INSTYTUT BADAŃ LITERACKICH
POLSKIEJ AKADEMII NAUK

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БЪЛГАРСКА АКАДЕМИЯ НА НАУКИТЕ

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ПАМЯТЬ И ТЕКСТ



MEMORY AND TEXT

БОЯН ПЕНЕВ
ИЗДАТЕЛСКИ ЦЕНТЪР

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MEMORY AND TEXT

Cognitive and Cultural Aspects

ПАМЯТЬ И ТЕКСТ

Когнитивные и културологичные аспекты

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БАН - Институт
за литература
БИБЛИОТЕКА

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Cognitive and Cultural Aspects

Editors
Teresa Dobrzyńska
Raya Kuncheva

РНБ АТНР

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TERESA DOBRZYŃSKA

ВСТУПЛЕНИЕ

Память – это единственная форма
существования моего „я".
(André Maurois,
A la recherche de Marcel Proust)

Сборник научных трудов *Память и текст. Когнитивные и культурологические аспекты* содержит результаты совместной работы группы болгарских и польских ученых, посвященной явлению памяти. Память принадлежит к ряду наиболее существенных проблем антропологии и находит свое отражение во всех отраслях деятельности человека, в том числе, в языковой коммуникации и литературном творчестве. Работа велась в рамках программы научных взаимоконтактов между двумя академическими институтами: Институтом литературы Болгарской академии наук в Софии и Институтом литературных исследований Польской академии наук в Варшаве. 16–17 июня 2003 года в Софии состоялась организованная ими дискуссионная беседа, в которой приняли участие и ученые из других польских и болгарских университетских кругов.

Несмотря на то, что софийская конференция должна была стать выражением официального сотрудничества Болгарской АН и Польской АН, она приобрела для участников – представителей двух, довольно отдаленных научных центров – характер подлинной интеллектуально вдохновляющей встречи. Этому способствовал уже сам

выбор темы. У лиц, принимающих участие в программе, появилось приятное ощущение совпадения в стремлении сосредоточить внимание на анализе явления памяти. Это сходство в определении тематики, подтверждающее значимость и актуальность проблемы памяти, было для участников конференции предвестником существенных и плодотворных дискуссий, вписывающихся в более широкий контекст фундаментальных исследований современных гуманитарных наук. Ведь в последние годы в научных рассуждениях гуманитариев обнаруживается особая чуткость по отношению к вопросу исторической памяти, выявляются проблемы личности или разлома личности субъекта; было разработано новое понимание традиции культуры, что сопровождается изучением интертекстуальных процессов, довольно знаменательных в современной концепции произведения искусства. Все эти явления культуры основываются на функционировании механизмов памяти.

Тема, которую мы выбрали, была сколь привлекательной, столь и сложной в восприятии, что вызвало необходимость в соответствующем сужении изучаемого пространства, а заодно и умение учесть широкие контексты и интердисциплинарные связи. Подняв эту тему мы замечали интерес, который она издавна вызывала, и особенно в [illegible]днее время, среди ученых разных гуманитарных специально- Здесь мы не можем привести перечень всех опубликованных следний период научных трудов, подтверждающих глубокую тересованность в данной проблеме. Отметим только, что в него ключаются разработки многих философов, психологов, неврофизиологов, педагогов, социологов, историков, политологов, литературоведов, и даже... самого папы римского.

Выбрав память предметом филологических исследований, а в дальнейшем, приготовив свои выступления для конференции, авторы научных трудов, представленных в настоящем издании, отчетливо понимают, насколько в теме памяти скрываются богатые конгломераты вопросов и насколько существенные вызывает она импликации. Память притягивала внимание ученых в разных формах своего проявления, а также в различных способах фиксации

– как механизм мысли, как понятийное содержание, подвергающееся преобразованию и сохранению в уме; как ее эквиваленты, закрепленные в текстах и изобретениях культуры, а также как связанные с ней дискурсивные процессы и литературная деятельность. В ходе исследований и дискуссий мы осознавали предопределяющее присутствие памяти в ежедневной познавательной и коммуникационной практике человека, как индивидуальной, так и групповой; обнаруживали ее влияние на изображение мира, находящееся под контролем понятийных категорий языка; мы наблюдали за ее проявлениями в литературе, в закрепленных формах и ритуалах общественной жизни.

Тема, которая стала общим объектом размышлений, представлена в настоящем сборнике в разных частных аспектах и с разной точки зрения. Звеном, связывающим все затронутые в научных трудах проблемы, является общая – относительно общая – методология, свойственная этим трудам. Все они поднимают вопрос, связанный с функционированием памяти в языковой коммуникации и в литературных произведениях, вписываясь в новаторские исследовательские направления, такие как когнитивизм в языкознании, нейросемиотика, исследования связности текста и теория дискурса, новые подходы в литературоведении (м. пр. проблематика субъекта высказывания и вопросы повествования), изучение языка убеждения и рекламы. Все представленные здесь труды отражают современное стремление к расширению горизонта филологических исследований путем изучения философской и антропологической проблематики. Именно языковедческая и литературоведческая перспективы являются той чертой настоящего сборника, которая отличает его от других работ, посвященных памяти – психологических, исторических или антропологических. Этот отличительный фактор следует и считать надлежащим обоснованием и оправданием проведения наших исследований в этой области.

TERESA DOBRZYŃSKA

FOREWORD

Memory is the only lasting form of my "I".
(André Maurois, A la recherche de Marcel Proust)

The collective study *Memory and Text. Cognitive and Cultural Aspects* presents the results of Bulgarian and Polish scholars` common debate on the phenomenon of memory which constitutes one of the most essential anthropological questions and reflects on all fields of human activity including linguistic communication and literary works. This cooperation took place within the framework of a programme of scholarly contacts between two academic institutes: the Institute of Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Sofia (BAN) and the Institute of Literary Research at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (PAN) which held a panel discussion in Sofia, from June 16. to 17. 2003 with the cooperation of researchers from other Polish and Bulgarian university communities.

Albeit the conference in Sofia was to have been merely a part of an official cooperation between BAN and PAN, it turned out to be utterly authentic, intellectually stimulating to an extent much greater than it is usually expected in case of discussions and contacts between two academic communities as unacquainted with one another. It was a result of the choice of the theme itself. People participating in the programme chanced to experience the moment of the exciting discovery that both communities – independently of each other – expressed their will to focus the common researches on the phenomenon of memory. This co-

incidence of thematic proposals, only emphasizing the momentum and actuality of the problem, gave those present a foretaste of their future participation in an undertaking of great importance inhering in the context of the basic inquiries of modern humanities. In current discussions between humanists a particular sensitivity towards the questions of historical memory can be perceived, problems of identity and the disintegration of the subject`s identity are being explored, a new understanding of cultural tradition has been developed, it accompanied by the observation of intertextual devices, so characteristic of the contemporary conception of a work of art. All these phenomena are based on the functioning of the mechanisms of memory.

The chosen theme was as enticing as it was difficult due to the necessity to narrow down the field of our researches and, at the same time, enable a skillful consideration of wider contexts and interdisciplinary correlations. We took up this theme having noticed the interest it has been arousing, also lately, in scholars representing various branches of humanities. It is not the proper place to enumerate the many studies related to the subject, yet it would mean no effort to mention a great number of such recent publications prepared by philosophers, psychologists, neurophysiologists, pedagogues, sociologists, historians, politologists, literary researchers, and even...the Pope.

Having chosen memory as object of philological research, while working on their conference papers, the authors of the studies were becoming more and more aware of the complexity of this set of questions and the significance of the implications it involves. Memory has been attracting researchers` attention to all spheres of manifestation of the phenomenon, also to its various linguistic and symbolic ways of notation – as mental mechanism, expressional matter processed and stored in the human mind, its equivalents preserved in verbal texts and products of culture as well as all discoursive procedures and literary practices connected with it. In the course of our researches and discussions we became more aware of its determining presence in everyday cognitive and communicational experience – both in its individual and collective dimension; we discovered its influence on the world image controlled by

the language expressional categories, we observed its manifestations in literature and social rituals.

The theme which was to become object of common reflections has been exposed as seen from various particular viewpoints and many perspectives. What unites studies dedicated to different questions is the one – relatively cohesive – methodological ground characterizing the here presented treatises. They all discuss questions related to the functioning of memory in linguistic communication and literary works inherent to novel research trends, such as the cognitive branch of linguistics, neurosemiotics, researches on textual cohesion, the theory of discourse, new approaches in literary studies (among others the problems of the subject of the statement and narratological questions), research on persuasive discourse and commercial. They demonstrate the contemporary tendency towards broadening the horizons of philological research with the help of philosophical and anthropological problems. It is this linguistic and literary perspective that renders this collective study different from other – psychological, historical or anthropological – publications dealing with the question of memory, and it is this characteristic trait that explains and justifies our decision to conduct researches in the field.

ANGEL ANGELOV

"QUELLA ROMA ONDE CRISTO È ROMANO": THE CONCERN FOR EUROPE IN THE WORKS OF ERICH AUERBACH[1]

The article studies the understanding and the concept of Europe in the works of Auerbach. Erich Auerbach (1892–1957) was a Romance philologist, professor in the universities of Marburg, Istanbul and Yale.

(Un)interruptedness

In European cities, maybe mostly in Rome, we could catch in one and the same frame antique columns or walls built into more recent buildings – frequently, but not always, into churches. Into, and on, that historical collage a contemporary home is built and we can see somebody opening the window just to shake out the table cloth. In the

[1] Dante, La Divina Commedia, Purgatorio, XXXII, 102:
Qui sarai tu poco tempo silvano,
e sarai meco sanza fine cive
di questa Roma onde Cristo è romano.
„Our object is not the lore of Being and Culture, but rather "that Rome whence Christ is Roman." („*Quella* (italics E.A.) Roma onde Cristo è romano." – Erich Auerbach into the guest book of the Institute for Romance Philology of the Cologne University, 1932. citation after: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, The Pathos of Earthly Progress": Erich Auerbach's Everydays – In: Literary History and the Challenge of Philology, ed. by Seth Lerer, Stanford University Press, 1996, Stanford, CA, p. 25.

frame, of course, not only buildings are caught, but also people, and the signs of the contemporary life are visible as well – vehicles and roads. The conventional combination between a market and a church creates the impression that here life is as if unchanged for centuries and the buildings as a rule are constructed over older ones. This workday of building and communication, passing through the vicissitudes and changes, lasts for one thousand, two thousand or more years. This kind of historical collage continues to be alive, being not only a museum, a monument of culture or a tourist landmark. I could name these sites according to their national belonging and this will be correct, but the national is only part of a more durable stratification / obliteration / transformation of materials, names, spaces. The materialness suggests the feeling of a full life time, the feeling of a tangible, tactile historicity. It is possible to build constructions which are purposeful pastiches of imitated histories; there was such a postmodern architectural practice. What these buildings lack is the experience in / through time, the very living of history.

I would like to compare such images of a plural, fragmented, but lived through European historicity with the half century philological studies of several German Romance philologists from the beginning until the end of the 50es of the 20th century. The text that follows is dedicated to the understanding and the concern for Europe in the works of Erich Auerbach (1892-1957), a professor in the universities of Marburg, Istanbul and Yale.

Craving and "Home"

In his introduction[2] to "Literary Language and Public in the Late Latin Antiquity and in the Early Middle Ages" Erich Auerbach asserts that the main attitudes of the German romantic historicism from the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century (multiformity of

[2] Erich Auerbach, Einleitung. Über Absicht und Methode, S. 9-10 – In: E. Auerbach, Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter, Bern 1958, (Franche Verlag), S. 9.

the nationalities, they themselves considered to be historically formed individualities) are not developed more consistently anywhere but in the German Romance philology.

Really the German Romance philologists from the 19th and the first half of the 20th century have as an object of their investigation the vast territory of the Romance literatures and languages, as well as their immediate connection with the Latin heritage and through it with Greek antiquity. Antiquity could be judged as a norm, at least a fund, from which models are drawn and according to which the classic works of the Romance literatures are measured. Through the comparison between the Latin and the Romance, the Romance philology as if "recalls" its origin in the Classical philology[3]. The heritage of antiquity has been appropriated for one or another national or literary cause, but in the works of those, whom Auerbach calls "European philologists" the important value is not the national exception, but the common European basis. As they are coming from outside, they could share the national, but find it hard to identify with the nationalistic positions in relation to any of those literatures.

"There were scholars that could not be found in any other philological subject and in any other country (with the exception of B. Croce, but he is also closely connected with German Geisteswissenschaft); thanks to the broadness of their horizon they were or are European philologists. I have in mind first of all Karl Vossler, Ernst Robert Curtius and Leo Spitzer"[4] The fragments in this book ("Literary Language and Public in the Late Latin Antiquity and in the Early Middle Ages"), Auerbach continues, as well as his works as a whole have been the result from the same premises, but they have more clearly shown the consciousness about the shaking up of Europe:[5]

The introduction "On the Intention and the Method", from where the quotations are taken, has been probably completed in 1956/57, af-

[3] I use the concepts Romance, Latin, and German well aware of their conventionality and because they are in use in the philological works of the commented period.

[4] E. Auerbach, op. cit., p. 9.

[5] E. Auerbach, op. cit. p. 9-10.

ter the other chapters of the book were already written. The acknowledgments are dated February 1957. Possibly this is the last completed text of Auerbach. In it for the first time the European importance of the Romance philology is openly estimated and the denomination "European philologists" is employed. The problem if the studies of Vossler, Curtius, Spitzer and of Auerbach himself could be defined as philology has been discussed more than once. It presupposes the disciplinary distributions and limits, topical for Modernity. Now, however, the specialized knowledge, although important as before, does not so clearly fit in definite disciplines, nor do the respective disciplines exist so firmly. Because of their constant transformations, the disciplines are rather institutional reference points than frames for problems, topics and approaches.

The main problem for the topic of my work is whether Auerbach and the other great Romance philologists really worked with the idea of Europe from the very beginning or the idea was formed later as a result of personal and social concussions such as the emigration of Auerbach and Spitzer (to Istanbul and later in the USA), and the inner isolation of Curtius and Vossler in Germany during the years of 1933-45[6].

The interest in tracing the origins and the tradition still does not mean that Auerbach and Spitzer conceptualize their study as European from the very beginning, that they presuppose a common European horizon for their historical (literary and linguistic) investigations. For their self-consciousness as "European philologists" a situation was required, which could be generally defined as a "loss of the European": an imagined "spiritual" unity which existed exactly through the actual impossibility to be fulfilled. At personal level emigration means the loss of what is defined as academic (and social) milieu and establishment, i.e. all the institutional economy: the philological knowledge, distributed in language families; the seminar studies, the German li-

[6] Leo Spitzer (1887–1960), Ernst Robert Curtius (1886–1956) and Karl Vossler (1872–1949) are German Romance philologists.

braries, the specialized editions, the rivalries, the mutual visits with lecture courses inside and between the (West) European countries. The compulsion to change the language should be also added and the entirely different student's audience to whom the material is taught and with whom a communication is realized. To Auerbach the language will be of decisive significance.

Leo Spitzer and Erich Auerbach are forced to leave Germany (Spitzer leaves the Cologne University in 1933, and Auerbach – the Marburg University in 1936) and to occupy professor's positions at the Istanbul University[7]. The professor's position is offered to Auerbach by the German Office for Academic Exchange (DAAD)[8]. Several of Auerbach's letters from Istanbul give an idea about the degree of alienation he experiences in his new social milieu[9]. From Istanbul, from the position of being outside the German academic milieu, but also outside the geography of the "Romance" Europe[10], Auerbach should have acutely conceived his studies as something more than philology, more than academic activity, as an engagement with a position which should be able to defend and to establish the unity of Europe. So for him the Romance culture ceased to be only a group of languages and literatures and was seen as a basis and a construction of the European culture par excellence. The remoteness from his own intellectual surrounding and the presence of the foreign one are probably the strong motive to stick together the image of a wholeness, called Europe. The loss of the own, which has possibly become still closer, is requited with the study of the utopian wholeness of Europe's literature – with

[7] Auerbach took the place of Spitzer, who left for the USA.

[8] About Auerbach's institutional behavior see quite at length in: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht. „Pathos of the Earthly Progress: Erich Auerbach's Everydays. – In: Literary History and the Challenge of Philology, ed. by Seth Lerer, Stanford University Press, 1996, Stanford, CA, p. 13–35.

[9] Karlheinz Barck, Fünf Briefe Erich Auerbachs an Walter Benjamin in Paris. – Zeitschrift für Germanistik 6 / 1988, S. 688–94.

[10] In a letter to Ludwig Binswanger from 28.X.1932 Auerbach retells about the vacation spent in Italy together with his family. – See: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, op. cit. p. 25.

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the creation of a unity and a tradition beyond the national literatures and traditions, with "European philology". The loss and the craving, except for being experiences, become structuring characteristics of the professional activity – into purpose settings. Defining the philology as "European" does not follow now the routine, according to which the philological field is formed by language families (Romance, Slavic), by a historically completed wholeness (antiquity, Renaissance), or by the nationality mark. In the 40es Auerbach's "European" philology, as well as Leo Spitzer's "European" historical semantics are tasks, which should substantiate the historically topical necessity of European unity during and after the Second World War. Then "European" will mean that the specialized historical and philological knowledge and research techniques will serve for the fulfillment of a social or even a political task[11].

If Auerbach had shown an interest in the Turkish culture different from the mere spectator's one this would have distracted him from his occupation; the researcher's interest in the foreign culture would have transformed his study into something else. I think that exactly the stay in the physically tangible, not only linguistic and historical otherness, and the will to find a mainstay during the break up of Europe in the Second World War incited him for his search of a historical unity of Europe. In his conclusion of "Mimesis" Auerbach will say that frequently he has been compelled to leave the field of his study – the Romance literatures[12]. This explanation is not a mere consideration of the usual specialization, which is already exceeded by the project for European literature, realized in "Mimesis" (and also in the "Introduction

[11] About the actuality of the idea for an united Europe see: Une Europe inedited. Documents des Archives Jean Monnet reunis et introduits pas B. Lefort 2001 (Bulgarian edition: 2003 (превод Красимир Кавалджиев; ИК СемаРШ). Невижданата Европа. Документи от архива на Жан Моне, София

[12] Э. Ауэрбах, Мимезис, Москва 1976 (изд. Прогресс) (перевод Ал. В. Михайлова), с. 548. All citations from „Mimesis" are after the Russian translation with the exception of the first chapter „Odysseus' Scar" for which I use the Bulgarian translation of Boyko Atanassov.

aux études de philologie romane" written almost at the same time). The specialization of Auerbach, in spite of his pleading for such a general notion as Europe, does not transform into essayistic reflections, not basing nor deducing this idea from fragments and / or massifs of texts. The specialization in Auerbach's interpretations manifests itself as giving / retrieving the voice of the chosen texts, as asking a question and recording the answer, as a denial of direct generalizations, as attention towardsto the concreteness of the human existence. Such a specialization however is not identical with the discipline "history of literature" because Auerbach's "synthetic" philological approach equalizes as literature various texts.

At the same time the advance towards the idea of Europe's unity, realized through an acribic analysis of texts, is connected with the Auerbach's great knowledge exactly in the Romance literatures. We could think that the other subdivisions of philology – Slavic, German, the national philologies, still existing up till now – are less beneficial as material for such a transition towards the European; and yet not the material and the knowledge themselves, but the changed situation (the emigration) and the reaction towards it have been the decisive ones. It is true that particular Romance characteristics have been defined as "the better Europe", but still there is a qualitative difference between the situation of reducing / appropriating the European by one or several close cultures (depending on the characteristics of closeness), and the situation in which the European is a Gestalt non reducible to its components[13].

Let me use the metaphor of one's home, which includes the native language. In spite of the emigration and the necessity to deliver his lectures in Istanbul in French, Auerbach will continue to be consolidated mostly in his native German language. In French is written the textbook "Introduction aux études de philologie romane"; the other

[13] Obviously in other fields of knowledge the European would be constituted not on the basis of linguistically cognate literatures, but by religious, political, economic characteristics.

two books, which Auerbach considers as research ones, are written in German – "Neue Dantestudien" and "Mimesis"[14]. Does this mean that they were not intended for seminar lessons or parts of them were also taught in French? Auerbach prefers to remain in his native language, although institutionally he has been obliged by his agreement with the University in Istanbul in the measurable future to teach in Turkish. Auerbach arrives in the USA at the age of 54, late enough to begin thinking and writing without difficulty in English[15]. Is this the only reason? His last book Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter", despite his English speaking milieu, has been also written in German. I think that Auerbach's attachment to his "home" is evident in the fact that he continues to write in German in the years immediately after the Second World War in the USA, as well as in the choice of his study – the Latin Late Antiquity and the Western Middle Ages, considered by him to be the foundations of Europe[16].

A comparison with Spitzer, who in the USA first writes in French and then also in English, is indicative not only for the differences between the two of them[17]. Still more indicative would be the comparison with

[14] "Neue Dantestudien" is published in 1944 in Istanbul, and "Mimesis" in 1946 in Bern.

[15] In this direction may be interpreted the evidence of Stephen G. Nichols, Philology in Auerbach's Drama of (Literary) History – In: Literary History and the Challenge of Philology, ed. by Seth Lerer, Stanford University Press, 1996, Stanford, CA, p. 64. "Perhaps because we spoke French primarily, a language she handled easily whereas my spoken German was rudimentary to nonexistent, I had the sense of being transported on those afternoons into another world, a world of European intellectual life as lived in Germany before the Third Reich. This was a world, it seemed, where ideas were mediated not by abstract theories, but by the individuals who espoused them and by the friends and colleagues who debated them in long, handwritten letters."

The word is going about the talks with Marie Auerbach when investigating her husband's archive "three or four years after his death". About fifteen years after Marie Auerbach has come to live in the USA, the language with which she manages better, obviously when compared to English, is French.

[16] In English Auerbach publishes several articles about Dante and Vico.

[17] As far as I know Spitzer's first publication in English is from 1940: History of Ideas versus Reading of Poetry, Southern Review, 6, 1940, 584–609.

some German emigrant intellectuals who are not philologists. It seems as if after 1936 Auerbach did not feel very much "at home" where he worked and has marked his own "otherness", inhabiting the "home" of his native language – the language of the German Romance philology. The metaphor of the "philological home" is really to be found in Auerbach's article "Philologie der Weltliteratur" (1952). In Istanbul he teaches a discipline called "European philology" – a denomination, possible only from an outside position, distinguishing the European from one's own. Inside Europe itself in the first half of the 20th century the denomination seems impossible not because discussions are lacking on Europe's wholeness, but because of the specialization of the academic knowledge. Even if the coincidence between the official denomination "European philology" in Istanbul and Auerbach's later self-defining as "European philologist" is accidental, all the same it seems that in Istanbul he has problematized the foundations of his occupation and the social engagement of philology, which would be not imperative in a milieu with an established disciplinary framework. It is also important that Auerbach was coming from an extremely powerful learned milieu and did not have to adjust to the standards of the one surrounding him.

For ten years in Istanbul Auerbach does not develop an interest towards the Turkish or the Islam culture in a way to make it part of his scholar interests; on the contrary – the re-establishment of an European philological home, of an utopian space, drives away and conceals the immediate presence of that alien milieu. The degree of alienation inside the academic institution, I think, is manifested in a clause in the agreement between the Istanbul University and Erich Auerbach, according to which professor Auerbach should have started to give his lectures in Turkish. The requirement is legitimate, yet in a professional, as well as in an existential plane it seems as a sad misunderstanding. Auerbach, whose linguistic knowledge is immense (from the Old Testament to Virginia Wolf in "Mimesis"), is envisaged with an invincible linguistic as well as cultural difficulty, which however convincingly shows the impossibility the whole world, except as a metaphor, to be

a "philological home". I did not find any evidence that Auerbach ever delivered his lectures in Turkish.

Europe: Meanings / Territories

I suppose that the idea of Europe as a horizon of the study was formed gradually. The first chapter of "Mimesis" – "Odyssey's Scar" concludes the analysis of the two styles – Homer's and that of the Old Testament with the assertion: "because the two styles, such as they have been formed in earlier days, have fundamentally influenced the European way of representing reality[18]. And after the enormous undertaking is concluded, the last words in the afterword of the book are: "Let this study reach those of my friends who are still alive and also all those to whom it is addressed; ... those who have preserved with all its purity the love for our history – the history of Europe"[19]. In the identification between the personal and the community's we may see the main motif of the "European" conception of "Mimesis".

Once established, the aim laying "Europe" may be spread over some earlier texts, written before the emigration in Istanbul, and even over his wholesome work. Discussing the difficulties in the application of the synthetic-historical philology when trying to present "the spiritual fate of an entity like that of Europe", Auerbach explains that he has applied his method for the first time in "La cour et la ville"[20], published in 1933. But this study is not about Europe, in it the European is not a horizon of the investigation. Claiming this however, Auerbach imparts a powerful consolidating characteristic to his studies, a unity with a later date. "The general, which seems possible to be fulfilled, is to present a historical development, as it is with the drama, which is

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[18] Е. Ауербах, Белегът на Одисей. – In: Традиция. Литература. Действителност. Проблеми на старогръцката литература в световното литературознание. съст. Б. Богданов, с.42, (превод Бойко Атанасов), с. 42

[19] Э. Ауэрбах, Мимезис, Москва 1976 (изд. Прогресс), с.548.

[20] E. Auerbach, La cour et la ville. Französisches Publikum im 17. Jahrhundert. – In: E. Auerbach, Vier Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des französischen Bildung, Bern 1951 (Franke Verlag), S. 12–50.

not a theory, but a paradigmatic representation of the human fate. The subject, most generally speaking, is Europe, and I try to comprehend it in various studies"[21]. Auerbach makes the comparison between the drama and Europe's history in the introduction ("About the Intention and the Method") to his studies on the Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, but refers it to all of his research; the idea of "the fate of the spiritual wholeness Europe" would add to his investigations a potential, which they in themselves may be lacking. I do not analyze the characteristic "the fate of a spiritual wholeness like that of Europe", in which "fate" and "entity" seem especially problematic, I only try to underline their motivating power for Auerbach himself.

Why however should we not ascribe an European horizon to every investigation fulfilled on a material from the European history? Probably Auerbach's answer would be that it is quite possible, if it represents a paradigmatic event from Europe's "fate". From this position Auerbach's studies could be understood as representing paradigmatic situations from Europe's historical development. Then "La cour et la ville" (1933) and "Typological Motives in the Medieval Literature" (1953)[22] may be equally referred to the theme "Europe", despite that in both of the studies the European is not directly discussed and that they are written before and after the emigration in Istanbul. And yet "the Medieval literature" is a subject different from the national-European paradigmatics of the French 17th century. The paradigmatic, the exemplary could also be a constraint, limiting variety; a constraint which the other literatures or languages should impose on themselves (or it should be imposed on them) in order to become European. The paradigmatic is a limit for the variety, it is evaluating and isolating, and so besides being an uprise, it could be also a constriction / power. The view of the French 17th century as a paradigmatic for Europe is

[21] E. Auerbach, Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter, Bern 1957, (Francke Verlag), S. 22.

[22] E. Auerbach, Typologische Motive in der mittelalterlichen Literatur, Krefeld 1953 (Scherpe Verlag); Schriften und Reden des Petrarca-Instituts Koeln, 2.

widely shared, but also disputed in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century.

The constriction of the exemplary is also visible in the identification of the history of one country or of one cultural region with the European – for instance, when the culture of France is represented as a high expression of the Romance and as the classic country of Europe, so that studying the French is pars pro toto representative for the exemplary European. Cravingly utopian is also Leo Spitzer's idea about happiness and harmony, about "joie de vivre", inherent to the French and the Romance. Utopian or not, this idea of Spitzer forms his conviction that the Romance, that Middle Ages civilitas romana is the foundation of Europe[23]. We could remember also the characteristics, projected on the Italian Renaissance by the Basel's inhabitant Jacob Burckhardt.

"What can be achieved at the best is a penetration into the diverse elations of the happening, which we derive from and in which we take art; a location of the place which we have reached, but also an anticipation of the forthcoming possibilities; and for sure an innermost participation in our own selves and an activation of the "we here and now" consciousness with all the richness and all the limitations it implies"[24]. Here still more clearly than in the last sentences of "Mimesis" Europe's history (Europe's becoming) is paralleled with the most cherished personal participation and self consciousness, which adds to the historical research one more dimension, transforming it into memory, into a quest / creation, into a choice of a definite identity: the identity of what is called "Abendland". Telling about the main statements in his book "Literary Language and Public in the Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages" Auerbach makes the symptomatic replacement

[23] See for instance the characteristics: joy from life, feeling of happiness, which Leo Spitzer interprets as pertaining to the notion of *civilization* in his study about Albert Thibaudet – Leo Spitzer, Marcel Proust e altri saggi di letteratura francese (a cura di Pietro Citati), Torino 1959, p. 337–73, (translation from English).

[24] E. Auerbach, Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter, Bern 1957 (Francke Verlag), S. 22

of "western public" with "European" in the title of the last chapter. "... The purposefully paradoxical title "Das europäische Publikum..." underlines the unity of the European"[25]. The chapter, however, is actually titled "Das abendländische Publikum..." and in the contents of the book "das abendländische" and not "das europäische" is also used.

It seems that for Auerbach the two words mean one and the same thing and are mutually replaceable. And if we adopt the opinion, that the European for centuries on end has been represented by the Romance, then the tasks of the Romance philology as an European one begin to clear up, and the cultural geography of the European – to constrict. Up to which point should Europe be mapped to the east – to the Rhein, to the Elba, or to the upper flow of the Danube, and what about to the south or to the north? Whether to the south Northern Africa should be included, because of St. Augustine and not only? The problem does not seem easy to solve and the synonymy between "Abendland" and "Europe" doesn't solve it as well. The word "Abendland" calls its pendant "Morgenland", the last referring to the East without outlining clear territories; it signifies and suggests distance, otherness and even opposition, not in the last place also through the phenomenology of the images of the morning and the evening, of the sunrise and the sunset (Occident, Orient). Whether intentionally or not, the definition of the "Europe's spiritual wholeness" is also a distinction from the United States, where Auerbach, writing these sentences, have lived for more than ten years.

The introduction "About the Intention and the Method" ends with the stated regret that, in spite of the wholesome intention, the book, designed also as a supplement to "Mimesis", is only a fragment or a series of fragments. "It is not finished, but interrupted, the real integration of the subject was not reached"[26]. I would like to trace in this statement something more than fragmentariness of the fulfillment – namely a fragmentariness of the very European becoming, an

[25] E. Auerbach, ibid., S. 23.
[26] E. Auerbach, ibid., S. 24.

impossibility for the postulated and desired unity, a non-coincidence between conceptual and historical. The unity is defensible if no questions are asked about the interruptions in history and about the limits, social and cultural, of Europe. This could be used as an argument that the idea about Europe's historical unity has originated in the situation of endangerment and absence, imposing that identity is created of the professional occupation as well as of one's own life history – a historical identity and an actual presence. And also that this idea has not been in the basis of Auerbach's study of the Romance literatures from the very beginning.

Translation: *Albena Georgieva*

АНГЕЛ АНГЕЛОВ

БЕЗПОКОЙСТО ОБ ЕВРОПЕ В ТВОРЧЕСТВЕ ЭРИХА АУЭРБАХА

Основным в работе предстает вопрос работали ли еще с самого начала Ауэрбах и другие большие романисты с сознанием об Европе или эта осознанность оформилась постепенно и позже вследствие личных и социальных сотрясений, таких как эмиграция Ауэрбаха и Шпитцера (в Стамбул и, позже, в США) и внутренняя изолированность Курциуса и Фослера в Германии в 1933-1945 гг. Автор приходит к выводу, что Ауэрбах и Шпитцер не концептуализируют с самого начала свое занятие как европейское: они не предпосылают общего европейского горизонта своим историческим (литературным и языковым) исследованиям. Для их самоосознания в качестве „европейских филологов" была нужна ситуация, которую в самых общих линиях можно определить как потеря европейского. Европейского „духовного" единства, хотя и воображаемого, которое осознается именно посредством реальной невозможности поддерживать и осуществлять его.

В личном плане эмиграция - потеря того, что называется академической (и социальной) средой и установленностью. К этому нужно добавить смену языка и совсем различную студенческую аудиторию, перед которой филолог излагает свой материал и с которой он общается. Для Ауэрбаха язык, на котором он пишет, будет иметь решающее значение: независимо от того в Стамбуле ли или в Йельском университете обитает он „филологический дом" немецкой романистики. Метафора „филологического дома" на самом деле встречается у Ауэрбаха в его статье „Филология мировой литературы" (1952).

ELKA DIMITROVA

ON HOSTILITY AND NOSTALGIA
(SOME OBSERVATIONS ON BULGARIAN AVANT-GARDE LITERATURE OF THE 1920'S)

The paper is focused on some texts of Bulgarian post-symbolist modernism with a view to their ambiguous relation to the cultural background. This relation for its part is described in terms of simultaneous collaboration and opposition. The processes of continuity and rejection are concretely presented through the model of interaction between the individual reminiscence and the collective memory.

The main point is *the interaction between the individual reminiscence and the collective memory in circumstances of socio-cultural crisis and changes to be used as means of understanding some paradoxes which are supposed to be typical for the modernist state of mind.*

The so-differentiated interaction is interpreted after some preparatory explanations concerning the specific roles of hostility and nostalgia in the mechanism of deleting/continuing the background, i.e. in the sample of opposition/collaboration between the individual reminiscence and collective memory. In this context two main relations are outlined: between the individual reminiscence and hostility, on the one hand, and between collective memory and nostalgia, on the other. The first one is thought to have a predominantly historical profile, and the second – to have a predominantly mythical one.

The investigation of the problem is relatively divided into two parts,

first of which concerns mostly the thematic plan, while the second is focused on the aesthetic one.

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Nostalgia proves to be a phenomenon, inevitably connected with remembering. As the most spontaneous association causes first of all a sort of identification (I feel nostalgia, therefore I remember) so it is particularly interesting the opposite process to be thought over. I mean the process of de-identification, the process of distinguishing the "remembering-mind" from the "nostalgia-producing-mind".

Amongst the words devoted to nostalgia Milan Kundera's meditation on the etymology and psychology of the phenomenon in his book "The Ignorance" is particularly up to the point. There, apart from everything else, nostalgia is interpreted through its abilities to radiate our personal stories and to produce life events. Thus it is defined not as a connection to the past, but on the contrary – as a kind of concentration on the present which is open to the future. This way nostalgia could be extrapolated as an immanent vector of the individual being in its existential and historical argument with the historical community.

During his twenty year long absence the inhabitants of Ithaca kept lots of memories about Odysseus, but they didn't feel any nostalgia for him, while Odysseus suffered from nostalgia, but he could hardly remember anything. We can understand this strange contradiction if we are aware that memory needs a constant training in order to function properly: if reminiscences are not recalled again and again in conversations between friends, they leave us. (...) The stronger the nostalgia is (...), the more it gets empty from reminiscences. The more Odysseus longs for, the more he forgets. Because, being completely obsessed only by its own suffering, nostalgia does not increase the activity of memory, it does not awake reminiscences; it is enough in itself, for the sake of its own excitement.[1]

[1] Kundera, M. The Ignorance. Кундера, М. Незнанието. ИК „Колибри". С., 2004, с. 31.

Interpreted in this sense, nostalgia proves to be exactly the antipode of remembering, and thus in a way it differentiates itself both from the function of practical control on the past and from the idea of the past in general.

Another writer, decades before Kundera, shared:

My memory is hostile to everything personal. If it depended on me, I would only frown when remembering the past. (...) I repeat – my memory is not a love but a hostile one, and it works not on reproducing but on rejecting the past. The average man does not need memory, for him it is enough to tell about the books he has read, and the biography is ready. Where for the happy generations epos speaks in hexameters and chronicles, there for me a sign for a gap exists, and there is an abyss between me and the century, a ditch full of noisy time – the place destined to family and home archive. What did the family want to say? I don't know. It has been stammering by birth – yet actually it had what to say. Stammering by birth has been impending over me and many of my contemporaries. We have been learning not to talk, but to mumble and only tried to hear the increasing noise of the time, and bleached by the foam of its crest we acquired a language.

Revolution is itself both life and death, and it cannot bear when they backbite about life and death in its presence. Its throat might be parched with thirst, but it would never receive a single drop from somebody else's hands. Nature – revolution – eternal thirst, inflammation (maybe it envies the ages in which the homely humbly slaked their thirst like a sheep going for water). The fear, the dread of getting something from somebody else's hands is specific for revolution – it does not dare, it is afraid of approaching the sources of life.

But what did those "sources of life" do for it? Where did their round waves flow so indifferently! They flew for their own sake, they joined in streams for their own sake, they seethed for their own sake! ("For me, for me, for me" – the revolution says. "On my own, on my own, on my own," – the world answers.)[2]

[2] Mandelstam, O. The Noise of the Time. Мандельштам, О. Шум времени. – В: Мандельштам, О. Собрание сочинений в четырех томах. Арт-бизнес-центр. Москва 1993, т. 2, с. 384.

Thus Ossip Mandelstam gives an example for a memory which, being hostile to the personal experience and individual reminiscences, generalizes at the expense of that the completeness of the collective events (denoted by "the noise of the time") in a mythic scale. If we continue Mandelstam's formulation, we will come to the conclusion that individual reminiscences connected to periods of deep crises and changes need the shelter of the collective memory. They prove to be too heavy a load for the private consciousness and need to be moulded, shaped, "normalized" in the completeness of the collective mind, i.e. they need to be conventionalized.

The common point in Kundera's and Mandelstam's statements is the strange feeling towards the past of the native community, or in a general sense – towards the homeland in its historical hypostasis. In both texts – though in different ways – the issues are aimed at the idea of "emigration". In Kundera's case we have a clear example for the "real", actually realized emigration. In Mandelstam's case we observe the phenomenon of speculative separation from the initially native community. In the first case the feeling for splitting with the native community discreetly connotes to the idea of splitting with its history. According to Kundera, nostalgia comes to absorb the historical reminiscences in something which resembles the mythical plan connecting the individual being to the collective memory.

The quotation from Mandelstam's text demonstrates in terms of the aggressive combating the desire for splitting with the native community and its history, implying the impossibility of real distancing from them. I.e. it shows how the hating consciousness cannot get rid of the object of its hate. Thus it stays in the plan of the historical reminiscences, though meanwhile longing to disappear in the Promised Land of the collective memory.

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The purpose of involving the examples above was to illustrate by some concentrated conclusions of a couple of writers' speculations two faces of the relation to the socio-cultural background. As we will see, both of them could be related to the modernist state of mind, moreover they could be used in order to represent it.

Thus, according to my presumption, the status of being a modernist in a way unnoticeably blends with the status of being an exile. This status for its part contains both the abstract phenomenon of nostalgia and the concrete passion of hostility.

Mandelstam's statement reveals also another collision – the drama of revolution. It proceeds from the fact that revolution has an all-controlling, totalitarian view of the world, but this view has a deeply subjective, and because of that – deceitful, origin. So the contradiction between revolution and world brings us back to the infantile delusions of being almighty and all powerful.

The relations between "revolution" and "world" in this quotation could be easily read as a parable of modernism which is always ready to identify itself with revolution and get into contradictive relations with the big pre-existing and out-reaching reality in which we easily recognise "the world". Thus the figure of the rebelling child which is often met in the critical approaches to modernism stands out.

Bulgarian post-symbolist modernity, as well as modernism in general, demonstrates particularly clearly the phenomenon revealed by O. Mandelstam as an appearance of the hostile mind. Especially obvious it is in some works of the so-called September literature, where the features of the aesthetical avant-garde collaborate with the situation of socio-historical crisis.

