die Lampe in bedrohlicher und drohender Isoliertheit existiert, kann ich – unter Berücksichtigung der Willkürlichkeit der Lesart – den ersten Vers („Noch unverrückt, o schöne Lampe, schmückest du") nicht nur als „Noch unverrückt, oder noch stärker: unverdrängt" auflösen, sonder auch als „noch nicht verrückt, schmückest du". Es gibt keinen Grund, die Lampe zu personifizieren, indem man ihr einen Seelenzustand zuschreibt, andererseits aber wendet sich die Stimme des lyrischen Ichs an sie, spricht sie an.[41] Ich wähle diese willkürliche

[41] Als Argument für diese Distanz weist Weithase darauf hin, dass die Anrede „o schöne Lampe" lautet, und nicht „du, schöne Lampe", und dass auch die Überschrift nicht „An eine Lampe", sondern „Auf eine

Deutung von „unverrückt", um die Bemühung aufzuzeigen (und das gilt nicht nur für „Auf eine Lampe"), mit der das Klassische als Harmonie der Einzelteile und Ausgeglichenheit des Ganzen dargestellt wird. Eine Bemühung, die den drohenden sozialen und psychischen Konflikt, das fehlende äußere und innere Gleichgewicht verdecken soll.[42] Einen Zustand potentieller Verrücktheit beschreibt Mörike in einem Brief an Johannes Mährlen vom 7. Mai 1829. Beim Lesen des Briefwechsels zwischen Goethe und Schiller, „in heiliger klassischer Atmosphäre" und sozusagen „die Seele der Kunst" anschauend, am Ende des Lesens, bereits nach Mitternacht „...geriet meine Phantasie auf ganz fremde Abwege; ich durchlief die benachbarten Zellen des Irrenhauses und wühlte in der nächtlichen Fratzenwelt ihrer Träume; auf die schöne Tagesklarheit Deines Büchleins grinsten tausend Narrengesichter, die mit ihren tiefpfiffigen Augen mich fast überredeten, die Philosophen liegen in einem entsetzlichen Irrtum, und nur sie, die Narren, wären hinter die Gardine des göttlichen Verstandes gekommen..." (Mörike 1985, S. 30) Schilderungen oder Thematisierungen von Zuständen, die den Verstand gefährden, lassen sich auch in „Maler Nolten" und in der Zeichnung „Traumerscheinung" nachweisen.

Lampe" ist. (Weithase 1967, S. 78).

[42] Bennett bietet eine Interpretation, in der er „unverrückt" als „nicht verrückt" (nicht wahnsinnig) liest. (Bennett 1993) Dieser Gedanke steht bei ihm nicht im Zusammenhang mit klassischer Kunst, doch bestärkt mich sein Artikel in der Überzeugung, dass eine solche Lesart möglich ist, wenn auch wohl nur für ein Sprachverständnis, für das das Deutsche nicht Muttersprache ist. Eine Bestätigung der Bedrohung – nicht nur äußerer (ein Verrücken der Lampe), sondern auch innerer (Verlust des Gleichgewichts) – ist, so scheint mir, auch in Weithases Beobachtung erkennbar: „Das Nachdenkliche, ja Bedenkliche, geboren aus dem Wissen um die Möglichkeit des Verrücktwerdens und der Störung der alten Ordnung, zeigt sich am Gedichtanfang in einem etwas verlangsamten Tempo." (Weithase 1967, S. 74).

Albrecht Holschuh wehrt sich vehement gegen Interpretationen, laut denen nur die Lampe selig sei, denn es „vollbringt bei Mörike die Leistung ein Betrachter, der in Worten ein Kunstgebild der echten Art schafft. ... Am Anfang ist die Lampe bloss schön und ohne Wirkung. Dann tritt der Mensch ins Gemach und gibt ihr durch seine Sprache Leben. Wenn am Ende das, was schön ist, selig in ihm selbst scheint, bleibt zwischen dem Ich und dem sprachlichen Kunstwerk kein Unterschied." (Holschuh 1991, S. 591) Der Behauptung, die Schönheit genüge sich, wie alles Göttliche, selbst, hält Holschuh entgegen: „Nein: ohne Menschen keine Götter." „Daß Generationen von Literaturwissenschaftlern beim Besprechen von „Auf eine Lampe" die menschliche Hälfte vernachlässigt haben, hatte ... zwei Gründe. ... der bedeutendere Grund, befreit sich das Kultur-Establishment nur zögernd von einer menschenunfreundlichen Kunstauffassung. Auch heute noch (im Jahre 1991, Anm. d. Verf.) wirkt der Glaube an das autonome Kunstwerk als Rechtfertigung für die Geheimnisträgerei einer Kulturpriesterschaft." (Holschuh, *Wem leuchtet,* 592) Zwar ist in den Interpretationen Staigers und besonders Heideggers, aber auch in denen Spitzers eine priesterliche Haltung zu erkennen. Doch nehmen nicht nur sie, sondern eine Vielzahl europäischer Intellektueller der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts eine priesterliche Haltung als Träger eines außergewöhnlichen und anscheinend magischen Wissens ein. Holschuh kritisiert die Interpreten, die die Auffassung vom autonomen Kunstwerk vertreten, geht jedoch nicht der Frage nach, ob das Kunstwerk in der Moderne nicht Anlass für eine derartige Interpretation gibt, ob die Reflexion, die er stichhaltig kritisiert, nicht der künstlerischen Form entspricht, wie sie sich im 19. Jahrhundert in Europa herausbildete und entfaltete. Mit anderen Worten – ob die moderne Kunstform nicht Autonomie und Sakralisierung anstrebt. Rolf Selbmann folgt Holschuh und erklärt sogar noch nachdrücklicher, dass die bisherigen Lesarten des letzten Verses falsch sind.

„Auf eine Lampe" sei kein Plädoyer für das autonome Kunstwerk, sondern genau das Gegenteil; es gehe um die Subjektivität der ästhetischen Wahrnehmung, die sich als objektive ausgebe (Selbmann 1995, S. 593–595).[43] Die Interpretationen von Holschuh und von Selbmann, veranschaulichen eine unterschiedliche Haltung nicht nur zu „Auf eine Lampe", sondern zum poetischen Text überhaupt; sie resultieren aus der veränderten Denkweise in den letzten Jahrzehnten, sich mit Literatur zu beschäftigen. Dennoch gewinnt man bei beiden Autoren den Eindruck, dass das Kunstwerk keiner Kritik unterliegt, dass das Herangehen an die Kunst nur hermeneutisch-affirmativ sein kann. Diese Position ist aber den von ihnen kritisierten früheren Interpretationen gleich.

V

Für das seltene Wort Lustgemach gibt Grimms Wörterbuch folgende Erklärung: „gemach, in dem man zur lust weilt." (Grimm 1991)[44] Erstmals belegt ist „Lustgemach" bei Adam Olearius in seiner bearbeiteten Übersetzung des „Persianischen Rosenthals" von Saadi. „Lustgemach" ist im Sechsten Buch, Erste Historia anzutreffen. Hier geht es um das Gleichnis eines sterbenden Alten, der, obwohl hundertfünfzig Jahre alt, bedauert, dass er einige Gerichte der Tafel seines langen Lebens nicht noch länger genießen kann. In der Erzählung kommt das Wort „Eiwan" vor, das Olearius mit „Lustgemach" übersetzt und es, um es den deutschen Lesern näher zu bringen, mit cenaculum (Speisezimmer) vergleicht. „Diesem [Eiwan] war nicht ungleich der Römer coenaculum." Einige Zeilen weiter erläutert der Autor, was Sandelholz bedeutet und wofür es im Orient verwendet wird.

[43] Anscheinend lastet auf Selbmann eine deutsche Tradition, die er auf revolutionäre Weise abzuschaffen strebt.

[44] Ebenso „Ein Lustgemach ist ein bequemes Zimmer mit Bett, in dem man sich aufhält um lustvolle Dinge zu tun." (Deutsches Seminar 2004)

(Olearius 1660, S. 123–24)[45]. Der Kontext, in welchem „Lustgemach" auftritt, kreiert eine Atmosphäre orientalischer Exotik (das Alter des betagten Mannes, die Speisen des Lebens, das Sandelholz), die gleichzeitig mit der für den europäischen Barock charakteristischen Synästhesie verbunden ist, wie auch mit der Erweiterung der Kenntnisse und des Einfühlungsvermögens der Europäer in Bezug auf den Orient. „Lustgemach" gehört zu den zweigliedrigen Wörtern, die im 17.-18. Jahrhundert für Räume verwendet wurden, in denen man sich diverser sinnlicher Genüsse erfreuen konnte. Worte wie Lustraum, Lusthaus, Lustschloss, Lustgarten, Lustwald, Lustpartie oder Lustort überwinden nicht die Zeit, sondern die Zwängen unterliegende Lebenswelt, in der Ängste und Sorgen herrschen. Diese Worte erzeugen Bilder einer diffusen, doch ersehnten Welt, unabhängig davon, ob sie für persische Lustgemächer, chinesische Landschaften, für Neapel oder abgeschiedene barocke Sommerschlösser, Pavillons oder Gärten verwendet wurden. Die Exotik impliziert Ferne, geografische und kulturelle; sie drückt die Sehnsüchte der Europäer, am Ende des 18. und in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts nach einem Verhältnis zum Genuss aus, dass in ihrem eigenen Milieu nicht, anderswo jedoch als imaginär durchaus möglich war.

Lustgemach kann jedoch auch jenes Gemach der Lust bedeuten, in dem für gewöhnlich das Ehebett stand (thalamos) – eine Metonymie sowohl für die Sexualität, als auch für den Ehebund selbst. „Auf eine Lampe" verbindet den imaginären Orient und das europäische Artefakt. Das Wort, das das Artefakt bezeichnet, „Kunstgebild", vermittelt sowohl etwas Organisches, als auch etwas Kunstvolles, aber ebenso auch orientalische Pracht. Grimms Wörterbuch gibt einerseits seine Verwendung bei Herder an, die den Muskelaufbau als ein verflochtenes Kunstgebilde aus Fasern beschreibt, und andererseits die Verwendung bei Schiller, die auf den Orient verweist. In der

[45] Auf dem Einband des mir zugänglichen Exemplars stand 1654 als Erscheinungsjahr, auf der Titelseite jedoch Anno MDCLX.

„Braut von Messina" (1803) beschreibt Don Manuel die prächtige gegenständliche Atmosphäre eines Basars: „... wo die Mohren zum Verkauf / Ausstellen, was das Morgenland erzeugt / An edelm Stoff und feinem Kunstgebild." (Schiller 1965, S. 849–850; v. 812–45) Zur natürlichen Kunst der Natur in der Bedeutung von „Kunstgebild" (Herder) kommt die meisterhafte Fertigung von Gegenständen: die einen sind antik, wie die Leuchter, die Goethe in Portici sah, die anderen ungewöhnlicher, weil exotisch. Und somit verschmelzen natürliche und kulturelle Eigenschaften (Antike und Orient) miteinander in der Gestalt der Lampe und, was entscheidender ist, in der Gestalt des „Kunstgebilds der echten Art". Das Gedicht erzeugt ein heterogenes Bild des Klassischen.

Vergleichbar damit ist die Verwendung „Lustzelt" im ersten Teil von „Peter Schlemihls wundersamer Geschichte" (1813) von Adelbert von Chamisso. Das Wort steht in einem Kontext, in dem die auf spektakuläre Weise aufgetauchten Dinge sowohl der europäischen Moderne, als auch dem sinnenbetörenden Orient entstammen: englisches Pflaster, ein Fernroh[46], ein golddurchwirkter türkischer Teppich und „drei Reitpferde, ich sage Dir, drei schöne, große Rappen mit Sattel und Zeug" Die Handlung spielt auf einem Hügel mit Rosensträuchern, von dem aus der Ozean zu sehen ist. Der Hügel, das Tal, der Rosenhain und die Verletzung der schönen Fanny an den Dornen können sowohl auf das Bild der Rose in Europa bezogen werden, als auch auf das, was die Europäer in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts als Orient begreifen. Das Zelt wird über dem Teppich aufgespannt, mit dessen Maßen sein Grundriss übereinstimmt; das so entstandene Bild erinnert an eine orientalische Miniatur (Chamisso 1975: 19–21).

Um den Gedanken von Lust und Erotik zu untermauern, wäre noch zu ergänzen, dass der Mikrokontext des Verses „Die Schöne bleibt sich selbst selig" aus „Faust" zwei Arten weiblicher Schön-

[46] Das für „Fernrohr" verwendete Wort ist hier Dollond, benannt nach seinem Hersteller John Dollond (1706–1761).

heit einander gegenüberstellt: die eine ist erstarrt, ohne Leben, die andere, mit unwiderstehlicher Anmut, voller Vitalität und Lebensfreude. Der erste Schönheitstyp, der sich selbst selig ist, erweckt Assoziationen mit der Leblosigkeit einer Statue (ein starres Bild). Es wäre unbegründet, so wie auf die Verse 7399–7405 aus dem „Faust" bezogen, auch bei „Auf eine Lampe" nur von ästhetisch empfundener Schönheit zu sprechen, die bar jeder Erotik ist. Es gibt einige Interpretationen, nach denen das Gedicht eine gewisse Erotik birgt. Die Verfasser stützen sich dabei sowohl auf eine Textanalyse, als auch auf den Einfluss der altgriechischen und römischen Dichtung auf Mörike. (Selbmann 1995, S. 595–97)[47] Mörike beschäftigte sich fortwährend mit antiker Dichtung, er übersetzte oder bearbeitete schon vorhandene deutsche Übersetzungen, versah sie mit Anmerkungen und Vorworten. Die Anthologie „Classische Blumenlese" erschien 1840, die Übersetzungen Anakreons 1864. (Mörike 1970, S. 830–940)[48]

Ich sehe keinen überzeugenden Grund, nur eine der möglichen Bedeutungen auszuwählen, seien sie nun lexikalischer oder kulturgeschichtlicher Natur, ich beziehe sie lieber gleichzeitig in meine Überlegungen ein. Aus diesem Grund ist, kurz gesagt, das vom „Lustgemach" erschaffene Bild der Lust und der Erotik (un)klassisch, ausgehend vom Klassik-Verständnis der zweiten Hälfte des 18. und der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Das Gedicht „Auf eine Lampe lässt uns das Klassische als Ergebnis einer modernen Bündelung und Vermischung zweier Richtungen denken – auf der einen Seite haben wir die Tradition, die von der europäischen Antike kommt, und auf der anderen die orientalische Exotik, die für einen Teil Europas (einschließlich Deutschland) im gesamten 19.

[47] R. Selbmann vertritt die Auffassung, „Auf eine Lampe" sei erotische Dichtung.

[48] Chronologie und Kommentar zu Mörikes Beschäftigung mit dem Schaffen altgriechischer und römischer Dichter s. Unger 1970, S. 151–159. Ebenda zur „Anthologia graeca" (152–153).

Jahrhundert aktuell war. In beiden Fällen ist „Lustgemach" jedoch ein Raum der Lüste. Das Klassische ist ex-zentrisch; der Raum, in dem die Lampe „scheint", ist (außer)europäisch.[49]

Nicht zuletzt zeigt das Bild der Lampe in dem Gedicht die Verhäuslichung der Klassik, die Wandlung vom Städtischen und Heroischen zur Melancholie und Verzierung (die schöne Lampe, an leichten Ketten zierlich aufgehangen, schmückt...). Die Lampe gehört kompromisshaft zur klassischen Kunst, denn es umgibt sie ein „Geist des Ernstes", der jedoch keine Strenge beinhaltet, wie es das klassische Ideal verlangen würde. Das Wissen um die klassische Antike, aber auch um die Lust an ihrer gegenständlichen Nachbildung ist zu einem Wert geworden, den die gebildete Schicht in Deutschland miteinander teilte. Der Markt antiker und antikisierender Gegenstände und von Kopien antiker Funde in unterschiedlicher Größe (meist aus Gips, aufgrund seiner Materialeigenschaften und des erschwinglichen Preises) unterstützte die beschauliche und individuelle Begegnung und Aneignung von verschiedenen Elementen der Antike. In einem Brief an Luise Rau vom 10.-11. Dezember 1831 schreibt Mörike: „Es (Goethes „Wilhelm Meister", Anm. d. Verf.) setzt mich wunderbar in Harmonie mit der Welt, mit mir selbst, mit Allem. Das, dünkt mich, ist das wahrste Kriterium eines Kunstwerks überhaupt. Das thut Homer und jede Antike Statue. Eine gute Gipsfigur muss einmal in unser Zimmer, das sag' ich Dir." (Mörike 1985, S. 239). Das Bild der Lampe vermittelt das Erlebnis des Klassischen in geschlossenen, überwiegend privaten Räumen in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. In dem Moment, da man eine maßstabsverkleinerte Kopie des Parthenon, des Diskuswerfers oder der Pallas Athene haben

[49] Eine andere Interpretation des Wortes „Lustgemach" deutet es als Fest- und Tanzsaal. „Saal in einem meist großen Haus, wo Feste, Tänze veranstaltet werden." Diese Bedeutung kann eher auf die Interpretationen Staigers und Heideggers bezogen werden, auf die Sehnsucht nach der vergangenen Zeit.

konnte, gesellte sich zur monumentalen und öffentlichen Dimension des Klassischen das Familiäre und Gemütliche, doch liegt in beiden Fällen ein historisches Interesse vor. Die Statuen sind zu Statuetten geworden. Die Statuetten aus hellenistischer Zeit passen jedoch vollkommen zum häuslichen Raum und Geschmack der Biedermeier-Zeit. Mit dem Angebot von Kopien von Statuen unterschiedlicher Epochen der Antike „verhält sich" der Markt „historischer" als die sehnsuchtsvolle Idealisierung der Antike als heiliges Maß, einzigartige Harmonie und klare, oder appolinische Heiterkeit. Dieses Bild der Antike ist nur möglich, wenn man zielgerichtet vergisst, dass es in der Antike auch das Gegenteil der genannten Charakteristika gegeben hat, und dass ihre kulturelle Geographie die des Mittelmeers ist, uneinheitlich und mit widersprüchlichen Tendenzen.

Das private Erschließen der antiken Klassik durch Besitzen verleiht den Gegenständen eine ästhetische Funktion, die sie zuvor nicht besaßen. Die Ästhetisierung des Gegenstandes kommt dadurch zustande, dass dieser über den Rahmen der realen Kommunikationsbeziehungen, in denen er (in diesem Falle die Lampe) existiert hatte, hinaus getragen wird. Die Ästhetisierung macht den Gegenstand zu einem Museumsexponat[50], wodurch die Wahrnehmung des Gegenstandes außerhalb der Zeit verstärkt wird. Der Gegenstand wird über die Unsicherheiten und Wandlungen der Geschichte hinweg zur Klassik erhoben. Diese Tendenz, künstlerische, historische und Naturgegenstände öffentlichen musealen oder in privaten Sammlungen zusammenzustellen, wird ab dem zweiten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland offensichtlich. Der Gegenstand in „Auf eine Lampe" ist zu einem Artefakt geworden – schön und sich selbst genügend.[51]

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[50] Eines ähnlichen Verfahrens – der Entfremdung eines (meist) alltäglichen Gegenstandes von seiner Funktion – bediente sich Ende der 1950er und in den 1960er Jahren die Spätavantgarde, nur mit entgegengesetztem Ergebnis – der Entästhetisierung.

[51] Susanne Fliegner nimmt eine kurze, doch äußerst interessante Ana-

Fliegner sieht die kulturhistorische Tendenz, Gegenständen verschiedener Art Museumsstatus zu verleihen, in der Idylle „Der alte Turmhahn". Die Wetterfahne in Form eines Hahns wird nach hundertunddreizehn Jahren Dienst abgesetzt, doch vom Pfarrer mitgenommen, der ihn auf den alten Ofen in seinem Arbeitszimmer stellt. Das neue „Lebens"-Umfeld des Turmhahns gewährt ihm Schutz vor den äußeren Gefahren und weist idyllische (ahistorische) Eigenschaften auf.[52] Später erhält der reale Wetterhahn, dem die o.g. Idylle gewidmet ist, auf regelrecht magische Weise gleichermaßen den Status von Ewigkeit und von einem gedruckten Bild. Mörike nahm den ausrangierten Veteran mit in seine Wohnung, brachte ihn 1866 zu einem Fotografen und verschickte danach die Fotografie als Visitenkarte. Als moderne Erfindung nimmt die Fotografie durch die Vervielfältigung zwar die Einzigartigkeit des Wetterhahns, doch bestätigt sie zugleich mittels der visuellen Form das Althergebrachte des Gegenstandes. Heute befindet sich der glückliche Wetterhahn im Schiller-Nationalmuseum Marbach, ist also im buchstäblichen Sinne zu einem Museumsstück geworden. (Fliegner 1991, S. 193–194)

Von privaten Räumen auf das Nationale übertragen, sollen die ästhetischen Eigenschaften das Bild sozialer Harmonie erzeugen, welches seelische Behaglichkeit vermittelt und Konflikte bemäntelt. So wird eine konfliktfreie nationale Identität möglich. Im Unterschied vom privaten Räum, verlässt dieses Bild jedoch das „Reich der Schönheit" und wird zur Ideologie, zu einem Instrument bestimmter Interessen und bestimmter potentieller oder tatsächlicher Macht.

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lyse von „Auf eine Lampe" vor, und zwar unter dem Aspekt des Verhältnisses von Kunstgegenstand und Industrieerzeugnis. Ihre Studie positioniert Mörikes Werk unter den verschiedenen Formen von künstlerischer Geselligkeit und kunstbezogenen außerberuflichen Tätigkeiten in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Fliegner 1991, S. 192–193).

[52] Zum Verhältnis von Idylle und Geschichte in „Der alte Turmhahn" s. Andreas Böhn im Mörike-Handbuch 2004, S. 150–152.

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Some interpretations of "Auf eine Lampe," Mörike's most frequently interpreted poem, raise the literary work to the rank of a sacred text, and the interpreter to the role of a priest, a possessor of sacred knowledge. In favour of another position I try to substantiate the instability in the lamp's classic form and to discuss the social function of the classic form. "Auf eine Lampe" leads us to reconsider the classic as a result of the connection and intermingling of two directions Modernity makes, the one being the tradition of European Antiquity, and the other the oriental exoticism, topical throughout the nineteenth century. I come to the conclusion that the classical is ex-centric; the space, in which the lamp 'shines' is (Non) European.

BRYGIDA PAWŁOWSKA-JĄDRZYK

EYE AND LIGHT

THE SHORT STORIES OF EDGAR ALLAN POE IN THE CONTEXT OF PAINTING

1.
REDON'S EYE

In 1882, Odilon Redon published a series of lithographs titled *À Edgar Poe*. The work of this graphic artist and painter – known as the "French Blake", and admired by both the representatives of symbolism and surrealism – is distinguished by an atmosphere of uncertainty and mystery, a visionary power, and even a hallucinatory imagination. Monstrous creatures in starkly poor space taken in perspective, extraordinary, beyond the rationalisation of relationships between objects, disturbing the penetration of light and shadow, and the ubiquitous black, whose hues seem to opalesce (the artist likes to apply different types of charcoal) – are hallmarks of the Redon style. Characteristic of the author *Dans le Rêve* must be considered above all to be the presentation of the eye, which takes the form of an oneiric phantasmagoria. Here we find among others an eye-asteroid, wandering between heaven and the empty horizon, an eye-balloon floating in the sky and an eye-flower sink-

ing, eyes without eyelids, sometimes just encircled by eyelashes, and oddly decorated with a poppy head, a lonely one-eyed planet and distorted in the grimace of a disturbing smile of Cyclops, which rises to the top of his sole, disproportionately large pupil; among there are: a vicious eye, hazy melancholy, and penetrating eyes staring, eyes turned heavenward, as if fleeing beyond the borders of the visible world, and the hypnotic eye "attached" to the viewer[1].


On Redon's "black paintings" the eyeball is always singular and unreal (usually an autonomous entity, as if it were liberated from its beholder), it marks the direction toward that which defies perception, a clear, one might say – categorical "swing toward transcendence". From the portfolio devoted to Edgar Allan Poe comes a lithograph titled *The Eye like a strange balloon floating towards infinity* (see picture No. 1), interpreted as an expression of willingness to enter unexplored areas of the imagination.

Researchers see the sources of inspiration for this unprecedented work primarily in microbiology and pathomorphology, in the fantastical apparitions of Francisco Goya and in nineteenth-century literature, especially in Poe's romantic writings translated into French by Mallarmé and Baudelaire. It is believed that the work of Odilon Redon did not refer directly to the legacy of Edgar Allan Poe, but rather only follows its climate in its own way. The world-renowned art historian generalised this issue, saying they are rather "illustrative poems", which "evoke the macabre, hallucinatory world of the poet"[2].

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[1] The motif of the eye in the works of O. Redon ais written about by M. Poprzęcka: *Inne obrazy. Oko, widzenie, sztuka (Od Albertiego do Duchampa)*, Gdańsk 2008, p. 54–81. I gleaned a lot of valuable information from this work; however, the author does not deal with the literary inspirations of the artist's work. For this subject see: D. Gamboni, *La plume et le pinceau. Odilon Redon et la littérature*, Paris 1989; A.E. Miller, *Literary and pictorial sources in the graphic work of Odilon Redon*, "The Burlington Magazin", 146, No. 1213 (April 2004), p. 234–242.

[2] H.W. Janson, *Historia sztuki*, trans. i.a. J. Wiercinska, Warsaw 1993, p. 625.



This opinion needs clarification. Firstly, besides the intuitively recognizable kinship between the climate of Redon's artistic work and the atmosphere of Poe's literary works of art both artistic visions combine the occurrence of a unique status and a special way to develop the theme of the eye. Secondly, the aesthetic homogeneity which characterizes the French painter lithographic cycle is rather difficult to assign to the legacy of Poe: the author of *The Fall of the House of Usher*, known primarily as the creator of grim tales of horror, also wrote successful songs of another kind, including satirical and humorous. Incidentally, he was guided then by an edgy parody, even in his own ideas[3], which refers to a certain extent artistic concepts related to the issue of wider perception (its limitations and specific hypertrophy), and other topics implied by some form of textual realisation of the theme of the eye. For these reasons, it seems that after analysing the ways in which Edgar Allan Poe ex-

[3] M. Palmowski, *Jak napisać blackwoodowski artykuł, czyli Poe jako satyryk*, Tekstualia 2009, No. 1, p. 73–82.

ploited this characteristic motif in his work, one can reasonably expect both a deepening of reflection on the complexity of the work of this excellent writer, as well as a highlighting of some of nuances of its rich and varied artistic reception[4]. This sketch focuses on one very important aspect of the problem: the coexistence next to each other in many works of the American writer of eye (eyes) motifs and light.

2. "THOSE SHINNING, THOSE DIVINE ORBS!" OR PENETRATING THE MYSTERIES OF THE OTHERWORLD

Edgar Allan Poe's short story titled *Ligeia* (1838) is based on the most basic, yet most puzzling contradictions of human existence: love and hate, human will and the relentless decrees of destiny, life and death. Generally speaking, the rhythm of the narrative and the irrational logic of this dark tale define the opposition between ignorance and initiation, which is expressed in the imagery surrounding the themes of (not)seeing, darkness and brightness.

The very beginning of the work emphasises the issue of ignorance ("I cannot, for my soul, remember how, when, or even precisely where, I first became acquainted with the lady Ligeia", p. 167)[5] – the first-person narrator initiates a series of comments on

[4] The work of no nineteenth-century writer enjoyed perhaps such popularity among artists as did the work of Edgar Allan Poe. One could mention such artists as: Odilon Redon, Alberto Martini, Gaetano Previati, William Degouve de Nuncques and František Kupka. For a discussion on the artistic reception of the writer's legacy see: Burton R. Pollin, *Poe in Art, Opera and Dance*, [in:] *A Companion to Poe Studies*, Eric W. Carlson (ed.), Greenwood Publishing Group: 1996.

[5] All fragments of Poe's work are given according to the following publication: E.A. Poe, *The Complete Illustrated Stories and Poems*,

a more or less peculiar limitations of his own memory. From the perspective of this sketch, the most important figure is the heroine of the title story, who appears to the narrator as a person exuding an aura of unusualness, extremely smart and distinguished by the "the beauty of beings either above or apart from the earth". Ligeia's ontological status is not fully clear. This also applies to the heroine's earthly existence, that is, the period preceding the moment when – contrary to the unbridled lust for life – she will fall to the categorical call of death. The loving husband, totally absorbed by a passion for metaphysical investigations, is amazed by the silent, ghostly appearance of his wife ("I was never made aware of her entrance into my closed study, save by the dear music of her low sweet voice, as she placed her marble hand upon my shoulder", p. 168). In fact, only one feature of Ligeia reveals itself to the narrator's consciousness in full clarity, even though he cannot fathom it, nor find an adequate word for it – the wonderful and scary yet at the same time inhumanly beautiful eyes of this woman:

> For the eyes have no models in the remotely antique. It might have been, too, that in these eyes of my beloved lay the secret to which Lord Verulam alludes. They were, I must believe, far larger than the ordinary eyes of our own race. They were even fuller than the fullest of gazelle eyes of the tribe of the valley of Nourjahad. [...] The hue of the orbs was the most brilliant of black, and, far over them, hung jetty lashes of great length. The brows, slightly irregular in outline, had the same tint. The 'strangeness', however, which I found in the eyes was of a nature distinct from the formation, or the color, or the brilliancy of the features, and must, after all, be referred to the *expression*. Ah, word of no meaning! behind whose vast latitude of mere sound we intrench our ignorance of so much of the spiritual. The

Chancellor Press, London 1994.

> expression of the eyes of Ligeia! How for long hours have I pondered upon it! How have I, through the whole of a midsummer night, struggled to fathom it! What was it–that something more profound than the well of Democritus–which lay far within the pupils of my beloved? What *was* it? I was possessed with a passion to discover. Those eyes! those large, those shining, those divine orbs! they became to me twin stars of Leda, and I to them devoutest of astrologers (p. 168–169).

Poe in some way exceeds in this story an ancient literary motif that appears in Cicero and Lucretius, and captures the eye as the "window of the soul", a tool for mental and spiritual expression. Ligeia's eyes are like telescopes open to the cavernous depths of the cosmos, which conceals the Mystery – inscrutable and non-human, evoking a burning desire for knowledge. The plot, like the symbolism of space and colour, indicates that the object concerns, above all, the relationship between life and death.

Particularly noteworthy is a certain feature of one of Ligeia's eyes: it is characterised as being able to reflect (emanate?) light. The narrator dreams of the "glittering blackness" of the pupil ("The hue of the orbs was the most brilliant of black"), admired their brilliance ("the radiant luster of her eyes") and repeatedly calls them "luminous", "brilliant", "shining". These terms are not merely a manifestation of fascination with the dazzling beauty of the women or ordinary exaltation. Some parts of the story irrefutably prove that the amazing shimmering eye of the title character takes on a symbolic dimension; it becomes a s i g n o f l i g h t. In the view of the narrator the glow of Ligeia's pupils dissipates the gloom obscuring the road that leads to achieving the highest wisdom, forbidden to man. Therefore, the death of the heroine – the closing of (these) eyes – condemns his consciousness to wander in the darkness of the "transcendental labyrinth":

> I saw not then what I now clearly perceive, that the acquisitions of Ligeia were gigantic, were astounding; yet I was sufficiently aware of her infinite supremacy to resign myself, with a child-like confidence, to her guidance through the chaotic world of metaphysical investigation at which I was most busily occupied during the earlier years of our marriage. With how vast a triumph–with how vivid a delight–with how much of all that is ethereal in hope did I *feel*, as she bent over me in studies but little sought–but less known,–that delicious vista by slow degrees expanding before me, down whose long, gorgeous, and all untrodden path, I might at length pass onward to the goal of the wisdom too divinely precious not to be forbidden!
>
> [...] Without Ligeia I was but as a child groping benighted. Her presence, her readings alone, rendered vividly luminous the many mysteries of the transcendentalism in which we were immersed. Wanting the radiant lustre of her eyes, letters, lambent and golden, grew duller than Saturnian lead (p. 170).

By associating with each other motifs of light and the eye and making them carriers of the metaphysical connotations, Poe's work is consistent with the tradition initiated by representatives of European painting from at least the late Middle Ages. It represents, among others, the work of Albrecht Dürer[6], who consistently used in the representations of the human eye some specific forms of gleaming and light reflections (especially reflections of the eye in the shape of a luminous rectangle), combining in his works naturalistic tendencies (the desire to obtain the effect of illusion) with those of symbolic thinking (referring to an interpretation of *claritas* through theological aesthetics). For example, in *Self-portrait*

[6] Incidentally, Dürer, next to Leonardo da Vinci and Rembrandt, belonged to a group of artists and thinkers admired and eagerly invoked by Odilon Redon.

(1500) in Munich, in which the artist styled his face in the traditional image of Christ, within a lit spot in the left eye a cross is drawn; the mystic symbol of salvation[7].

In the case of Ligeia, specifying the symbolic references, which would allow the symbolism of light and the eye to be set in a specific ideological or philosophical context[8], seems quite an impossible task. This is due to the nature of the work, which probably reflected in the comment of Odilon Redon on the nature of his own artistic creativity: "My drawings inspire, but they don't define. [...] They lead us, like music, to an ambiguous and indeterminate world"[9]. There is a lot to suggest that Poe's story stems from a similar desire to place the reader in a universe of elusive meanings. According to the diagnoses of European art experts, it was born in the renaissance, it intensified in romanticism and reached its apogee in nineteenth-century symbolism.

Ligeia can be interpreted as – lacking the aspect of rebirth, but with faith in the redemptive power of unearthly love – a macabre variation on the Eleusina myth. This can also be read to some extent in the context, extremely popular in European Romanticism, of the ballad about the returning dead, like *Lenora* (1773) by Gottfried August Bürger or *Ucieczka* by Adam Mickiewicz. In Poe's idea of possessive feelings, which is able to transcend the boundaries of the underworld, there is an association with the theme of Rowena. The second wife of the narrator falls victim to a

[7] See: J. Białostocki, *Okno i oko. Realizm i symbolika refleksów światła w sztuce Dürera i jego poprzedników*, [Ibid.] *Symbole i obrazy w świecie sztuki*, Warsaw 1982, vol. 1, p. 68–85.

[8] In this story traces of Plato's conception of ideal reality can be discerned (see the section reminiscent of the concept of anamnesis, in which the narrator – in the context of considerations about the eyes of Ligeia – juxtaposes knowledge with remembering). Platonic conception of knowledge through anamnesis involves the transmigration of souls (the motif of metempsychosis appears at the end of the story).

[9] Quoted: M. Poprzęcka, op. cit., p. 75.

mysterious illness; a poison seeping in from beyond the grave (in the story there is mention of drops of a ruby fluid added, perhaps, by an invisible hand to Rowena's cup) like her "hatred of a demon rather than a person" from the soul of her hated husband. Ligeia and her successor are contrasting characters. The heart of the first beat with the rhythm of a vibrant spiritual life and the burning heat of passionate love; the other is cold, listless and frightened, the first has jet-black hair and the same pupils, while the other is a blue-eyed blonde. One may suspect that the miserable man has an unconscious desire to kill his new companion, because he chooses a bridal chamber adorned with Egyptian sarcophagi and equipped with four-poster bed that is like a shroud. In the description of the room there are other significant details. They relate to the theme of the window, which is sometimes interpreted as a symbol of consciousness (especially when the window – as in this case – is situated at the top of the tower)[10]:

> The room lay in a high turret of the castellated abbey, was pentagonal in shape, and of capacious size. Occupying the whole southern face of the pentagon was the sole window–an immense sheet of unbroken glass from Venice–a single pane, and tinted of a leaden hue, so that the rays of either the sun or moon passing through it, fell with a ghastly lustre on the objects within. Over the upper portion of this huge window, extended the trellis-work of an aged vine, which clambered up the massy walls of the turret. [...] The phantasmagoric effect was vastly heightened by the artificial introduction of a strong continual current of wind behind the draperies–giving a hideous and uneasy

[10] The importance of this is motivated by an analogy between the shape of the tower and the human figure, see: J.E. Cirlot, *Diccionario de símbolos*, 1969, entry: window. For other interpretations of the symbolism of this passage see: S. Studniarz, *Tragiczna wizja. Rzecz o nowelistyce Poego*, Toruń 2008, p. 110–111.

animation to the whole (p. 173–174).

At the beginning of the description Poe presents a number of objects that share a common trait: they impede the access of light (it is not enough that the only window in the room was made of dark grey Venetian glass[11], it is obscured by a trellis and climbing lush vegetation). It is hard to resist the impression that the accumulation of themes of this type serves to constitute an antithetical imaginative connection between images of Ligeia's burning eyes and the darkened windows in the bridal chamber of her "unworthy" successor. The part of the story from which I drew the quoted passage can be read – through the prism of earlier diagnoses – as an allegorical representation of the atrophy of the hero's spiritual existence after he lost the ability to gaze at the glowing eyes of his beloved. The will to see again their splendour proves so indomitable that the foundations of the Land of Darkness are shaken[12].

[11] In the process of producing this type of glass sodium is used in order to obtain an opaque surface and materials that provide a colour. It should be noted that the window described is in a shade of lead (*"tinted of a leaden hue"*) – which corresponds to the previously quoted fragment of narrative, in which the narrator in a similar way determines the disappearance of their skills to delve into the mysteries of transcendental philosophy after the death of Ligeia.

[12] At the end of the work the narrator, staring at the reviving corpse of Rowena, recognizes in it the object of his desire: *„Here then, at least", I shrieked aloud, „can I never be mistaken–these are the full, and the black, and the wild eyes–of my most love–of the Lady–of the LADY LIGEIA"* (p. 180).

3.
THE EYE – A FALSE MIRROR?

The chapter devoted to Odilon Redon cited in the introduction of Maria Poprzęcka's book bears the title "Paint only what you have never seen" ...[13] These words express – currently over a hundred years old – an opinion about the visionary character of the French artist: that its main feature is considered as a striving for "portraying what exists outside visibility". They can also refer to *Ligeia*, as in the work the eyes are – from the viewpoint of the protagonist – an inalienable medium of mystical experience (the experience of the world in a supernatural dimension), and – from the viewpoint of the reader – they are a theme in the story creating an effect of incredibility. This is not Edgar Allan Poe's only way of exploiting artistically the theme of the eye.

The *Man of the Crowd* (1840) tells of a man who spends his time while recovering from an unnamed illness by observing Londoners through a hazy cafe window. The first person narrator – like a detective fluent in the art of deduction (like Dupin and Legrand) – read into the surface features of reality a hidden deeper meaning. From observing the behaviour of passers-by, their appearance, expression of eyes, facial expressions and gestures he draws conclusions about the occupations, customs and even characters of strangers. The weak plot somehow emerges from the tangle of glances. Reality seems to offer no resistance to the inquiries of the observer to reveal their secrets until such time as he fishes out from the crowd the figure of an old man of singular appearance, whose looks and behaviour do not lend themselves to logical interpreta-

[13] "Paint what you have never seen, and what you'll never see" – this sentence by Tristan Corbiere, a poet, cited by Maria Poprzęcka to determine the purposes of symbolism, which was a poetic program is again adapted (and – according to the researchers – without much success) to the visual arts (*Inne obrazy*, op cit., p. 68).

tion. This event initiates the narrator's stubborn pursuit of the mysterious drifter, undertaken in the hope of identifying him - this is in fact the quest for meaning, which places stubborn resistance against the inquiring gaze.

The title of Jerzy Jarniewicz's interesting essay on a summary of the story sounds like the quote from Maria Poprzęcka: *Read what has not been saved*[14]. However, the analogy is apparent, resulting rather from the similarity in the way in which ideas are formed than a genuine kinship with their content. Jarniewicz formulates the thesis in his study of interpretation, in light of which the main theme of the story is basically an obsessive, "inability to accept the observed world": a look into the eyes of a gloomy passer-by, which is the finale of a strange chase finale, makes the narrator aware that the stranger's face can never be 'read' for the simple reason that there is probably nothing in it 'to read'[15].


Interpreted in this way, the American work of the Romantic looks like a literary trailer of the intriguing image of René Magritte's *False Mirror* (*Le faux miroir*, 1935, see picture No. 2). The main representative of Belgian surrealism placed on his canvas a huge human eye, which instead of expressing expected depth (in accordance with the idea of the eye as a "mirror of the soul"), showed the 'background' of the outside world: blue sky and clouds. (This image is sometimes interpreted as a kind of perverse game with the viewer.)[16]

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[14] J. Jarniewicz, Read what you has not been saved. *"Człowiek tłumu" Edgar Allan Poe i jego polskie przekłady*, Tekstualia 2009, No. 1, p. 113-122.

[15] Ibid, p. 116, 121.

[16] M. Paquet, *René Magritte. Widzialna myśl*, transl. E. Tomczyk, Kolonia 2003, p. 11. Imagining the eye as a mirror image of the soul seems to be perhaps even more important for the visual arts than for literature. Painters for centuries have been emphasising the individuality of portrait models by the precise representation of the eye, sometimes achieving specific effects by different forms of their "elimination" (for



The effect of disappointed expectations, to which the end of *The Man of the Crowd* leads may, however, be a trap, which the writer set for amateurs to make easy generalisations, and too hasty interpretations. Jerzy Jarniewicz was most likely caught in this trap, despite certainly not belonging to any of these groups of readers; in this case, guilt must be sought rather as a consequences of the chosen research method. "Comparative translation" – or at least a variant thereof, which the cited essay presents – is in fact conducive to focusing on the molecular level of a literary text (in the case of prose – in words, expressions and phrases, to a lesser extent, the longer sentence). The mechanisms of this method of analysis prejudge also to a large extent the selection criteria of the material (the interpretation is determined by reviews of these text elements that have received a different treatment among different translators, and which moreover can be effectively compared), which threatens to lock the researcher in the grip of "false alternatives".

Edgar Allan Poe's story does not disappoint the expectations of the inquiring reader; however, it gives rise to the formulation of a highly probable hypothesis about the identity of the mysterious stranger. Perhaps the indefatigable observer of London's passers-by falls silent not because he did not read the truth of the grim old

example Amedeo Modigliani, and Pablo Picasso in *Portrait of Vollard*).

man's eyes, but precisely because – looking at them – he experienced an epiphany. Perhaps the sense of what the narrator discovered turned out to be shocking and inexpressible (after all, "There are some secrets which do not permit itself to be read"). – Perhaps it is the name that does not pass through the throat ...

Discerning the disguised "depth" of the *Man of the Crowd* requires perhaps not so much a probing of individual words, but rather viewing them from a distance, in light of the constellation of themes that are scattered around the work. It seems that reflection on the semantics and aesthetics of words should in this case be accompanied by a reflection on the "aesthetic imagination"[17]. Let us assume that the truth, which the narrator finds in the eyes of the gloomy passer-by, is not articulated in the Poe's work directly. The text of the story conceals it, but it is not lost; why, it even allows the "prohibited" name to be read to some extent. (Stephen Mallarmé's famous saying irresistibly arises at this point: "To suggest – is just an ideal!") In brief, let us highlight the most important observations and insights which, taken together, probably without much risk of error, will reveal from the gloom of uncertainty the identity of the unidentified dark hero:

1. In the passage from the story that tells of the emergence in a crowd of passers-by of the mysterious old man and the observer in the cafe seeing him, the writer tells the narrator to say – in passing – the following:

> With my brow to the glass, I was thus occupied in scrutinizing the mob, when suddenly there came into view a countenance (that of a decrepid old man, some sixty-five or seventy years of age) – a countenance which at once arrested and absorbed my whole attention, on account of the abso-

[17] I use this concept for: M. Delaperrière, *Fantastyka czy cudowność. Z badań porównawczych nad polską wyobraźnią literacką*, „Ruch Literacki" 1990, p. 1.

> lute idiosyncrasy of its expression. Anything even remotely resembling that expression I had never seen before. I will remember that my first thought, upon beholding it, was that Retzch, had he viewed it, would have greatly preferred it to his own pictural incarnations of the fiend (p. 214).