But first some stipulations concerning the term of Bulgarian modernism should be made. I mean the modernism from the late 19th – early 20th century which corresponds to the European consequence of decadence, modernist individualism, symbolism and avant-garde. In the last concept such trends are included, as expressionism, futurism, imaginism, Dadaism, surrealism, etc. In Bulgaria some of those cultural and aesthetical currents developed in their completely outlined appearance (modernist individualism, symbolism); others existed under the guise of separate and fragmentary tendencies (decadence and some of the avant-garde trends: expressionism and diabolism, the hints at futurism and imaginism).

There was also a circle of texts in Bulgarian post-symbolist literature,

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embraced by the term of "September literature". Thought out by the left critic Georgi Bakalov, it had an entirely thematic origin – referred to a number of texts topically connected to the uprising which started in September 1923 in order to obtain the character of a civil rebellion, dividing Bulgarian nation into two incompatible parts.

Proceeding from the historical fact of the September rebellion and containing texts which are thematically united by its topic, September literature from the 1920's proves to be an aesthetically contradictory appearance.

It both provokes and resists to be expressed in the terms of modernism. That is why for its description such formulations are often used which refer to the idea of a self-originated or spontaneous avant-garde. Critics also often stress on the selective adopting of samples from the European modernity in Bulgaria through the predominance of the social engagement.[3]

With a view to the writings of the particular authors, their "September works" also remain in a way distinguished from the previous ones (Geo Milev, Anton Strashimirov) and the following ones (Nikola Furnadjiev, Asen Raztsvetnikov, Angel Karaliychev). Here we meet the question about the provocation of the time – an interpretative approach which does not make the terminological description of texts easier, but at least throws light on the sporadic for most of them impulse for modernity.

That is why Rozalia Likova's formulation "aesthetical turning point"[4] remains the most relevant one, though it relies to a high degree on a negative definition, i.e. it describes the Bulgarian avant-garde tendencies as oppositions to symbolism, as appearances of "what symbolism was not".

There are also lots of significant features of these poetic tendencies which have been defined in a positive way – issued, formulated and explained as presences – both in R. Likova's study and in the critical

[3] See Likova, R. An aesthetical Turning Point in the Poetry of the 1920's. Ликова, Р. Естетически прелом в поезията на 20-те години. – В: Ликова, Р. Литература и художествени търсения. Изд. „Български писател". С., 1982, с. 31.

[4] See Likova, R. An Aesthetical Turning Point in the Poetry of the 1920's. Ликова, Р. Естетически прелом в поезията на 20-те години. Изд. „Български писател". С., 1978.

literature about the 1920's in general. But they always in a way slip out of an eventual conceptual homogenization. Obviously the reason for that has its roots in the very nature of the appearance. It is difficult to inscribe Furnadjiev, Raztsvetnikov, Karaliychev in the conceptions of any trend neither because they are less erudite than Geo Milev (which is a fact), nor because they haven't found their aesthetical cause, but because (which is particularly important) they haven't looked for it the way Geo did. However, the idea of self-origination and uniqueness is not a sufficient explanation. According to this logic and with a view to the specifics of their early works these authors could be fluently identified with a trend like Rodno Izkustvo (Native Art)[5] for example. It is clear that there is a sort of reaction which "pulls" them away from the conceptuality. There is a sort of a too intensive relation to the "time" (and besides not exactly the literary time) which prevents them from self-defining and turns the "September texts" into isolated "cross appearances".

In such "cross appearances" the characteristic fact is their both aesthetic and thematic ambiguity. They are in a way crucified between the idea of the past and the idea of a present-future – both in their aesthetic and thematic orientation. Besides these essential dimensions could be reduced to some questions about memory, about the contradictions of memory, and more concretely – about the collaboration and opposition between individual reminiscence and collective memory.

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As the reflection of these problems in a thematic plan is easier to be observed, I will dwell on it in the first place.

The way the aforementioned writers speak about "what happened" is symptomatic in itself – their discourse is being promoted by the awareness of an insuperable drama. For them "what happened" is an abyss (they themselves often use this word referring to the idea of a mythical

[5] Rodno Izkustvo (Native Art) – a movement in Bulgarian art, very popular in the 1920's, which made a cult of the native cultural tradition.

chaotic world) – an abyss between "before" and "now", between frantic and normal. And this abyss is being comprehended in the culmination moments when the individual reminiscence, pieced together by imaginable perceptions, gives up turning into a collective memory constructed from emblems.

There are lots of symptoms for the crisis of the individual consciousness in the literature of the 1920's. They most often take the form of certain image constructs which are typical exactly for that period; they appear in easily discovered "common images" in the works of different authors. This way an impression of a clichéd reality is moulded which for its part reveals the crying need of the reminiscence to be shared.

The river carrying death in its water (in the image of which the river of Maritsa[6] is a priory recognized); the dead bodies; the blood; the remains of the former way of life – which have become tragically awkward in the new situation – all of them turn into signal images. Moreover, signs quite diverted from their denotations – as for instance the spring[7] – also unconditionally are being read as referring to the topic. That is the case with the spring in Furnadjiev's book of poems Spring Wind and in Lamar's poem Spring Horror.

As an extended example Furnafjiev's book Spring Wind (1925) could ›e taken. Its discourse stands out against the outlined background by its adical confrontation to the ordinary logic, by the resolution of its dipping into a pre- and beyond-logical world which could be conditionally called "a world of the elements" and which is usually described in terms of the chaos. Its nature bears the symptoms of that destruction of the "civilized mind" which reminds of the primitive stage of human development, but in fact it is regressive – as far as it bears the tracks of a crisis return, not of an immanent state.

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[6] Maritsa is historically connected with the September rebellion, as it crossed the territory of the uprisings and the bodies of the killed rebels have been thrown there.

[7] The idea of the spring in this case is an extremely interesting example, because the rebellion obviously happened in the autumn, but the symbol of the spring as a renovating element, wiping away everything old and giving life to an entirely new reality remained one of the main verbal signs for it.

Inspired by the extremity of the emotion and sense of the book, the critics invariably insist on its uniqueness and originality searching the symptoms of this originality mostly in the imagery. The difficult and often impossible "translation" of the images and their relations in Spring Wind in the terms of the conventional concepts indisputably sets the feeling for the presence of a self-originated world, unusually diverted from the "normative" (despite the relativity of the idea of "normative" when talking about a fictional text).

Spring Wind has been described as a text with "illogical, drastic images" (Z. Petrov)[8]; as a text leaving the impression of "mixing the initial existential elements" (M. Tsaneva)[9]; as a text based on "images-shocks" (Z. Cholakov)[10] interpreted by A. Kyossev as "images with unmotivated appearance and unmotivated disappearance", images which "move on the edge of the imagery impossibility"; "sensory absurdities".[11]

These characteristics seem to make the being of the book uncertain in the continuity of the literary history, they put it in a way out of the literary-historical context, turn it into an exception. In a way Spring Wind differs even from the context of Furnadjiev's works themselves. In the poem Rainbow (from the book of the same name[12]) the poet recognizes the former obsession as a mythical creature similar to the vampire ("morá"). ("As if a vampire has stopped in my soul, / as if a dark, insane love, / bigger than me, bigger than our land / so powerful her call was."). The process of normalizing the discourse is significant in the whole book of Rainbow where there are still themes, images, plot kernels, even whole

[8] Petrov, Z. N. Furnadjiev. Петров, З. Н. Фурнаджиев. – В: Петров, З. Избрано, изд. „Български писател„, С., 1978, с. 94.

[9] Tsaneva, M. N. Furnadjiev. Цанева, М. Н. Фурнаджиев. – В: Септемврийското въстание в българската литература, изд. „Наука и изкуство„, С., 1983, с. 275.

[10] Cholakov, Z. Theoretical Problems of Bulgarian Antifascist Poetry. Чолаков, З. Теоретични проблеми на българската антифашистка поезия, ДВИ, С., 1975.

[11] Kyossev, A. Spring Wind by N. Furnadjiev in the Context of its Time. Кьосев, А. Кьосев, А. „Пролетен вятър„ на Н. Фурнаджиев в художествения контекст на своето време, УИ „Св. Кл. Охридски„, С., 1988, 27-28.

[12] Rainbow (1928) is Furnajiev's second book – after Spring Wind (1925). There he „normalizes" many of Spring Wind's images.

poems from Spring Wind kept. In the variant of the poem Horsemen in Rainbow the gallows don't "sing" (as in Spring Wind), here they creak; the synthetic image: "as if the eyes of God's scarlet rage" is transformed into the explanation: "as if even the vault from above / stares at us with rage". In the later versions of the poems from Spring Wind the poet insistently reduces the number of the adjective "dark", replacing it by the logically more meaningful "native" and "distant". On the place of the mythically generalized lyrical "I" the slogan "we" appears.

Of course, the problem of the contextual situating of Spring Wind into the literature of the 1920's has also its opposite side which is not less relevant. The texts of the book are obviously symptomatic for their literary time. For instance, referring exactly to the poem Horsemen Radosvet Kolarov illustrates "the unmotivated in themselves, oxymoronic combinations on the level of the micro image" which he defines as typical for the "September poetics"[13]

Thus, being a text confusing by its uniqueness, Spring Wind is in the same time the perfect "representative sample" for the spirit of the 1920's. It seems to "suck in" all those symptoms of the literary and historical time which could not but be "felt" as universal. This impression is due most evidently to the atavistic element of the book – to the figures of the *initial* both in the imagery and in the meaning in general. This way the text is being distinguished at first sight as *unique* in a literary-historical respect – because of its spontaneity, because of its obvious non-quoting, "non-cultural", "elemental" discourse. It in a way speaks "in elements" to a degree to which the lyrical "I" obtains "shamanic" connotations. Exactly the same characteristics though turn the discourse of Spring Wind into a psychologically *universal,* into an "archetypal" one as well. Exactly they make the historical meaning of the book "totally" comprehensible for its contemporaries – in spite of the lack of any concrete historical realities in it.

In this respect a parallel with a text of the same time and thematic circle is symptomatic. I mean Geo Milev's poem September (1924). In its

[13] Kolarov, R. The Balladic in Nikola Furnadjiev's Poem Horsemen. Коларов, Р. Баладичното в стихотворението на Н. Фурнаджиев „Конници„. – В: Коларов, Р. Литературни анализи, ИК „Век 22„, С., с. 92.

capacity of an intentionally avant-garde text, it remains to a high degree historically incomprehensible for its cotemporaries. They cannot recognize their idea of the September events of 1923 in the poem despite the directly designated names, places and events. Obviously Geo Milev – the emblematic author of Bulgarian expressionism – relies in his writing too much exactly on the expressionism. The event in his text is directly "exposed" – there is not a doubt for anybody that the poem reflects the September rebellion. Yet it does not activate the contemporaries' reminiscences in the way Furnadjiev's book does that, though being maximally deprived from historical concreteness.

On the contrary, Spring Wind – despite its mimicry, despite the radical absorbing of the historical texture in the "poetics of the elements" – appeals exactly to the feeling for familiarity, for participation in some community's destiny. Even the reader who is a stranger to the concrete historical predisposition gets the feeling of participation. That is due most of all to the fact that Furnadjiev activates archetypal states of mind – as for example the feeling after the crushed mutiny and the destruction, the guilt and the irretrievable loss, the exulted resurrection.

The lyrical "I" of Spring Wind following the steps of his infantile regression is the absolute antipode of Geo Milev's utopian almighty authoritarian author who secretly promotes the raising over the defeat in September. In Spring Wind there is not a united power to reorder the cosmos broken into pieces, there is not a united will to reconstruct the principal of being. There is not the perspective of: "we are going to resurrect the human / free in the world", "the Earth will be heaven" (September).

But Furnadjiev does not try to find them. He recreates something which is principally opposite to the utopia – something which has fatally and irreparably gone. And only from this complete "being-gone" the resurrection in Spring Wind could arise – "in front of the eyes of the reader" – the resurrection which in Geo Milev's text remains a point of the plan for the future. Against Geo-Milev's perspective *forward* in Spring Wind we face the absolute perspective *backwards* – which is regressive

to such a degree that leaves the feeling rather for a falling down in the depths than for a historical return along a horizontal plane.

Having the meaning of a ritual death, this falling down for its part gives rise to the impossible super-active living in the book. Thus the other remembering in Spring Wind appears – the ecstatic fusion with everything around after the great inanity.

But these two elements fit together rather the wholeness of a mythological cycle than of a historical reminiscence. And the deserting from the historical plan is not lacking in its painful drama at all. How is Furnadjiev's anti-historicity in Spring Wind achieved? One of the possible approaches to this question could be made exactly through the problem of the individual reminiscence and the collective memory.

The individual reminiscence proves to be beyond the strengths of the individual and he resorts to depersonalizing it speaking of it in terms of some "universal" mind. Escaping from the painfulness of the reminiscence, Furnadjiev's lyrical "I" makes an attempt to articulate "what happened" in terms of the collective memory, but thus he cannot achieve the consolation of canonizing the event. He cannot achieve the solemnly echoing voice in which to pronounce the past. He cannot stand "aside" from it. He cannot also find this stylization of the images beyond which they would turn into national icons. The dramatics of the book is to a big extend due to this remaining somewhere on the way to the generalization, somewhere between the painful individuality of the reminiscence and the consoling distance of the collective memory. The saving instinct for generalization proves to be paralyzed. The "I" remains on the stage of articulating the psychic. He can neither turn "what happened" into history, nor canonize the individual reminiscence into collective memory. He dips into the elementary-chaotic territories of the unconscious by which he himself becomes a mythical object instead of withdrawing as a mythologizing subject. And here he loses his personal matrix, yet without freeing himself completely from the personality of the reminiscence – which would have made it less painful.

This tension is felt in the very lexical expansiveness of the book. Co-existing of forms as "ne'er" and "never" in one syntagm (in the poem

Horror) sets the impulse for generalizing contained in "ne'er" against the painful clearness of the own, simple, human's "never". The sacredness of the "vessels" and the "icon" from the same poem is not enough to canonize the "black blood" and the "bloody bones". The mystically extending apocalyptic horseman does not delete the everyday life's stylistics of the "visiting", or the unconditional concreteness of "they died here".[14] Despite this a movement to the opposite direction is made. The normal for the historical subject concepts of "homeland" and "people" self-destruct to the helpless nakedness of the "field", the concretely historical realities of the "villages" and "gallows" degrade to the indefiniteness of the "waste fields" (Horsemen). Rushing to get rid of his reminiscences of the events of the community, the lyrical "I" unconsciously loses the feeling of connection with it. He becomes powerless and cannot create a community ideal from his lonely horror.

Thus the trajectory of a mind trying to forget the unforgettable, to delete its meanings is being outlined. Poems like Horsemen, Horror, In the Fields articulate the desire for forgetting by means of unfinished statements, aposiopesis, collapses of meaning, deletion of actions.

The psycho-emotional super-concentration of the texts of Spring Wind naturally provokes critical readings through the categories of the emotional and psychic.

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[14] It will ne'er, never happen –
somebody to visit me again,
black blood fills all the vessels,
in front of the icon – bloody bones.
(...)
Heavens stare at me mercilessly,
and with a white and fiery axe
somebody on black mare visits me in the night
and invites me to a wedding.

He looks at me with sour eyes
and lifts up the fiery axe,
as if he wants to pass over me
the way they died here once upon a time.
(Horror)

One of the rare examples for investigating the mechanism of the transformation of emotional experience into image – without meanwhile losing its essence of an experience – is presented by Radosvet Kolarov's analysis of the poem Horsemen. Observing pedantically and from different approaches the process of forming the layers and images, the author reveals the structuring of horror, silence and inanity:

The emotional status caused by – respectively causing – this moment, is the dejection, the horror of silence and inanity in which the inertia of the affect keeps on searching, and not finding, it causes – already in an opposite way unreal – images.[15]

What R. Kolarov with an extreme clearness extracts from Horsemen is the intuition of horror – the horror of the overmastering suffering, the horror of not knowing the way to assimilating it, and in the end – the horror of not looking for such a way. As if the gap between the solemn generalization and the painful concreteness prevents from producing a universal canon of the event and this way also prevents the liberation of the lyrical "I" from his nightmare. The individual reminiscence fails in bearing the events, so the individual consciousness appeals to the collective memory in order to find the words, the samples – the instrument for expressing the inexpressible. But the nightmare refuses to turn into an icon of the collective memory – in a generalized hypostasis purified from the passion of the private image.

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The second part of this paper will concern mostly the theoretical aspect of the same problem. Here some problems of modernist aesthetics will be exposed rather in an inductive plan than in the deductive approach of the foresaid.

The starting point is the question *how does the modernist text exist in its actuality – keeping its cultural prejudices and changing them accord-*

[15] Kolarov, R. The Balladic in Nikola Furnadjiev's Poem Horsemen. Коларов, Р. Баладичното в стихотворението на Никола Фурнаджиев „Конници". – В: Коларов, Р. Литературни анализи. ИК „Век 22". С., 1994, с. 102.

ing to the rules of its autonomic being? How does the text try to "escape" from its cultural background – keeping the memory of it in the same time, and yet not "understanding" this continuity? How does the formula "trying to forget" prove to be the surest way not to forget?

The idea of the hating memory taken from Ossip Mandelstam's text, though formulated in different ways, proves to be a universal slogan of the modernism of the early 20th century. A brutal explication of it is given by none other than the emblem of futurism – Filippo Marinetti, who insisted that all the galleries should be burnt and all the libraries should be destroyed in order the mankind to get rid of the terror of the past.

But to what degree does modernism (and avant-gardism in particular) succeed in this ambition? The appearance of some "breaches" in the idea of time is amongst the most obvious symptoms of this tendency. They are specific for the catastrophic consciousness. In the avant-garde texts they usually take on the shape of missing present and eschatological projections, thus resembling "temporal collapses". The past and present are ignored as values; they are also ignored as time continuity and thus give in to the pressure of the future. This fear of the present provokes destructivity, a will to destroy the old world with everything familiar in it, while on the principal of utopia the unknown is being made a cult of. This way one of the greatest myths of the avant-garde movements appeared. I mean the myth of the radical rebellion, followed by total destruction of the old world and building a new world from the very beginning. Obviously it has much in common with the archetype of Apocalypse[16] and its psychological projection formulated by Sigmund Freud as an instinct for Apocalypse.

This myth contains the paradoxical (and thought by its own authors as paradoxical) system of the chaotic-cosmic world postulated by the main avant-garde trends themselves.

So opposing eschatology to progress proves to be one of the main appearances of the modernist spirit. The Enlightenment myth of the

[16] In order to stress on the archetypal potentiality of this myth, I will only remind that in a much more general plan Nortrop Frye interprets the symbolism of the Bible as a

progress continued by positivism finds its most evident failure in the inhospitable territory of avant-gardism. There is no other epoch striking such a blow on the myth of the constructive continuity as the transient avant-garde movement. After it all the ways for uprising against the centuries-old European cultural wealth were open – in one blow and without any responsibility to the institution of history which had been inspiring fear for ages. The crash of confidence in history was projected most obviously exactly in the avant-garde conception of time. Past has been deleted, and present has been reduced to a spring-board to the future. This context determines the key meaning of the word "jump" in the avant-garde texts and metatexts.

Yet in this picture, where the very idea of the past has been deliberately crossed out, nostalgia has a specific place. And namely the appearance of nostalgia – the modernist nostalgia for continuity – supports the second main level of avant-garde aesthetics with a view to the temporal logic. It forms the implicit counterbalance for the explicit rebellion against the past.

Modernist nostalgia for continuity sets the foundations of a specific coexistence of the mythical and historical mind. Being a situation very similar to this of dreams and mystic experiences, nostalgia is a sign of creating a reality different from the existing one. The nostalgia of the historical mind for something different from it itself, reveals a desire for creating myths in the conditions of a non-mythical culture. The drama of historical mind – to bear nostalgias, to have a past, to keep a memory for the lost – proceeds from its inherent ability to divide the past from the present. In fact this is a drama which has its roots in the impossible but coveted self-completeness of historical mind. On the other pole the completeness of the mythical mind stands. For the mythical mind the coexistence of past and present is not a problem. In the mythical cosmos the past as a value-corrective of the present is always welcome. Besides its concrete temporal meaning is strongly neutralized but it is not deli-

„grammar of the literary archetypes", and the Apocalypse – as a „summary" of the Bible. (Frye, N. The Great Code. Фрай, Н. Великият код: Библията и литературата, изд. „ГАЛ-ИКО„, С., 1993.)

berately ignored, as it happens in situations of rebellion of the historical mind against its own history, which is the case with some avant-garde trends.

The myth as a practical-philosophical system pointed to a life without suffering discharges the subject of the responsibility for the events (as far as everything is immanent and a priory and nothing depends on the subject). History, on the contrary, is being created by subjects and exists through them – through their consciousness, memory and historical adjustment. And these consciousness, memory and historical adjustment are not collective as the mythical ones.

In order to return to the concrete topic of modernist text and its relations to the background, I will refer to some of Yury Lotman's general observations on text. According to them, text as "ritualized speech", as "natural language speech", "encoded by some secondary language" "achieves an entirely new degree of structural complication, when we are speaking of a work of art".[17] "Having its ability for condensing information revealed it [the text] *obtains memory"*. Being "multi-stratum and heterogeneous in a semiotic plan", "the work of art correlates both to the cultural context and to the readers' audience". "In the same time it shows a quality, mentioned by Heraclites as a "self-extending logos".[18]

According to this classical formulation of Lotman, the text at this level of its own structural complication reveals the characteristics of its intellectual organization being able not only to transfer the outer information contained in it but also to transform the messages and to create new ones. Among the processes of the social-communicative function of the text there are two, which are exceptionally relevant to the phenomenon of the modernist text:

2. Communication between the audience and the cultural tradition. This process reveals the function of the text to be a collective memory. In this capacity the text shows the ability for constant self-completing, on

[17] Lotman, Y. Semiotics of Culture and the Concept of Text. – In: Lotman, Y. Culture and Information. Лотман, Ю. Семиотика на културата и понятието за текст. – В: Лотман, Ю. Култура и информация. Изд. „Наука и изкуство". С., 1992, с. 181.

[18] Ibid, p. 182.

the one hand. On the other hand, it actualizes different aspects of information, and temporarily or completely forgets others.

5. Communication between the text and the cultural context. In this situation the text, identifying itself with the cultural context exceeds its own meaning and obtains the features of the presented culture – it becomes a cultural model. On the other hand, it resembles an autonomous person, tending to self-dependent conduction...

These two processes of the social-communicative function of the text are an extremely sensitive area for modernism. The quality of representing the collective memory has its specific appearance in the modernist, and especially in the avant-garde opinions, as well as in the aspiration for actualizing some and forgetting other aspects of information.

The avant-garde trends are predominantly anti-historical. Their main feature is the consciousness of breaking with the past, the consciousness of declining the layers of the civilization. To this effect the opposition civilization – culture was actively discussed in that period. Civilization was understood as dead, petrified heritage belonging to the past, which rather loads the individual and prevents him from development; culture in this opposition, on the contrary, was predetermined to bear the signs of life and development.[19] In the same pathos history was dethroned as a legitimate biography of the community. And in a general plan – the idea of its positive significance was revised in the context of a cultural mind, which was impatient to bring forward the myths of its own instead of to continue, develop or "serve" the history.

In these circumstances the feeling of continuity which appears existential of historicity (as a modus making from historicity a "natural" experience in human life) is being projected in the opposite direction. The avant-garde splits with history as past, but in return it develops the idea of history as future. This is a history which is believed to start from the very avant-garde movement. This genuinely mythical project is stimulated by the fact that the avant-garde trends are in a way products of the "present"

[19] The opposition civilization-culture has been widely interpreted in Bulgarian modernist critical texts, and especially in Geo Milev's articles.

in its social dimensions. Or, more precisely, it could be described as articulation of actuality (thought as a potential history) through a mythical mind (revealed for example by E. Kassirer in "An Essay on Man" as a general emotional modus of human view of life).

Thus the avant-garde reconstruction of the past proves to be a reconstruction of a mythical adjustment through which being in history is being experienced. (Here I would remind Gadamer's words that each history has its mythical prejudices, and each mythology has its historical horizon.)

So in the modernist context history paradoxically appears either in the image of *historiography*, destroying the *history as continuity* (because historiography turns history into a dead description, into a series of facts), or it takes the shapes of mythical constructs. These processes are even more evident for the observer, as far as the avant-garde, which genealogically proceeds from the interwar period and respectively is closely connected with the atmosphere of socio-cultural crisis and catastrophe, contains in itself the themes of history. This exactly is the origin of the great modernist (and especially avant-garde) theme of the *rebellion* – imagined as a complete destruction of the old world and building of an entirely new one "from the very beginning". Besides this rebellion is supposed to happen both in the community's history and in the intimate being, it is supposed to be both announced as community's cause and felt so personally, that words cannot express it.

The tension between being a "cultural model" and behaving self-dependently is also a determinant in analyzing modernism. It provokes many receptive reactions, which could be generalized in reading the modernity as an "abnormal" discourse. This approach is encoded by the inner resistance of modernity itself to be accepted by the "others" as a part of "their" continuity.

One of the main oppositions, through which the idea of avant-garde and non avant-garde literature used to be formulated in the 1920's in Bulgaria, was the opposition Apollo's – Dionysus' element.[20] By the

[20] This question is concerned by R. Likova, E. Sugarev, R. Kuncheva, etc. (Лико-ва, Р. Художествено и естетическо новаторство на септемврийската поезия. – В:

way, this antinomy proves to be an orientation mark for generations of European modernists, who have developed their way of thinking and discourse, influenced by Nietzsche's philosophy.

In Bulgarian literary life this opposition remained active at least until the end of the 1920's and it was reduced to certain opinions and cultural necessities. It was applied mainly to the process of looking for a creative pattern in a period of self-identification for the Bulgarian literature. To this effect Bergson's interpretation of the myth about Dionysus exceeding to some psychological aspects is more productive compared to Nietzsche's conception. In Bergson's interpretation Dionysus as a god of wine is a secondary image, covering his ecstatic nature and "translating" the foreign – Thracian – divinity in the language of the well balanced Greek culture. In this case the wine as an attribute of Dionysus turned to be a kind of cultural metaphor.[21]

This model proved to be functional in comprehending different contra-traditional cultural appearances, felt as "abnormal". It's no chance that one of the names of the post-symbolist ecstasy is "drunkenness", and the other one is "madness". Both examples are reflections of the phenomenon of the new item, felt as an ecstatic one. Thus the concepts of drunkenness and madness are a kind of "translating" constructs.

There are some very typical critical adaptations, which read the post-symbolist modernity through the concepts of pathology, and especially through the concept of psychotic. Wandering around the question of madness becomes extremely strained in the process of development of the avant-garde as actual practice. This question is the main modus of its initial socio-cultural reception. And this refers both to its positive and negative reception.

Септемврийското въстание в българската литература, изд. „Наука и изкуство", С., 1983, 127-151; Сугарев, Е. Българският експресионизъм, ДИ „Народна просвета", С., 1988; Кунчева, Р. „Чистата поезия" – пресечно понятие на модернизма. Пол Валери и Николай Лилиев. – В: Езиците на европейската модерност, изд. „Боян Пенев", С., 2000).

[21] See: Bergson, A. Two Sources of Moral and Religion. Бергсон, А. Двата източника на морала и религията, изд. „Аргес„, С., 1993, с. 156.

One of the many examples is the unintentional dialogue, formed by the statements of two Bulgarian modernists from the first decades of the 20th century. Pencho Slaveykov – a representative of the already old "aesthetic individualism", brands the "new modernity" of symbolism, calling "the modern soul" "that mental mess of different ill, half-ill and mad people, for whom blue is green, yellow is a cat, woman is a pin, and September is a billy-goat".[22]

The defender of the "new modernity" (the avant-garde trends) – Sirrak Skitnik – interprets the same topic in the opposite pathos, but still through the concept of madness: "The contemporary specialists in human hurried to put a diagnosis: disorder of the nerve centers! (...) And those who dislike the scandal calmed down that all the "ist"-s were sent to the madhouse. (...) Mankind is trying to deny its own pain: because the wandering, the explosions, the disguised cry for help of the contemporary creative spirit are nothing else but the modern soul's pain – an unclear protest against the horror of death, dissatisfaction with their own selves and an unsatisfied desire for being strong and self-dependent."[23]

Thus P. Slaveykov, criticizing the symbolist Richard Demel, and Sirrak Skitnik – defending the futurist Marinetti (because those are the objects of their statements), achieved a strange dialogue, connecting the first and the third phase of modernism in a dynamic relation which leaves the feeling of a lack of time and a too great speed of development. But this "dialogue", connecting two independent statements with about twenty year distance between them, is symptomatic for the contradictory continuity of modernity, for the relativity of its own memory of itself.

So it turns out that the relations between modernist and preceding positivism are not much different in their mechanism from the relations in the inner system of modernism. And the memory of the past, which

[22] Slaveykov. P. Bulgarian Poetry. Славейков, П. Българската поезия. 1906.

[23] Sirrak Skitnik. The Secret of the Primitive. Сирак Скитник. Тайната на примитива – Златорог, 1923. И в: Сирак Скитник. Избрани статии 1920-1943, цит. изд., С., 1982, 42-43.

modernism and especially avant-gardes deny, is saved in its "cultural skeleton", in its cultural reflexes of conduct.

Thus the memory of the modernist text about the preceding is never enough for the past to be appreciated. But the modernist ambition of creating memories of its own is so strong, that it distracts the channel through which these memories are expected to pass.

This way modernity develops the models of the past, sharply changing them, instead of deleting and creating entirely new ones (which is the constitutional myth of modernism). So the modernist intention for destroying the cultural legacy proves to be actually a change of stress from the previous center to the margins, which now have become a new center. This could be most easily illustrated by the change of importance, ascribed to the rational. The positivistic type of culture overrates the rationality and neglects the intuitive knowledge and the discourse, deprived from the rational type of logic. It removes them somewhere to the periphery. Modernism, on the contrary, exchanges the places of the stresses. The reason could be a kind of "exhaustion" of the previous cultural system. That's why modernity is much more tolerant to the cultural models of the most distant past (primitive art, for example), and even looks for its own routs in them, besides ignoring the recent positivist model as irrelevant to modernist development, though it has obviously provoked modernity as a negative reaction of it.

So maybe modernity could be compared to those illusions, which come to compensate for the firm canon of the rational logic; it could be compared to those "mirages of mind" (after Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari[24]), that come to rescue us from the plan of immanence. To this effect, to exist in modernity, that is to feel somewhere in the margins of the plan of immanence. And moreover – to feel in a kind of active margins, opposed and rebellious to the central plan taken for immanent. Thus the problems of modernity tend to be read as problems of human mind in general. And this should be the humanized image of the formal relation

[24] See Deleuze, G., F. Guattari. What is Philosophy? Дельоз, Ж., Ф. Гатари. Що е философия? ИК „Критика и хуманизъм". С., 1995.

between the text and its "forgotten" background, between the text and its scared audience. Because the cultural memory contained in modernist texts very often appears in unrecognizable faces. And this should be the source of the grotesque avant-garde images, of the lack of common logic, of the "unnatural naturalism", in which the well known articles are exaggerated and related in an unusual way.

ЭЛКА ДИМИТРОВА

О ВРАЖДЕБНОСТИ И НОСТАЛЬГИИ

(НАБЛЮДЕНИЯ НАД БОЛГАРСКОЙ АВАНГАРДИСТСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРОЙ 20-ЫХ ГОДОВ XX ВЕКА)

Автор останавливается на некоторых текстах болгарского постсимволистического модернизма с учетом их двойственного отношения к являющемуся их предпосылкой культурному прошлому. Это отношение со своей стороны описано в понятиях одновременного продолжения и противопоставления. Процессы преемственности и отвержения представлены конкретно на модели взаимодействия между индивидуальным воспоминанием и коллективной памятью.

Главная цель состоит в использовании взаимодействия между индивидуальным воспоминанием и коллективной памятью в условиях социокультурного кризиса и перемен как средство для понимания некоторых парадоксов, воспринимаемых как типичные для модернистского сознания.

Очерченное таким образом взаимодействие интерпретируется после некоторых подготовительных объяснений, затрагивающих специфические роли враждебности и ностальгии в механизме стирания/продолжения

культурного прошлого, т.е. в модели оппозиции/сотрудничества между индивидуальным воспоминанием и коллективной памятью.

В этом контексте намечены две главные связи: между индивидуальным воспоминанием и враждебностью с одной стороны и между коллективной памятью и ностальгией с другой. Первая связь наполняется смыслом как преимущественно исторически профилированная, а вторая – как имеющая преимущественно мифологическую типологию.

Исследование проблемы условно разделяется на две части, первая из которых затрагивает главным образом тематический план, в то время как вторая сконцентрирована на эстетическом.

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ТЕКСТ И ДИСКУРС ВО ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИИ С ПАМЯТЬЮ

Память как умственная способность, фиксирующая и сохраняющая информацию, имеет огромное значение для процессов коммуникации. Запоминание, хранение запоминаемого и его воспроизведение из фонда памяти – это функции, которые обуславливают как создание, так и понимание высказывания.[1]

Сознание значимости этих функций проникало в языковедение постепенно, совместно с развитием психолингвистики. Ключевое значение имело также изменение объекта изучения в рамках сугубо языковых исследований: прежняя заинтересованность текстом, его структурой, всё более отчётливо уступает место исследованию высказывания – т. е. текста, употребляемого в определённой коммуникативной ситуации, а также исследованию дискурса – процессов создания и понимания высказывания, которые рассматриваются в аспекте интеракции, динамики и с точки зрения некоторых коммуникативных функций.

Вопросы, о которых говорим, являются предметом изучения таких языковедческих дисциплин как теория текста (лингвистическая текстология), теория коммуникации и теория дискурса. В теории

[1] Анализ разных типов и механизмов памяти, а также богатый обзор психологической литературы на эту тему даёт I. Kurcz – см. гл. *Pamięć. Uczenie się. Język*, Warszawa 1995 (в серии: Psychologia ogólna, ред. T. Tomaszewski).

текста вопросы эти возникали посредственным образом – в связи с построением связности текста и необходимостью учитывать наличие информации, не поддающейся вербализации в самом тексте, но участвующей в создании его смысла.

Текст – в представлении лингвистической текстологии – это сложная языковая структура, построенная из одного или многих высказываний, которая составляет относительно автономную информационную целостность: законченное сообщение.[2] Связность содержания текста (когерентность) – результат его прагматической обусловленности. Это основной принцип в акте коммуникации; он обуславливает суммирование значений знаков в высказывании „на одну и ту же тему", имевшем смысл. В суммировании значений существенную роль выполняют „знания о мире" – познавательный фон высказывания, которое модифицирует смысл предложений, используемых в тексте.

Текст – как произведение, составленное обычно из многих предложений, наделённое линеарной очерёдностью элементов – создаёт смысловые ряды прогрессивным образом. Исходная когерентность высказывания находит более или менее выразительную поддержку в „структурной", „локальной" связности, выраженной при помощи языковых средств, таких как: анафора, кореференция, тематико-рематические отношения, причинно-следственные и временные связи между предложениями, метатекстовые соотнесения в рамках высказывания и т.п.

Несмотря на то, что текст – в ранних исследованиях по теории текста – был анализирован как модель-понятие, нельзя было не заметить его линеарную структуру и прогрессивность наплыва информации. Соотнесение данного элемента с предшествующими и

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[2] Категория эта шире обсуждается в : T. Dobrzyńska. *Tekst. Próba syntezy*, Warszawa 1993. См. также: R.-A. de Beaugrande, W.U. Dressler, *Wstęp do lingwistyki tekstu*, Warszawa 1990; A. Duszak, *Tekst, dyskurs, komunikacja międzykulturowa*, Warszawa 1998; T.A. van Dijk (ред.) Dyskurs jako struktura i proces, перевод G. Grochowski, Warszawa 2001; A. Wilkoń, *Spójność i struktura tekstu*, Kraków 2002; T. Dobrzyńska, *Tekst – styl – poetyka*, Kraków 2003.

последующими элементами должно было учитываться в исследовании механизмов связности текста. Такие взаимосвязи преобразовывают свободную секвенцию языковых знаков в сеть единиц, связанных по значению: отмеченных как тождественные, как близкие по значению или предмету, обогащающие данное содержание новой информацией. Таким образом возникает функциональная перспектива высказываний, а также изотопия текста. Всё это приводит к тому, что по сути дела ни один элемент текста не является элементом изолированным и независимым. Интерпретация одного из них должна учитывать присутствие и других элементов текста.

Тем самым, можно сделать заключение, что знак в тексте требует активизации других элементов содержания, знаков, находящихся с ним во взаимосвязи. А так как выделение связных и несвязных элементов обозначает необходимость анализа всех элементов, текст реально указывает нам на свою целостность и относительный статус линеарного ряда своих элементов. Границы текста (часто обозначенные при помощи показателей начала и конца высказывания – „делимитаторов“) показывают заодно границы пространства, в котором может осуществляться связь значений различных языковых единиц, выступающих в тексте. Преобразование значений в данном пространстве – происходящее реально в процессе создания и передачи высказывания, а также его приёма и интерпретации – обязывает нас отнестись с должным вниманием к механизмам памяти, способным хранить поступающую информацию, предоставляя возможность воспроизведения их по мере необходимости в акте припоминания.

В связи с этим лингвистическая текстология обратилась к результатам исследований иной отрасли науки – познавательной психологии, в которых различаем кратковременную память (англ. short-term memory), сугубо активную в локальных оперативных процессах, а также долговременную память (анг. long-term memory), хранящую м.пр. языковые и внеязыковые знания. Оба вида памяти характеризуются следующим образом[3]:

[3] Ср. Kurcz, op.cit.; представленные в скобках цитаты относятся к этой разработке.

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ЧИТАЛНЯ

„Кратковременная память [...] является первым этапом переработки информации, ибо сенсорную память понимаем как вид пассивного хранилища. Память эта характеризуется ограниченной ёмкостью, она преходяща, т.е. время её функционирования ограничено. Ёмкость КП [STM – short-term memory] составляет 7± 2 единицы [...], которые могут представлять собой любые элементы, создающие некое целое, напр: буквы или слова. Данный вид памяти определяется иногда термином „свежая" или „первичная" память.

Долговременная память [LTM – long-term memory] – это прочное, устойчивое хранилище закодированных следов памяти [...], не ограниченных ёмкостью и временем хранения. Кодирование информации заключается в присоединении их к категории или системам категорий, существующих уже в уме индивида, либо в создании новых категорий. [...] LTM определяется как устойчивая или вторичная память" (стр. 39).

Устойчивая (долговременная) память делится на семантическую память и эпизодическую. „В общих чертах, семантическая память – это система нашего общего понятийного знания, а эпизодическая память – это знания, связанные с воспоминаниями личного опыта" (стр. 62). И далее: „То, какой является организация семантической памяти, решает система понятий. Единицам организации информации в этой системе соответствуют термины, употребляемые разными авторами: понятия, идеи, факты, суждения, правила, расписки и т.п. Это знание человека о мире. Вневременное и внеличное" (стр.63).

Упомянутые здесь виды памяти не исчерпывают вопрос описания ситуации передачи и приёма высказывания. Несмотря на то, что необходимая для этих процессов коммуникативная и языковая компетенция, а также общие знания о мире находятся в зоне долговременной памяти, кратковременная память является недостаточной основой для проведения действий, связывающих текст и гарантирующих ему связность, когерентность. Во-первых, действия, совершаемые на элементах текста, не совпадают по своей природе с действиями, совершаемыми на каких-либо других внеязыковых или

внетекстовых элементах, напр. на запоминаемых фруктах либо на геометрических фигурах. В данных действиях, совершаемых даже по самому близкому соседству, как в случае тематических связей между предложениями в процессе создания функциональной перспективы или в случае анафорических соотношений, всегда участвует языковое сознание, активизируется сфера языковой и коммуникативной компетенции. Итак, следует принять, что фиксированию очередных элементов текста в кратковременной памяти сопутствует постоянное соотнесение с фондом долговременной памяти. Эту модальность функционирования памяти определяют термином „оперативная память". В разработках психологического характера она представлена следующим образом:

„Оперативная память [...] понимается как место, в котором совершаются умом любые операции. Кратковременная память (STM) с ограниченными ёмкостью и временем хранения, отождествляемая нередко с тем, что в данный момент осознаётся, являлась как бы частью (субсистемой) оперативной памяти, действия которой не обязательно **сознательны** [отм. I.K.] и ёмкость которой не кажется столь ограниченной. [...] В оперативной памяти (понимаемой иногда как побуждение, состояние готовности разных структур долговременной памяти) хранилось бы то содержание, те операции, которые могут пригодиться в сиюминутной работе ума. [...] Можно предполагать, что в оперативной памяти хранятся или удерживаются в состоянии готовности, доступности разные информации, и что там осуществляются операции на новых информациях. Происходит это независимо от сознательного характера данных операций. Оперативная память была бы тогда местом как осознанной (в STM), так и неосознанной переработки информации. В памяти этой происходили бы как автоматизированные, так и контролируемые процессы" (стр.58-59).

Вышеуказанные психологические заключения, касающиеся способа приёма и накапливания информации умом, облегчают исследование языковой коммуникации с точки зрения динамики развития высказывания, а также её обусловленности спецификой передачи и

приёма. В исследованиях подобного рода, предметом которых является уже не текст, а дискурс, коренным образом изменяется трактовка „знаний о мире“ (иначе „общих знаний“ или „элементарных знаний“ – англ. Back-ground Knowledge), являющихся опорой для передаваемого содержания. В теории текста допускалось воспринимать её как совокупность предпосылок, необходимых для понимания текста; предпосылок, учитываемых автором высказывания. Совокупность эта контролировалась логическими факторами, и по крайней мере частично создавала стабильную, статичную базу текста. Понятийный аппарат текстологии не облегчал задачу отметить разнообразие дискурсивных практик, заключающихся то в вербализации предпосылок, входящих в сферу „общих знаний“, но, может быть может, незнакомых слушателю, то в повторах неких информаций, которые несмотря на факт их передачи и значение для понимания дальнейших элементов высказывания могли быть незамеченными. Совсем по-другому дело обстоит в теории дискурса. Исследования хода коммуникации, учитывающие её динамический, интерактивный характер, вынуждены считаться с наличием прагматических факторов – между прочим с гипотетическими рамками „общих знаний“ (содержание которых не подлежит непосредственному контролю и остаётся в сфере предположений участников коммуникативного акта), а также с проблемой ёмкости памяти и сосредоточенным вниманием собеседников. Факторы эти учитывала, как известно, риторика. Черпая вдохновение из риторической традиции и современных психолингвистических исследований, можно увидеть новые аспекты языковых действий, а также обнаружить порою сходство разных на вид практик.

Для подтверждения роли воспоминания в коммуникации, проанализируем несколько дискурсивных ситуаций, которые представляют собой разные функции воспоминания – когда вспоминается реально знакомое индивиду содержание либо когда „воспоминание“ симулировано.

1. В беседе (также мысленно обращенной к себе – в *soliloquium*)

появляются – как исходный пункт для вопросов, выводов, повелений – разные предложения, констатирующие факты действительности, очевидные для адресата, напр:

– Вы – градостроитель. Что вы думаете о развитии нашего города?
– Ты – мать. Почему не реагируешь?
(внутренняя речь) – Я взрослый /взрослая. Нельзя мне падать духом.

Первые предложения из приведённых выше примеров констатируют факты (быть градостроителем, матерью, взрослым), о которых слушатель отлично знает, т.е. с точки зрения обоснованности коммуникации они абсолютно лишние. Как суждения, находящиеся в комплексе „элементарных знаний" и хранящиеся в долговременной памяти обоих говорящих, они коммуникативно избыточны. Однако их пребывание в долговременной памяти не гарантирует им возможности появиться и остаться в пространстве актуальных действий ума, в орбите оперативной памяти. А их активизация там необходима, так как они являются предпосылкой для серии выводов – импликаций и импликатур, обосновывающих очередные сегменты высказывания. Напр.: только после активизации суждения „Вы – градостроитель" приобретает смысл вопрос: „Что вы думаете о развитии нашего города?". Это уже вопрос, не касающийся личных импрессий, субъективных и непрофессиональных оценок. Это вопрос, результатом которого является авторитарный ответ, основанный на знаниях и профессиональном опыте. Подобный процесс осуществляется в случае вербализации суждения „Ты – мать". Этот очевидный для говорящего факт выявляет не только семантическое содержание слова „мать", но и поле его коннотаций, участвующих в создании понятийного стереотипа матери. Благодаря этому подчёркиваются такие черты матери как напр.: любовь к ребёнку, привязанность, ответственность, обязанность охранять его – даже от него самого и т. п. Итак, воспоминание об очевидном факте имеет смысл с точки зрения логики дискурса. Как показывает последний при-

мер, перекодировка информации из сферы долговременной памяти в оперативную память обоснована даже в случае soliloquium.

2. Следующий пример (см. Приложение, I) – из литературного произведения, но он иллюстрирует дискурсивные действия, которые могут появляться в более продолжительном высказывании, не обязательно литературного характера. В цитируемой сатире Красицкого „К королю", которая является мастерским примером мнимой, не фактической критики (согласно замыслу автора, обвинения, направленные королю, относятся к обвинителям – шляхте) несколько раз повторяется суждение „Ты – король"(„Jesteś królem" – иногда в модификации „Tyś królem"). Здесь имеем дело с присутствием предпосылки – переносом её из долговременной памяти в оперативную, как и в предыдущих примерах. Однако такое толкование нашло бы уже своё оправдание в всего лишь одном, единственном напоминании, что „Ты – король". Многократное изъявление этого факта выполняет здесь добавочную функцию: каждый повтор суждения „ты – король" открывает иной ряд выводов и аргументации, является предпосылкой, обосновывающей выводы. Высказывание в своей аргументационной части составлено из ряда параллельных умозаключений, обособленных точкой опоры. „Быть королём" – это не только выявление логической аргументации, но также и тема серии умозаключений; тема, к которой несколько раз возвращается говорящий. Этим и подчёркивается многогранность обсуждения темы: критика короля относится ко многим аспектам, и она должна быть сокрушительной. Тематическая связь построена здесь на простейшей технике связности: повторении тематического элемента. Тема кладёт начало не одному потоку аргументации, а серии умозаключений, связанных возвращением к исходной точке. Ингеренция оперативной памяти отражается здесь выразительно в структуре текста: организует паратактический ход умозаключения и гарантирует ему тематическую связность.

3. Речь Антония над телом убитого Цезаря (см. Приложение, II) – это классический пример применения иронии, анализированный в разных обсуждениях этого тропа[4]. Цитируемый фрагмент взят из

литературного произведения и подчиняется многим художественным приёмам, однако представляет собой некие дискурсивные явления, которые могли бы появиться в высказывании нелитературного типа, особенно в таком, которое показывает высший уровень коммуникативной способности говорящего.

В анализах механизма иронии, проявляющего своё функционирование в этом фрагменте, подчёркивается оппозиция применения и воспроизведения (англ. use – mention) слов или предложений[5]; воспроизведение, т.е. род дискурса, метаязыкового подхода, можно объяснять в категории кавычек. Роль кавычек м.пр. в том, что „побуждают [они] к реинтерпретации выражения и приписанию нового значения связям, существующим в их знаковой структуре“[6].

В речи Антония, произносимой им с разрешения Брута во время ритуала погребения, совершается шаг за шагом переоценка роли Цезаря и его убийц. Цезарь, представляемый заговорщиками как узурпатор, тиран, враг республики, стал восприниматься как благодетель народа. Заговорщики, целью которых было спасти гражданские свободы, превращаются во врагов общества, изменников. Эта двойная переоценка, совершающаяся в драматической обстановке, когда решаются судьбы государства, когда война висит на волоске и жизнь многих людей подвергается опасности – результат выступления одного человека: Антония. В трагедии Шекспира он даёт пример ораторского мастерства, умения манипулировать общественным мнением. Квинтэссенцией его манипуляции является нейтрализация смысла выражения „человек чести“ (англ. honorable

[4] Ср., напр. D. Sperber, D. Wilson, *Irony and the Use-Mention Distinction*, in: Radical Pragmatics, ed. P. Cole, New York 1981; польский перевод: *Ironia a rozróżnienie między użyciem a przywołaniem*, „Pamiętnik Literacki“ 1986, z.1.

[5] Как „воспроизведение“, т.е. употребление, дистанцирующееся от иного кода, образа речи и мышления объясняют иронию Sperber и Wilson, op.cit.

[6] M.R. Mayenowa, *Expressions guillemetées. Contribution à l'étude du texte poétigue*, в: *To honor Roman Jakobson. Essays on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday*, vol. 2, The Hague – Paris 1967; польский перевод: *Wyrażenia cudzysłowowe. Przyczynek do badań nad semantyką tekstu poetyckiego*, в: M.R. Mayenowa, *Studia i rozprawy*, wybór i oprac. A. Axer i T. Dobrzyńska, Warszawa 1993.

man). Выражение это – в разных функциях и соотнесениях (к Бруту и другим заговорщикам), присутствует во всей его речи. Антоний, желавший подвергнуть сомнению позицию всеми уважаемого Брута, подтверждает для вида его характеристику как „человека чести", однако постепенно собирает аргументы, которые осложняют либо не позволяют сохранить эту позицию – если хочется одновременно признать авторитет Цезаря (и воспользоваться духовной записью...). Многократное повторение выражений „Брут – это человек чести", „все они – люди чести" заставляет сосредоточиться над их смыслом и подвергнуть их повторной интерпретации вместе с актуальной аргументацией. Многократно повторяемые выражения – объект перекодировки из долговременной памяти (сохраняющей узнаваемость факта, что Брут, кроме свойственных ему нравственных качеств, человек благородного происхождения, и что вместе со званием сенатора ему присвоен статус человека чести) в кратковременную и оперативную память. Результатом таких переносов является нарушение обоснованности характеристики Брута и заговорщиков: слова „все они – люди чести" воспринимаются в кавычках иронии и как антифраза подвергаются отрицанию.

Повторение информации в тексте не обязательно должно быть повторением её в неизменной форме и с сохранением её смыслового потенциала. В цитируемом фрагменте повтор служит очередным этапам смысловой обработки – преобразованиям смысла выражения в изменяющихся контекстах. Смысл выражения подвергается постоянной модификации в процессе высказывания, и может, в итоге, стать своей противоположностью (т.е. противоположностью смысла исходной фазы).

4. Следующее наблюдение связано с фактом, что функцию вышеобсуждаемых повторов могут выполнять разные метаязыковые выражения, указывающие на предыдущие элементы высказывания, которые вновь должны находится в центре внимания, напр.:

Давайте задумаемся над значением названия этой главы.
Вернёмся к исходной констатации.

Время от времени, воспроизведение, осуществляемое метатекстовым образом, выступает вместе с воспоминанием звучания или содержания воспоминаемого, напр.:

Давайте повторим это ещё раз: X (здесь наступает цепь высказываний, исходной точкой которых является X).

Всегда недостаточно будет вспоминать X (о котором раньше уже говорилось), так как ... (здесь представляется новая аргументация).

Как я уже раньше отметила: X (здесь наступает развитие сюжета в новом направлении).

Такие метатекстовые указания подчёркивают напоминания известных информаций или ощущений, и могут выступать в качестве заменителя непосредственных повторов этих элементов. Как и повторы, они укрепляют тематические связи в тексте, способствуя таким образом становлению когеренции. Они облегчают интерпретацию высказывания, так как указываемые суждения являются исходной точкой для процесса умозаключения: импликатур и инференции.

5. Наконец, обратим внимание на факт, что вербализация общеизвестных информаций (по крайней мере известных обоим участникам коммуникативного акта) является своеобразным нарушением правил кооперации[7]; не менее тонким вопросом следует считать введение неизвестных информаций, которые должны быть знакомы адресату. В обоих случаях слушатель может почувствовать себя обиженным, так как намекается на его неведение или он ставится в затруднительное положение – положение невозможности понять вывод, опирающийся на неизвестные ему предпосылки. В обоих случаях также можно прибегнуть к дискурсивной технике мнимого (симулированного) воспоминания, которая нововводимым инфор-

[7] Ср. H.P. Grice, *Logic and Conversation,* in: *Syntax and Semantics* 3; Spech Acts, eds. P. Cole and J. Morgan, New York 1975; польский перевод: *Logika a konwersacja,* „Przegląd Humanistyczny" 1977, z.6. В анализируемом случае речь идёт о нарушении максимы количества, предписывающей подачу достаточного объёма информации (не слишком мало и не слишком много).

мациям придаёт удобный статус известных информаций, но переносимых из долговременной памяти в оперативную, напр::

Мы помним: X.

Давайте не забывать, что X.

Как известно, X.

Данная техника является особенно удобной в случае сложной коммуникативной ситуации, когда высказывание адресуется какому-нибудь индивиду и, заодно, широкому кругу слушателей, знания которых менее расшифрованы либо их значительно меньше, чем у непосредственного слушателя. С таким явлением встречаемся, например в интервью. Оттуда и берутся такие формы введения существенных, хоть известных информаций, как:

– Напомню: вы лауреат премии Нике. [...]

– Все мы помним, что в последнее время вы совершили путешествие в Африку. [...]

Воспоминание, которое является существенным фактором формирования дискурса, проявляет здесь свой риторический потенциал и связь со сферой речевого этикета. Роль повторений в высказывании воспринималась в какой-то степени издавна[8]. Многие примеры риторической фигуры *repetitio* можно объяснять как психологически мотивированные случаи воспоминания суждений, которые станут пресупрозицией для дальнейших смыслообразующих действий в высказываниях.

[8] Ср. S.I. Gindin, *„Была ли риторика „донаучной" теорией текста?"*, в: *Tekst w kontekście*, red. T. Dobrzyńska, Wrocław 1990.

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ I:

Im wyżej, tym widoczniej; chwale lub naganie
Podpadają królowie, najjaśniejszy panie!
Satyra prawdę mówi, względów się wyrzeka.
Wielbi urząd, czci króla, lecz sądzi człowieka.
Gdy więc ganię zdrożności i zdania mniej baczne,
Pozwolisz, mości królu, że od ciebie zacznę.
Jesteś królem, a czemu nie królewskim synem?
To niedobrze; krew pańska jest zaszczyt przed gminem.
Kto się w zamku urodził, niech ten w zamku siedzi;
Z tegoż powodu nasi szczęśliwi sąsiedzi.
Bo natura na rządczych pokoleniach zna się;
Inszym powietrzem żywi, inszą strawą pasie.
Stąd rozum bez nauki, stąd biegłość bez pracy,
Mądrzy, rządni, wspaniali, mocarze, junacy,
Wszystko im łatwo idzie; a chociażby który
Odstrychnął się na moment od swojej natury,
Znowu się do niej wróci, a dobrym koniecznie
Być musi i szanownym w potomności wiecznie. [...]
Tyś królem, czemu nie ja? Mówiąc między nami,
Ja się nie będę chwalił, ale przymiotami
Niezłymi się zaszczycam. Jestem Polak rodem,
A do tego i szlachcic, a choćbym i miodem
Szynkował, tak jak niegdyś ów bartnik z Kruszwicy,
Czemuż bym nie mógł osieść na swojej stolicy?
Jesteś królem; a byłeś przedtem mości panem;
To grzech niedopuszczony. Każdy, który stanem
Przedtem się z tobą równał, a teraz czcić musi,
Nim powie: „najjaśniejszy". pierwej się zakrztusi;
i choć się przyzwyczaił, przecież go nie łechce;
Usty cię czci, a sercem szanować cię nie chce. [...]

Ignacy Krasicki, *Do króla* (Satyry)

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ II:

Anthony: Friends, Romans, Countrymen, lend me your ears:
I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him:
The evill that men do, lives after them,
The good is oft enterred with their bones,
So let it be with Caesar. The Noble Brutus,
Hath told you Caesar was Ambitious:
If it were so, it was a greevous Fault,
And greevously hath Caesar answer'd it.
Heere, under leave of Brutus, and the rest
(For Brutus is an Honorable man,
So are they all; all Honorable men)
Come I to Speace in Caesars Funerall.
He was my Friend, faithfull, and iust to me;
But Brutus sayes, he was Ambitious,
And Brutus is an Honorable man.
He hath brought many Captives to Rome,
Whose Ransomes, did the generall Coffers fill:
Did this in Caesar seeme Ambitious?
When that the poore have cry'de, Caesar hath wept:
Ambitious should be made of sterner stuffe,
Yet Brutus sayes, he was Ambitious:
And Brutus is an Honorable man.
You all did see, that on the Lupercall,
I thrice presented him a Kingly Crowne,
Which he did thrice refuse. Was this Ambitions?
Yet Brutus sayes, he was Ambitious:
And sure he is an Honourable man.
[...]
Will you be Patient? Will you stay a while?
I have o're-shot my selfe to tell you of it,
I feare I wrong the Honorable men,
Whose Daggers have stabb'd Caesar: I do feare it.

4 Ple.: There were Traitors: Honorable men?
[...]

Ant.: Good Friends, sweet Friends, let me not stirre
To such a sodaine Flood of Mutiny:
Thay that have done this Deede, are honorable.

What private greefes they have, alas I know not,
That made them do it: They are Wise, and Honorable,
And will no doubt with Reasons answer you.
[...]

W. Shakespeare, *The Tragedie of Julius Caesar*, (*Mr. William Shakespeares Comedies, Histories and Tragedies*. A facs. ed. prep. by H. Kökeritz, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1954, p. 121 – 122)

TERESA DOBRZYŃSKA

TEXT AND DISCOURSE IN COOPERATION WITH MEMORY

The development of psychological research into different types of cognitive mechanisms, and especially into the long- and short-term memory as well as the operative memory, opens a new perspective in the text and discourse studies. Text can be seen not only as a coherent and meaningful linguistic construct produced and understood with the impact of 'background knowledge', but it reveals its processual and interactive aspects in the way it stores and resuscitate relevant pieces of information. The influence of the cognitive mechanisms on the discourse structure can be seen in some practices of introduction or repetition of the known information in the message. Several examples of such cases will be shown and discussed in the paper. They reveal their rhetorical character. It is significant that they represent certain specific discursive situation, which involves recalling of a presumption regarding an important bit of information, or they repeat some phrase in order to bring to mind the point of departure for several ways for conclusion drawing. In this way they consolidate the thematic lines in the discourse and they make the processing of the text easier - the processing which includes the drawing of its implications and implicatures. It is argued that many instances of the rhetorical figure of *repetitio* should be understood as the psychologically motivated cases of remembering presumption for later operations on the text and its content.

MAURICE N. FADEL

LITERATURE, MEMORY, ACTION

Despite the methodological and interpretive achievements of Formalism and structuralist and deconstruction trends connected with it, the most common approach applied to the literary text continues to be the thematic one. *It did not only prove to be extremely resisting but it could also be described without implausibleness as blossoming at the present – after formalist ideas have lost their followers.* The various transformations of the thematic approach can be observed in the most popular schools in literary criticism such as New Historicism, Postcolonial, Gender, and Post-Marxist studies.

The most evident reason for the spread of this approach is that in the first place it seems to be easy and simple. *Theme is a product of meaning, it is connected with the content aspect of a text.* It is the most visible part of it, its surface, or, to be more precise, the veil that enwraps it. This is so because it is characteristic of theme to create an impression of exhausting a text, of representing it entirely. *The theme is the connection between the text and the outer reality. Through its theme, a text turns into a message and becomes meaningful for the reader, it becomes a fact for the social world.* Though related to the text's linguistic structures, the theme does not totally depend on them. The theme originates from the interrelations between those structures and the acts of reading. *It is an outcome of the interaction between a text and an interpretation.*

The veil metaphor, however, is misleading. It does not describe thor-

oughly enough the specific character of the theme. In fact, the theme is not just an external part of the text. Traces of thematic dimensions can be detected even in the most anti-thematic analyses of literary texts. This indicates that the metaphysical striving for leaving the thematic aspect is unfeasible. *Theme soaks up deep down into the text pervading even levels that seem least related to it, which leads to the conclusion that differentiation in language between the elements of form and these of content cannot be easily made.*

It is worth paying attention to a phenomenon of speech practiced in literature that contains in itself this intricate (perhaps even to the point of indistinctness) intertwining between the structures of form and content: rhetorical figures. Although they seem to be proper forms, through which meanings and messages are transmitted, this is far from being so. *Rhetorical figures are related to intentionality in language practice.* There is hardly a text, where a symbol is present at random. Any use of a rhetorical figure realizes an intention. Using a particular figure results from choosing among it and other figures as well as from the option to use and aviod using figures at all (which certain scholars consider utopian). Choice is an act of ascertaining value, of privileging. In the area of language it is combined with signifying and hence – with semantics. I choose a certain language element because for me it means something. This way I indue it with meaning. *Rhetorical figures themselves may well be pure forms. But the intentional dimensions introduced by their usage fills them up with content.*

Poststructuralist lines in literary studies lay particular emphasis on rhetorical figures and rhetoric in general. They do this as a gesture of differentiation from structuralist disposition to give priority to logic. As we know from Aristotle, logic and rhetoric are differentiated between themselves by the fact that the former evaluates utterances according to the criteria of truth/ falsehood, whereas the latter aspires after producing the effect of persuasion. Persuasion is attainable in intersubjective situation of communication. As well as communication itself persuasion does not have to satisfy criteria of truth/ falsehood. We may seek to persuade someone in something true as well as in something false.

Poststructuralists favour rhetoric as it provides an opportunity for critique of metaphysical mode of thinking. Rhetoric has a pragmatic character. It aims at achieving concrete objectives in specific communicative situations. Rhetoric also has a performative character. Persuasion is a practice of doing things with words. Through it we make the others believe that our statements are the most relevant to the subject of communication, i.e. we try to present the possible as real.

Yet the Poststructuralist turn towards rhetoric has not had a great social impact. For example, it has not led to introducing "Rhetoric" as a subject in secondary education. *What is more, in the field of literary theory itself, it has not resulted in studies fundamentally contributing to the solving of the problem of the relations between rhetoric and literature* (perhaps with the exception of Paul de Man's "Allegories of Reading"). *And it would be false to claim that poststructuralists are not interested in rhetoric in general. It is rather that they pay more attention to rhetorical figures.*

Allegory, undoubtedly, is such a figure. Together with irony it occupies the central position in poststructuralist discourses. This particularly concerns Paul de Man and the so-called "Yale School" in the 1980s. Concepts of allegory in poststructuralist studies derive from Walter Benjamin's works. *Here the notion of allegory is related to the notion of history.* And Benjamin's interest in history as well as Michel Foucault's one later on, appears as a result of an endeavour to define the present. How can this endeavour be accomplished? Whoever attempts to comment upon their times faces an obstacle: any definition is a definition in terms of something else, in terms of an object that lies outside the definable. *His encounter with this obstacle directs Benjamin to history.* It is precisely in history where one can find this "something else" in relation to which contemporaneity is to be thought.

Benjamin quastions the illusion that the times we live in are unique – an illusion which arises from the fact that our existence is singular and unequaled. According to his late text "On the Concept of History" the connection between historical periods is established by the expectation of happiness and redemption from evil. This expectation is not

rationalized, rather, it remains on the level of emotion, of experience. *It passes through the ages and, regardless of their differences, it makes them covertly project on and mutually anticipate each other.* Through this expectation Benjamin comes to such a vision of history that presents it as something integral, as *our history, without following the traditional models of history, that subject wholeness to the systematic integrity.* Also the expectation introduces perspectivity. *In contrast to the conventional views on history Benjamin considers it is not that much as connected with the past as with the future.*

According to Benjamin, Baroque is the period that anticipates and is projected into the modernity. Its specificity as well as the specificity of the present is revealed by allegory. *In this sense, for Benjamin allegory does not belong merely to the paradigm of figures and it is not just a formal structure, but it represents a profound unity with humanity and culture.* Through allegory a certain outlook on the world is presented. Benjamin designates it with the notion of "allegorical intention". It has to be understood literally. *The nature of "allegorical intention" is not subjective.* This is not somebody's intention, neither of the person who resorts to allegory nor of the one who perceives or reads it. *"Allegorical intention" is objective. It is immanent to allegory as such.*

Benjamin defines this intention by opposing symbol to allegory. The opposition "symbol – allegory" is used in Romanticism. Here the act of attributing value and privilege is related to the symbol. Allegory is blamed for being sketchy, speculative and artificial.

Benjamin preserves the romanticist opposition but he reverses the act of privileging. He seeks to recover the virtue of allegory. Benjamin performs this tactfully and with consideration lacking in the later poststructuralist views of allegory, influenced by him. In the latter views, there lurks the intuition that allegory is more valuable than symbol. Benjamin does not insist on that.

In "The Origin of German Tragic Drama" Benjamin refers to Kreuzer who distinguishes between four features of the symbol: *instantaneousness, totality, unattainability of the beginning and necessity.* Let us examine such a conventional symbol as the flag for example. One im-

mediately connects its colours to the country it represents. At the precise moment when the flag is seen, it is evident which country it belongs to. The material element and the meaning form a totality. At the same time, this element, which is the point where the reading of the symbol starts from, seems to disappear and get lost in its meaning. We quickly forget the colours of the flag. The country they signify completely displaces them in the act of perception. The material element seems related to the meaning by necessity. The relationship between the colours and the country is stable and it seems indissoluble. Kreuzer indicates one more feature of the symbol: its *brevity*. In fact, it contains the other four. *The symbol presupposes conciseness in both structure and reception as it implies instantaneousness, totality, unattainability of the beginning and necessity.*

All the features of the symbol point to its non-dialectical nature. Symbol is a fusion, an entity. The entire power of Benjamin's analysis is focused on the endeavor to demonstrate that, *in contrast to the symbol, allegory's distinctive nature is a dialectical one. It does not totalize. With allegory image and meaning in visual representations or the literal and figurative meanings of a literary work remain separate.* There is a difference between them, which Benjamin designates with the metaphor of "the abyss of allegory". Albrecht Dürer's famous work "Melencolia" that Benjamin addresses in his texts includes a combination of elements that can hardly be related to each other : a figure with a wreath gazing at something outside the picture's space, a dog, a ladder, a piece of rock , a pair of scales, a bell, a slate with figures on it, the sky and a rainbow. And this is only a part of all the elements. In the upper right corner of the engraving there is an inscription: "Melencolia". The relation between the images and the inscription is enigmatic. Why are all these elements used to present melancholy? What is melancholy according to this engraving?

If "Melencolia" was a symbolic work we would not experience so acutely such an enigma. Its solution would be discovered in the fusion of the levels of image and meaning or the literal and figurative meanings. In the case of allegory there is a disparity between these levels. Benjamin

connects it with *the dialectical contradiction between convention and expression.* The relation between the two levels is a result of a convention established by the author or existing beforehand in the milieu where the allegory has been created and where it functions. Yet the convention is exceeded by its expression. *There is some remainder in allegory, something in excess, that does not tesselate in the transition from image to meaning and from literal to figural meaning.* This peculiarity is what makes allegory inhomogeneous. It undermines the idea of the indispensability of the connection between the two levels. *Thus the effect of allegory cannot be immediate.* Brevity is not its attribute. *Allegory presupposes reflection. It is not accident that later Paul de Man and poststucturalist criticism bring together the problem of allegory and the problem of reading.*

The heterogeneous nature of allegory poses the question of memory in a curious manner. *Memory has an important share in figures. It is a structure constituting element in the interrelations between the two levels of both symbol and allegory.* Each level "keeps in mind" the other. The connection between the levels of the symbol is stable. There is no problem with their mutual "memorizing" each other (although on the level of its reception symbol generates oblivion: we "forget" about its material aspect). However, it is not the same with allegory. Here both levels "forget" about each other to a certain extend. *Except from being dialectics of convention and expression allegory is also dialectics of memory and oblivion.* This comes from the fact that, as Benjamin points out, *with allegory time plays an important part.* Thanks to it the appearance of the relation between memory and forgetting becomes possible. We forget because time passes between the fact or event and their recollection. *Dialectics between memory and oblivion presents time as an immanent characteristic of allegory.* Time is almost absent in symbol. In the fusion of the two levels, implemented by the symbol, time is shortened. *Symbol exposes the moment in its uniqueness.*

Benjamin sees the cultural and historical significance of allegory in its disunity. *This figure reveals one of the substantial characteristics of the present that could be observed clearly already in Baroque: fragmentariness.* The individual constituted by the institutions of modernity is

fragmentary in social as well as in personal and ethical terms.

The difference between image and meaning, literal and figural meaning of allegory is interpreted by poststructuralist criticism as a self-deconstructive element. Such a line of interpretation is noticeable already in Benjamin's works. The disparity between the two levels demonstrates that in their connection there is nothing natural or requisite and that it is a result from the will of the one who establishes this connection. *Allegory is a figure that presents its own artificiality.*

This peculiarity of allegory provides poststructuralist critics a possibility for using it as a field of critical distancing from ideology. The latter adheres to the principle of symbol. *By creating the idea of necessity of the relation between the two levels of its structure symbol seems as something produced by no one, something organic, natural. Ideology performs precisely the same act. It presents culture as nature.* Advertisements, as one of the main propagator of ideologies nowadays, claim that we almost vitally need the products they offer for sale. Like symbols, they are constructed in such a way as to exercise an instant influence, not to make us think. They aim at reactions of instinctive, natural character Through advertisements commercial interests are disguised as concern about us. They need doing so in order to exist. Capitalism has to produce ideologies to disguise its nature. It is significant that Marx addresses them in his book "German Ideology". They hide the market principle and this way assure its existence. *If there were no advertisements, we would find it difficult to bear this cold, distant from nature world we live in guided by marketplace values and the rational interest in preserving and increasing capitals One might say that exactly because of its ability to reveal its own synthetic nature, its artificiality, allegory has been neglected ever since Romanticism.* The development of capitalist relations increasingly needs symbols – figures that insist on the natural, the organic – in order to create its ideologies by means of their mechanisms.

In the poststructuralist lines the critique of the relation "ideology – symbol" is a part of a more extensive task: the critique of totalizating in the modern European thought and practice (ever since Descartes), or, in the thought and practice of the modern West, as it is the custom to say

nowadays. Ideology needs unifying, totalization. It relies on the trivial everyday concept of nature as something that stands no incommensurability. This critique has a lot of directions. It concerns the metaphysical philosophical systems which claim to describe exhaustively the existance; totalitarianism, imposing its vision of the world; firm identities (special attention is paid to firm sexual identities). *It is possible to draw parallels between all these issues and the symbol.* They could be grounded on its coherency and the stability of the connection between the two levels of its structure which could result in concealing the fact that it is a constructed phenomenon, a creation of a preliminary intention.

Poststructuralist critics draw a parallel between allegory and language. De Man follows Saussurean model of the linguistic sign, which includes two elements: signifier and signified. Their mutual relation is a result of a convention; it is random by nature. Convention is determinant also for the relation between the two levels of allegory. But the similarity between allegory and linguistic sign ends here. *Sign does not emphasize its conventional character and thus provides an opportunity for disguising it which is accomplished by ideology.* Like the symbol in its submission to necessity, ideology creates the illusion about motivated nature of he linguistic sign. In such a way the sign is taken out of the sphere of ocial artefacts and brought nearer to the natural. Ideology takes advantage of an everyday, unscientific understanding of nature according to which the organic does not tolerate contrasts. *With allegory there is no such a thing. Disparity between the levels in its structure reveals its conventional character.* In "The Origin of German Tragic Drama" Benjamin also takes notice of the difference between allegory and the linguistic sign, although he does not mean the linguistic sign only, but all human signs in general.

Another, deeper resemblance that postsructuralists specify is not between allegory and linguistic sign but between allegory and literature. Like allegory, literature is self-deconstructive. It is occupied by mechanisms for reminding that it is nothing more than a construct of language, a fiction. Thus literature performs two acts: it resists ideologies imposed by society and emphasizes the arbitrary character of the linguistic sign.

This intuition about literature and allegory especially characteristic of Roland Barthes' late work and of De Man but occuring already in Jean-Paul Sartre privileges literature as a realm of freedom in terms of the individual and as an opportunity for the human being to leave their social and institutional determinacy and have a look at themselves and the world from an outer position. Through this intuition literary theory acquires political direction. From an academic and publicistic practice engaged in the task of studying literary texts it turns into a critique of the status quo.

But the concept of literature used by this intuition does not take into account the variety of literature. It is true that in modern and postmodern texts the disclosure of their own artificiality is a frequently used device. On the other hand, popular literature does not only refuse to operate in such a mode but, as well as advertising, serves as a disseminator of ideologies. The so-called "high" or "elitist" literatute is not entirely self-deconstructive. It is rather that in it self-decontruction is interwoven with masking and strenghtening artificiality and hence with serving ideologies and authorities' policy. *Literature is as much a realm of freedom as it is a mechanism through which the social and institutional determinacy of the person gets a firm foothold* That is imposed by its own specificity. Vladimir Nabokov's novel "Lolita" stresses a lot of times the fact that it is only a novel, a fiction; it also speaks ironically of other literary fictions, including those of popular literature, but at the same time it still remains a fictional discourse. *Though literature can unmask its own artificiality, it is not able to repudiate it as otherwise it would not be literature but something else.*

With both Benjamin's and poststructuralist critics' interpretations of allegory the following significant characteristic is neglected: *allegory is a rhetorical figure*. This fact is a part of a more general problem. *The XXth century literary theory has not got to a revival of the project of rhetoric or to some new version of it, therefore, as mentioned above, the relation between rhetoric and literature remains obscure*. There is a focus on the figurative structures but not on rhetoric in general. De Man realizes this situation. He attempts to excuse his own predisposition in favour of fi-

gures, their privileging, by assertion that the division between rhetoric and figures is determinative of rhetoric as such: "...What is called "rhetoric" is precisely the gap that becomes apparent in the pedagogical and philosophical history of the term" (p. 131). Here "pedagogical history" means the project of rhetoric (the different theories of argumentation and composition), and "philosophical history" – interpretations of figures. According to De Man the two histories contradict each other: "Considered as persuasion, rhetoric is performative but when considered as a system of tropes, it deconstructs its own performance" (p. 131).

It is doubtful whether this is exactly so. The self-deconstructive element in allegory is a consequence of the enacting intentional gesture of structuring the allegory itself. The same applies to symbol and to the other figures as well as to literature in general. *Self-deconstructiveness, symbolicity, ideological character, ironizing, self-ironizing, connectedness to memory and oblivion as well as any other of the peculiarities of literature become possible through the confirming act of constructing literary texts. It is privileging because it is combined with choice among different possible specificities of the text*

To hold such a view means to maintain that *action plays a crucial role in literature* or simply that *literature is an action*. The temporal structure of *action* is determined by *the movement from a present to a future moment*. This structure is opposite to *memory, which is bound to the orientation from the present to the past. Creating literary and other kinds of texts as well as any human act of constructing is intentional and projective by nature. The same is applicable to reading as well. Readers do not so much adopt given meanings of the text as they construct them.*

Writing and reading a literary work do not relate to social state of affairs in the same way. On the one hand they are distanced from them because they are not subjected to necessity. Nothing makes us write or read literary texts. Writing and reading are induvidual practices. *Literature is a field of the personal.* However with writing and reading the personal is revealed in different ways. *Whereas reading is completely personal by nature, writing, being itself also a personal act, is pointed at publicity. It is a public and hence a political (considering that it is difficult to differ-*

entiate between public u political and that not a few literary texts have a straightforward political orientation) expression of the individual.

In these characteristics of literature a part of poststructuralist critics finds an opportunity for opposing personality to social determinacy. (Another part of poststructuralist trends questions the idea of personal autonomy at all. It is influenced by Foucault's view that the individual is a result from the impact of anonymous institutiolized social forces.) In Barthes's late work the resistance to social determinacy has an aesthetic character. This is evident in his idea of "the pleasure of the text", the pleasure of reading and writing, by means of which we are able to leave roles and identities imposed on us by society. *In many poststructuralist lines personal freedom becomes a priority of literary theory as well.* In terms of logic this has become so through the problemizing the questions of the demarcation line between literary theory and literature undertaken in these conceptions. Poststructuralist readings sharing the idea that literature and criticism confirm the personal autonomy subvert the conventional, canonical concepts of literary texts. *They strive for carrying out small personal revolutions, yet without considering the fact that writing and reading are situated in an institutionally and ideologically constructed milieu which exerts influence on them. Literature and literary theory can be inscribed neither in the critique of individual autonomy, nor in the favoritism of that autonomy. They are areas of both freedom and dependency of the subject on social authority structures.*

Action is the point where literature and the project of rhetoric converge. The practice of persuasion developed by rhetoric is a language act. *Persuasion exposes an aspect of language that the influenced by Saussure linguistic, literary and philosophic theories are insuffucuently interested in: its power. By virtue of that power and through language worlds are created.*

Another characteristic that draws rhetoric and literature together is *their fictional dimension.* Persuasion is a fiction as it represents not the real, but the possible. The possible also gets together rhetoric and literature. It is exactly the notion connected with one of the most authoritative definitions of literature – the definition in Aristotle's "Poetics".

Fictional character of rhetoric and literature resembles the nature of the linguistic sign. A sign is a fiction of what it signifies. Self-deconstructive works emphasize its fictional character as well as the fictional character of rhetoric. *They emphasize the language action as such and not the effects that stem from it.* By doing so they also put into question a basic metaphisical premise intrinsic to both classical and modern rhetorics: that the possible has to be presented in such a way so as to suggest that it is real.

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МОРИС ФАДЕЛЬ

ЛИТЕРАТУРА, ПАМЯТЬ, ДЕЙСТВИЕ

Статья рассматривает в критическом плане отношение между риторикой и литературой в постструктуралистском литературоведении. Как эмпирический материал, представляющий это отношение, взято понятие аллегорий в работах Вальтера Беньямина, которое оказало сильное влияние на литературоведческую мысль во второй половине двадцатого века. На основе критического анализа этого понятия делается попытка достичь понимания о литературе, связывающего её с языковым действием и дающего возможность раскрыть её перформативный характер. Статья затрагивает также все еще не разработанную до настоящего момента тему памяти в структуре риторических фигур.

GRIGOR GRIGOROV

PROPER NAME AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Every society establishes personalities whose vocation is to "remember" events significant for the entire community.[1] At the end of 19th century two writers performed similar social roles in Bulgaria: Ivan Vazov, recognized as the "National poet" and Zachary Stoyanov, named "The Chronicler". The attaching of such attributive names to the keepers of the memory is symptomatic with regard to the present theme, but does not conclude it. In that time the Bulgarian literature pretended to reflect (today we should say construct) reliably the struggles for national independence that had lead to the liberation from Turkish domination. A great number of literature works focus on the building of biographies of the national heroes and have proper names as titles. Ivan Vazov's cycle of odes "Forgotten men's epopee" and Zachary Stoyanov's biographies will be the empiric material on the basis of which we shall make an attempt at theorizing the problem of whether the co-presence of collective memory and proper name is accidental or regular.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY

The current humanitarian investigations on the problem of memory rely on two fundamental ideas. The first one is supported by Henry Bergson who assumes the understanding of the memory as a never ending act

[1] Such typological social roles are described in the chapter „From Singer to Poet" of Veselovskiy. [Веселовский 1989: 246-269]

of interpretation. [Bergson 1896] The second idea connecting memory and group is suggested in the scientific works of Maurice Halbwachs. [Halbwachs 1975] These two hypotheses proved to be a well working approach and lie at the root of numerous scientific discussions, specifying and detailing some aspects of the problem.

The philosophical idea of Bergson about the interpretative character of the memory is supported by the investigations of the cognitive psychology. The psychologists introduce a model according to which the souvenir of the past is recognized continuously in the view of the present and of the future. [E.g. Ломов 1990: 50-55] Today, the idea that the memory does not represent reliable reproduction of the past, but a distinct type of its interpretation with a view to the present, is common to all scientific works. Another specific direction is the study of the connection between memory and anticipation which might be generalized by the hypothesis that memory is a model of anticipation and consequently motivates actions ("learning, memory and performance are interrelated topics"). [Norman 1982: 66] Thus, a final generalizing formula might be read as follows: memory is an act of interpretation in which retrospective and prospective aspects are inseparable.