2. This seemingly random association is a kind of continuation of the naming of the gloomy gentleman scattered throughout the text: some of these expressions (for example, "the genius of deep crime") can even be considered as being the periphrastic identify of Satan.

3. Moreover, in this interpretive perspective, there is also (especially when you consider the literary demonology) an intuitive recognition, which the narrator makes at the time of the meeting:

> As I endeavoured, during the brief minute of my original survey, to form some analysis of the meaning conveyed, there arose confusedly and paradoxically within my mind, the ideas of vast mental power, of caution, of penuriousness, of avarice, of coolness, of malice, of blood-thirstiness, of triumph, of merriment, of excessive terror, of intense–of supreme despair (p. 214).

This impression does not have of course in the work the status of objective truth, especially since the determination of "investigator" seems to be a marked feature of madness. Yet another indication of the "demonic theme," which appears in Romanticism as a state of loneliness, is made outside the competence of the first-person narrator: it puts forward a motto that Poe puts in his story[18].

Among the essential external features of the spokesman of destructive force, it is worth noting the ominous expression of the eyes ("His chin fell upon his breast, while his eyes rolled wildly from

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[18] This motto is: "*C'est grand malheur, de ne pouvoir être seul*" – La Bruyère.

under his knit brows, in every direction, upon those who hemmed him in", p. 215; „He [...] spoke no word, and looked at all objects with a wild and vacant stare", p. 216). A significant element of the damaged and dirtied yet elegant old man's clothing is his tightly fitting coat, from which emerges probably a diamond and a blade. It may be worth recalling that Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust* was dressed in a silk robe and also wore a side weapon (sword). And one of the illustrators[19] of the great work of the German Romantic was Friedrich August Moritz Retzsch (1779–1857) – a painter whose name (simplified with the English version) recalls the narrator telling of the time at which first saw the mysterious old man.

4. Suggesting the dark sides of the stranger's selfhood – and perhaps upsetting his certainty about his ontological status – in the *Man of the Crowd* also serves the characteristic of space, as seen especially in the passage describing the purpose of his wanderings through the city[20], and a significant response to the changing environment:

> It was the most noisome quarter of London, where everything wore the worst impress of the most deplorable poverty, and of the most desperate crime. [...] Horrible filth festered in the dammed-up gutters. The whole atmosphere teemed with desolation. Yet, as we proceeded, the sounds of human life revived by sure degrees, and at length large

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19 See: *An Analysis of Goethe's tragedy of Faust in Illustration of Retsch*, engraved from the original by Henry Moses, London 1820.

20 At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the city was often presented as a "seat" of the power of evil, see e.g. the painting by Wojciech Weiss *Demon* (1904), considered as a satanic echo of themes of the prose of Stanisław Przybyszewski. The demonic meaning of another canvas by a Polish painter, *Tłum – Mi-carême w Paryżu* by Witold Wojtkiewicz (1907), is associated with the deformation of profiles crowded on a square in the city that seem to have no eyes (as if in contrast to the buildings that are shown in the background).

> bands of the most abandoned of a London populace were seen reeling to and fro. The spirits of the old man again flickered up, as a lamp which is near its death-hour. Once more he strode onward with elastic tread. Suddenly a corner was turned, a blaze of light burst upon our sight, and we stood before one of the huge suburban temples of Intemperance – one of the palaces of the fiend, Gin (p. 216; underlining – B.P.J.).

5. Perhaps the strongest argument (as it is independent of the narrator's consciousness) as to the satanic nature of the title character comes from an analysis of how Edgar Allan Poe exploits the themes of light and darkness. The narrator sees an old man in a crowd of pedestrians at the time of evening when the darkness of night begins to thicken. When he manages to get near him the night is deep, and the city is wallowing in a thick, damp fog. It is possible that, in addition to the analogy generally reported by interpreters between the gloomy London weather and state of mind of the storyteller, the motif plays a role as a factor creating in the story a demonic aura: after all, in *Paradise Lost* (1667) John Milton (and this is a work that strongly influenced the imagination of the Romantics, including Byron and Shelley), fog is one of the incarnations of Satan[21].

The discreet observer follows the old man on the streets lit by faint gas lamps, among streams of rain and a few passers-by, until an area in which there is a brothel. Here, the men came out from behind the corner, are stricken by bright light. Then dawn begins to break. The sun rises. Another whole day of wandering among the

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[21] It is a purely associational relationship, rather than ideological between Milton and Poe's works. Milton's Satan, similarly to Byron's, is a Promethean (Eliot), sublime in its impressive stamina and strength of character (Shelley), and his attribute is the "beauty of the damned" (Praz). About how the last mentioned author defines the eyes of Milton's "fallen angel" see: M. Janion, *Gorączka romantyczna*, Kraków 2000, p. 212.

crowd begins. In the end the narrator falls silent in the face of the "the worst heart in the world".

It is hard to resist the impression that a man hungry to penetrate the mystery of the gloomy wanderer persistently follows in the footsteps of those who for centuries have been called by mistake as "wearing a light". Somewhere on the edges of the rationally perceived world the inquiring researcher of crowds inevitably encounters the eyes of Lucifer[22].

ГЛАЗ И СВЕТ.

ПО КОРОТКИМ РАССКАЗАМ ЭДГАРА АЛЛАНА ПО (В КОНТЕКСТЕ ИЗОБРАЗИТЕЛЬНОГО ИСКУССТВА)

Эссе посвящено двум коротким рассказам Эдгара По, *Лигейя*, *Человек толпы*, помещенным в контекст европейской живописи. Основным объектом рассмотрения в этой работе являются мотивы глаза и света, которые сосуществуют в произведениях По довольно часто, и, по всей видимости, несут особую смысловую нагрузку. В представленном мире эти мотивы, так же как и специфический облик рассказчика, обычно подчёркнуты метафизикой помещений: они являются комментарием к реальности за пределами нашего восприятия. В каждой части исследования описаны различные, но взаимодополняющие аспекты этой проблемы, со ссылкой на видение выдающихся художников, Альбрехта Дюрера, Рене Магритта, Одилона Редона. В поисках наиболее адекватных средств описания идей Эдгара По, автор эссе облагораживает «язык изобразительного воображения».

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22 Lucifer: Lat. *lux* – 'light', *ferre* – 'to bring'; Lucifer – 'Light bearer; morning star'. This name was given to the fallen angel, the prince of darkness, through a misunderstanding – it's an incorrect translation of the biblical book of Isaiah (made by Saint Jerome), who with Vulgate spread across the whole world (see W. Kopaliński, *Słownik mitów i tradycji kultury*, Warsaw 2003, p. 681–682).

PIOTR MATYWIECKI

MATERIAL
(ON JAN TARASIN'S ART)

Jan Tarasin – painter and graphic artist – is a philosopher of seeing and thinking. Of seeing and thinking conceived as one process.

There is no other Polish painter who would inspire critics to a deeper, more thoroughgoing reflection about the nature of seeing and meaning and their mutual relation – a relation which has existed always, from the dawn of human consciousness, and will exist as long as that consciousness survives. This interrelation is at times harmonious – and at times it is conflicting.

Do the qualities of Jan Tarasin's art spring from the roots of painting itself? I believe they do. And I believe that his art merges a pursuit of primal visuality with a modern element: an immersion in the textual world. To illustrate this I must first relate the unique experience of visiting one of the painter's exhibitions – it will make no difference which one I choose, as they all bring about in the viewer sensations of a similarly fundamental nature[1].

It is said of exhibitions that they are „open" – here one would like to say that a „book is open", and we, the spectators, are walking

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[1] For me, the source of the most intense sensations and richest intellectual inspiration was the September–October 1995 Warsaw retrospective in Zachęta – National Gallery of Art.

inside it... That is because the painter Jan Tarasin can also be called a writer – in the deepest, most basic sense of the word.

His paintings are full of signs similar to letters of a bizarre alphabet; some of them are completely abstract and two-dimensional (geometrical or free in form), others are similar in shape to three-dimensional solids whose purpose and functions are unclear. Some of the signs are black and white, others have sharp, vibrant colors, others yet are subtly shaded. A single painting will often unite well-known conventional signs – letters of the Latin alphabet – with signs which seem conventional, yet we are not familiar with the rules which govern their meaning; and next to those we will find semi-conventional signs, which – like Egyptian hieroglyphs or Chinese ideograms – are somehow similar to certain objects or landscapes. And all these cohabit a single space with yet another category: the type of signs that are more or less realistic images. And composed into all this we find photographs, unequivocally representational signs.

I have compiled this inventory of signs found on Tarasin's paintings and, simultaneously, I have classified them. I am not the first to have done that! Many critics have done so before me[2] – as if something in these works compelled one to arrange such lists... Tarasin inculcates his audiences with the inalienable temptation of enumeration and classification.

On the paintings, all these signs appear in an illusion of deep and colorful space, with multiple and differentiated planes – we can find signs far away on the horizon, or close to the painting's edge. The signs float in this space – it is a suspension, and they are its internal phase. There are moments when it seems that these very

[2] Mieczysław Porębski's text, included in the Zachęta exhibition catalog (Warszawa 1995) is penetrating and beautiful in an unequalled manner – Porębski can be considered the patron of all such attempts. On the diversity of signs in Tarasin's work he superimposes the vocabulary of medieval theory of sign (which is refined yet close to visual experience).

signs, these bizarre letter-like existents give birth to space itself, to color, and smell, and time. (Even in the black and white drawings one feels as if the signs emanated colors!) The intensity of the images is such that one feels like saying: his signs are the germs of which space, color, smells, and time are borne – the whole sensual, physical world, together with its atmosphere, its „echo" in our psyche. Tarasin says: „We applaud art which is (...) suggestive, which brings light out of the colorful pigment, space out of the flat surface, movement out of the static patch. We applaud the magical capability of transforming the dead matter of paint into equivalents of life."[3]

How can we then describe this strange sign-writing? What sort of a writer is Jan Tarasin?

Let us imagine, let us r e m e m b e r that we were once children who did not know yet what it means „to read", children who were learning that for the very first time. Let us imagine that here, at a Jan Tarasin exhibition, we are experiencing the return of this lost moment – when letters suddenly began to signify sounds, and when just as suddenly sounds collated into words, and words jumped into their place in reality, naming this or that object, and the surprised child realized the nature of conventionality – realized that since signs, parts of words are conventional, then so are words themselves! At that moment of mental revolution, when a child realizes the sense of reading, the world becomes in its mind a dizzying mixture of conventionality and reality, the abstract and the concrete, mind and world. But soon it all becomes ordinary, it becomes habit. The mixture of conventional signs and real space becomes part of a mundane chore. The c o n t e n t of what we're reading is still capable of enthralling us. Not the m i r a c l e o f r e a d i n g itself, though. Not anymore...

We walk around the exhibition – Jan Tarasin, this writing painter, this painting writer, has led us into such a book where we

[3] Tarasin, „Przestrzeń w przestrzeni".

can become aware of the miracle of reading, the primal miracle of mixing space and thought. Our eyes are spinning, our thoughts are spinning – here, in the presence of these works, our thoughts pull apart what used to be routinely connected. And they do it in such a way that we realize and experience both the difference and the connection between the separated elements.

When we exit the exhibition onto the street, we will look at the world in a different light: we will look at the mixture of letters on advertisments, the various graphic signs of the city, the traffic signs – and at people, who are the signs of their own feelings, of the worlds that are locked inside their heads. How wonderful all this, in its heterogeneous homogeneity!

Jan Tarasin pastes photographs, such as portraits, into paintings full of other signs, or turns them into backgrounds for other signs. He is saying to us: we live through thought, we think through life, thought is our space, and the wonderful space of the real world is our thought!

This is how I have experienced all the Tarasin exhibitions that I have been able to visit. Now I will try to sort out the various problems that this lyrical experience poses to objective knowledge.

The most important question is the one all works by great painters ask: what is the material of the visual arts? Tarasin demands that we rethink this, he suggests an unusually wide understanding of the term.

The material of the visual arts is captured by sight, by the mind – the visual-mental universe. Is it possible to see without thinking about what one is seeing? No, it's impossible. Is it possible to think without imagining, without „visualizing" what one is thinking? That isn't possible either.

We therefore think in meanings, in images which connect

meanings to the visual world. But the relation is mysterious, difficult to grasp, elusive. When we want to define it, its meaning flees into the sphere of visuality, it defies capture into words. And at the same time, this visuality itself is concealed in meaning, it is „hidden" in words. The material of the visual arts is therefore „in between"... The painter himself is well aware of this „in between" nature of it, and he expands it to cover even some non-visual mental habits: „Are our perceptive capabilities determined only by physical constraints? Aren't they restricted to a far greater extent by our habits, our knowledge, suggestion, our unwillingness to change opinion or point of view? And ultimately: by convenience, inertia, our utilitarian needs?"[4]

The modern stereotype proclaimed that the painter paints with paints, not with ideas pertaining to the visual world. But today we are closer to saying that the painter „paints with signs"... Tarasin's work plays a great part in establishing that opinion.

This raises the question: if a painting is painted with „signs", does it become a painting „about" the material that is somehow s i g n i f i e d through those signs (in a painterly, mental way)?

Describing graphic art is always difficult. In this specific case (the case of „painting with signs") it is both difficult and paradoxical – because one has to use signs to describe signs!... Is that even possible? One is obliged to use fully developed signs (writing) to describe signs which barely emerge from an indeterminate reality – this incompatibility precludes faithful description.

In order to resolve this contradiction one has to delve deeper. In a sense, one can say that seeing itself is the material of the visual arts. Signs such as those that we find on Tarasin's paintings could then be treated as capturing the most basic state of the gaze, its primal „rest". The gaze flows around these signs, they are barely stable under it.

In ordinary typography – and Tarasin alludes to it constantly –

[4] Tarasin, op. cit.

the shape of signs changes depending on material conditions: on the tool (chisel, burin, quill) and material (rock, clay, parchment). Looking at Tarasin's paintings and drawings one has the impression that, in terms of matter, the shape of the sign is conjured in a „generalized" environment, one that „easily" submits itself to setting signs, and that no resistance is being overcome – that the „tool" used is to a large extent purely mental. It would then seem that the shapes of such signs cannot stand out in any striking way, cannot have any characteristic traits, because they are not limited by their materiality.

And yet the distinctive quality of Tarasin's signs is obvious, peculiar only to him, even in a sort of „physiological" way. Each painter works out his own „forms", which are specific only to him. These archetypal shapes are something extremely individual – they consist what is most deeply personal in painting. In Tarasin's paintings these are not even shapes, but rather protoshapes, prototypes of all other shapes, *the very principles of all the appearances* that our eyes are capable of perceiving. The difference between shapes and appearances is that shapes are formed and they of themselves form, whereas all that *appearances* do is reveal the existence of the gaze, its material roots in space. At most, these „appearances" of signs in Tarasin's paintings can be only suggested through words: they are usually bulgy, loaded with a sort of visual substance, which vacillates between a perfect blackness, abstracted from the senses, and a clear, prime matter without qualities. Their shapes and colors are at once distinct and intangible. They are of an ineffable essence.

Perhaps this is why these are not so much signs generating senses, as senses surrounding, „flowing around" signs.

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That is how the problem of the meaning of Tarasin's paintings manifests itself. One would want to *gaze at them and read*

them. Gaze at them and read them as paintings which objectively depict reality, but at the same time see them as Tarasin's visions, his means of personal expression. Through the gaze – assimilate them sensually. Through reading – understand them.

Does a painter find, discover the nature of signs in his painting? Does he philosophize about signs? And if he does, then how? Where in a painting can we seek out the fissure between a sign's visual component and its meaning, the fissure which is capable of becoming a neutral space for objective knowledge, for philosophizing? Is a fissure of this sort to be thought of, to be seen anywhere in the painting? Can the painter and audience dwell there?

It seems that many 20th-century painters, Jan Tarasin among them, asked themselves these questions upon coming into contact with Japanese and Chinese calligraphy.[5] When imitating the signs of Far Eastern alphabets – the shape of which, while already abstractly simplified, retained a similarity to the signified objects – painters succumbed to manifold temptations.

First of all, they revealed in the gestures themselves – the gestures of the painting arm, gestures which imitated the most intimate rhythms of the body and at the same time imitated, with precision, the life of the landscape, the movement of things: the thickening of fog, the sharp edges of rocks, the flight of a bird, the tenseness of a bamboo bough.

Secondly, they would discover the harmony, the energy of converging and diverging lines, which they could endow with „character", not unlike that of handwriting.

Thirdly – and somewhat in contradiction to the two preceding points – they emptied signs of any similarity to existing entities. They found joy in building pure structures of signs – they believed that this structure generalized (and did not concretize) the principle through which everything that is visual manifests itself.

In the atmosphere of this type of paintings – Jan Tarasin is one

[5] In 1962 Tarasin stayed in China and Vietnam.

of the masters of this current – our gaze strays unendingly between seeing and reading. It „likes" to errantly stray – this straying lets it remember the wonderful surprise of discovering as a child that a shape on paper i s meaning itself!

This childhood memory has far-reaching consequences for our consciousness. We have to cope with the following question: now that we've learnt to read, do we still possess the ability to look at the signs of letters as if they were meaningless shapes? Do we s e e letters? It seems that we do not... In reading, our gaze plays the role of a passive intermediary of the senses. So: do we still see signs when we understand them?

We must take a step further still and allow for the possibility that for people brought up in the era of the printed word, all the shapes that surround them are, in a sense, „contaminated with letters" and have lost to a great extent their „pure" visuality.

Jan Tarasin endeavors to change this situation, to reverse it. Among other shapes he brings „letter-like" signs into his paintings and deliberately distorts their essence. In the art of typography legibility is one of the principles which should be observed: the shapes of letters are designed in such a way that nothing in their outlines should call attention to the materiality of their appearance – they should be made meaningful to the utmost and as un-visual as possible. Jan Tarasin's letter-like signs, however, are constructed as „illegible", „protolegible", „post-legible". Sometimes, when contemplating his paintings, we lose meaning, sometimes, we wander in a meaning-less space, flitting between the letters; at times, we detect in the signs an undiscovered, intriguing legibility, and at other times still, we feel as if we were communing with a world weary of its written nature, tired of its own stale meanings.

This way Tarasin places us in a visual and epistemological wilderness – where we errantly stray between seeing and reading.

It is this stage of errant straying – the state of an induced innocence of the eyes and the mind, an innocence which does not hide

however that it is a sham – that is full of elements of the real art of painting: an array of visual existents in their mutual relations.

Tarasin wants to „track down" these visual „configurations" in the world and carry them over into his works. He wants to place them in relations of mutual harmony and conflict. He declared this in a theoretical statement:

„Drawing these unending animated configurations of variable rhythm and saturation, monotonously lined up, sometimes waning or thickening to the point of losing their rhythm, to the point of a catastrophic collapse or fading away – this gives me a purely sensual pleasure comparable e.g. to that of painting a landscape from nature or tapping an uncomplicated rhythm on a percussion instrument.

Another, more selfish reason for making these drawings is the desire to bring into being, by distorting the rhythm of one configuration, fragments of a new one; where the irregularities or even 'catastrophes' of the first are but a weak impulse activating the pulsation of the second.

This leads to the difficulty of finding an appropriate scale or distance, wherein both configurations would be legible."

Further on Tarasin defines the type of „configurations" he has in mind:

„It can be a trivial configuration of randomly assembled objects, a group of plants or animals, the growth rings on a plank that is being sawed in two; two beings joined by play, struggle, or love; our mirror image, connected to us, trying to repeat us; or our shadow, running over the objects which surround us."

It may all sound vague, but behind these „configurations" is the whole richness of reality and an everlasting realism of art. Tarasin considers Peter Breughel to be a master of this „tracking down":

„In painting, Peter Breughel was the one who possessed this ability, extremely difficult to define, this intuition and perspicacity developed to the greatest extent. His ability to decipher so many threads and to connect them into one whole coherent polyphonic

configuration is an exceptional phenomenon in the history of European painting. No one has managed to discover an equally convincing relation of man and the world, or such an imposing picture of the world's coherence."[6]

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Peter Breughel's realism and Tarasin's abstract art – what an inappropriate connection! And yet...

It appears that what fascinated Tarasin in the Dutch master's paintings was an ability to arrange the elements of a landscape and the people inhabiting it in a way that retains the clarity and translucence of space, that arouses our curiosity towards the random scattering of houses, things and people in the depicted scenes, and finally: that leaves undisturbed the variety of functional relations between people and their material surroundings.

Jan Tarasin transplants this Breughelan ideal into his own paintings, into the visual-mental material found at the roots of the sight-mind connection.

This leads us to another series of questions and another series of attempts at answering them:

What does it mean when one sign is placed next to another? What does this „next to" mean in Tarasin? Can there even be any real „next to" in the space he conjures? His signs are both dispersed and „lined up" – their sequences often imitate the linear placement of letters on the page of a book. They attain a harmony between dispersion and stability – in one glance the viewer gets both the impression of chaos and of order.

It seems obvious that the i m p r e s s i o n of order alone already endows chaos with some m e a n i n g. But the roots of semantization lie even deeper. Perhaps the layout of visual elements in space (both in reality and on paintings) already consists their

[6] Jan Tarasin, „Tropienie", *Miesięcznik Literacki* 1979 nr 2.

meaning? It was Stéphane Mallarmé who introduced that idea into poetry, in his poem *Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard* ('A roll of the dice will never abolish chance') and in the utopian project of the „Total Book". He regarded empty spaces of various lengths between words to be as meaningful as the words themselves. The non-semantic, non-textual white turned out to be the source of all semantization!

In the aesthetics of the Far East this idea has been present for ages. Jan Tarasin and other painters inspired by that art are very familiar with the semantic functions of the great expanses of emptiness and whiteness prominent in Chinese and Japanese landscape painting. In these paintings – as in Tarasin's – emptiness and whiteness placed between signs is never an expression of lifelessness; on the contrary – it guarantees that the world of the painting is set into genesiac cosmic motion. François Cheng writes about this: „On a painting, emptiness introduces infinity and a 'rhythmical breath' that animates the universe. It dissolves the artificially constructed links or oppositions and that way it dissolves the stiff 'logic' of development, and it gives rise to a circular motion which causes things to join again into a process of mutual creation."[7] By making his signs similar and dissimilar to letters, Tarasin dissolves artificial relations and substitutes them with real ones, thus making the world more readable, in an elementary, cosmological sense.

Another Far Eastern analogy seems even more important. In Taoism there is *li,* „organic order, as distinct from mechanical or legal order, both of which go by the book. *Li* is the asymmetrical, nonrepetitive, and unregimented order which we find in the patterns of moving water, the forms of trees and clouds, of frost crystals on the window, or the scattering of pebbles on beach sand."[8] This is the sort of „order of chance" which governs

[7] François Cheng, *Chińska twórczość poetycka,* in: *Estetyka chińska.* Antologia, Kraków, 2007 r. p. 159

[8] Alan Watts, coll. *Al Chung-liang Huang Tao: The Watercourse Way*

the signs in Tarasin's paintings. The loose „scattering" of signs on a plane is not the only element entering the scope of this „chance order". Another is the diversity of types of those „signs/non-signs". Since each type requires a different mental approach (from the ability to read to the ability to abstract from that ability), one could assume that a „general" approach which would include all the others is not possible. It appears that the only original order, the only overriding order is the one that Taoist thought calls *li*. It is the only order – but is it all-encompassing? Isn't there a visual-cognitive breach in this type of painting, one which cannot be assuaged even through *li*?

I shall have to end this essay with statements which do not allow us to accept Tarasin's paintings as visual-cognitive idylls, despite their harmonious character, which I have described above.

Tarasin is an astute observer and thinker, he is fully aware of the drama contained within the modern visual universe. Contemporary art, which dwells within this universe, is subject to that drama. Tarasin says that in contemporary art „The motives of mutual conditionings and relations evolve. A new static type of space is born, a new type of movement, a new relative type of coexistence of all these elements. It is only these whole complexes of elements that determine whether what we have to do with is dead matter, a living phenomenon, or maybe a consciousness. But are we capable of imagining a space enclosed within another space? A space shot through with another space, governed by a different scale, a different movement, different motives of connection, a different number of elements? Or several spaces 'passing each other', existing simultaneously, springing from various stimuli which bind them together and actuate them. Our imagination desperately seeks for analogies,

(Pantheon Books 1977), 46.

substitute models, associations."[9]

What can these „substitute models" be? These „substitute models" for the conflicting interplay of various interweaving spaces – spaces amongst which Tarasin the artist and theorist distinguishes the opposite extremes of visual space and abstracted space? We should be looking for „substitute models" of opposite extremes among opposite extremes. The first would be the pole of abstraction – there we encounter a „mathematization" of paintings; they fascinate us with the topology or the countability of their shapes. The other extreme is that of realism, where the hyper-realism of representation (photographs included in paintings) becomes provocative, sharp, ironic in relation to reality's mellow, uncertain, confused status.

It appears that these are the two poles, between which the visual environment of the human being is torn today: countability of elements and photographic representation. In the realm of the arts, this translates into the opposition between conceptual and sensual art. Art theory renders this as a simple division: reflection about the eye's sensations – and those sensations themselves.

Since the visual and semantic aspects of these paintings are rooted in their most primal material, we have to concede that its very nature is conflicting. „Visual" and „meaningful" seem to diverge in this material, they dramatize it...

How does this look in painting and drawing practice?

One aspect of Tarasin's practice is a sort of visualized countability – one of his most important cycles is entitled „Przedmioty policzone" ('Counted objects'). By arranging his signs in columns and rows the painter imposes on the viewer's cognitive powers the idea of number – the most basic oscillation between dispersion and order available to the human mind. The essence of the mental action of counting is that, on the one hand, one acknowledges the existence of a set of elements in a „raw", cha-

[9] Jan Tarasin, „Przestrzeń w przestrzeni".

otic state, devoid of any meaning, on the other hand, one assumes that there is a barely emerging, meaningful order in this chaos: countability.[10] Though I just used the phrase „one acknowledges", the readiness of the eyes and mind to count anything is in fact subconscious, pre-established in our psyche, it is not a result of the mind's willful act.

Another aspect of Tarasin's practice is something that causes a discomfort of seeing, a cognitive shock in the visual environment he conjures. Among those almost abstract signs of his, those almost real signs, signs whose meaning is as faint as number, photographs suddenly appear. Images permeated with concrete meanings – this or that landscape, this or that human face. The whole delicate ineffability of Tarasin's spaces is shattered by the arbitrariness of photography, of something that is forcibly and meaningfully thrust at us. The juxtaposition of photographs with signs of a different nature is unpleasant, unsettling, it interferes with seeing. Sometimes the photographs, gigantic, enlarged, are the background for other types of signs, sometimes they are placed among the other signs. In both cases there is a striking semiotic dissonance.

It is not, as almost all the critics would have it, that Tarasin's paintings and drawings give the audience a feeling of some higher harmony. A view emphatically expressed by Janusz Jaremowicz:

„Tarasin creates an apotheosis of harmony wherein individual beings do not wage wars and do not extol themselves one above the other. (...) The order of the whole is a higher order, it is not a consequence of a reduction, a pillaging of ingredients. This order is not mechanical and we may call it spiritual."[11]

Mieczysław Porębski concludes his text in a similar fashion: „It is comforting to think that there exist signs which have retained their dignity, all of their innocence. Signs in a pure state, signs not-

[10] Janusz Jaremowicz, on www.artnewmedia.pl.

[11] Text from the catalog of the Tarasin exhibition in the Zachęta gallery, Warszawa 1995.

ed in the sketchbooks and paintings of Jan Tarasin."[12]

I believe these conclusions are too easy. Visual-cognitive rupture is inseparable from harmony. Only both of them together give us the final significance of this oeuvre and its message to audiences contemplating contemporary art and contemplating the world.

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We exit the exhibition onto the street. From inside the book we lead our mind outside, and direct our attention towards the signs dispersed in the world. Having experienced contemporary art, we do not know any longer, if the world is a background for signs, or if signs are a background for the world. In previous eras people knew the changeability of cognitive attitudes well: sometimes the visual was a background for thought, sometimes thought was a background for the visual.


The art of Jan Tarasin and other similar artists represents another, different basic state of human cognition: here the world's background is a heterogeneous mixture, it is visualized mind and thinking visuality at the same time. Sometimes we revel in this mixture, and sometimes it hurts our eyes and our mind. Perhaps something extremely archaic has entered the modern consciousness: a Presocratic state when seeing was still indivisible from the logos. Like every return to the roots, this sort of intrusion of the ancient into the modern has got to hurt...

Even though thinking in images and visualizing thoughts is common among poets and philosophers, in many eras it was considered embarrassing, it compromised the honorability of their professions. Today things are different. Ostentatiously so. One of the pioneers of this change (and this return) was the recently deceased Jan Tarasin.

(translated by Maciej Mrozik)

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12 Porębski, op. cit,



Infinity.
Бесконечность

В своих живописных и графических произведениях Ян Тарасин (1926–2009) продемонстрировал своеобразную философию знака, уподобляя их книжным страницам. В настоящем очерке описываются два аспекта этой индивидуальной семиотики. Это, с одной стороны, материальное сходство с предметами-десигнатами, а с другой – прочтение произвольных живописных знаков, напоминающее тот момент, когда ребенок только осваивает чтение, смешивая сферу сходства со сферой условности.

Искусство Яна Тарасина, обнаруживает неочевидность перехода между визуальной и ментальной сферами в человеческом сознании. Картины этого художника, в которых сочетаются разнообразные типы знаков (реалистические, фотографические, буквенные, абстрактные), создают особое сенсорное и мысленное пространство, которое заставляет задуматься над природой человеческого ума.

MAGDALENA SZCZYPIORSKA-MUTOR

UNLIKE IN THE MIRROR[1] PHOTOGRAPHY BETWEEN (SELF-)SEEING AND (SELF-)KNOWLEDGE

No one sees themselves. To find yourself in the face of yourself is to be forced to consent to impossible objectification.
I stop at this alien exteriority, which appeared to me in spite of myself.

Edouard Pontremoli[2]

1

"Photography is the emergence of myself as someone else: a twisting dissociation of conscious identity"[3], wrote Roland Barthes in 1980. 140 years earlier, shortly after the invention of this technique, the first confrontations with the human image recorded on a daguerreotype board were a cognitive shock. Those who viewed the first pictures did not formulate their impressions in

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1 Roland Barthes, La chambre claire. Note sur la photographie, Cahiers du Cinéma/Gallimard/Seuil, 1980.

2 Edouard Pontremoli, *L'excès du visible. Une approche phénoménologique de la photogénie,* Edition Millon, 1996.

3 Roland Barthes, op. cit.

Barthes's language of reflection – but testimony from the early years of photography is a rich record filled with wonder, fear and anxiety.

"From the beginning, as my father told me, no one dared to look longer at the first pictures taken by him", wrote Max Dauthendey, the German poet and painter, son of the photographer Karl Dauthendey. Expressive human figures were feared and it was believed that the tiny faces of people in the pictures could also see the viewer[4]. The photographic portrait was a subject that particularly worried the person who portrayed – as a dead copy, a double, or even a record of a past time that would return in an unknown way in the picture. The point at which the gaze of the posing model in a studio met the dead eye of the camera was debated in the first years after the invention of photography in various ways: from the concept that the camera steals the soul to theories that an invisible layer of the body was torn. 140 years later, Barthes called this moment "a micro-experience of death".

2

The invention of photography was a cultural revolution not only in the most often quoted dual perspective: visual, associated with the phenomenon of a completely new image – and the temporal, analysing the problems of photographic time and memory. Third, the revolutionary aspect of photography, created somewhere at the intersection of the first two meanings, just grew from the experience of looking face to face – a model and its photographic copies, and gave a whole new dimension to the autobiographical narra-

[4] Max Dauthend, op. cit. *Mein Vater wird Photograph*, in: Wilfried Wiegand (ed.), *Die Wahrheit der Photographie. Klassische Bekenntnisse zu einer neuen Kunst*, Frankfurt/Main 1981, p. 23–40, for: Bernd Stiegler *Bilder der Photographie. Ein Album photographischer Metaphern*, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

tive, its construction and reconstruction. The photographic image of "me" – suspended between past and present, without a doubt, testified to the existence of the subject photographed, at that time and in that body. Barthes' thought about photography – "what was"[5] – would become evidence here for existence, a confirmation of the identity of the model and a tool of its self-identification.

"The immutable dream: connect the identity with physiognomy", wrote Courtine and Haroche in the History of the Face; "in the second half of the [nineteenth] century, photography will allow the capturing of and reproduction of facial expressions. [...] The birth and development of photography overturning the people's perception of the face, a stage in the history of the face is coming to an end ..."[6]

3

An important starting point for reflection on the status and types of photographic auto-image and types of its perception in the history of photography has been the variously conceptualized figure of the mirror.

"To see yourself (unlike in the mirror): is a completely fresh acquisition on the scale of History"[7] – Roland Barthes wrote about the invention of photography, and the mirror appeared in the observation not by chance. Comparing photography with a mirror on one hand creates an opposition between a mirror image (dynamic, instantaneous and always present) and a photographic image (static, stable and always past tense). On the other hand, it points to the mirror as a source of self-discovery and knowledge about one's own image, which is closest to pho-

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5 Roland Barthes, op. cit.

6 Jean Jacques Courtine, Claudine Haroche, *Histoire du visage. Exprimer et taire ses émotions XVI – début XIX siècle,* Éditions Rivages, 1988; Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1994.

7 Roland Barthes, op. cit.

tography, additionally equipped with the possibility of recording and reproduction.

Among the metaphorical expressions that define the difference between a mirror and a photograph, the most accurate appears to be the figure of oblivion and memory. The mirror forgets as in the observation of Edouard Pontremoli: "The mirror dazzles the person looking into it for a moment, after which it immediately forgets and reflects something else"[8]. Photography remembers as in the definition of Oliver Wendell Holmes: photography is "a mirror endowed with memory"[9].

The transition from the image of 'I' in the mirror to the image of the 'I' in the photograph required new rules of perception to be mastered, new coding, another 'photographic seeing'. "We must first learn to see"[10] – Max Dauthenday wrote about the new pictures, commenting on the first reactions of viewers, who expected that the pictures would move as in a mirror and look.

The figure of a mirror recording a picture, the metaphor of the photograph as a mirror endowed with memory in the first decades of the discourse on photography had many varieties. It first appeared shortly after the invention of the daguerreotype. Associating the picture in a photograph with an image from a mirror was tied up not only with the characteristic optimistic belief of early photography in the absolute objectivity of the photo-

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8 Edouard Pontremoli, op. cit.

9 Oliver Wendell Holmes, *Soundings from the Atlantic*, Boston 1864; German translation *Das Stereoskop und der Stereograph*, in: Wolfgang Kemp (ed.), *Theorie der Fotografie I*, 1839–1912, Munich 1980, p. 114–121, for: Bernd Stiegler *Bilder der Photographie. Ein Album photographischer Metaphern*, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

10 Max Dauthendey, *Mein Vater wird Photograph*, in: Wilfried Wiegand (ed.), *Die Wahrheit der Photographie. Klassische Bekenntnisse zu einer neuen Kunst*, Frankfurt/Main 1981, p. 23–40, for: Bernd Stiegler *Bilder der Photographie. Ein Album photographischer Metaphern*, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

graphic record – not without significance was also the fact that the silvery, shiny surface of the daguerreotype gave the illusion of a mirror pane. In 1839, the year photography was invented, journalist Jules Janin explained how the daguerreotype worked: "Just imagine that the mirror retains the reflection of all the items that are reflected in it, and then you will understand almost fully what the daguerreotype really is"[11]. That same year, Hans Christian Andersen wrote in a letter to a friend: "All items are captured and retained as an image in the mirror"[12]. Many years later, Eco called photography a frozen reflection of a picture, and Pontremoli defined the photograph as a materialization of a mirrored picture on photographic paper.

The record – what Holmes called the memory of photography – was conserved in a photograph "between" in Barthes' 'past-future' time, in this unique moment that Hans Finsler called a "permanent preparation of the cross-section of time"[13], in the clearly captured singularity of photography, giving, according to Edouard Pontremoli, something unusual: an existence in the past.

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[11] Jules Janin, *Le daguerotype [sic], L'Artiste*, November 1838 – April 1839, in: André Rouillé, *La Photographie en France*, pp. 46–51, by: André Rouillé, *La photographie. Entre document et art contemporain*, Éditions Gallimard, 2005.

[12] Fritz Kempe, *Daguerreotypie in Deutschland. Von Charme der frühen Photographie*, Seebruck am Chiemsee 1979, for: Bernd Stiegler *Bilder der Photographie. Ein Album photographischer Metaphern*, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

[13] Hans Finsler, *Das Bild der Photographie*, w DU, Zürich, 3, 1964, pp. 2–54, reprinted in: Klaus E. Göltz et al (ed.), *Hans Finsler. Neue Wege der Photographie*, Bern 1991, pp. 283–291, for: Bernd Stiegler *Bilder der Photographie. Ein Album photographischer Metaphern*, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

4

A photographic record offered a whole catalogue of images documenting the course of human life. At first – only its most important moments, when a visit to the photo studio was a rare and festive event. Later – also images of everyday life, after the invention in 1888 of simple to use, lightweight cameras, in which film rolls with dry emulsion, replaced the complicated, wet plate technology requiring knowledge and skills[14].

The photograph, a new kind of image, from an "anthropologically new subject" (Barthes)[15] became a regular subject. From photographs, with anchor points in time and space it was possible to arrange a story about oneself: changing the auto-narration each time.

At the turn of the century among public rituals, there was a new one: looking at photographs. Among gestures of recognition and self-presentation strategies, a new and important gesture emerges – looking at a picture with the comment: it's me. Photographic biography becomes a new quality, a new tool for constructing identity, part of building a story about oneself. The photograph album is its simplest form. The art projects, the photographic cycle has the form of using the opportunity to register in a selected and permanent rhythm. In special cases – a single image is sometimes the only trace of an identity, the only message from an unknown past, as in the literary narrative of W.G. Sebald about Austerlitz, a man who does not know who he is.

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[14] Anne H. Hoy, *The Book of Photography. The history, the technique, the art, the future*, National Geographic, 2005.

[15] Roland Barthes, op. cit.

5

The photograph album is the "ikonoteka of family memory" (Le Goff)[16], appeared with the growing up of the first "photo" generation, in the first decades after the invention of photography. "This was a time" – writes Benjamin – "when photograph albums began to be filled up. They took a liking to the most uncomfortable places in the home, consoles and tables with candlesticks in the living room: bloated leather bound tomes with off-putting metal fittings and pages with gold edging as thick as fingers cards on which were placed funnily draped or braided figures"[17]. The times in which a person's personal history was documented by a few photographs recording milestones ended with the development of amateur photography. The joyful snapping of pictures produced a kind of photo-biographical excess – one's life story became a matter of choosing frames, selecting events, places and people. Placing one's history in a photograph album ceased to be a simple gesture of giving a dozen photographs a chronological order and a time frame; it became a matter of decision, creation and interpretation. This required ordering a set of images according to rules that guided the choice of components and laid them out in a clear structure. From a multiplicity of frames, with countless potential stories, ready to be laid out in many combinations a limited set of a dozen or so photos had to be selected to put in an album. Photos had to be divided into ones that were official and excluded. Why this one and not that one? Why this character, this place, this time? This convention, this pattern of story? This line of narrative, these details of style? Each of these decisions is an eloquent gesture of self-creation, and the choices made often tell a story that is more important than the album.

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16 Jacques Le Goff, *Storia e memoria*, Giulio Einaudi, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1981; *Histoire et mémoire*, Éditions Gallimard, 1988.

17 Walter Benjamin, *Kleine Geschichte der Photographie*, in: Gesammelte Schriften Band II, Frankfurt am Main, 1977.

A photographic interpretation of the past, a presentation of one's own identity, is a game between discovery and hiding, between what is official, solemnly pasted into an album, framed and what is unofficial, repressed, deeply hidden. Yves Bonnefoy wrote about photography, that it is: "(...) less a reconstruction of the world than a point at which the phenomenon is "broken" by the dream, a crossroads where we can choose our "self" with its narratives, shortcomings and phantasms"[18].

In a photobiographical album, the strongest voice belongs to the photographs that are not included – not only those omitted, but also those that have been removed, torn up and erased. A photographic anti-biography – the photographs that are not there – talks about the fears and obsessions, the thresholds of internal censorship of sensitive areas. The features that need to be quickly masked, the gaps and cracks that would like to be hidden. A photobiographical album is a scene of dramatic choices, exclusions and returns; a game of life and death.

"Albums hold forever only death", wrote Timm Starl, a historian and theorist of photography – "and they pose for the holder a cementing of the past in an individual story, from which emerges the identity – the elixir of life"[19].

6

A special case of a photo-biography is the formula of a cycle composed of a series of portraits that are formed at regular inter-

[18] *Histoire de voir*, vol. 3, Centre national de la photographie, Photopoche, No. 42, Paris 1989, by: François Soulages, *Esthétique de la photographie*, Armand Colin, 2005.

[19] Timm Starl, *Der Faden des Gedächtnisses. Über Fotoalben im 19. Jahrhundert*, in: Martin Heller (ed.), *Welt-Geschichten. Fotoalben im 19. Jahrhundert*, Zürich 1989, pp. 9–41, by: Bernd Stiegler, *Bilder der Photographie. Ein Album photographischer Metaphern*, Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

vals. A cycle is governed by two design principles. The first is a strictly followed steady rhythm of taking photographs: daily, weekly, yearly. The second is to take pictures freely and optionally; it is a similarity in the composition of each frame, stylistic simplicity and aesthetic purity. The repeatability of consecutive sets in the space of each frame focuses attention on what changes over time – in the face, the form of the figure being photographed.

The Austrian photographer Friedl Kubelka[20] took a photograph of his daughter Louise every Monday for 18 years. Small, black and white passport photos stuck in even rows on large boards are hundreds of Louise's face, recording her life; the history of the daughter and mother saved in the changing glances and reactions of the child. A linear, continuous reading of this cycle comes to a halt at empty squares: white spots, which over time are more and more: there was no picture on that Monday nor on that one[21]. The empty spaces form two parallel stories. The first is the text of her daughter: a story about Louise growing up and leaving. The second is the text of the mother: the story of the gradual release of the child from her embrace.

The American photographer Nicholas Nixon[22] once a year for several decades has photographed his wife and her three sisters, always in a similarly composed frame. The women are changing from year to year, from frame to frame and the camera's eye tracks the facial modelling, the texture of wrinkles, the furrows and the changing features. The 'Brown Sisters' cycle is Nixon settling scores with the passing of time, a kind of violence – to force the world once a year to stand still in one place, to force time to submit to the iron will of the photographer. (See: Sisters Brown: Picture 1. and 2.)

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20 More about Kubelka's cycle in: *Friedl Kubelka. Porträt Louise Anna Kubelka*, Edition Fotohof, Salzburg 1998.

21 Cf.: Marianna Michałowska, *Obraz utajony (The Latent Image)*, Kraków 2007, pp.147–150.

22 More about Nixon's cycle in: Nicholas Nixon, *The Brown Sisters. Thirty Three Years*, The Museum of Modern Art, New York, 2008.



1. Nicolas Nixon, The Brown Sisters, Harwichport, MA, 1978, http://www.sfmoma.org



2. Nicolas Nixon, The Brown Sisters, Wellesley College, 2006, http://www.sfmoma.org

Richard Wagner[23], a German amateur photographer, for 42 years (from 1900 to 1941), photographed his wife on December 24 by the Christmas tree and carefully stylised pyramid of Christmas presents. It is difficult to reconstruct the artistic motivations of Wagner, but two aspects speak a lot about the character of his idea: first, the poetics of the composition of carefully displayed gifts and Christmas dishes, the second – the intention of the image. Wagner's cycle is a story of life written with collected things: the pyramid melts during wars and crises, rising in times of peace and prosperity, but, always arranged with unusual piety, is witness to the material status of the family. Wagner's Cycle is a powerful gesture of self-creation: the pictures acted as Christmas cards and, as such, were sent to relatives and friends.