Maurice Halbwachs connects memory and group by introducing the idea of "collective memory". The term used by the French sociologist is not only metaphoric but possesses a number of meanings in different contexts. In the first place Halbwachs confirms the social origin of the individual memory through the assumption that the possibility of remembering is connected to the possibility of putting ourselves in Others' places. [Namer 1987: 21-25] In this sense memory is social but not collective – it is an individual phenomenon which however goes beyond the individual and is put into certain social frames (cadres sociaux) as time, [Halbwachs 1968: 80-129] space [Halbwachs 1968: 130] and language likewise [Namer 1987: 34]. In other words memory is a "social construct". The model of memory built by the sociologists as a continuously dynamic actualization and organization of the knowledge with a view to the present and the motivation of future actions repeats the model of the cognitive psychologists. [Бурдийо 1993: 103]

The presence of common social frames of the memory does not yet mark the emerging of collective memory – for that also needs a common shared knowledge within the framework of one group.[2] Moreover, the common knowledge of the same facts is not in itself a guarantee for collective memory because their interpretation might be strongly individual. That is why some investigators suggest that the totality of memories "recognized by one group" ("reconnus par un groupe") is referred to the social memory and those "common for one group" ("commune a un groupe") – to the collective memory. [Candau 1998: 25] Here the opposition is: presence of recollection – recognition of its meaning, [Candau 1998: 34], We could simplify it to the opposition: text – understanding of the text. If every understanding of a certain text is strongly individual and does not match with the "Others", then the collective memory would be impossible, but reality (and more rarely the theory) proves the opposite. The freedom of individual interpretation is large enough, but every text succeeds in limiting the arbitrary reading to some extent.[3] Very suitable is the approach of Tzvetan Todorov who distinguishes between two types of layers in the text – the ones which are signified (signifies) and have to be understood (compris) and the others which are symbolized (symbolisés) and have to be interpreted (interpretés). [Todorov 1978: 91].[4] For the constructing of a collective memory a common understanding of a given recollection is necessary which might be accompanied by additional individual interpretation.

The transformation of social memory into collective memory is a process of social understanding of a certain recollection. In other words, the collective memory exists virtually, "not like something established, but as something which has to be produced".[5] The common understand-

[2] „Every memory is social, but not obligatory collective" („/.../ toute mémoire est sociale, mais pas nécessairement collective /.../"). [Candau 1998: 46]

[3] Umberto Eco proposes the formula: the text has „plenty of sense" („de nombreux sens"), but no „arbitrary sense" („n'importe quel sens"). [Eco 1996: 131]

[4] The same is opposition between meaning („значение") and sense („смысл"), used by Bakhtin. [Бахтин 1986: 384-385]

[5] This is the formula of Bourdieu with regard to social classes. [Бурдийо 1997: 30]

ing seems unimaginable without the presence of certain texts which orient individual memories in one direction. [Candau 1998: 100] These texts are an instrument of the memory, "extensions of memory" and have the possibility to retranslate the memory. Literature is one of the most important amongst them.

Some researchers distinguish between two parallel images of collective memory, created by two types of social agents: the historian and the writer. The boundary between history and memory is established by Halbwachs and further developed afterwards. It includes the following oppositions: history puts an accent on discontinuity, memory is interested in confining; history names, memory relates; history is "authentic" reconstruction, memory is fictional construction; history is scientifically correct whilst memory sacrifices the correctness in favour of approval of identity, etc. Similar distinction is important from a theoretical point of view but practically overestimates the means of historiography, which in the past (and probably today) uses the model of writing of literature. [Jauss 1878a][6] Furthermore, national historiography also produces identity when it has to choose between nominations such as coup d'etat or rebellion, criminal adventure or sacred deed. The difference – if it exists – is probably elsewhere: fictional texts stabilizing the memory ensure not only their existence but provide them with the chance of future reuse.[7]

The texts, fixing the collective memory, have the character of a myth, comprehended (here and afterwards) not as a genre but as a way of thinking, as a text with the function of an "official fiction". [Stierle 1979: 319] The collective memory is in close connection to identity. This connection has been determined by Halbwachs [see e.g. Halbwachs 1968: 77]. So, every text that reinterprets the past to some extent formulates once and again the identity of the group.

An important condition for the appearance of collective memory is

[6] In other work Jauss proves that even most „innocent" text propagate certain type of ideology. [Jauss 1978b]

[7] E.g. the opposition communicative – cultural memory proposed by Assmann. [Асман 2001: 46-64] The reuse as a basic characteristic of the fictional discourse is idea of Warning 1979: 335.

oblivion. Oblivion in Freud's traditions, but also in those of Halbwachs,[8] might be presented as pushing out of the consciousness everything that threatens the present identity. Thus, a common recollection of the past, but also oblivion, are necessary for the construction of collective memory. This is possible only with a specified codification of the text (materialization of the recollection) and codification of the interpretation (materialization of oblivion of other interpretations), which have institutional character. Institutionalization might be achieved in two ways: autocratically (by institutionalized canon) or democratically (by social canonization of some individuals as commentators). At the end of 19th century the second possibility was in use in Bulgaria and was connected with the social establishment of Ivan Vazov and Zachary Stoyanov as legitimate interpreters of nationally important events.

Let us summarize and try to formulate the problem. The understanding of the collective memory as a unity of memory and oblivion, of text and interpretation (supported here) allows an approach to the problem through the paradigm of literary criticism. It is efficient with the view of the fact that the establishment of collective memory might be reduced to another problem – how literature texts restrict the possibility of interpreting creating a unity of understanding among the readers. One of the answers is: through the proper name.

PROPER NAME

The contemporary investigations of the first name have added to the theoretical argument, bequeathed by Plato's "Kratil" /the name has a sense (Frege) – has not a sense (Stuart Mill, B. Russell)/ another field of discord: the name is a rigid designator (Kripke) – is a non-rigid designator (Frege, Russell). [Engel 1990: 75-78] These theoretical differences,

[8] „That's why the society strives for pushing out everything, which might separate the individuals" („C'est pourquoi la societé tend à écarter tout ce qui pourrait séparer les individus") [Halbwachs 1975: 290].

connected to the semantics and pragmatics of the proper name, are a reflection of the cultural context, in which they are created. Related to a culture with a domination of mythological thinking they might be absolutely irrelevant. [Лотман/Успенский 2000] They are also absolutely inapplicable in relation to the regarded empirical material.

CHOOSING A NAME

The heroes of Bulgarian Renaissance repeat the archaic model of nominating: almost all of them abandon their names and selfnominate themselves with socially important names. The choice of name is connected to a search of synonymization of their semantics and the ethnonym "Bulgarian" through nomination connected to a geographic area (Rakovski), sovereign nominations referred to the traditions of the Bulgarian medieval state (Zachary Knyajeski, Hadji Dimitar Asenev), nominations connected to Christianity (Rayko Jinzifov) etc. So, the old name is "forgotten" since it had no important semantic value and the selfnomination affords the opportunity for addition of a meaning to a construct with a predominantly referential function. From this point of view, the choice of a name not only marks the national identity, [Isaacs 1989: 75f.] but also contains a certain social pledge that the character of the Self will cover the meaning of the name. The approach and fusion of the name with the action, of the subject with the predicate is evidence for a type of thinking in which the action is not abstracted from the personality but is an integral part of it; thinking which shows the action as a "state of name". [Лотман/Успенский 2000: 533]. Such an identification of meaning and essence is a feature of mythological thinking. The very act of changing the name is an act of initiation connected to the leaving of an everyday way of life and entering into the field of history with a passage from the profane to the sacral, and from semiotics to asemiotics.[9]

[9] E.g. the idea of Lossev: „There, where the essence is fully present, the name is the essence itself" („Там, где сущность пребывает всецело, имя есть сама сущность")

NETWORK OF NAMES

Proper names have relations not only with the language but also with the life of the individual in the society. The name as a rigid designator is an institution for summing of the Self, which, according to contemporary hypotheses, is not perceived as something united, but as a sum of a great number of social roles. [e.g. Бурдийо 1997: 73-74] The nominal stability appears as the only guarantee for the focusing of certain social roles into a unique individual. This principle is discouraged in cases such as Bulgarian Renaissance, when the individual is known through a plurality of different names and nicknames (sometimes up to 10 different names not counting their obligatory and almost arbitrary translations into Turkish). The process of generation of names is connected to an expansion of the proper name: plenty of common nouns began to be perceived as proper names.[10] In such a way every nomination allows the addition of a semantic layer in the social image of the hero. The multitude of attributive names becomes completely synonymous with the proper name (an impossible case in the common language) and in this way the name obtains a stable semantic halo. So, we could rationalize the proper name as a centre of collective memory since synonymizing of names and nicknames determines the understanding and restricts the direction of interpretation.

The mechanism of synonymizing of proper names and common nouns has a key importance in such genres as biography. Biography implicitly (and often explicitly) has a proper name as a title. Within the framework of the text the proper name is substituted by a network of synonymous common nouns having the roles of attributive names of the hero. In Lev-

[Лосев 1990: 157]. The idea for the asemioticity of the mythological thinking is borrowed from Лотман/Успенский 2000: 529.

[10] Vasil Ivanov Kuntchev stays before the nominations: the Deacon, Vasil Levski (lev *bulg.* 'lion'), Apostle of freedom, etc.

ski's biography such names for example are: "the brave Bulgarian", "the psalm-singer", the "Bulgarian rebel.", "the deft Levski", "the modest teacher", etc. The attributive names are a means of creating the image of the hero by accumulation of a network of inherent social roles and thus they represent certain "segments of the Self. [Berger/Luckman 1973: 92] The genre of biography and the specificity of the name are a guarantee of a clear individual referent, which might be accomplished by a network of identifications since "to every name a multitude of descriptions could be associated". [Engel 1990: 77]

Similar common cliché-nouns ("freedom fighter", "poet-revolutionary", etc.) exist and are again and again generated in the common language. Their connection with a concrete heroic person allows the biographer to be classified as a "name-giver" of the hero. [Makolkin 1992: 19] The attributive names are contextual synonyms of the hero's name in the narrative, but there exists the possibility of the created synonymy exceeding its natural context and changing into a collective language synonymy. In many cases the attributive name begins to function as a proper name since it refers to a sole person (the Apostle of freedom = Levski, the National poet = Vazov) and thus the achievement of identity between individual authenticity (if it exists in a pure form) and collective identity, as suggested by Lotman, is possible. [Лотман 2000: 38] The creation of identity between a given constructed personification and the name as a social individuality fulfils the requirement for co-presence of sense and rigid referent.

ETYMOLOGY OF THE NAME

The proper name potentially possesses additional possibility for generation of a meaning, because the name is "a plot-generating factor", [Левингтон 1983: 154] often realized through development of folk etymology. This mechanism allows the addition of whole plots to the name by creating a connection, assuming a stable causality. The folk etymology explains the origin of the name of Levski (lev *bulg.* 'lion') and Stefan

Karadja (karadja *tur.* 'deer') by the legend for the great jump committed by the heroes (lion's or bear's jump). The motif is borrowed from the folk hajduk songs, where it's a part of the ritual election of the leader of the rebels. The etymological explanation of the name has probably developed in folklore, but could be found in a number of memoirs, including Zachary Stoyanov's. Extracting the etymology of the name is extremely characteristic in the view of the present thesis – it is the smallest narrative plot format and obligatory code for its comprehension. The development of etymology of the name is one of the possibilities for its semantic spread, which transforms it into a myth.[11] With the explanation of its appearance the name loses its innocence. It becomes meaningful and ideologically usable because it brings a certain context in itself.[12] The name holds the plot in compact format [Левингтон 1983: 154] and its use in another text introduces an additional plot, which, if it does not determine the understanding, at least directs it. *Or: the name is a possibility for coding of a text.*

THE COMPARISON THROUGH NAMES

The present-day sociology claims that individuals are not recognized by the consciousness as unique but interchangeable types [Berger/Luckman 1973: 92] in relation to their roles in society. The memory works through type models (idea inherited from Huserl and Schutz) and recognizes the new through "synthesis of identity" with something familiar in the modi "identity", "similarity", "likeness", "analogy", etc. [Шютц 1993: 199-200] The model principle of human memory (recognition by prototype) makes the comparison through names (im-

[11] E.g. one of the Lossev's formula for myth: "the myth is a spread magic name" [Лосев 1991: 171]. The connection between myth and name may be described by the next statement: „myth is personal (nominative), the name is mythological" („миф – персонален (номинационен), имя - мифологично". [Лотман/Успенский 2000: 529]

[12] „There does not exist a word without a trace of context establish" Bakhtin. [Бахтин 1983: 142]. The same problem is on the focus of Stanley Fish. [Fish 1994: 226-237]

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plicitly or explicitly) a powerful instrument for implanting of meaning in the proper name. The examples of such comparisons are numerous: Vazov in the "Forgotten men's epopee" compares Levski with Jesus, Perushtitza with Cartage, Shipka with Thermopiles, Benkovski with Levski and Rakovski, etc.[13] The modi of comparisons are two: the new is either identical to the old, or exceeds it. They could be described by two modes of repetition ("Platonic" and "Nietzschean"), substantiated by Hillis Miller. [Hillis Miller 1982: 5f.] These forms, of course, could not be met in pure form; they are theoretical abstractions, trying to catch the dual aspect of happening simultaneously as "repetition" and as "reproduction", [Асман 2001: 16] as "reconstitution of archetypal semantic and its modernization, actualization" [Смирнов 1995: 44] The two comparison types respond to the natural striving of the unity to present itself simultaneously as similar to the "Others" and as superior to them.

It is important to notice that similar comparisons refer to other texts and that is why these are hypertextual phenomenon.[14] The texts to which the reader is referred have stabilized meaning and thus they play a key role for understanding and even something more – they assist remembering, directing it to a certain already known model in the memory. To explain it with an example: the naming of priest Chrustjo as Judas in Vazov's ode "Levski" implied the identification of Levski with Jesus (which is underlined by other ways as well). Such an interpretation attracts the attention of the reader to the possible Christian symbolics in the cycle "Forgotten men's epopee". It consists of twelve odes, describes the heroic deeds of twelve heroes and comprises one more person, the thirteenth, announced as the betrayer. The Levski's gallows is compared with the Cross, etc. This understanding gives the possibility of interpreting the composition order of the distinct poems

[13] Detailed analysis of comparison with names in Makolkin 1992.

[14] We use „hypertextuality" [Genette 1982] in the place of more current term „intertextuality", because the name is a sign in the text which description seems obligatory, in the same time the term „intertextuality" allows the understanding of free reader's association.

as definite narrative: from the death of the Bulgarian Christ through the martyrs' deaths of the multitude of heroes to the triumph of initiative, conceived in the "The volunteer forces on Shipka". The proper name plays the role of certain "hermeneutic code" which gives direction to the understanding of the text. [Riffaterre 1990: 54-55, 131] *Or: the name is a possibility for decoding of a text.*

"PLACES OF MEMORY"

All described mechanisms enabling the proper name to code and to decode a text, could be reduced to the two main functions of collective memory: memory and oblivion. The manipulations with the name give the opportunity to construct layers of reading in a certain ideological direction. In this sense the proper name is one of the main (if others exist at all) „places of memory" (according to Pier Nora's expression) in the framework of the common language. The often practiced forcible change of proper names is the most typical proof for this hypothesis.

Consequently it is possible to construct a two-sided model of collective memory, composed of restricted „places of memory" (which are marked and have to be understood) and unlimited connections between them (which are a subject for symbolizing and have to be interpreted). Or, the memory is fragmentary. This model is anticipated by Halbwachs who demonstrates how the Stendhal's memory strictly represents certain events and transforms others. [Halbwachs 1968: 63-64] A simplified model of memory could be presented: the memory consists of different fragments, separated by gaps. These gaps are filled by imagination, having the capacity to create different connections according to the pragmatics of the situation. This model describes the dynamic character of the collective memory and represents the simultaneous integration of stability and instability.

CONCLUSION

Collective memory, described as common shared knowledge and common understanding of the knowledge, seems difficult to achieve in the field of language. The difficulties are related to the semioticity of common language, which inevitably is connected with the freedom of interpretation. For this reason collective memory can be constituted only with the assistance of this asemiotical (mythological) layer of language which has as its center the proper name. [Лотман/Успенский 2000: 530]

Collective memory is mythological. The limitation of mythological thinking, connected to the passage from asemiocity to semiocity, discourages the possibility of proper names to possess meaning and rigid referent. The destroyed connection between meaning and essence can be partly reconstructed in two ways: *by the synonymy* (in the global sense of the term, including even the comparison) *which allows the decoding of the meaning of the proper name* and *by the etymology which permits the coding of meaning into the proper name.*

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ГРИГОР ГРИГОРОВ

КОЛЛЕКТИВНАЯ ПАМЯТЬ И ЛИЧНОЕ ИМЯ

Коллективная память, понимаемая как общее поделенное знание и общее толкование этого знания, на первый взгляд кажется трудно достижимой в поле языка. Причиной этого является семиотичность естественного языка, которая неизбежно связана с многонаправленностью интерпретации. Поэтому учреждение коллективной памяти возможно только при участии того семиотического (мифологического) пласта языка, который ограничивает возможность интерпретации. В центре этого пласта стоит личное имя.

Коллективная память по условию мифологична. С распадом мифологического мышления связан переход от асемиотичности к семиотичности, что отменяет возможность наличия значения и твердого референта у личного имени. Разорванная стабильная связь между именем и сущностью, между названием и тем, что оно называет, закрепляется двумя способами. Первый из них – синонимия (понимаемая в самом широком смысле слова), которая реализуется через отождествление личного и нарицательного имени или через сравнение двух имен собственных. Второй способ - народная этимология. Эти два метода противоположны друг другу по отношению к накоплению значений: атрибуция значения имени или дистрибуция значения из имени.

GRZEGORZ GROCHOWSKI

POETICS OF MEMORY

A turn from fictional literature to autobiographical forms has undoubtedly become one of the most characteristic phenomena of the twentieth-century writing. The importance of this process will appear even more momentous if we take into consideration not only the career of different varieties of so-called personal narratives, but also the popularity of an essay as a form of preserving subject's cognitive experiences, stories saturated with determinants of an author's point of view or a high status of a literary first-person narrative pertaining to off-literary forms of discourse. Such preference for a certain type of texts is usually regarded as a reflection of a present state of culture, a determinant of a system of values, imaginings or attitudes preferred by a given human community. The advancement of diarist's and memoirist's writing has been caused by a chain of historical, social and philosophical factors including, for instance, the pressure of painful wartime experiences, fascination with the issue of identity and subjectivity, aesthetic wear of the novelistic conventions or the crisis of the collective memory in liberal societies of the modern era. Central discourses in these societies have been diffused by configurations of private recollections. All these phenomena – unusually varied as they are – have caused consciousness and memory to stand among the central categories of the contemporary reflective literature. Many critics and researchers acknowledge they play the key role in the understanding of the humanist reality. Marek Zaleski,

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for example, opens his book Formy pamięci (Forms of Memory), a very significant study from our point of view, by a very firm statement: "We are created by what we remember and our consciousness is the function of our memory. This past of ours calls for being recalled and the desire to recall the past is continuously reflected in our actions"[1]. In the case of Polish literature this global context should be complemented with certain, local-specific factors as the common need for commemoration and remembrance is particularly evident with communities and groups who have been inflicted with a loss of a sense of continuity. It is for that reason that memory regains a particularly high status in Polish writing of the recent decade. It is used for refreshing forgotten traditions, seeking individual origins, creating one's own symbolic biography. Anna Sobolewska believes that in most of recent literary works "the past recreated in many ways still reigns absolutely. Polish literature loves memory more than any other province of the soul"[2].

Nevertheless, it is easy to notice that most of the books devoted to this problem have been based on the point of view that reaches beyond the traditional genologic divisions[3]. Generalisations are often formulated on the role of personal narrative in literature and culture, placing side by side texts which apparently show great formal and functional differences. Ever since narratives of that kind started to be primarily perceived as instruments for making sense of events, the typological differentiation of texts has ceased to be a matter of utmost importance and the classifying

[1] M. Zaleski, *Formy pamięci. O przedstawianiu przeszłości w literaturze współczesnej*. Warszawa 1996:5.

[2] A. Sobolewska, *Proza pamięci i wyobraźni*. W: *Sporne sprawy polskiej literatury współczesnej*. A. Brodzka, L. Burska (eds.). Warszawa 1998: 345.

[3] Małgorzata Czermińska (*Autobiograficzny trójkąt. Świadectwo, wyznanie i wyzwanie*. Kraków 2000, s. 243) says that in most of the works on the nonfictionary prose genological perspective serves as a dominant way of theorizing. It seems to be true but only as far as we consider text morphology and theory of literary communication. On the one hand we have many detailed theretical descriptions of given genres of discourse, on the other – works within literary history considering various images of memory with the latter ignoring generic questions. In this paper I am trying to find a link connecting those two separated perspectives.

categories have been blurred and weakened. It is said, for instance, that since a representation of past experiences is but a more or less arbitrary interpretation of them and since we tend to arrange experiences by means of traces and fictional plots – being faithful to empiry is utopian and the border between fiction and the alleged truth of document appears to be dubious and fluid. As long as a quarter century ago Edward Balcerzan argued in his study of autobiographical literature of the 70s that the main feature of that literature is the tendency to link together personal credibility and literary refinement and to combine "truth and imagining"[4]. The more we proceed towards the present the more confusing and the less distinct becomes the old division. Zaleski, discussing in his book the present state of knowledge of recollective narratives, notes that:

> *there is no such thing as a normative generic poetics of autobiographical discourse. What is referred to as "autobiographical" can be found both in prose, poetry and assays, no to mention interlocutory texts. This state of affairs encourages scholars to search texts of various genres for something, which – being an autobiographical approach – is manifested by an author's way of expression*[5].

Indeed, the prose of this kind no longer constitutes an element of strictly defined classification systems, and is beginning to be characterised, above all, in sub-genre categories of "attitude", "discourse" or "strategy"[6]. Such approach seems to be steadily founded by the very nature of the discussed matter. I think, however, that – with all the nonuniformity and ambiguity – we are still able to distinguish analytically some sets of preferences ascribed to definite conventions. Although, indeed, we do not have a cohesive theory of autobiographical writing, we are still

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[4] E. Balcerzan, *Powracająca fala autobiografizmu*. In: *Kręgi wtajemniczenia*. Kraków 1982: 385.

[5] M. Zaleski, *op. cit.*: 70-71.

[6] See J. Smulski, *Autobiografizm jako postawa i jako strategia artystyczna. Na materiale współczesnej prozy polskiej*. „Pamiętnik Literacki" 1988/4; J. Kandziora, *Zmęczeni fabułą. Narracje osobiste w prozie po roku 1976*. Wrocław 1993; M. Czermińska, *op. cit.*

able to indicate a number of generic forms which mark the boundaries of recollective narrative. Taking into account the high status of the concept of memory in the modern literature and the complexity of culture-determined conditions of its existence, I would like to establish in what extent is the comprehension and representation of memories conditioned by a communicative context or a type of discourse. Therefore, I am interested not so much in memory itself but in the ways it is implemented in a discourse, i.e. in narrative conventions of recollecting and functional characteristics of such discourses. To be more exact, I would like to compare models of memory that are integrated into the poetics of several selected genres constituting a transposition of the recollection process – the models are sometimes looked upon as aspectual equivalents of that process.

1

The genre of nonfictional prose, referred to as a recollection, is a relatively simple form of literature[7]. It occupies quite an important place in the domain of documentary writing. As Michał Głowiński puts it:

> *It is widely practised, liked by readers and belonging to the willingly visited regions of literature. It is not as popular as a criminal story, but the scope of its influence is fairly large*[8].

[7] My description in this part is based mainly on the following books and articles: *Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz. Człowiek i twórca. Księga pamiątkowa*. T. Kotarbiński, J. E. Płomieński (eds.). Warszawa 1957; Z. Chądzyńska, *Gombrowicz w Argentynie*. „Twórczość" 1972/ 4; R. Kalicki, *Tango Gombrowicz*. Kraków-Wrocław 1984; *Bruno Schulz in memoriam (1892-1942)*. M. Kitowska-Lysiak (ed.), Lublin 1992; *Miron. Wspomnienia o poecie*. H. Kirchner (ed.), Warszawa 1996; *Jan Józef. Spotkania i spojrzenia. Książka o Janie Józefie Lipskim*. A. Brodzka, M. Puchalska, J. Jedlicki, R. Loth (eds.). Warszawa 1996. The main papers on this genre: M. Głowiński, *Między dziełem i biografią, na marginesie książek Rity Gombrowicz i Rajmunda Kalickiego* (1986). In: *Gombrowicz i nadliteratura*. Kraków 2002; J. Kopciński, *Niby – ja, niby – on, czyli zbiorowe ustalanie persony Mirona Białoszewskiego jako dalszy ciąg jego pisarskich autokreacji*. In: *Osoba w literaturze i komunikacji literackiej*. E. Balcerzan, W. Bolecki (eds.). Warszawa 2000.

[8] M. Głowiński, *op. cit.*: 242.

Being popular, as indicated above, and representative of colloquial ways of thinking the genre undoubtedly deserves a wider consideration. Therefore, I would like to outline some of its general characteristics and then show how its structural properties refer to the concept of memory. A recollection is a written account of past events (usually forgotten or unknown to the general public) associated with author's experiences or reflections, typically of a small size and a loose composition, formally resembling a short story. A particularly distinct and popular variety of a recollection is that presenting a person, whom an author has known personally (e.g. many texts have been devoted to famous writers). Narratives of that kind are often written for a special occasion, published in newspapers or magazines to commemorate a deceased person (e.g. on the occasion of an important anniversary) or to be included in collective commemorative books. As a rule, they contain a personal profile of the described person shown through a selected aspect of his or her activity, aimed at drawing a brief but clear and suggestive picture. In this respect, recollections approach the form of a portrait not achieving, however, its versatility and complexity. They tend to focus on a specific trait, a special feature of a given person by using anecdotal examples or recalling some characteristic gestures, situations or doings which are believed to be representative samples of the person's conduct. They are also usually confined to a definite period in the described person's life or to a single aspect of his or her activity.

A general structure can be then compared to that of a personal profile written by students at school. It is more difficult, however, to go any further beyond this general definition as there are no determined standards of style or composition for this form of discourse. Undoubtedly, the communicative context defines a certain range of possibilities that encompass particular circumstance-specific variants. But on the other hand, a recollection is characterised by a certain extent of flexibility which permits an author to adapt his story to different discourse registers. Accepting a hierarchy- and module-based vision of a literary genre one might assume that the superior classification framework of a recollection may comprise segments with features typical for other kinds of literary expression. The

choice and scope of dominants decide which aspect of a text is exhibited, each of these aspect being conditioned by a number of factors. Whereas the decision concerning activation of modules depends on a character of the recalled person, relationships between the recalling persons, time gap, place of publication or local customs observed by a given social group.

Recollection stories are mostly devoted to people of fame, merit and high reputation – or thus perceived by a certain social environment. They deal with people who have made an extraordinary achievement, have been distinguished by their original personality or moral virtues. Therefore, in certain respects, a recollection may resemble a laudatory speech (or even a panegyric), especially a laudatio funebris. It relates events from the protagonist's life, enumerates his or her merits and virtues, gathers exempla and often ends up with a clear culminating point. This aspect is enhanced e.g. when a protagonist of a recollection died a relatively short time ago and recalling is still painful. Additionally, the text is created for the needs of official communication. On the other hand, if a person in question has been gone for a time long enough not to arise strong emotions any more, authors of particulars texts had not had any closer relationships with the protagonist, and a potential recipients prefer a direct style of communication – the story may adopt a form of a toll anecdote. In another case, when an inquisitive desire to know details from famous people's lives has the floor, a recollection is shifted towards a gossip story, which is also a kind of a micro-narrative told at its subject's absence. These sort of stories about celebrities' shameful vices and failures enable readers – as does ordinary hearsay – to relieve their hidden tensions and complexes. It does not have to signify automatically a degradation of the genre but may, for example, lead to dispersion of prejudice, a halt in mindless admiration and a more critical view on some unquestionable authorities.

Speaking of varieties within the genre, one has to point out at one more source of differentiation which revealed, if only, in selection of titles. Reading indices of various commemorative books one becomes convinced that there are three predominant strategies of title-giving. If

we additionally assume that certain choices of composition stand behind decisions concerning titles – and such assumption seems to be well founded in the case of the discussed genre – then we are able to distinguish three most popular types of recollection stories depending on an aspect of reality they mostly deal with. The following title categories can be set apart: a) titles which draw reader's attention to a subject and emphasise a subjective nature of a description conditioned by an individual point of view (*Jan Józef, As I Remember Him, Doctor's Look, Once I Knew a Boy...*, etc.); b) titles which define limits of a perspective caused by time, space, situation or profession (*Tarczyńska, Jan Józef in Staszic Palace, Literary Researcher*) and finally c) titles which model described events in terms of axiological features to dignify a described person (*He Was a Unique Man, He Had a Gift, Heroism Made Usual*). Analogicaly, one can indicate texts which focus mainly on a) the tie between an author and his hero, b) the social role played by the latter, c) the described person perceived as embodiment of certain values.

The first group of texts make us realise quite clearly that a character of described situations and events depends very much on a subjective point of view. The narrative distance between the recalled person and the one who recalls goes beyond the sphere of cognitive report embracing certain emotional attitudes based on admiration, disappointment, fascination, jealousy, a sense of guilt, etc. A portrait of the recalled person appears then to be a self-portrait of the story-teller and "underlining the closeness or even intimacy between the author and the dead artist" as well as "peculiar tonic of intimacy, appreciated by large-circulation illustrated magazines, or colouring the story with anecdotes"[9] – to quote Głowiński – become elements of a narrative. Records of that kind are marked with a special kind of egocentrism of memory, which determines essentially the shape of all recollective narratives, being to some degree subject to thematisation and evident personalisation. The second variety reveals limitations of cognitive "access" to another man, whom we usually meet in a definite social and situational context and whose image

[9] M. Głowiński, *op. cit.*: 243.

we perceive through the spectrum of general stereotypes, group imaginings, appropriate social roles[10]. And finally, the narratives from the last category exhibit the relationship between a person and the symbolic domains, placing their protagonists on a pedestal. Such a story performs a function comparable, in a way, to the role that biographical writing used to be ascribed. Events from the life of a well-known, popular and respected person are called back for (a more or less camouflaged) educative purpose to be used for integrating a given community and preserving its most appreciated values. This – one could say – parabolic aspect of a recollective narrative is fully displayed by means of author's strategy, but to some degree (although, usually only potentially) it is present in most of such stories.

Despite the internal differences, one can also indicate certain common features that make the model of memory used by typical recollection narratives so unique. Memory is treated here as a sort of a stockroom, where preserved traces of people, events and situations are stored as a deposit, safe and easily accessible, if necessary. It is a little reminiscent of a family photo album, where we can always find a frozen moment from the past, be it for our own pleasure or to improve others' knowledge. In this perspective memory becomes a static being that can be expressed with the language of spatial metaphors. Structural and communicative attributes of recollections encourage us also to consider the social conditions of memory[11]. Such connections between mental processes and norms of the group life may be observed in several dimensions. Firstly, the very selection of facts which are regarded as worth recollecting depends on their status in relation to social values internalised by an individual. Hierarchies of such values make up sorts of matrixes that define our scopes of perception and determine our way of seeing things. Secondly, narrativation of data gathered in our memory and selected to be told, which is also manifested through assigning relevant events (experienced by an individual) to well ordered, common-sense categories, or in other words,

[10] See J. Kopciński (*op. cit.*: 168).

[11] See M. Halbwachs, *Społeczne ramy pamięci*. Transl. M. Król. Warszawa 1969.

to different loci communes. Therefore, the ultimate form of a story is a result of a compromise between effects caused by prints of past events stamped in our personal memory and functioning of mechanisms and instruments enabling us to depict aspects recognisable in a social space[12]. Thirdly and finally, the objective of a recollection can usually be easily rationalised. Authors call back from the past deeds of people who were meaningful for a given group, owing to which published recollections may serve for exchanging experiences, comparing viewpoints, broadening common knowledge, setting examples to follow, and consequently – preserving desired attitudes and conducts. The association of recollections with social categories and clearly defined communicative functions give this model a character which might be called rhetorical.

2

Out of such portrait-like recollection a special group can be distinguished to actually make up a separate generic variety. What I mean is a so-called alphabet, i.e. a set of recollection stories written by one author and devoted to different characters known by the writer and arranged in an alphabetical order (the best known examples of these are: *The Alphabet of Memories* by Słonimski, *Miłosz's ABC's, Alphabet* by Kisiel). Such little collections of stories abundant with anecdotes and trying to give a preliminary ideological, artistic or historical assessments gained considerable popularity, especially in the 70s-90s of the 20th century. Writers employing this genre tried usually to reconcile faithfulness to facts and local colour with their striving for generalisation, not uncommonly tingeing the described events with aphoristic punch lines or essayist's reflection. An alphabet, however, partially crosses the border of the convention presented above as its thematic and compositional dominant is a perspective of a recollecting author rather than a recollected person. It gathers on-and-off observations on various people and blurs the frontier between a collection of portraits and a self-portrait composed of

[12] See M. Beaujour, *Autobiografia i autoportret.* Transl. K. Falicka. „Pamiętnik Literacki" 1979/ 1.

extracts from other people's images. One can go even further claiming that: in many cases proportions, which in typical recollections formed systems of a shaky balance, in alphabets incline more and more towards the speaking "I". Sometimes we even have the impression that protagonists of particular segments are not autonomous characters but rather serve as reference for authors self-determination or act as pretences for the writer to formulate his or her distinct opinions and present his or her knowledge. Alphabets constitute then a transitional stage between some varieties of biographical and autobiographical writing, thus putting our discussion closer to another kind of recollective writing[13].

Let us have a look at texts where memory resources are explored not to commemorate another person but to relate one's own experiences. As the above-quoted Marek Zaleski stresses, autobiographical approach is manifested in many different types of discourse to form a wide variety of literary and paraliterary conventions. It seems, however, that not all of these forms are equally valued by the general public. A memoir remains probably the best recognisable, most clearly defined genre which is most frequently associated with recollective narrative. Sometimes (although more and more rarely) a broad understanding of autobiography as an attitude or strategy is also accompanied by narrower understanding which defines autobiography as a clearly determined generic category. And indeed, with all the multiplicity of discourses pertaining to past experiences, we are still able to identify a classic, i.e. typified and well-tested form of a narrative relating the ups and downs of the author's life. Stories of that kind are usually arranged chronologically and based on a common-sense picture of the world. They – to use Wayne Shumaker's apt phrase – "start with a baby's cry and finish on a cradle chair placed against a sunlit wall"[14]. Both genres (i.e. a classic autobiography and a memoir) assume a similar shape and

[13] The status of this text convention I treat as an argument against the claim – which can be found in many works – that biography and autobiography have nothing in common and are absolutely different genres.

[14] W. Shumaker, *English Autobiography: Its Emergence, Materials and Form*. Berkeley 1954: 130.

are sometimes treated as being next door or next of kin. Whereas the difference between them seem to be – from our point of view – very fine and rather secondary. Since I do not aim at developing detailed and complete characteristics of successive generic categories but instead concentrate exclusively on a sketch reconstruction of memory images related to them, I consider myself justified in treating them collectively (being, nonetheless, aware of certain nuances that can only be analysed in separation). It needs to be added at this point that, recognisable and well settled in the Polish tradition as they are, these conventions do not occupy a privileged position among genres of the modern literature. While the above-mentioned autobiographical approach can easily be found even in most surprising contexts, the classical forms of the conventions are in retreat. A memoir, which reigned, for example, in the romantic literature[15], has become one of less popular varieties of a personal writing of the 20th century, giving way to journals. Autobiographies, in turn, are written less and less frequently in the classical form mostly taking up the shape of a series of episodic micronarratives and sketches or even a built-up essay. However, due to its clearly determined character they constitute a potential point of reference (even if negative) for many literary works, thus being a phenomenon that is still worth consideration.

The way of introducing and presenting the recalled contents in these literary forms depends first of all on the character of the narrative distance, superiority of the author's present perspective to past situations being their principal feature. The writer, who is recalling past situations in an autobiography or a memoir, has more knowledge at the moment of telling the story than at the time the described events were taking place. This cognitive advantage is a trump in the author's hand that gives him or her the right to comment, interpret or assess the presented facts[16]. The process of recollection in such a case has a theleologic character

[15] J. Bachórz, *Pamiętnik w polskiej kulturze romantycznej*. In: *Prace ofiarowane Henrykowi Markiewiczowi*. Tomasz Weiss (ed.). Kraków-Wrocław 1984; A. Witkowska, R. Przybylski, *Romantyzm*. Warszawa 1997, ch. XII: *Pamiętnikarstwo doby romantyzmu*.

and serves to a large extent for creating a desired picture of the recaller. Usually the past is not perceived as a subject of nostalgic longing, anecdotal curiosity or antiquarian contemplation. It is presumed – though often not expressed expressis verbis – that the origins of subjectivity determine a subject's identity while a given person's life story explains the structure of his or her personality and legitimises his or her attitude and views. This conviction – probably only sensed or taken for granted as a cultural axiom rather than consciously realised – is somehow integrated into a selected mode of relating events. It conditions the application of particular narrative techniques and strategies in the process of developing a story. Owing to this, it can be reconstructed (though only hypothetically) at the level of functional description on the basis of information implied by the way a discourse was formed.

Therefore, contents retrieved from the resources of memory are usually deliberately segmented, arranged according to a preconceived compositional intention and cemented by being placed in a determined communicative system. Particular memories make up discrete or autonomous chains of events which are subject to cause-and-effect relationship (if only indirectly, through a suggested direction of reader's reconstruction). Owing to such a structure particular pieces of information on facts, feelings or reflections – even if they do not form clear fictional sequences of a pièce bien faite type – build complex semantic systems that undergo further integration and narrativation. Then additional senses are ascribed to them by reference to toposes recognised by a given literature, symbols preserved in the collective memory and fixed patterns of social interactions. Quite frequently, for instance, a story of author's life constitutes a coherent whole thanks to a veiled employment of a Bildungsroman, thus becoming an educative story of development and maturation or a chronicle of a downfall serving as an ethical

[16] This could be the main reason for the move from memoirs to diaries. In XX century – after so many examples of epistemological crises – it is difficult to find some stabile ground for authoritative, firm, reliable and imperative perspective.

warning (although the way such axiologic aspects are revealed is more or less concealed). Nevertheless, irrespective of what narrative strategy is accepted – educational or ominous – the pursuit for reflective and comprehensive presentation of one's biography implies a set of convictions that could be defined as a symptom of a peculiar (one could say – dialectic) anthropologic optimism. If the past did undergo a syntagmatic process and became a subject of a coherent story, then memory cannot constitute a substantial threat and painful experiences preserved in that memory will turn out to be stimuli for development of personality. The resistance these experiences offer to human pursuits is to some degree included in the costs of the intended sender-recipient communication. Even if the events recalled from the depth of memory seem to show successive steps leading to protagonist's degradation, the very act of relating these events appears to be a peculiar form of expiation or rehabilitation (assuming a referential status of the discourse) as every negative experience becomes the basis of correct recognition of a true state of affairs. Half-jokingly, one might conclude that the act of confession is a budding form of a memoir and autobiography.