The photographic series is a neat piece of hand luggage of an autobiographical memory. Constructing the image of "self" in the characteristic complication of synchrony and diachrony, which is characteristic for the photographic structure, is a special case of building a sense of identity, accessible by the invention of photography. "If our vision was a book and our memory a bibliophile, then each new issue would be placed next to the lovingly held previous edition (...) In fact, our memory is an instrument designed for the evolutionarily useful tasks, a collection of old editions is not included in this sphere."[24] – wrote Douwe Draaisma and John Berger argued that the camera has replaced the memory[25]. This remark is particularly important in the case of the genre of the photographic cycle. Memory is economical and rational. Photography is not. For Louise Kubelka, the girl photographed every Monday, the Brown sisters, the women standing in front of the lens once a year and the

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[23] More about the Wagner's cycle in: Douwe Draaisma *Waarom het leven sneller gaat als je ouder wordt. Over het autobiografische geheugen*, Historische Uitgeverij, 2001.

[24] Douwe Draaisma, op. cit.

[25] John Berger, *About Looking*, Vintage 1992.

Wagners who each Christmas were photographed with a self-timer camera, photography has given them special tool to construct their own identity: a cyclical record of a face, a record of the 'self', in a formula unattainable for the human memory.

A photographic memory of one's own life – wrote Draaisma – "is a memory that retains all the previous versions and records deceptively slow changes, which no one observes in himself or in others"[26].

7

At the other pole of the world made up of photographs, at the opposite pole to that seething from the excess of photographic collections and catalogues, which have to be given form – is a single picture. Just one. As in the case of Jacques Austerlitz, the hero of W.G. Sebald's essay/story[27] – unknown, found after many years. It is supposed to be the answer to the question "Who am I" – not only the order of selecting a narrative identity, not only in giving one's life the attributes of a legend. It is a question about name, surname, mother, father, language, fate.

"The picture lay before me" – said Austerlitz – "but I did not dare touch it. (...) in this role, I could not remember myself either this evening or later, despite strenuous efforts. Yes, I recognised the distinctive diagonal line at the base of the hair, but everything else was extinguished under an overwhelming sense of the past"[28].

Jacques Austerlitz is a man deprived of his childhood memory – a man without memories, without language, without a name. He does not know; he is just finding out that as a young Jewish boy he was sent from Prague in a children's transport to Britain, saved, rescued from their fate, adopted by the family of a Calvinist preacher – at the cost of erasing the traces of his past life.

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26 Douwe Draaisma, op. cit.

27 Winfried Georg Sebald, *Austerlitz*, Random House, 2001.

28 Ibidem.

The adult Austerlitz does not know who he is, "ever since I can remember (...) I have always been haunted by the feeling that I do not have my own place in reality, that I do not actually exist"[29]. No clear clues, no face. No photos. No one who would say: "it's you", no one somewhere, sometime who could establish the beginning. On a journey into the past, after many years, Austerlitz goes to Prague. He meets Vera, her childhood babysitter. Vera shows Austerlitz a photo showing a boy who is only a few years old dressed in a ball costume. It was a moment in which between Austerlitz and Vera and between Austerlitz and the boy in the picture there is something special. Vera tells the sixty year old boy: "it's you". Vera has the knowledge ("it's you") and Austerlitz the faith ("so it's me") – it is enough to momentarily stop the spillage, the spinning world, to record the first sentence of the story about himself. Only that Austerlitz is defenceless against the photos; there is no pattern into which he can place them; he is left to Vera's testimony, torn between "I" and "not I", with the question current in the background asking how much weight these recognitions are supposed to have for a sixty year-old. At the level of the image an additional signal of this fissure is that the child pictured posing in the ball costume is disguised as someone else.

The photo of the five year-old boy dressed as a page is a metaphor for the fate of Austerlitz, and at the same time a photographic image of a falsified identity, which is supposed to be the only witness to the true identity. This complication is a source of shock, before which it is difficult to defend oneself, before which Austerlitz is defending himself, denying: "That evening at Szporkova when Vera showed me a picture of a child knight, I was not, as might be supposed, moved or shaken" – said Austerlitz – "but just speechless, stunned and incapable of any thought". Also then, when I thought about five year-old page, I was seized by blind panic"[30].

29 Ibidem.

30 Ibidem.

8

The way of seeing himself pictured in the case of Austerlitz is motivated by his own past ignorance, his inability to determine the relationship between vision and knowledge, or rather ignorance. The specificity of his perception of the image may be a variant of a certain model of perception of photographic portraits, the correct model of the philosophy of photography, which focuses on issues of complex relations between the model and its photographic representation – with the entire repertoire of questions about the status of the photographed subject: as an emanation of the object of reference (Barthes), as the effect of "fluid transfer" (Gautier), as an eïdolon (Morin), as removed from the model's outer layers of skin (Finsler), or the emanation of "rolls of coating" (Balzac).

Austerlitz's anxiety has an echo of the reflections of Barthes' and other theorists' "alchemy of photography", accurately collected by Edouard Pontremoli: "Confrontation with my-watched-image turns out to be a difficult experience for me. Artificial Perception appears then as an act carried out by a soulless and conformist machine. But a machine capable of this, to "see". The reason for our confusion is the method of perception, by which the photographic "vision" draws our attention. Indeed I show myself, personally. The correct *licentia photographica* for a camera cannot free me from being in a particular place. My visible body is always there. I have to take on each of shape"[31].

In the historical and anthropological perspective, photography has become a new tool for constructing and reconstructing identity and autobiographical narrative. In the philosophical perspective, it has become a source of academic reflection on a new kind of representation, a new quality of the human image, a reflection on an irresolvable discussion about photography as a copy of the world and photography as his creation.

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31 Edouard Pontremoli, op. cit.

The paradox of photographic self-realisation, the complications of photographic identity is summarised by Pontremoli: "From a distance, which precludes any active involvement, I find myself as an unknown land. In a particular (impossible?) way I recognize myself. It is "being seen", which takes on a significance for the look yielding to him"[32].

«Мне бы хотелось, чтобы появилась История взглядов», – писал в *Светлой камере* Ролан Барт. Изобретение фотографии было бы в Истории взглядов революционным событием: феномен нового изображения предлагал новую возможность видения себя, запечатления и размножения своего изображения, а также новое переживание: взгляд в лицо собственной фотографической копии.

Отправной точкой анализа этой новой игры взглядов является в философии фотографии образ зеркала, которое «видит», но «забывает», в противоположность фотографии, которая «видит» и «помнит».

Фотография – это не только новое видение себя, это также новое знание о себе и новый инструмент создания смыслов и значений. Видеть себя иначе, чем в зеркале (Барт) – это также по-новому концептуализировать собственную индивидуальность и слагать о себе повествования.

Статья является попыткой размышлений над особым характером фотографической записи «я», над ролью снимка в создании самоповествования, а также над спецификой фотографии как игры между видением и знанием, на примере трех моделей: фото-биографии (альбома) в общепринятом значении, фотографического цикла (коллекции портретов, документирующих через определенные промежутки времени изображения одних и тех же лиц), а также отдельных, случайно найденных снимков, являющихся единственным следом своего собственного лица, единственным строительным ма-

[32] Ibidem.

териалом повествования о собственной индивидуальности (как в *Аустерлице* В. Г. Себальда).

Теоретический контекст составляют выбранные сюжетные нити тех направлений философии фотографии, которые анализируют феномен снимка-портрета с перспективы взгляда и памяти (Барт, Бертер, Понтремоли).

IV.
Communication and understanding in social life

Коммуникация и понимание в социальной жизни

SYLWIA FABISIAK and PAWEŁ RUTKOWSKI

ICONICITY IN POLISH SIGN LANGUAGE

0. INTRODUCTION

It seems to be an uncontroversial fact that natural sign languages are characterized by ever present iconicity. According to some scholars, this feature makes the lexical and grammatical systems of sign languages substantially different from those found in oral communication. Others say that although, admittedly, many phenomena occurring in sign languages do have an iconic motivation, the cognitive basis of both spoken and signed communication is exactly the same. The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the most notable aspects of iconicity in Polish Sign Language. We also attempt to juxtapose the notion of iconicity with that of (non-)arbitrariness and argue that iconic motivation does not represent a binary feature distinguishing visual-spatial languages from vocal-aural ones. Instead, we prefer to think of iconicity as one of many universal cognitive mechanisms that may influence but do not define the human language faculty.[1]

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1. WHAT IS POLISH SIGN LANGUAGE?

Polish Sign Language (*Polski Język Migowy*, usually referred to as *PJM*) is a full-fledged natural language used by the Deaf community in Poland (cf. Świdziński and Gałkowski (2003)).[2] Note that Polish Sign Language (hereinafter, PSL) should not be confused with the so-called *System Językowo-Migowy* [Signed Polish] (see e.g. Perlin (1993)), an artificial language whose grammar closely corresponds to that of spoken Polish. PSL, on the other hand, is completely different from Polish in terms of grammar: it is an analytical language, devoid of fusional inflection, characterized by non-linearity and three-dimensionality of syntax. It should be considered a minority language in Poland; its only unusual characteristic being that in most cases it is not passed on from generation to generation but rather through peer assembly (typically, in deaf schools).

Sign language research is a very prodigious and quickly ex-

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a grant entitled *Składnia Polskiego Języka Migowego (PJM) w ujęciu typologicznym* [The syntax of Polish Sign Language from a typological perspective].

[2] The word *Deaf* is usually capitalized when it refers to people who were born with a hearing impairment, use sign language as their primary means of communication, and consider themselves part of the Deaf cultural/language group. Deafness is their social identity, and not a disability. By contrast, the spelling *deaf* is typically used for the hearing impaired who became deaf later in life, do not sign natively, and hence do not belong to the Deaf culture. Note, however, that when it comes to social identity, we should not expect clear-cut distinctions: some of those born with hearing impairment are deaf not Deaf; many of those born to hearing parents never identify as Deaf; some native speakers of spoken languages who later develop hearing impairments become Deaf; some hearing impaired people who later develop hearing abilities remain Deaf but not deaf; some who were always hearing are Deaf (CODAs, i.e. Children of Deaf Adults).

panding area of linguistics. The academic community all over the world recognizes sign languages as an extremely intriguing subject of study because, despite being fully systematic and complex systems of human communication, they are intriguingly different from spoken languages. Sign language research has resulted in redefinition of existing language typologies and modification of many traditional assumptions about the nature of human linguistic competence (see e.g. Siple (1978), Emmorey (2002), Sandler and Lillo-Martin (2006)). According to most researchers, sign language communication is based on the same (possibly universal) set of cognitive principles that underlies the use of spoken languages. However, how this fundamental linguistic competence maps onto the actual grammatical form of individual sign languages is, to a large extent, determined by the visual-spatial medium of sign. This medium shapes linguistic structure in ways not encountered in languages based on the auditory-acoustic medium of speech. One of the most striking differences is that, unlike spoken strings of words, signed utterances need not be strictly linear. Two (or even more) signs may be produced simultaneously. This forces us to redefine the notions of syntactic word order and phrasal structure. Signs also undergo specific types of movement and are always produced in three-dimensional space. The grammatical categories of movement and space do not belong to the traditional set of linguistic features encountered in spoken languages. Additionally, grammatical information may be conveyed non-manually, through facial gestures, such as head tilt, raised or lowered eyebrows, eye gaze etc. In sign language research, grammar has to be understood in a broad sense, encompassing much more than just word order and inflection. Grammar, i.e. the relations between individual signs, shows us how the Deaf categorize the world through their language.

2. ICONICITY IN POLISH SIGN LANGUAGE

The term *iconicity* is meant to refer to the situation in which the form of the word, sign or linguistic structure conveys the desired meaning by somehow resembling the denotation. As noted by Sebeok (1979), iconic signs need not be exclusively visual, they can as well be auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile (see also Eco (1976)). Visual iconicity has received a lot of attention from scholars working on sign languages (see e.g. Taub (2001)). Cormier (2007) treats the phenomenon in question as a manifestation of a more general property of sign languages, which she refers to as isomorphism, i.e. a close relationship between form and meaning.

Although the fact that numerous lexical and grammatical phenomena of sign languages are motivated iconically is not questioned by modern linguistics, it is not uncontroversial to what extent iconicity should be viewed as one of the defining features of sign communication. The issue at hand has been subject to much debate in the last few decades. It seems clear to most researchers that the iconic dimension of sign languages is independent from natural gesturing. As shown by Szczepankowski (1999), only a small subset of kinetic gestures used by hearing people have their exact equivalents in the lexicon of PSL. Interestingly, some gestures of this type are used in PSL with a completely counter-intuitive meaning, e.g. the gesture of saluting used in the army would be interpreted as the sign for 'toilet'. As demonstrated by Klima and Bellugi (1979) and Fabisiak (2010a), among others, hearing non-signers can correctly guess the meaning of only more or less 20% of signs used in sign languages. It should also be stressed that, having been told the meaning of particular signs, hearing subjects in the study conducted by Fabisiak (2010a) found 65% of presented signs iconic. In order to emphasize the fact that sign languages are not simply mimetic, in the sense of being grounded in non-linguistic gesturing, many contemporary linguists tend to concentrate on those prop-

erties of sign languages that are also crucial for spoken languages (such as their grammatical nature) and understate the importance of those characteristics that are not typical for oral communication – see e.g. Rée (1999). The implicit aim of this line of research (dubbed the 'iconicity fallacy' by Thoutenhoofd (2000)) seems to be to avoid the following possible interpretation: being iconic means being non-conventional and non-arbitrary, which in turn means being non-linguistic (Saussure's (1916) view on arbitrariness as the crucial bond uniting the signifier with the signified has been a fundamental assumption of modern linguistics for almost a century now).

However, whatever the interpretation of the status of iconicity in language may be, it seems justified to assume that no adequate linguistic analysis of signed communication can be carried out without a detailed description of those signs and structures that involve iconic motivation. As PSL is one of lesser studied sign languages, there are very few papers dealing with the iconic aspects of that language. In his brief overview of the problem in question, Mrozik (2006) states that iconic signs are very common in PSL and relates this fact to the generalization that the visual-spatial communication channel has an impact on the frequency of different types of signs (cf. Peirce's (1932) taxonomy of signs) – symbols, deictic references or icons, with the iconic type being significantly more frequent in sign language than in spoken language. Mrozik (2006) further distinguishes three types of iconicity in PSL, each based on a different kind of visual similarity between a sign and its denotation. According to this typology, iconicity may involve similarity in terms of shape, spatial relations or various aspects of movement (path, speed, etc.). The first of these types is exemplified by the sign for 'house' (hands forming a pitched roof); the second, by the expression 'a square surrounded by houses' (the sign 'house' is repeated several times, each time in a different location around an imaginary square); and the third, by verbs of movement (such

as 'drive', which conveys not only the basic meaning of going by car but may also imitate the manner of movement).

A more detailed classification of various aspect of PSL iconicity is presented in Fabisiak (2010a) and (2010b). In the remaining part of this section, we will outline the main points of the analysis proposed in those papers. In order to illustrate the scope of the phenomenon under consideration, let us first say that Fabisiak (2010a) distinguishes the following types of iconic signs in PSL:

- deictic (directly pointing to their referents, e.g. 'I', 'nose' or 'hair'),
- locative (pointing to the location of their referents or to the location associated with their referents, e.g. 'hearing', 'deaf' or 'to watch'),
- vectorial (pointing to well-established directions, e.g. 'north', 'right' or 'down'),
- reflecting the manner of use (imitating activities associated with the use of various objects, e.g. 'soap', 'towel' or 'coffee'),
- metaphoric (based on conceptual analogies between two objects or ideas, e.g. 'rich' – depicting a pocket full of money, 'to know' – suggesting knowledge is something contained in the head, or 'communication' – showing the flow of information between the sender and receiver),
- metonymic (referring to their referents via something intimately associated with the referents, e.g. 'man' – imitating shaving, 'Poland' – based on the sign of the Christian cross, i.e. alluding to the predominant religion in Poland, or 'Warsaw' – related to the breasts of a woman, as the coat of arms of the city of Warsaw depicts a half-naked siren),
- morphic (imitating the shape or another easily perceivable property of their referents, e.g. 'house', 'flower' or 'sun').

- physiognomic (imitating the appearance of their referents, e.g. 'cat', 'cow' or 'snail'),
- relational and quantitative (referring to the size or quantity of their referents, e.g. 'tall', 'far' or 'many'),
- movement-related (imitating the movement associated with the action referred to, e.g. 'to drink', 'to read' or 'to give'),
- expressive (imitating the facial expression or gestures associated with the action referred to, e.g. 'to cry', 'to laugh' or 'to ask'),
- employing classifiers (based on manual classifiers representing the entities involved in the action referred to, e.g. 'to walk', 'to run' or 'to fall'),
- dactylographic (related to the letters of the corresponding words in written Polish, e.g. 'May', 'son' or 'God').

Due to space limitations, we cannot discuss each of theses classes in detail. Our aim is more modest: to present examples of the influence of iconic motivation on the lexicon and grammar of PSL. It should be noted here that, being three-dimensional, the very communication channel of visual-spatial languages forces the use of iconic relations, such as placement of signs in particular locations in the signing space. When discussing this characteristic of signed communication, Cormier (2007) talks of the *topographic* use of the signing space, which reflects the real-world locations of the objects referred to. The place of articulation of a sign often has an iconic motivation. Signs expressing emotions, such as happiness or anger, are typically produced on the chest, whereas signs related to cognitive processes, such as thinking or understanding, are produced on the temple (cf. e.g. Kyle and Woll (1985)). This could be interpreted as the phonological aspect of iconicity – the feature of the place of articulation is one of the contrastive diacritics of a sign (in sign linguistics, the term

phonology is used to refer to the study of sublexical features with distinctive functions). There are numerous examples of iconicity in the phonological structure of PSL. Most importantly, they include non-manual sublexical features, such as the direction of sight, eye contact or head and body movements. Iconicity also affects the inflectional properties of PSL, with the notable example of the phenomenon of verb agreement – many verbs seem to be inflected for person by incorporating their subjects and objects, e.g. 'I give you (something)' is signed in the opposite direction than 'you give me (something)'. Plural marking is another instance of an inflectional process based on iconic principles: plural forms are often signed as reduplicated forms of the basic shape of the sign being pluralized. Last but not least, iconic basis could also be traced in many syntactic phenomena of PSL. Relevant examples include questions, negative sentences and imperatives, all of which are distinguished from affirmative sentences through non-manual markings, such as raised/lowered eyebrows, frowning, wide opening of eyes, direct eye contact, head tilts and shakes, and expressive facial gestures. Similar means serve the purpose of indicating clausal subordination. The interaction between syntax and iconicity reaches beyond individual sentences. Whole narratives may also be iconically-driven. In this respect, the situation in PSL is not different from other sign languages. Liddell (2003) discusses a narrative in ASL (American Sign Language) devoted to the inseparability of language and culture, in which the two phenomena are presented as a married couple. The signer states that if language and culture were divorced (which is represented iconically, with two handshapes beginning together then separating), they would both die. This potential consequence is indicated as follows: first, one of the signer's hands drops and rolls over dead, then the other one. Note that it is not only a particular sign ('divorce') that has an iconic basis but also the whole narration. To sum up the facts presented in this section, it seems justified to

say that iconicity is one of the most important cognitive forces underlying the lexicon and grammar of Polish Sign Language (or even sign languages in general).

3. ARE ICONICITY AND ARBITRARINESS MODALITY-DEPENDENT?

It could be considered a platitude to say that the three-dimensional visual-spatial modality has a higher potential of visual iconicity than the vocal-aural modality, limited by its one-dimensionality. Still, it does not necessarily mean that the iconicity of visual imagery is more easily perceivable than that of the vocal type. Of course, iconic words are virtually absent from spoken language. Exceptions to this generalization include onomatopoeia, i.e. words that imitate the sounds they stand for (e.g. the English verb *meow* or the Polish verb *miauczeć* that imitate the noise made by cats), and phonesthemes, i.e. recurrent sub-lexical and sub-morphemic clusters of phonemes, associated with a specific meaning (e.g. the English phonestheme *gl-*, which occurs in a number of words related to light and vision, like *glow*, *glitter*, *glisten*, *glare*, *gleam*, *glimmer*, *glint* etc.). However, iconicity as such is definitely not a marginal phenomenon in spoken languages (cf. Wescott (1971)). For instance, similarly to what happens in many sign languages, iconic motivation can take the form of reduplication, i.e. a morphological process by which the root of a word is repeated in order to convey a semantico-grammatical function, such as plurality (e.g. *orang* 'human being' > *orang-orang* 'human beings' in Indonesian, cf. Macdonald (1976)) or intensification (e.g. *nononga* 'long' > *nononononga* 'very long' in Daga, cf. Murane (1974)). The process in question seems to be based on the following cognitive mechanism: intensity of a feature is positively correlated with complexity of structure (the more intensive a feature, the more

structure should express it) – for a more detailed discussion of reduplication, see Moravcsik (1978).

It is worth noticing that Peirce (1932) distinguishes two types of icons: an iconic image is a single element that (visually or otherwise) resembles its denotation, whereas an iconic diagram is a complex icon, whose parts are related to each other in such a way that the relationship resembles the relationship between the extralinguistic objects to which these parts refer. The latter kind of iconicity could be viewed as syntagmatic in nature.

Iconic motivation in the diagrammatic sense is well-attested in many spoken languages. According to some scholars, it should be viewed as one of the most important conceptual bases of syntax (see e.g. Jakobson (1965), among others). Moulton and Robinson (1981) use the term *iconic syntax* to refer to the situation in which the arrangement of lexemes in a sentence reflects or "looks like" the arrangement of their referents. They illustrate this model with an example of a radio announcer at a car race: the order, spacing and pace of uttering the names of the racers going by the press box corresponds to the real-time situation on the track. In other words, the organization of our utterances tends to be based on the actual temporal organization of the events that we are talking about. Therefore, we prefer to say: "I ate dinner, brushed my teeth and went to bed", instead of "I went to bed, brushed my teeth and ate dinner", as a reply to the question "What did you do last night?". Theoretically, linguistic coordination is a kind of addition operation, in which A + B + C should be equal to C + B + A. In fact, examples such as the one above show that linearization of speech is rooted in extra-linguistic factors, mimicking the real-world experience of the speaker. Similarly, Diessel (2005) points out that the placement of subordinate temporal clauses is based on temporal iconicity. He shows that the linearization of clauses in a complex sentence reflects the temporal order of the events that they refer to (see also Haiman (1985), Kortmann (1991)). Subordinate clauses

describing an event that takes place prior to the event described by the main clause tend to precede the main clause, whereas clauses referring to a posterior event typically occur sentence-finally. Diessel (2005) illustrates the phenomenon in question with sentences such as (1) and (2), which are much more frequent in natural speech than sentences such as (3) and (4):

(1) *After the moon went down the night was pitch black.*
(2) *They've started to have coffee together in the morning before I get out of bed.*
(3) *The night was pitch black after the moon went down.*
(4) *Before I get out of bed they've started to have coffee together in the morning.*

Diessel's (2005) analysis shows that at least some principles of clause combining must be viewed are driven by temporal iconicity. Similar examples could easily be multiplied. Therefore, it seems that iconicity is present in all languages, both spoken and signed.

However, Thoutenhoofd (2000) argues that the iconic character of the visual modality makes sign languages substantially different from spoken ones. His argument is based on the observation that sign languages can develop quite rapidly whenever a new deaf community is formed, which could be interpreted as a sort of creation "ex nihilo". A well-documented example of such a situation is the birth of Nicaraguan Sign Language, which was spontaneously developed by deaf children in a number of schools in Nicaragua in the 1970's and 1980's (cf. Kegl (1994), Senghas (1994)). According to Thoutenhoofd (2000), it is only thanks to the "common-sense referentiality of iconic forms" that a completely new system of signs can arise and be acquired in a relatively short time. As noted by Givón (1989), "all other things being equal, a coded experience is easier to store, retrieve and communicate if the code is maximally isomorphic to the experience".

The arguments put forward by Thoutenhoofd (2000) seem to touch upon a more general problem of the role of iconicity in language development. Grice (1989) argues that all systems of non-iconic signs are historically derived from earlier iconic systems. According to this line of reasoning, iconicity underlies primitive non-conventional signaling and is typically lost as a result of conventionalization. This model could be valid both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. It is not surprising that spontaneous iconic gesturing plays a much more important role in child language than in adult language. For example, Capirci, Iverson, Pizzuto and Volterra (1996) show that, in the transition from one-word utterances to more complex syntagms, the child necessarily goes through an intermediate phase of gesture-word combinations. Thus, the presence of gestures in children's communication seems to facilitate the development from pre-linguistic to linguistic behaviors.

The above applies to both signed and spoken languages. It should be emphasized here that, as observed by Frishberg (1975), the iconic basis of linguistic structure in sign languages is prone to gradual diachronic change in the direction of arbitrariness, formal reduction and conventionalization. Iconically motivated elements which are frequently used tend to get simplified (reduced to those features that function as contrastive diacritics) and systematized in a step-by-step fashion by assimilation and lexicalization processes, such as the loss of redundant body or facial movement. For example, ASL compound signs are often merged into simpler forms, as in the case of the sign 'home', which historically consisted of two separate signs (meaning 'eat' and 'bed'), but was reduced by modifying its articulation from single touches at two distinct locations to two touches at one location. Such changes leading to coalescence and formal attrition make the visual motivation of signs less and less transparent, up to the point when it becomes completely opaque. Frishberg (1975) argues that this process is instrumental in the creation of full-fledged linguistic systems of signs, as op-

posed to random sets of iconic gestures, devoid of any systematic relationships. This analysis is in line with Zipf's (1935) observation that linguistic elements with a high frequency of usage tend to be expressed in a reduced (opaque) form. He treats this regularity as resulting from a least-effort mechanism (if a concept can be conveyed by means of a relatively simple form, there is no need for a more complex form). In other words, loss of iconicity due to conventionalization may be viewed as driven by the principle of the most economical expression.

The same trend from more iconic to more arbitrary was noted by Tomaszewski (2006), who observed conventionalization processes similar to those discussed by Frishberg (1975) in the linguistic behavior of Polish homesigners, i.e. deaf children who do not know Polish Sign Language but communicate gesturally with their hearing families. Tomaszewski (2006) examined changes in their communicative techniques resulting from exposure to other homesigners in a kindergarten context. He noticed an expected development of the children's lexical competence but also various adaptations and simplifications, such as transfer of movement from body language to the hands or elimination of one of the hands from symmetric signs. The changes in question could be illustrated with a telling example of the gesture sign for 'dog'. At the beginning of their interaction, homesigners produced this sign in a pantomime fashion (both hands raised to the face level, forward movements of the body, accompanied by an angry facial expression, very much like in a theatrical performance of an attack by an aggressive dog). After some time, the way the sign was produced changed quite significantly: the movement was transferred from the body to the hands, got faster, shorter, and in a way conventionalized ("fossilized") in the sense of being done exactly twice (rather than several times). Additionally, the facial expression of anger was abandoned. Tomaszewski (2006) explains this clear loss of iconic properties as driven by the economy of expression.

Interestingly, it seems that once a sign is conventionalized and integrated into the linguistic system of a given sign language, it is no longer processed mentally as an icon, but rather as a bundle of arbitrary features. Bellugi, Klima and Siple (1975) describe a short-term memory experiment, in which deaf subjects were asked to recall ASL signs which they had been presented on a screen. The experiment showed that short-term memory mechanisms of lexical retrieval are not based on iconicity. Certain intrusion errors that occurred in the responses were related to the formal characteristics (articulatory/phonological features) of particular signs, and not on their visual properties. For instance, the sign for 'candy' was mis-recalled by one of the subjects as the sign for 'apple'. The explanation of this error seems straightforward in light of the fact that the two signs differ in only one articulatory feature related to hand configuration, namely the position of the index finger. Other features of the sign presented, such as the place of articulation and the type of movement, were preserved in the sign recalled. Similarly, 'noon' occurred as an error for 'tree' because, again, the two signs differ in only one feature, in this case, movement ('noon' is still, whereas 'tree' moves). This shows that signs are most likely coded and processed as bundles of arbitrary articulatory features, and not as mimetic images. In other words, iconicity does not seem to play any role in the memorization of conventionalized signs.

Emmorey, Grabowski, McCullough, Damasio, Ponto, Hichwa and Bellugi (2004) used positron emission tomography to examine if the fact that signs denoting tools in ASL usually have a clear iconic motivation (a handshape representing the human hand holding a tool) results in a different activation of the neural systems involved in lexical retrieval, when compared to non-iconic signs. Surprisingly, it turned out that there are no such differences, which suggests that the human brain does not distinguish between non-iconic and iconic signs, even if the latter are indistinguishable from pantomimic gestures. This observation could possibly be explained in

the following way: as soon as an icon becomes part of the linguistic system of a given sign language, the iconic motivation of its form ceases to matter any more – it simply becomes an arbitrary sign, interpretable only within the limitations imposed by the system.

As pointed out by Mrozik (2006), among many others, being iconic does not make a sign non-arbitrary. Even if the motivation of a given icon becomes transparent (or at least easy to decipher) once the meaning is given, no icon can be thought of as based on a simple one-to-one relation between form and meaning. Iconic elements are as conventional as non-iconic ones, i.e. one must *learn* their shape, instead of just creating them ad hoc. Mrozik (2006) illustrates this problem with the example of different words used for the noise made by dogs: *woof* in English, *hau* in Polish, *am* in Lithuanian. All of them are usually considered iconic due to their onomatopoeic character, but this does not mean that their interpretation is in a way language-independent. In other words, a speaker of English would not be able to guess the meaning of the Lithuanian word *am* only on the basis of its phonetic shape. Similarly, if lexical elements used in sign languages were not as arbitrary and language-specific as spoken words, signed utterances would be easily understandable for non-signers, which is obviously not the case (usually, an outside observer is not even able to guess the general topic of a signed dialogue).

Note that arbitrary signs used in sign languages should be distinguished from non-linguistic pantomimes accompanying this kind of communication. Hohenberger (2007), among others, points out that signed narratives are often interspersed with spontaneous gestures and pantomimes. They include both paralinguistic signs that are created on the spur of the moment for the purpose of a particular communicative context, as well as various iconic modifications of well-established signs, e.g. changes in the manner of movement which may signal that the action described by the sign was performed slowly, quickly, repeatedly etc. We could also

include here all kinds of non-manual (facial) indicators of emotions or value judgments, such as those that may change the interpretation of the sign 'girl' into 'pretty girl' or 'ugly girl' (cf. Fabisiak (2010b)). Elements of this type are also common in oral communication, when co-verbal gesturing or facial expressions are used as a kind of illustration of what is being said. But the phenomenon in question poses a serious problem when it comes to *delimiting what is* linguistic in sign language and what is not. Although it is virtually impossible to draw a clear line between linguistic signing and paralinguistic gesturing, the dichotomy in question should be kept in mind when discussing the issue of iconicity. Ad hoc gesturing is obviously rooted in human sensory experience, and hence non-arbitrary. As for its role in the grammatical system, non-linguistic gesturing in sign languages could be compared to certain suprasegmental prosodic features in spoken languages, such as intonation, pitch, timbre, loudness, rhythm, or (non-phonological) vowel length. Factors of this type are not distinctive in terms of phonological features, however, they may play an important role as meaningful elements in oral communication. For example, when reading out a dialog between the big bad *wolf* and *Little Red Riding Hood* to a child, parents will usually lower/raise their pitch in order to make it clear who says what. Similar modifications are possible on other levels of prosodic suprastructure, e.g. longer than usual pronunciation of words may indicate that the action referred to was very slow, e.g.: *The train was going veeery slooowly*. Such modifications are clear examples of aural iconicity. They definitely affect the interpretation of a given utterance but are not part of the linguistic (phonological) system in a narrow sense. Loudness or pitch cannot be thought of as binary features; they are gradient, similar to various paralinguistic gestures and sign modifications in sign languages.

4. CONCLUSION

We believe there are many convincing arguments for treating iconicity as a cognitive mechanism underlying various aspects of both oral and visual communication. Therefore, iconic motivation as such does not seem to be a defining feature of sign language. Once gestures enter the language system, they get conventionalized and become arbitrary, even if visually motivated. In other words, the imitative potential of gestural signs should not be considered a plus/minus feature, absent from the vocal-aural modality. The iconic grounding of linguistic signs seems to be a relative rather than absolute characteristic (cf. Wescott (1971)). Its scalar nature is best described as a kind of continuum with full arbitrariness and full iconicity as two extremes (neither of them attested in natural languages). As shown by Frishberg (1975) and Tomaszewski (2006), among others, various phenomena in sign languages may be interpreted as involving a change in the location along that continuum. Interestingly, such changes seem to be unidirectional – from more iconic to more arbitrary. According to this line of reasoning, the fact that some grammatical categories in sign languages (such as, for instance, agreement) seem to exhibit a lesser degree of conventionalization than their equivalents in spoken languages may be interpreted as resulting from sign languages being relatively young (see Aronoff, Meir, Padden and Sandler (2005) for a similar conclusion). It could be assumed that in the course of diachronic development, many aspects of the grammatical structure of sign languages will move along the iconicity-arbitrariness continuum, getting conventionalized in ways analogous to those known from the history of spoken languages.

EWA SZCZĘSNA

THE CREATION OF MEANINGS IN DIGITAL TEXTS

1. INTRODUCTION

The function of technology in the area of cultural texts can be of dual nature. First of all, technology is perceived as a mean of message transmission. It usually takes place when new technologies appear, as their invention is inspired by human willingness to improve the way of communication. However, when new media gradually develop and become more sophisticated, their active participation in the creation of meanings becomes more visible. Comprehension of highly-sophisticated technologies, in particular digital ones, as nothing more than a medium means losing their essence.

Martin Heidegger points out that technology is not only a medium of transmition but first of all it is the way of discovering and making the being. It means that new technologies discover new ways of the creation of meanings as they produce new textual forms and modify existing ones. As such, they become a subject of interest to the humanities, including semiotics and poetics.

The shaping of meanings in a digital message is strictly related to specificity of a sign, text and digital discourse. I intend to show this specificity with reference to internet messages.

2. STRUCTURE AND SPECIFICITY OF A SIGN IN A DIGITAL MESSAGE

A digital sign should be considered in relation to its four aspects: the layer of its appearing, its substance, meaning, and in its functional aspect.

The layer of sign's appearing is of polisemiotic nature. Internet messages use existing forms of signs, combining and changing them through media processing. This linking is possible due to the substance of digital sign. The signs irrespective of the form of their appearing are constructed from the same bit substance. This causes that linguistic, visual, numerical, sound, and graphical signs exist according to the same principles. From the point of view of a digital technology, those signs are of the same type. It does not happen in the case of traditional media, where linking the sign to different substance and arts (e.g. word to print paper and literature, sound to sound wave, a score and music, colourful spot to paint, canvas and painting) make them signs of varying types. Development of technology causes that substance of text is invisible electronic phenomena. The possibility to record every piece of information, irrespective of its semiotic organization, using the same 0–1 code causes that image, word and sound are of the same type of information. Thus, they can be easily linked and processed.

The layer of appearing of signs is of optional nature. It means that one meaning and acting has an iconic, verbal, literal and mathematical presentation, and periphrasis (description using words) at the same time (e.g. the icon of the printer, command „print", „Ctr+P"). The iconic and verbal variants can be linked with a metonymic relation, similarity, and conventionality.

The digital sign is characterized by its functional aspect that means the ability to perform actions on other signs and texts. Not every sign in hypertext has this aspect activated, but every sign can become a functional one. Its presence is marked in the sign's ap-

pearing (marking a word or several words, part of text using different colour or underlining) or adopted conventionally (e.g. icons in toolbars), signalled with a changing a shape of cursor.

The user's action activates this sign aspect. This manifests the persuasive nature of the digital sign that transforms the receiver into the sender, encouraging him to organize the text. Among signs with an active functional aspect, one can distinguish sings linking to other texts or signs changing the text. The former transfers the user to another text – page, for which a specific sign (word, icon) gives the go ahead. The latter can be used by the user to introduce changes to the text.

The sign of cursor represents a typical sign changing text. It does not belong to the text, but enables operations that could be made on it (it is related to discourse). The cursor is a multiform and multifunctional sign. Once moved across the screen, it adopts different appearance informing the user about its readiness to act. These actions are started as a result of clicking, which – as Paul Levinson points out[1] - replaces the verbal syntax of commands. The cursor sign organizes textual reality, and encourages the user to manage it through its mediation. It gives the user a creative position and a feeling of power over a virtual world, although this power does not go beyond, what has been programmed.

In signs with an active functional aspect the layer of meanings may become blurred. Then the meaning is included in the action and possibility to manipulate other signs in the process of the creation of meanings.

The digital culture also creates signs peculiar to itself, e.g. emoticons. Punctuation marks, which fulfil a grammatical function in other media, become part of an iconic sign that expresses emotions of the sender.

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1 P. Levinson, The Soft Edge: A Natural History and Future of the Information Revolution, Routledge, London 1997.

3. FEATURES OF INTERNET TEXT AND DISCOURSE. THEIR FUNCTION IN THE CREATION OF MEANINGS

Internet, like every semiotic system, has a rhetoric nature. It organizes a textual world in a way peculiar to itself. The meanings creation in a digital message is influenced by such features of text and discourse as: multimediality and polisemiotics, ability to programming, linking different ways of receiving, editing as a principle of text creation, palimpsests and hybridization of discourse.

Meanings in polisemiotic transmissions are not an effect of simple summarization of meanings represented in any specific sign systems, but they are a result of interactions among them. Signs entering into rhetorical relations may belong to different semiotic systems, forming the trans-semiotic narration and figures (metaphors, epithets, repetitions, hyperboles, etc.). They can also belong to different layers of a message, e.g. to text and discourse forming interactive narration and figures.

Meanings may consist of simple units like words, pictures, or more compound ones such as images, stories, and fragments of music. Digital technologies lead to the transformation of the system of signs and meanings. Introducing a metaphorical relation, for example the correlation between word and image, does not only lead to the formation of new meanings, but also causes a change in the function of "sign" and the way of it existence. In that case, it will result in word visualization or image verbalization[2]. Analogically, the image and sound narration may visualize the sound or materialize the acoustic signals. Thus, the transsemiotic relations lead to the modification of ontological meanings of the semiotic systems.

The message can be programmed. That means the same tex-

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[2] M. Sandbothe, Transversale Medienwelten. Philosophische Überlegungen zum Internet, in: G. Vattimo,W.Welsch (Hrsg.), Medien_ Welten Wirklichkeiten, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 1998, 69–76.

tual information to function in many semiotic variants[3], which can modify the meaning of message, adapt it to the needs of a receiver. The presentation of information in the form of printed text, image or film engages also different types of perception.

Along with hypertext different types of the message receiving are linked: linear (typical for word texts), symultanic (initiated by adjacent windows and presence of image) and link type. Individual words or even larger fragments of text can belong to different types of discourse at the same time. The meanings are created in consequence of interactions among mentioned types of the message's receiving, while a link type distinguishes digital discourse from other ones. The link type of the receiving also invalidates an inversion as there is no determined order of reading. In consequence discourse that is created as a result of opening subsequent pages is unrepeated.

Editing is a principle of the creation of digital text. Text can be edited by the user in a one-time way (every time differently) from ready textual units, which are different in terms of semiotics, media, style, area, volume. It facilitates the creation of hybrid forms[4].

The internet text continuously varies from closure as an act of placing it on website to instability manifesting itself in being open to changes, constant updates and modifications.

The internet discourse is characterized by palimpsests that mean endless multilayer nature of textual units with subsequent layers appearing as an effect of marking selected text's elements. Every website can make a beginning, centre, or end of discourse. It gives access to many parallel discourses that appear only at the moment of selection made by the user. The selection act has to be repeated again and again, as every choice requires from the user

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[3] L. Manovich, The language of New Media, The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 2001.

[4] D. Grigar, The challenges of hybrid forms of electronic writing, "Computers and Composition" 2005/22, 375–393.

to make another choice, engaging him in the process of discourse creation being series of such one-time choices.

Automatism of links and choices, which is characteristic for internet communication, is conductive to hybridization of discourse and text: various neighboring communication practices belonging to different areas of social life, texts varied stylistically, unequal in terms of an intellectual level. For instance, web browsers are a source of such match accidentality. They do not select data without any additional command. Writing a word or expression gives access to other websites representing various areas of life and human activity. The effects of searching reveal maximum homonimity of the word (e.g. *Chopin* as a name of a historical person, school, hotel, vodka etc.).

Hybridization is accompanied by inclination to homogenization of the structure of the entire classes of messages. For example contents of websites of information services produced in different countries, a set of elements they contain, textual forms, a way of presenting information are analogous. This leads to creation of extralingual and extranational Internet genres, modification of the message meaning through placing it in a framework determined by a given genre.

On the one hand, internet creates textual genres that come from established textual forms, e.g. blogs, chats, e-mails, web computer games, or hypertext novels[5]. On the other hand, it continuously adapts existing texts and makes them popular.

Entering texts into the web opens new opportunities for the creation of meanings but also inevitable eliminates its media nature. The painting, performance, film or novel, entered to the web comply with principles of digital media. Their creative abilities get deactivated, fixed. Their context, ontological situation and a way of

[5] See e.g.: J. McGann, Radiant Textuality: Literature after the Word Wilde Web, New York: Palgrave 2001; Cyberspace Textuality: Computer Technology and Literary Theory, (ed.) M. L. Ryan, Bloomington 1999.

perception get changed. For example, it is impossible to experience with a computer the reality of one-time performance, or things substance. The receiver of the art of painting cannot touch the paintings' texture through internet, although he can get to know the appearance of an artistic subject located far away. He can also know what kind of paints the artist used, how he obtained them, which techique he used to create this picture. The receiver can view a film simulation of impossible spaces from the graphics of Escher[6]. The digital technology enables experimental cognition manifesting itself in the user's ability to dismantle a text, create new textual combinations. As a result, the piece of art entered into internet obtains new quality, becomes new text with the meaning defined by specifity of a digital medium.

Exchanging the role of sender and receiver, as well as author and reader funtions is typical for internet communication. The receiver becomes the sender, author, and even editor. The receiver's awareness based on associative thinking gets shaped. The term 'user' replaces a traditional one – 'receiver'.

The participation of the user in the creation makes him more engaged. It becomes possible to create transmissions as an effect of interactions between several users. The user is also able to conduct a purposeful auto-creation. He is given a feeling of power over the presented world, which is reinforced by the possibility of issuing commands (therefore computers are called invocatory media[7]). The user of internet or computer games may decide on the course of a plot, create characters and their personalities, as well as form clues and episodes. As a result, digital world can become for him

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[6] Films creating spaces from the graphics of Escher, e.g. *Belvedere, Waterfall, Ascending and Descending*, are presented on the web page http://www.mcescher.com.

[7] Ch. Chester, The Ontology of Digital Domains, in: David Holmes (ed.), Virtual Politics. Identity and Community in Cyberspace, Sage Publications, London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi 1997, 79–92.

more realistic than the reality he lives in, as the every-day reality cannot be influenced so remarkably. The possibility of introducing changes by anonymous users leads to weakening the status of the personal author.

Digital systems assume an attitude of continuous queries directed at the user, which gives the transmission a structure of dialogue. They offer interactivity and the possibility of simulating events. As such they overcome a problem of receiver's passiveness, the issue that critics have seen as an essential limitation of analogous media.

Easiness and popularity of introducing changes, the principle of continuous update create text *in statu nascendi*, question a to-date way of functioning of an oryginal term. The question appears whether one should point at a lack of the original text, its multiplication, or perhaps the original characterized by continuous modification.

A rhetoric dimension of digital technologies is visible in the elaboration of own mechanisms of the receiver's manipulation, influencing his outlook, inclinations, desires, or even decisions he makes. An example of such mechanisms is engagement of the receiver through making the message more and more attractive aimed at willingness to deal with a given computer program. A verbal layer gets reduced, while audiovisual one gets enriched. A moving picture, colour and sound serve a purpose of attracting the receiver's attention. Both esthetics and economy of the message make it more persuasive. Using visual presentations and ellipses frequently enables condensation of the message and its quicker perception.

In consequence, one faces what Baudrillard determines as simulacrum[8], which is generating unreal hyperreality. Contact with an information service, Internet portal, or database is related not only to extending someone's knowledge, entertainment but also to esthetic experience directed at getting the receiver's attention. It is

[8] J. Baurillard, Simulacres et simulations, Galilée, Paris 1981, 9–69.

also persuasive to continuously demand making a choice, acting, or surprising with novelties that attract attention. The persuasive function is fulfilled by visual and sound effects on websites (e.g. using attractive composition of colours, movement on the screen, appearing sounds), which control the perception's mechanism and determine the type of choices. It is also persuasive to adapt appearing information and advertisements to the specific user – the type of websites he downloads most often. It manifests itself in tracking the choice of websites, followed by presenting consumer offers corresponding with the most frequent choices.

4. TECHNOLOGICAL STRUCTURALISM

The Internet is a system, but a system highly formalised, ordered and above all programmed. Its entire message and each communicative action are inscribed in certain structure, which allows us to talk of technological structuralism. Such structures are first of all computer programs, which set definite ways of existence of a text and discourse.

A computer program is a structure in which a user enters a text, be it verbal, pictorial, sonic or polisemiotic. It is a system which enables textual action, but only in the frame of what has already been programmed. It is, therefore, a designed construction used for generating meanings, communicating, performing mental operations or influencing social reality via internet discourse. The user, whilst working with a computer program, fills in and actualises this structure; he implements what is given in this program as a possibility of existence. An example of such a structure could be the program in which I am currently writing these words. Text editors, graphic and educational programs, or those used for preparing presentations are precisely media structures, which enable creating of texts and discourses in a required form. It is equally relevant to aforementioned application programs (applications), system programs (controlling

the work of a computer) and to compilers (programs which aid a programmer) as well, which are structures allowing creation of other structures. Thus, digital technologies generate hyperstructures – that is structures designed to create other structures.

Computer programs are generators of systems which have specific, iterating features; they are, therefore, generators of media genres and textual worlds. The generic features of a text are as if programmed (established) beforehand, and they are not drawn from a group of existing texts with common reoccurring characteristics. A contemporary user of computer media "learns" how to recognise and create a text of a certain genre most commonly through multiple encounters with a given program. The user can also work with an instruction manual, nevertheless, the greater familiarity with the world of digital texts and genres, the better is his ability to adapt to new programs and to modify the existent ones as well, exclusively in the process of unaided diagnosis. In this regard, computer systems do not differ much from other media systems which create their own textual worlds.

Digital genres operate in a variety of spheres of human activity. A multidisciplinary character is shared by multimedia presentations, databases, or statistics. But digital technologies enter also in the realm of art, offering diverse textual structures. There are programs which enable graphic design, creating of a virtual theatrical play, a film or, last but not least, a literary text. A fine example could be *Storyspace* – a program for writing and reading literary hypertexts. The creators of the program (Michael Joyce, Jay David Bolter and Mark Bernstein) call *Storyspace* a fluid writing environment, which allows gathering, storing and experimenting with one's narrative ideas, without worrying whether all of them fit together at the very moment.

New ways of constructing a text and creating meanings are generated by computer programs. A text more and more often becomes a medley and a reworking of what already exists (recycling).

One could say that it is not a new feature, since pre-digital texts have also been referential and combining; ranging from a quotation and a paraphrase, to a collage and an assemblage. It is true; nevertheless, it has never occurred on such a scale – it mainly used to be a purposeful textual or artistic endeavour. The easiness and commonness of cutting and pasting of fragments of texts, which was brought about by the digital technology, conduce to creating of textual medleys. The content of such medleys is not an effect of an in-depth study of a problem and careful organisation of the whole text, but it is often a result of automatic combining of already existing textual fragments. They do not attempt to constitute new values, either, as was the case of the twentieth century collage or assemblage. They merely shuffle other text entities in order to create seemingly new meanings.

The easiness with which it is possible to search and use a part of a text from the whole leads to a change of the status of a fragment. More and more often a fragment (most commonly a citation), which used to be treated as a conclusion, a thesis, or a presentation of sources, is becoming an initiator and inspirer of new texts. Sometimes, even a shift in the hierarchy of significative elements can occur. What in a given fragment had a primary semantic function when in the source text, can now recede into the background, allowing other elements to gain importance, although in the original order of meaning they were less significant. This fact, together with the easiness of computer cutting and combining of texts, results in the possibility of manipulation – the usage of source texts to create different senses. Certainly it diversifies meanings and the function of a fragment. On the other hand, however, the same easiness of searching enables verification of a quotation or a reference far more quickly than in the hitherto prevailing printed media, thus resulting in a system of protection of a source text.

A fragment taken out from one text and put into another has a different meaning. The level of departure from the original sense

may vary – from a slight modification of secondary significative features to a complete change of the message. Hence, fragments which were taken from various texts and now constitute another text, gain a status of a meaningful entity and become something like a lexical unit. They become an analogon of a word, an expanded sign which in diverse uses and various contexts means something different. The discrepancy between the word and those entities lies in the fact that, although they are meaningful units, they are subject to further changes. Digital technologies enable continued modifications: cutting, pasting or changing the order of fragment's constituents. Texts created in this manner are unceasingly open and in a state of becoming, although they declare themselves to be ready and finite whilst they are being approached. Depending on author's intellectual abilities, they can be mere compilations which do not bring about new information, or creative variations discovering innovative meanings.

5. CONCLUSION

This study has shown that digital technologies enable a proceeding enrichment of messages in terms of their semiotic organization and text structure. They create new textual genres and forms, modify existing ones. As such they give a new research area for semiotics and poetics. At the same time the analysis of digital texts leads to development of semiotics and poetics themselves. Improvement of research tools as they have to turn out poor in their current shape is necessary to satisfactorily and adequately describe and name new ways of meanings' creation in contemporary and future texts of culture.

Статья анализирует качества знака, текста, и дигитального дискурса. Показывает их влияние на способ формирования значений компютерном воспроизведении. Это такие качества как: множесты вариантивных паралельных форм презентации знака, многофункцыональность знаков (совмещение функцый воплощения значени с совершением действий на тексте), нестабильность и неготовнос текста, монтаж как принцип воплощения, гебридность воспроизведения передачи (совмещение текстовых сфер пренадлежащих к разным областям жизненной деятельности).

Значения в воспроизвидениях дигитальных создаются в интеракции разных знаковых систем и порядков чтения: линеарного симультативного, и связаного с асоциациями (действует на правах ссылки), который является репризентативным для етой формы коммуникации. Дигитальный дискурс специфируется заменимостью ролями между источником и получателем информации и выработкой новых механизмов управления получателем информации (например: требование совершить выбор или возможность эстэтичного воспроизведения).

KALINA ZAHOVA

A VISION OF OUR CITY

(SOCIALIST URBAN LEGACY AS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF POST-SOCIALST YOUTH OF SLOVAKIA, POLAND AND BULGARIA)

Echoing an empiricist insistence on perception, one could argue that things are different when perceived differently. The present paper will offer a version of the recent socialist past as seen through the eyes of those who have not had the chance to witness it directly. The text will attempt to look parallelly at the notions of young people in three former socialist countries about the period before 1989 and its legacy in the present. For that purpose inquiries and interviews were conducted on the following scale: respondents from Slovakia – 26, respondents from Poland – 22, respondents from Bulgaria – 32, respondents from former socialist countries studying abroad – 13 (namely, Poles in Slovakia – 3, Ukrainian in Poland – 1, Czechs in Austria – 2, Bulgarians in Austria – 3, Bulgarians in Germany – 4). For the conduction of the inquiries in 2009–2010 I would like to express my gratitude to the Ján Stanislav Institute of Slavistics, Slovak Academy of Sciences, and the National Scholarship Programme of the Slovak Republic, to Albena Vacheva and Valeri Vachev, as well as to the respondents themselves: students at the Bulgarian Cultural Institute (Bratislava), Comenius Univer-

sity (Bratislava), Bulgarian Primary and Secondary School „Hristo Botev" (Bratislava), Maria Curie Skłodowska University (Lublin), St. Kliment Ohridski University (Sofia), Paisii Hilendarski University (Plovdiv), and the doctoral students of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (Bratislava). As it is in evidence from this list, the respondents were born predominantly between 1988 and 1994, that is to say they do not have direct observations of the socialist period. In order to make a comparison, another twelve respondents were included, who were born in the 1980s and could have had early childhood memories of the life before 1989. All respondents are students in high school, university or doctoral students, therefore the study cannot be considered exhaustive or representative of all young people in Slovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria. Instead, it would try to offer certain viewpoints that hopefully older people (and for that matter scholars) might find curious and thought provoking.

This paper presents the results regarding young people's vision of the city they live in. It summarizes the major trends in the answers of the first part of the questionnaire, which consisted of three consecutive questions:

- Which city do you live in?
- What do you know about the buildings and the monuments there from the socialist period?
- Are there any buildings/places from the socialist period that you don't like and consider in need of transformation?

I will here try to map the socialist highlights as seen through the eyes of those born around and after 1989.

1) MONUMENTS

Young respondents from Bratislava are unanimous in singling one monument out: Slavín (1960, Ján Svetlík). Some would explain that it is a World War II memorial dedicated to the Soviet

soldiers who liberated the city, others would just mention it as socialist. In his "Cultural Landscapes of Post-Socialist Cities" study Mariusz Czepczyński draws attention on the "(a)dditional coding" that was "connected with monuments of the liberating Red Army", and the fact that all over Central Europe "thousands of war graves and memorials had been erected to commemorate the dead soldiers, as well as to strengthen the 'eternal friendship' between the Soviet nation and the nations of the 'brotherhood democratic republics'." [Czepczyński 2008: 71]. Being well-kept and hosting important official holidays (like 4th April – the day of Bratislava's liberation, and 8th May – the end of the World War II in Europe), Slavín is the obvious first choice of almost every Slovak respondent. It is far from insignificant to observe that even in 2009–2010 for young people born after 1989 the monument still functions the way it was planned to – as an "architectural and ideological dominant of Bratislava" [Šášky 1988: 50]. It is tempting to conclude that the socialist strategy of building important monuments on eminences visible from every point of the city was clearly a successful one.

Bulgarian socialist city architecture was no stranger to that strategy either. Even independent travel advice books as Lonely Planet's "Eastern Europe" would mention that "(n)ot to be overlooked are the ever-heroic communist-era monuments standing on hilltop vantage points" [Lonely Planet 2005: 120]. A couple of those monuments get the occasional mention in the student questionnaires, namely Bouzloudzha and Shipka, but it would be perhaps more interesting to compare the visibility of the city Red Army monuments in Bratislava, Plovdiv and Sofia. While the majority of the Slovak respondents undoubtedly associate Slavín with socialism, only 5 Bulgarian respondents living in Sofia mention the Soviet Army Monument (1954, Mitov) at the city centre, and no one points out the Mound of Brotherhood (built in 1956 to commemorate the struggle against fascism), even though it was carefully designed not only to rise from a comparatively high point of

Borisova Gradina Park, but also to form a ray lining with the Soviet Army Monument and the Party headquarters. Since the obelisk of the Mound is both situated on a ridge and higher itself than the Soviet Army Monument, it is clear that in this case the key to its "invisibility" is not height. One probable reason is the location of the Mound in the corner of the park, and the efforts of the Sofia City Council in the early 1990s to substitute the flowered alleys leading to the obelisk with grassed lawns. Compared to Bratislava's Slavín, both Sofia monuments look deliberately deserted, but the area around the Soviet Army Monument has managed to become attractive for young people, predominantly skateboarders and beer lovers. Along with this, another reason for its relatively higher popularity and potential for association with socialism is probably originating from the long-lasting debates around the demolition, preservation, or transformation of the monument. The Mound of Brotherhood, on the other hand, has not become a centre of youth activities and has not caused so much media fuss, so it is hardly surprising that respondents born after 1989 would not mention it at all. The situation is similar with the Soviet Army monument "Aliosha" in Plovdiv (1954, Radoslavov, Kotzev, Topalov, Zankov), which still rises from the peak of Bunardjik Hill, and yet proves to be totally invisible to the respondents from Plovdiv. Another temporary conclusion that may occur: when it comes to identifying monuments as socialist, it is not necessarily about size or height, it is also about equal parts of (not) knowing your history and presence or lack of youth activities in the area.

A significant part of the Slovak, Polish and Bulgarian respondents point out as socialist simply "monuments" and/or "sculptures", without elucidating which ones exactly and what do they know about them. In doing so, they count on associations of almost irrational nature, not on knowledge, education or logic. It would seem that young people from all three countries are well aware that at some places around their cities there should be socialist legacy

left, but are totally ignorant about the details and quite indifferent about their symbolic potential. Which leads me to the next section:

2) ABSENT SYMBOLS VS EVER PRESENT SYMBOLS

Every period and every city concentrate around certain symbolic centres, the material appearance of which is usually designed to correspond with the power they represent. And while castles were the obvious choice for many centuries, in the 20th century socialist world "the most important function of communist cities were in their centres of political power, always located in the central committee of the Communist Party's headquarters. In smaller towns the committees were sometimes located in the same buildings as municipalities, but in larger cities the party had separate, usually newly constructed building. Communist party quarters, at national, regional, or very local level, were clearly the focal point of powers in landscapes." [Czepczyński 2008: 70]. Nonetheless, almost none of the respondents indicate those key buildings. This fact is especially interesting in the case of Sofia where the communist rule buildings of the so-called Largo (1954–1956, Tatarov, Danchov) still implement administrative functions:

- the former Party House (headquarters of the Bulgarian Communist Party) is now a building of the National Assembly of Bulgaria;
- the former Ministry of Energy, and subsequently State Council, is now the President's Office (and is also partly used by the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Justice and other organizations), and the former Hotel Balkan is Sheraton Sofia Hotel Balkan (surrounding in the inner yard the 4th century Rotunda of St. George);
- the building of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria still

functions as such, as does the Central Department Store (TZUM).

The three edifices are executed in Stalinist style (also known as Socialist Classicism, Stalinist Empire Style, or Stalinist Neo-renaissance), and are both directly and symbolically the ensemble most representative for the 1945–1989 historical period. And while for this reason for the older generations the connection of the edifices with their past is inevitable and irrefutable, it is interesting to observe the lack of such sight on the part of the young people who do not recognize these buildings as socialist. Only one respondent points out the Office of the President as "part of the representative socialist buildings", and no one mentions the other edifices or the ensemble as a whole. The situation is slightly different with the respondents born in the 1980s, included in the inquiry for the purpose of comparison: they all mention the Party House and/or the President's Office with their former and present functions. But on the basis of the questionnaires of the respondents born after 1989 (most of them university students) it is safe to say that former socialist symbols are totally absent on the historical map of the youngest generations. Exactly the same goes for the Slovak and Polish respondents – the emblematic socialist buildings are lacking symbolic content, at best the buildings are perceived with their current functions.

The real paradox revealed from the inquiry though, is the *interchange of present and absent symbols*. While the obvious symbols of socialist power appear invisible to the young people, the major part of the respondents insists on symbols that are practically absent. Such symbol is for instance the massive five-pointed red star on a pole atop Sofia's former Party House, which was removed in 1990 after the building was set on fire during protests. And while the star is mentioned three times, another virtually absent sight is indicated by 70% of the respondents living in Sofia: the mausoleum of Bulgaria's

first communist leader Georgi Dimitrov that used to house his embalmed body before it was (not too easily) dynamited in 1999. The demolition and removal of the mausoleum was planned to have huge symbolic weight as a total differentiation from the communist past and its ideological burden. But has this strategy succeeded? Judging by two-thirds of the questionnaire's replies, the act of demolition (even though many of the respondents declare being against it) has resulted in firm binding of the locus with its past. Young citizens of Sofia might not have eyes for the huge socialist buildings at the city centre, but almost all of them see the non-existent mausoleum, and some even see the five-pointed red star instead of the Bulgarian flag that now takes its place on the huge spire.

The lack of eyes for the socialist monuments and buildings in a way corresponds with the reluctance to see them on the part of the older generations. Many books and travel guides refrain from mentioning such sights. For instance, the bilingual 1995 book "Slovakia's Cultural Heritage. Architectural Monuments" presents all the architectural richness of Slovakia throughout its whole history, and yet without mentioning a single word about the socialist cultural legacy [Urbanová, Šukajlová 1995]. Obviously the examples could go further and further, but the major point is that this absence is sought-after, it is a desired demarcation, an aspiration for historical blindness. While for the young people paradoxically the symbols that were demolished in the element of negation turn out to be ever present, while the available prefunctionalized monuments and buildings appear actually absent. Theo Hauben takes notice of the fact that "(b)lind acceptance of the past in not automatic in Central and Eastern Europe. There, much more so than in Western Europe, historicism faces a difficult dilemma: should it make use of existing symbols or should it create new ones?" [Hauben 2004: 70]. I think the answers of the young people in 2009–2010 could offer food for thought, and perhaps even a recipe for seeing demolition as conservation, and preservation as symbolic erasure.

3) NON-SOCIALIST MONUMENTS AND BUILDINGS SEEN AS SOCIALIST

This is probably the most predictable section of the inquiry, because it can only prove obvious presumptions, such as the lack of knowledge and the historical blindness on the part of young people, as well as the lack of clear uniform criteria regarding what "appears" socialist in any way.

Many respondents living in Lublin indicate as socialist the monument of Józef Piłsudski on Litewski Square, which was planned in the 1930s (1937, prof. Jan Raszek), but not realized until 2001. Examples of fallacies concerning the history of Bratislava include the Castle (Bratislavský hrad, burned down in 1811 and reconstructed in the 1950s-1960s), the Slovak National Theatre (Slovenské národné divadlo, built in 1885–1886 and restored between 1969 and 1972), the Presidential Palace (Grasalkovičov palác, built in 1760), all listed as socialist. In Sofia respondents erroneously see as socialist the National Assembly (Parliament, constructed between 1884 and 1886), the St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral (Hram-pametnik "Sveti Aleksandar Nevski", built between 1904 and 1912), and "the old residential buildings in the city centre".

So one might ask what is it that makes earlier historical buildings, and even recent monuments, seem socialistic? Sadly, the answer has to do with ignorance. A Bulgarian respondent writes how some edifices "definitely look too communist", a Slovak one mentions "a cast or a pattern", but obviously when one has not lived during a certain period, one cannot recognize its markers, and, as already mentioned, is clearly lacking criteria for it. Which is exactly where education comes in. Or apparently not.

In other cases though, it is not the lack of knowledge that confuses post-socialist youth, it is rather the mixture of time layers. A significant number of respondents from Lublin mention

the Zamoyski Museum in Kozłówka (Muzeum Zamoyskich w Kozłówce), which "functioned as Central Museum Repository (1955–1976)". Being well aware of the palace's history, they draw attention on a certain part of this history, to them most closely connected with socialism. Examples of time shifts include pointing out as socialist "the monument of Solidarity (Solidarność)" or "the monument to the victims of communism "Round Table" (Okrągły Stół)". Obviously in these cases knowledge is present, only not perfectly structured.

4) PREFABRICATED HOUSING ESTATES

On the basis of the inquiries conducted with young people from Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria, born after 1989, without a doubt the absolute, unquestionable, incontestable marker of the socialist legacy are the prefabricated housing estates. The 19th and early 20th centuries buildings might appear "somehow communist" to the respondents for no particular reason, but the *panelák / wielka płyta / panelki* are unmistakably attributed to the 1945–1989 period. Moreover, communism is openly blamed for their existence, imperfections and ugliness. An attitude actually quite similar to a certain foreign perspective: "Like many Western visitors to former Communist countries, one of the first things that struck me about former Czechoslovakia was the size and number of high-rise, concrete estates. When, after accidentally getting the wrong bus, I saw my first panelak estate at close quarters, I thought I had landed on the moon. Towering concrete block after towering concrete block, running like artificial canyons in all directions as far as the eye could see." [Hanley 1999]. What might escape some people though, especially the younger ones, is that under the conditions of post-war issues some Western countries had similar housing policy as well. In fact, "stocked construction, poured concrete construction and heavy and light system building appeared on both sides of

the Iron Curtain." [van Gelderen 2004: 129]. The huge difference is of course that in communist countries prefabricated, prestressed concrete panel construction was not just an effective way to deal with the housing shortage, but also a massive accumulator and conductor of ideology. And with 40 per cent of the total urban population of Central Europe still living in prefabricated housing estates [Czepczyński 2008: 98], it is no strange that young respondents would notice their grayness and voice certain discomfort. What is more significant though, is that in unison with the regime, which in spite of their obvious imperfections "lauded these flats as a triumph of socialism" [Konrád 2004: 41], post-socialist young people still apprehend the ideological charge of panelák to a much greater extent than any other city element.

In addition to identifying prefabricated panel blocks of flats with socialism, some Polish respondents consider them built "for the poorer people" or "inhabited by people of certain professions". The social ideological strategy embodied in this type of construction is also noted in some of the Bulgarian replies too: "the panel housing estates were designed to be a modern place to live" and were "planned to be affordable to everyone". Many respondents indicate as socialist the prefabricated housing estates in general, others specify particular residential districts: Mladost, Lyulin, Druzhba in Sofia; Trakia in Plovdiv; Nowa Huta in Kraków; Petržalka in Bratislava; etc. And even though some of the young people appreciate the recent improvements of some buildings, the predominant attitude is frankly negative. Prefabricated blocks of flats in all cities of all three countries are seen as "concrete and gray", "unpleasant", "dirty and sad", "ugly", "terrible", "horrifying", "awfully made", "quickly and poorly built", "designed like Lego constructor", "all identical", "lacking individuality", "in need of renovation", etc. Clearly, for the post-socialist young people the socialist housing construction strategy is most visible through its imperfections, and even though many respondents are well aware of the ideological charge of this

strategy, they cannot but feel only dissatisfaction with the result and indifference with any presumable former good intentions.

5) PALACES OF CULTURE

As Mariusz Czepczyński helpfully reminds: "(a)nother important function and feature of socialist landscape was culture" and it is no secret that "the official, controlled and Party facilitated 'state culture'" "was extremely important for the regimes, as a major ideological and propaganda tool" [Czepczyński 2008: 72]. During socialism the "eyes" and "hands" of ideology carefully covered various aspects of culture, and many of them are escaping today's youth (this part of the questionnaire is to be developed in a separate paper). But when it comes to the city appearance, "(t)he main representation of official 'culture cult' were impressive, sizable, significant culture centres, known as 'palaces' or houses of culture. These important features were built in almost every major socialist city." [Czepczyński 2008: 72].

It would seem that in the eyes of post-socialist young people the visibility of those houses of culture is more than anything a matter of size, and presumably location. No Slovak respondent mentions the Park of Culture and Leisure (PKO, Park kultúry a oddychu) in Bratislava, even though many events (and youth events in particular) are still taking place there. And it is not that PKO is lacking public and media fuss around it; on the contrary, there has been a debate over its destruction or preservation going on for years [Slovak Spectator 2010]. And yet, the respondents all fail to see it as part of the socialist legacy, while quite the opposite trend could be observed with relation to its much more massive equivalents in Warsaw and Sofia.

Many Polish respondents indicate the Palace of Culture and Science (PKiN, Pałac Kultury i Nauki) in Warsaw as a building from the communist period, even though most of them live in oth-

er cities. This could only prove what the official website of the Palace states in its "History" section: "the Palace has been remaining the highest, the biggest, the most popular building in Poland and those features make the Palace win all the popularity polls" [PKiN 2010]. 80% of the respondents who mention the Palace consider it in need of "renovation", "restoration", "repairs", and "transformation". Only two respondents give a reason for that: "it represents the country capital" and "it should be presentable".

Compared to its Polish counterpart, the National Palace of Culture (NDK, Natsionalen dvorets na kulturata) in Sofia has been less controversial and more praised. Some tourist guidebooks, for example, laud it as "(t)he largest multifunctional complex in Southeastern Europe", being along with its surrounding area "the favorite places of the young people of Sofia" [Sofia 2005]. Unlike the website of Warsaw's Palace, NDK's official website refrains from explaining the history of the complex and emphasizes in a not very modest way its current being as a "contemporary castle synthesis of modern architecture and plastic arts", whose "magnificent spaces are spiritualized by more than hundred works" of art, and while it is not very clear when, why or how the Palace was built, it is proudly stated that "there is more steel used in it than in the Eiffel Tour" [NDK 2010]. Still, in 60% of the Bulgarian questionnaires, it is listed as a socialist building, with the occasional explanation that it is "a cultural symbol", "designed for events with social importance" or even that it was "projected by Lyudmila Zhivkova". And the biggest discontent of the post-socialist young people is not with the building itself (even though 5 respondents consider it in need of transformation), but rather with the "ugly useless thing" in front of it that "hardly resembles a monument", which according to most of the respondents is "useless", "uglifying" and "should be torn down straight away".

Judging by the present inquiry, the representational function of the huge palaces is still alive, and sensing it clearly, the respond-

ents react according to their upbringing – pro or contra. They might not be perfectly aware of the "almost religious 'culture cult'" [Czepczyński 2008: 72] that the communist power was pursuing choosing those particular shapes, sizes, settings, and locations, but they unmistakably detect the "time spirit" of the palaces and the legacy they represent.

6. TRANSFORMATION?

As a whole, the respondents look less certain and more precautious when it comes to the third question: "Are there any buildings/places from the socialist period that you don't like and consider in need of transformation?". Some of the alteration suggestions have already been mentioned in the previous sections, therefore here I would like to draw attention to the predominant answers, namely "No", blank, and "I don't know".

On the one hand, uncertainty attests to difficulties in the historical orientation and it is possible to conclude (without insisting on exhaustiveness of the inferences or representativity of the inquiry) that many people born after 1989 are not well-oriented neither with respect to the present, nor regarding the recent past. Compared to the others, Polish respondents seem less "lost": none of them have answered "I don't know", and 7 of them have put a long line that could be read either as a blank, or as a "No".


On the other hand, the impressive number of the "No" responses shows another rather interesting tendency: many young people are capable of looking impartially on our recent past. The reason might be open-mindedness and tolerance, or it might as well be ignorance, nevertheless it is obvious that unlike older generations, a certain part of contemporary youth is willing to accept history as it is, and move on without destroying it, because "transformation means probably alienation from our history". This tendency is even more evident in the replies of those born in the 1980s: "I

don't think such places should be destroyed or transformed beyond recognition, since they are part of the city history; it rather makes more sense to keep them in functional and safe condition"; "No, all of them are part of our history and belong right where we have built them"; "In my opinion concrete is old and very very very gray, but some of them are monuments of history, so they should be saved"; "I personally don't think it necessary, because the 'original' condition testifies to those particular times of our history"; etc.

In this particular sense, young people are probably showing more maturity than the direct witnesses of socialism, who often prove to be unable to escape their nostalgic or negational attitudes. Pro-socialist supporters often defend socialist legacy blindly, while anti-communists demand categorical destruction. And yet none of them would ever be able to look at the city they live in with brand new eyes, and none of them would ever be able to wholeheartedly say something like: "I think those sights have spent enough time in our culture and they should not be destroyed. They have helped us build our identity, therefore we should respect them even if we don't like them". If anything, the vision of our cities through young eyes could be thought provoking, since it might be incomplete or even ignorant, but it is also definitely unique, and to a certain degree even mature.



01. Slavín (Bratislava)



02. Largo: the former Party House, now building of the National Assembly of Bulgaria, and the former Ministry of Energy / State Council, now President's Office (Sofia)



03. Petržalka (Bratislava)



04. Palace of Culture and Science, PKiN (Warsaw)



05. National Palace of Culture, NDK (Sofia)

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В тексте предлагается версия недавнего социалистического прошлого в том виде, в каком оно существует в восприятии тех, кто не был прямым свидетелем того времени. Параллельно рассматриваются представления молодых людей из трёх бывших социалистических стран – Словакии, Польши и Болгарии – о периоде до 1989 г. и его наследия в настоящем, представленного в различных аспектах города.

V.
Methodological implications of vision

Методологические импликации взгляда

GRZEGORZ GROCHOWSKI

POINT OF VIEW AS A GENERIC CATEGORY

The category of point of view in literary research has for a considerable period of time remained a narrowly specialised tool, limiting the scope of its own functionality to a strictly determined excerpt of poetics of narrative forms, usually associated with modernist subjectivisation of personal relation exemplified by Henry James and usually connected with stylistic structures of indirect interior monologue. This reduction was not an accidental characteristic of modern theoretical-literary reflection, but constituted an expression of a certain general mistrust, which virtually entire structuralist poetics harboured towards notions connected with visuality. The mistrust probably stemmed from the fear of blurring semiotic specificity of the art of words and falling prey to old-fashioned illusionistic, somewhat text-anthropomorphising, projections of naive mimetism (it is with the same dislike for referring literary senses to personal experience – and with fear of the possibility of disregarding formal, sign-related or structural properties of artistic artefacts – that we should also connect the discernible pursuit of depersonalising stratification of subject correlates of communication into subsequent sender-receiver instances, as well as a certain reserve towards the issue and concept of literary figure, reduced to the role of e.g. an actant or a set of indexical signs that enroot nar-

rative functions in the codes of knowledge[1]).

It was only at a slightly later stage of development of structural-semiotic tradition, i.e. at the beginning of the 1970s, when the need was uttered to expand methodological frames of the paradigm, that two important (although very divergent) attempts at revalorisation of this problem-matter emerged. On the one hand, it was the statement of Gerard Genette, who – in pursuit of arranging narratological concepts into a certain order and emphasising differences, often blurred in colloquial theoretical nomenclature – suggested terms like *focus* and *focalization*, referring to the issue of focus management[2], on the other hand, however – concepts of Boris Uspienski, who considered the ideologically tinged correlates of the author's point of view as a *tertium comparationis* of sorts, which enables comparison of mechanisms of meaning proper for various kinds of art[3]. Both approaches (especially the issue of focalization, since Uspienski's poetics has rather preserved the value of a genuine author's undertaking) were followed by various references and sparked many debates, anticipating two main avenues of research on the question of point of view, connected with treating perspective as a specific narrative tool, which regulates relations between the narrator and the characters, or between levels of the story, and also as a typified – but at the same time culturally and axiologically

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1 This influential tendency within narratology can be easily exemplified with such works as e.g. R. Barthes, *An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative* (1966), „New Literary History" 1975: 6; T. A. van Dijk, *Some Problems of Generative Poetics*, „Poetics" 1972: 3; L. Dolezel, *Narrative Modes in Czech Literature*, University of Toronto Press 1973; E. Traugott, *Generative Semantics and the Concept of Literary Discourse*, „Journal of Literary Semantics" 1973: 2.

2 G. Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*, transl. J. E. Lewin, Cornel University Press 1980 (selection of *Figures III*, 1972).

3 B. Uspensky, *A Poetics of Composition. The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of Compositional Forms*, (1970), transl. V. Zavarin, S. Wittig, Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press 1973.

tinged – manner of perception of the world, preserved in texts of culture[4].

In literary studies of the late 20th century, these tendencies usually existed unrelatedly, however recently – in connection with a certain shift of the focal point of research interests towards pragmatic conditions of communication – there are significant attempts to be observed at transcending the usual dichotomy and creating methodological contamination of both mentioned approaches. In Polish humanities an interesting example of such work, oriented towards the lookout for stitching points and locating in the centre of attention the issue of connectivity of both interpretations, is constituted by the outline by Małgorzata Czermińska *Punkt widzenia jako kategoria antropologiczna i narracyjna w prozie niefikcjonalnej*, where the Author discusses autobiographical-documentary texts by Czesław Miłosz, Bronisław Malinowski and Ryszard Kapuściński, confronting narrative forms of focus management applied there with patterns of shaping cultural identity that they represent[5]. In the light of similar investigation, it proves that selected strategies of dosing information can have consequences in the sphere of semantic, ideological or axiological settlements (e.g. focalization measures in the beginning chapters of the book *Dojczland* by Andrzej Stasiuk – such as focusing attention on accidental figures of "aliens", counterbalancing the observations made in Germany by Balkan reminiscence, valorising people and places through metaphorical conceptualisation – constitute a literary manifestation of the critical outlook on rationalised, technocratic world of the Western civilisation; the matter is not limited, though, to the level of author's or narrator's single perspective, since legibility of the mindset tinge of particular measures depends, among

[4] These issues are taken into consideration for example in: W. Nelles, *Getting Focalization into Focus*, „Poetics Today" 1990, 11: 2.

[5] M. Czermińska, *„Punkt widzenia" jako kategoria antropologiczna i narracyjna w prozie niefikcjonalnej*, „Teksty Drugie" 2003, 2–3.

others, on polemical reference to typified forms of world vantage, associated with various kinds of voyage literature[6]). It is possible to point out more attempts of this sort, clearly situating themselves in the broader project of anthropological literary studies, however the nobilitation of both the sheer problem-matter connected with visual (or generally sensory) perception, as well as of terminology based on references to visuality should be linked primarily with expansion of – broadly understood – cognitivism[7].

Obviously this notion refers to an extremely complex and heterogenous movement, which does not lend itself to reduction to a specified doctrine, embracing divergent, often even contradictory pursuits, reluctantly succumbing to holistic approaches. However, for the needs of the present outline, I would like to leave aside such concepts that are typecasted as "cognitive" for the single reason that they refer to mechanisms of cognition (in this sense, e.g. Roman Jakobson, Anna Wierzbicka or Noam Chomsky are sometimes considered cognitivists), and also such interpretations that are strictly related to doctrinal stances of particular researchers (we would be dealing with such an already narrow understanding of this direction if we limited its scope e.g. to the version accepted by partisans of Ronald Langacker). Talking of cognitivism as a movement that sanctions positive revaluation of visual metaphoricalness in the domain of theoretical-literary terminology, I would like to concentrate on a certain set of assumptions, concepts and research preferences that broadly resonated in literary studies and established themselves as a distinct and recognisable – though ambivalently evaluated – meth-

6 A. Stasiuk, *Dojczland*, Wołowiec: Czarne 2007, p. 7–10.

7 In Polish linguistic and literary studies this wide concern with the issues of perspectivism in communication might be exemplified by two volumes collecting several studies from many different traditional fields of academic research: *Punkt widzenia w tekście i dyskursie* and *Punkt widzenia w języku i kulturze*, J. Bartmiński, S. Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska, R. Nycz (eds.), Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 2004.

odological option (represented – for example – in works of Mark Johnson, Mark Turner or Peter Stockwell[8]). Above all, I would like to tackle specifically the matter of potential usefulness of the concepts of "perspective", "vantage", "point of view" as tools that have become less frequently used in recent times to describe complex genre conventions.

Attention of authors inspired by the achievements of "sciences of cognition" may have been oriented particularly towards literary stylistics and text semantics, but their proposals left a mark in the realm of modern genological reflection. Cognitive approach to the problem-matter of genre conventions tends to be reported in most studies primarily (if not exclusively) in the context of such questions as "natural categorisation" of phenomena, "radial structure" of meaning, or flexibility of "fuzzy classes" (with an already habitual reference to the idea of Wittgenstein's "family resemblances") which leads *de facto* to associating this concept with a simple application of the theory of prototypes. Thus conducted identification seems to speak clearly of how our comprehension of genology remains conditioned by the image of this discipline as a systematic arrangement of textual forms, oriented towards forming logically arranged classifications, or – in more modest variant – transparent typologies (thus justifying to a certain extent caustic comments of critics of genology, who believe that "genre thinking emerged from the spirit of hierarchy and reglamentation"). However, the model of "prototype categorisation" seems sufficiently deeply rooted in the holistic concept of language and communication, accepted by the majority of cognitivists (albeit commented with large scepticism in other branches of linguistics), that any attempts at its me-

[8] M. Johnson, *The Body in the Mind. Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason*, University of Chicago Press 1987; Mark Turner, *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language*, New York: Oxford University Press 1996; P. Stockwell, *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction*, London Routledge 2002.

chanical transfer to the field determined e.g. by structuralist standards of the scientific, must lead to disappointment (consequently, the sceptical tone that often appears in comments of researchers who represent other methodologies should not come as a surprise). There is no place here for describing the concept in detail (after all it has been done a number of times before[9]), so I will just venture to concisely remind and emphasise several principal features that have a decisive impact on its specific character, and also influence the way genological problem-matter is embraced.

The pivotal issue in this context is recognition of the primacy of metaphor, as the main form of functioning of language, enabling both coding subjectivity and constant extension of ostensive references, arranging experiences into a hierarchy and coordinating social interactions. In turn, among main consequences of this fundamental methodological decision one should locate embracing the dynamic interpretation of meaning, understood not as an objectivised relation between the sign and the system of abstract conventions, but as a complex operation of connecting concept domains with those updated conforming to local contexts, which has an inalienably interpretative character. While a similar reorientation of semantics (rather situational than logical or structural) is linked with methodological questioning of explanations based on the dominant of the system in favour of approaches referring primarily to the category of process, still manifested by e.g. interest in the activity defined as conceptual "blending" mental spaces and establishing concept "blends", where again a specific extrapolation

[9] Such general introductions and/or recapitulations can be found for example in: R. Gibbs, *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language and Understanding*, New York: Cambridge University Press 1994; G. Lakoff, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind*, University of Chicago Press 1987; *Metaphor in cognitive linguistics*, R. W. Gibbs and G. J. Steen (eds.). Philadelphia: John Benjamins 1999; E. Vyvyan, M. Green, *Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2006.

of metaphorical discovery of the similar in the dissimilar can be observed[10].

As a matter of fact, almost the entire repertoire of topics, plots and questions described by cognitivists lends itself to treating as a set of appositions, stemming from the development of the primal intuition linking communication with tropical dimension. Thus – for instance – the concept of profiling in texts refers us to various forms of subject-related modification and emphasis on meanings, to inventive ways of aspect-embracing of the object through interweaving idiomatic signals of subjectivity with carriers of established connotations, and therefore – to measures that repeat strategies, on the level of the presented world, typical of configurating features of sign with respect to metaphorical use. Moreover, profiling – be it of a metaphorised object or the entire presented world – is not only a cognitive emphasis on a selected aspect, but also its valorisation, bearing a complex reference to various types of cognitive command of the subject, i.e. both to intellect and emotional attitudes, aesthetic sensitivity or mindset preferences, constituting not only a preservation of the point of view of the sender, but also an appeal to the receiver to look at a given matter from a similar perspective (as a result of which the adequacy of reconstruction of decoded content as a normative horizon of communication is replaced here by the abundance of resonance and the force of response). After all, such interaction is referred to by the concept of empathy (yet another favourite in the repertoire of cognitivist themes), which assumes association and makeshift identification of two remote realms, two spaces of experience and their corresponding points of view (i.e. mine and belonging to the Other), which demands not only carrying out certain inferential procedures, but also constituting a certain emotive reference and a collision of perceived content with own experience.

Therefore, if it is assumed that similar mechanisms also organ-

[10] M. Turner, G. Fauconnier, *The Way We Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities*, New York: Basic Books 2002.

ise cognitivist thinking of genre conventions, it is easy to notice that the majority of allegations made against conceptualisations based on the concept of "prototype" (such as relativity, liquidity, unstability or subjectivity of description) decrease the value of the concept from the point of view of "objectivist" model of the scientific, however, it can be seen clearly that the legitimacy of these polemical references remains conditioned by acceptance of tacit assumptions of this very paradigm, contested by principle by cognitivism itself. Hence several scholars rightly conclude that upon accepting cognitivist *modus operandi*, researcher arbitrarily picks, arranges and connects specific specimens of a described category, owing to which he or she merely creates a schema of his own perception of genre, which – according to traditional genre theory – is to limit the usefulness of commented approach to the field of "genre consciousness research"[11], it should also be noticed, though, that a consistent cognitivist does not recognise – by principle – any objective models of genre patterns, and any reconstruction always remains a schematic approximation, and at the same time a "certain" or "somebody's" interpretation (where an expert and a lay person are distinguished only by the difference in degree, conditioned by the scope of reading experience, ensuring a broader base for comparison to establish analogies, and the alleged "genre consciousness" is not an epiphenomenon, but the main medium of stabilising generic structures).

It could be admitted that prototype categorisation has not become the most perfect tool for arranging literature into a certain order, and cognitivist genology – if we understand this concept as an elaborate systematics of artistic form, based on logical criteria of division and described by means of consistent terminology – has

[11] In Polish literary studies such opinion is represented for example by S. Wysłouch (*Nowa genologia – rewizje i reinterpretacje*, (2005), in: *Polska genologia literacka*, D. Ostaszewska, R. Cudak (eds.), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2007).

not yet emerged. However, the understanding of genre, proposed in this orientation, occurs without the assumption pertaining to the superordinate character of typologisation tasks and does not demand building global schemata of textual universe stratification. From today's perspective it can be seen clearly that the sheer postulate of sytematisation of forms was legitimised in the modern literature theory by establishing structural poetics in linguistic concepts, which give privilege to the categories of code, arbitrary sign and, above all, system (which led to e.g. attempts at developing the so-called grammars of literature).

At the same time, in cognitivism, recognition of the primacy of figurative order over grammatical organisation of speech, with a simultaneous weakening of the authority of logic in favour of polymorphous character of colloquial language, leads to significant shifts in the scope of accepted research priorities. If therefore one ceases to perceive generative-transformational derivations as the main text-generating mechanism, and formalised syntax is given a second-rate position in the communication space, then there is also a decrease in the cognitive reliability of practices aimed at grammaticalisation (i.e. formalization, codification and systematisation) of literary research. Together with the shift of the focal point of linguistic research from modelling syntax structures to problematising tropological projections, there was therefore a reformulation of tasks of linguistic poetics, alongside genology, which gave up the pursuit of building abstract matrices and general models, concentrating on following various forms of acquisition, attribution, transposition, inclusions, contamination, migrations or genre interference. An interesting perspective might be associated especially with the studies on diverse plays with conventions, exceeding purely aesthetic dimension and focusing on their semantic interactions, caused by "activation, interconnection and manipulation of 'mental spaces' structured by schematic models"[12]. In such view, genre is no longer an algorithm

[12] M. Sinding, *Genera Mixta: Conceptual Blending and Mixed Genres*

updated in textual manifestations, but proves to be an image schema, a specific figure of reading, reorganising sign sequences and shaping the perceived matter of inscription.

Evoking the notion of figure, which cognitivists consider to play a key role in perception and discourse, entails manifold implications. Above all, it leads to the already mentioned rehabilitation of textual anthropomorphisms and popularising visual categories, signalising cognitive conditioning of communication, treated as linguistic preservations of attempts at grasping reality (although – it has to be instantly underlined – the sheer notions are subject to metaphorisation, referring not only to verbalization of perception sensations, but also to various forms of conceptualisation, distinct types of rationality, or eventually – to competing ideologies and mindsets). Attempts at treating point of view as a genological category, enriching the characteristics of selected conventions by the level of cognitive descriptions, emerged particularly in research on journalistic genres, non-fiction prose and media discourse. These works tend to highlight, among others, the problem of complexity of text tinges, which not only can represent a specific phenomenon, but also reveal the multitude and changeability of forms of reality vantage. For example, Iwona Szatkowska in her study on text typology considers as particularly important "the division into genres that introduce one perspective and those whose structure allows a multitude of perspectives"[13], and among polymorphous varieties of discourse she indicates further differentiation between harmonious co-ordinations and dissonant juxtapositions as well as between

in „Ulysses", „New Literary History" 2005, Vol. 36 No. 4, p. 590. This article is a good example of precise, clear, comprehensible presentation of main premises and principles of such studies, followed by a stimulating demonstration of such analysis, explaining several generic interactions within *Circe* in *Ulysses* by James Joyce.