This tension between the sphere of private experiences and phenomena of social importance influences also (i.e. apart from affecting the narrative perspective, toposes and symbols and apart from the level of compositional strategies) the choice of relevant references used in memoirs and autobiographical narratives, becoming a guideline for selection of events regarded as worth recalling. It is generally assumed that memoirs more than other varieties of personal narrative focus on external circumstances, historical and social conditions. Małgorzata Czermińska emphasises that:

> *Memoirs, so numerous, varied and important in our culture, own their significance, above all, to a picture of life shown from an extrovertical perspective. Wars, travels, family traditions, flow of life in the rhythm of seasons and changes in Nature, liturgies and rituals – all this happens in the social scale. Even if it is just a lens focusing on a memoirist, even if he exhibits his own deeds and merits, what he really means is to be admired "against a*

background" in the perspective of his contemporary history, in company of his family and subjects – he is, first of all, a witness of his times[17].

Perhaps Polish writing is particularly resistant to introspective approaches but, as it seems, also memoirs of other literatures – to begin with Caesar, for that matter – show a tendency to deal with the external world. As opposed to recollective writing, autobiography is generally attributed more possibilities in the field of self-analysis and a stronger shift towards observation of the internal world. But even in autobiographies imbued with the introvert's approach life of an individual is shown against the background of a historical reality. The reference to historic events is forced, to some extent, if only, by the desire to find an all-embracing meaning of existence – a meaning of an individual existence would be difficult to account for without a reference to superindividual processes. As a rule, autobiographical narratives and memoirs semanticise linearly orderly accounts of facts known by an author from his or her own experience by placing them in a wider, superior context of ideological, symbolic and social orders. Therefore, writing texts of that kind is usually aimed at finding a place for an individual in a symbolic order legitimated by a given cultural community and negotiating a compromise between contents of individual memory and current state of social awareness.

Memory which emerges from typical manifestations of memoirs and autobiographical narratives does not constitute an amorphic collection of varied pieces of information and anecdotes but gains a hierarchic structure subordinate to clausal and theleological rules[18]. Recollection in this model stands for a variety of intellectual operations (e.g. comparing, concluding, generalising, evaluating) that determine a position of particular images in superior symbolic or quasi-fictional complexes, thus ascribing a definite semantic quality to particular representations. The

[17] M. Czermińska, *op. cit.*: 70.

[18] It is only reconstruction of some dominant tendencies. One can easily find autobiographical writings which do not follow these general patterns. I return to this question in the last paragraph.

arrangement of successive recollections depends usually on an author's own interpretation of his or her personal identity.

3

Memory, which is a natural and obvious building material for all forms of autobiographical discourse, has also become a popular subject of fiction narratives, particularly novels (which is proved e.g. by artistic achievements of Schulz, Kuncewiczowa, Miłosz, Konwicki, Herling-Grudzinski, Odojewski, Chwin, Stasiuk, Filipiak, Huelle, and in the world's literature – Proust, Grass, Faulkner to mention just a few[19]). One can even say that contemporary Polish prose (and not only) is almost obsessively concerned with the problem of memory, often neglecting – or even ignoring – other aspects of psychological life. In radical discussions such categories as consciousness and identity are sometimes reduced in their meaning to mere epiphenomena of memory – noticeable but superficial signs of its activity. The status of recollections in fiction literature is a bit different than in strictly biographical and autobiographical writing. Memory is no longer a cognitive condition necessary to build a story nor a source of information that call for being told but, instead, it becomes by itself a subject of a literary presentation. This affects the character and form of a narrative. Even at the very point of departure an author is faced with the lack of a significant and perceptible motivation for telling a story. In such a case there are no significant events worth depicting nor, as a matter of fact, any situations or states of affairs worth disclosing. It is an author's task to invent them. Thus novel narratives are not based on the process of recalling but on its simulation, a fictional reconstruction.

[19] See M. Janion, *Świat jako pamięć*. In: *Odnawianie znaczeń*. Kraków 1980; T. Burek, *Autobiografia jako rozpamiętywanie losu*. „Pamiętnik Literacki" 1981/4; A. Nasalska, *Formuła nostalgii. O sposobie kształtowania świata przedstawionego w prozie Tadeusza Konwickiego*. In: *Modele świata i człowieka. Szkice o powieści współczesnej*. J. Święch (ed.). Lublin 1989; J. Jarzębski, *Apetyt na przemianę. Notatki o prozie współczesnej*. Kraków 1997. E. Szczepkowska, *Cykl podolski Włodzimierza Odojewskiego. Postacie. Krajobrazy. Obszary pamięci*. Warszawa 2002.

The recollection is made attractive by pertaining to people or events that are thought of as significant, momentous or representative while a novel has to find its own raison d'être and provide appropriate justification to account for a memoirist's undertaking. The above-mentioned images gain value only if they manage to become specific figures of discourse representing meanings that go beyond the episodic nature of single situations, revealing certain existential, historiosophical, and psychological truths.

It often happens that recollective novel narratives gain additional value by entering into a dialogue with their contemporary aesthetic, scientific or philosophical reflection. This kind of interaction is manifested in the way characters are built, time relationships shaped and events tied together. The most influential type of poetics in the 20th-century literature is that based on an associative model of memory, built with considerable contribution of vital trends of the 20th-century philosophy and psychology. Images recalled in such narrative are not arranged in a logic or chronological order but reflect dynamics of subjective experiences. People, objects, situations are shown in a fragmentary way not according to general knowledge of the world (as it is the case of recollections) but basing on individual, idiosyncratic criteria. Usually the flashbacks put into a narrative tend to escape a clear-cut time framework, being situated with respect to a narrator's point of view. Particular participants of recalled events are rendered as fluid and variable sets of diverse elements which remain in constant tension and move. Writers often refrain from consolidating these dispelled components by attaching them to a definable personality stereotype; they do the opposite – disintegrate the protagonists' identities by enhancing dissonant aspects in their profiles. Given narratives so formed it is sometimes difficult to determine what comes from a recalled experience and what is a figment of imagination, a confabulated supplement to the fragmentary recollection[20]. It is easy to notice that this type of poetics permitsa recollective narrative to ap-

[20] The question of imagination seems to be crucial for the analysis of the forms of memory. See *The Imagined Past.* M. Chase, Ch. Shaw (eds.) . Manchester University Press 1989.

proach oniric images, descriptions of dream hallucinations or ecstatic visions. The border is even more blurred because these hallucinatory states often appear to be the most important manifestations of contents recorded in a protagonist's mind. Memory in this perspective is no longer a static reservoir of memories but becomes, instead, an independent and dynamic force that exerts a strong pressure on everyday activity of a given person[21].

The above-discussed elements of poetics mark but a general framework for actual artistic practice for novel narratives are characterised by their outstanding diversity. Particular works tend to take up very sophisticated forms and escape any accepted classification. However, seeking further generalisations – though they seem to be rather rough – one could identify the impact of two evident dominants. Namely, two main variants occurring in the discussed model of memory: traumatic and nostalgic. As Czermińska writes, in the post-war fiction writing "memory could have been [...] cursed or blessed"[22]. In prose of the last century the former type seemed to prevail for a long time. It assumes a pessimistic view of a Man as a being enslaved by his bleak memories. In such works memory is presented primarily as a record of painful, usually unrealised experiences which deform a subject's personality and keep returning in the shape of phobias and obsessions. Memory proves to be a barrier that separates Man from the external reality, limits his ability to perceive new things and hinders his communication with the outer environment (such features can be found, for instance, in the prose of Faulkner, Konwicki, Odojewski)[23]. There seems to be a sort of terra incognita, a secret world, from which we receive only shreds of information and distorted or overcoloured stories. It is worth noting at this point how difficult it is for a

[21] Images of memory in novels should be analized in the context of the time construction in fiction. See e.g.: Z. Lewicki, *Czas w prozie strumienia świadomości.* Warszawa 1975; K. Bartoszyński, *Problem konstrukcji czasu w literaturze polskiej XX wieku. In: Powieść w świecie literackości. Szkice.* Warszawa 1991; A. Sobolewska, *Struktura czasowa utworu i problematyka czasu.* In: *Polska proza psychologiczna.* Wrocław 1979.

[22] M. Czermińska, *op. cit.*: 120.

[23] D. Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country.* Cambridge University Press 1985.

writer to unveil such unrealised layers of memory. Since a subject of a novel (or a personalised narrator) does not realise that some past events determine his or her way of conduct or perception and since the memories of these events have been smothered they can now be seen only through irrational phobias or neuroses – the author is not able to tell us about them. Therefore neither the past events nor their traces in protagonists' behaviour can be expressed directly, stated expressis verbis. It is for that reason that in similar situations modern prose has to make use of symbols, brash recurrence of motifs and other elements or meaningful (for a reader) silence for that matter.

However, apart from the traumatic and fatalistic variant, there is also a nostalgic variety of novelistic, memory-based pictures that develops rapidly, especially in recent years. In this version the past is depicted as an unreversably lost eclogue, and a recollection as a quest for the lost treasure, well hidden somewhere among unwanted images which litter our consciousness (in spite of distinct differences between the today's prose and the modernist one, Proust with his monumental series of novels deserves to be called a patron of this literary movement). Many a time one may have had the impression that contact with past events has been the only way to survive in an unfriendly world because, as critics rightly underline, there is a relationship between a nostalgic attitude and rejection of a currently ruling order of things.. Przemysław Czapliński, for example, believes this peculiar kind of escapism to be the chief determinant of the spirit of new Polish prose.

> *When the elapse of time is a source of our fear, when the present does not let itself be liked, and the future only makes us afraid, we seek help in the past times looking out not only for durable values which are stored there but also for ways of managing time.*[24]

Memory, giving access to the past events, is no longer looked upon as an ominous force having control over Man but treated as a source of

[24] P. Czapliński, *Wzniosłe tęsknoty. Nostalgie w prozie lat dziewięćdziesiątych*. Kraków 2001: 5.

the sense of existence. The access may certainly have a different character in different works. – e.g. in *Weiser Dawidek* the aim of the "travel to the past" is a cognitive reconstruction of a true course of events that happened a long time ago while in Stasiuk's *White Raven* – an emotional revival of the state of juvenile spontaneity and bravura (both aims, by the way, turn out to be equally unreachable). Nevertheless, in both cases, images kept in memory constitute a specific point of reference for present experiences and form a kind of paradigmatic situations that convey meaning to protagonists' experiences. Past states of things are shown in a static way, as if frozen in a mythical, time-resistant space. Since, as most researchers note, semantisation and axiologisation of the above-mentioned images is done in the nostalgic type of prose mostly by means of culture-determined codes through mythologisation of selected experiences[25]. This symbolic marking of facts surely affects the meaning and importance of those imaginary wanderings in time. Marek Zaleski indicates that in such circumstances:

> *The very act of recalling is mythologised – which is no less important – changing itself into a rite of saving things from being forgotten, extracting memory from the abyss of oblivion, liberating the past. An author's returning to the past, which is always ambiguous and undefined, resembles a mythical hero who sets off for a quest into the depth of the Labyrinth, supported only by a frail and uncertain thread of his memory*[26].

The past in such cases does not emerge by itself in the form of compulsory behaviour and other unrealised traces but lets itself to be unveiled only through active author's endeavours. It ceases to be a hidden source of motivation for human actions and becomes an object of nostalgic longing. The difference applies mostly to the axiologic evaluation of the act of recollection and the recollected contents but entail also some disparity in the way literary images are shaped. Events take a clearer fic-

[25] See B. Kaniewska, *O niewyrażalności doświadczenia dzieciństwa w młodej prozie. In*: *Literatura wobec niewyrażalnego* W. Bolecki, E. Kuźma (eds.) . Warszawa 1998: 178. T. Mizerkiewicz, *Stylizacje mityczne w prozie polskiej po 1968 roku.* Poznań 2001.

[26] M. Zaleski, *op. cit.*: 31.

tional course, motivation for particular deeds is easier to reconstruct and the plot, composed of coherent chains of actions, heads evidently towards a climax. The narration is also more often built by means of more traditional techniques and poetics. Many times, for instance, – which critics have pointed out – the process of reconstruction of the past is based on a pattern of a criminal or a detective story[27]. Sometimes a reference to a well-known convention is meant to be a meaningful contradiction. This is the case, for example, with many works that deliberately reverse relationships typical for Bildungsroman or so-called educative novel. The deformation may then express, for example, one's reluctance to comply with accepted social norms, a sorrow over one's lost childhood or frustration with the elapse of time which pushes successive arrays of experiences into the abyss of oblivion.

Generally, one could say that such compositional solutions enhance in a greater extent an active role of a subject making his or her conduct strategic, significant and purposeful. At the same time, however, with all the differences mentioned, there are many features that this type of novel shares with the modern prose discussed before. Here as well, memories return without respect to chronology triggered by an interaction of random stimuli and author's intellectual efforts. The pictures of the past situations are fragile, changeable, unsteady. Also characters are shown through a montage of fragments and mark their fantasmatic presence only by single actions, accidentally remembered details of appearance or characteristic gestures. Eventually, the truth discovered in memories turns out to be as frail and hypothetical as the one revealed by neurotic obsessions. Therefore, it seems right to claim that, nostalgic prose usually remains within the scope of action of the associative theory of recollection.

[27] P. Czapliński, *op. cit.*:. 78-81, 194-209.

4

The components of novel-based model of memory discussed above – disintegration of a character, disturbed chronology, associative montage, episodic composition – were aimed at breaking the realistic conventions and making a more "authentic" picture of mental processes. As Agnieszka Graff illustratively argues: "modern novel, which has never been born, was to show us finally what it is really like; it was to be a text that, instead of artificial arrangement of the world, would present life as it is – would capture time without disturbing its original fluency"[28]. In its utopian desire to show an allegedly unfalsified form of time, space and human experience this kind of prose actually reached the limit of narration and got to the point where it was no longer able to make stories. However, in the literature of the last century we may encounter a number of works that have managed to cross even that border. It would be very difficult to detect any traces of sequence, cause, cohesion or easily recognisable objective in their structure. It applies to texts based on an open composition, constituting polimorphic sets of loosely bound pieces. Polish literature usually refers to these texts as modern silvae rerum or associates them with the category of literary collage[29]. They cumulate manifold records of diverse origins making use of unreliable, alternative rules of discourse arrangement and coherence. At the level of semantics they build meanings of potential character that, instead of making a definite sense, multiply allusions and require a reader to be an active interpreter. They imply a picture of memory understood as (to reach for Eugenio Donato's suggestive phrase) "a collection of memories, an archaeological museum of carelessly arranged fragments of the past, each of them being a synechdochic textual representation subservient to an insignificant, metonimic incident of its neighbourhood"[30]. A large part

[28] A. Graff, *Pytanie o czas – pytanie o tekst: kwestia czasu jako problem teoretyczno-literacki*. „Kultura i Społeczeństwo" 1996/4: 67.

[29] The main work on this issue is R. Nycz, *Sylwy współczesne*. Kraków 1996.

[30] E. Donato, *Ruiny pamięci. Fragmenty archeologiczne i artefakty tekstowe*. Transl. D. Gostyńska. „Pamiętnik Literacki" 1986/3: 338.

of such syncretic works is counted into recollective writing – suffice to give such examples as: *Sny. Ogrody. Sérénité* by Iwaszkiewicz, *Fantomy* by Kuncewiczowa, *Matka odchodzi* by Różewicz, *Piesek przydrożny* by Miłosz.

If we were to agree that the objective of textual representation should be to render the fragmentary and discontinuous nature of our memory, the blanks in our knowledge, unreliability and fragility of bonds between the remembered images or deformations due to a variable perspective – we would have to conclude that this incohesive and fragmentary structure constitutes the most natural medium. Literary rendering is meant here to be an attempt at creating a verbal equivalent of a psychical experience rather than a description or account of facts. To give an example, one of the scholars analysing Kuncewiczowa's prose maintains that: "Memory is fragmentary by nature. Blanks and deformations of our memory determine our vision of the world and ourselves", therefore, a fragmentary composition of recollective narratives is not "an artificial superstructure but a form which from the point of view of autobiography is most appropriate, most compatible or, one could say – most natural"[31]. Whereas an open, additive composition, which can gather still new segments, is a kind of a homologic equivalent of a permanent cumulation of constantly added memories, a reflection of the process of growth and updating of information stored in an individual's consciousness. We are able, as it is, to point out at other similar ways of semantisation of different features of discourse morphology. Such works contain, for instance, extracts written originally by different authors, combining records from an author's diary with quotations from different books and summaries of overheard opinions. This is to mirror a heterogenic character of memory, which stores side by side our own reflections, encyclopaedic information acquired in the course of education, thoughtlessly repeated gossip or myths preserved in the collective memory. Quoting other people's opinions makes us

[31] E. Woźnicka, *Fragment jako autobiografia*. „Pamiętnik Literacki" 2002/2: 83, 87.

then realise in a way that the knowledge we have is not all exclusively our personal property but contains also things that we learn from others. While combining records which do not fit to one another testifies to a random and involuntary nature of facts that we encounter in our conscious life and preserve in our memory.

Diversity of poetics, differentiation of subsequent fragments can be interpreted as representation of the multiplicity of remembered experiences, into which count lyrical emotions, dry data, colourful anecdotes and large-size stories. To take the above-mentioned Iwaszkiewicz's triptych as an example – the first part, *Sny* (Dreams), brings mostly recollection of intense youth experiences, combines a lyrical, subjective view of the world with a predominance of direct interactions shown by means of a stage presentation. Part Two, relating to wider perspective of the adult life and giving account of experiences met at different places, develops a descriptive and epic character by making use of a more distanced way of relating events and allowing not only for personal emotions but also external facts (i.e. *Ogrody* – Gardens). And finally the last part revealing clearly the moment when the story is told by referring to the end of life assumes an essayistic character and willingly turns to the sphere of abstract reflection (which is, by the way, implied in the title describing Sérénité's state of mind). The multiform nature of the texts discussed here is sometimes even more blatant with some works crossing the border of verbal discourse. For instance, the moving book *Matka odchodzi* (Mother Departs) contains not only the diary recordings of the heroine but also fragments of Różewicz's own journal, his poems and minor narratives in prose as well as photos from the poet's family album. This structure of the text seems to suggest that words are helpless to express experiences of the sensual concrete which have been preserved by our memory in the form of images of once-seen faces, places or gestures.

Relationships between particular textual models are not explicitly determined and may be many times regrouped and supplemented. Thus juxtaposed segments are but a loose collection of elements which will gain a definite semantic value only through a recipient's participation.

Only then will they become components of still new systems by being interpreted in different ways. As in the case of separate memories – which thanks to a sudden intuition or connotation may unexpectedly be linked together to make up a new sequence and to show us the truths which we have not realised before – separate textual units are linked in different ways by readers, every time bringing a new meaning. A recollection is then characterised by a lack of focus, it does not concentrate on a predominant obsession nor does it seem to look for a single, defined sense. Instead, it drifts freely on the waves of motifs, wanders about pointlessly among cumulated conscious and unconscious contents. It needs to be added, however – to avoid extremes and not to overestimate the disintegrating power of a collage composition – that fragmentarisation of a discourse in the discussed works is counterbalanced by various compositional and conceptual orders (e.g. in Miłosz's *Piesek przydrożny* [Road-side Dog] some compositional "rounding" and implicit thematic dominants showing through the mosaic of microforms encourage scholars to treat the work as a kind of an epic poem in prose).

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This review of recollection models proposed above implied by various representations of particular genre conventions is, by no means, exhaustive or complete. Perfunctory as it is, this discussion indicates, however, that the way memory is depicted depends more on a stylistic register, function and social context than actual knowledge of Man's mental make-up. It is this genologic marking that decides what kind of a recollective narrative is to be expected. One should remember, however, that the relationships here outlined between a genre and a model of memory are of a probabilistic rather than deterministic nature. None of the discussed factors – such as the approach to past events, type of time relationship, mode of reminiscence introduction, form of presentation of recalled persons – constitutes a definitional feature allowing to determine an identity of a given form of discourse. On the

other hand, none of the genologic conventions resolves explicitly and ultimately what images of memory it permits to recall to life. We know very well that there are memoirs which make use of novel narration techniques and novels based on classic autobiographical patterns. A genre is not an algorithm enabling to create a certain category of texts but rather a type of social semiosis, an open and dynamic system of directives. It prefers certain combinations of stylistic and compositional features but only by qualifying them as more or less applicable in a given context and not treating them as obligatory or necessary elements. It reflects various cultural pressures in the process of building a discourse thus allowing an author to refer to the state of consciousness of a given community. It acts as an intermediary between a specific text and a level of communicative habits, moral values, knowledge of the world. There is no doubt, for example, that psychoanalytical conceptions have influenced strongly the way of displaying memories in the novel of mature modernism. It is worth noting though that more recent trends of cognitive psychology have put a strong emphasis on a structural character of all mental processes, organised by different scripts, plans or scenarios[32]. Consequently, they question or even reject the associative conception of memory, so significant for the twentieth-century prose.

As it appears, literary renderings speak more of prevailing scientific conceptions, ideological strivings or aesthetic doctrines than the very object of a representation. Textual representations of memory, similarly to painters' landscapes or portraits, take up forms consistent with requirements of a convention and dependent on historic, functional and social conditions. The same phenomenon is one time shown as an idiosyncratic symptom of an obsession and the other time as a testimony of compliance with social values. It appears as a process of concluding based on

[32] See P. N. Johnson-Laird, *Mental Models*. Cambridge University Press 1983; J. Mandler, *Stories, scripts and scenes: Aspects of schema theory*. Hillsdale 1984; M. Billig, *Arguing and Thinking: a Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology*. Cambridge University Press 1987; D. McAdams, *The stories we live by: Personal myths and the making of the self*. New York 1994.

logical premises, as a stream of spontaneous associations, an encyclopaedic register of data, a picture created by imagination or, finally, as reservoir of easily accessible data or a disastrous, mysterious force. If then, as it seems, memory can be attributed quite differently, sometimes even contradictory profiles depending on a way a story is told, we have to admit that it is just not being faithfully copied in the structure of a discourse. Its picture is not made by mechanical copying but is constructed and shaped socially in such a way as to be relevant to needs of a given cultural context.

GRZEGORZ GROCHOWSKI

ПОЭТИКИ ПАМЯТИ

Статья представляет собой попытку сравнить несколько моделей памяти, порождаемых свойствами поэтики повествования воспоминаний, представляющих избранные традиции жанра. В статье рассматриваются как разновидности дискурса, основанные на процессе воспоминания, так и его художественные образы.

Оговариваются представления, связанные с формами, принадлежащими к литературе *по случаю* (воспоминания), с документами автобиографического характера (автобиография, дневник), с художественным вымыслом (роман), а также синкретические, экспериментальные произведения, имеющие общие черты с категорией текстового коллажа либо silva rerum.

Сравнение представлений, связанных с отдельными жанрами, выявляет яркое разнообразие характеристик, приписываемых явлению памяти. Факт этот свидетельствует о достаточно глубокой зависимости текстовых транспозиций процесса воспоминания не столько от реальных знаний о механизмах психики, сколько от нужд и коммуникативных функций, релевантных в данном культурном контексте.

RADOSVET KOLAROV

THE CRATIVE MEMORY: ENGENDERING THE FIGURES

It is generally accepted in modern ideas of memory that it is not a storehouse for storage of information, passive and static, stored and "archived" once and for all, but it is rather changeable, fluid, and, so to speak, is adapted to the present moment which the individual lives in. Creativity, the participation of the memory in the creation of new structures is a significant moment in this mobility. "Memory actively seeks to create meaning" – Nicolae Babuts states in his seminal book[1]. According to Z. Mints and Yu. Lotman "in the event of partial forgetfulness the entire texts remain in the memory in a kind of peculiar "remnants", performing the role of "folded" program of the text. They can be elements of a high level (the logically constructed thought) as well as of a low level – a word embodied in a sound image of an object[...] props, of a sort, concealed in unconscious memory mechanisms. When their internal development however provides them with an impulse to wake up they acquire the nature of text forming programs, creating[...] new texts"[2]. John Jackson points out the dual nature of memory – it is metonymic in

[1] Nicolae Babuts, The Dynamics of the Metaphoric Field, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1992, p.52

[2] З. Минц, Ю.М. Лотман, О глубинных елементах художественного замысла. К дешифровке одного непонятного места из воспоминаний о Блоке. В: Материалы всесоюзного симпозиума по вторичным моделирующим системам. Тарту, 1974, с. 174-175.

the sense that it fragmentizes the whole; on the other hand, it connects 'engendering closeness between casual fragments which it has selected, formulating a proposition with a new meaning'[3].

Yet it must be acknowledged that the analytical procedures in the research of the creative memory are more in the sphere of craving. If we look at the field of the cognitive science occupied actively with the processes of memory we may hear the disconsolate statement that 'there is little one can actually learn about creativity from reading the current cognitive literature.'[4] Ten years later things did not seem changed. An authoritative international workshop on constructive memory while investigating deviations of memory from reproducing 'true facts' and the creation of its own constructions depending on goal-structures, contextual filters, inhibition mechanisms, coherence requirements and so forth, does not take any notice of memory's real euristic functions, its capacity to initiate new structures beyond itself.[5]

Implicit barriers stand in the way of the investigations of the creative memory. The metaphor of palimpsest is furtively or manifestly present in the intertextual analyses; in spite of its attractive visualness it is, like every metaphor in science, methodologically manipulative. Ostensibly depicting the "presence of one text into another"[6], it in essence hints at their dissociation , the displacement of one text from the other; their "cohabitation" is an undesired compromise, a "residue" from the imperfect displacement.[7] What is more important, the palimpsest metaphor manipulatively states the idea of an external touch between frozen sur-

[3] Hohn Jackson, Mémoire et création poétique, Mercure de France, Paris, 1992, p.52--53.

[4] Ronald Finke, Thomas Ward, Steven Smith, Creative Cognition. Theory, Research, and Applications. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London 1992, p.4.

[5] See Constructive Memory, ed. By Boicho Kokinov and Wiliam Hirst, New Bulgarian University, Sofia,2003.

[6] Gerard Genette, Palimpsestes. La littérature au second degré, éd.du Seuil, Paris, 1982, p.8.

[7] Baudelaire's statement 'Le palimpsest de la mémoire est indestructable' uses the word *palimpsest* in no other way than to formulate the idea of steadiness against defacement which is naturally far from the idea of a structure-forming mechanism.

faces, between discursive completenesses. In this view the hypotext is a full-fledged text ready, so to say, to be turned into the hypertext through a kind of elementary transformation of the expansion, condensation and so forth type. Speaking of transformations authors in such cases perform a simple reduction: they merely juxtapose the beginning and the end, hypo- and hypertext in their discursive completeness without resorting to hypotheses concerning what is true, genuine transformation, what takes place remaining unobservable in-between texts – in the author's mind. But of course things are far more complicated. The transformation of one text into another is not done 'wholesale'; it passes intermediary stages producing mental structures which are not to be observed in hypo-and hypertext. Very often the creative impulse and the program of the new text starts pecisely from such an intermediary structure consisting of fragments in memory of which the hypotext cannot supply direct instructions. Without a reconstruction of such a structure the transformation may not be noticed at all – the 'palimpsest' may remain out of sight owing to an insufficiently high profile and visibility of textual correspondences between the hypo-and hypertext. That is why the drill investigating the textual similarities is required to be dropped at a much deeper level as usually is practiced.

A generating structure of the kind in cases of autotextuality[8] is what I shall call a *virtual figure*. In order to reconstruct it let us adopt the following premises: We may imagine the 'remnants' remaining in the poet's memory of his/her own texts as verbal indexes of lyrical situations registered at the same time in the form of iconic-imaginal code. We may call them *motives* – thematic units of content which can be expressed by a word, a syntagm or a more expanded text - not solely because of the convenience to perceive them in a double, imaginal- verbal perspective, but in the creative meaning as well, which the etymology of *motive* reminds of- *mōtīvus* (from Latin movēre) – 'moving'.[9].

[8] See Lucien Dällenbach, Intertexte et autotexte – **Poétique,** 1976, 27

[9] According to Constantin Floros 'the motif can be viewed as a substantial unit (stofische Einheit) that possesses an energetic power and that has an accelerating effect (als

The connections between the motives-fragments form a flexible, mobile network. They may break up and reform, selectively reinstate parts of the initial trajectory, enter into various configurations. Another very important movement obviously exists in this turbulent space – an exchange of elements takes place between the nods-fragments in the network. Within the unconsciousness of memory situatively unconnected fragments seem to feel affinity one to another, testing common semantic valences, forming blended mental spaces.[10] Predicative clutching happens to take place in the mental space between two motives, short-circuit so to speak, which may be called a *figure* in the meaning both of a visual scheme (following Lyotard[11]) and of semantic distance (in conformity with Genette[12]). We may imagine it as a discoursively unarticulated metaphor. But it may present a conceptual combination containing a kind of distance, a semantic conflict amongst the elements and without obligatorily pointing at a metaphor as well. Let us take two examples of the work of memory garnered for the poem 'Night" by Bulgarian poet Peyo Yavorov. The figure of a "wall – window" may appear in the exchange of elements between the darkened, frosted window and on the other hand the "brittle'wall, ready to fall down; the association of the "blazed up skull" of the lyrical "I" and the missing oals of the cold, straining itself to utter a curse fireplace may generate

orantribendes Element wirkt) (Michel Vanhellepute,The Concept of Motif in Literature: A Terminological Study. In:The Return of Thematic Criticism. Ed. by Werner Sollors, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, London, 1993 p.96); Paul Handermann figuratively calls the motif 'a motor element that pushes along the crearive process (Vanhellepute, op. cit. p.100); Theodor Wolpers consider the motif as ' a kind of visualized outline" in which case 'an incidental detail or associative idea may generate a new twist and correct or transform the original pattern or set a new motif in motion' (Theodor Wolpers, Motif and Theme as Strucrural Content Units. In:The Return of Thematic Criticism, p.88).

[10] On conceptual blending see Mark Turner, The Literary Mind, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1996,pp.57-83; Gilles Faukonnier, Mark Turner,Conceptual Integration Networks, Cognitive Science 22(2) 1998, pp.133 – 187.

[11] Jean-François Lyotard, Discours, Figure, Editions Klincksieck, Paris, 1971

[12] Gérard Genette, Figures I, éd. Du Seuil, Paris, 1969, p. 204-221.

the figure of a "skull-fireplace". Unlike the articulated metaphor, however, the hypotext contains solely the possible terms of the figure. Its occurrence takes place in the unconscious of memory between the old and the new text. How may we be sure of its appearance? Here we arrive at the main point of our topic. The figure is not manifested directly but through the texts which it engenders performing the functions of their matrix. What is very important – it is not constituted through substitution, displacement of elements, with it the transfer of meaning does not flow one-way (from the modifier to the subject or from the focus to the frame), but in the two directions and all the elements remain there, in the "creative blend" - to act on each other, to modify each other and to create new meaning. Representing the motifs as sets of features we can write the inception of the figure like this:[*wall & window*] → [*wall* ∩*window*]; [*fireplace & skull*] → [*fireplace* ∩ *skull*].

The text production program which is mentioned by Mints and Lotman commences from the formation, or we could better say the vibration of such a figure non-existing in the text . It bears the energetic impulse, performs the function of the 'motor'(Handermann), the "eureka" of the idea clicks in it, the image of the idea (the idea of the image) of the future work – at the moment at which the possibility of this figure being encumbered with higher semantics is opened, its passing into the regime of symbolic designations. It may draw various generating matrices from the joint predicative space – for instance (wall-window) – "glass wall", but also "window overlooking nowhere"; "fireplace-skull" – "fire-breathing speech" but also "inexpressibility of the Logos". The setting in motion of the text-forming program consists of the commencement of such a matrix powerfully to generate predications, to unfold the plot, set in the "deep propositions" (Anderson) under the indexes – key words of the motives or in the "hypograms" (said following Riffaterre) to unlock the fund of cultural and literary associations. At the same time this program foresees the cooperation of the motif network selectively stirring portions of it around the key motifs. I would like to note the difference between the matrix launched by Michael Riffaterre[13] and the one I have in mind in this article. The

matrix of Riffaterre is introduced as ready-made, available construct whose genealogy is beyond attention and whose presence is attested through the "given" within the text. The figure I have in mind is *formed from memory elements*. We may reinstate its origin, observe it so to speak in *status nascendi*. As far as the theory of Fauconier and Turner for conceptual blending is concerned, it obtains support from a new point of view.

I will try to illustrate the functioning of this model by an example from the poetry of Peyo Yavorov. Here is an extract of his poem "Night", in which the lyrical subject speaking in the first person imagines his own death and the tomb his beloved comes to:

НО ЕДНА
душа все тайно зарад мене
ще жали още. В лунна нощ,
когато влюбени зефири
милуват полските цветя
и скрито някъде поточе
в самотност тъжно ромоли,
ще дойде тя – преплетен бурен
полека там ще раздвои,
въз гроба хладен ще припадне.
Последен стон тогаз дълбоко
гърдите й ще раздере
и устните й кръв ще багри,
и гласно тя ще да ридай:
"Пустинен път живота беше,
изминах го едвам:
омразно беше тежко бреме...
Кажи ми, чакаш ли ме там?"


[13] Michael Riffaterre, Semiotics of Poetry, Methuen, London, 1980

BUT A
soul will still secretly grief
over me. On a moonlit night
when zephyrs in love
caress wild flowers
and a hidden somewhere streamlet
sadly murmurs in loneliness
she will come – slightly splitting aside
interwoven weeds,
fainting over the cool tomb.
And then a last moan will
deeply tear her chest,
blood will tint her lips
and she will sob aloud:
"A desert road was life,
a hard path to walk upon :
it was a hideous and painful burden…
Tell me, are you still there waiting for me?"
She will sob and ask
Having bent her forehead to the ground;

There is not causal connection between the underlined fragments of the text – they exist as actions parallel in time synchronized through the conjunction link (when). On the other hand, however, something in common is noted in their profound semantics: "somebody (something) touches something else". This common scheme receives also different lexical and stylistic contents: the first fragment contains doubly expressed figurality ("in love", "caress") through which the instrument of the action – if we follow Fillmore (the zephyrs) – is personified, whilst in the second fragment the action of the agent (the human hand), contrariwise presents frugally expressed plasticity ("slightly"), physically specified movement.

The word "slightly", however, bears the gleam of the context of the entire behavior of the woman's character "a /soul will still secretly

grief/ over me", "She will sob and ask, having bent her forehead to the ground". In this context "slightly" bears the connotations of "tenderly", "with love". This thread in the common semantic structure "touch of an object" provides grounds for an exchange of predicative connections taking place between the two fragments, their integration in a blended mental space. In it the anthropomorphism in the figural meaning seems to return over the human action. The caress of the zephyr puff returns to the woman's hand. The exchange of predicates results in an exchange of the objects and the imaginable propositions appear: zephyrs caress the interwoven weeds; a woman's hand slightly touches wild flowers. But more fusion is possible in the blended mental space. The objects ("weeds", "flowers") may be also merged directly – spatially through the only transposition possible in this event "flowers in weeds". That is it! The figure is formed.



„Flowers in weeds" is a gestalt; an image with a clearly expressed visual form, in which there is a semantic tension, notional contradicti-

on. It is reminder of what is symbolic of the destroyed flower, withered, broken in two, in the expression of the idea of lost dreams and hopes, of ruined life... This image is one of the topoi of the literature. 'Flowers in weeds' may be considered as its variation, as spontaneous invention, which is met with the urgency of the cliché. I will repeat the that this image does not exist in the text of the poem 'Night', there exist solely elements of it which are joined and semantically reconfigured later on in memory. It is a result of the new which arises in joining of the fragments in the blended mental space. According to Fauconier and Turner in the creative blend where two input-spaces are projected new meanings appear which are encountered in neither of the two spaces – these are the meanings of the parabolic thinking. According to the theory of Nicolae Babuts „the meeting of two images or idea sequences already in memory (...) may create new metaphors, musical structures and other new structures."

And thus the figure „flowers in weeds" starts to work in the regime of symbolic meanings. An additional impulse for this is the fact that in the background part of the merged predications, as we know, there are personified meanings present. Re-moduling of the internal articulation of the images takes place. The touch of the woman's hand and of the zephyrs in love can already obtain solely a negative sign. Because the *closedness* is an emblematic sign of the figure, setting the engendering matrix in motion. Any kind of touch with a positive sign – life-giving warming, caressing, erotically-exciting and so forth are rationalized as physically and psychologically impossible. The matrix contains the latent readiness to intensify, multiply, split up these states of obliterated touches, of non-touches. In this context „interwoven weeds" activates the connotations „suffocation", „darkness", „remoteness", „loneliness", „abandonment", „anaemicity", „secrecy" and so forth. The aspiration of these meanings being articulated and unfolded (aimed at freeing their energy) engenders the lyrical plot of another Yavorov's poem „Violets":

ТЕМЕНУГИ

Вас слънце ви не вижда – лъх,
зефирен лъх ви не допира;
сред тръни, скромни и без дъх,
дори пчела ви не намира –
печални, бледни теменуги.

Печални чакате ръка,
сънувате и пръсти нежни.
Напразно чакате!.... Така,
в надежда тихо безнадеждни,
вий мрете – болни теменуги.

Вий мрете – в храсти и бодил
от първи ден чела навели...
Желания в живот немил,
мечти неволни и несмели –
вий чезнете едни след други.

О, бледни, болни теменуги!

VIOLETS

The sun does not set its eyes on you – puff,
zephyr puff does not touch you;
amongst thorns, unpretentious and with no breath
even a bee is not able to find you -
sorrowful, pale violets.

You mournful wait for a hand,
dreaming of tender fingers, too.
You wait in vain!... Thus,

in hope calmly hopeless,
you pass away – ailing violets.

You pass away – in bushes and thistles
having bent your foreheads down since the very first day...
Desires in an outcast life,
involuntary and timorous dreams –
you languish some after others.

Oh, pale, ailing violets!

In the unfolding of the plot „flowers in weeds" the hypothetically admitted virtual images in the blended mental space in the figure obtain manifestation in the new text („Zephyr puff does not touch you", „Dreaming of tender fingers, too"). At this the metaphoric field „woman-zephyr" in conformity with the adopted hypothesis stretches and spreads not only over the gesture but esthetically filters the view of the hand („tender fingers"). On the other hand in the unfolding of the allegorical plot the collective lyrical „we" of the violets borrows elements from the real and not so attractive image of the woman kneeling on her knees on the tomb in expression of the suffering and death engraves itself on the trace of this character from „Night" through semantic re-functionalization: compare „Tell me, are you still there waiting for me?" and „You wait in vain!...", „Having bent her forehead to the ground" – „Having bent your foreheads down since the very first day...", „A desert road was life,/a hard path to walk upon:" – „Desires in an outcast life".

The virtual figures are arising in the unconscious generators of texts forming themselves from memory traces of one's own texts. They testify to the fact that the memory for one's own texts is polymorphic; it is a memory for texts, but simultaneously for unrealized projects as well, for latent works – a laboratory for the creation of new texts. It has two functions – of preservation of the traces and at the same time of urgency for the completion of the work commenced in the creative process.

Must we attribute the second function solely to the imagination?

And where does the border between memory and imagination pass? There is a long tradition in existence commencing from Aristotle of erasure of the firm boundaries between memory and imagination, their placement in the same class. Suffice it to mention that for Hobbes 'the Imagination and Memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names' and that Giambattista Vico grants to *memoria* the right to *inventio*, assigning memory and imagination to the first operation of the human spirit, to the art of invention class (*ars invendiendi*)[14] If we acknowledge the activity of the memory, we must hardly attribute the combinatorics of the traces preserved solely to the imagination. The matter is that memory inputs structures which are, so to say, its priority. One may say that they are the result of spontaneous, 'plasmic' motions in its space, all the more so that they occur in given contextual proximity between the memory traces. I should cite some statements in support of such a concept concerning memory's own creativity. Speaking of the metaphoric field, N. Babuts points out that 'the field is a mnemonic space newly awakened by the involuntary strategy of memory.'[15] And elsewhere he notes that 'memory is alert, full of anticipation.'[16] Mikhail Gasparov for his part presents such an impressive picture of the work of the memory: 'Mnemonic language ources represent not an immobile arrangement of a storage depot but constant 'buz' of meaningful images drawing closer to one another, ısing one into another, resonating one upon another[...]. I see language memory as a 'super-cubist' composition, awesomely multi-dimensional, whose diverse particles flicker and bear one another's reflection hither and thither in countless directions and in that process these mutual reflections have a moving-glittering appearance.'[17] Of course, the

[14] Jürgen Trabant, Memoria – Fantasia-Ingegno. In:Memoria – vergessen und erinnern./ hrsg. von Anselm Haverkamp und Renate Lachmann, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München,1993, S.410.