[13] I. Szatkowska, *Kategoria „punktu widzenia" w charakterystyce typologicznej gatunku mowy*, in: *Język – Styl – Gatunek*, M. Kita (ed.), Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego 2009, p. 26.

entanglement of replicas of many subjects and changeable modulations of notions ascribed to one sender. An issue that merits attention, given such approach, seems also the matter of potential ways, principles and signals of their modular hierarchisation. And last but not least, a question emerges about the relations between stereotypical and individual (at times very peculiar) outlooks – since while some genres seem vulnerable to all kinds of transposition, subversions and transgressions, others function almost exclusively as reproducers of codified perspectives. The themes mentioned here may not exhaust the repertoire of issues related to applications of visual metaphores, but they probably create enough comprehensive a list to give proof of fertility of similar investigations, and at the same time varied enough to find its place among the presently universally postulated model of dynamic and multidimensional typology of discourse.

Detailed threads evoked here briefly, most often associated in genology with the category of point of view, seem to merge into a certain broader current of research on the ways of managing indicators of individual and cultural vantages of the world in textual spaces[14]. However, one may venture a further broadening of this problem-matter through transgressing the boundaries of genre de-

[14] It would be difficult to find any wider agreement among scholars upon distribution of respective 'visual' categories and thus all these notions are being used in many different ways. We might risk however very approximate distinction of main tendencies – such concepts as *point of view* and *perspective* are usually connected with cognitive competence and communicative credibility, categories of *focus* and *focalisation* often refer to mobility of sensual perception and its consequences for attention management, and finally – an idea of *vantage* has been used to define complex network of mobile coordinates enabling construction of diverse conceptualisations (such interpretation and employment of thiscategory might be found e.g. in works of R. E. MacLaury (e.g. *Vantage Theory* in: *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, J. R. Taylor, R. E. MacLaury (eds.), Berlin – New York: Mouton de Gruyter 1995).

scription as a configuration of various perspectives and undertaking reflection on the possibility of holistic approach to cognitive tinges of the message – there are several scholars who hope to go beyond limitations of poststructuralist scepticism by focusing on "the idea of cognitive framework underlying the categories that enable genre formation"[15]. Hence, I would like to express a supposition according to which particular conventions not only evoke or allow various points of view, but also are connected themselves with fixed ways of perceiving reality. Given this approach, genre would not only be a schema that determines which points of view might appear in a given group of texts, but it would itself constitute a distinctive kind of conceptualisation, delimited by a relatively stable spectrum of typical topics, forms and values. Identity of a given pattern would be in that case decided primarily by such factors as reference to selected fields of reality and their corresponding methods of schematisation, connection with fixed repertoires of cultural connotations and saturation with modal exponents of the assessment attitude of the sender to embraced content. Thus it can be clearly seen that this approach is situated in the field of impact of research on the literary subject, although treating genres as tools of world vantages demands to a certain extent transcending traditional dualisms, lead-

[15] F. E. Hart, *Embodied Literature: A Cognitive-Poststructuralist Approach to Genre*, in: *The Work of Fiction: Cognition, Culture and Complexity*, A. Richardson, E. Spolsky (eds.), Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2004, p. 89.

ing to merging the description of addresser manifestations with the characteristics of object domains.

On this occasion, it is worth mentioning that, in such understanding of genology, some threads recur that were present already in Michail Bachtin's thought, whose works (especially his dissertation of genres of speech, but partly also monographs devoted to novel) heavily emphasized the subject-related dimension of communication, underlining at the same time the cognitive values and axiological tinges of genre forms. What cognitivists and Bachtin's thought have in common is also the fascination with integity of form, its "hermeneutic function", i.e. its ability to evoke holistic signigicance, affect "the recovery of implicatures" and build global coherence [16]. Genre, determined by a particular mode of perception of the world, creates in their approach a certain figurative whole, a specific *Gestalt* of experience, recognisable owing to reference – through analogy – to similar communication events, which does not lend itself to reducing to the sum of elements merged in the textual structure[17]. It seems that such holistic approach, granting cognitive factors not only co-participation, but maybe even priority in determining generic affinity of a statement, could – at least in some cases – render genological structures more consistent, replacing enumerative lists of arbitrary norms with integrated approaches, which would vest isolated morphological traits with

[16] Ch. Unger, *Genre, Relevance and Global Coherence. The Pragmatics of Discourse Type*, Palgrave MacMillan 2006, p. 253.

[17] In spite of revolutionary rhetorics of cognitive poetics, we may easily find several antecendencies of its main approaches – one of them would be obviously German school of *gestaltism* in psychology, emphasizing holistic nature of human mind as a complex entity organizing incoming stimuli with the principles of parallelism and analogy. The earlier references to *Gestalt* psychology in genre theory with subsequent dilemmas and perplexities have been briefly discussed long time ago in: P. Hernadi, *Beyond Genre. New Directions in Literary Classification*, Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press 1972, pp. 4–7.

semantic motivation in the scope of complex network of cognitive-linguistic links.

If we referred, for the sake of illustration, to three most popular forms of non-fiction prose, each of them could be characterised in a makeshift manner through an approximate reconstruction of their corresponding points of view. Thus, e.g. identity of *reportage*, traditionally defined as an account of real events, is clearly connected with a specific way of embracing reality, conditioned by a tacit acceptance of the entire set of typified cognitive assumptions, among which one could indicate, among others, non-critical assumption of speech referentiality, recognition of stability of the notion of "fact", primacy given to phenomenalism of perception and to personal experience, respect for habitual chronology as a measure of time or reference to explanatory authority of stereotypical categorisations[18]. *Reportage* would therefore come as an account from the perspective of someone who – assuming the primacy of empirical objectiveness and "event-related" concept of existence – mainly perceives changes happening in social space, and who attempts to convey to others the truth about the course of these changes, treating the measures of reasonable thinking as an inevitable medium of agreement. One could guess that even a text that included an account of real events, but which questioned at the same time the possibility of adequate representation, disturbed the consistency of narration with a metatextual comment, revealed metaphysical senses of every fact and ironically deconstructed evoked conventions, would have little chance of being categorised as literature of fact.

Going further, we might assume that at the foundations of *feuilleton* there is the understanding of the world as a space of agonic, but not entirely serious interpersonal game, and also perception of the reading audience as a specific conversational commu-

[18] For somewhat different view on diversity of perspectives applied in reportage see A. Mikołajczuk, *Punkt(y) widzenia w reportażu. Od etymologii do tworzywa gatunku*, in: *Punkt widzenia w tekście i dyskursie...*

nity, feeding on current controversies and having a penchant for intertextual plays, whereas *essay* preserves reflectional outlook on the world from the position of the subject focused on constant pursuit of changeable, pulsating sense and always trying to determine ever-escaping identity anew[19]. Each of these "genre" perspectives is based on different anthropological assumptions and each of them stimulates a different kind of attention, locating accents in a different manner e.g. between the current character of events and long lasting of history, or between the space of public discourse and enclaves of intimate contemplation. Moreover, each entails granting a privilege to specific linguistic means, bringing us closer to complex perception of convention, whereas sheer formal criteria, isolated from their semantic motivations, seem insufficient for constituting full reconstruction. For neither the sheer stylistic-compositional syncretism will change a dry commentary into a feuilleton, as long as it's not correlated with author's temperament and equipped with polemical values, nor a stylistically refined sketch, merging the precision of analysis with vibrance of metaphors, will become an essay if it remains an authoritative presentation of peremptory theses and definitive settlements. Above all, with the formalising, inventorying approach to generic characteristics, we lose the possibility of grasping potential correlations between particular dimensions of text, since the same morphological traits can appear in a plethora of configurations.

Connecting the same traits with semantic priorities, including, among others, the category of the dominant point of view, seems in turn to open significantly more promising perspectives. A cer-

[19] Due to historical and cultural variety of generic repertoires all these genres can be treated in a different way within given communities (sometimes they are even not being recognized as separate entities). The concepts and patterns of *reportage, feuilleton* and *essay* in Polish journalist writing has been strongly influenced mainly by French tradition and that's also a perspective that I am applying in this paper.

tain formal simplicity – i.e. stylistic moderation and compositional traditionalism – of the reportage, and even a specific reluctance of its authors to verbal eccentricity, seems a well motivated concern about the possibility of shifting the receiver's attention form the object of the account, fear of risk of veiling events (considered in this convention as "hard" real) through cultural mediatisation. Both cautiousness in selection of linguistic means and frequent resort to chronological composition serve here the purpose of rhetorical authentication of the account with documentary aspirations and focus management on multiple tensions stemming from the sheer course of action, with a simultaneous marginalisation of dilemmas resulting from the problematic character of the medium of language. In turn, assuming the conversational-agonic approach to communication in feuilleton explains both the penchant for grotesque approach and ostentatious intertextuality, stylistic profligacy and compositional unpredictability, since all these properties are favourable for demonstrating language mastery, multilateral erudition and brilliance of associations, proving to be an effective tool of self-creation. And finally, discursive strategy of essay – based on interweaving notion argumentation, anecdotical exempla, metaphorical insights and autobiographical confessions – may be interpreted as a textual equivalent of subjectivisation of thinking, free of rigor of institutionalised disciplines, whereas fragmentary composition of this reasoning has often been considered as a formal correlate of cognitive assumptions of the elusive object, openness of the subject, processual character of cognition and relativity of knowledge.

What is important, though – these links stop at the level of preferences, dominants or optimal conditions, adapted to the needs of changeable contexts and modified by author's strategies, never acquiring the form of mechanical determinants. In the given situation, in reference to the particular subject, in works of a particular writer – in all these cases there is a possibility of reader's acceptance,

e.g. for a reportage experimenting with conventions, feuilleton emanating formal rigidity or an essay restrained by methodological restrictions, although the reading of such untypical solutions usually refers to a supposed mediatisation, basing recognition of generic affinity on a hypothesis of indirect reference to model realisations and anticipation of the supposed direction of strategic modification of the pattern. If we therefore treat genres as typified forms of vantage of reality, and texts – as their sign preservation forms, we have to admit that acts of verbalisation are usually accompanied by decision-making tensions, since it is not possible to definitely correlate specific forms and perspectives, but at the same time we may look for certain regularities, because most genre fields witness a tendency to favour specific language structures. Let us add that although the featured links came here in a nutshell, it is easy to imagine more detailed and multilateral characteristics, which – apart from other values – could tempt us with heuristic usefulness in the didactic context.

Methodological consequences of the discussed approach are not limited, though, to enriching genology by the dimension of consideration of variety of textual points of view and complexity of cognitive shaping of discourse, nor to accepting the postulate of searching for holistic model of perception and explaining generic characteristics. Because considering genre as a specific figure of reading also entails revaluation of the manner of perception of relations between text and genre, leading to a certain destabilisation of categorial affinities. On the grounds of the concept of language dominating in cognitivism – and briefly described above – it is proved, therefore, that all genre marks lose their status of substantial, objectively verifiable properties of statements, owing their stability to code guarantees, and start being perceived as dynamic identifications, always conducted in reference to certain needs and inevitably preserving their interpretative charactern (traditional approaches sometimes have been even criticized by cognitivist op-

ponents for their tendency "to reify genre into a thing"[20].

Whereas sheer recognition of form and tackling suggestions stemming from its use was indeed treated as a task for the receiver already in communicative versions of structuralism, the discrepancy results from a different determination of the set of references of these attributions – while for structuralists it was a set of abstract, a priori relations established by the system of language and literary codes built on it (with such interpretation genre gained substantiality and durability for the price of hypostatic abstraction), in cognitivism the chief principle is subordination based on the category of iconicity, which refers to trains of analogies forming layers of experience. As a result of such shift, genre models are practically associated with the multitude of their representations, which subjects their form to constant modification and fluctuations. If however "figures are perceptive memories"[21], and forms are recognised not in relation to a hypothetical system, deposited in the supposed collective consciousness, but owing to similarity to a range of accidentally encountered artefacts, this every time understanding of genre has a perspective character, dependent on subjective (although corrected in social interactions) "perceptive memories" of a given subject.

In this view, what may seem natural is e.g. such set of circumstances, where different receivers – be it as a result of being situated in different communicative contexts or because of being enrooted in dissimilar cultural traditions – conduct divergent conceptualisations and competing generic identifications as regards to substantially identical inscription. Moreover, even such a situation becomes clear where upon changing perception parameters, one reader will recognise distinct, genre-varied texts in the same sequence of signs.

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20 F. E. Hart, *Embodied Literature...*, p. 90.

21 S. Lash, *Discourse or Figure? Postmodernism as a „Regime of Signification"*, in: *Sociology of Postmodernism*, London – New York: Routledge 1991, p. 178.

It can be illustrated in a simple way with a reference to an example from the border of literature and press genres – slightly randomly chosen text by Jerzy Pilch *Bułka mało słona* was published in the collection of his feuilletons[22], which has a decisive impact on the selection of a certain interpretation frame, formally, however, it assumes the form of a first person narration of events observed in the streets of Warsaw, therefore it is easy to imagine its reading – after a shift to other fields of discourse – e.g. as a literary short story, sketch story or a piece of autobiographical account. Obviously, with each of these identifications (which – as cognitivists claim always have the character of approximation, never reaching the level of full identicalness) the same inscription is included into a different series of textual analogies, and therefore – profiled differently through different border marking between what we unearth as a figure and what we leave in the background (with feuilleton, story may turn out to be a commentary in disguise, and persons entangled in the train of presented events become exemplary specimens of social moods and attitudes; in the narrative – "smart lady with a bag", described in detail, will become the protagonist of the anecdote, participants of a big public manifestation will be treated as "accompanying" stunts; in the autobiographical – narrator is promoted from the role of communicative medium to the position of chief protagonist, whereas other characters will play puppet roles, helpful in adding drama to author's *solliloqium*).

It stems form this that in the evoked concept, genre identity – constituting a specific figure of reading and associated with specific types of world vantage – does not lend itself to being inferred through induction from the multitude of objective morphological traits, remaining rather a singular communicative filter and preserving the ability to reinterpret meaning of these traits. Profiling through design of iconic references is, in turn, supported in such

[22] J. Pilch, *Bułka mało słona*, in: *Upadek człowieka pod Dworcem Centralnym*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 2002, pp. 60–65.

process by the mechanism of the so-called pregnancy (i.e. closing fragmentarised figures, adding the missing links in each understanding, or a narrative termination of descriptions of disrupted situations), explained earlier with psychology of figure, and present also in the thought of cognitivists, treating reception – both on the level of perception and reading – not in the categories of mechanical imaging, but as a creative process stimulated by encountered stimuli, however, based on cooperation of manifold cognitive powers (including volitional, emotive or imaginative mechanisms). It does not mean, though, that a given arrangement of signs is an empty screen, onto which changeable projections are thrown, generated in the framework of arbitrarily selected mental schemata (as it seems e.g. on the grounds of pragmatism, in some interpretations of provocative concepts of Stanley Fish), since accepting the principle of marking by similarity assumes, however – despite suspending the criterion of objectivity – basing fractional identifications on real (although makeshift, approximate and split) links, demanding to test estimate boundaries of category flexibility, through confronting it with the body of interpreted text[23]. It might be said therefore, referring to Wittgenstein's notion of "seeing-as"[24], that alongside transpositions of particular elements, vested with various semantic roles, metamorphoses can operate also on the sheer text, perceived – depending on the assumed perspective – as an ironic commentary, episodic tale or personal documentary, yet referring subsequent transfigurations to a fixed sequence of signs.

I should not like, however, the above presented overview, maintained in the tone of kind, but cautious interest, to give an impression of an enthusiastic paean in the honour of cognitivist

[23] *Kognitywistyka. Podobieństwo*, H. Kardela, Z. Muszyński, M. Rajewski (eds.), Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 2006.

[24] Z. Muszyński, *„Widzenie jako" jako metareprezentacja i podobieństwo*, *Ibidem*.

methodology or programme manifesto, decreeing transformation of genology into a science of textual points of view. I would be inclined to treat categories of narrative perspectives, cognition schemata, focalization, image framing, completing *gestalts*, dynamics of vantage, etc. as tools that enable enrichment – or at least gaining a certain orientation – of the prior instrumentarium of literary studies, but I am remote from discerning within them notions that form the foundation of the present holistic research paradigm. Revolutionary declarations of some representatives of cognitivism seem in this respect very far-fetched, and sometimes expressed hopes for establishing an entirely new model of the scientific – with all due respect to the oeuvre of this orientation – are at least untimely (let us merely recall that the sheer concept of language, forming the basis of other problematisations, is often subject to criticism from the perspective of various linguistic stances). I would link the main benefit stemming from the promotion of "perceptive" issue, rehabilitation of anthropomimetic thinking and popularising cognitivist research strategies, not with spectacular theoretical projects nor with faithful applications of specific notions or procedures (which may be testified by – in my opinion – e.g. half-success of projects of typologisation based on the concept of prototype), but rather with the impact of more temporary, often quite loose and indirect inspirations, unrestrained by methodological orthodoxy. In the above study I attempted to outline several examples of such – not exactly impressive but interesting for genologist – shifts, which are consequences of assuming figurative interpretation of genre, and lead to increased sensitivity to variety of perspectives in discourse, focusing attention on holistic explanations, dynamic grasp of relations text-genre, and last but not least granting a privilege to the category of iconicity.

However, it's worth to remember that – in spite of cognitivists' inclination towards a special kind of nautralism and nativism – an eye capturing similarity (even in sensual perception) is never pure

and innocent, being strongly shaped by the local – historical, social, cutural – circumstances, as such recognition is based on the process of "undertaking certain motifs already existing in intersubjective field of common actions, perceptions, meanings and attributing them to the similar, but previously unnoticed senses"[25]. Thus, it seems that studies on literary perspectivism, points of view or diversity of vantages – if they are to remain of any value - should exceed limits of purely cognitive (psychological and linguistic) approach and more willingly apply inspirations (ideas, concepts, methods, strategies) incoming from various trends and tendencies within pragmatic poetics, new historicism, discorse analysis or cultural studies.

Перемены, которые наблюдаются в литературоведческих исследованиях, связаны прежде всего с переходом от структуралистских методов к интерпретациям антропологического, когнитивистского или прагматического толка, оказывают также существенное влияние на современную генологию (жанроведение), заставляя исследователей по-новому описывать жанровые правила. Настоящая статья вписывается в это направление, предпринимая попытку проанализировать пригодность понятия "точка зрения" в качестве основания текстовой типологии.

В рамках постановки данной проблемы, автор пытается определить предпосылки, условия, формы и последствия применения обсуждаемой категории в литературоведческих и текстологических исследованиях (причем использование категории точки зрения в итоге приводит к определению жанра как особой "фигуры" чтения). При этом учитываются разные позиции, занимаемые избранными методологическими направлениями по отношению к анализируемой проблематике. В свете нашего очерка, важное значение смежных вопросов "перспективы", "осмотра", "точки зрения" отмечается в первую очередь различными подходами из круга когнитивизма.

[25] A. Pawelec, *Podobieństwo w języku. Wybrane problemy*, *Ibidem*, pp. 68–69.

В дальнейшем познавательная продуктивность вышеуказанных категорий обусловлена, однако, выдвигаемым автором требованием предпринять усилия ради устранения некоторых ограничений данной теории.

IVAN MLADENOV

CONCEPTUALIZING VISION. A PRAGMATIC VIEW

Conceptualizing is developed as a method of revealing, sorting and representing the meaning that is undisclosed in the old philosophical metaphors and in the symbolizations we make in everyday life. The study rests on the understanding that in the nucleus of the metaphors lie concepts, or stored meaning able to represent itself anew or, to give birth to further theories. *Conceptualizing* works as an apparatus made of three macro-elements. Conceptualizing as *technique* represents, points or hints at the hidden meaning. It does this with the help of the *seeking Self*, which refers to and actively evokes this *sleeping meaning*. Finally, the layer from which the meaning is dug up is called by Charles Peirce *effete mind*. I use this notion in a much broader and modified sense. An undivided part of any sign is its iconic nature. To recover meaning from the sign, the iconicity needs to be conceptualised.

Conceptualizing as a method

We conceptualize the world of ideas in order to orient ourselves in it. But even at the most elementary level we still conceptualize. Any coordinated movement of our bodies means that a lightning-fast concept has been created and we act according to this short scheme that we

have received from the mind. We conceptualize the symbols and the signs we constantly perceive, which mean that we are permanently decoding and de-ciphering the realm of signs coming towards us. Most often those signs are structured in the form of metaphors. That is, we try to make a successful leap between the two distant elements out of which each metaphor consists. The traditional view of the metaphor did not change too much from the ancient times: a distant comparison between two elements, where "as if" is missing.

Conceptualizing metaphors can take place at each moment of our everyday life. It is involved in every instance of behavior or thinking. Just as there is no such a thing as an interpretation "for itself", there is no concept or term that can fully exhaust its object. To understand the significance of a sign means to grasp it in regard to an aspect – that of its meaning. The method of conceptualizing metaphors considers the inexhaustibility of sign as the most important one. Even the simplest sign, say a *qualisign*, is virtually inexhaustible by any interpretation, because each interpretation represents only one possible approach to its relevance. Even the simplest of signs needs to be conceptualized in order to act upon the sensations. What we actually do, when we think is following the footsteps of sign-building with coded instructions for acting. Any sign contains traces of its creation i.e., it represents an outcome of something that resembles the device of metaphor. There is something general in every sign, which makes possible its reading/understanding. Most often, this is its iconic or, conventional component. By conceptualizing a sign-system, for example, a metaphor, we do not attain the same results each time we approach it.

Attaining Meaning

Everywhere around us is a thick layer of thought-clichés, of exhausted minds, of things that are thought and re-thought thousand times before they have calmly settled down and turn into genetic

memory of dead or frozen meaning. Perhaps this is what Peirce calls *effete mind*, something, which we may call today *aggregates of memes*. On the other hand, the way our knowledge develops and grows is by surprise, by unexpected deviation from the path of the old layer. It is like a gramophone needle that suddenly vaults over to a wrong groove of the record while the listener discovers a harmony unheard before.

Let us take an example. Chess has been played since the sixth century AD, when it was invented in India. Almost all kinds of variants were re-played, especially the debuts. But the *end spiel* differs so much that the specialists assert there are hardly to find two absolutely equal finals. The best players know that the supremacy of one player over the other lies in the patience to wait for the only move, which decides the game, the more surprising – the better. But the rules of the game did not change – they are strictly defined. So, how a surprise occurs at all? All moves are fixed, although the situations differ. Paradoxically, the surprise can only be found in what was forgotten, in other words – in the past. Something that is known but slipped out of the mind in the very moment the player needs it. Let's recall here the famous dialogue of Socrates with Meno, when Socrates explained a mathematical theorem: "I told you, Meno ... I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection..." (In: Deely, John: 2001, pp. 44–52). Then Socrates proceeded as if meno already knows what he is now learning and realizes that he seem to always knew it.

To explain further the method of conceptualization let's take another example from the reverse side. There are plenty of semioticians, who like Peirce's statement that "man is a sign". Never mind how this sounds but the entire meaning of Peirce's thought is lost here. A widened citation would reveal the depth of his thought.

> This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation

> both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign.
> (CP 5.283).

This is the case whereby we enjoy the meaning not as condensed into a conclusion *but as it unfolds towards the process of its own creation.*

Locke's Triadic Fault and Saussure's Fault Triads

The main question of thinking process is *how is meaning possible*? A lot of ambiguity in the approaches for outlining meaning could be cleared up by showing not how, but *where meaning arises* according to some of them. Among the chief predecessors of the contemporary semiotics is John Locke, so let's first take a look at his understanding of sign and meaning. His is one of the first attempts for outlining a clearly non-dyadic model. He strangely failed, although reading his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* one has the impression that it is the triadic thinking Locke favors. (See Fig.1)




Fig.1. Where Meaning Arises According to John Locke

Locke's fall into idiosyncrasy is unnoticeable at first reading, rather the opposite looks true. But following the logic of his claims, the reader will surprisingly discover the failed experiment of him to grasp the *dynamics* of the triadic thinking. This can be said in another way: if the reader follows Locke's ratiocinations, he will think that they represent a true triadic understanding. If the reader proceeds to imagine the logic of relations among them, the triadic character vanishes. The reason for this might be the early use of *sign* by Locke, not yet as a mark of transition, but rather as an *idea*. Only with Peirce the stress will be put on the transformability of sign into another sign and thus, the explanation of the triadic character of communication will be implemented. Locke still sees the sign statically.

In *Book Three, Chapter Two*, of his famous *Essay*, he obviously sees words as signs of ideas, but further it becomes even clearer that for him signs "self-evidently signify ideas", and that the same is true for words: "Words by use readily excite ideas" (Locke, 1964: §6, p. 261). It seems that for Locke these are two different processes. This is to say that both, words and signs *separately* have the capacity to *directly* evoke ideas, which is the same as to say that words are different, though, having similar functions with signs. The trouble begins when to both has been granted status of evenly able to participate into communication process.

> *Words often secretly referred, First to the ideas in other Men's Minds.* But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.
>
> (Locke, 1964: §4, p. 260).

The next sentence "properly and immediately" shows that he has in mind a triadic signification, but then suddenly – adds that words *immediately* referred to the outside objects. Here it is: „*First,*

they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas" (Locke, 1964: §4 p. 261). And in the next paragraph: "*Secondly, (they referred) to the Reality of Things*" (Locke, 1964: §5 p. 261). While the first sentence confirms the mediated character of signification, the second one casts doubts whether he meant by this a single process. To be completely precise, we have to say that Locke uses "often" here, thus the correct quote is: "they often suppose *the words to stand also for the reality of things*" (Locke, 1964: §5 p. 261). Locke does not conceive those two routes working simultaneously, as two phases of one process, resuming in something third (an interpretant) as it is in Peirce. However, Locke allows that there is something *uncontrollable* in this double-reference (to the ideas and to the things), something, which comes up involuntarily in any act of signification, a kind of a left-over meaning.

> But this relating more particularly (...) though give me leave here to say that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds.
>
> (Locke, 1964: §5 p. 261).

Such supposition appears by all philosophers who touch upon meaning, from Hegel to Adorno. It shows that the philosophers are aware of the inexhaustibility of meaning in the process of communication.

Locke virtually reaches a triadic understanding of the signification, but did not model it dynamically as a single process. He might have envisaged such an understanding but he couldn't give it a shape that one can found later in Peirce. In other words, he might've been aware of the triadic nature of signification, but he was inconsistent in following this conception.

Instead of calling this a triadic model, for the sake of accuracy, one might call it a concatenation of two dyadic models. In oth-

er words, Locke speaks of two dyadic relations: the one "word - signs – ideas", and the other, "words – ideas – things", making altogether a relationship of two dyads. "Things" cannot be directly referred by words, but are mediated by ideas. Thus they turn into signs too. Locke is pretty modern in grasping both sign and idea as concepts. What is missing is the next step – allowing *things* in the communication act be considered as concepts too and conceiving them as mediated by signs. Stopping before this last step freezes Locke's scheme as static, for example, the word *fire* would have evoked the idea (or the sign) of *fire* in consciousness, but in the sense that *the fire exists*. What we actually receive in our minds by hearing the word *fire* is a unite of a sign and a concept of it. Had he made the considered step, would have made him pretty contemporary; while seeing the concepts of things *in action*, would have made him a pragmatist. Stopping where he reached had left him in the course of the philosophy of ideas. However, he is pretty modern in his conceptions and stays closest to Peirce's understanding of signification.

The Deconceptualized World

As radically opposed to this line of potentially but not entirely triadic thinking, we will explore the contemporary structuralism and see if it corresponds to other logical doctrines. Then we'll try to see how those theories explain the emerging of meaning and valid judgments. This brief overview will be pronounced successful if it matches today's unquestionable conclusions about social-mind constitutive facts of meaning. In this article we can only dot some of the main theories of how thought is taking shape from the effete mass of consciousness.

As it is known structuralism emerged as a twentieth-century approach in various social scientific disciplines under the auspices of the "human sciences" that promised to put them on a solid scientific

basis. The origin and model of structuralism was Ferdinand de Saussure's work in linguistics. It should be stressed that Saussure's historical source is the famous school from the 17 century of Port-Royal. The monks there taught that science and knowledge are not a final goal, but a means; they should open and develop the mind, and raise it above the matter of teaching. In teaching they adopted an openly Cartesian and rationalistic method by a constant appeal to personal reflection. Saussure's approach was later adapted in anthropology by Lévi-Strauss, in psychoanalysis by Lacan, and in literary theory by Barthes. The core of structuralism was the treatment of distinctively human domains as formal structures in which meanings were constituted not by conscious subjects but by relations among the elements of a formal system. Let us see more closely what this claim means. We might be surprised as always happens, when we re-read the originals, not the comments. In "*The Linguistic Sign*", from Saussure's most celebrated text *Course in General Linguistics*, he says:

> If we could embrace the sum of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals, we could identify the social bond that constitutes language. It is a store house filled by the members of a given community through their active use of speaking, a grammatical system that has a potential existence in each brain, or, more specifically, in the brains of a group of individuals. For language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity.
>
> (Saussure, Ferdinand de, in: Semiotics, 1985, 33).

We need to remember the expression "word-images stored in the minds of all individuals". This metaphor is, according to Saussure, what constitutes the social link of language. The stored word-images are *passively waiting* to produce meaning. In the next few words though seems that Saussure rejects entirely the quality *passive* of his metaphor by stressing its opposite, the *active*. He speaks of "a store house filled by the members of a given community *through*

their active use of speaking. Then, suddenly, he makes a new turn by deepening the characteristic *passive*. The "store house" is "a grammatical system that has a potential existence in each brain".

Let us leave now the strict semantic analysis and see what *passivity* is in a broad philosophical sense? It is *past*; something which can be stimulated as a result of certain activity. It is commonly characterized through a *potentiality*. In fact, Saussure mentions potentiality in his next words: "potential existence in each brain". We have thus far a metaphor on word-images stored in a house, where they could be evoked to produce meaning by an "active use of speaking of the individuals". In other words, we have a scrupulous account of the elements of the communication act. What is still missing in this model is a trigger or, a mechanism which can set in movement the entire "machinery". To find this clue, we may take a look at the following scheme (see Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Where Meaning Arises According to Ferdinand de Saussure

We see that for Saussure signs signify through differential opposition. In the very strict system of language, we can have a meaning of a sign, if we only know another meaning of another sign. In the very strict sense this might be true. It would mean though that

we only have at our disposal a kind of secret language, spoken by knower. It will be similar to Esperanto or to a cipher where something means if only something else does. Yet, does an object produce its own meaning? What makes it unique among other similar objects? Are there momentum operations of comparisons flowing in our minds each time we determine diverse phenomena? How do we distinguish between different kinds of water, or fire, for example? By lightning-fast comparisons only? Are we humans, devoid of any creativeness? Do we compare but never compose?

We need an even closer look at Saussure's words. The "word-images in the store house" is a *living past*. It is ready to produce meaning by a trigger. Such trigger, according to Saussure is the "active use of speaking of the individuals". We can widen his claim by naming it "social groups searching for identification ground, common to the entire society". Yet the stored word-images need first to be recognized, revived, and set in movement. All this cannot be done by putting them in oppositions only. In other words, they have to be conceptualized, ordered in working schemes, interpreted, and animated. However, to shape the past we still need to know its formulae for self-organization. We must find out what gives "arrangement and definite form" of the past. That is why Saussure speaks of the linguistic unit as a double entity, one formed by the association of two terms. He further stresses: "not by a thing and a name, but by a concept and a sound-image" (op. cit. p.36).

This "double entity" is the missing step in Locke's thought. However, there is still something absent. The definition he gives for the concept/signified is insufficient. He says that it is "generally more abstract" than the sound-image. Nevertheless he explicitly claims that the communication act represents a circuit, where there is an active and a passive part: "everything that goes from the associative center of the speaker to the ear of the listener is active, and everything that goes from the ear of the listener to his associative center is passive" (op. cit. p.32). Furthermore, he develops his argument: "in separating

language from speaking we are at the same time separating (1) what is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental (op.cit. p.33). Never mind the stipulations, his understanding of the *concept* sees it as passive; it does not include processuality of any kind. Even though, it would be correct to say that there is a strong hint in his work at a more developed, future theory of conceptualization.

Meaning as Past

We are still in search for a working conception of *where* is meaning usually been born. We may try the writings of another, quite different than Saussure, thinker who worked in the same course of thoughts, Charles S. Peirce. One of the sharpest differential characteristic of Peirce's theory to any other is his claim that what we can know is not an object, but *the effects* this object exhibits. These effects are the signs. Strangely enough, objects are signs as well. For the sake of clarity, we have to add – in the communication act only, but what other act of understanding we know? Moreover, we cannot grasp signs outside their relations to other signs. Even though we cannot claim that we "know" a sign, but we *re*-cognize it each time it exhibits its effects for us. We name it and it slips out of our mind, that is, it becomes partially unknown. *Partially* is important word because another *part* of any sign, even the simplest one, according to Peirce, possesses *a seed* of generality, which makes the communication act possible. It is true that whoever pronounces (or, sees, reads etc.) the word "apple" is having in his/her mind a particular object, intimately known to his/her mind only; at the same time we all know what "apple" means if we share the same language competence. A divine sigh of generality in any sign cares about that. Still, where does meaning, that is common to more than one individual, arise? Let's take a look at the following scheme of emerging meaning, according to Peirce. (See Fig. 3).

Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839–1914)




Fig.3. Where Meaning Arises According to Peirce

In this scheme we see that for Peirce meaning does not arise from anywhere, it grows, changes, and develops. In fact, gaining more meaning is for him the core characteristic of human thinking. Unlimited semiosis, endless interpretation, and the growth of thought are synonyms. But what happens to thoughts once they were born? In the process of growing and justification they are tending to "habit-taking-tendencies". Still, after a while they turn into habits. They spread throughout the Universe and make it thinkable. The ideas perfuse the world with live concepts that slowly fade away, but they never really die. A phenomenon once thought, becomes branded by this thought forever. The thought of it turns into a kind of exhausted mind, or, in Peirce's words – into *effete mind*.

> The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. But before this can be ac-

> cepted it must show itself capable of explaining the tri-dimensionality of space, the laws of motion, and the general characteristics of the universe, with mathematical clearness and precision; for no less should be demanded of every philosophy.
>
> (CP 6. 25).

We are now ready to conceptualize the elements of signs according to the outlined models of Saussure and Peirce.

In order to examine some new directions, we need to modify the question of meaning as to *where* to search for the meaning in the scheme of Saussure or, in the ones of Locke and Peirce. Does it arise between the sign, the word and the idea or, between the sign and the signifier or, between the sign and the interpretants? Let's try to demonstrate the thought-action, which we may call *natural* and the flow of the same process by an originally blind man who suddenly begins to see again. At the first moments of his recovery, suppose, after many years in blindness, the man sees like in a "Saussurean world" – he sees signs (objects) and he needs to adjust the previously known meaning (from his tactile period) to the newly learned one. What he lacks is the *conception of capacity of meaning* – he does not know that an object put differently, seen in different light, under different angle, means differently, in other words, he lacks of a clue to the outgrowth of knowledge. There are medical doctors for teaching such people of how to start seeing again. For such people those doctors use terms and expressions, like: "mental blindness", "a lack of a concept of the outside world", etc. The conclusion is the surprising finding that we are able to partially recover the sight of an originally blind man by improving his conception for the outside world. In Peirce's words this would mean to make his thoughts clearer. Or, we may learn the characteristics of thinking and thus, shorten the process of conceptualization. Never mind how it will be described, it is true that we are able to put the entire process under control and guide it.

The Patina-Meaning

What is the difference between interpretation and conceptualization? Do we need the latter as one more theoretical tool? One of our assumptions was that, while interpretation resembles more or less a reading or a free-association process that seeks meaning, conceptualizing might be defined as a flexible scientific method. In its kernel lies a search for *effeteness* that unfolds any metaphor. We can refer to the effeteness directly, or we can devise a concept to search for it at every layer from our past experience. In both cases we deal not with mental entities but with signals or stimuli, which activate the mass of sensation in consciousness. From consciousness we receive a symbolized (metaphorized, conceptualized or, visualized) response. Conceptualizing metaphors is a method of explaining, referring, or evoking meaning with the help of seeking selves from stored experience. Thus, it represents a process-model, which can provide explanations and derive meaning, but above all, which is applicable to diverse situations of decoding symbols from our everyday life.

In this respect, conceptualizing stands for a search of an inactive, effete mind that gives rise to any metaphor. *The effete mind provides patterns for acting.* To bring to mind these patterns requires another active element, and this is the *seeking Self.* In general, here we are outlining a *process model* of thinking, which shows how knowledge grows. It rests on the fundamental claim that we learn something new by making clearer something that is already known. The same is valid for the way we approach the Other. If we do not look deeper into our own consciousness, we cannot know the consciousness of the Other.

We can express the same hypothesis from a linguistic perspective. At the surface of language flows a stream of thought-clichés, which after some time moves to a lower layer of language, and after still more, *hardens* into a linguistic structure that is similar to a mould of frozen metaphors. The most successful metaphors need

to touch this floor of "patina-meaning" in order to be lifted upwards, as in Peirce's famous metaphor of the bottomless lake. We cannot be sure whether Peirce thought similarly when he invented his undeveloped concept of the *effete mind*.

We can now propose a new explanation of the limitlessness of thinking and the need for its conceptualization. Any sign that signifies a segment of action from reality is inexhaustible by another sign that interprets it. This is obviously true, since an action occupies a present moment, whereas interpretation grips a past one. Action is also divided into numberless atomic segments, which were first comprehended in the past and then realized in subsequent present moments. Action and thought-action are *synechistic*[1] phenomena that mirror each other but do not overlap. This is what makes knowledge a continuous process. The mediator between these two processes is our dynamic Self, which *supervenes*[2] onto the temporal characteristics of both. By acting, we simply follow the patterns provided by the effete mind. By thinking we are saving the recognizable traces from our action by turning them into metaphors or, by conceptualizing them. We are pushed forward by the concept devised by the past. And we dream of the coming of the inexperienced future.

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[1] Tychism, Synechism, Agapism – the tree phases, the creation of the universe passes through, according to Charles Peirce's *evolutionary cosmology*. Synechism means duration, or continuation.

[2] Supervenience: according to Donald Davidson's notion, supervenience means, that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics.

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*Conceptualizing is a method outlined in the book of Ivan Mladenov *Conceptualizing Metaphors. On Charles Peirce's Marginalia*; first published in 2006 by Routledge, London & New York.

Концептуализиране е метод за изследване, класифициране и представяне на значението, скрито в старите философски метафори и символизациите, които правим всекидневно. Изследването се основава на разбирането, че в ядрата на метафорите лежат концепции и значения, които могат да бъдат показани по новому и да породят нови теории. *Концептуализирането* работи като апарат, съставен от три макроелемента. *Концептуализирането* като *техника* изважда на показ или подсказва как да се стигне до скритото значение. Това става с помощта на *търсещия Аз*, който активно буди *заспалите значения*. Слоят, от който значенията се извличат, е наречен от Чарлс Пърс *effete mind* (изтощен разум). Използвам тази идея в много по-широк и променен смисъл. Неделима част от всеки знак съставлява неговата иконичност. Иконичният елемент, който е общоразбираем прави възможно концептуализирането и извличането на значение от знака.

DARIN TENEV

THE THRESHOLD OF MEANING (NOTES ON LITERARY PHENOMENOLOGICAL ARCHEOLOGY)

It seems easier to write on a given author than merely to focus on a certain problem. All the easier it is to write on a chosen problem as it occurs *in* the work of a given author. If we look at the majority of the literary studies and investigations, we won't be too much surprised to see how many of them are dedicated to the study of a single author. Of course, there are studies that deal with two or three or more authors at the same time, like Shakespeare and Montaigne, T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, etc. But the principle remains in general the same. It is as if the author is still what guarantees the unity and comprehensibility of the investigated problem, and also what postulates the inducibility of a founding „logic", on the basis of which the problem is posed. By this I do not mean that all such critical texts claim that the author guarantees the concrete meaning of his works. Now in the sphere of literary studies it is almost generally accepted that in a way the author should be dead, in other words, that a certain interpretational procedure has become unavoidable. And yet the author still serves as an excuse when defining chosen problematic, she or he helps to explicate the limits of the field of research. I am not saying that it's illegitimate. What I am trying to say is that the presupposition

of the given field guaranteed by an author functions as a non-questioned evidence, as if it was obvious why we make (or have to make) the presupposition.

One can easily object that in the analysis it will become clear whether or not the presupposition was legitimate. If a homogenous „logic" underlying the investigated problem is indeed found, then obviously the choice made when choosing the author as a guarantee of the field was correct. And it is quite often the case with the investigations concerned with a given author.

In the text that follows I want to pose the question: What does this (the confirmation – in the light of the analysis – of the legitimacy of the presupposition of the author as a guarantee of the field of research) mean with regard to the literary work? By using the methodology of the phenomenological archeology, I will try to show why and following what procedures do we presuppose the author (understood in the above sense), and what this has to do with the construction of the meaning of the work.

As I said, the author could have served as a formal reason (let us say an „empty premise") to disclose the unities in his works. But at a second step, these disclosed unities only confirm the legitimacy of the premise, in a way they fill its emptiness. The analyses, in this sense, are fulfillments. Thus in a retrospective way the discourse bearing on an author and his ideas is justified. We could even say more generally that not only the notion of the author works in this way but also the notions of literary trends, schools, worldviews, etc. As I will try to show, the *retrospective justification*, or what could be called *retrospective fulfillment procedure* is in a certain sense bound to succeed. It cannot make a mistake. (What is most curious is that it works even when the analyzed work was eventually found not to be by the presupposed author.)

Now, a different reading is also possible. A reading that would insist on the disintegration of the unities, on their decomposition. This type of reading (if it could be labeled indeed a „type") is, as is

well known, usually associated with what is called deconstruction. It shows that the unities are not naturally given, that they are historical constructs, and are therefore deconstructible. All this is probably all too well known. I only want to underline the significance of this reading. It does not only mean that different unities along with the ones already accepted, could also be constructed but that the very procedure by which we construct such a unity is a rather complicated process.

How can this procedure in its most universal aspect be elucidated?

Let us introduce two terms that could help us in the elucidation.

The first one is that of *actualization*. I believe that literary works are fields of potentiality, each one a singular or rather unique (since it is not opposed in any way to multiplicity or plurality) field. The actualization of this potentiality is what happens in a usual reading. It is in the actualization that the meaning of a work is not just grasped but created, or in other words the meaning is not pre-given or pre-determined and does not precede the actualization. Critics like Roman Ingarden (1973) and Wolfgang Iser (1978) have done much to clarify the actualization.

(In fact, what is here called „actualization" is very close to Ingarden's concretization although both terms are used by him (See Ingarden 1973, Fizer 1983). Let me parenthetically explain how Ingarden defines their difference. The concretization is used in regards to the aesthetic potentialities of the work and thus has the character of an outside action towards the work, which is why it can be analyzed only in a historical perspective. Ingarden's actualization concerns only the artistic side of the work itself, it has a descriptive character and represents the work as a static construction, guaranteeing its identity. The discrimination of these two potentialities, one related to the aesthetic side, and the other to the artistic, is delusive. There could be no actualization non-related to a historical horizon, so the idea that there is an identity

of the literary work independent of all historical contexts should be abandoned. From this it follows that the potentiality of the literary work itself has to be conceived in a different way, a way that won't bind it to a static identity, or to an essence that lies there, waiting for no more than its realization by the reader. This is what I meant when I spoke of a certain non-pre-given-ness. In truth, it concerns not only the meaning but the very essence of the literary work.)

The actualization is done by the reader, it is a one-time act on his part by which he grasps the meaning of a work. The universal structure of this act is probably most well described in Wolfgang Iser's *The Act of Reading* (1978).