[15] Nicolae Babuts, op. cit., p.105.

[16] Ibid,p.72

[17] Б.М. Гаспаров, Языкь, память, образ. Лингвистика языкового существования. Новое литературное обозрение. Москва, 1996, с. 109, 144.

virtual figures of autotextuality do not exhaust the functioning of the creative memory. They are only its special case.

РАДОСВЕТ КОЛАРОВ

КРЕАТИВНАЯ ПАМЯТЬ: ПОРОЖДЕНИЕ ФИГУР

Современные теории памяти единодушны в том, что она не склад для хранения информации, архивированной раз и навсегда, а является подвижной, текучей, адаптирующейся к настоящему индивида, способной порождать новые значения. Особый случай креативной роли памяти - это порождение новых текстов на основе перефункционализирования старых текстов в творчестве данного автора. В исследованиях трансформаций текстов обычно упускается из виду роль ментальных структур, работающих в бессознательном памяти автора между гипо- и гипертекстами. Настоящая статья делает попытку реконструировать одну из этих структур, которую называют *виртуальной фугурой*. Исследование этой фигуры подтверждает с новой точки зрения теорию Жиля Фоконье и Марка Тэрнера о концептуальном совмещении (blending).

JAN KORDYS

MEMORY AND OBLIVION

Let us first sketch a map of areas where mechanisms of forgetting might become a distinct object of research, without assuming that it is possible to delineate a field common to all of them. In neurology or neuropsychology amnesia remains a phenomenon which reveals how the mind and the brain work; shows dissociations among various systems of information processing, making it also possible to seek associations with literature and anthropology by asking the question about the sense of identity and its connection with the experience of time, or autobiography. In ethnography the study of genealogical memory also includes the mechanisms of erasing the knowledge about past generations in order to open the way for new kinship relations. A sociologist or historian will be able to find something of interest, too, by studying the mechanisms of institutional oblivion. Finally, in ethical terms, forgetting is associated with acts of law and forgiving.

Apart from the studies of amnesia which is induced by pathological conditions forgetting has received relatively little attention. While the literature devoted to the study of memory is enormous, forgetting has been marginalized by being treated as something negative, arousing sympathy (in disease) or anger – in the everyday life[1]. Memory is worthy of respect;

[1] A compendium of recent studies in mechanisms of forgetting: D. Schacter, *Science de la mémoire. Oublier et se souvenir*, O. Jacob, Paris 2003; see also P. Ricoeur, *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*, Seuil, Paris 2000, pp. 536-588.

forgetting is a flaw which should be eradicated. However, the power of the former is an illusion; there is no defence against forgetting. When we delightedly talk about unforgettable moments, we express an illusory belief in the permanence of mental record. To prevent its possible erasure we resort to mnemonic devices, regarding forgetting as a natural process and memory as an artificial construct. Actually, if our relationships with other people and affective life depended on 'natural' biological processes or states of the nervous system, these relationships would disintegrate and gradually fade away in the way emotions change and disappear. There are situations where, as in ritual wailing to show mourning, the affects, though unaccompanied with words, are nevertheless extremely codified. Remembering the dead is not limited to the physical ability of 'being sad' because unstructured images would dissolve as their duration and sequence would not follow from that continually active form of consciousness which produces memories. We cannot fully share the pain with others as we are not able to form representations identical to those entertained by people close to the deceased, having no memory of relationships permeated with affects. The ritual of mourning transforms the experience into an intersubjective relationship; wailing is performed like a piece of music, the distress caused by the pain is controlled by a set of precisely coordinated actions. Although technical details of these actions are not directly related to the content, the ritual acts through symbols and transports the mourners into another dimension of existence with an ever-lasting pre-determined sequence of events which is not submitted to dissolution. Remembering becomes a practice, a social construction, both synchronically and diachronically[2]. Ritual wailing reveals a peculiar symbolic arbitrariness described also by neuropsychologists: if there is no content determined by experience, emotions, like signs, may become vehicles for a variety of meanings. Hans Lucas Teuber describes

[2] M. Mamardasvili, *Lekcyi po anticznoj filosofii,* ed. by J. P. Siekonosov, „Agraf", Moscow 1997, pp. 15-16, 19-20, and B. Karsenti, *L'homme total. Sociologie, anthropologie et philosophie chez Marcel Mauss*, PUF, Paris 1997, pp. 175-189; see also M. Billig, D. Edwards, *La construction sociale de la mémoire*, „La Recherche" (La mémoire) 1994, no. 267, pp. 788-790.

a patient wounded in a war. When he leaned his head forward, a fragment of a shell exerted pressure on the posterior part of the hypothalamus. As a result, the patient experienced a sudden flood of sadness and invariably started crying. When asked why he became sad, he replied *I don't know; it cries within me*[3].

Affects were incorporated into a symbolic code to save them from oblivion, which itself is a form of therapy bringing relief. It is worth recalling the suffering of a man whose memory had no limits described by Alexander Luria. The man had to resort to special techniques to remove the excess of memories. The main character of a story by Borges, *Funes the Memorious* (from *Fictions*), endowed with an extraordinary gift for remembering each object separately is unable to make generalizations, so his thinking is deficient. For Nietzsche "obliviousness is not only some *vis inertiae*, as superficial people think. It is, on the contrary, an active and, in the most exact sense, positive inhibitory ability. [...] To close the doors and windows of our consciousness for a while, not to be harassed by turmoil and struggle of the underground world, where our servant organs work for each other and against each other, some silence, some tabula rasa of consciousness, to make room again for something new, first of all for the noble functions and functionaries, for ruling, predicting, ordering (as our organisms are structured oligarchically) – these are advantages of the said active obliviousness"[4].

In some languages (e.g. French and Polish) the verb *forget* is active in form, suggesting that the process of forgetting is intentional and the subject is responsible for the consequences. But isn't it that we too easily accept responsibility (I'm sorry I have completely forgotten about it!) while at the same time we feel submitted to forgetting, which is imposed on us despite our efforts. In semantic terms forgetting occupies a middle ground between action and being controlled by something independent of the person (this can be seen in the Latin *oblivisci*, which is verbum deponens – i.e. a de-

[3] M. Jeannerod, *La nature de l'esprit. Sciences cognitives et cerveau*, Odile Jacob, Paris 2002, pp. 194, 213.

[4] F. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887).

ponent, a verb passive in form but active in meaning)[5]. On the other hand, circumlocutions – it slipped my memory – show forgetting as dispersion, scattering of the things previously collected and concentrated in memory. The recurring theme of forgetting in fairy-tales and myths should not be reduced to a device used to animate the plot; instead, it should be seen as a manifestation of mythical thought occupied with the mechanisms of information transmission. From such a perspective forgetting becomes "an authentic communication category" (Lévi-Strauss). If we classify communication phenomena in terms of binary oppositions (excess *vs.* lack, communication with oneself *vs.* communication with others), indiscreetness will be excess of information and forgetting – self-referential reversal of that 'excess' simultaneously at two levels: lack of communication with oneself rather than with others; to forget is to be unable to recall what you should have told yourself[6]. Painting metaphors, in turn, represent oblivion as a landscape – a desert, moving sands, a desolate place, or a grave. Alternatively, the daylight of memory is opposed to shadow, night, clouds or fog. A still different image of memory visualized as a storeroom or treasure chamber has its counterpart in the abyss of oblivion, although sinking into it may give access to the past hidden in the depths of the psyche. Freud's great discovery was to show oblivion as rejection and denial rather than as annihilation. What has been (apparently) forgotten affects the psyche and may continue to torment a human soul. There are also metaphors connected with writing, information inscribed on a tablet and the erasing of the script/trace. *Tabula rasa* is a topical image of conscious forgetting. On the other hand, the philosophical tradition associates truth (*Aletheia*) with memory. While for us truth is opposed to error or falsity, in Greek philosophy it is opposed to oblivion (the latter associated with death; in the waters of the mythical *Léthé* souls lost the memory of eternal truths). That was because memory did not consist in remembering facts but in a person's continued existence as a living being[7]. Mnemonics also had a mirror reflection. The

[5] H. Weinrich, *Léthé. Art et critique de l'oubli*, Fayard, Paris 1999, p. 13.

[6] C. Lévi-Strauss, *Paroles données*, Plon, Paris 1984, p. 137.

[7] Mamardasvili, *Lekcyi...*, pp. 23-24, 233-236; M. Detienne, *Les maitres de vérité dans la Grèce archaique*, Maspero, Paris 1981.

concept of the art of forgetting (*ars oblivionis*) is associated with a Greek statesman and strategist Themistocles (524-459 BC), who – asked by the poet and master of mnemonics Simonides whether he wanted to acquire the latter skill – replied that he didn't need it but he would like to learn how to forget things at will. Cicero explained that request by noting the exceptional memory of Themistocles, who forever retained everything he had seen or heard[8].

Many manifestations of loss of memory reveal that memory is overcome by oblivion in the cases which would be difficult to regard as cases of amnesia. From the information that we receive every day when we are awake and active the mind keeps a tiny part for several days and after that there is hardly anything left. Moreover, each memory is tainted with imprecision, a loss, that is a form of oblivion. The first manifestation of that is the fading of the original sharpness of perception; the blurring of colours, smells and sounds as well as the emotions once felt; a gradual decrease of the memory's intensity combined with the difficulty of situating it in time[9]. A typical example is the tip-of-the tongue experience. Studies showed that the phenomenon is connected first of all with the inability to recall persons' names (66 %) , even if there is no problem with recognizing a face. This is because the name cannot be modified, however slightly. While remembering places or faces, we can describe or draw them and the noticeable imperfections or misrepresentations will not disturb the memory itself but the names will not tolerate even the slightest imprecision. According to psycholinguists the impression of having a word on the tip of one's tongue is "an open window showing the failure of the process of lexical retrieval." This confirms the hypothesis that our memory does not reproduce things with perfect precision, even if they seem to be fixed therein. We cannot recall the name, but we have a perfect idea of the memory itself or the context (Proust was a master of description of this mechanism). Paul Valery saw in the tip-of-the-tongue- phenomenon a manifestation of the mechanism of memory by means of the impression of a loss. John Flavell introduced the concept

[8] Weinrich, *Léthé*, pp. 28-29.

[9] Jean-Yves & Marc Tadié, *Le sens de la mémoire*, Gallimard, Paris 1999, pp. 213-215.

of 'meta-memory' defined as introspective competence (St. Augustine talked about remembering the forgotten) making it possible to estimate how our memory works. The tip-of the tongue experience is an example of such competence; the irresistible feeling is that we possess some information which is just escaping us. The phenomenon can be caused by the right answer being blocked by a word-screen which is felt to be improper, or it can result from the activation of the entire collection of information related to the lost word which leads to the interference of two overlapping processes – the impression of our knowledge about our knowledge and the mechanism of searching in memory[10].

It is important to distinguish awareness the sense of existence connected with the autonomy of the body from consciousness the intellectual organ connected with the working of the mind[11]. Intuition tells us that the extent of awareness is at the same time the field of activity of consciousness, referred to in communication as 'I' and that the two areas must be closely connected and contiguous. Awareness and consciousness being rooted in body and mind respectively together form intersubjective links. If other people talk about themselves as 'I' and treat me likewise as an autonomous 'I', I can do the same thing with regard to the location of the consciousness of my own self. The process of inference connects the sense of bodily identity (awareness) with consciousness, at the same time displaying the same nature as remembering, because it is the sense of spatio-temporal continuity that allows me to talk about myself as 'I'[12].

[10] E. Bacon, L. Paire-Ficout, M. Izaute, *Je l'ai sur le bout de la langue*!, „La Recherche" (Spécial: La mémoire et l'oubli), 2001, No. 344, pp. 46-48; D. Schacter, *Science de la mémoire*, pp. 83-115; A. S. Brown, *A Review of the Tip-of-the-Tongue Experience*, „Psychological Bulletin" 1991, vol. 109, No. 2, p. 211; Tadié, *Le sens de la mémoire*, pp. 217-221, 237. Cf. also the case of Kant's intentional removal from memory of the name of his faithful servant Martin Lampe (Weinrich, pp. 101-114).

[11] Colwyn Trevarthen (*The tasks of consciousness: how could the brain do them?*, in: *Brain and Mind*, Ciba Foundation Symposium 69, Amsterdam 1979, p. 188) observes that the Middle English (1150-1500) term for consciousness refers to 'shared' or 'mutual knowledge'.

[12] P. Jorion, *La pensée se confond-elle avec la parole interieure? Paper presented in 1995 in Paris at a seminar of a research group Théorie et Clinique des Pathologies de la Pensée*, p. 19, 23-24.

It requires nevertheless the constant renewal by others, who make up the social mirror. Confirmations of identity rooted in the body, images and language are fixed in memory and only in extreme cases may undergo dissolution. Let us recall a recently published story of a young businessman who was attacked and received a heavy blow to the head. He went into a coma and woke up with total amnesia (no damage to the brain was found). On recovering consciousness his mind was like a *tabula rasa*. The records had to be entered again and the speed of regaining knowledge was amazing to the physicians. But what constituted the subjectivity, the life-story, the autobiography, was retrieved exclusively through his family and friends. The man's knowledge about himself consisted of stories narrated (rendered) by others[13]. It might have been the case of the syndrome known in psychological literature as 'psychogenic amnesia', which is triggered by stressful or emotionally negative event.

Let us mention two cases where the sudden recovery of autobiographic memory recall the work of Proust – the unexpected appearance of an image, sound, a small detail from the environment and external or internal event brings back a whole scene, a fragment of our life history; we have been convinced that it is forgotten when suddenly what has been erased returns in the full glory of colour, smell and emotions experienced at the time. Reference to Proust appears both in the title and the text of the article published in *Brain*. According to it, "full and permanent recovery from retrograde amnesia occurred within a short time after the spontaneous emergence to consciousness of a single autobiographic event, triggered by the specific experience of a very similar new event". First case: "G. R., a 67-year-old man, has a very creative personality. He is a painter, poet and art reviewer. On March 19, 1992, he woke up in a confused state, right hemiplegic and aphasic (these symptoms cleared completely over the next 3-4 days). Magnetic resonance imaging located the lesion in the left anterior thalamus. Retrograde amnesia was so dense that G. R. experienced a sense of uncertainty about his identity, amnesia encompassed the whole autobiographical knowledge of the people. He

[13] R. Eyraud, *J'ai oublié qui j'etais*, Plon, Paris 1996.

also could not find the inspiration to paint again, because, as he said, he 'had no more self to express'. One year after a stroke, G. R. was admitted to a Cardiology Unit for the onset of cardiac arrhythmias. It was decided that a pacemaker was necessary and the implantation was performed. After local anaesthesia was given, while he was lying awake on operating table, feeling a little discomfort due to the surgeon working on his chest to insert the cable [...], he suddenly felt a change: he had a vivid memory of an almost identical situation he had experienced during a previous hernia operation some 25 years before [...]. Then all his other 'medical' autobiographical memories came back and immediately afterwards, in a matter of minutes, countless events of his past life 'filled his head' one after the other. G. R. described his experience as 'a catharsis' [...] In the following 3-4 days his memories 're-arranged' themselves in time and G. R. was 'himself again'".

Second case: M. M., a 24-year old man, was involved in a car accident. Rushed to the emergency department, he was examined by a neurologist – no focal neurological signs were reported. Two hours later M. M. appeared frightened – he wrote (since he had difficulty opening his mouth – deep cut on the lip) that he 'could not remember anything'. A CT scan performed the day after trauma failed to demonstrate any focal lesion. M. M.'s manifested dramatic inability to retrieve any information about himself or to recognize previously well-known people (his parents, friends, etc). "Recovery from amnesia occurred exactly 1 month after the accident, while M. M. was playing tennis: at some point during the match, he was struck by awareness that he was making the same mistake he had made in another match, years before. This triggered the recall of all the details of the last tournament and, subsequently, of other tournaments, and so on, all his memories came flooding back. They were vivid and clearly loaded with all emotional attributes"[14].

"G.R. and M. M. shared the features of 'transient retrograde amnesia' and of its sudden, complete and permanent recovery. As in Proust's nar-

[14] F. Lucchelli, S. Muggia, H. Spinnler, *The 'Petites Madeleines' phenomenon in two amnesic patients. Sudden recovery of forgotten memories*, „Brain" 1995, vol. 118/1, pp. 167-183.

ration, once a single past event has emerged, the whole framework of past memories surfaces to consciousness. It might be inferred that recovery took place in a two-steps sequence: first, the unplanned occurrence of an event (its uniqueness in the patient's past) in which the patient played the role of the actor (the patient's active re-experience of the episode) and that closely resembled a forgotten one restores to consciousness that isolated past experience. Second, over a short time the previously inaccessible memories become accessible and remain available for recollection. In the framework proposed by the authors 'transient retrograde amnesia' corresponds to a 'distortion' of the neural matrices subserving memory representations. This hypothesis considers the resetting of distorted matrices to be the consequence of the successful re-enacting of a single past experience, which restores the original distribution of the connection weights in the network".

Another intriguing description of disorder of episodic memory shows a case of a male adolescent, Neil (14 year old), who consequent to a pineal tumour (treated with chemotherapy, followed by cranio-spinal irradiation) began to exhibit global anterograde amnesia, visual agnosia and alexia without agraphia in presence of normal verbal intelligence. Despite his profound deficits in processing, identifying and recognizing visual objects, Neil demonstrates considerable skill in drawing. He produces precise and even intricate rendition of imagined objects and scenes. Like his verbal IQ and drawings skills, and unlike his reading ability (his reading disorder appeared to reflect an agnosia, in this case for words and letters), Neil's writing ability is remarkably intact. Moreover, although his amnesia is truly profound in all sensory modalities, he is able to retrieve memories (in response to his parents' questions) through the act of writing without having any awareness, at least to oral report, of content of his written report. His memory retrieval thus has some of the character of 'automatic writing'. This "ability to write down memories that otherwise seem totally inaccessible to him, even during and after the writing, is both unprecedented in the literature on anterograde amnesia and unexplainable by current conceptions regarding the neurobiology of memory". The recent studies seem to point to the existence of two dif-

ferent lexical systems, one for oral and the other for written report. It is also known that Neil's tumour caused damage to those areas of the brain which play an important role in the mechanisms of memory. The exceptional limitation of the expression of the boy's episodic memory can be described as a situation where nonverbal perceptions encoded and stored in multiple representational systems are nonetheless retrievable and communicable exclusively through orthographic output, whose semantic dimension seems to be inaccessible to the sender at the time when he becomes the addressee of his own communication (the parents bought Neil a notebook, where he could write down what he experienced; he was amazed at being read what he himself had written)[15].

Let us pass on to social sciences now. Institutionally organized oblivion remains outside the interests of psychologists, because – as Mary Douglas maliciously observes – they are institutionally unable to remember that humans are social beings[16]. Evans-Pritchard in Nuers introduced the notion of 'structural amnesia'. Ethnographers have rarely been interested in the question of what causes oblivion. The favourite theme has been memory, studies of counting systems in oral culture or diachronic mechanisms of social exchange. In societies described by them cycles of matrimonial exchange usually consist of four generations. During that time rules for getting married are established; history is constrained by the cognitive mechanisms that fix possible combinations. Although new generations appear all the time their number remains constant because the earlier ones are erased from collective memory[17]. Genealogical memory and the associated procedures indicate the forbidden and preferred relations (e.g. in mediaeval Europe the use of writing made it possible to ex-

15 F. Vargha-Khadem, E. Isaacs, M. Mishkin, *Agnosia, alexia and a remarkable form of amnesia in an adolescent boy*, „Brain" 1994, vol. 117/4, pp. 683-703.

16 M. Douglas, *Comment pensent les institutions* suivi de *Il n'a pas de don gratuit* et *La connaissance de soi*, La Découverte/M.A.U.S.S, Paris 1999, p. 97. The author recalls in this context the research of dieteticians on the diet of inhabitants of Arizona. These scientists proceeded not unlike archeologists in searching through the heaps of refuse, which told them more about the diet than sociologists' surveys .

17 P. Jorion, *L'inscription dans la structure de parenté, Ornicar*? „Revue du Champ freudien" 1984, No. 31, pp. 58-59.

tend the prohibition of incest to seven generations). Marcel Granet clearly described the mechanism of the cult of ancestors in ancient China: "Only the ancestors belonging to the four generations directly before that of the master of the cult have the right to the place reserved in a home temple. They are represented there in the form of tablets kept in chapels in the correct directions arranged in a square. On those memory-saving tablets the names were to be inscribed. No name of the members of the family who are dead can be used again for any of the relations, until the tablets on which they are written remain in one of the chapels. But when the master of the cult dies and a place for the tablet of a new ancestor must be found, one of the tablets with the name of a great-grandfather on it must be removed. Only then can the name be given to a newborn child"[18]. The processes of removing things from memory tell more about a society than practices of recording information. Textbooks become outdated every 30 years on average; the necessary changes follow both from the scientific progress and from the studies of researchers (especially historians). Expressions and political beliefs change but the resulting picture of reality is not any more precise but deformed to the same extent as the previous one. This is because the change aims at "adapting the optical deformations to present tastes" (Douglas); the change rather than the past is at stake; its fixed image is an unexpected result of purely pragmatic actions. The analysis of the criteria which throw light on certain events and cast shadow on the other reveal social practices affecting an individual's thought[19].

Only due to forgetting can there be forgiveness to an individual or in public life and politics. In legal terms it is expressed by the decree of amnesty (where the offence sinks into oblivion) and by an act of grace associated in this context with the Christian compassion and forgiveness. The sources of public oblivion go back to the Roman law (damnatio memoriae); the condemned man was proclaimed as a public enemy, his statue and portrait were destroyed, and the name removed from the boards. In

[18] M. Granet, *La pensée chinoise*, Albin Michel, Paris 1968, p. 88.
[19] Douglas, *Comment...*, pp. 86-87.

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the Christian law erasing somebody from memory was associated with excommunication but on the other hand Jesus Christ personifies forgiving and forgetting[20]. Judaism and Christianity meet each other as the two great monotheistic religions of memory. In the former the agreement between God and the chosen nation rested on reciprocal memory – God will not forget the chosen nation, if the chosen nation doesn't forget God. The modern conception of amnesty and forgiveness in international relations developed in the 17th century. In such acts as Westfalia Treaty the parties gave up chasing and punishing the acts committed during the war. The 20th century brought a change; crime against humanity are never subject to expiration. Following this principle President of Israel Ezer Weizmann on 16 January 1996 in Bundestag formally rejected the possibility of forgiving and forgetting the crime of Holocaust. Holocaust itself should be regarded as an act of memori-cide [killing memory] exceptional in the history of human race, the desire to expunge from the history of Europe an entire nation with its unique heritage[21].

Finally, what can be said about the deletion of information as practiced in science – the institution that follows established procedures to formulate, popularise and document the knowledge about the world. In the triad: research-registration-documentation, the first function is the most respected. The strategies legitimising the scientists' ambitions use then originality as a basic criterion in awarding prizes and posts. However, the precursors disappear if they were not able to clear themselves a way to collective memory. It may also happen that a discovery remains in the background, because the idea has not been (or could not be) made part of legitimisation procedures[22].

Such a situation is relatively new. Formerly, science was strictly related to memory as the knowledge about God and the world was given in the revelation or handed down by the past masters. However, such a conception of knowledge gradually lost its prestige, the process reach-

20 Weinrich, *Léthé*..., pp. 9-11, 58-59, 232-234; see also Ricoeur, *La mémoire*.., s. 593-619.

21 Ibid., pp. 239-240, 42-43; 256-257.

22 Douglas, *Comment*..., p. 105.

ing its climax at the end of the 17th century, when the art of searching in a corpus of knowledge was replaced by the art of discovering things in unbounded space.

Although libraries, supported by electronic media of documentation, have become big centres of data collection, a scientist (especially at the beginning of the research) who has to perform a simple and indispensable operation, going back to the mediaeval ethics of gaining knowledge, that is reporting the state of research, will always hear a merciless criticism: *X has forgotten (= doesn't know) the fundamental work of Y*. Therefore the initiation into research and the obtaining of a successive academic degrees requires today getting to know not only the rules of the game but also "the subtle art of rejection", the art of conscious forgetting. Weinrich formulated the following principles:

1. Anything published in a language other than English – *forget it!*
2. Anything not included in the reports from the state of research – *forget it!*
3. Anything not published in one of the prestigious journals – *forget it!*
4. Anything published earlier than five years ago – *forget it!*

The legitimacy of these principles depends obviously on the character of a given discipline. The first principle concerns sciences, whose achievements can be awarded the Nobel Prize. The second principle has been formed since the end of the 17th century due to academies of science established in London, Paris and Berlin; that is already not enough to obtain the most up-to-date results of research. The list of the most prestigious journals is relative to a discipline, but those who publish there gain not only recognition but very often also money for further research, so they remain in memory of other scientists. The fourth point shows the mechanism of institutional oblivion. The earlier knowledge does not disappear but is brought back in ceremonial lectures or by historians. Oblivion in science is conscious and controlled, the premises can be always recovered[23]. Weinrich additionally points

[23] Weinrich, *Léthé*..., pp. 290-295.

out a paradox connected with the position of a researcher in a given discipline. One should always be in the mainstream, because everything else is ignored. But this trend might also turn out to be a passing fashion, and then all those who subscribed to it will be forgotten.

To what extent are these rules relevant for social and humanistic sciences, which contain permanent historical experience? The necessity to refer to the past does not entail losing oneself in it in order to proclaim in a bored voice that everything has already been said. The spirit of the age forces us to follow, though still to a limited degree, all the above mentioned principles. They are nevertheless significantly constrained, and in some cases even completely reversed: one should not forget about the work from outside of the English-language area or the literature that has no form of a report or is published in journals of limited circulation. The mainstream is also not so easily recognizable, that's why the scientists studying humans and their products have to be prepared for the unpredictable without giving up the store of past knowledge[24]. Any of the great authors may suddenly start to shine, indicating new paths, even if we might have the impression that the old masters departed or their works are lying on dust-covered shelves, where nobody ever looks. After all, the easy access to information is connected with the increased awareness of ignorance, of superficial knowledge about everything. Humanities are ruled by memory and recognition rather than selection and oblivion. Let us recall the etymology of the word denoting the science of signs. The Greek sema indicates the function of recognition, it is a sign which makes present what was absent, requiring an interpretation. *Sem- (semainei* – 'indicate, signify') comes from the Indo-European **dhyem* (sanscrit *dhyama* 'thought', dhya 'think') and refers back to the noun *noos*, 'mind', 'understanding' as well as the verb *noeo* – 'think', 'notice'. The contexts of use of *noeo* in the *Iliad* suggest an idea of a thought capturing the meaning of the perceived signs according to the rule: "in order to understand the sense of the message, it is neces-

24 Ibid., pp. 297-298.

sary to recognize (the noun *nóos*, the verb *noéo*) how *sema* functions within its own code"[25]. To the mind reading the signs there opens a sphere inaccessible to sight. The text acquires a meaning owing to the work of memory and we find in it the amazing activity of the mind transformed into signs. The text becomes a mirror, in which we can recognize ourselves.

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ПАМЯТЬ И ЗАБЫВАНИЕ

В настоящей статье я пытаюсь определить пространство, в котором механизм забывания мог бы стать отдельным предметом изучения. Литература, посвященная памяти, очень богата и обширна, в то время как понятие забывания, кроме изучения амнезии как патологического состояния, относительно редко становилось предметом размышлений.

Оно воспринималось как явление отрицательного характера, вызывающее сочувствие (в болезни) или раздражение в повседневной жизни. Только в течение последних лет появились работы, посвященные механизму забывания, понимаемому как имманентное свойство мнестических процессов (см. Daniel L. Schacter).

В неврологии или невропатологии амнезия последовательно рассматривается как явление, которое поясняет механизмы работы мозга и ума, показывает диссоциации между разными системами переработки информации, позволяет находить соотнесения как с литературой, так и с антропологией. Ставится наконец вопрос о сознании личности, связности с переживаемым временем, с автобиографией.

[25] G. Nagy, *Greek mythology and poetics*, Cornell University Press, 1990; F. Frontisi-Ducroux, J.-P. Vernant, *Dans l'oeil du miroir*, Odile Jacob, Paris 1997, pp. 265-266, 283.

В этнографии исследование генеалогической памяти охватывает заодно и механизм удаления знаний о минувших поколениях, для того чтобы открыть путь новым связям.

Социолога или историка науки может заинтересовать механизм забывания, связанный с нормами в какой-либо области общественных отношений, отбор текстов достойных закрепления, а также тех, которые удаляются из коллективной памяти (M. Douglas, H. Weinrich).

В свою очередь для философа существенным является этический аспект рассматриваемого, т. е. забывание как правовой акт (амнистия) и прощение.

JACEK LEOCIAK

THE MEMORY SAVED AND PRESERVED IN TEXTS
(IN A PERSPECTIVE OF THE EXPERIENCE OF HOLOCAUST)

Memoirs, diaries and testimonies written down by Jews in ghettos and labour camps were carefully hidden. Very often buried, like Underground Warsaw Ghetto's Archive (also known as Ringelblum's Archive) or manuscripts buried in ashes of Auschwitz-Birkenau crematory by members of the local Sonderkommando. Let us have a look at the symbolical meaning of this situation.

Paper on which chronicles of Holocaust were written down was thrown into the soil just like a seed for the future crop. This was exactly the way a Jewish poet – Abraham Suckewer – has seen it in the Vilnius Ghetto in march 1943. His poem *Ziarno Pszenicy* [Wheat Grain] is a comment to the action of hiding books and manuscripts from the Jewish Scientific Institute in Vilnius and the local library. *"Manuscripts herein I bury and sow..."* – says Suckewer, telling a story of a grain which had been hidden in a pyramid in ancient Egypt. When it was taken out 9 thousands years later and thrown into soil it grew into wheat. *"Maybe one day those words / Will be brought to the light* – writes the poet – *And maybe in the hour of destiny / They will flourish unexpectedly? / Like a primeval grain, / that has turned into ear (...)"*.[1]

[1] From: *Pieśń ujdzie cało... Antologia wierszy o Żydach pod okupacją niemiecką"*, Warsaw 1947, p. 41 (Translation from Hebrew – M.M. Borwicz) [translation from Polish – own]. „9 thousands years later means hier probably a remote future.

Grain – the basic aliment of judeoichristian civilisation – is a symbol of existence. Symbolism of a word-grain places the process of writing in the immemorial order of sowing and harvest. A text becomes a life-giving food. The symbolism of a word-bread, rooted deeply in The Holy Bible, also leads towards such an interpretation. A word, just like a bread, can be shared with others. This possibility of sharing is neither limited by space nor time.

Suckewer's poem speaks about the hope of persisting in a rebirthing rhythm of culture. A grain resists the destructive power of time, as it retains within itself an energy that can vivify organic world. Such an energy in the world of culture is the power of a written word. Text can remain hidden for a long time until harvest comes, when – while read – it will revive and flourish.

Figurative meaning of burying and sowing of manuscripts reveals a universal order of culture in which making written testimonies under the threat of Holocaust is included. Parable about the grain that was taken out from a pyramid after thousands of years sets a horizon to hope of all those Jews who were writing and then hiding their texts in a belief that they were keeping them as a spiritual aliment for the future.

Suckewer's poem also shows the mechanism of tradition as a process of transmitting and receiving – mainly by means of word – the deposit which reveals our identity and its roots, which creates a union, forms a link between the past (which is an inexhaustible source of the new) and the future (which brightens, fills and renews the old). Such a link is created thanks to the memory, that joins, unites and records. Because it is memory that is the first commandment of tradition.

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A text consolidates written message, guarantees its presence in the consciousness of generations establishing a spiritual contact with the following generations and enabling accumulation of experiences. History is the teacher of life – wrote Cicero – and witnesses of Holocaust seem to allude to that ancient topos by expressing their faith in the power of a message written on paper.

Humanistic Mediterranean tradition treats text as an embodiment of its content no matter how distant in time or space it is. Biological passing is confronted with endurance of text, and physical distance is opposed to spiritual proximity of the author and the reader.[2]

Spiritual communication by means of text is based on memory. In classical metaphors memory is represented as a record – a wax tablet that contains signs of cyclostyle pen (Plato, Cicero) or as a space – container (Cicero); storehouse or a house (Plato, Cicero); landscape or a field (St. Augustin).[3] The act of writing is therefore in its basis connected with giving permanence to what is ephemeral; with leaving a trace of our existence for our successors.

David Lowenthal claims that conviction that memory creates identity is relatively new. It always helped in a struggle against the horror of oblivion, but "the awareness that memory is the key to self-development that throughout the whole life sustains and strengthens the identity was a discovery of a late 18th century and its only previous signal were Bible tales."[4] Once again the foundations of understanding memory both as a salvation and a form of national identity are to be found in The Holy Bible.

Memory is one of the rudiments of Judaism – says rabbi Byron Sherwin[5] – as Jews' faith is not based on theological dogmas, but on the memory of past events. History becomes the arena of covenant with God. Medieval poet and philosopher – Juda Halewi – stresses that the Decalogue doesn't begin with a dogma, but with a reminder: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage" [Ex, 20, 2]. A Jew confirms his faith by recalling constantly the

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[2] Look in J. Domański: *Tekst jako uobecnienie. Szkic dziejów myśli o piśmie i książce,* Warsaw 1992.

[3] Look at an entry: *Memory in Ancient and Medieval Thought,* in: *New Catholic Encyclopedia,* Washington 1967.

[4] D. Lowenthal: *Pamięć i zapomnienie.* Translated by I. Grudzińska-Gross and M. Tański. „Res Publica" 1991 no. 3, p.12.

[5] Rabbi B.L. Sherwin, *Duchowe dziedzictwo Żydów polskich.* Translated by W. Chrostowski, Warsaw 1995, p. 104-106.

events in which his ancestors took part. There is a significant warning in Deuteronomy [4, 9]: "Only take heed and keep your soul diligently, lest you forget the things which your eyes have seen (...)."

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Reflection on textual testimonies of Holocaust reveals four dimensions of the symbolism of writing. Let's explain briefly three of them to have a deeper insight into the fourth, in which category of memory becomes a key concept.

Writing as a form of giving testimony

Authors are driven by obligation to testify the genocide, to alarm and shake world's conscience in hope that the world will change morally. Writing as an act of testifying the Holocaust is rooted deeply in Biblical-Talmudic tradition. Tora and Talmud order to testify wickedness. In Leviticus we read that who "hears a public adjuration to testify and though he is a witness, whether he has seen or come to know the matter yet does not speak" [Lev 5, 1] commits a sin. In this context a witness is not only the one who has seen what has happened, but also anyone who "only" knows about it. Such knowledge is an obligation. Being a witness implies the duty to testify – inform others about what has happened. This obligation has got both moral and religious character. Testifying is therefore in Jewish tradition directly linked with legal process of determining evidence in order to find truth and administer justice.

Writing as a form of prophesying

Some testimonies of Holocaust seen from the perspective of Biblical tradition resemble the form of inspired writing which is a part of specially understood prophesying. Specially, as it is not based on foreseeing, it fulfils however in an absolute and not accepting any opposition order to write and testify. Author acts with a feeling of a mission. He has to speak in the name of those who already cannot. He has to reveal the truth to the world. The obligation to write is so strong and irresistible that nobody

can stand against it. The seer was working, although he was in constant danger and had to face the despair and dejection. He even had to work against his own, purely human, weak will. Such a determination is to be found in the testimonies of Holocaust. Author has no choice. It is not him who chooses, but it is him who is chosen. Such an attitude was perfectly expressed in a diary from Warsaw Ghetto by Chaim Aron Kapłan who wrote: "I am sure that the Providence has sent me so that I could complete this mission".[6]

Writing as administration of justice or the last will of revenge

This form can be understood either as an obligation to gather evidence that are to testify the genocide and accuse those who have committed it in a future court, or as an obligation to leave the last will of revenge for the offspring. A conflict between a thirst of justice and a lust for revenge is revealed this way. Call for justice is based on a conviction that the fundamental order of the world has not been irreversibly destroyed nonetheless. It is a voice that expresses faith in restorable order of laws and values and in the durability of such civilisation achievements as law or courts. Call for revenge is a scream of despair and pain that cannot be soothed. It is a sign of loneliness and abandoning, testimony of a void that cannot be refilled and irreversible destruction which is the effect of Holocaust.

Writing as a liturgy of memory

This form, which is of biggest interest to us, expresses the universal will to stop the time and leave a trace of oneself and the murdered nation for next generations. Such an important motivation – in a variety of personal document genres and autobiographical forms –is confronted with an unknown until today form of experience of Holocaust. When he records the surrounding events a diarist or memoirist is aware of double moral obligation that he has to fulfil. Firstly – the obligation towards the

[6] A. Ch. Kapłan, *Scroll of Agony. The Warsaw Diary,* translation and publishing: A. I. Katsch, London 1966, p. 86.

victims, secondly – towards future generations. It is a commitment of memory.

The effort of making documents by a group called "Oneg Szabat" was made for a "future historian", for "future generations". *"They all knew* – Ringelblum says about his collaborators – *the significance of their work. They understood how important it was to leave a record of Polish Jews' tragedy for future generations."* [7]

A note in a diary of Abraham Lewin directly shows that the group was motivated by moral duty towards future. Record of suffering was supposed to be a commitment of memory for future generations. *"We gather each Sabbath an activist group of Jewish community to discuss our diaries and writings. We want our suffering, those <<birth pains of Messiah>>, to leave a mark in memory of the whole world. We meet each Sabbath and talk about our duties in this matter."* [8]

Memory is the key word in this strategy of obligation, which inspires the authors to write. Written sheets of paper resist massively inflicted death and they overcome the destructive effect of time. Against their vulnerability and evanescence they give permanent shape to an elusive moment. They are like a monument build of words, in which – like in granite – an immortal message is carved. They are like a sanctuary that stores and immortalises victims' names. The act of writing itself becomes a liturgy of memory.

An essay called *"Izkor. 1943"* by Rachela Auerbach, created in the Aryan zone, demonstrates such a liturgical way of celebrating memory. In Hebrew *Izkor* means "you will remember" and it is the first word of a prayer to the blessed memory of the dead members of a family that is said four times a year: the last day of Passover, in Shawuot (Whitsuntide), in Szemini Aceret and in Jom Kippur (The Reconciliation Day). The names of the dead are mentioned throughout the prayer. For Rachela Auerbach the enumeration of names becomes the axis of the text.

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[7] E. Ringelblum, *Kronika getta warszawskiego. Wrzesień 1939 – styczeń 1943.* Translation from Yiddish: A. Rutkowski, Warsaw 1983, p. 476.

[8] A. Lewin, *A Cup of Tears. A Diary of the Warsaw Ghetto.* Publishing: A. Polansky; translated by: C. Hutton, Fontana/Collins 1990, p. 120.

It starts with an image of a flood, which is a great metaphor of mass deportation of Jews from Warsaw, who left only a "mute scream" and "silence". Later on is the ceremonial of incantation of memory, written into words of Psalm 137 (*Super flumina Babylonis)*: *"If I forget about those whom I have seen let myself be forgotten and cursed be my name, as of those traitors, that are not worthy to share Your* [*doomed nation* – J.L.] *pain."* [p. 460]

The same psalm echoes in a confession of an unknown author, lawyer from Włocławek, higher official of *Ordnung Dinst* (Orderly Duty) in the ghetto: *"(...)we will always and everywhere remember every day, every moment and every face. We remember. Memory of these days lives strongly in us, permanently; forever it will be this way, until our last breath (...) We remember, we will not forget, if we forget let our right hand wither, let our tongues cleave to the roof of our mouth. We remember and we will remember. The memory of those years will not fade, it will reach everyone, it will reach everywhere."*[9]

The proper *Izkor* prayer is a chain of enumeration. Each of its links, connected by an anaphoric "and" starts with apostrophes to each group or class of Jewish nation. Recalled characters appear as if they were caught still in a frame, immobilised and recorded in compact images, with attributes of their everyday life, work, appearance and customs. With rich details and in sensitive precision. In this group portrait of the whole nation various characters pass in front of our eyes: little children, boys and girls, youth, pious Jews, rabbis and teachers, artisans, workers, riksha drivers and bearers, merchants and philanthropists, fathers, mothers, grandfathers and grandmothers, scientists, artists, musicians, painters, professors and tailors, watch-makers and medics, the poor from dim nooks and thieves, smugglers and street traders, beggars and starving displaced people. We see "ribbons in girls' hair", or "delicate blondes whose Hebrew passion is mixed with Slav happiness"; we see a thirteen year old beggar asking in the evening on Leszno for a piece

[9] Unknown [no title], Archive of ŻIH *„Pamiętniki"* signature. 129, p.252 „If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand wither! Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I do not remember you(...)" [Ps 137, 5-6].

of bread from rotten apples sellers who freeze in winter evenings on the street.

The series of characters seems to be endless. The author tries to stop this wave of enumeration – "Enough, enough... I have to stop writing. No. No. I can't" – and then she only changes the perspective: from public to private. She starts to list names from her own family. But after a moment it becomes clear that such distinction is pointless, that both perspectives meld. Among the murdered there are no strangers and familiars – "All of them belong to me, all of them are my kin. All those who have been killed."[10]

Rachela Auerbach finishes her essay with a prayer-like call and commitment – she will unceasingly celebrate the memory ritual, she will list the names of a murdered nation.

"Each day I recall another one of those who are gone. And when I reach the end of the list adding another link to the chain of my present life in the city [on the Aryan side], I start once again from the beginning, and I always start in pain. Recalling each of them hurts me individually. (...) And I have to groan, I have to cry. Not four times a year. I feel the need to say Izkor four times a day. (...) At the end of the prayer in which everyone says the names of his family members there is a part said to the benefit of those who haven't got anyone who would remember about them and who in diverse times died suddenly only because they were Jews. Today they are the majority."[11]

A word is confronted with Holocaust. It brings hope of salvation. Gustawa Jarecka in her prologue to partially conserved relation called *"Ostatnim etapem przesiedlena jest śmierć" ["The last stage of displacement is death"]* talks about the "desire to write", about "writing down the evidence of guilt" and about a great weight of cognition that reaches the "bottom of human cruelty". All this gives sense and hope to living on a former "battle-field", as writing is an act of disagreement with Holocaust and turns out to be the only way of saving the existence

[10] R. Auerbach, *Yzkor 1943* [in:] *The Literature of Destruction. Jewish Responses to Catastrophe* ed. D.G. Roskies, Philadelphia 1988, p. 463.

[11] Therein, p. 464.

from the void: *"(...) these notes are made because of an instinctive desire to leave a trace of oneself, because of a despair that sometimes wants to scream and because of a will to excuse one's life that still goes on in a deadly uncertainty. (...) In front of and behind us there is death, one could say that present moments of waiting are happening after a sentence that has already been pronounced. Only an accident can reverse it. In moments of waiting, that contain immemorial instinctive hope, we want to consolidate a trace of ourselves."*[12]

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The impulse of writing as recording, interpretation and transmission of sense of the experience is based on ancient tradition. Writing, although many authors were aware of an impending catastrophe, was an objection to Holocaust, an act of faith in a better world in future, act of hope, that future generations will come to know, will understand, evaluate and satisfy. Important is therefore not only what has been written, but also the fact that they have decided to write.

It doesn't matter if the reader has been mentioned in authors declarations or not, the mere task of writing forced somehow his existence. In the situation of authors whose testimonies are studied an otherwise obvious thought about someone who would read the text has become a heroic proposition. And without it writing would be pointless. Therefore they wrote against the absurd, giving this way a testimony of faith in indestructibility of the world, in which people can talk to each other and understand each other. It was a heroic attitude in which despair was confronted with hope.

Celan's "black milk of morning" (from one of the most widely known writer's poems *"Fuga śmierci" ["The Fugue of death"]*) seems to be one of the best metaphors that expresses what in Holocaust cannot be expressed. Immense tension of Paul Celan's poetry arises thanks to irremovable collision between the despair and hope. The white colour of

[12] *„Biuletyn ŻIH"* 62 (1967), p.137.

silence brightens for a moment the sable of experience, that can't be named. A man struggles within the walls of speech like in a prison. Words are dead, so they cannot vivify the memory.

"A word – you know:
just a corpse.

Let us wash it,
Let us comb it,
Let us turn its eye
Towards the sky"[13]

How far have we strayed from a word-grain from Suckewer's poem, which placed in the soil of Vilnius Ghetto has the power of an invincible, ever rebirthing life. Suckewer puts into the soil a word for a future crop. Celan is faced only with a naked corpse and celebrates the funeral of word. Does such poetic self-annihilation mean also an ultimate "execution of memory" – to use a title of Jerzy Fickowski's poem? Celan himself seems to deny it in his speech after receiving a literary prize of Free Hanseatic City of Bremen in 1958: *"As a form of manifestation of a language a poem is in its nature a type of a dialogue, so it can be a bottle with a letter sent in – quite hopeless – faith that some day it will reach a coast, maybe in a heart-felt country. Poems are travelling also in such sense: they head towards something. Towards what? Towards something that is opened, ready to be inhabited, maybe some kind of You and some reality, which can be guessed."*[14]

The author's words can be related to diaries, memoirs and witnesses' relations of Holocaust that have been recovered from the ruins. Written pages are filled with pain (it is Celan's metaphor from a poem *"Kartek z zapiskami ból" ["Written pages' pain"]*), therefore even the text itself suffers. But this writing demands to be read. Reading by ordering the text

[13] From a poem *Nocą spowite [Wrapped in night]*, [in:] Paul Celan, Utwory wybrane, different translators, Kraków 1998, p. 37.

[14] From F. Przybylak's *Posłowie*, op. cit., p. 279.

to speak continues and brings to life the memory heritage. Only in such way can the writing save the memory about existence and therefore also the existence itself.

Optimistic version of this belief has been expressed by a Nobel prize winner René Casin in his prologue to Michał Borwicz's book *"Écrits des condamne 'a mort sous l'occupation allemande (1939 – 1945).* He says that the "saved writings of the murdered travel throughout the history. And as long as the memory about them is preserved, their suffering will not have been in vain."[15] Therefore memory (of the readers) saves the writings – whereas writings save the memory (about the victims and witnesses).

[15] From R. Löw, *Czytając Borwicza.* „Zeszyty Historyczne", no. 98, Paris 1991, p. 218.

JACEK LEOCIAK

УЦЕЛЕВШАЯ И СОХРАНЕННАЯ В ТЕКСТЕ ПАМЯТЬ (С ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ ОПЫТА ХОЛОКОСТА)

В статье рассматривается культурный механизм, целью которого является сохранение памяти опыта Холокоста путём его закрепления в письменных текстах и передачи информации будущим поколениям. Обоснование значимости письменной формы документов, представленное их авторами, берёт своё начало как в еврейской традиции, так и в культуре Средиземноморья.

Память составляет основу стратегии поведения, которое мотивируется чувством долга. Изучение текстовых свидетельств Холокоста выявляет четыре измерения символики записи. Я объясняю три из них (запись как форма свидетельства, запись как форма признания, запись как совершение акта правосудия или выражение воли отомстить), чтобы глубже вникнуть в символику явления, для которого память является ключевым понятием: „запись как литургия памяти“.

BOYAN MANCHEV

IDYLLIC MEMORY, WRITING AND ANTHROPOTECHNIQUE. ON TONCHO ZHECHEV'S *ODYSSEUS MYTH*

The aim of this text is to approach memory, writing and language as ideological figures in the context of the national ideology. At the same time, it is hard to explain the importance of those concepts without taking into consideration their structural relation to the ideological paradigms of modernity in which they are inscribed, developed and in which they function. Indeed, the figure of the memory acquires paradigmatic cultural value in the context of French Enlightenment and German Romanticism. It is directly related to the emerging national ideologies which are based on visions of shared past and cultural legacy. According to the provocative thesis of Peter Sloterdijk[1], the national ideology has in its very foundation the literary principle: it aspires to create a community of friends-readers through the common language and mostly through the literary reading. The national project forms a space of a common fiction, that is public space, fictional space, which unifies the community in a whole. The *canon* of the national literature represents always a limited number of divinised books the reading and exegesis of which form a true community in the sense of the communion. Thus, according to Sloterdijk, the nationalism is a modern form of *anthropotechnique* – of 'domestication

[1] See *Regeln für den Menschenpark. Ein Antwortschreiben zu Heideggers Brief über den Humanismus*, SuhrkampVerlag, Francfort/Main, 1999.

of human', in which the brotherhood of the book has an important role. In that sense nationalism is one of the cultural transformations of the process of *humanization*, in which the culture of book has always had a central place.

However, Sloterdijk's propositions – especially those related to the national project – are in a sense reductive. First of all, when analyzing the ideological patterns and the origins of the national projects we should take into consideration their double nature, which comprises hidden mythical structures (here one may think of H.-R. Jauss' powerful approach to the 'hidden myths of the Enlightenment'[2]) naturally opposed to the culture of writing and its type of fictional construction of world. Modernity has a paradoxical structure: in a sense it includes its negative double the 'antimodernity'. We should think in that perspective of the attempt to achieve a structurally paradoxical *immanent* community, which leads to a sacralization of the figures of its natural immanence, the blood and the soil – a tendency which has an opposite direction to the movement of anthropotechnique which struggles for culturalizing of nature in transcendental horizon. The ideology of cultural nationalism has an uneven answer to the universal demand of humanism: it tries to find a transcendental guarantee in the repetition of a rhythm, immanent to the kin's world. It is precisely in that perspective that the figure of the memory occupies a privileged place. It functions in the Platonic mode of anamnesis as a super-personal predetermination related to the Idea, or, to the national Spirit or Soul. This is the structural moment in which we could place the relation between memory, language and book. The national ideology presents the being of national community as a language-text, which is nothing less than the immanent being of the idea. At that point we could note the difference with Plato – in opposition to Sloterdijk who is tending to homogenize platonicism, Christian theology and nationalism – Plato, for whom the writing is unacceptable because it deteriorates memory,

[2] Jauss, Hans-Robert, *Studien zum Epochenwandel der ästhetischen Moderne* Suhrkamp Verlag, Francfort/Main, 1989.

the powerful tool of the *anamnesis*, of the real knowledge for the idea. But we could also suggest that Plato's rejection of writing is related to the belief in the extraordinary character – or origin – of writing (which would mean to credit certain Pythagorean legacy in Plato's thought). In such perspective the real writing would be that of the sacred forms, of the eternal ideas. For all archaic religious and esoteric traditions writing is sacred, which means that it should not be seen or read: it does not represent, but signify, as the oracles at Delphi.

TONCHO ZHECHEV'S *ODYSSEUS* MYTH: IDYLLIC MEMORY, WRITING AND ANTHROPOTECHNIQUE

In the following central part of this paper I intend to examine the complex use of the figures of memory, language and writing in Toncho Zhechev's *Odysseus Myth*. Zhechev's essay, which appeared in the early 80s and provoked an important critical debate, could be considered as the most influential neo-conservative attempt at figuration of an exotic national mythology which opposes the basic ideological patterns of Modernity. It is a late emanation and revival of that mythical nationalist figuration. At the same time, the detailed reading of the text with an attention to the history of figures could give us some insights about the ambivalent grounds of the ideology of modernity itself. Figurative oppositions such as myth/history, speech/writing, organics/technics are of particular interest in this respect.

From that point of view *Odysseus' Myth* is not to be treated simply as 'antimodern'; we should rather say that it reveals the double face of modernity. The first question which it is necessary to formulate and which will allow us to approach our main topic is the question why Odysseus was chosen as a legitimating figure of Zhechev's communitarian conservative visions. In some previous works[3] I claimed that Zhechev's choice of the figure of Odysseus as personification of

[3] See "L'Eternel retour d'Ulysse ou l'Orient de la philosophie", in ARCHES, 2002, 3; "Ulysses and his Double", in *Critique and Humanism*, 2002.

his communitarian ideology has deep and not so obvious structural motivation. If we want to shed some light on that, first we should say that Odysseus is not simply the archetypal figure of the Adventurer. Four crucial structural models could be found in it, which imply some basic anthropological functions. Apart from the Adventurer, these are the Worker, the Warrior and the Husband – three figures which are legitimating not only the national but also the political in general (we could follow their trajectory from Plato to Jünger and beyond). What is common for the three figures is their *productivity*. From this point of view, the Adventurer could be seen as subordinated to the figure of the Warrior – he is an incarnation of its productive side, he is the bearer of the value of Warrior, so to speak. Unlike most of the heroes from the Trojan pantheon, Odysseus is the *surviving* Warrior, and his adventures are namely the trajectory of this survival. The warrior is a figure personifying the contact with the transcendental sacrality to the extent war is thought from the antiquity until 20th century as an extra-ordinary world opposed to the profane order of peace. In one hand a space of limitless excess related to the order of the divine (as it is in Friedrich Schlegel, Georges Bataille and Roger Caillois), and on the other it forms in its bloody orgy the body of the community. The idea about this normative role of the orgy is implied in Freud and René Girard as well as in Alfred Baeumler. It is precisely this role that allows *war* to be thought as supreme instrument of the plastic ideology of State, as its *bloody* and *fiery* baptism.

In that sense, the Warrior is the one who comes back from the transcendence. The contact with the divine violence and the impossibility for figuration is the baptism of the subject of the figuration, of the *plastic art* of politics. It is its constitutive condition. Undoubtedly that is one of the structural preconditions, which leads to Zhechev's interpretation of the return of Odysseus as a creative act, as *creation*[4]. In Odysseus case, the

[4] "The return journey of Odysseus is creative and not completely predetermined. Even when the prophet Tiresius predicts the journey of Odysseus to Ithaka, he leaves for him some freedom of movement and many 'if' about which it has to be decided with wisdom and freedom." (Toncho Zhechev, "The Odysseus Myth" in *The Swan and the*

return would be the final moment of a transition which inverses the structure of the messianic transition of Christ. It ends with the incarnation of transcendent into immanent and not with the Resurrection which 'closes' the regime of the transcendent divinity as a pure immanence which does not communicate anymore with profane world. At the same time, the *return-as-creation* is related to the return to the matter subjected to formation. It presupposes that one has to throw aside the warrior's armour and to put on the everyday clothes of the worker. It means a return to the banal productive labour. In the tradition of the Bulgarian national-idyllic ideology Zhechev interprets the Worker as a Peasant. For him Odysseus is first of all peasant-farmer. If we remember the by Zhechev quoted well known scene from the *Odyssey* - the excitement of Odysseus at the sight of the ripen field[5], we have to admit that Zhechev's interpretation undoubtedly has certain structural and anthropological premises[6]. For that reason the return of Odysseus, which is return to the soil and the labour, is creation. The circle made from his journey took him out of the state of animalistic primacy, of the fusion with the immanence of the *land* and gave him the *world* as a transcendent scene of the creative labour. The apparent pastoral bestiality (which we discover in the description of love, where initially the human love is made identical to the animal one[7]) is vanishing in a requirement of the cultural-political, humanistic anthropotechnique: *the return creates the human* (i.e. the entering in tran-

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Death. Hristo Botev Publ. House, Sofia, 1994, p.276).

[5] "Homer hints many times and on many occasions that Odysseus is a farmer in his mind and soul, in his biography. With what a longing and envy he looks at the fat, uncultivated soil on the land of the Cyclops! How he dreams to have it in order to cultivate and fertilize it!" (p. 254)

[6] From that point of view we could name Zhechev's myth not simply pastoral, idyllic or bucolic but also a *georgic* myth. It is an apostrophe against the idyllic archetype of Bulgarian national ideology where the sublime, the aesthetic and the tragic-idyllic space of the mountain and the wood, the space of the shepherd-rebel [*haidouk*] is opposed to the profane space of the slave-peasant-farmer. In that sense Zhechev's idyll is *an idyll of the idyll*, it – at least at first sight – opposes itself to the tragic-messianic threads woven in the texture of Bulgarian national-idyllic myth.

[7] "The ability to love is not only a human quality. Wherever we look in animal

scendence and the return from it to immanence): "But only the human is condemned to love after the break of the natural bond and even in the absence of any natural bond and necessity. Generated from the urge and reared in the womb, the human need of love begins *its odyssey* already as *a need of soul and spirit and elevates itself to divine heights in order to transform the urge and the womb including them in the same sphere.* Many of the people *remain on the natural and animalistic level of love and when they succeed to preserve their nature* as in the old patriarchal life, *in that there is order and purity, simple morality and soul but there is no spirit.* Others with weak urge and with souls untorn by passions are born directly as angels – cold and without gender, to the same extent alien to the sin and the holiness *as if they came directly from Heaven not having been travelled to it through the fiery tongues of the blazes of live. Also here the problem of Odysseus does not exist."* (pp. 279-280, italic mine, B.M). Consequently, the Return *makes* the Spirit, i.e. the Human. The *idyllic origin* is not a primary value in itself but only a valuable object of the return, a place of the solution of a 'problem', the Odysseus one. The morality related to the *idyllic topos* turns to be insufficient condition for the definition of the human, regardless of the fact that it is one of the key concepts of Zhechev in the ideological opposition of the exotic idyllic culture to the inauthentic culture of the modernity. For example, it is said in a key ideological passage: in the *Odysseus Myth* that "Bulgarian peasant hides the treasures of the people's moral culture of this Eol's island" (p. 265). The morality turns to be an element, or perhaps a stage in the elevation of the Spirit – the substantial determinant of the human, but not the *very* Spirit. From that point of view the opposition between the morality of Zhechev related to the pastoral idyll and the antimoral Nietzschean individualism of the sacrificial-tragic project of Ianev[8] is not so sharp as it may seem. The human for Zhechev is at first place Spirit,

world, we will find touching and pure forms of a blessed love together with wolfish laws and intolerance. In its perfect forms the human mother's love is identical to the mother's love in nature and among the animals." (ibid., p. 279).

[8] "The creation is wild, a rage, a liturgy of the spirit frantic with rhythm and tears,

not organic, fused with the nature animalistic body. The leaving of the idyllic origin is necessary for the *becoming* of the Man. In more general terms, where there is no Spirit as becoming, as movement of the human *substance* we cannot speak about identity, about subject – individual or collective, i.e. about community. It is no chance that these propositions, which are key for the understanding of Zhechev, are formulated in the context of the reasoning about the socialisation of love. The matrimony incarnated in the figure of Odysseus – the husband, is not only natural and based on the urge function. It is generating, forming, i.e. it has a *political* function. This generative function of Odysseus – the creator-husband – is also implied in Zhechev´s understanding of the repetitions as 'repeated possessions'. The fertilising power of the creator-husband is inseparable also from the generating force of the farmer Odysseus, who according to Zhechev longs to 'possess' the fat field of the Cyclops. In that sense the regressive imagery of the return to the origin, of the return of the spirit in the idyllic ground is deeply penetrated with *phalologocentrism* in Derrida's sense.

In the described dimensions, the idyllic vision of Toncho Zhechev

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while the moral deed always presupposes clear and sober consciousness. It is for the man of the empirical being; and the creation - for the man of the absolute. (...) First of all, the new Bulgarian writer has to get rid once and for all from the army of those moral idiots who still could call themselves writers and whose name is only a black spot. (...) There is a deep relationship between the metaphysical and the immediacy of the accidental being. Here and there the creator bears the sign of the divine." (Ianko Ianev "Creation and Conscience" [1927] in *Season*, spring 2002, pp. 148-149). The creator for Ianev is a messianistic tragic priest–leader of the community, its supreme emanation through which the divine is reached. The poet is the one who in times of despair keeps in touch with the divine, as in the same epoch Heidegger will write about Hölderlin. On his turn, reducing the tragic messianism and individualism, Zhechev explicitly relates – through the image of love, archetype of the creation at least from Plato's Eros onward – his idyll with the *heavenly,* i.e. not with the immanent, but with the transcendent: "The idyll of love in Bulgarian folk song is only in the longing, in the dream (...) The discrete, subtle, lucid eroticism with which folk songs are saturated has heavenly and not earthly origin" (p. 310).

reveals the fictional nature of its exoticism, it reveals the universal ideological-political structure – its subordination to the transcendent imperative of the political anthropotechnique. The idyllic myth of Zhechev is *humanistic* and not *animalistic* one. Its idyllic modus and pastoral staging are invoked to 'mute' the messianic-tragic logic of the *rupture* through the idyllic bonding. (We could note that from this point of view the conservative vision of Zhechev remains completely inscribed in the general perspective of the Bulgarian national project and is structurally determined by its coherent ideological deployment. In depth it does not contradict even to the messianic visions of the Bulgarian modernism and avant-garde.) In the same manner as the tragic heroes who come (according to Alfred Baeumler, one of the important figures of the so-called Conservative Revolution) to defend the motherland from the Dyonissian madness the Odysseus is anti-Dyonissian hero, incarnation of the temperance[9], of the Logos (we could continue the interpretation of Zhechev's ideologeme, relating its two key components Reason and Measure to its ancient Greek matrices: Logos and Nomos).He is a hero of the cultural-political order, who is called to fight with the chthonic bestial monstrosity not to lesser extent than Oedipus: "In a sense all feats of Odysseus could be understood and conceived as a human fight for measure, war with the extraordinary, the monstrous, hypertrophied in one or another way, with the inhuman in the human, with the Cyclops and the cyclopean in us. (...) Any of the episodes of the poem could be

[9] Bulgarian word 'умереност' [temperance] combines the radicals of the words *ум* [reason] and *мяра* [measure]. Zhechev plays with this etymological potential of the word. See the key chapter "The *Odyssey* as an Apology of the Temperance": "IN TEMPERANCE are related beautifully and inseparably two ingredients – Reason and Measure and even fused in a such way that the last consonant of the first word – M – is first of the second one and nothing could ever break their alliance. In that way Bulgarian language found an ideal expression, a perfect form to mirror the nature and the soul of the people, his ancient ideal for himself." (Zhechev 301). One thing is certain: Bulgarian people are already identified with Odysseus who travels towards himself. There could not be a more clear answer to why Zhechev prefers the figure of Odysseus to Dionysus as legitimising figure of his idyllic national-humanistic myth. Odysseus is antipode of Dionysus, an 'improved', dynamic version of Apollo.

seen as titanic fight of Odysseus for propagation and establishment of the human measure, as a victory or tragic defeat of the cultivated temperance in the chaos and the disgrace of the world, against excess and the savage extremism, against the spoiling of those powers in the man, those which he himself does not have knowledge of how they could be cultivated and tied. (...) Those who are not taught to temperance, who did not master their own boundaries, those who did not understand with what and how to play, the untying extraordinary powers, who cannot restrain are unworthy and detestable for the Gods. They do not deserve their own return and will never achieve it." (pp. 300-301).

In his proximity to the land Odysseus is a farmer and a shepherd who does not remain locked in pre-cultural immanence: he is a *shepherd of the being* in Heidegger's sense, he *trans-cends* the immanence. In that perspective it is not strange that the pastoral-idyllic being – the being of the peasant retro-utopia of the regressive Zhechev's myth is not to a lesser extent political-cultural construct from the Heidegger's pastoral figure of the being. Zhechev's idyll is not opposed to the culture, it is opposed to the *false* culture. Furthermore, the idyllic myth of Zhechev is incarnation of the authentic culture, while "the loose mythology of the present?" (p.283)[10] is a symptom of the decline of the culture. This is the symptomatic lexical register of a phrase from the *Death of the Swan*: "Indeed,

[10] Zhechev unambiguously implies the opposition of the authentic myth and the mythos-pseudos: "the myths are universal language of the humanity, language through which it communicated and can communicate, but we are refusing this common language in the name of what – of the Babylonian discord, in the name of incomprehensibility and the savage gesticulation. We are refusing the only little-much known language in order to close ourselves in our dialects. Indeed there is some contemporary becoming wild. The barbarism predicted by Vico is coming!" (*The death of the Swan*, p. 152). In the previous paragraph of the same text the myth is opposed to the analytical approximation to it: " ... with all that (concretely about the withdrawal of the ancient Greek from the education around the world and its replacement by the English language) slowly but steadily the very basis of the human civilization is undermined, because the next step would be the confinement of the mythologies and their withdrawal from the living consciousness of the humanity in order to make them an object of the scholarly interest of some academic monks with glasses, the so-called mythologists. It will happen what already happened to the folklore in order to allow the folkloristic to develop."

there is a contemporary going wild, the barbarism predicted by Vico is coming!" (p. 152; the coming of the "third barbarism of Vico" is constant theme in Zhechev – see also the *Odysseus Myth*, p. 263). The *looseness* and the *bestialisation* are symptoms of regress to the bestial, they are related to the transgressive character of the animal. In Zhechev, the idyllic nature, related to the "village mud" (p.264), to the village as an uneven *idyllic polis*, a place of the universal values of the human community and culture, is opposed to the animal bestiality. The particular version of the opposition nature/culture in Zhechev is a consequence of the idyllic *double bind*. His project offers a political anthropotechnique for preservation of the natural, or as it would be more correct to put it following the logic of Zhechev's project, the *naturalhuman*. In other words, he protects *the human as a culture* opposing it to the *culture as inhuman*.

And so, Odysseus fights against the monsters, Odysseus fights against the falseness of the unauthentic culture. Is it necessary to remind that since Plato and Aristotle the monster, on the one hand, and the unauthentic, false, illusionary, on the other, have common denominator: they are reduced to the definition *phantasm*. To the extent to which in Plato the chase and the ban of the sophistic-poetical phantasms from the city is a basic task of its governors - the philosophers-warriors, Zhechev's Odysseus could undoubtedly be defined as a prototypical political-philosophical figure. The idyllic world of Zhechev is not a world of the primary-unsignified matter, a world *out of*, *before* and *against* the signification. On the contrary, it is a world of the primary signification, of primary – motivated – representation, world of the primary writing. It is not necessary to move away from Zhechev's text in order to discover that in his idyllic world "everyone could read the endless book of the being " (p. 270). Or that "the Bulgarian peasant was cultivating one of the heavenly pieces

(pp.151-152) Even the first page of the *Odysseus Myth* says: "We are going away from the primary meaning, invested in them, we are using them as they are tormented and deformed, transformed into symbols cold as arctic ghosts, without their usual primary lively pulsation, warm mucus and prophetic depth." (p.249). In other words the Myth has to be interpreted as language of the initial idyllic 'natural'-womb being.

on the Earth, he has seen how the shiny bridge of the rainbow connects the sky with the earth, *has read the colorful hieroglyphs of the being* with lucid and sober eyes keeping measure in everything" (p.265). Or further: "Only in the mysterious depths of language the primary meaning is sometimes hidden, a place where people put and keep the endless multitude and richness of their perception and experiencing of being." (p. 381). Zhechev's peasant is *reader* of being and he is its privileged reader as a farmer and shepherd in his proximity to land. At the same time, the primary meaning of being is kept in language, it clarifies itself in language. Zhechev's language signifies in an idyllic regime – it is a primary matter, primary immanence as the very land. But it is not meaningless, senseless immanence, inert and rough matter. It is immanence of the sense, or more precisely the sense is (always already) immanent to it; the land and the language are primarily signified, primarily meaningful, they mean before every act of signification and representation, they are the *very* meaning.

Thirty years before Zhechev, Heidegger wrote his famous phrases: "Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. (...) He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being's truth. The call comes as the throw from which the thrownness of Da-sein derives. In his essential unfolding within the history of Being man is the being whose Being as ek-sistence consists in his dwelling in the nearness of Being. Man is the neighbor of Being."[11] In his interpretation of *Brief über den Humanismus* Peter Sloterdijk discusses the idyllic pastoral metaphoric of Heidegger as the most clear expression of the European ontopolitical humanist thinking (independently from Heidegger's opposition to humanism), which since Plato defines as its *telos* the cultivation, or, in other words, the *humanisation* of man. *Reading,* according to Sloterdiik, is a basic instrument and figure of humanisation, and at least the pastoral-humanist projects of Heidegger and Zhechev are a proof for that (regardless

[11] Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", p. 245.

of the fact that Sloterdijk skips with silence Plato's objections against the writing in *Phaedo*). From that perspective, the idyllic myth of Zhechev is undoubtedly close to the pastoral metaphorics of the late Heidegger. At the same time, we have to note the key disagreement between them, or even their structural opposition. If for Heidegger the appearance of being is related to the appearing of the hidden, of truth as the *unhidden*, as a-*letheia*, to the ek-static going out in the open, in Zhechev the return to being is related to the reincarnation in immanence, with the return to the idyllic bosom (also the 'bosom of the language') with taking shelter and huddling in the immanence. The meaning of the human being according to Heidegger is in the very ek-sistence, which leads to transcendence, to the crossing beyond the limits of the being; in Zhechev the meaning is in the return from transcendence to immanence, in the return in its 'own' limits, in eternal re-production of the own, and not in the ek-sistence, but in the *en*-sistence. Zhechev's shepherd does not reveal the truth as the hidden, on the contrary he digs towards the hidden in the deep, immanent truth. Still this described generally structural opposition between the perspectives of Heidegger and Zhechev is not impossible to overcome. With the passing of the time Heidegger's ek-stasis to greater extent falls under the sign of the return, of the *epistrophe* as it is in *Holzwege*. The creative way of the thinker-farmer–insemitator-creator has its supreme value namely in the return, in the 'repeating itself'.

БОЯН МАНЧЕВ

ИДИЛЛИЧНАЯ ПАМЯТЬ, ПИСЬМО И АНТРОПОТЕХНИКА О „МИФЕ ОБ ОДИССЕЕ“ ТОНЧО ЖЕЧЕВА

Студия задается целью проследить комплексное использование фигур памяти, языка и письма в „Мифе об Одиссее“ Тончо Жечева. Эссе Жечева, появившееся в начале 80-ых годов XX века и вызвавшее серьезные критические дебаты, можно определить как самую влиятельную неоконсервативную попытку формирования экзотической мифологии общности, противопоставляющейся основным идеологическим моделям модернизма. В то же время углубленное прочтение текста с учетом истории фигур может позволить нам вникнуть в противоречивый характер идеологии самого модернизма. В этом смысле особое значение приобретают фигуративные оппозиции, такие как миф/история, устная/письменная речь, органическое/техническое.

Мое намерение заключается в том, чтобы высветлить философские и антропологические мотивы Жечева для использования фигур памяти, языка и письма, обращая внимание на оппозицию память/письмо, развитую Платоном в „Федре“ и на рассуждения Хайдеггера о связи между языком и Бытием. Этот анализ позволяет прийти к заключению, что текст Жечева вписывается в долгую онтополитическую традицию того, что германский философ Петер Слотердийк определяет как антропотехнику.

PIOTR MATYWIECKI

MEMORY

In memory of Janusz Lalewicz

From the inside of a room we are looking through a closed window in a massive frame. Behind the windowpane we may see a grassy hill with rounded shapes of trees in windless silence, the sky frayed with a green mist of dusk or morning. The pane is broken – the sharp-angled opening lacerates the landscape with edges hardly visible in this lighting. Pieces of broken glass are halted falling, some against the background of the view from the window, and some of them lower, against the wall. There are splinters leaning against the floor, as if an invisible presence in a picture has miraculously saved them from shattering. On the surfaces of glass bits, both those suspended in midair and those on the floor, patches of the hill, the trees, the sky are faithfully, photographically saved – like displaced fragments of a puzzle which could form the whole of a landscape behind the window if only put together.

The gaze is readily caught in this "intellectual play". The puzzle has a peculiar quality – it gets more complicated with time as it is completed.

Describing *Key to the Fields*[1] by René Magritte I had a sensation of this landscape's triple presence: one being the view outside the window, the other – its mysterious continuance on the broken pieces of glass, stopped short in falling, and the last one – my verbal description, stretching in time the event caught in a snapshot.

[1] René Magritte's painting, *Key to the Fields*, painted in year 1933, in the collection of Claude Spaak.

My reader shall add something the text is primarily concerned with: memory. After reading several sentences which have passed after the description of *Key to the Fields*, he now formulates the memory of the painting pictured in my decription, even if the reader cannot refer to his memory of Magritte's picture because he hadn't seen it.

I have the impression that all those "presences" have to do with memory's mode of existence. Hidden in all images seen, remembered, and stored away in oblivion, they are there in every look cast on the world. Magritte has artfully "staged" them before our eyes so that we could see them and give them a thought.

Memory is pictorial. Its pictures have been observed since long ago – if not by sight, then by imagination, as inner galleries of images our thought browses at times of remembering. This rhetorical-philosophical (but also magically-ordinary) conception was developed by Frances A. Yates in her book, *The Art of Memory*[2]. In her journeys through the labyrinths of the mind, decorated with pictures, she followed the guidance of the ancient, the medieval and the Renaissance magic and gnosis, visiting not only the corridors of natural science academies, but also the poetical and symbolic recesses.

Painters of the 19th and the 20th century were attracted by two contradictory tendencies. On one hand, the scientific and the common-sense trend aimed at precision and accuracy, the cult of realistic representation. On the other – the confusion of time and space, of those scales on which things are presented to us. All contemporary painting, so willingly described by the fetish-word "distortion", falls into that second category.

Rene Magritte's painting was created with a realist's conscientiousness and at the same time with a "surreal" sense of the confusion of truth and fiction. It seems designed for both mind and imagination, as a subject of conversation dealing with reality and memory, with the time of physics and the time of psyche.

Before we join in this conversation however, let us take a look at some curious personifications of the contemporary "fetishes" of a gaze.

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[2] Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* London 1972.

The attachment to the image of "mind's inner galleries" must have been strong indeed. Several years after the invention of those pictures proclaimed with true fascination as produced "without the help of hand, by nature's own powers"[3], there surfaced the idea of using the principle of photography to understand the mechanisms of memory. In the year of 1841 a young poet and journalist Piotr Dahlmann put forward the following hypothesis: for the needs of a huge gallery called memory, images are chemically preserved on the section of the optic nerve leading to the eye, similarly as in a daguerrotype. "An image permeates the mass of a nerve". Images are stored in the brain as daguerrotypes. "One could object that it is impossible to have so many pictures crammed in the head. However, everyone will agree that a brain can hold an infinite number of images, considering they have two dimensions only, i.e. breadth and length. They are as if shadows only, therefore they can be suspended on one precisely mathematical plane in infinite numbers." According to Dahlmann, "images" of all other senses are daguerrotyped and stored in mind in a similar fashion. When we remember something, we "browse" the photographs in our heads. "Whether these hypotheses be true or not, let the scientists, and the physiologists in particular, decide."[4]

In the year of 1980 psychologist Miroslaw Z. Harciarek, excited by the recent invention of holograms which extended the capacity of photography to the third, spatial dimension, formulated another hypothesis, based on K. H. Pribram's earlier suggestions. Harciarek conjenctured that there is a "holografic record made in the brain", external stimuli being in an unexplained way chemically transformed into a hologram in the optical nerve. He suggested that all sensory information – hearing, smell, touch – was holographically "recorded", and that "on one photosensitive surface many distinct holograms can be laid out and read"[5]. Admittedly, there are many

[3] Such and similar expressions may be found in many 19th century dictionaries and encyclopaedias.

[4] Piotr. Dahlmann, *Daguerotyp w człowieka zmysłach,* „Tygodnik Literacki", 51 (1841).

[5] Mirosław Z. Harciarek, *Holograficzna koncepcja pamięci a powidok,* „Przegląd psychologiczny", 2 (1980).

proofs here quoted from detailed, experimental works; the terminology is professional and coherent, yet at the bottom we find the same old myth of imagination: "browsing" the faithfully preserved pictures (holograms) of reality bears greatest semblance to the mechanisms of memory's workings...

Both authors – despite the 140 years between them – share scientific insight supported by the fascination with precision and verism of the images of memory. Painters and artists with a romantic and surreal outlook have differetnt fascinations – their visions combine dreaminess and an assumed uncertainity of intuition with a blurred aura of intermingling "inner pictures", subject to reality as much as to the unconscious. Whole pages could be quoted here from various works and manifestos, hundreds of galleries could be furnished with works of that kind. Since we are interested in common notions of memory, let us refer to an example taken from science fiction, literary genre which produces most myths today, and which also owes most to popular myths.

In his story Bob Shaw presents a device called "retrospective glass" – a sort of a hologram which, apart from the three-dimensional space, "comprises" in its plane also time. For many years these strange glass panes are exposed to most beautiful landscapes and absorb the views in order to be later put in the windows of city rooms and "emit" the living, moving landscape: "water will ripple in the sunlight, animals will come to quench their thirst, birds will circle in the sky, night will come after day, seasons of the year will change, one after another."[6]

Bob Shaw's story suggests the existence of three types of time in which images of reality are recorded.

The first type is physical time measured by the "thickness" of the "retrospective glass" pane, i.e. by the time it takes the light to pass through the glass. It is the time of cosmology, measured by "light years", just as the interstellar space. Ten years' time of a memory recorded on this glass is like ten years of the light ray's travel – a cosmic distance. The inner world of memory "interpreted" into the exterior world acquires superhuman dimensions.

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[6] Bob. Shaw, *Światło minionych dni (Light of the Days Past)* Warszawa 1973.

The second type is the time of natural cycles, more familiar to human beings, as "noted" on the glass: the rhythm of the seasons, days and nights, rippling waves of a lake.

The third, dramatic, specifically human type of time is introduced by the plot of the story. Years before the protagonist lost his wife and child in a car crash. The widower's slovenly existence in a shabby flat stays in contrast with images of a domestic idyll, preserved and still alive on the window pane. The clash of the presence with materialised past is what dramatises his world. What is inward and imagined will not come to terms with what is outside and true.

Let us go back to Rene Magritte's *Key to the Fields* and repeat: this picture is one of the few paintings which combine both aspects of "images of the memory": the scientific-veristic and the intuitive-imaginative one. It is as if a still version of images on "retrospective glass" from Bob Shaw's story, it is their section along the plane of presence, a paradoxical view through the window which overlooks both the bright, clear world outside, and the dim interior of our consciousness. It is a photo of the conflicts between truth and fiction, hidden under the seemingly coherent images of "the objective world."

Let us take a close look at the "layers" of Magritte's landscape – those "photographies" or "holograms" which can be placed "on one plane in infinite numbers." We will recognise forms of time standing still in several images of memory. By being incoherent with other images and paradoxical in themselves, they introduce tension into the usual looks on the world.

Here we first have a still, windless landscape in the window, rendered in a light, even banal manner. The painter obtained the impression of reality not as much by meticulous realism as by a certain lack of deference to the truth about the world, expressed in an openly undetermined character of time of day, in the misty atmosphere, in the dispersed light and the blurred patches of green. The onlooker's gaze is an intruder in this garden of peace and quiet, it is a brutality of sense in an ideal silence of physical time. Or, to the contrary, it is an isolated and lonely gaze, like a thought uneasily stirred in a suddenly motionless world which, though

a moment ago it was vividly present in the senses, has already passed into the past, into the abstraction of time[7].

Here are the pieces of broken glass, stopped in falling, immobilised in a snapshot: the improbability of movement caught by stillness, the paradox which through the millenniums have become so well-known to every observer of all visual representations that it is accepted without surprise. However, in this very image it is irritatingly obtrusive. In the peaceful view from the window, lasting rather outside of time than in one moment and thus "commemorated", this paradox is like a flash of sobering actualisation, the actualisation which is made even more shocking by being in fact precluded by the picture's immobility. And yet memory embraces the possibility of a materialised reminder, of breaking towards "now", of afflicting the well-ordered past.