The second term I want to introduce is that of *idealization*. Here it is understood in the meaning Husserl gives to it in his later writings. In the field of phenomenology usually two types of idealizations are distinguished. First-order idealizations are of the type „and so on" („und so weiter" – the supposition that what has proven its validity will still be valid in the future) or „I can again and again" („Ich kann immer wieder" – the supposition that I can do again what I already did once) and they are accomplished on the level of the life-world. Then there are the second-order idealizations, which are those who made modern science possible. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* E. Husserl analyzes in detail such idealizations in Galilee's mathematizations of physics (Husserl 1970, 23–60, §9) but maybe the best descriptions are to be found in „The Origin of Geometry" where he follows the steps of mathematical idealization revealing the crucial role played by language and writing (Husserl 1989, 160–164). Yet since first-order idealizations are usually related to the natural attitude and are associated with the life-world (a reason for Husserl to name the language „a first idealization" – see Husserl 1973, 58), the idealizations we will speak about, should at the beginning be thought of as first-order idealizations.

Let us return now to our problem. I think we can schematize

in a simplified way the procedure as follows. 1. First we have the reading, or the gaze of the reader discovering the underlying (homogenous) logic by *actualizing the potentialities* of the text. 2. Secondly, we have another act, accompanying the first, which *idealizes the actualization.* This means that the reader now constitutes his own reading as an independent ideality „abstracting" it from the text. (Yet as Husserl points out in „The Origin of Geometry", the ideal objectivity created by literary language does not have the same status as the scientific ideal objectivity (Husserl 1989, 160). The ideal objects of literature are, so to speak, not ideal enough. Their ideality is due to the language used, but as objects they remain irreducibly singular.) Probably it won't be wrong if we say that *by this idealization an institution/ establishment* (Stiftung) *is accomplished that permits the actualized meaning to be sedimented* so that further actualizations can be based on it. 3. Finally, the idealizing act leads to a *retrospective justification of a former idealization* that made possible the first act of actualization. In fact, only now, retrospectively, this former idealization, preceding the actualization, can be grasped as an idealization at all. (But doesn't it mean that the very *Ur-Stiftung* is produced „backwardly" by some of the *Nach-Stiftungen*?)

Thus actually we have three acts that need not but could coincide temporally. The triple aspect introduces a particular circularity which should not mislead us. It is this circularity, not to be mistaken either with the hermeneutical, or with the vicious circle, that constitutes the background of the unities, as well as their infallible persuasiveness and legitimacy.

(Also, it won't be wrong to say that if we are not so easily mislead, it is perhaps mostly in virtue of the work done by deconstruction – though the meaning we put in this last word should be clarified.)

Let me resume. It is easier to write on an author because the author „stays there", she „is there". But that means only that we presume the „being there" of the author so that it can be justified

afterwards. This first presumption – which as yet has not the strict character of idealization since it is originally void of any content – predetermines the actualization, or at least its most general direction. Of course, if this is true, it will be true not only for the „author" but for all the empty premises. *The empty premises constitute the threshold of meaning for the literary work.* There is a sort of double bind here because, on the one hand, there will be no literary potentiality without such thresholds and, on the other, the thresholds cannot but foreclose the potentiality with the actualizations that reduce it to an essence. There cannot be a literary potentiality without a threshold for many reasons, one of which is that without the threshold of meaning as an empty premise the reader will not suspend her or his usual frames of reference and will have no understanding of literature at all. (In this sense, perhaps the very notion of literature could be seen as such an empty premise. Of course, in the case of literature this could hardly be seen because of the many *Nach-Stiftungen* that instituted conventions, etc.) But since the threshold is idealized retrospectively (this is the third stage described above), idealization veils its specific function, and thus the literary potentiality.

(A question appears therefore, a question concerning this potentiality – the singular potentiality of a literary work – and if it is at all thinkable. Is it possible for the gaze of the reader not to reduce it to his particular actualization? Is there a reading that will remain meaningful and yet will not idealize only its own stance? I can't answer these questions here, so I will only make an optimistic hint that the answer should be sought in the direction of a reading activating by incompatible actualizations, opening through the problematic possibilities the open possibility of the work.)

In the above schematization many oversimplifications were made for the clarity of the structure. For example, it is well known that real readers do not differ that much in the way they view the literary works. It can be objected therefore that the actualizations

do not depend so much on the concrete reader and the above scheme is wrong. It could be answered however that there are levels of actualizations and some of them, as we supposed, depend on others which have established idealities. The way we read Baudelaire's poems is not arbitrary; it does not depend only on the empty premise of an unknown name. Our regard is structured by some of the former institutions (*Stiftungen*). This comes down to say that there is never only one threshold of meaning. The different thresholds are often interdependent, sometimes participate in complex hierarchies, and are always subjected to a certain history. The complex of thresholds is what determines the individual regard.

Instead of conclusion, I want to pose a final question: Why do most people choose the way of actualization that presupposes the unity guaranteed by the author? Why not choose a reading that, while still being a form of concrete actualization, will stress the dissemination and the disparateness? Perhaps the answer lies in the very fact that the idealities are related to unities that not only put in order the work, but also put in order the world. (Maybe they make the world a world, of course, retrospectively.) Therefore the answers probably lies in the formula used in the beginning of this text: it is easier.

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Этот текст исходит из наблюдения, что предполагание автора или иного единства, объединяющего данное число произведений, впоследствии бывает потверждено развиваемыми на основе этого предполагания анализов, но при этой операции ретроспективного оправдания оказывается скрытым тот механизм, который обрекает ее на успешность. Феноменологическая археология литературы позволит анализировать этот механизм. Согласно предложенной здесь теории, налицо одно начальное допущение, которое позволяет *актуализацию* значения в акте чтения. Впоследствии эта актуализация будет *идеализирована*, тем самым *ретроспективно оправдывается* первоначальное допущение, которым оно само *учреждается* (во феноменологическом смысле Stiftung-а) как порог значения на подступе к произведению. Подобные пороги значения в некотором смысле парадоксальны, так как, с одной стороны, они делают вообще возможной такую вещь как литература, но, с другой, постоянно ограничают поле ее потенциальности.

ANDREY TASHEV

THE WHISPER OF THOUGHT

A Revived Thought

A few years ago the name and work of the Bulgarian philosopher Professor Ivan Sarailiev was resuscitated. Sarailiev's name had been condemned to a half-century of silence by the communist regime. Then suddenly this brilliant thinker reappeared as though out of nothingness. Ivan Mladenov, who rediscovered Ivan Sarailiev, writes about him: "*Had he written in an internationally recognised language, Professor Ivan Sarailiev would have largely been celebrated as a prodigious and eminent thinker...*" (Mladenov 2002: 282). Even a cursory glance at Sarailiev's life shows this is true.

Ivan Sarailiev was born in 1887 in Sofia. He studied in Paris, where he was a student of the famous scholar Henri Bergson. In 1909 he graduated *summa cum laude* from the Sorbonne. Sarailiev spent the following year in Oxford and London studying philosophy. There he met some well-known philosophers, among them Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, one of the prominent pragmatists in Europe. Sarailiev was in intensive correspondence with both Bergson and Schiller. Some of their letters survived and are now in Sarailiev's archive. In addition, there are also Sarailiev's diaries and other valuable documents pertaining to his life and work in the archive.

From 1916 to 1918 Sarailiev studied at the University of Ber-

lin and the University of Bern. He was one of the very few Bulgarian scholars familiar with the three main philosophical traditions: French, Anglo-Saxon, and German. While the majority of the Bulgarian philosophers after the First World War followed the German Classical tradition, Ivan Sarailiev favored the Anglo-Saxon one. He spent the year 1924 in Great Britain, followed by two years (1931–1933) in the USA as a Rockefeller grantee. He studied pragmatism extensively and met some major American philosophers such as John Dewey and William Pepperel Montague, two of Peirce's few students. Although Sarailiev wrote almost exclusively in Bulgarian, he was fluent in Greek, Latin, French, English, German and Russian.

Thirty years (1920–1950) Sarailiev taught the history of philosophy at the Sofia University. He maintained contacts with his contemporary fellow philosophers, and took part in international conferences and congresses in Europe.

Sarailiev's work includes seven books and a number of articles. He also translated *Principles of Human Knowledge* by George Berkeley into Bulgarian.

His book *Pragmatism* (Sarailiev 1938; reprinted in 2002) deserves special attention. This is a remarkable book in many respects. It is the first presentation of the pragmatic doctrine in Bulgaria and elsewhere. The book is well written and readable, consisting of essays on the greatest pragmatists, such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, Ferdinand C. S. Schiller and John Dewey. The appendix offers a survey of the history of the terms "pragmatism", "pragmatical", and "pragmaticism" and is followed by twenty pages annotated bibliography. The book includes an essay, "Charles Peirce and His Principle", in which Sarailiev quotes Peirce's *Collected Papers*. This is more than a surprise, keeping in mind the year of publication of *Pragmatism*, 1938. (The book was already finished in 1937.) The first six volumes of *Collected Papers* had just appeared from 1931 to 1935. Moreover, Sarailiev's essay was published even earlier publication in the Bulgarian journal *Uchilishten Pregled* (Sarailiev 1933). At the time when

the name and work of Charles Peirce was almost forgotten, Sarailiev appreciated the genius of Peirce's insights. Thus he was ahead of today's massive interest in the founder of pragmatism and semiotics by more than three decades.

When the communist regime took power in 1944, Sarailiev's career came to a violent halt. In June 1946 he was elected president of Sofia University, but because of his refusal to cooperate with the communist authorities, he was compelled to resign some few months later. He was then asked to teach Marxism-Leninism instead of philosophy. Again Sarailiev refused. He was saved from the labour camps thanks only to the respect, which his work commanded even among the communists. Nevertheless, he was forced to retire and was banned from further publishing. Any access to his previous publications was prohibited and his name was classified. He was doomed to oblivion. The authorities forbade his students from visiting him, but he was awarded a consolation prize: every morning in front of the doorstep of his house, he found a bunch of fresh flowers left by his students. Sarailiev died peacefully, but in total obscurity and isolation, in Sofia in 1969.

In 1956 Ivan Sarailiev wrote the paper "Philosophy in Bulgaria" at the request of the Italian Professor Michele Federico Sciacca. In the part reserved for his own work, Sarailiev defines his main contribution to Bulgarian philosophy as follows: "*... with his lectures at the University and his written works he acquaints Bulgaria with ... Bergson's philosophy and pragmatism*" (Sarailiev 2004: 103)[1], and he thereby enlarged the domain of philosophical thought in Bulgaria. In fact, he did more. We can find many pragmatic notions and Bergson's concepts in his own philosophy. Sarailiev uses some of them as a starting point of his research and he often comments, criticizes, or fulfils them. (One of Sarailiev's books is entitled *On Some Unclear Moments in Bergson's Philosophy*). He reaches the rest of them unintentionally, in his own way. This means that Sarailiev did not merely

[1] The translations from Bulgarian into English are mine.

adopt isolated ideas from pragmatism and Bergson, but their whole model of thinking. Some of his critics, such as Spiridon Kazandzhiev, limit Sarailiev's contribution to the introduction of pragmatism in Bulgaria, "*without any sharing in this doctrine*" (Kazandzhiev 2005: 113). This is too far from the truth.

Sarailiev admits that he is influenced by Bergson, especially in his first books – *General Ideas* (written in 1916, published in 1919) and *On the Will* (published in 1920, second expanded edition – 1924). Bergson's ideas are well-known in Bulgaria, so the common points between Sarailiev's philosophy and Bergsonism can be easily observed. This is not the case with pragmatism. The doctrine is almost unknown in Bulgaria and Sarailiev never claimed that he was influenced by it. However, the relationship between his ideas and pragmatism are considerable. The book *Pragmatism* is only the "visible" part of the world-view which characterizes his entire work. All Sarailiev's books, from the first one, *General Ideas* to the last published book *Socrates* (1947), as well as the late philosophical diary *Meditationes* (written in 1952–55, published in 2005), clearly show his pragmatic orientation. Ivan Sarailiev was without a doubt the first pragmatist in Eastern Europe and certainly one of its pioneers in Europe, preceded only by the group of Italian pragmatists working with the journal *Leonardo*. Charles Peirce was the founder of pragmatism and the co-founder of semiotics. So we may conclude that Sarailiev made the break-through for semiotics in Bulgaria as early as the turn of the 20th century, before Jacobson, before even Charles Morris. Although Sarailiev did not use any semiotic models in his work, he established the link between semiotics and pragmatism. Peirce scholars describe semiotics as nothing more than a terminological dress of the pragmatic doctrine.

The pragmatic tendency in Sarailiev's philosophy can be found in the model of thinking in *General Ideas*. The notions there were enriched and further developed in other books by Saraliev, such as *On the Will* and *Meditationes*. Sarailiev's permanent interest in thinking

is an important indicator for possible relations with pragmatism. Its original version is "*a method for determining the meaning of a concept*" (De Waal 2005: 6). The founder of the method, Charles S. Peirce, summarizes it in his essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) in the form of maxim: "*Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object*" (W3: 266)[2]. Sarailiev's researches provide answers to the main questions about thinking. As the following text will try to prove, these answers are entirely pragmatic.

Ideas as Signs

What is the relationship between general ideas (or concepts, as the author calls them sometimes) and thinking? According to Sarailiev we think in general ideas[3] which are the smallest, integral part of our thought.

The function of general ideas is defined as follows: „*[They] are acts of our thought which present to us a whole group of resembling objects; although general ideas are individual objects, they stands for an infinity of possible perceptions [...] They were called general, because they are related to a genus or a group of resembling objects...*" (Sarailiev 1919: 7). Sarailiev notes that „*a general idea is not identical in all minds*" (Sarailiev 1919: 122). One general idea can stands for different objects, and vice-versa, different general ideas can have one meaning. This notion stresses the necessity of interpretation in each case. It corresponds directly to Peirce's idea of an interpretant.

[2] In referring Peirce's works, I have adopted the method of reference used by all Peirce scholars. "W" means *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, followed by the number of the volume and the page. "CP" means *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, followed by the number of the volume and the paragraph.

[3] He uses the phrases "*we think general ideas*", "*we think with general ideas*", and "*we think by virtue of general ideas*" as synonyms.

It will not be surprising that Sarailiev's general idea has all characteristics of a sign according to Peirce: "*A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody or something in some respect or capacity*" (CP 2.228).

We can summarize this in the following syllogism:

We think by virtue of general ideas.
General ideas are signs.
Therefore we think with signs.

Besides general ideas, there are other acts of our thought, which represent an individual object or its image. But „*the notion of an individual object is a kind of general idea too*" (Sarailiev 1919: 13). In other words, we think with general ideas only. Thinking without signs is absolutely impossible. Peirce reaches literally the same conclusion: "*All thought ... must necessarily be in signs*" (W2: 207).

Nearly half of Sarailiev's book deals with the centuries-old prejudice that general idea is image and word. "*... there is a whisper of thought, weak, difficult to perceive [...] it can be sensed not straight but by removing the obstacles, unveiling, undraping the curtains between consciousness and the current of thought: these curtains are images and words*" (Sarailiev 1919: 81–82).

General Idea-Image. The Dynamics of Thought

Quoting many data from different scientific areas, such as psychology and philosophy, Sarailiev proves that the images in our consciousness are not a constituent part of the thinking process. Therefore, they are completely different from general ideas. "*Images are memories, which can stop thinking and break into consciousness. [...] their nature is a parasitic one, and they can even prevent thinking*" (Sarailiev 1919: 60–61). Thought is a kind of dynamic or, a movement. Images in our consciousness have just the opposite characteristics. That's why they are mutually opposite terms.

A very important concept in Sarailiev's model is that meaning doesn't grow in an isolated idea, but in the relations between ideas as signs in the current of thought: "*.... we never think* one (underlined by Ivan Sarailiev) *general idea [...] we think relations between general ideas, systems of general ideas, movement from general idea to general idea*" (Sarailiev 1919: 16–17). An idea for itself is nonsense and therefore hasn't got any meaning. The separation from the current of thought is unnatural. It is only made for research's sake. It is done only for the purpose of the research. For Sarailiev, a general idea becomes a "working" one only when it strives to other ideas. Therefore, the meaning of a given idea is not static and defined once and for all. It is different every time, depending on the surrounding general ideas. This specific view on idea as sign is analogous to Peirce's view. Peirce's logic is often called relational. As he puts it many times: „*At no one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the relation of my states of mind at different instants there is*" (W2: 227). For Peirce, the essential of a sign is its ability to relate to another sign. Otherwise, it is not a sign. This is also true for Sarailiev's general ideas.

General Idea-Word. From Doubt to Belief

The relationship between a general idea and words is more complicated. Sarailiev disagrees that we can't think without words, and even that thought and word are equal. His opinion is closer to Berkeley's, summarized in *General Ideas* as follows: "*According to Berkeley's doctrine, thought is completely different from words*" (Sarailiev 1919: 93).

Thought and word were caused by one and the same reason, which is overcoming matter and death. But thought frees a single human being from the chains of necessity and matter, since words do that with the whole society. Language is "*a result, device, and condition*" (Sarailiev 1919: 109) of social life, and it can express the

general only. Thought is the sphere of the individual. However, the development of the humanity brings thought and word together. Their influence on each other becomes so strong, that they seem to be equal. But the separation must be made, if we want to understand the whisper of thought.

"*When I think,* Sarailiev writes, *I feel a kind of vacillation ... but I see neither the vacillation, nor the terms, where the vacillation occurs*" (Sarailiev 1919: 59). The function of thought is surmounting difficulties. Therefore, one of the terms must be the initial stage, the problem, which we are faced with, and the final one – the surmounted difficulty. The galvanization between them, i.e. the action of thought, stops, when the final point is reached. The aim of thinking, then, is to lead us between these two points. The final chord is an action, caused by thought, because for Sarailiev "*psychological and even cognitive processes are never cognitive only; we know in order to act; knowledge helps action*" (Sarailiev 1919: 75). Although we are not in a position to overcome matter, we are always in a situation that provokes thinking. The action, marking the end of a thought, is a potential beginning of another thought. The process of thinking never stops. This is just a version of Peirces's notion of "unlimited semiosis".

Sarailiev makes it clear that the function of a general idea and a word is identical, but they are related respectively to the individual and to mankind. Language keeps mankind's experience and hands it down to the next generations (Sarailiev 1919: 109–110). The addition, which Sarailiev doesn't make, but which follows from his reflections, is that thought maintains the individual experience. The only way in which this can happen, is as habits, or more precisely, habits of action.

The view on thinking is identical with Peirce's conception of thought in his essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". The difference is merely terminological. Peirce calls the starting point "doubt", and the final one – "belief": „*... the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained*". "Doubt" and "belief"

mean respectively *„the starting of any question, no matter how small or how great, and the resolution of it"* (W3: 261). Peirce's conclusion about thinking is: *„... the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action"* (W3: 265). This idea becomes a basic point in many further versions of the pragmatic doctrine, such as John Dewey's instrumentalism and Ferdinand C. S. Schiller's humanism, for example.

Thinking by True Guessing

An infant doesn't perceive the world as constructed of a great number of individual objects. He sees everything as a coloured continuity or nebulosity. How will s/he see a table on this background, for example? Sarailiev's answer is: "*... s/he must be interested in the table, to have a previously formed concept about it, a hypothesis or a vague idea for its function: in a word, a general idea is necessary*" (Sarailiev 1919: 12). We throw a net of general ideas in order to "cut off" and organize the world. Sarailiev concludes that "*in a great measure* we (underlined by Ivan Sarailiev) *shape the objects*" (Sarailiev 1919: 81).

The creating of a general idea is closely connected to our interest in the object and to the future result and expectations. The only object of thinking is "thinking of/about reality". This is the common point of all versions of pragmatism. Sarailiev uses the word "benefit" in its broader meaning, as pragmatists do. In his philosophy, it includes satisfaction of intellectual and spiritual needs: "*[We seek to know the reality] in order to make our life better, but also to satisfy a primary need of our spirit, which is its curiosity*" (Sarailiev 2005: 67).

For Sarailiev, thinking is moving between two terms accomplished by the help of a general idea/hypothesis. In the book *On the Will* (Sarailiev 1924), this process is analyzed in more details and in different terms. From this point of view, *On the Will* is a continuation of *General Ideas*. In his first book Sarailiev outlines the thinking process. In the second one he shows how exactly the process is completed and how we think.

The four parts of the book consider the physical strive, attention, consideration and self-creating efforts. These different acts of human will are accomplished in the same way. Three terms participate here. One of them is the present state; the other one is the future state, which we aim at. The link between them is a hypothesis (or, according to the first book's terminology, a general idea). The hypothesis is made by memories and united by some kind of pulsation between them. The motion stops when the present and the future state are combined. The process stops when the aim is achieved. Obviously, this is the model of thinking presented in *General Ideas*, but the terms and their role in the process are defined more precisely here. The meaning of *vacillation*, which Sarailiev failed to explain in *General Ideas*, is now comprehensible.

The function of the past in Sarailiev's model is just as important as it is in the pragmatic doctrine. The hypothesis/general idea, which brings the present and future state together, is made by memories. The new knowledge is neither entirely new, nor stemming directly from the object. It is always determined by previous knowledge. In the essay „Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" Peirce comes to the same conclusion: "*No cognition not determined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist...*" (W2: 210). In his *Pragmatism* William James also underlines this characteristic of the increasing knowledge. As he puts it: "*...our knowledge grows* in spots (underlined by William James). *The spots may be large or small, but the knowledge never grows all over: some old knowledge always remains ...*" (James 1987: 559).

The interpretation of *On the Will* in the light of *General Ideas* extends the boundaries of the "thought" to the main conception in Sarailiev's philosophy. "Thinking" becomes an umbrella-term, embracing bodily movement, memory, interpretation, creating of works of art, and other human activities, analyzed in *On the Will*.

Sarailiev's hypothesis refers to Peirce's concept of abductive method. Abduction, or the method of guessing, is the basis not only

of pragmatism, but of Peirce's entire philosophy. He even combines abduction with induction and deduction. Hypothesis in Peirce's and Sarailiev's philosophy functions in the same way: it is created by past experience and is then projected forward. For Peirce, as for Sarailiev, the dynamics of thought depends on the hypothesis. It marks the beginning of any idea.

The main question about thinking is, how does meaning emerge? This paradigm moved towards more detailed questions. An example could be of how meaning is embedded in thought and in natural phenomena. Sarailiev's exploration of a similar problem presents an early attempt to place this problem in the focus of modern research.

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Настоящая статья задается целью доказать наличие ранней пирсианской модели мышления в болгарской гуманитарной науке. Мы попытались увидеть ее проявления в первых двух книгах забытого на сегодня философа профессора Иван Сарыилиева (1887–1969) – „Родовые идеи" и „О воле". Для исполнения этой цели текст концетрирован в двух направлениях: представление модели мышления Сарыилиева и ее сравнение с философией Чарльза С. Пирса.

Следуя за изложением Сарыилиева, статья раскрывает сущность мысли на нескольких этапах, в каждом из которых убирается по пласту неточных клише и предрассудков. Таким образом в конце мы достигаем шепота мысли, который согласно философии Ивана Сарыилиева оказывается мощной симфонией, наполняющей всю вселенную. Своими идеями о мышлении болгарский мыслитель ставит в фокус научного внимания проблемы, которые выступят на передний план несколькими десятилетиями позже и определят развитие современной философии.

Проведенное сравнение показывает, что любой элемент этой модели имеет свое соответствие в прагматизме Чарльза Пирса. Это дает нам основание определить Ивана Сарыилиева как одного из первых последователей Пирса и бесспорно как первого в Восточной Европе.

МИРЯНА ЯНАКИЕВА

ЗНАЧЕНИЕ ВЗГЛЯДА В КРИТИЧЕСКОМ ТВОРЧЕСТВЕ ЖАНА РУССЕ

О значении взгляда в трудах женевского ученого Жана Руссе можно говорить в двух аспектах – в тематическом и в методологическом. Первоначально, взгляд, а точнее, первый обмен взглядами персонажей в романе, центральная тема одной из его монографий. Ее заглавие «Взгляды их встретились» (*Leurs yeux se rencontrèrent*) цитата из романа Флобера «*Воспитание чувств*». В ней, на основе внушительного корпуса, около ста произведений, выделены наиболее частотные черты, которые характеризуют сцену первой встречи героев. Целью является построение из этих черт кохерентной системы, которая будет выполнять функцию нормы, чтобы установить, какие виды отклонений от нее встречаются в анализируемых примерах, и оценить значение этих отклонений.

Тема взгляда привлекает исследовательский интерес Жана Руссе еще в одном смысле, который мы открываем в его книге «*Переходы. Обмен и транспозиции*» (*Passages. Echanges et transpositions*). Обширная ее часть посвящена связи и взаимодействию между визуальным образом и текстом, между живописью и литературой или, по выражению самого автора, между чтением и смотрением (lire et regarder).

Другая форма присутствия взгляда, которую я связала с методологическим уравнем в сочинениях Руссе, выражается в его склонности к постоянному самонаблюдению. Эта склонность находит свое прямое выражение в его текстах, где часто встречаются оценки как возможностей, так и неизбежных ограничений выбранного им подхода. Самоанализ выделяется как органичная черта его научного метода. Его исследовательский взгляд направлен с одинаковой остротой и к изучению предмета, и к приложенному при его изучении инструментариуму. Хочется отметить, что Руссе часто использует оптические метафоры, когда описывает свою работу как критик. Эти особенности в его трудах создают впечатление, что он непрерывно смотрит на себя со стороны, что превращает его из автора этих трудов в их первого критика.

Постараюсь развить эти первоначальные наблюдения на основании упомянутых двух книг Руссе.

Первая из них – «*Взгляды их встретились*» – с подзаглавием: «*Сцена первого взгляда в романе*». Уточненный в нем предмет исследования указан еще один раз в самом начале введения, которое начинается следующим предложением: «Моя тема – одна **сцена**, ничего более». Минимализм этого «ничего более» привидный, потому что речь идет о сцене, которая играет ключевую роль, независимо от того обхватывает ли она несколько страниц, или несколько предложений. Она представляет собой динамичную повествовательную единицу, предназначенную входить в связь и взаимодействие с другими единицами, раждая более близкие и более далекие последствия. Именно этот потенциал сцены первого взгляда дает толчок дальнейшему ряду событий, предопределенных в сущности именно ею, и является основанием быть рассмотренным как *функция* в повествовательной логике, но так же и как основная *фигура* в романовой риторике. Постоянство, с которым эта сцена присутствует в преобладающем количестве романов, не

смотря на исторические и культурные различия, обусловленны временем и местом их создания, и позволяет Руссе говорить о наличии постоянного кода, который устойчив на культурные перерывы.

Верен своему убеждению, что «литературная теория может быть только эмпиричной» и, что «критический инструмент не должен предшествовать анализу» (цитаты из эмблематического сочинения Руссе *Forme et signification*), сперва он развертывает ряд анализов, для того чтобы, на основе достигнутых через них результатов, приступить к конструированию модели. Это будет модель одной предполагаемой нормы, от которой будут отчитаны вариации и отклонения. Анализированные сцены первых встреч, семи различных романов, окачествены исследователем как образцовые. Имена авторов достаточно хорошо говорят об историческом и культурном диапазоне избранных примеров – Хелиодор, Кретиен дьо Троа, Рабле, Руссо, Гете, Флобер, Андре Бретон. Именно эти огромные отстояния в пространстве и времени написания романов придают убедительность выделенной из этих романов системы из устойчивых градивных элементов сцены первого взгляда. Между этими элементами или их вариантами возможно большое количество различных сочетаний, в основе которых, однако, стоит одна предельно вычищенная схема, способная принять огромное количество разновидностей анализированной сцены. В упрощенном виде она выглядит так: **впечатление** (effet) – **обмен** (échange) – **преодолевание** (franchissement).

Самые частотные и типичные характеристики **впечатления** первого взгляда могут быть выражены такими словами, как: удивление, пораженность, ослепление, омаломощение, ошеломленность... Как правило, данные воздействия персонажи ощутили внезапно, но впечатление первого появления другого образа перед взглядом определенного героя романа,

является не менее глубоким и судьбоносным и в тех случаях, когда оно замедлено, приглушено или угнетенно.

Обмен обхватывает все возможные виды коммуникации между партнерами, независимо от того, явным или скрытым, прямым или косвенным, вольным или невольным является их послание. Ее знаки могут быть слишком разнообразны: взгляд, жест, мимика, положение тела, румянец на щеках, побледнение, слезы, замалчивание, потеря сознания... Вообщем, как отмечает Руссе, литературные тексты, и в особенности, сцена первой встречи в них, являются неисчерпаемым источником свидетельств о красноречии (l'éloquence) всех безмолвных посланий, которые отправляет человеческое лицо и тело.

Преодолевание или сокращение дистанции между персонажами тоже может проходить различными способами, но их многообразие все же следует систематизировать. Руссе сводит все до следующих трех вариантов: невозможное, сложное и осуществимое преодолевание.

Этапы, которые были рассмотрены до сих пор в ходе исследовательской мысли в рассматриваемом сочинении, были следующими: формулирование предварительной концепции о ключевом характере одной романовой сцены; доказательство предложенной концепции посредством наблюдения над строем и функциями данной сцены в различных образцах романового жанра; синтез достигнутых данным эмпирическим путем результатов в теоретическую модель. Следующий шаг состоит в испробовании уже сконструированной модели посредством ее соотнесения к одному конкретному романовому творчеству – *Человеческой комедии*. Выбор падает именно на нее, так как Бальзак, по словам Руссе, «более, чем автор, он и есть сам роман; он обобщает повествовательную литературу во всех ее поисках и формах.»

Анализированные сцены первой встречи в приблизительно двадцати из Бальзаковских романов, предоставляют убеди-

тельные доказательства, о функциональности моделя **впечатление – обмен – преодолевание**, а также и о его «гибкости». В одних случаях, сцена исчерпана однонаправленным воздействием одного ее участника на другого (*La vieille fille*). В других случаях внезапно почувствованной взаимности, впечатление и обмен почти совпадают во времени (*La recherche de l'Absolu*). В третьих случаях, возможно, что при встрече не осуществляется никакого обмена, но, несмотря на это, преодолевание дистанции все равно существует. В *Саразине,* например, она зачеркнута, хотя и иллюзорно, в моменты лихорадки, когда герой находится в плену своих видений.

Если правило гласит, что первая встреча должна происходить неожиданно, то Бальзак не пропустил случая отклониться и от данного правила. В его романах есть примеры, так называемого Руссе заранее подготовленного впечатления, когда один из двух участников внимательно подготавливает сцену. Тогда она превращается в заранее подготовленный капкан.

Примеры, взятые из *Человеческой комедии*, потверждают то, что впечатления от первой встречи имеют как последствия для героев их метаморфозы – после нее они уже не прежние люди.

В романах Бальзака третий элемент модели, а именно, преодолевание дистанции, является нам в самых разнообразных формах. Иногда, приближение осуществляется только посредством взгляда, иногда зрительный доступ воспрепятствован, но присутствие другого можно уловить не менее волнующими ощущениями – прикосновением к волосам, ощущением дыхания, теплотой плеча...

Короче говоря, Бальзак, как бы, ставил перед собой задачу попробовать все потенциальные возможности сцены первой встречи. Таким образом видит ситуацию Жан Руссе и так ее передает в конце данной главы своего исследования, которая посвящается *Человеческой комедии*. По его словам, творчество

Бальзака позволило ему использовать уже принятую им теоретическую модель в самом концентрированном виде и, таким образом, заранее иллюстрировать следующие систематические части своей книги.

Далее, каждой из трех составных модели посвящается по одной обширной части, которые озаглавлены «Внезапность **впечатления**», «Разновидности **обмена**» и «**Преодоление**». В рамках каждой из них, с помощью очень богатого набора литературных примеров, описаны и проанализированы различные формы проявления и функционирования соответственного элемента. Больше всего присутствуют варианты усложненного обмена: прерванный, отложенный во времени, обманный, заблокированный и др.

Самостоятельная глава посвящается и отклонениям от модели. Первая часть названа звучным заголовком *Rencontrer sans voir* (Встречать, *не видя*), и рассматривает четыре парадоксальных случая встреч без непосредственного участия взгляда: **предшествующее видение**, когда первое впечатление получено посредством нарисованного портрета; **отказанное видение**, когда лицо женщины покрыто; **скрытное видение**, когда встреча происходит ночью; **замедленное видение**, когда воздействие голоса предшествует впечатлению лица.

Последнее значение сцены первой встречи, которой посвящается заключительная глава, является, быть может, самым литературным. Оно присутствует в романах, герои которых переживают встречу таким образом, которым их предопределяют книги, которые они читали. Герои одной истории читают другую историю и узнают себя в ней. Реальная любовная встреча удвоена прочитанной встречей. В таких случаях, по мнению Руссе, писатели превращают сцену первого взгляда в модель чтения, и, таким образом, еще больше увеличивают ее роль.

Как видно, в *Их взгляды встретились* тема взгляда интерпретирована с точки зрения, которая является всецело внутренней для литературы. Как и что видят герои романов; как на них воздействует то, что они видят; как писатели строят сцены, в центре которых стоит определенное событие взгляда – коротко, такими являются вопросы, которыми интересуется это исследование. В другом исследовании, озаглавленном «*Переходы. Обмен и транспозиции*», Руссе снова берется за типологизирование и конструирование модели, но в этот раз речь идет о взаимоотношении между взглядом и голосом. Он выходит за границы литературы, чтобы обратиться к проблеме взаимодействия между словом и зрительным изображением. Предварительная оговорка, с которой он приступает к работе, совсем в духе Лесинга: Руссе считает парадоксальным единство между вербальным и визуальным, поскольку они гетерогенны, и поскольку такими соответственно являются время и пространство, последовательность и одновременность.

Несмотря на это, он воспринимает две системы как теоретически противопоставленные одна другой; Руссе признает, что в практике очень часто мы становимся свидетелями самых различных видов комбинаций между ними. Он объединяет комбинации под названием *иконотекст*, чтобы подчеркнуть, что они представляют равностойные сочетания между картинами и словами, где каждый из двух элементов необходим другому.

Его типология обхватывает в общих чертах следующие модели.

Первая названа **визуализирование без образа** (image). Выражается в какой-то необычной организации печатной страницы, через которую достигается определенный зрительный эффект, но без присутствия чисто иконичных элементов. Например, таблоидное расположение страниц в романе Мишеля Бютора *Mobile*.

Под понятием **ввод** Жан Руссе обобщает случаи, когда какое-то визуальное изображение, в действительном смысле этого слова, вплетается в словесную ткань: план жилища в романе Жоржа Перека «*Жизнь – способ употребления*», нарисованная стрела вместо слова «стрела» в *Битве при Фарсале* Клода Симона и др.

Третий тип сочетания между картиной и текстом – **соединение**. Например эмблемы, характерные для XVI и XVII веков. Они состоят из трех элементов со строго установленными местами. Наверху – заглавие, под ним – картина, а в самом низу – тема заглавия, развитая в стихотворной эпиграмме. Соблюдение этой последовательности при восприятии эмблемы не обязательно. В подтверждении этого наблюдения, Руссе цитирует слова одного позднего теоретика эмблемы – Менестрие (XVII в.). По его мнению, в этом жанре самой существенной материей является картина, так как эмблемы являются напутствиями (instructions), которые должны воздействовать сперва на глаза, чтобы потом перейти оттуда в душу.

Следующий вид в *иконотексте*, рассмотренный в труде Руссе, калиграмма в стиле Аполинера. В ней уже есть **взаимопроникновение** (interpénétration) между зрительным образом и текстом.

Классическая иллюстрация текста отнесена к, так называемому, типу **соседства** (contiguïté).

Включением названа модель, у которой какой-то языковой элемент записан на самой поверхности картины – как, например, на полотне Николя Пуссена «*Пастухи из Аркадии*» с гравированной на надгробном памятнике надписью на латинском языке *Et in Arcadia ego*. Надпись, по словам Руссе, так сильно интегрировалась в живописную драматургию, что пастухи дешифрируют ее одновременно с нами, зрителями. Знаком этому является их жест в середине картины. Читая,

мы в свою очередь обвязываемся с действием, изображенным художником.

Кроме указанного опыта о разграничении, названии и описания различных видов *иконотекста*, в книге *Переходы* отделено место и для анализа одного явления, которое Руссе называет ***écrire la peinture*** (*писать картину*). Предметом этой части исследования являются визуальные функции в романах Клода Симона, конкретнее в *Истории* и *Битве при Фарсале*.

В первом из них – *Истории* – главная структурирующая роль дана одной коллекции почтовых карточек. Временная рамка повествования строго определена – она охватывает один день от рассвета до позднего вечера. Почти постоянное место действия – это объявленный для продажи старинный дом. Рассказчик разбирает шкафчики, откуда, в перемешку выпадают фотокартачи и открытки, которые он рассматривает и читает. Совсем случайный порядок, в котором они представляются перед его взглядом, обуславливает хронологические перерывы и обраты в повествовании. Руссе подчеркивает их двойную функцию: во-первых, то что они были посланы на различные даты и из разных частей света, обуславливает временной и географический беспорядок в романе; во-вторых, то, что они с двумя лицами – изображение карточки с одной стороны и текст с другой – их можно как рассматривать, так и читать.

Предоставляя образам, предназначенным для зрительного восприятия, основную структурирующую роль в своем романе, Клод Симон испытывает возможности словесного описания. Когда Андре Бретон в «*Манифесте сюрреализма*» (1924) отрекается от него полностью, писатели школы так называемого *Нового романа* (*Le Nouveau roman*), к которым принадлежит и Клод Симон, превращают его в объект различных экспериментов, полностью осознавая его проблема-

тичность. В связи с этим, Руссе ставит один вопрос, который как он сам признается, трудно поддается теоритизированию: что происходит в голове человека, который читает описание? Если он пытается заменить написанные слова с отсутствующими вещами, о которых эти слова говорят, тогда он заменяет текст с какой-то мысловной картиной или, иначе говоря, визуализирует. Но сведенный, таким образом, только до опоры этой картины, текст теряет свое собственное значение. Однако, не этого ожидает писатель от своих читателей. Поэтому, по мнению Руссе, авторы, как Клод Симон, пишут так, чтобы отстранить угрозу визуализирования, они фрагментируют и разбрасывают описание или пытаются его динамизировать, используя способность статичного образа внушать ощущение движения.

Именно на неподвижной подвижности картины сосредоточено внимание повествователя в другом романе Клода Симона, который анализирует Руссе – «*Битва при Фарсале*». Об этом говорится еще в заголовке первой части – *Неподвижный Ахилл на больших шагах*. Заголовка цитирует последний из шести стихов Поля Валери, которые даны как мотто. Добавим еще, что во втором и в третьем из этих шести стихов говорится о стреле, которая летит и не летит. Таким образом, мотто загадывает о намерении писателя соперничать с живописцем, который, чтобы изобразить движение и последовательность, использует элементы, которые статичны и связаны в симультанной композиции. Теза Руссе заключается в том, что основная проблема в этом романе Клода Симона – это представление движения – проблема, перед которой, хотя и по-разному, поставлены как писатель, так и художник. Ключом к ее решению является цитированный стих Валери, где имя Ахилла отсылает нас к центральной фигуре на войне, а выражение «*неподвижный на больших шагах*» собирает в себе оппозицию между подвижностью и неподвижностью.

Почему именно солдат является центральной фигурой романа, становится ясно во второй части, где описаны четыре сцены битвы, изображенные на полотнах известных художников. В пассажах, где говорится о картинах, имена художников не даны. Описание первой из них даже ничем не подсказывает то, что объектом является живописное полотно. Все равно, что это есть описание утреннего пейзажа, увиденного и изображенного таинственным наблюдателем. Слово «картина» появляется восмью страницами ниже, а еще через несколько десятков страниц появляются и имена художников Пьеро делла Франческа, Учелло, Брейгель и Пуссен, которых внимательный читатель свяжет с описанными полотнами. Руссе отмечает, что установление этой связи позволяет столкнуться тексту с его референтом, проверить метод рассказчика, которой описывает картины и оценить, какая часть от описания, сделанной по памяти повествователем в романе Симона, отвечает на то, что действительно изображено на картинах, а какая часть есть плод интерпретации.

Анализирующий взгляд Руссе устанавливает, что порядок, в котором описаны четыре полотна, не случайный и имеет прямое отношение к упомянутой выше основной проблеме в романе. Смысл в том, что если первоначально область изобразительного искусства есть неподвижное действие, то внутри ее рамок существует множество нюансов. Таким образом, каждая последующая из описанных четырех картин в *Битве при Фарсале* показывает большую степень возможности изобразить движение в границах одной нарисованной поверхности.

Руссе показывает, как одно литературное произведение превращает в свою основную тему соперничество между двумя искусствами – визуальным и словесным; то же относится и к представлению движения и неподвижности. Но, может быть, роман Клода Симона успевает внушить то, что

есть почва для такого соперничества в большей степени благодаря тематике описанных картин. Они изображают битвы. Вспомним, что еще Лесинг как раз определял коллективные действия как область, к которой не относятся сделанные им разграничения между живописью и поэзией или оппозиция «изображение тел» – изображение действий». Он указывает на то, что при коллективном действии один ряд движений распределяется в несколько тел, а тела в пространстве должны всегда находиться одно возле другого. Именно это пространственное измерение коллективных действий позволяет им превратиться в предмет живописи. Представленные на полотне художника, они не могут быть одновременно охвачены взглядом и требуется определенное время, чтобы глаз успел охватить целое пространство картины. Поэтому, картины изображающие коллективные действия воспринимаются *постепенно*, точно так, как воспринимаются и произведения словесного искусства.

Пример с *Битвой при Фарсале* показывает, что когда литература пересоздает своими средствами живописную манеру изображения действия, получается то, что Руссе называет нарративизированием описания. Один из способов, через который Клод Симон постигает это нарративизированное описание, является глагольное время. На местах в его описаниях картин существует переход из настоящего к прошедшему времени: «появился один всадник...», или к будущему времени: «через несколько мгновений солдат получит удар мечом, который проникнет через его открытый рот...». Таким образом, статичность картины убрана. Картина будто-бы движется.

Упомянутое нарративизирование описания является одним из результатов превращения живописи в основной конструктивный материал романа Клода Симона. Чисто литературным следствием этого является переосмысление и, в

конечном счете, отпадание разграничений между описанием и повествованием. Вывод Руссе: уже не уместно их разделять, так как одному суждено представлять вещи, а другому – действия. В анализированном примере именно описание, обычно принятое за статичное, становится источником движения.

До сих пор, я попыталась показать, как важная часть научных интересов и целей Жана Руссе связывается со взглядом и видением – как цели чисто литературного исследования, так и те, которые относятся к отношениям между литературой и другими художественными системами. В конце моего доклада, хочу остановиться и на том значении взгляда в текстах Руссе, которое я назвала методологическим, и о чем свидетельствуют частые обращения к зрительным метафорам, когда автор описывает и обсуждает собственную критическую работу.

Пример этому мы находим еще в начальном предложении книги «*Взгляды их встретились*». В нем говорится, достаточно бросить *беглый взгляд* (*un coup d'œil*) на весь наш литературный клад, чтобы убедиться в том, что везде присутствует сцена первой встречи. Первое значение этого выражения – подчеркнуть очевидность основания посвятить избранной сцене столь обширное исследование. Ее значимость легко заметить и она неоспорима. Несмотря на то, что «беглый взгляд» звучит неангажирующе, названное таким способом действие, требует в сущности исключительно большой подготовки и глубокого знания огромного количества литературных произведений, так как данный взгляд должен охватить одну традицию, которая насчитывает около двух тысяч лет.

Несколькими параграфами ниже, автор возвращается к своему утверждению, что предмет его исследования входит в число тех, которые появляются сами по себе. Он находится перед нашими глазами, достаточно только обернуться к нему.

Более того, критик присуждает инициативу этого исследования не себе, а самим литературным произведениям. По его словам, именно они – анализированные тексты – сделали так, что в процессе чтения *проявляются* (т.е.становятся видимыми) сходства в способах, по которым столько много различных романов представляют сцену первого взгляда.

Видно, что еще в начале своей работы Руссе защитил свою исследовательскую тему, указывая на то, что важность ее очевидна, а не приписана. Он не упускает сделать это и в самом конце своей книги. Значение, которое имеет первая встреча между героями *оправдывает* (точно это слово!) создание и этой книги, как и то, что в нее включено такое изобилие примеров и анализов.

Сейчас, я снова возвращаюсь к страницам введения книги, где интересующие меня знаки самонаблюдения Руссе встречаются и гораздо чаще. После утверждения, что один беглый взгляд на долгую литературную традицию (преимущественно европейскую) достаточен, чтобы сделать явной основательность темы, автор отбрасывает панорамный подход: «Я не мог и не хотел заниматься панорамным трудом». Метод, который с этого момента последует, будет старательного, иногда даже очень медленного анализа. «Я надел очки для близоруких, веря, что человек читает хорошо, только если читает на близком расстоянии; только тогда текст раскрывает все свои смыслы».

После того, как именно этим медленным и старательным способом Руссе анализирует первые семь романов, взятых как образцы, и обобщает результаты в указанной выше модели из трех элементов, он снова выделяет один параграф для оценки сделанного до этого момента и тому, что, на основе постигнутого, можно строить дальше. О комбинаторной игре между данными тремя элементами Руссе говорит, что она не имеет амбиций *предугадать* все смысловые возможности, а только начертить канву, на которой, если мы

смотрим *с высоты птичьего полета,* организуется поле романа. После того, как это уже сделано, истинная цель предстоящей работы, представить *наблюдению под лупой* только один ограниченный сегмент повествовательной литературы. *Предугадать, с высоты птичьего полета, наблюдение под лупой* – три связанные со зрением выражения только в одном параграфе из нескольких рядов. Конечно, присутствие такого рода выражений не единственная отличительная черта, по которой читатель распознает те нередкие моменты в трудах Руссе, когда автор сосредотачивается над наблюдением и оценкой своей работы. Но все же, можно сказать, что для Руссе характерно полагаться на видимое, на то, что без особых усилий может быть замечено – как в текстах, которые он анализирует, так и в его собственных текстах. Вероятно, это и есть выражение его глубокого исследовательского настроя и его уверенности, что, как теоретик и критик литературы, он работает прежде всего с фактами, со свойствами и значениями произведений, которые даны в наличии, а не внесены через интерпретацию.

Один из частых результатов самонаблюдения, как составной части научной деятельности Жана Руссе, это выпрямление перед границами. Иногда, они предполагаемы и заявлены предварительно, в других случаях, они выявляются в процессе работы. Они определяются или неисчерпаемостью исследованного поля, или неизбежностью хорошо осознаваемого несовершенства используемого подхода. Но, может быть, их ставит и сам автор, считая, что это и есть проявление научной корректности – не поддаваться искушению перешагнуть через них.

В размышлениях о столкновении безграничности изучаемого поля и ограниченности прилагаемых к нему инструментов, заканчивается рассмотренный выше опыт Руссе, о типологизации отношений между зрительным образом и текстом (в *Переходах. Обмен и транспозиции*) – опыт, который привел

к констатации, что встреча между письменным текстом и визуальной картиной представляет собой необъятную область. Вот, что сказано по этому поводу: «чтобы организовать поле исследования и развернуть изложение, я принял, методом абстракции, сделать типологический монтаж, в чьих сетях успел удержать одну малую часть смысловой добычи. Потеря была предвидимой: мне осталось утешиться удовольствием, которое мне доставило урегулирование временного порядка в огромном беспорядке фактов. Все же, есть что-то иррациональное в сочетании несочетаемых систем, несмотря на то, что практика их сочетает, более или менее удачно. Со своей стороны, я уступил еще одному удовольствию – удоволствию связать чтение слов с созерцанием картин. Тем хуже, если будет сложно оправдать это теоретически.»

In the works of the Geneva scholar Jean Rousset the meaning of sight can be interpreted in two ways: thematic and methodological. The first exchange of glances between the characters in the novel is the central theme in one of his monographs. Its title *Leurs yeux se rencontrèrent* is a quotation from Flaubert's *L'Éducation sentimentale.* The most commonly used traits, which characterise the scene of first meeting of the characters were drawn from a corpus of nearly 100 works. The aim is to build a coherent system from these traits, which can be view as a norm in order to find out the differences in the analyzed examples and to evaluate their meaning.

The theme of the sight attracts the attention of Jean Rousset in yet another sense, which can be observed in his book *Passages. Echanges et transposition.* A great part of it is dedicated to the links and interactions between visual image and text, between the art of painting and literature, or in the words of the author himself, between reading and watching (lire et regarder).

The other present form of sight, which is linked to the methodological level of the works of Jean Rousset is expressed in his inclination

to constant self-observation. This inclination can be found in his texts, where he evaluates the possibilities and the inevitable limitations of his approach. Self-analysis can be recognized as an organic trait of his scientific method. His sight is directed both to the studied object and to the instruments used. It is worth mentioning that Rousset often uses optical metaphors, when he describes his work as a critic. These moments in his works leave the impression that he constantly views it with an outside eye, which turns the author into his first critic.

The article develops these first observations on the basis of the two already mentioned books of Jean Rousset, namely *Leurs yeux se rencontrèrent* and *Passages. Echanges et transposition*.

ENYO STOYANOV

THE FICTIVE GLANCE: WOLFGANG ISERS'S INVENTION OF THE "REAL"

Iser's project, outlined in his fundamental work *The Fictive and the Imaginary*, now seems almost dated. Yet a renewed consideration of what he termed "literary anthropology" might still prove useful, especially since the stakes of the project are nothing less than an adequate response to the perceived threat of dissipating the notion of a proper literary space in culture altogether – a threat posed both by new media and literary academia. The main presumption of this paper is the conviction that basic to Iser's response to this crisis in situating literature is his emphasis on invention. Invention not in the sense of the compromised Romantic notions of originality and authorial spontaneity, not even in the sense that literary works are artifacts, something created, but rather as an inherent mode of production. Something is invented, created *through* literature. Or, which may or may not amount to the same, something has been rendered available through it[1]. In *The Fictive and the Imaginary* Iser claims that although literature has lost some of its

[1] This claim corresponds to the inherent ambiguity proper to the term "invention" in its etymological aspect – it can mean both that something has been created for the first time, i.e. rendered existent as something new, or that something has been encountered for the first time, i.e. acknowledged existence for the first time. See, for instance, Smith 1925.

former functions ("from entertainment to information" Iser 1993, p.x), its anthropological function has remained unchallenged. The latter is considered as a mode of operation that affirms the unlimited indeterminacy of human existence and its ceaseless attempt at finding forms for self-presentation, without at the same time being confined to these forms. The emphasis is placed upon the way literature effects *changes* in its recipients, upon the way the literary texts exceeds its own boundaries by exceeding the boundaries of what is considered given in certain social contexts[2].

What we propose here is an examination of the triad Real-Fictive-Imaginary, proposed by Iser as the mode of specifically operational (and thus performative) organization of literature that may, according to him, account for its continued necessity and pertinence.

The discussion of the relations involved in this triad here will be marked by a very specific attempt at translation or correlation of this conception in terms of the systems theory, proposed by Niklas Luhmann (see Luhmann 1995), among others. This translation or interpretive transposition may meet with certain limitations, but still may prove as a heuristic procedure, that could unveil certain tensions in Iser's scheme that otherwise may not be so apparent. It should be immediately mentioned, though, that Iser explicitly points towards Luhmann's systems theory as a major methodological framework[3]. Thus

[2] The emphasis on this relation between the anthropological function of literature with a notion of invention is already apparent in The Act of Reading: "[T]he literary work is to be considered not as a documentary record of something that exists or has existed, but as a reformulation of an already formulated reality, which brings into the world something that did not exist before" (Iser 1978, p. x).

[3] The importance of Luhmann's general systems theory for Iser is evident already in the Act of Reading (see Iser 1978: p. 70–71). In The Fictive and the Imaginary there is only one reference to Luhmann, but an interview from the time of the preparations for this book demonstrates

the form of the proposed examination of Iser's notions is not in the least arbitrary.

First we will provide a very brief outline of the conceptual apparatus we are borrowing from Luhmann. According to him, social systems (art included), as well as living and psychic systems are autopoietic, i.e. proceeding trough self-development and operationally closed (recursive). The self-development of social systems according to Luhmann proceeds in the manner of differentiation, with the major difference that constitutes the system is the difference between system and environment. This difference is internal to the system itself and should not be conceived as extending ontological claims about reality. The operation of the system is one of selection from the stock materials of the environment, but these elements should not be conceived as external, but rather produced by the operation itself, since the difference between active system and passive environment is also systemic in origin. The final element of Luhmann's approach in our somewhat limited selection is the notion of observation. When the system observes itself and its own environment, it in fact produces in this observation this distinction. This equation of observation and self-positing is done as a second-order observation, observation of observation, which always is the work of a separate system. The system itself cannot observe its own self-producing in observation. Besides, even second-order observation is observation, i.e. construction, developed by the observing system. Thus a second-order observation cannot be communicated back to the system under observation. In short, the system does everything – differentiates itself, stabilizes through observation the distinctions produced, but always remains blind to this self-constructed character of its functioning.

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the continuous relevance for Iser of the notions, derived from the German social theorist: "I have chosen General Systems Theory as a point of departure for the assessment of such a function [the function of literature]" (Iser 2000, p. 61)

Let us turn now to Iser triad. What is at work in a literary text, according to him, is a specific process of interplay between the Real and the Imaginary by way of series of fictionalizing acts. The triad is proposed to supersede the inaccurate clear-cut mutually exclusive opposition between reality and fiction. "The literary text is a mixture of reality and fictions, and as such brings about an interaction of between the given and the imagined." (Iser 1993, p. 1) Initially this statement may seem to claim that literature is composed of elements that are given (though it yet needs to be determined what mode of givenness they seem to exhibit), and elements that are paradoxically not-given, immediately unavailable. From the start the distinction between the Real and the Imaginary in Iser's scheme is one of opposition between determinacy and very radical indeterminacy. Here we may suppose that the triad may very well be operating dialectically, though, as we shall see, Iser implies a rather literary-specific brand of negative dialectics that claims not to fulfill its development in an encompassing unity of a higher order.

The mode of description of the elements of the triad, provided by Iser, is one of mutual determination and supposition, so any attempt of isolating them may lead to error. For starters, it may be useful to draw a distinction between reality, which in Iser's framework comprises other social systems which, and here he immediately digresses from Luhmann's definitions[4], fulfill needs, and the Real as an element operating in the mixture of literature. What I attempt to show in this paper with the help of the system-theoretical framework is precisely the non-arbitrary character, the necessity of such a distinction in Iser's project, which, however, is never made explicit in *The Fictive and the Imaginary*.

The Real in Isers language is described as „empirical world,

[4] According to Luhmann pragmatic systems are not contraptions, devised to satisfy anthropological needs, they are essentially contingent in their origin. This, of course, puts a strain on the correlation between Luhmann's project and Iser's, a strain we will shortly explore.

which is "given" for the literary text and generally provides the text's multiple fields of reference. These may be thought systems, social systems, and world pictures, as well as other texts with their own specific organization or interpretation of reality" (Iser 1985, p. 226, see also Iser 1993, p. 2–21)[5]. This very underdetermined articulation of the field of determinedness acquires a specific clarification, which surely shifts Iser's project closer to the orbit of general systems theory – according to him, the Real is characterized by its inability for observation "from within", without stepping over its borders. We will return latter to the key place, afforded by Iser to observation and inobservability in the description of the Real. For now it is enough us to underline his view that the Real is a case of a number of habitual interpretations (termed "observations") of what is the case, of which we cannot become aware as interpretations in their functioning outside literature.[6] Even in the context of such "weak"definition, the Real is still definitely encumbered with contradictions – its initial independence from the literary text is not altogether guaranteed, since it is a referential field of the text.

According to Iser in the interaction with the Fictive, the Real is stripped of any pragmatic characteristics and turns into a reserve of elements that are transformed into signs, pointing towards the Imaginary. The fictionalizing acts themselves assure the transformation of reality into the Real by removing its elements from their determinations and roles of their systems of origin. It is the Fictive[7] that affords observability to the Real, observability, which I gained by overstepping of its boundaries (Iser 1993, p.

[5] The text that provides this quote, "Feigning in Fiction", is one of the first developments of the main argument of *The Fictive and the Imaginary*.

[6] Hence this status of "givennens" – the passive certitude in their ontological validity meddles with coming to terms with the activity, which accounts for their construction. .

[7] The choice of „fictive", rather than the usual „fictional" is chosen, in order to render the notion in a more dynamic and procedural manner and not as some kind of essential quality or logical status of statements.

2–21). The Fictive is defined as directed activity. It is a series of intentional acts, which transforms the literary text into transgression of established, "given" distinctions in the direction of something that correlates to the act, which undergoes determination within the act itself, i.e. it is not immediately given. In these acts of fictionalization the Real is transcended in favor of something, the determination of which remains rooted in its relation to the Real. Explicated in somewhat simplified terms, the Fictive tells us something, which becomes available to our understanding only if we consider it as a new, alternative analogue of reality, only if we subordinate its indeterminacy to the determinacy, to which we have become accustomed. The form is changed, but the need for form remains. This operation seems to aim at the simultaneous destabilization and transformation of the two poles of the correlation.

Iser describes three types of fictionalizing acts (Iser 1993, p. 4–21) and they all have in common the "overstepping of boundaries", i.e. the impossibility of retaining the boundaries of the Real in literature without modification. The first type of fictionalizing acts is selection. Elements from the Real are gathered and inscribed in the text, but they are extracted from their usual context and relations, they are displaced in terms of the positions and functions they fulfill in the systems of the Real. Placed within the literary text, these elements from the systems of the Real, devoid of their habitual environment, still maintain the relation to the Real, albeit negatively, signalizing the dissipation of its stabilities. So they both overstep the boundaries, which they used to observe before the fictionalizing act, and at the same time in this negative and transgressive operation they afford visibility (they account for observablility) of the boundaries themselves. The Fictive creates through differentiation the boundary that it crosses. "I propose...to conceive of the Fictive as an operational mode of consciousness that makes inroads into existing versions of the world. In this way, the Fictive

becomes an act of boundary-crossing which, nonetheless, keeps in view what has been overstepped." (Iser 1993, p. 2)[8]

The second fictionalizing act is the act of combination. Here the emphasis is on the intra-textual relations, operative on different levels of its organization. Here Iser places his theoretical notions in the well-worn framework of literary semiotics.[9] Here once again we have boundary-crossing – for instance, the semantic limitations of lexical elements are broken down through the formation of figurative meanings and the move from stable denotations to these new meanings operates once again like pulsation between (negative) background and foreground. The newly established relations once

[8] It is noteworthy that this logic is reminiscent of the claims of Georges Bataille, for whom it is transgression that makes possible any knowledge of boundaries and limits. (see, for instance,) This is probably not a coincidence, since in *The Fictive and the Imaginary* actively relies on references to Roger Caillois, one of the closest figures to Bataille in the College of Sociology.

[9] Yuri Lotman is explicitly referenced, but in the examples and commentaries, made by Iser we can discern even some older notions, for instance elements of the logic, with which Roman Jakobson affirms the semantic function of verse organization. The semiotic views of both Lotman and the Prague School are undoubtedly operative in the previous act of selection as well – for instance, for Lotman the literary text enters into semantic relation with the extraliterary discursive formations on the basis of the opposition between inclusion-exclusion& what is included gets its semantic relevance on the background of what may have been included besides or instead of it. In this way the act of selection acquires the determination of choice between alternatives and becomes significant. The question of the intentional basis of this choice, is, of course, irrelevant for Lotman – see Lotman 1970, p. 269–280. Here Iser's conception is not far apart: "If we are to uncover an intention, our best chance lies... in those manifestations of intentionality, expressed through the selection of extratextual systems to be found in the fictional text." (Iser 1985, c. 208). As for the Prague School, the emphasis on selection and combination as primary determinants of organization is well known.

again open up a horizon, in which they operate as foregrounded over a background of relations and contexts, that have now become void, unactualized. The selected elements in the first act start to recontextualize between themselves, they develop new relations that overcome the way they have been encountered in the Real. The result is a very complex intermingling of old, "given" and new, undetermined.

The last and probably the most important act for Iser is the act of self-disclosure. According to him, the literary text never hides its status as Fictive, never attempts to conceal its inconsistency and discrepancy with the Real. Here Iser constantly references Hans Vaihinger's notion of "as if" (*als ob*), which gives an "impossible" or "unreal" point of comparison. The first two fictionalizing acts constitute a "world", which is then disclosed in the third act as utterly artificial. This, according to Iser, is the primary difference between the Fictive of literature and fictions, operative in other systems. The latter constantly conceal the fictional origin of their claims. This final act discloses how the Imaginary acquires an arbitrary and necessarily inauthentic form, and at the same time relates back to the Real, which now becomes just one of those arbitrary inauthentic forms of the Imaginary.

The Imaginary itself relates to the real not only as a relation along the axis of determinacy-indeterminacy, but also along the axis actual-potential. "The imaginary is basically a featureless and inactive potential, which accounts for the failed attempts to grasp it cognitively" (Iser 1993, p. xvii). The Imaginary in Iser's terminology[10] defies definition, since it is a pure potentiality, disclosed in a definite way

[10] Iser prefers this term over the more common "imagination" because of two reasons. On the one hand, "imagination" traditionally is thought of in psychological terms as a faculty, connected with the fulfillment of specific, defined function, while Iser insists on the radical indeterminacy, which he relates to this entity. On the other side, he wants to affirm that the Fictive is an intentional act, whose noematic correlative is the Imaginary.

only according to the specificity of the activator that happens to give it form (Iser 1993, p. 2–21, 171–246). It must be activated, a process involving intentionality. Beside the features, acquired through the activation, the Imaginary remains featureless, resists description, lacks a definite ordering. This in turn is provided by the fictionalizing acts of selection combination and self-disclosure that comprise the operation of the Fictive. The Fictive essentially transforms elements, gathered from the systems of reality, into signs that provide form and determinacy to the otherwise inert Imaginary. "[T]he fictionalizing act converts the reality reproduced into a sign, simultaneously casting the imaginary as a form that allows us to conceive what it is towards the sign points" (Iser 1993, p. 2).

The potentiality of the Imaginary is necessarily primary to its realization and accordingly every form of awareness of reality has its unacknowledged origin in this inexhaustible potential. Outside literature in everyday experienced, the Imaginary makes itself evident as madness and delirium – hence its dangerous character. The role of fiction vis-à-vis the Imaginary is to confer it with form that has not severed its ties with the Real. Yet it seems that literature is not simply restricted to taming the potential of the Imaginary – through it the Imaginary destroys any tenable notion of the Real except as a precarious actualization of some potentialities, instead of others.

Iser examines the Imaginary in much the same way as he did with the Fictive. They both are considered first in their extraliterary mode of operation. For the Fictive, Iser claimed that outside literature it displayed the feature of "boundary-crossing", though in an attempt to conceal this operation, while the literary workings of the Fictive was tied to the "self-disclosure" of fiction in the third act of fictionalization. The same procedure is applied to the Imaginary – Iser surveys other, non-literary activators: subject (Coleridge), consciousness (Sartre), the social-historical (Castoriadis). The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate a constant aspect

in various activations. Iser is concerned above all with two features, shared by all manifestations of the Imaginary[11] – 1. Once activated, the Imaginary modifies its activator; 2. Outside literature the Imaginary is activated in accordance with some aim and the ensuing modification of the activator ends with the accomplishment of this aim. The first feature gives access to the Imaginary as a process, while the second demonstrates how its process is finally repealed in the context of its activation with pragmatic aims. These conclusions serve as background for the description of its literary activation. In it there are no pragmatic aims, so the process is constantly open, infinite, while at the same time retaining the feature of reciprocal modification of the activator.

In the context of this determination of the literary activation of the Imaginary a clarification may prove useful: how the fictionalizing acts and the Imaginary relate to the traditional notions of fiction and invention? Iser's logic gives basis for the conclusion that what usually understood as "fiction" – non-actual, "unreal" objects and states of affairs that come about by way of an act of invention – here is turned on its head. It is not the case that the imagination is productive of fictions, but rather the fictionalizing acts actualize the Imaginary potential. The Fictive is a negative condition for the productiveness of the Imaginary. The Imaginary turns out to be the act of invention only under the prior condition of the act of fictionalization. Yet it is still a productive and inventive act, since once activated, it continuously modifies its activator. Thus the Imaginary prevents the Fictive into turning into an abstract, pure negation. It confers a direction and motivation to the negativity of the Fictive. At the same time the fictionalizing acts are not fictional objects. They are intentional structure, build over the Imaginary, which both actualizes it and reveals it as a pure potential.

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[11] Here we will skip a detailed consideration of them, since we are more interested in the results of Iser's claims for the relationship within the triad, defining literature.

Iser introduces this logic a little bit counterintuitively. If the Imaginary is invention, it seems that it never produces anything, never creates anything. Its productivity is not based squarely on it, but rather comes about through its "medium" – the Fictive. Still, the Fictive is not productive by itself.

In a long footnote (Iser 1993, p. 333–334) Iser tries to clarify this point, starting this time from the reverse pole – from fiction. He claims that the Renaissance literary figure Sir Philip Sidney in his "Defence of Poesy" provides a turning point in the history of literature, in which it is no longer restricted to copying a pre-given world[12], but is considered as a creative activity. In Sidney Iser identifies the tension between fiction and invention with the tension between negativity and productivity. Sidney defends the poet from the accusation of lying by insisting that his verbal act is negative – "for the poet, he nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth" (Sidney 1595). Together with this labor of the negative, the poet yet manages to be productive, as long as he "calleth the sweet Muses to inspire into him a good invention" (Ibid.). The regime of this invention is imitative – in his productivity the poet imitates nature, considered as *natura naturans*, creative nature and not nature in the sense of passive givennes that has been produced i.e. not as *natura naturata*. In this imitative practice Sidney confers

[12] In his discussion of literature's performativity, Iser claims that its performative dimension has always been operative, even in the ancient codifications of poetry in terms of mimesis. Iser sees in Sidney (both in his "Defence" and in his pastoral texts) the first explicit acknowledgment of this performativity. It must be noted, however, that in this explicitness of the performativity of literature the mimetic reference to the independently given does not disappear, but rather changes its status. Though Iser is not absolutely clear, he seems to be insisting that for him the movement of mimesis as representation of the already given towards mimesis as performance is a gradual process, which is not based on a Renaissance break, but rather is an explication of a potential of the classical notions of mimesis.

the activity of the poet with the all-important for Iser function of compensation – here what gets produced is better than what was produced by nature, or something comes about that nature has yet to produce. Correction and supplement are the two results of the invention, conducted under the guidance of the Muses. Of course, since supplementation also can be considered a correction, a compensation for what happens to be, Iser, following Sidney, subsumes the notion of invention under the concept of correction.

Of course, Iser quickly states that in the coordination of fiction and invention the correction of the given is never final: "such a process of correction is comparative and never final" (Iser 1993, p. 334). The precise move away from Sidney of Iser's reasoning concerns the notion of "perfection", which guides the process of invention, according to the Renaissance poet. Thus for Iser literature is not simply a pedagogical tool that points us in the right direction, but something more radical and open. The correction that literature affords is targeted at the Real and its systems, which are, as we said earlier, unobservable from within. It points at deficiencies not in the name of something better, but rather in the name of constant re-pattering and mutability. This is due to the fact of literature's self-disclosure of its fictional status – it posits some alternative, but immediately disposes of its tenability.

As for the "Muses" in Sidney, Iser claims they are actually the traditional name for the Imaginary. Here we can finally grasp the significance of this concept for Iser. On the one hand, the notion of activity by the Muses in poetry since Plato boils down to the problem of "inspiration". Some type of divine spirit takes possession of the poet and forces him outside himself. This mysterious process is understood by Iser in anthropological terms (suggested by the identification of imagination and the Muses). This "introjection" of the Muses makes possible the understanding of the process of inspiration in terms of non-coincidence with oneself and the general self-overcoming of the human being that drives Iser's anthropological notions.

However, the reference to the Muses is not simply restricted to explication of the anthropological underpinnings of Iser's project. It already inscribes the Imaginary in the mechanism of literature in its difference with the Fictive. Iser constantly states that the Fictive invites, seduces the imaginary potential into form. This, however, does not mean that the Fictive gives the Imaginary its form. It is rather the opposite – the Imaginary gives itself forms, stimulated by the negativity of the Fictive. The poet never affirms, as Sidney said, but at the same time he necessarily does *something*. Otherwise, if the Fictive comprises the whole of his activity, this activity would be pure negation, nothing, refusal of activity. But there is productivity through the "Muses", they guide the negativity of the fictionalizing acts into an activity, which is nevertheless simultaneously repealed. Invention, the Imaginary produces, but the Fictive binds this production with a double negation – it de-actualizes the prior givens of the Real, and the new givens, produced by the Imaginary, are always already repealed. Furthermore, the double negativity of the Fictive is itself doubled by the double positivity of the Imaginary – it not only produces the new, and newly repealed by the fictionalizing acts forms, but it also retains in view the form, undermined by Fictive.

But why must we concern ourselves with the Imaginary? After all, its determinations are derived and defined through a relation to the real. At the same time Iser claims that without infusing it with guidance and determinations, in its pure potential state, the Imaginary is threatening. In fact, the danger perceived as stemming from the Imaginary, its empirical manifestation in phenomena of the order of madness and delirium, might be considered as a the radical rupture of the ordering of reality itself, especially when it is not activated intentionally but presents us with spontaneous eruptions. The Imaginary has no guidance and spreads amorphously as a disorganized chaos in which anything is possible, and nothing is real. The danger stems from the understanding that reality emerges out

of the possible. Here Iser follows Aristotle, with whom also potentiality precedes and takes precedence over the actual. The Imaginary as inactivated potential presents a danger, because it reveals itself as ontologically prior to reality, as the principle of its production. Reality thus becomes a simple, even contingent effect of activating the Imaginary. Thus the Fictive reestablishes a vital connection, it reinstates the Imaginary as the possibly-real as a guided, controlled process. As a consequence, the whole scheme of the triad has the marked appearance of dialectic relation – the Real as thesis, the Imaginary (profoundly un-real) as its antithesis and the Fictive as a synthesis of both. Within this dialectical scheme the synthetic work of the Fictive might be described as not so much a moving beyond the Real in a spiral of ever further transcendence (which is what happens, according to Iser, if the Fictive does not find its target in the Imaginary); neither is it a unification, it is rather the process of devaluing the Real, a process of demonstration of its essential poverty, a process that is at the same instant combined with a promise of rectifying this traumatic realization of poverty with possible alternatives for its future expansion through continuous reconstitution. It is an operation of constant redistribution that strives to assure that the real and the unreal, on the one hand, and the determined and the indeterminate, are ever in an asymmetrical relation. The Real comes in contact with the Imaginary to be constantly negated and immediately recovered in an ever exceeding motion of its own self-development. In short, the work of literature is not devoted to letting our imagination, our dreams, deliriums and hallucinations run wild, but it rather provides ground for their realization. Though, as we shall see immediately, this comes at a price.

The mode of functioning of the literary text towards reality is described as "insertion", but it is actually closer to the exact opposite, a procedure of extraction that simultaneously converts the ordered reality into a diffused stock of extractable elements. Thus,

at its core, through the Fictive the Real becomes the determination of reality into an analog of the environment form Luhmann's framework. Through the operation of the Fictive the Real can now be conceived of as viewing reality as indeterminate reservoir of elements that can be used in ordering the Imaginary, of determining its amorphous potentiality. This, according to Iser, is achieved by rendering these elements in reality observable. Observability becomes the key quality that can turn units from reality into signs for the Imaginary. From mere meaningless but functional existents they become signifiers that may be applied to segment the protean field of sense that is the Imaginary. They are not observable in themselves, "objectively", outside of the operation that selects them and orders them to certain functions, here – those of signification. This does not mean they are not observable in their determinacy, but rather that the operation of selection and observation has severed them from some possible original determinacy and rendered them a new determinacy within its own systematic work. They are observable as determining the Imaginary, not as stock materials.

As a result, the Fictive both disrupts and doubles the referential world. The transgressive impetus of the Fictive has relativized the Real, made it essentially a deposit of stock raw materials for the forming of the Imaginary. Here the parallel with Luhmann may indeed hold, especially his master distinction between system and environment. The process of the Fictive produces components (selection from the Real) that themselves recursively operate as constitutive of this process. There is nothing outside the selections of the Fictive except what the Fictive posits dialectically as negated. And those selections themselves become forms for the Imaginary. In short, the Fictive is the process of imposing the Real on the Imaginary. Here there is nothing of the Imaginary except in the form of the Real. But that also means that this Real is already a construct, a Real proper to literature. This is the striking result of this reading of Iser's operations indeed the product, the invention of literature –

the Real as essentially insufficient, lacking in its contact with what might have been and (as with Iser's optimism for literature) what might still become Real. But, of course, this is just a reiteration of a high modernist believe, since this Real is just an element, a subsystem of literature, totally devoid of ontological bearing outside it. Literature presents the Real with its poverty, but at the same time it is literature that has impoverished it. And that is not all: "As a medium, it [literature] can only show all determinacy to be illusory. It even incorporates into itself the inauthenticity of all the human patterings it features, since this is the only way it can give presence to the protean character of what it is mediating. Perhaps this is the truth through which literature counters the awareness that it is an illusion, thereby resisting dismissal as mere deception." (Iser, 1993, p. xvii). Literature thus serves as testament to indeterminacy, but it always signals that this indeterminacy as its doing. At least it would have been so, if the logic on which Iser relies was imanentistic, or indeed, system-theoretical.

In truth, there is still an element of transcendence that intrudes in the inner workings of the literary creation of the Real. Here Iser responds to anti-humanist logic with which we confronted him by way of Luhmann with the correlation between the Fictive act and an act of consciousness. That is why his project claims anthropological purport. The involvement of the reader that always persists in the background of Iser's writing provides for a confrontation – the Real of the text (the Real proper to literature) and the Real of the reader, the bearings of his her experiences. It might be possible to claim that this second Real is isomorphic to the first, that it also does not coincide with a reality in any objective sense, but is a construct for it. If that is correct, then it can be correlated, implicated in the Real of the text, and thus it can become indiscernible from it. This might seem to insure that literature might indeed manage to produce effects beyond itself, i.e. in the reader who has passed through the process of dis-

mantling and reconstituting reality enacted by the text. But then again if the Real of the reader is indeed a construct, it must be constructed by a system that already works in a similarly recursive manner, a system that also provides him/her with a second order observation, a disclosure of the indeterminacy of the Real. But if that is the case, what is the use of literature?

Undoubtedly this is not what Iser is trying to say. But the possibility of this "translation" of his concepts in the language of the operatively closed systems of Luhmann already undermines the optimism for any anthropological validity of literature according to Iser's model. This operative closure here must be understood precisely as self-positing, which has no anthropological import and which works as self-limitation vis-à-vis the human being, a being, which itself becomes environment, constructed as a background for the operations of this self-positing of literature. Since the terms of Iser's model so easily afford themselves to a "closed" description of the literary system, they surely do not provide a satisfying answer to the question "What does literature do beyond itself?"

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Статья внимательно анализирует концепцию Вольфганга Изера о антропологической продуктивности литературы, которую автор излагает в своей книге «Фиктивное и воображаемое». В этой книге Изер пытается осмыслить литературу как систему, которая корригирует односторонность и недостатки остальных социальных систем, в которых человек находится, при том реальность осмысляется как актуализированная потенциальность, открытая для изменений. Статья пытается демонстрировать неадекватность методологического инструментариума, действующего в исследовании Изера – понятие „система», происходящее от общей системной теории Никласа Лумана. Поскольку системы Лумана работают в условиях оперативной замкнутости, между ними невозможно установить отношений, при которых данная система корригирует другую, без при этом само отношение между системой и ее коррективом не является полностью продуктом корригирующей системы. Так как это означало бы, что литература сама порождает реальное, которое она претендует, что корригирует; что это реальное никак не является реальностью, которая остаются вне литературы. Таким образом оказывается, что модель Изера о антропологической релевантности литературы содержит серьезный недостаток.

ГАЛИНА ГЕОРГИЕВА

ВЗГЛЯД НА УЛИЦУ (ЯЗЫКОВАЯ «УСТАНОВКА» ЛИТЕРАТУРНОГО ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЯ ЛЕФА)

Уже в первом выпуске своего одноименного журнала русское объединение Леф (Левый фронт искусства) намечает свои основные эстетические позиции, свой взгляд на поэзию и поэтические формы. Комментарий будет сосредоточен на трех основных статьях «Наша словесная работа» (Брик, Маяковский), «Футуристы – строители языка» (Винокур), «Т. н. «формальный метод» (Брик).

Первая статья, «Наша словесная работа», внушает наличие безусловной связи между языковым (литературным) поиском Лефа и текущей социальной динамикой, связь между литературной работой и социальной сферой. Исходным положением здесь является категорический отказ от «древнего» традиционного дихотомического деления литературы на поэзию и прозу. Это деление непродуктивно, оно не отвечает не только на требование новых форм, но и на требование нового склада мышления. Критика направлена и на устойчивые поэтические «каноны», среди которых: «засахаренные метры (ямбы, хореи или винегрет «свободного стиха») и «особый «поэтический» словарь». По отношению к прозе авторы критикуют ясные, знакомые схемы сюжетостроения и художественно-сти-

листические украшения: неадекватной оказывается как формула классиков-новеллистов «он+она+любовник», так и формула символистов «некто в сером+ незнакомка+христос». Повторяя эти классические характеристики (которые собственно усиливают и удерживают деление) поэзия и проза «одинаково далеки от практической речи, от жаргона улицы, от точного языка науки» (Брик, Маяковский 1923, с. 40). Именно эта точка зрения позволяет нам определить и позицию, с которой Леф смотрит на поэтическую практику: «Мы не хотим знать различья между поэзией, прозой и практическим языком» (Брик, Маяковский 1923, с. 40).

Авторитет и влияние поэзии и прозы в качестве относительно автономных литературных институций уже весьма неустойчив и проблематичен, за счет сближения поэзии и прозы с тем, на фоне чего традиционно отображаются и дифференцируются их отличительные особенности – практическим языком.

Намечается тенденция к конвергенции особенностей разговорной речи и художественного творчества, которую, в свою очередь, можно толковать как отказ от строгой иерархии языковых функций[1], отказ от строгого разграничения поэтической, конативной и референтивной функций языка. Сегментирование и регламентирование коммуникативных зон здесь ставятся под сомнение. Обособление, выделение литературы из других коммуникативных рядов приводит к обособлению

[1] Речь идет о шести языковых функцией Р. Якобсона: эмотивная (экспресивная), конативная, референтивная, фатическая, металингвистическая и поэтическая. Эти функции он связывает с элементами коммуникативного акта: адресат, адресант, контекст, контакт, код и сообщение. По мнению Якобсона в данной коммуникативной ситуации можно отличить отдельные элементы этих функций, доминирует однако только одна из них. То, что Брик и Маяковский предлагают, является попыткой вывести все функции на уровне литературного произведения, осмысленного как коммуникативный акт.

сферы «чистой эстетики», сферы экспертности, что, со своей стороны, обособляет литературу как фундаментальную институцию, поддерживающую социальную статику.

Дальше в статье читаем: «Мы знаем единый матерьял слова и пускаем его в сегодняшную обработку» (Брик, Маяковский 1923, с. 40). Это заявление внушает, что произведение уже интерпретируется и дифференцируется не с позиции своих родовых или жанровых особенностей, а с позиции обработки словесного материала, которая именно определяет и выявляет особенности произведения. Со своей стороны обработка является своеобразным обменом между материалом и современностью. «Мы работаем над организацией звуков языка, над полифонией ритма, над упрощеньем словесных построений, над уточненьем языковой выразительности, над выделкой новых тематических приемов» (Брик, Маяковский 1923, с. 40–41). Здесь кроме формального разнообразия и нагрузки, авторы предлагают и такую обработку материала, посредством которой можно достичь ясности, простоты, «опрятности» выражения. Эти на первый взгляд противоречивые поиски и процессы – усложненность и полифоничность, с одной стороны, и простота и ясность, с другой, находят свое относительное единство в попытке достижения экспрессивности языкового выражения, в использовании приемов, усиливающих воздействие и коммуникацию. Здесь поэтическая, эмотивная и конативная функция как бы ставятся в один ряд. Социальная динамика трансформируется в динамику художественных приемов, а социальные факты – в принцип организации и обработки словесного материала. «Вся эта работа для нас – не эстетическая самоцель, а лаборатория для наилучшего выраженья фактов современности», отмечают они и добавляют: «Мы не жрецы-творцы, а мастера-исполнители социального заказа» (Брик, Маяковский 1923, с. 41).

Попытка сближения ежедневного языка, использованного

в практических ситуациях, с языком художественного произведения (ведущим к упрощению поэтических конструкции), продиктована стремлением авторов Лефа предоставить доступ читателю к литературе и в частности к поэзии (поскольку на страницах журнала печатают преимущественно поэзию Маяковского, Асеева, Хлебникова, Каменского, Крученых и др.). Этот доступ возможен посредством употребления знакомых ежедневных языковых практик на уровне лексикона, синтаксиса, ритма и интонации, посредством кажущийся необработки языкового материала. Введение языковых конструкции повседневной практики в качестве организирующих структуру и определяющих смысл элементов в рамках художественного (лирического) текста, внушает близость между текстом и актуальной социальной динамикой и свойственными ей языковыми рядами. Сочетание разных языковых функций ведет к трансформации статуса текста, а также и к трансформации модуса восприятия. Дискурсивные формы размещены в определённом социальном пространстве и воспринимаются посредством определённых социальных измерений. Так посредством обработанной «необработки» словесного материала читатель воспринимает произведение созвучным и близким к ситуации, в которой находится он сам. Наряду с этим однако, произведение оказывается своеобразным и нетрадиционным по отношению к знакомым художественным образцам. Звуковая организация, полифонические рифмы и размеры, тонкая выразительность, ритмические и интонационные нововведения создают препятствия в восприятии со стороны читателя. Пытаясь ответить на обвинение в непонимании, Маяковский в 1928 г. иронично отмечает: «Я не понимаю футуристов» – несется пятнадцать лет, затихает и снова гремит возбужденно и радостно. На этом кличе люди стоили себе карьеру, делали сборы, становились вождями целых течений. <...> Простое: «Мы не понимаем!» – это не приговор. Приговором было бы:

«Мы поняли, что это страшная ерунда!» (Маяковский 19691 с. 494). Обвинения в непонимание для поэта неосновательны и являются результатом «спекуляции и демагогии». В той же статье поэт комментирует и вопрос понимания искусства широкими массами: «Искусство не рождается массовым, оно массовым становится в результате суммы усилий» (Маяковский 19691, с. 494–495). На самом деле массовое искусство не является целью представителей Лефа; отчетливый социальный ангажемент искусства, выявление социальных функций являются только этапом специфической финальной судьбы искусства – его слияние с жизненной практикой. Однако чтобы достичь этот утопический горизонт, искусству в первую очередь необходимо выполнить свою нынешнюю задачу – вырабатывание определенных режимов социальных отношений и определенного социального сознания. Для этого оно может содействовать именно при помощи изобретения и приложения новых, особых, нетрадиционных и «затрудняющих» читателя форм и языковых конструкции. Именно они стоят в основе возникновения и формирования определенного социального самосознания. Сюрприз, дистанция, «остранение» читателя по отношению к художественному произведению, вызваны особыми формально-техническими приемами произведения, ведут к дистанцированному, «остраненному» взгляду и по отношению к ситуации, в которой находится он сам. Этот внешний взгляд, эта «вненаходимость» провоцирует сознание читателя и приводит к действиям, направленным на изменение ситуации.

Возвращаясь к вопросу о поэзии и художественных трансформациях, вызванных радикальным реформированием эстетического поля, Винокур в статье «Футуристы – строители языка» рассматривает поэзию Маяковского, Хлебникова и Крученых. «Как бы ни определять существо и назначение поэзии – бесспорным представляется мне право лингвиста анализиро-

вать поэтические факты, как факты языковые» (Винокур 1923, с. 204–205). Так концентрируясь исключительно на языковых явлениях в поэзии, Винокур ставит и развивает тезис о том, что «язык есть объект культурного преодоления», поскольку язык является социальным фактом. Важным акцентом здесь является его понимание о языке именно как «социальный факт». Со своей стороны социальная жизнь языка формирует «культуру языка», выраженную посредством двух свойств, которые язык выявляет в рамках поэтического произведения – «организация» и «изобретение». Эти свойства находятся в отношении комплементарности: «Культура языка – это не только организация, как указывалось выше, но вместе с тем и изобретение. Первая – предваряет второе, но второе в определенный момент неизбежно заявляет свои права» (Винокур 1923, с. 207). Организация языка по отношению к составным компонентам, его умение активизировать весь набор единиц, составляющих его как знаковая система, является тем, на что положен поэтический текст. Организация должна довести до проявления таких связей между языковыми элементами, которые раскрывают новый вид отношений между ними, а это уже является предпосылкой для новых, своеобразных языковых изобретений. Винокуру интересны именно те возможности и механизмы, при помощи которых осуществляются эти изобретения, более того, именно в этом он видит значение и роль поэтического дела. Комментируя «установку» футуристов на язык улицы, он рассматривает ее как попытку преодоления этого языка, как попытку достижения такой организации языкового материала, которая выявит новые структурные отношения, в рамках которых «инерция» повседневного языка будет преодолена. «От наклейки о сдаче комнаты в наем и конферирования на митинге до поэтического произведения и ораторской речи – лежит путь преодоления языковой инерции» (Винокур 1923, с. 204) и еще: «Футуристы не руководились готовым образцом, они преодолевали тот мас-

совый, разговорный язык, откуда черпали материал для своего языкового творчества» (Винокур 1923, с. 207). На самом деле задача поэтов футуристов в том, чтобы «сделать язык улицы», поскольку «Улица – косноязычна, она не владеет речью, не знает языка, на котором говорит, следуя лишь слепому инстинкту» (Винокур 1923, с. 206).

Для Винокура организация языка и новые проявления отношений элементов являются не только внутренними свойствами самого языка, они вырабатываются в результате его социальной жизни, разных контекстовых употреблений и наложений, которые язык накапливает, будучи системой единого социального поля. Представление о языке как о системе поглощающей и усваивающей разные социальные и культурные коды преимущественно на уровне лексического состава, но еще и на фонетическом, морфологическом и синтаксическом уровне, конституирует язык как динамическую, открытую и развивающуюся систему. Так именно, по мнению лингвиста, совершается и смена исторических школ и литературных приемов, господствующих в определенной исторической эпохе. Он интерпретирует эту смену как непрерывный диалектический процесс, как процесс взаимодействия между определёнными художественными системами. «Но формы поэзии, как и всякого иного искусства, развиваются диалектически. Возникая на почве противоречия, создавшегося в силу определенных причин между наличными художественными традициями и параллельными фактами быта – они умирают, как только противоречие это устранено, но только для того, чтобы восстановить его вновь. Конкретная художественная задача решается, однако, каждый раз по разному» (Винокур 1923, с. 205–206). В этой перспективе, что делают футуристы, «нарушение традиции» весьма закономерно. Это «нарушение» представляет собой явление, которое обосновано динамикой исторических и культурных перемен, поскольку «культура организует, а потому требует и разложе-

ния – она строится противоречиями» (Винокур 1923, с. 212).

Для лингвиста это порождающее и продуктивное противоречие лежит в основе системы языка, эта диалектика культуры кодирована в языке, однако для ее интенсификации и проявления способствуют преимущественно поэтические практики. Именно они раскрывают и обнажают культурные слои и социальные маркеры языковой системы. По отношению к этому работы Маяковского, Хлебникова и Крученых, а в прошлом и Некрасова, весьма показательны, по мнению исследователя. Их преимущество перед остальными поэтами в том, что «первые сознательно приступили к языковому изобретению, показали путь лингвистической инженерии, поставили проблему «безъязыкой улицы», и притом – как проблему поэтическую и социальную одновременно» (Винокур 1923, с. 208). Для Винокура предназначение и суть поэзии в «делании языка» (хотя, по его мнению, этот процесс может развиваться на всех уровнях употребления языка). Однако это было бы возможным, только если «успеем покончить с представлением о языке, как о неприкосновенной святыне», и если «вопрос о возможности сознательного воздействия на язык со стороны говорящего коллектива» станет более популярным как в научных, так и в широких общественных кругах. На этом этапе только поэты могут «делать язык», притом только те, у кого есть «воля – не только учиться языку, но и делать язык, не только организовывать элементы языка, но и изобретать новые связи между этими элементами» (Винокур 1923, с. 207). Посредством активизации всех языковых ресурсов, актуализации забытых значений и функций отдельных языковых элементов, посредством их укладки в новой структуре отношений осуществляется и «культура языка», приобретенная и накопленная в динамике исторического процесса. Нововведения генерируют разнообразные и многопластовые отношения, при помощи которых выделяются и разные культурные слои.

Таким образом язык выступает как сложная, полифоническая система, выражающая разные культурные, социальные и исторически «голоса». Наряду с этим, вбирая в себе именно эти темпорально обусловленные «голоса», язык преодолевает себя на каждом этапе своего существования. Культурные и социальные факторы ведут к непрерывному преодолению данного языкового статус-кво, к преодолению языковой системы, характерной для определенного исторического периода. Язык постоянно преодолевает себя, свой состав и отношения элементов, которые встречаются на данном этапе исторического процесса. Это отчетливо можно отметить и уловить именно в поэтической практике. Винокур заканчивает свою работу тезисом, которым он начал: «язык есть объект культурного преодоления в нашем социальном быту». Таким образом именно в своем практическом употреблении язык берет на себя выполнение функции деавтоматизации, не выдвигая при этом специальную область поэтического, лишая себя коммуникации. Здесь автоматизация и деавтоматизация полностью являются вопросом ежедневного употребления.

«Учение о языке, как о социальном факте, а не индивидуальном высказывании» (Винокур 1923, с. 207) развернуто и в статье Осипа Брика «Т. н. «формальный метод». В ней Брик ставит акцент на двух ключевых образах традиционной эстетики: личность творца и творческий процесс. Осмысление произведения при помощи «индивидуальных качеств и привычек» поэта не осветляет специфику произведения, не объясняет тематику, структурные и языковые особенности и отношения, в которых они находятся в рамках произведения. Брик настаивает на осмыслении литературного произведения независимо от авторской персоналии и на его понимание не как «человеческий документ» или «дневник», а посредством идентифицируемых литературных характеристик, понимаемых на фоне существующей литературной традиции и соци-

альной динамики периода. «Нет поэтов и литераторов, – есть поэзия и литература. Все, что пишет поэт значимо, как часть его работы в общем деле, – и совершенно бесценно, как выявление его «я» (Брик 19231, с. 213).

Именно отказ от прочтения художественного произведения через призму индивидуально-психологических свойств автора, отказ от анализа лирического произведения как анализ внутреннего, эмоционального мира является и одним из принципов, на которых Левый фронт искусства строит свою литературную концепцию и свое понимание о лирике. В этом понимании лирика лишена своих традиционных «лиричных» свойств и проявлений, лишена романтической связи субъективного с интимным. Она не воспринимается как выражение «необъятного», эмоционального мира субъекта (тем более что этот субъект неудовлетворен «здешней» социальной жизнью и в качестве возможного выхода рассчитывает на свою трансгрессию в воображаемом пространстве вечных и абсолютных идей). Не допуская возможности чтения лирики посредством измерения интимного, эстетические взгляды Лефа направлены и против идеи о возможной идентификации между «миром» автора и «миром» читателя. На смену этого предлагается дистанцированное, «научное», «массовое изучение приемов поэтического ремесла». Изучение, которое осмыслит развой литературы и изменение приемов при помощи динамики социального и исторического процесса, при помощи «надлитературных рядов». И здесь основным для изучения и осмысления литературы оказывается противопоставление по координатам: традиция-новаторство, автоматизация-деавтоматизация, канонизация-революция. Потребность в данном подходе для Брика безусловна, поскольку все еще: «У нас нет истории литературы. Есть история «генералов» от литературы». А история поэзии «не книга «житий», а «история развития приемов словесного оформления» (Брик 1923, с. 214). Только

в развитии этих приемов, в динамике «законов словесной обработки» появляются новые произведения. Эту свою логика Брик отчетливо выражает в ставшем позже эмблематическим заявлении: «Не будь Пушкина, «Евгений Онегин» все равно был бы написан» (Брик 1923, с. 213). Если Винокур воспринимает язык полностью на базе его социальной обусловленности, то для Брика социальная детерминация лежит в основе фигуры поэта: «не себя выявляет великий поэт, а только выполняет социальный заказ» (Брик 1923, с. 214).

Ведущий теоретик Лефа связывает социальный заказ с перемещением оси литературы в новое русло – растет потребность в информацию за счет потребности в иллюзии. Это по крайней мере означает, что «установка» литературного выражения должна перестать быть непрагматической и некоммуникативной. Вся претензия в том, что новая социальная ситуация требует повышенного сознания о действительности, а не бегства в сферу эстетического. Представители Лефа отказывают литературе какого-либо доступа к реальности, лишают ее и статута репрезентации, поэтому социальный заказ понимается, как требование не писать литературу, а создавать документалистику и журналистику, т. е. регулярно удерживать информационный дискурс. Важно отметить, что контекст, в котором появляется понятие «социальный заказ» характеризуется комментарием о различиях функциональной установки литературы разных исторических периодов и размещение этой установки в едином поле разных социальных моделей. Понятие появляется и в обобщенных комментариях о литературных практиках прошлых эпох (в статье «Наша словесная работа» Маяковского и Брика) и в конкретных примерах, связанных с эпохой Пушкина (в статье «Т. н. «формальный метод» Брика). Вывод, который можно сделать по отношению к связи между фиксированием понятия и контекстом его употребления, как бы соблюдает общий дух вышесказанного – если эпоха

Пушкина (или другая историческая эпоха) имела потребность в литературе, то новая эпоха такой потребностью не характеризуется, поскольку «новая» эпоха осмысляется как эпоха, которая обеспечила нехватку «эстетического», удовольственного (себе)переживания «нового» человека в социальных модусах.

Еще один концепт традиционной романтической эстетики провоцирует критические отношение Брика – понятие «вдохновение». По его мнению, демистифицирование и деидеализирование творческого процесса являются бесспорной необходимостью. Концепция вдохновения, как «мистического», иррационального, сопровожденного «секретами» акта, заменена концепцией специфического процесса производства, обработки словесного материала. Со своей стороны производство и обработка находятся в прямой зависимости от этапа, на котором находятся литературные формы в актуальной исторической эпохе, а так же и от актуальных трансформаций в социальных тенденциях и настроениях. Поскольку литература и в частности поэзия не рассматриваются как замкнутая и саморегулирующаяся система, а как часть единого поля социальной жизни, взаимодействующая с граничными «надлитературными рядами», то процессы, которые протекают в них нельзя рассматривать в своей самообусловленности и самодостаточности. Смена форм и приемов социально детерминирована и осознается при помощи социальных эффектов и функций. В этом смысле законы словесного оформления и обработки являются темпорально и пространственно обусловленными: «Все великое создано в ответ на запросы дня, что «вечное» сейчас, тогда было злободневно» (Брик 19231, с. 214).

Несмотря на то, что проблема не исчерпана, можно обобщить, что ситуация, в которой развивают свои тезисы представители Лефа – ситуация послереволюционная, требует информативности, которую литература с изначально присущей ей природой деформации и «сдвига» действительности не спо-

собна предоставить. Отсюда проистекают и специфические жанровые трансформации, требуемые Лефом. Лирика, центральная область их творческой деятельности, берет на себя практические, коммуникативные функции.

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The article focuses on some key positions of the Russian avant-garde journal LEF. It provides analysis of texts by Osip Brik, Vladimir Mayakovsky and Georgy Vinokur. In their views the authority of the traditional literary institutions – lyric and prose poetry – is already shaken and rendered problematic. They claim that the literary language needs to transform itself and become closer to what it used to distance itself from – the practical language. According to LEF the post-revolutionary situation necessitates informativness, which literature, with its characteristic modes of deformation and displacement ("sdvig") of reality cannot afford. Therefore LEF insist on specific genre transformations. Lyric poetry, the central field of their literary practice, is forced to acquire practical, communicative function.

RAYA KUNCHEVA

KLEIST'S "ON THE MARIONETTE THEATRE": THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL AND THE LOOK OF AGREEMENT

Heinrich von Kleist was rediscovered at the beginning of the XX century in the context of increasing anti-intellectualism, which pervaded the European spiritual climate and which, in Germany, found expression in the existentialist criticism of the Enlightenment and Hegel's idealism. The studies about him extended rapidly; his life and work became a battlefield of methodological clashes. This conflict of interpretations is above all due to his creation, which is dramatic in its essence, because Kleist, in his plays as well as in his prose, creates characters posing ethical dilemmas, which do not have a single answer.

In the first decades of the XX century Kleist's personages are accepted as living in a world which is not understandable, they are losing and finding themselves in trying to find security. The perception of the crisis in the traditional moral values, sharpened by the experience of the First World War, by the disintegration of the world, in which, in the words of Martin Buber, man does not feel at home, contributed to this new approach.

The perception of crisis, homelessness and loneliness in a world where the irrational power of chance reigned and where, more than ever, the doubt in the clear and universally valid distinction between

good and evil increased is the spiritual situation in which the work of the great German writer found its true readers for the first time. It was then, at the beginning of the XX century, that the essay "On the Marionette Theatre", published in "Berliner Abendblätter", attracted incredible interest with its enigmatic and open-ended character and great artistic merit, which caused Thomas Mann's admiration and inspired writers like Reiner-Maria Rilke and Beckett.

The issues the essay deals with are of such nature that they can be interpreted in different mental paradigms. In the essay, the anthropological issue is introduced in an unexpected way; the strange statement of one of the characters that the mechanical doll is more graceful than man, that it is superior to him, because, being deprived of consciousness, it is never affected, nor is it subject to the law of gravity, is at first sight in the field of the aesthetic. However, Kleist does not remain in it.

It is in the XVIII century that the concept of beauty began to be permanently perceived as an analogy of the concept of good moral behaviour. The idea of moral beauty was also firmly and permanently established in the mentality of that age in different social strata, first in England and later in Germany as well. The concept of the beautiful soul replaced the idea of moral behaviour in the vacuum, formed after the norms of an ethics sanctioned by religion began to lose their power.

The autonomous subject of the Enlightenment is confident in the power of reason not only to explain the world but also to justify the grounds for moral actions. The concept of the beautiful soul combines two incompatible things: the sensuousness, which is external, with the internal, the soul; and for the mentality of the Enlightenment this dichotomy is crucial. The concept of the beautiful soul has to fulfill an important social function because it is through it that the dry moral message can use sensory means to form moral behaviour in the reader. In such a way the two realms of sensuous experience and rational thought can be connected.

> It was in every respect a remarkable phenomenon: in the relatively brief course of only seven or eight decades, beauty of soul had become nothing less than a cardinal ethical ideal of the Enlightenment, which in an age that remained convinced that there was nothing more important than morality meant a great deal indeed. But even more astonishing, perhaps, than the rapidity of its adoption was the apparent universality of its appeal. Traversing all other national, cultural, ideological, and even sexual boundaries, moral beauty emerged as one of the most important concepts defining and guiding the aspirations of countless educated men and women throughout the Western world to attain that supreme, if elusive, goal: the good life. During the late eighteenth century the beautiful soul literally embodied the ultimate achievement of human virtue, and virtue – as almost everyone agreed – was the one indisputably necessary condition of true and permanent happiness.
>
> (Norton 1985:210)

But if the identification of the sensory with the idea in the allegory permeates the novel, if the parallel between internal and external beauty is readily accepted by the learned and laymen men, the theoretical defence of the idea of moral beauty requires special efforts and with his philosophical essay "Über Anmut und Würde" (On grace and dignity) Schiller gives his contribution in this respect. Precisely the concept grace (Anmut) is the theme in the Kleist's essay. The beautiful soul is the ethical ideal of the Enlightenment and Kleist was imbued with it. In his life and in the motives for his decisions as well as in his work and in the conception of his characters the traces of these ideas can easily be found.

Kleist himself admitted in a letter, written to his fiancée in 1801, that in his youth his personality was formed by the idea of improvement, of Bildung, which is the core of moral beauty.

> Ich hatte schon als Knabe (mich dünkt am Rhein durch eine Schrift von Wieland) mir den Gedanken angeeignet, daß die Vervollkommnung der Zweck der Schöpfung wäre. /.../ Aus diesen Gedanken bildete sich so nach und nach eine eigne Religion, und das Bestreben, nie auf einen Augenblick hienieden stillzustehen, und immer unaufhörlich einem höhern Grade von Bildung entgegenzuschreiten, ward bald das einzige Prinzip meiner Tätigkeit. *Bildung* schien mir das einzige Ziel, das des Bestrebens, Wahrheit der einzige Reichtum, der des Besitzes würdig ist. – Ich weiß nicht, liebe Wilhelmine, ob Du diese zwei Gedanken: W a h r h e i t und B i l d u n g, mit einer solchen Heiligkeit denken kannst, als ich – Das freilich, würde doch nötig sein, wenn Du den Verfolg dieser Geschichte meiner Seele verstehen willst. Mir waren sie so heilig, daß ich diesen beiden Zwecken, Wahrheit zu sammeln, und Bildung mir zu erwerben, die *kostbarsten* Opfer brachte.
>
> (Kleist 1978: 199–200)

Thereby he presented his own view, his worldview, his decision to build a life according to a rational idea of moral development through education. Thus this early period of Kleist's life is dominated by the conviction that education is the way to virtue and the man must concern himself primarily with carving out his happiness. The concept of beautiful soul defines his aspirations and aims. But when Kant showed him the limits of reason, Kleist was crushed:

> Vor kurzem ward ich mit der neueren sogenannten Kantischen Philosophie bekannt – und dir muß ich jetzt daraus einen Gedanken mitteilen, indem ich nicht fürchten darf, daß er Dich so tief, so schmerzhaft erschüttern wird, als mich. /.../ Wenn alle Menschen statt der Augen grüne Gläser hätten, so würden sie urteilen müssen, die Gegenstände, welche sie dadurch erblicken, sind grün – und nie

> würden sie entscheiden können, ob ihr Auge ihnen die Dinge zeigt, wie sie sind, oder ob es nicht etwas zu ihnen hinzutut, was nicht ihnen, sondern dem Auge gehört. So ist es mit dem Verstande. Wir können nicht entscheiden, ob das, was wir Wahrheit nennen, wahrhaft Wahrheit ist, oder ob es uns nur so scheint. /.../ Ach, Wilhelmine, wenn die Spitze dieses Gedankens Dein Herz nicht trifft, so lächle nicht über einen andern, dei sich tief in seinem heiligsten Innern davon verwundet fühlt. Mein einziges, mein höchstes Ziel ist gesunken, und ich habe nun keines mehr.
>
> (Kleist 1978: 199–200)

At the beginning of the XX century in the literary criticism on Kleist the concept of beautiful soul received a new meaning, to which the essay "On the Marionette Theatre" contributed. It began to be read as a key to Kleist's work. Interpretations of this essay are certainly continuing to appear claiming that it presents the aesthetic ideas of Romanticism. But as a certain anti-historicism is gathering strength in literary criticism, manifested in the understanding that neither the Enlightenment nor Goethe or Schiller, nor the Romantics can offer a conceptual framework for an adequate comprehension of Kleist, the statement about his isolation and loneliness in the spiritual scenery at the end of the XVIII century and the first decade of the XIX century is becoming well accepted and dominate. Like the marionette the man have to find his own center – so the literary criticism begin to understand Kleist's conception and this center is the Self – particular and unique. The approach of the humanities (Geisteswissenschaft) that, in principle, the creative individuality cannot be thoroughly objectified dominates in literary criticism. In this methodological context, the essay, which until then was almost unnoticed, suddenly acquired a special significance because it was accepted by its commentators as a symbolic presentation of Kleist's own views. The new meaning is formed when philosophy

and literary science cross at the point where existentialism and Geisteswissenschaft meet.

Existentialist philosophy is criticism of the Enlightenment and Idealism because they ignore the issue of the specific existence of the particular individual here and now. Human existence in this new treatment has been in the horizon of authentic communion with God since it was first formulated by Kierkegaard. At the beginning of the XX century Kierkegaard was also discovered for European thought and his followers developed his idea of the synthesis between the eternal and the transient. They developed Kierkegaard in the frame of revision of the concept of the absolute. According to Paul Tillich *Existenzphilosophie* or „Existential philosophy" is one of the major currents of German thought with long history in the past with different faces:

> For Kierkegaard it is the immediate personal experience of the individual in the face of eternity, his personal faith—although interpreted by a most refined dialectical reasoning. For Feuerbach it is the experience of man as man in his sense-existence—although developed into a doctrine of Man. For Marx it is the experience of the socially determined man, his Existence as a member of a social class—though interpreted in terms of a universal socio-economic theory. For Nietzsche it is the experience of a biologically determined being, his Existence as an embodiment of the Will to Power—although expressed in a metaphysics of Life. For Bergson it is the experience of dynamic vitality, man's Existence as duration and creativity—although expressed in words taken from the realm of non-existential space. For Dilthey it is the experience of the intellectual life, man's Existence in a special cultural situation—although explained in a universal *Geistesphilosophie*. For Jaspers it is the experience of the inner activity of the Self, man's Existence as „selftranscendence"—although described in terms of an immanent psychology. For Heidegger it is the experi-

> ence of that kind of being who is „concerned" with Being, with his Existence as care, anxiety, and resoluteness—although Heidegger claims to describe the structure of Being itself.
>
> (Tillich 1964: 88)

In Germany, existentialist thought was involved in the methodological debate in the field of the humanities, which was particularly intensive. Historicism is a methodology based on a specific worldview, which began to be perceived critically at the turn of the XX century. The objectivism of scholarly research and the "secret of life" constitute a paradox, which Wilchelm Dilthey faced. At the beginning of the XX century it was the great problem that caused the clash between the different schools of thought in Germany.

The encounter of existentialist philosophy with the methodological debate in literary studies determines the trends in the studies on Kleist to a very large extent. Literary studies turns to philosophy. In this context, the essay is perceived not so much as a text with artistic value as a symbol of the essence of Kleist's work.

In this study, I am going to consider the views of Gerhard Fricke and Jeanne Nikolova-Galabova, who understand the essay in this way precisely. They are in the same paradigm – the essay is a symbol of Kleist's creation.

G. Fricke was a student of Rudolf Unger, who is one of the most prominent figures in the Geisteswissenschaft. It was he who formulated the opposition Enlightenment – Romanticism, rationalism – irrationalism, and gave an impetus to studying German cultural history in this opposition. This anti-Enlightenment line found support in the general feeling of a crisis in traditional values at the beginning of the XX century and, consequently, created the prerequisites to understanding Kleist in a new way. His youth, the years before the so-called Kant crisis, which was under the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment, began to be regarded as a steel press weighing down on the real Kleist, who dis-

covered himself by managing to denounce his "religion of reason".

R. Unger distinguishes between content that can be learnt and content that flows from individuality itself and can only be expressed symbolically. It is here that the distinction is made between the old approach of literary criticism to Kleist and the new one. The traditional one uses concepts such as worldview and follows the change from an Enlightenment worldview to an idealistic one in Kleist's development; the new one uses the idea of essence and external influences, which can only conceal the internal movement of the real essence. Gerhard Fricke is Unger's student, but radicalizes his ideas. His book *Gefühl und Schicksal bei Heinrich von Kleist* (Feeling and Fate in Kleist), published in 1929, had a very powerful impact and was quickly established as a new approach. Foreign German studies, which did not accept the value opposition Enlightenment – Romanticism uncritically, could not ignore Fricke's new approach completely. In Bulgaria, the critics who wrote about Kleist till 1944 either followed him closely or, in the case of Jeanne Nikolova-Galabova, engaged in a debate with him. She takes a critical position against the opposition Enlightenment – Romanticism and despite accepting his network of concepts she endows them with her own meaning. Moreover, she also uses Fricke's key concept, the feeling, as the centre of her conception – *Der Sieg des Gefühls* (The Victory of Feeling) is the title of her research, published in 1940. In order to determine her position it is not only necessary to compare her interpretation of Kleist's characters with Fricke's, not only to point out the explicit differences and disagreements, which she does by quoting Fricke, but also to interpret the different meaning of the phrases in her text when they are hidden quotations by him. There is another significant fact which has to be considered: Fricke accepted the Nazi regime and became a semi-official figure, which placed him at the forefront of literary criticism.

The aim of this study is the clarification of the difference in the conception of man by Gerhard Fricke and Jeanne Nikolova-

Galabova as a start point of the literary criticism. I will limit myself to only methodological situation in the beginning of XX century but I believe it has a continuation in so far as the two trends, for and against the Enlightenment, remain debatable. Meanwhile, the very paradigm, to which Fricke and Jeanne Nikolova-Galabova belong, fails to see the artistic side of the essay, as I have pointed out above. They consider it entirely in a conceptual aspect. But what remains outside their paradigm is the look people exchange when communicating. From this aspect, from the look face to face in the conversation, I see the possibility for interpretation beyond opposition content – form.

The literary criticism of that period permanently established treatments based on thinking in oppositions, in dichotomies, amounting to juxtaposing the rational and its antipode, the irrational, this category standing for the essence, the powerful driving force, or as Schopenhauer formulates it, opposing the will to the representation or in Nietzsche's terms: Dionysus to Apollo. In this context, Kleist is seen as from the site of Dionysus: He is the modern author who embodies the tragic convulsions of XX century Man. Living at the turn of the XVIII century, he denounced the rationalism of the Enlightenment, the sensitivity of Sturm und Drang, the exoticism of Romanticism and turned, like Søren Kierkegaard, to his own existence.

One moment in his biography, the so-called Kant crisis, is commented on differently by Fricke and Jeanne Nikolova-Galabova. In a letter to his fiancée Wilhelmina, written in the winter of 1801, mentioned above, he described the effect of *The Critique of Pure Reason* as a turning point in his life, when the confidence he had in reason was undermined, when the aim giving meaning to his life suddenly lost its value, when he was left without "his religion". That moment acted as a catalyst for the internal process of finding his identity and the path to his becoming a writer was open. His very biography seems to mirror the spiritual situation in the

first decades of the XX century: reason is deposed; it is powerless to give directions in an incognizable world. Kleist became one of the most vivid examples of the deep confusion caused by Kant's *Critique* by introducing the concept of things in themselves. The world of phenomena is only cognizable; the subject with the a priori forms of time and space creates a world from chaotic sensory data. The noumenal world is incognizable in principle. Thus a line is drawn between the world of necessity and the sensory and the world of freedom and morals in Kant's universe. With his third Critique, *The Critique of the Judgment*, Kant is trying to build a bridge between the first two. But the analogy between the world of reason and the world of morals is stronger for Kleist. If the human being has access only to the phenomenon but not to the essence and this dichotomy refers to the moral as well, all efforts to build a personality, focusing life on Bildung are futile and Kleist did not see any other aims before him. Some authors even claim that Kant drove Kleist to committing suicide in 1811.

Goethe's and Schiller's, Friedrich Schlegel's and Novalis's contemporary, he, like Hölderlin, occupies his own independent place. In his life, circumstances met and connected him with representatives of late Romanticism, whose spiritual attitude and artistic quests are different from his. (Silz 1929) His relationship with Goethe was complicated. On Kleist's part, it ranged from recognition as an authority whose approval was of vital importance, recognition which contained in itself Kleist's endeavour to surpass Goethe, to profound bitterness and anger. On Goethe's part, it was distancing, an inappropriate revision of the comedy *Der zerbrochne Krug*, which led to the failure of the performance, and a feeling of indignation and dismay after reading *Penthesilea*. Exclaiming "Damned artificiality!" Goethe burnt the manuscript, which Kleist had sent with a moving dedication.

Existentialist thought in the first decades of the XX century was based on two ideas, through which it criticised the Enlighten-

ment. First, the issue of primary importance is not the essence; it is existence, specific, individual and concrete. Secondly, it is not reason that can give adequate knowledge about existence. The search for the metaphysical Gestaltdeutung in German literary studies stems from here. This metaphysical reality refers to the unique and the specific, to Kleist's existence here and now, which cannot adequately be expressed through concepts. To designate it, Fricke uses the concept of the feeling. With this idea he denounces the conceptions of the Enlightenment about the subject as well as those of Idealism and Romanticism and his statements gain their meaning through the categorical rejection of the ideas of the XVIII century because of their universality and abstractness.

According to Fricke, the metaphysical nature of the Self is inaccessible for the rationalism of the Enlightenment, because it is characterised by the conviction that the Self can dominate over reality through reason and, consequently, all the issues connected with the Self's lack of confidence when faced with chance are foreign to it.

> Daher war der Lebensplan keineswegs eine Art fix und fertiger Entwurf zum rationalen Aufbau des empirisch-bürgerlichen Daseins, wie es nach der aufklärerischen Deutung der Fall sein müßte. Denn für die Aufklärung bestand ja die religiöse Problematik der Freiheit: die Bedrohung des Ich durch den Gegenstand und den Zufall noch gar nicht. Sie war, im Besitze der Ratio, der Herrschaft über die Wirklichkeit gewiß, deren "rationelle" Meisterung sie als ihre Aufgabe empfand.
>
> (Fricke 1963: 9)

The "life plan", which Kleist believes has to lead him, because the maturity of an autonomous subject manifests itself in his ability to make his own destiny, is a concept that seems to demonstrate the ideas of the Enlightenment in Kleist's worldview in this period

of his life most clearly. Fricke argues against this interpretation and believes that, as this "life plan" has no empirical aims, it is a testimony to Kleist's idealism. According to Fricke the incorrect interpretation in the literary criticism on Kleist was due to the confusion of aim and means; the aim is idealistic but the means are rational.

> Kleist suchte jenes idealistische Ziel auf dem realistischen Wege, auf dem Wege der wissenschaftlichen Vertiefung und Bewältigung der Gesamtwirklichkeit zu erreichen.
>
> (Fricke 1963: 10)

Kleist left his military career and decided to devote his life to science. Consequently, Fricke does not accept an interpretation which uses the concept worldview; he does not see a change of one worldview with another in Kleist's spiritual journey. He aims to clarify a constant attitude in Kleist, the search for "the eternal meaning of his existence here and now in his specific being". He calls this search a vital feeling and fills it with metaphysical meaning:

> Kleists inneres Anliegen bei dem Lebensplan ist so unaufklärerisch wie möglich und scheinbar ganz idealistisch: Er will, unter Verachtung aller bloß empirischen und relativen Zwecke, den ewigen Sinn seines Daseins finden; /.../ die Gewißheit des Ewigen, die Wahrheit, dies Wort in einem absoluten und religiösen Sinn verstanden.
>
> (Fricke 1963: 9–10)

> Er besteht darin, daß die Frage nach Gott, nach der Welt und nach dem Du unter völliger innerer Aufnahme der idealistischen Erkenntnis des Ewigen als des Unbedingten auf dem Boden des nachidealistischen Erlebnisses der Urrealität des Ich neu gestellt ist.
>
> (Fricke 1963: 26)

> Das Ich des Idealismus ist zuletzt „rein", d. h. es ist eine Idee, ein identisches Prinzip, der Inbegriff der idealistischen Entdeckung des Ungegebenen, Transzendentalen, des Un-gegenständlichen.Kleist aber konnte auf Grund seines nachidealistischen – dieser Begriff im prinzipiellen, nicht im zeitlichen Sinne gebraucht – Erlebnisses der Urwirklichkeit der menschlichen Existenz diese idealistische Scheidung von empirischem und transzendentalem, also „reinem" Ich überhaupt nicht verstehen. Denn diese Scheidung – die Voraussetzung der idealistischen Lösung – ist ja selbst nur der Ausdruck dafür, daß der Idealismus, die Existenz überspringend, vermitteln des reinen Denkens das konkrete, wirkliche Ich in das abstrakt-allgemeine, das transzendentale Prinzip eines „Ich überhaupt" aufgelöst hat.
>
> (Fricke 1963: 35)

Jeanne Nikolova-Galabova rejects this attitude. According to her, "Kleist looks for a manifestation of the eternal in his life and believes that every person has to find their eternal purpose in life, destined for them by God. At first he looks for it through reason, but after his disappointment with reason, he asserts the feeling as the only means of communion between Man and God. Man finds his purpose in life through the feeling." (Nikolova 1940: 23) The feeling in Jeanne Nikolova-Galabova's conception is a means of achieving being, for Fricke it is being itself. We also find this major difference between Jeanne Nikolova-Galabova and Gerhard Fricke in the interpretation of the essay "On the Marionette Theater". Both of them accept it as a key to understanding Kleist's work; for both of them the external world cannot cause the absolute feeling, the discursively inexpressible metaphysical centre, to hesitate. In this sense, the marionette is a symbol and an idea.

According to Fricke, content, referring to the innermost essence, to "the invisible centre of his work", can only be conveyed through a symbol. It is impossible to reach it through an abstract

concept, through logic or psychological analysis. According to him, the entire value of the essay is in symbol of the marionette.

According to Fricke, when Kleist begins to theorize, when he develops his thoughts on his work, they are mostly ambiguous. In order to be understood they have to be included in the hermeneutic circle and to be referred to this symbolic centre, which, on its part, can be clarified only if all Kleist's works are included as well as his letters and any other testimonies to his spiritual life. Thus the essay here constitutes an illustration of the method of the humanities.

The centre is the secret reality of the Self. It is the source of everything. A centre which does not equal the finite but has metaphysical character. The centre or the soul is the opposite of the sensory and the finite and, in this sense, belongs to the world of ideas, to the intelligible, to the infinite:

> Dies Zentrum ist die geheimnisvolle, verborgene Wirklichkeit des Ich, der „Seele", wie Kleist sie hier und auch sonst nennt, der Quell alles Schmerzes und aller Seligkeit. Um sie kreisen die Symbolik und alle Gedanken des Aufsatzes. Es ist an jener Gliederpuppe der geheimnisvolle Schwerpunkt, der doch nicht ein Teil wie alle andern Teile ist, sondern die unsichtbare, allmächtige Mitte, die allen endlichen Teilen wie dem endlichen Ganzen gegenüber eine unendliche Bedeutung hat, ähnlich der die Kraft der Schwere überwindenden „Seele" des Gewölbes.
>
> (Fricke 1963: 150–151)

Here Fricke uses a symbol, the "soul" of the arch, which Kleist introduces in a letter to his sister again dramatically, as a clash between two forces, his inner state: each part of the arch is trying to fall on the strength of the law of gravity but the arch does not collapse. According to Fricke, this innermost reality, which cannot be objectified completely through the familiar terms of psychology, i.e. positivism is powerless here, can at least

be defined through its action. Fricke defines it by the formulation "holy absolutely specific law of the entity". The separate personality, being concrete and unique, is also absolute. It is absolute as far as it remains true to itself. Remaining true to itself, it possesses "infinite anti-gravitational force". This conception of the personality has had different metamorphoses through the ages and we can find it as early as Plato's *Dialogues* but here, compared to this long tradition, it appears in a modified form: the absolute is a personal existence and not a look inside and then upwards as it is in Saint Augustine, nor is it a reality you confront face to face as it is in Pietism. It is because it is the absolute, i.e. the sensory and the accidental cannot affect it, that it is capable of overcoming Man's finiteness or as Fricke prefers to put it: "the infinite anti-gravitational force" and "the ability to remain true to itself" mean that the soul overcomes "all laws of finiteness".

This way of thinking combines the absolute and the concrete in one entity, the unique Ego. Indeed, the Ego is no longer a means; abstract ideas are not substantiated through it. Ethical imperatives are dry and fruitless until they are transformed into this innermost reality. The subject-object relationship is rejected because something that cannot be objectified in principle is given as the "object" of thought.

Can the subject view itself as an object? However, another type of cognition, the symbolic one, is possible.

Mr. C, the protagonist of the essay, is a well-known and respected dancer in the opera, who is fond of the marionette theatre, a street art, and arouses the narrator's interest in it. He introduces the transcendental concept "soul", describing the mechanism of the marionette, but he also means the man moving the marionette. According to Mr. C, the relationship between the doll and the man is not purely mechanical:

> Keineswegs, antwortete er. Vielmehr verhalten sich die Bewegungen seiner Finger zur Bewegung der daran

> befestigten Puppen ziemlich künstlich, etwa wie Zahlen zu ihren Logarithmen oder die Asymptote zur Hyperbel.
> (Kleist 1978a: 475)

In mathematical terms, Kleist introduces the concept of infinity because the relation between the numbers and the logarithm is one of convergence but never of complete coincidence. In other words, Mr. C says, again in the idiom of mathematics, that the relationship is not mechanical; it is not a relationship of cause and effect, a relationship of necessity.

But it is also perfectly clear that the introduction of the concept of the soul is a matter of viewpoint. The phrase "the realm of mechanical forces" on analogy evokes its antipode, the phrase "the realm of freedom", i.e. the world of ethics and moral choice.

Relativity is an issue Kleist was interested in and concerned about after Kant introduced the concept of the things in themselves. He discovered it as an issue in ethics and asked himself whether there could be absolute evil in the multifaceted human world; he also found relativity in distinguishing between good and evil.

The human world is multifaceted in its essence, the viewpoints are different but is total nihilism possible? Even in his early essay on happiness he studies how far the doctrine of misanthropy might go. And he asks himself if the soul can be so big as to encompass the hatred to the entire world.

It is necessary to emphasize that the possibility of different viewpoints in Kleist is not only a statement but is manifested as a principle in his work; we find the acknowledgement of the existence of a different viewpoint in the very structure of the unfolding of the text. Mr. C has his own idea about "the path of the soul" in the marionette's dance but this does not prevent him from accepting his interlocutor's point of view; it is possible, one can view the marionettes only as a mechanism, moved by the turning of a handle like a street organ.

According to Fricke, the different points of view are erased. It is not only that the dialogue turns into a monologue but also the boundary between the categories of the mechanical and the human is erased. The marionette stops being an object and is only a symbol of the soul. To clarify this positive thought about the force of the "centre" Fricke uses the explanation of its opposite, to put it figuratively, what delays the influence of the centre on the marionette or makes it impossible, what interrupts the immediate security of earthly predestination and, by doing so, the infinite power that it should be fulfilled. Kleist calls it: consciousness, reflection, knowledge, affectation.

Actually, the unhindered action of the centre in the marionette, the fact that the centre of weight of the movement always coincides with the moving force makes it different from Man. "Consciousness, reflection, knowledge and affectation" are possible only in the human world, in society.

Mr. C answers his interlocutor's question about what the advantages of the marionette over the human dancer are by pointing out two: the marionette is not affected and is not subject to the law of gravity, because the force that raises it is more powerful than the force of gravity.

> Der Vorteil? Zuvörderst ein negativer, mein vortrefflicher Freund, nämlich dieser, daß sie sich niemals zierte. — Denn Ziererei erscheint, wie Sie wissen, wenn sich die Seele (vis motrix) in irgendeinem andern Punkte befindet, als in dem Schwerpunkt der Bewegung. Da der Maschinist nun schlechthin, vermittelst des Drahtes oder Fadens, keinen andern Punkt in seiner Gewalt hat, als diesen: so sind alle übrigen Glieder, was sie sein sollen, tot, reine Pendel, und folgen dem bloßen Gesetz der Schwere; eine vortreffliche Eigenschaft, die man vergebens bei dem größesten Teil unsrer Tänzer sucht.
>
> (Kleist 1978a: 476)

To sound more convincing, Mr. C gives examples with the performances of specific dancers but the essay does not have the nature of a theatre review. On the contrary, the mistakes do not refer to a specific dancer but to the human race. We have eaten from the tree of knowledge and paradise is closed to us. The biblical event is not narrated in Kleist's essay; it is portrayed like the scene of the original sin from a painting. Instead of Adam and Eve, it is we, the people, who ate from the tree of knowledge and were expelled from the Garden of Eden. The way back is closed and we will not be allowed in by the angels so we must find another way to return to Paradise.

> Solche Mißgriffe, setzte er abbrechend hinzu, sind unvermeidlich, seitdem wir von dem Baum der Erkenntnis gegessen haben. Doch das Paradies ist verriegelt und der Cherub hinter uns; wir müssen die Reise um die Welt machen, und sehen, ob es vielleicht von hinten irgendwo wieder offen ist.
>
> (Kleist 1978a: 476)

In Mr. C's words, Kleist, in his maximally concise way of narrating, presents a belief in the development of the world, shared by many of his contemporaries, who, just like him, are under Rousseau's influence. Man is good by nature, but knowledge, civilization and property corrupt him. A belief in achieving a future state of humanity which will fulfill the high aspirations is also widespread and all efforts are directed to this end. Yet, at the time Kleist wrote, the essay the enthusiasm of XVIII century Enlightenment had waned and the ideas for a new humanity, the so-called idealistic humanism, gave way to nationalist confrontation. However, in the field of moral thought, Rousseau's view of Man is contrasted with the old moralists' views as well as with Hobbs's view of Man being evil by nature. Fricke's commentary on this passage from the essay differs from what Kleist wrote.

> Kleist erwähnt den Sündenfall, der die Menschen, – wie er es in charakteristischer Umkehrung von Grund und Folge sagt, – durch die Erkenntnis, d. i. durch die *Bewußtheit* ihres Handelns, böse machte.
>
> (Fricke 1963: 151)

According to Fricke, Kleist confuses cause with effect. In order to maintain this he bases his conclusion on the premise that people are bad and as a result of this they have consciousness. This is a view which resembles Hobbs's and is dominant in one of the trends of XX century existentialist philosophy. Abandoned in his depravity, Man reclaims his being by overcoming the reflection which objectifies everything. Reflection is contrasted with feeling, as a primeval source of being and not as a specific feeling felt at a specific moment in contrast with another specific moment. Consequently, according to Fricke, reflection belongs to finite consciousness whereas feeling belongs to infinite consciousness. Reflection is mediated through concepts, without which it is impossible, while feeling is spontaneous. Respectively, the Self which has achieved its existence, "an Self at one with itself, existing through the absolute in the feeling of its earthly predestination" and the psychological and empirical Self are two opposite states: the gracefulness of the marionette and the young man who has lost his gracefulness and is consciously trying to repeat his spontaneous gesture in front of the mirror in vain. Fricke contrasts the absolute Self and empirical Self not only because of his methodological ambition to reject the conceptions about Man of the previous philosophical doctrines as untenable but also to establish as an ideal a new version of the beautiful soul, the Self which does not allow chance to destroy its spontaneous confidence in itself.

Fricke's debate with Brockman is quite indicative. The beautiful soul, the marionette is only subordinate to its internal moving force. Everything that comes from the outside belongs to the category of reflection. Fricke studies the Self as standing "in front of the

absolute question of its predestination" as an existential problem instead of the concept of "life" introduced by Dilthey, with which he seeks to overcome Kant's dichotomous concept about Man as belonging to two worlds: the world of the senses and the world of reason, instead of the formulation of the wholeness of the subject as Gesamtzusammenhang des Lebens. When Fricke uses expressions such as " the unconditional in religion", he does not have in mind the turning of the subject towards the transcendental but the intensity, the total absorption of the Self by the solution of its existential problem.

The stories included in the essay, are also read by Fricke in the light of the symbol. The conception of Schiller, Schlegel and Novalis about the future of mankind, which is a possible context for the understanding of the essay, in Fricke's interpretation loses its utopian character as an aim of the development of mankind. But basing his approach upon the symbol as an instrument for gaining knowledge, he loses all access to the text as fiction and his interpretation discovers what it has used as a premise. The soul, the pure feeling, the infinite consciousness, all these concepts serve to name the absolute in the concrete as an ideal. For Fricke there is no fundamental difference whether erasing the boundary between the absolute and "finite consciousness" is achieved after a period of "self-loss" or, as it is with some of Kleist's characters, most obviously with Käthchen, the pure feeling remains resolutely independent of the outer world. And here lies the fundamental difference between Fricke's interpretation and the interpretation of Jeanne' Nikolova-Galabova. According to her, the features of the beautiful soul and the grace of the marionette are not bearers of the dramatic nature, by them is impossible to create a tragic conflict. Käthchen is a character belonging to the world of fairy tales; Herman is a character from a play, which Kleist created to serve the specific historical moment. In other words, these protagonists who are illustrative of the notion of the beautiful soul, which the contemporary viewer and

reader finds most difficult to accept, are created as an illustration of a thesis, not as dramatic characters. For Frike there is no difference between these ideal characters and the others who walk their tragic paths to find themselves, more rarely in life, more often in death. The structure of the human soul resembles that of the marionette. Finding the existence means to remain true to yourself with your absolute feeling. The metaphysical reality of the soul is the essence and only it determines the moral ideal. For Jeanne-Nikolova Galabova, Kleist's Man belongs to two worlds: that of the senses and that of intelligence. Neither of them can be reduced with respect to the other, the marionette's grace is an ideal, not the reality of the human world. The feeling has its absolute dimensions in this ideal even when it is a feeling towards a concrete other.

According to Fricke, Schiller's concept of the beautiful soul, as long as it aims to overcome the dualism between the senses and duty, is also a concession to the empirical world and the beautiful soul cannot play the role of ideal by itself. In his philosophical - aesthetic texts Schiller tries to save the ethical ideal of the Enlightenment. He introduces the notion of grace to designate the merging of beauty with the world of freedom or that of morality. Kleist belongs to the generation which comes after Schiller and in his early essay about the sure way towards happiness shows continuity (virtue is happiness) as well as a certain distance from Schiller. In "Aufsatz, den sichern Weg des Glücks zu finden..." (1798) to present his concept of happiness more clearly, he gives an example with the pleasure and delight that the beautiful soul feels when contemplating its virtue, its moral acts. This look of inner contemplation resembles the structure of the marionette.

But the young Kleist is very different from the Kleist one year before his suicide, when he wrote the essay about the marionette theatre. Does reflection mean to him only the intrusion of reason destroying the spontaneity of art, an idea familiar from the aesthetics of Romanticism? We have to read the essay not only as a text in

which views are put forward, but also as a narrative. Then we will be able to see all gestures and movements of the looks exchanged between the two characters, which, together with the spoken words, represent the conversation, which is the event the essay is about. Each character tells his story; and the look of the other, which destroys the spontaneity and grace, participates in these stories within the story. The logic of the objectifying look can be traced here. But apart from this logic there is also another one, that of the story, in which the speakers have to support each other, so that the conversation can take place, so that neither of them will lose interest or the necessary dose of trust in the words of the other, in order to see that this makes sense in continuing the conversation. Here too, every precipitated decision can lead to the breaking up of the conversation. That is why, I regard as an essential element in the development of the text the moment in which each character, in his turn, discontinues his support and directs his supporting look towards the earth. It is human to wait before taking a decision, because neither support nor self-confidence can be absolute.

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Толкования и интерпретации эссе Генриха фон Клейста „О театре марионеток" в XX веке производят впечатление как своими разнообразием и разнонаправленностью, так и тем, что определяющие их взгляды о человеке взаимно исключают друг друга. Из пестрой картины разных мнений, отражающих и методологическое многообразие, и методологические конфронтации, в статье отчетливо обозначены две линии. Первая линия сфокусирована на понятии „грация" и переосмысливает понятие Шиллера о „прекрасной душе". Рассмотрены трактовки Г. Фрике и Жаны Николовой-Гылыбовой. Они представляют ту эпистемологическую линию, которая начиная с библейского грехопадения, отказывает человеку в возможности ясного видения сути, которой нельзя достичь посредством субъект-объектного отношения. Вторая линия рассматривает эссе Клейста в плане дискурса. В статье предлагается интерпретация, фокусирующаяся на взгляде как на мотиве в тексте эссе, с новым аспектом, вводящим субъект-субъектное отношение.


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