The broken illusion of peace immediately gives way to yet another illusion – that of *mimesis*! The remains of the landscape and the sky slant on the window pane shards, fragments of the painting in the painting follow the deceit of time and turn against spatial directions – here is the motley deposit of the semblance of truth on the semblance of truth. However, when the gaze is set at ease and focuses on comparing the painted reality outside the window and its imitation on the glass, the beholder may fell invited to ramble between fiction acknowlegded as reality and its reflection. It is a ramble through the continuum of memory and real space, languidly filling the consciousness, memory becoming the depth of the gaze, its "thickness", the additional dimension of real space, like the "retrospective glass" of Bob Shaw's story.

At the same moment (all paradoxes of Magritte's painting unravel at the same moment) a suspicion rips the continuum of truth and fiction: is not the landscape outside the window a painted glass too, not broken

[7] The tangled meaning of the above fragment might be better explained by the following fragment of a buddhist text, *Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* (as quoted in „Odra", 2 (1984)): „Two monks were discussing the problem of the wind and the flag. One of them claimed it was the wind that was moving, the other claimed it was the flag that moved. [...] I stepped forward and said: <Kind men, neither the wind nor the flag is moving, it is the mind that moves.>"

yet and thus indistinguishable from reality? And if it is so, then what lies hidden behind the next illusion? Another one, multiplied *ad infinitum*? Or is it eventually broken with a windowless wall or with a mysterious, strange landscape? True reality, fiction, and memory split into layers, forming distinct planes. All attention focuses on differentiating them, on the diversity of forms existing simultaneously in the same picture.

Finally, the last paradox: the stillness of a picture as a whole. This obviousness is even more familiar than the movement of falling glass shards shown as immobility. However, it is noticed and subject to thought as a result of multiple paradoxical tensions and movements of thoughts which, following the gaze to reach the holistic sense of Magritte's picture, eventually split into logically irreconcilable contradictions.

As I have mentioned at the beginning, Magritte's puzzle has a peculiar quality – it gets more complicated with time. The only simplicity that could match this complexity is the simplicity of the gaze. The puzzle can be put together (the painting has its visual syntax, it fits into the frames), however not according to the laws of logic, but to the nature of the gaze, it being richer than the knowledge it has about itself.

If after all these arguments we should feel the need for simplicity, I suggest imagining (or remembering!) Magritte's painting as a landscape behind the glass pane of our imagination and memory. Without imagination and memory space would be pure geometry. If knowledge breaks imagination – imagination will be reborn as memory. If we forget – memory will be recreated from imagination. The broken glass bears the landscape from outside of the window – or from the inside. Seeing links the inside with the outside and unites the view for ever. It closes up the real world. And it opens it, too. It is the "key to the fields."

ПАМЯТЬ

Очерк затрагивает вопросы существования памяти в картинках и изобразительное свойство памяти. Предметом обзора являются картина Рене Маргритта „Ключ к полям“ и рассказ Боба Шоу, принадлежащий к жанру science-fiction, составляющие основу обсуждения того, как вопрос памяти представляется в массовой культуре. Делается также обзор исторических и современных работ на эту тему. Автор пытается доказать их бессилие в столкновении с тайной памяти. Представлены также соотношения явления памяти с явлением mimesis'а и функции.

АННА ПАЙДЗИНЬСКА

ОБРАЗ **ПАМЯТИ** В ПОЛЬСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ[1]

Память вызывала всеобщий интерес задолго до того как она стала объектом научных исследований или предметом философских или художественных исканий. Познавательное стремление постичь ее суть, определить то, что недоступно прямому, сенсорно-моторному познанию, зафиксировано в языке. Исходя из мысли о том, что каждый язык отражает свойственный данной культуре способ интерпретации мира – сквозь призму потребностей и предпочтений человека-члена этой культуры, в настоящей статье я ставлю перед собой цель вскрыть те суждения об этом столь важном аспекте умственной деятельности, которые заключены в польском языке. Путь к так намеченной цели проходит через анализ разного рода данных: словообразовательного гнезда, к которому принадлежит слово *pamięć* 'память', семантических отношений, в какие оно входит, создаваемых им синтаксических конструкций, устойчивых словосочетаний, компонентом которых оно является, наконец, его происхождения.

Начнем с последнего, так как именно этимология позволяет выявить древнейшие, так сказать, исконные представления о памяти, которые легли в основу акта номинации. Исследователи сходятся на том, что внутренняя форма этого слова несомненно указывает

[1] В статье представлены частичные результаты исследований, финансируемых профессорской субсидией Фонда в пользу польской науки.

на связь памяти с мышлением, так как слово *pamięć* образовано от корня **men-//*mon-//mдn-* 'думать', широко представленного, по мнению А. Баньковского (Bańkowski 2000:II, 202), во всех индоевропейских языках. Как А. Брюкнер, так и А. Баньковский приписывает начальной части слова темпоральную, временну́ю функцию. Второй из них объясняет имперфектную форму *po-mьněti* 'помнить' как 'думать о чем-л. потом, позже, заново' („myśleć o czymś potem, później, na nowo" – Bańkowski 2000:II, 202), первый пишет: „*pa- (po)* w odcieniu czasowem: co się po-mni" (Brückner 1985:393).

Связь памяти с мышлением остается живой по сей день, что более или менее отражается в словарных определениях. Приведем здесь два объяснения из ISJP (II, 10): „jeśli ktoś zaangażował się w coś bez pamięci, to oddał się temu całkowicie, przestał myśleć o innych sprawach i stracił kontrolę nad sobą" ('если кто-л. предался чему-л. без памяти, то он предался этому полностью, перестал думать о другом, потеряв контроль над собой'); „jeśli robimy coś dla pamięci lub ku pamięci, to robimy to, aby pomyśleć o tym we właściwej chwili" ('если мы делаем что-л. для памяти или в память, то делаем это, чтобы подумать об этом в надлежащее время'). Словари отмечают также многозначность слова *pamięć*, хотя они не согласны в определении числа выделяемых значений. Так, в SJPDor (VI, 56–58) выделяются три значения: 1. 'способность, склонность ума присваивать, фиксировать, распознавать и вспоминать пережитое или узнанное'; 2. 'вспоминание, воспоминание о ком-л. или о чем-л.; ознаменование, увековечение'; 3. устар. 'пребывание в сознании' („1. 'zdolność, predyspozycja umysłu do przyswajania, utrwalania, odpoznawania i przypominania doznanych wrażeń, przeżyć, wiadomości'; 2. 'pamiętanie; wspomnienie, pamiątka, upamiętnienie czego lub kogo'; 3. daw. 'przytomność, świadomość'"). Те же значения находим в SJPSz (II, 588–589), и рядом с ними новое, техническое: 'устройство, служащее для приема информации, ее хранения (фиксирования) и воспроизведения в надлежащий момент в неизмененном виде'. Авторы SWJP (714) приняли иное решение: они выделяют две омонимичные единицы *pamięć I* и *pamięć II*, приписывая каждой из них по

два значения. Оставим в стороне вторую из них, представляющую собой термин из области информатики. Ограничимся лишь выражением удивления, что выразительность метафорического и метонимического переосмысления оказалась слишком слабым аргументом в пользу признания деривационной связи между всеми значениями. Стоит обратить внимание на другое: на неполное совпадение описания значений первой единицы по отношению к ранее приведенным словарным определениям. Не учтено устаревшее значение, более того – появились новые компоненты во втором значении: 'хранение чего-л. в сознании (как правило, в общественном); также: совокупность оценок, восприятий прошлого; уважение, почтение по отношению к кому-л. или к чему-л. в прошлом' („'przechowywanie czegoś w świadomości (zwykle zbiorowej), pamiętanie; też: ogół ocen, odczuć odnoszących się do czegoś minionego; szacunek, cześć dla kogoś, czegoś minionego'"). Трудно считать, что такие значения были в самом деле новыми в момент составления словаря (этому противоречит сам иллюстрационный материал в более ранних словарях); автор определения скорее всего приблизился к тому, что носители польского языка имеют в виду, когда они пользуются словом *pamięć*.

Еще более подробно демонстрирует семантическое богатство слова ISJP. В методологическом отношении этот словарь значительно отличается от всех предыдущих: определения имеют в нем форму предложений, объясняющих единицу в ее естественном контексте, и составленных с помощью широко известных, более простых по значению слов. Авторы избегают как энциклопедизма, так и синонимических и квазисинонимических ассоциаций. С нерезкостью границ и динамикой значений, столь характерными для естественных языков, авторы справляются путем учета в определениях центральных и типичных для объясняемого значения элементов и оставления в стороне периферийных и нетипичных. В результате словарь лучше, чем другие, показывает, что память представляет собой сложную понятийную категорию. Ее структура напоминает сложную систему узлов и соединений (как это показывает сетевая модель Р. Лангаккера). Пользуясь словом *pamięć*, мы определяем: нашу способность хранить и воспроизводить в

уме прошедшие события, а также лиц, предметы и места, помещаемые нами в прошлом; легкость запоминания чего-л.; мысли о прошедших событиях, предметах и местах, людях, их действиях и т.п.; то, что мы думаем о ком-л., о его делах, потребностях, чувствах; заботу о ком-л. или о чем-л.; чувство почтения или уважения к умершему; ту часть ума, в которой храним воспоминания; способность живых существ присваивать, фиксировать и воспроизводить в уме испытанные впечатления и опыт, выявляющуюся как их использование в последующем поведении; наконец, ту часть компьютера, где хранятся данные. Полисемию слова отчасти передает разнообразие образуемых им синтаксических конструкций: *pamięć o kimś, o czymś* или реже *kogoś, czegoś* выражают смысл ‘то, что о ком-л., о чем-л. помнят’; сочетания, представляющие собой реализацию образца *pamięć do czegoś*, например: *pamięć do liczb, do tytułów, do cyfr, do twarzy* означают легкость запоминания чего-л.

Рассматриваемое слово является также компонентом многих устойчивых словосочетаний (о некоторых из них речь пойдет в дальнейшем), сохраняющих более или менее четкую семантическую связь с названными значениями. Самые простые из них это именные словосочетания существительного с прилагательным, определяющим память, в частности, по следующим признакам:

- что легче запоминается: увиденное (*pamięć wzrokowa*) или услышанное (*pamięć słuchowa*);
- как долго помнится что-то или кто-то (*długa, krótka, kurza pamięć*)[2];
- как много запоминается (*pojemna, fotograficzna, chłonna pamięć*[3]).

[2] Этот фразеологизм имеет антропоцентрический характер. Он выражает отрицательную оценку по причине присутствия в его составе прилагательного, мотивированного названием живого существа, иного, чем человек и следовательно, худшего (здесь: по признаку способности долго помнить – букв. „куриная память“).

[3] Это выражение означает человека, который быстро и легко усваивает знания (ср. также *chłonny umysł*, метафорическое значение глагола *chłonąć* ‘впитывать’: ‘интенсивно воспринимать или присваивать что-л., обычно потому, что при этом испытывается удовольствие’ мотивировано значением ‘втягивать в себя жидкость или запах’).

Два последних аспекта или только один из них принимаются во внимание, когда память определяется с помощью прилагательных *dobra, świetna, wyborna, niesłychana, fenomenalna* или же наоборот: *zła, słaba.* Прилагательные употребляются в этих сочетаниях как в первичном смысле (обычно в качестве показателей оценки), так и во вторичном. Для установления способов концептуализации существенными оказываются в особенности последние.

Столь сложная понятийная категория выявляется по-разному – через разные метафоры. Самую многочисленную группу образуют фразеологизмы, развивающие схему КОНТЕЙНЕРА, может быть, потому, что эта схема, по выражению Лакоффа, постоянно возвращается к нам в нашем чувственном опыте (Lakoff 1987:267). Она относительно проста, базируется на картине ограниченного пространства и умении отделения того, что находится „внутри", от того, что остается „вне". К этой схеме явно относятся такие выражения, как *pojemna pamięć, pojemność pamięci* (букв. „емкая память", „емкость памяти"); а вот метафорическую основу предложно-падежных конструкций *w pamięci* и *z pamięci* мы уже, как правило, не осознаем. Названная схема легко обнаруживается также во многих оборотах. Хотя с семантической точки зрения основополагающим членом является в них именной компонент (это благодаря ему известно о каких процессах идет речь), глагол не выполняет лишь функцию вербализатора, он несет также существенное содержание. В этом легко убедиться, сравнивая фразеологизмы *ktoś ma coś w pamięci* 'кто-л. помнит что-л. хорошо', *ktoś zachowa coś w pamięci* 'кто-л. запомнит что-л.', *ktoś nosi coś w pamięci* 'кто-л. хорошо помнит что-л.', *coś zapada komuś w pamięć* 'что-л. прочно запоминается', *coś pozostaje / pozostało w czyjejś pamięci, coś wyleciało / uleciało / wypadło / uciekło komuś z pamięci* 'кто-л. забыл что-л.'[4], *ktoś szuka czegoś w pamięci* 'кто-л. старается вспомнить что-л.', *ktoś grzebie w pamięci, ktoś (coś) staje komuś w pamięci* 'кто-л. или что-л. вспоминается кому-л.',

[4] С этими языковыми метафорами когерентно выражение *dziurawa pamięć* („дырявая память").

coś$_1$ budzi coś$_2$ (obrazy przeszłości, wspomnienia...) w pamięci 'что-л.$_1$ напоминает кому-л. что-л.$_2$', *ktoś (coś) żyje w czyjejś pamięci, ktoś (coś) przetrwa / przeżyje w czyjejś pamięci, ktoś odtwarza (sobie) coś w pamięci.*

Память мыслится, как правило, также как средство для перемещения в пространстве: *ktoś przebiega coś pamięcią, ktoś cofa się pamięcią do czegoś (w coś), ktoś wraca pamięcią do czegoś*. Названные фразеологизмы представляют собой результат накладывания двух понятийных метафор: ВРЕМЯ ЭТО ПРОСТРАНСТВО и МЫШЛЕНИЕ / ВОСПОМИНАНИЕ – ЭТО ДВИЖЕНИЕ В ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ. Только выражение *ktoś sięga pamięcią gdzieś* имеет несколько иную мотивацию: выступающий в нём глагол означает первоначально протягивание руки (следовательно, ее движение в пространстве) для того, чтобы взять что-л. или прикоснуться к чему-л., что находится на некотором расстоянии или высоко.

Память приравнивают также к материальному предмету, используемому для фиксирования информации: *ktoś zapisał sobie coś w pamięci, ktoś wymazał kogoś (coś) z pamięci, ktoś zakarbował (sobie) coś w pamięci*, или к такому, в котором появляется что-либо в результате определенного действия: *coś utkwiło komuś w pamięci, coś wbiło się komuś w pamięć, ktoś wbija sobie coś w pamięć* (последнее выражение подчеркивает намеренность человеческого действия).

Польский язык представляет процессы, связанные с памятью, как касающиеся не всех впечатлений, переживаний, известий и лишь отчасти зависимые от человеческой воли. Выражение *wybiórcza pamięć* ('выборочная память') акцентирует факт, что не всё пережитое или узнанное нами запоминается. Подобное или схожее значение имеет фразеологизм *fragmentaryczne wspomnienia*. Убеждение об относительной независимости процессов памяти от намеренных действий человека находит отражение в синтаксической форме фразеологизмов. Только некоторые из них приписывают человеку функцию агенса – из названных это например: *ktoś zapisuje sobie coś w pamięci, ktoś szuka czegoś w pamięci, ktoś wymazuje kogoś (coś) z pamięci, ktoś odtwarza (sobie) coś w pamięci*. Однако столь же часто,

если не чаще, член, означающий лицо, появляется факультативно или – в лучшем случае – занимает место объекта: *coś utkwiło komuś w pamięci, coś wbiło się komuś w pamięć, coś zapadło komuś w pamięć, coś utrwaliło się w czyjejś pamięci, coś wyleciało / uleciało / wypadło komuś z pamięci, coś umknęło czyjejś pamięci, pamięć komuś szwankuje, pamięć kogoś zawodzi* и т.д. Точно так же обстоит дело с фразеологизмами, в состав которых входит существительное *wspomnienie / wspomnienia*. Во многих из них именно этому члену, а не существительному, называющему лицо, приписывается функция агенса: *kogoś ogarniają wspomnienia* ('кого-л. охватывают воспоминания'), *wspomnienia ożywają w kimś, kogoś nachodzą wspomnienia, przemknęło wspomnienie czegoś* (букв. „пробежало воспоминание чего-л.").

Забывание часто представляется с помощью зрительных категорий: то, что сначала видно отчетливо, постепенно сглаживается, бледнеет, тускнеет, становится туманным (*coś jest wyraźne w pamięci – coś zaciera się w pamięci / blednie / blaknie / staje się mgliste*). То, что помним, представляет собой, таким образом, своеобразные картины, которые мы лучше или хуже видим. Другая метафора, использующая зрительное восприятие – *zaćmienie pamięci* – позволяет назвать временную утрату способности воспроизводить закодированную информацию. Таким образом, память для нас – что-то вроде источника света, который иногда совсем теряет интенсивность, ясность и блеск. Для порядка отметим еще, что в книжном языке употребляется возвышенное выражение *świetlanej pamięci*, используемое, когда говорится об умершем, отличавшемся многочисленными достоинствами (первоначально *świetlany* значит 'насыщенный светом').

В нашем языке отразился также повседневный опыт людей по поводу того, что бывает нелегко как запомнить что-либо, так и забыть некоторые события, и простого решения здесь недостаточно. На усилие, связанное с запоминанием, обращают внимание фразеологизмы: *ktoś utrwala sobie coś w pamięci* („фиксирует"), *ktoś wbija sobie coś w pamięć, ktoś wrył sobie coś w pamięć*; зато часть фразеологизмов, в которых слову *wspomnienia* 'воспоминания' приписывается функция контрагенса или объекта, показывает, что то, что

помнится, может быть нежелательным: *ktoś odpędza wspomnienia* („отгоняет воспоминания"), *ktoś opędza się / broni się przed wspomnieniami* („отмахивается, защищается от воспоминаний"), *ktoś unika wspomnień* („избегает воспоминаний")[5]. Есть фразеологизмы, прямо говорящие о человеческой активности, направленной на забывание чего-л.: *ktoś szuka w czymś zapomnienia* („ищет забвения в чем-л."), *ktoś znalazł w czymś zapomnienie* („нашел забвение в чем-л.").

Фразеологические единицы показывают также, что разные вещи, которых мы не помним, даже те, которые нам хотелось бы вспомнить, но не можем, неожиданно появляются в нашей памяти: *coś staje komuś (nagle) w pamięci* („что-л. встает (вдруг) у кого-то в памяти"), *coś (nagle) przychodzi komuś na pamięć, w kimś obudziły się wspomnienia, w kimś ożyły wspomnienia.*

О том, насколько важное место в нашей культуре занимает память, свидетельствуют факты различного рода. Во-первых, это следует из статистических данных – как существительное *pamięć*, так и глагол *pamiętać* отмечаются частотным словарем современного польского языка: в ранговом списке по показателю F (абсолютная частотность) первое из этих слов занимает позицию 1056, второе – 329. Если учесть, что исследуемая проба насчитывала 500 тыс. словоформ (по 100 тыс. из пяти стилевых пластов: популярно-научных текстов, кратких газетных сообщений, публицистики, художественной прозы и драмы), приходится признать, что оба слова, несмотря на несомненное различие показателей между ними, занимают очень высокую позицию. К такому же выводу приводит анализ второго показателя – сложной дисперсии (D), т.е. показателя равномерности появления в стилях. Считается, что если D>50, то слово принадлежит к основному лексическому фонду языка, – а именно так дело обстоит в обоих случаях[6].

[5] Легко объяснить, почему так происходит, если просмотреть эпитеты, определяющие воспоминания – среди них есть прилагательные: ***bolesne*** *wspomnienia,* ***dręczące, ponure, posępne, przykre, straszne, straszliwe, złowrogie*** и т.п. Все они имеют отрицательный характер.

[6] В этом контексте решение авторов Словаря-минимума польского языка (*Słownik minimum języka polskiego*) об учете только глагола представляется не очень обоснованным.

Во-вторых, на культурную важность интересующего нас понятия указывает значительное число связанных с ним лексических единиц. Словообразовательное гнездо, в котором центральное место отводится слову *pamięć*, очень богато. Кроме упомянутого уже глагола *pamiętać* в него входят: *zapamiętać, zapamiętywać, spamiętać, rozpamiętywać, upamiętniać, upamiętnić, upamiętnić się, opamiętać się, zapamiętać się w czymś, popamiętać* и мотивированные ими существительные: *pamiętanie, zapamiętywanie, rozpamiętywanie, upamiętnianie, upamiętnienie, opamiętanie, zapamiętanie.* В его состав входят также прилагательные: *pamięciowy, pamiętny, pamiętliwy zapamiętały*, от которых происходят существительные *pamięciowość, pamiętliwość* и *zapamiętałość*, а также наречия *pamięciowo, pamiętliwie, zapamiętale.* Следующие словообразовательные ряды строятся словами: *pamiętnik, pamiętniczek, pamiętnikarz, pamiętnikarstwo, pamiętnikarski, pamiętnikowy, pamiątka, pamiąteczka, pamiątkarz, pamiątkarski, pamiątkarstwo, pamiątkowy, pamiątkowość.* В прошлом образований с этим корнем было еще больше. По А. Банькowскому (Bańkowski 2000: II, 490), это были, например, глаголы: *pamiętować, pamiętywać, przepamiętać, przepamiętawać, rozpamiętać, rozpamiętawać, upamiętać, upamiętawać, wspamiętać, wspamiętawać, przypamiętać, przypamiętawać, zapamiętawać, pamiętać się, upamiętać się.* Выход из употребления этих единиц, а также характерные семантические преобразования лексем *pamiętnik*[7], *pamiętny* и *niepamiętny*[8] указывают, скорее всего, на то, что в прошлом память играла еще более существенную роль, чем в наше время.

Вернемся, однако, к взаимоотношениям слов. Не менее важными, чем словообразовательные связи, являются связи семантические; впрочем, различие между ними бывает иногда относительным, от-

[7] В XVI и XVII вв. он имел не свойственное современному языку значение 'тот, кто помнит что-л.' со специальным оттенком 'очевидец, летописец, мемуарист' (Buttler 1978:30).

[8] Ныне только в пассивном значении 'такой, которого помнят' и 'такой, которого не помнят', однако, на протяжении всего XIX в. встречаются примеры употребления в активе 'помнящий' и 'не помнящий о чем-л.' (см. Buttler 1978:120).

личный пример чему – рассматриваемый здесь случай. Синонимом глагола *pamiętać* является ведь глагол *pomnieć*, т.е. слово, восходящее к тому же первоисточнику **men-//*mon-//mдn-* 'думать'. Это общее для них происхождение современными носителями польского языка уже не осознается, и тем не менее, они без колебаний помещают в общее семантическое пространство не только эти два слова, но и другие, например: *wspominać, przypominać (sobie), przypomnieć (sobie), pomnik*. В качестве антонимов слова *pamięć* называются, кроме слов *niepamięć* и *niepamiętanie* также *zapomnienie* ('забвение') и *zapominanie* ('забывание'), а противоположное значение, чем у слова *pamiętać* выражается глаголами *zapominać* ('забыывать'), *zapomnieć* ('забыть') или *pozapominać*.

Кроме того, память представляет собой базовое понятие, необходимое для понимания многих слов с совершенно иной этимологией, в том числе заимствованных. Здесь не место перечислять все эти слова, ограничимся иллюстрацией. Слова *zabytki, monumenty* и *relikwie* называют объекты, приобретшие особую ценность благодаря нашей памяти; слова *rocznice* и *jubileusze* – торжества, организуемые потому, что жива память о каком-либо факте, событии и хочется это отметить; *ewokacja* это 'возбуждение воспоминания', *reminiscencja* – `напоминание, воспоминание прошедших вещей, явлений, дел, связанная с ними мысль'; *retrospekcja* – 'воспроизведение в памяти пережитого'; *retrospektywa* – 'воспроизведение, воспоминание былых событий' и т.д.

В-третьих, о важности понятия памяти свидетельствует тот факт, что мы помещаем его среди понятий, необходимых для определения своей тождественности. На это имеется несколько причин. Об одной из них уже шла речь – о неразрывной связи между памятью и мышлением. А ведь мышление в языковой картине человека занимает особое место, выделяя людей из всех живых существ. Эта связь (о чем упоминалось раньше) имеет не только этимологический характер. Еще в начале XX века к слову *pamięć* возможно было подобрать синонимы *rozum* ('ум'), *rozwaga* ('рассудительность'), *zastanowienie* ('раздумье'), *umiarkowanie* ('умеренность'), *przytomność* ('сознание'

– SW IV, 27). Даже послевоенные словари (SJPDor, SJPSz) отмечают (правда, как устаревшее) значение ‘сознание’, мотивирующее выражение *bez pamięci* ‘забыв обо всем, утратив рассудок’. Близость понятий памяти и мышления подтверждается, кроме того, названными уже дериватами *opamiętać się*[9] и *opamiętanie*, следующим образом объясняемыми в ISJP (I, 1166): „Jeśli ktoś opamiętał się, to po okresie wzburzenia emocjonalnego zaczął myśleć i działać racjonalnie“ (‘если кто-л. опомнился, то после эмоционального волнения стал думать и действовать разумно’). Слово *opamiętanie* определяется как „nagłe zrozumienie, że robimy coś złego i powinniśmy to przerwać“ (‘внезапная мысль о том, что мы поступаем плохо и должны это прекратить’).

Данные языка показывают также человека как существо, развивающееся во времени, и в том же времени ограниченное: его существование начинается, когда человек рождается, а в момент смерти заканчивается. Это временно́е измерение человеческого бытия осознается благодаря памяти (ср. такие выражения, как *za czyjejś / ludzkiej pamięci, ktoś sięga pamięcią w przeszłość, ktoś ogarnia pamięcią całe życie*).

Наконец, язык приносит картину человека как члена некоторой группы, имеющей свое прошлое, свою историю, – и свою общую память. Перекрещивание названных понятийных доменов видно, например, в значениях таких единиц, как: *pomnik* ‘выполненное по заказу скульптурное, реже архитектурное произведение, служащее для увековечения кого-л. или чего-л.; таким образом люди хотят воздать славу заслуженным, знаменитым единицам, сохранить в памяти важные для человечества, нации или местного населения истори-

[9] Глагол *opamiętać się* ‘опомниться’ представляет собой преобразованную перфектную форму *upamiętać się*, функционирующую (подобно его имперфектному соответствию *pamiętać się* ‘говорить, действовать с пониманием, с рассудком, согласно нормам’) с XVI по XVIII в. Кстати, стоит обратить внимание на симметрию словообразовательно-семантических процессов: также от антонима глагола *pamiętać* – от глагола *zapomnieć* ‘забыть’ образовался дериват *zapomnieć się*, означающий ситуацию потери контроля над своими поступками, способности разумной оценки происходящего.

ческие события или – если произведение возникло в ознаменование жертв войн, восстаний, стихийных бедствий – предостеречь от них', *izba pamięci* 'небольшое помещение, в котором хранятся и демонстрируются предметы, связанные с какими-л. событиями или людьми, потому что не следует о них забывать', *miejsca pamięci narodowej* 'места, связанные с борьбой и героической гибелью поляков, о которых следует помнить и которые необходимо сохранять', *miesiąc pamięci* 'апрель, месяц, в котором чтится память жертв концентрационных лагерей'.

Память – определенного рода умственная способность – для нас несомненно ценна, что подтверждается хотя бы устойчивыми сочетаниями: *utrata pamięci, ktoś traci / stracił pamięć, ktoś odzyskuje / odzyskał pamięć* – об утрате или обретении заново чего-либо говорим только тогда, когда это оценивается положительно. К такому же выводу ведут выражения, показывающие память как то, что делает возможным невозможное, то, о чем люди издавна мечтают, например, движение назад во времени: *ktoś cofnął się pamięcią* (букв. „вернулся памятью") *do czegoś / w coś (w swoje dzieciństwo), ktoś przebiega pamięcią całe swoje życie, ktoś sięga pamięcią w przeszłość, ktoś wraca pamięcią do czegoś (do młodości)*, или отрицание смерти (*ktoś żyje / przeżyje w naszej pamięci, ktoś ożył w czyjejś pamięci, ktoś wskrzesił kogoś w swojej pamięci*). Также то, что кто-либо помнит о нас, представляет собой ценность, что выявляется в оборотах типа: *dziękuję za pamięć, jestem wdzięczny za pamięć, polecam się (łaskawej) pamięci*. Ценностное измерение свойственно также памяти как совокупности чувств и оценок, касающихся кого-либо, однако они в значительной степени зависят от него самого, например: *ktoś zasłużył sobie na pamięć, ktoś zostawił po sobie dobrą / niedobrą / złą pamięć*. Не всякий человек достоин памяти (*jest godny pamięci*), и тем более, не всякий заслуживает, чтобы его память чтили (*czcić / uczcić / szanować jego pamięć, poświęcić coś jego pamięci*) или хотя бы сохранили о нем добрую память (*zachować serdeczną pamięć o nim*). Память о некоторых людях нам особенно дорога, что показывают обороты *przysięgać komuś na czyjąś pamięć* и *zaklinać kogoś na czyjąś*

pamięć – именные члены, появляющиеся при глаголах *przysięgać* и *zaklinać*, сильно аксиологизированы. Итак, категория памяти, подобно многим другим, наглядно свидетельствует о том, что, как отмечает Я. Пузынина (Puzynina 1992:5), предстоящий нашим глазам мир с первых дней жизни по последние есть мир ценностей.

Перевод с польского *Романа Левицкого.*

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ANNA PAJDZIŃSKA

THE IMAGE OF MEMORY IN POLISH (SUMMARY)

The aim of the article is to reconstruct the image established in the Polish language of one of the most important aspects of the mind: that of memory. Various types of data are analyzed for the purpose: lexicographic definitions of the word *pamięć* 'memory', syntactic patterns in which it appears, its word-formational family, collocations and the word's origin.

The relevant collocations portray memory relative to what is easier to remember, for how long it is remembered and how much is remembered.

Memory is conceptualized in a number of ways, the most frequent metaphor being that of a CONTAINER. It is also conceptualized, however, as a means of doing something (usually moving in space) or as a material object used to fix information in it or in which something begins to be as a result of an activity.

The Polish language presents memory as selective within the realm of sensations, experiences, information, and as only partially dependent on people, even if they make an effort to fix something in memory, to recall or forget about something. Forgetting is often conceptualized in visual terms.

The importance of memory in Polish culture is manifested by:

- Statistics. Both the noun *pamięć* 'memory' and the verb *pamiętać* 'remember' occupy relatively high positions on importance lists. Also complex dispersion, an indication of the evenness of distribution in various styles, shows that both words belong to basic vocabulary.
- The multitude of lexical items related word-formationally and.or semantically to the word *pamięć* 'memory'.
- The inclusion of memory among concepts especially useful to describe one's own identity. Important are both etymological and currently felt connec-

tions between *pamięć* and *myślenie* 'thinking', the latter being a special feature of the linguistic picture of a human being. Besides, the relevant lexical items show that memory makes one realize the temporal aspect of one's life and the fact belonging to a given community with its past and history.

АЛЕКСАНДР ПАНОВ

ЛИТЕРАТУРНО-ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЙ СЮЖЕТ КАК ФОРМА ХУДОЖЕСТВЕННОЙ ПАМЯТИ

Еще со времен ее возникновения, с середины девятнадцатого века, мы воспринимаем литературу как историческую науку с характерными для любой науки объектом, субъектом, методом исследования и техникой анализа. Мы редко спрашиваем о цели исследования: позитивистическую науку часто воспринимают как самодостаточную ценность. И все-таки, проявив настойчивость, мы можем получить сравнительно разумный ответ. Литературная история – это один из способов понять сюжет, функционирование и воздействие литературы, а также ее взаимоотношение с человеком, с его обществами и сообществами в синхронном и в диахронном планах. С точки зрения научной методологии это вполне конкретный ответ, поскольку задача любой науки – раскрыть сущностные характеристики объекта своего познания и установить его отношения с познающим субъектом, или, выражаясь словами Канта, изучить „объект для нас".

И все-таки сама постановка вопроса – исследование процессов развития объекта, не может не привести еще к одному заключению. Ведь проблемы происхождения и развития вещей в мире волновали людей задолго до возникновения современной научной мысли. Более того – стремление рассказать о том, „как что-либо произошло" часто заменяет рассказ о самом явлении – о его сущности и специ-

фике. Любой студент, изучающий культурную антропологию, знает, что это основная характеристика досовременной мысли, начиная с генеалогической мифологии и кончая рассказами о подвигах и деяниях культурных героев. Задолго до возникновения не только науки, но даже организованной идеологии, какой являются жречески структурированные культы, человек строил представление о своем бытии, храня прежде всего рассказы о его возникновении и о его „историческом" развитии. Это стремление человека мы привыкли называть „памятью". Иными словами, еще в начале своего развития создание определенного космоса из хаоса и определенного типа сообщества из биологически разбросанных атомов вида „гомо сапиенс" проходит через процесс „запоминания" и сохранения сведений, типологически очень близких к объектам, которые оказались в центре интереса возникшей тысячелетиями позже исторической науки. Разумеется, средства разные, однако не сохранился ли в конститутивном принципе исторического исследования атавистический нагон к организации „памяти", которая в свою очередь является основой формирования самосознания данного человеческого сообщества?

Развитие европейской духовности показывает, что необходимость в сохранении – устном или письменном, каких-либо фактов, весьма похожих на исторические рассказы, всегда возникает тогда, когда данное сообщество людей объединяется и организуется на основании определенных принципов. Предания Ветхого и Нового Заветов, национальные эпопеи, жития святых и деяния святых апостолов, сказания и исторические предания, исторические интересы представителей Романтизма, „История Славяноболгарская" Паисия Хилендарского и даже современные исторические романы – это все явления, которые возникли и развились именно как средство утверждения разных этнических, национальных или классовых сообществ, претендующих на место под солнцем, на право существования и самовыражения, на определенный общественный статус и положение. Во всех этих случаях „память" объединяет отдельные биологические атомы и превращает их в осознанных членов сооб-

щества, обеспечивая им стабильность естественной связи с бытием: кто я такой, откуда я, какого я рода, где моя земля, каковы моя вера и язык, кто мои родоначальники, кто мои герои, которым я должен подражать, каковы ценности моего сообщества, которые я должен хранить, кто мои враги, с которыми я должен бороться, кто мои друзья, на которых я должен уповать, каковы проблемы, которые я должен решать, какова моя роль в создании, функционировании и передаче следующему поколению всего того, что не позволяет мне быть „сорванным листом", а превращает меня в разумное, оценивающее себя существо, имеющее свою историю и онтологически-экзистенциальные корни.

Эта одновременно экзистенциальная и онтологическая потребность в „памяти" вряд ли вполне совпадает с задачами исторической науки, такой, какую мы ее знаем со времен позитивизма, а еще меньше, с задачами литературной истории – столь специфическими и часто ведущими к анализу объектов, очень слабо связанных с потребностями человеческой „памяти" – такими, как, например, стилевые и жанровые характеристики и различия, развитие и движение мотивов, сюжетов, героев, конфликтов, возникновение и структура специфических текстов и авторских персоналий, школы, манифесты, текстологические различия и пр. – не будем перечислять всего разнообразия объектов литературно-исторического исследования и его инструментария. Но, несмотря на это, иногда чувствуется, что исследователь литературы часто испытывает необходимость опереться на свой материал именно как на „память".

Хорошо известно, что историки литературы иногда стремятся объяснить функцию определенных структурных или функциональных элементов литературы именно с точки зрения понятия памяти. Бахтин считает, что функцию „памяти" исполняет институт жанра, сохранивший древнейшие этапы исторического развития словесности. Исследователи мифологических школ усматривают ту же функцию „памяти" литературы в архетипических сюжетах, мотивах, символах, образах, сохранившихся на протяжении тысячелетий. Именно на этой основе возникают литературоведческие направле-

ния, известные как „литературная морфология“, „историческая поэтика“, „литературная культурология“ и т. д. Исследования многих ученых доказали несомненное присутствие долговечных и неизменных принципов строения и функционирования литературного произведения, несущих в себе свое древнее происхождение, не утратив при этом силу быть организующими культурными механизмами. Вспомним хотя бы теорию В. Я. Проппа о морфологии сказки, чью модель многие исследователи обнаружили позже в куда более современном, чем сказка, жанре романа. Все эти зависимости позволили Андрэ Жолесу сформулировать даже идею о том, что в мире человеческой словесности существует девять „простых форм“, чей конституирующий заряд невозможно преодолеть, независимо от конкретных проявлений литературного развития.

Однако, все эти употребления понятия „память“ в создании литературной истории или в исследовании развития словесных форм в большей или в меньшей степени являются метафорическими, их цель – подчеркнуть существование неких относительно постоянных принципов и механизмов строения и функционирования словесного искусства. Современная литературная история, однако, и особенно та, которая имеет не просто академическое значение, а направлена на создание устойчивых ценностных систем общества, часто стремится сыграть роль „памяти“ в прямом смысле этого слова – роль средства для осознания сообществом себя и своих культов.

Этот процесс становится особенно очевидным с появлением понятия „канон“. Несмотря на все споры о наличии и употреблении литературных канонов, о принципах их организации, о пользе и вреде их наличия в осмыслении литературы и самой литературной жизни, мы не можем проигнорировать тот факт, что именно понятие канона позволило нам понять не названные позитивистической наукой цели написания литературной истории. Это – организация наличных фактов, связанных с авторами, с произведениями, с жанровыми формами, с поэтическим языком и с самонаблюдением литературы, в стройную систему внутренне организованных элементов определенного типа человеческого сознания, который дик-

тует тип мышления, ценностей и поведения, выходящих далеко за рамки литературы как специфического общественного феномена, и который стремится полностью распространиться на устройство человеческих сообществ. Иными словами, создание литературной истории не ограничивается академической самодостаточностью, интересующейся возникновением, развитием и функционированием определенных четко дефинированных явлений, а все более настойчиво располагается в области идеологических конструкций общественного сознания.

Для того чтобы продемонстрировать более ясно суть этого процесса, мы должны проанализировать само понятие канона.

Это понятие введено в начале IV века нашей эры для обозначения списка текстов, в которых содержится доктрина Священного писания христиан. Все, что осталось за пределами этого списка, является неканоническим, т. е. апокрифическим. Иными словами, еще тогда существовала идея о том, что включение в рамки канона требует некоей активной и подчиненной определенным принципам селекции. В то же время понятие „канон" употребляется и в связи с определенными правилами при создании данного текста или изображения. Здесь четко видна предварительно заданная идея о том, что есть „правильные" и „неправильные" способы интерпретации тех же канонических сюжетов, образов и тем. И в том, и в другом случае вопрос сводится к тому, каким образом данная личность, текст или изображение может попасть в канонический список и каковы критерии, по которым совершается "канонизация".

Практика христианской церкви – того института, который безусловно имеет наибольший опыт в канонизации – показывает, что этот процесс очень логичен и подчиняется строгим правилам – он тоже каноничен по-своему. Личность, стремящаяся попасть в канонический список, должна доказать измеримыми и видимыми доказательствами свою действенную добродетель, проявляющуюся в чудесах, совершаемых добротворческой силой, материализованной в ее реликвиях (т. е. в ее мощах). Кроме того, личность канонизированного всегда неразрывно связана с историей его подвигов, с иден-

тифицирующими его специфическими атрибутами, с его специфическими ипостасными именами, а также с четкой схемой, по которой его жизнь повторяет подвиг первоканонизированного (imitatio Cristi) и по которой в дальнейшем поклонники будут подражать подвигам и действенной добродетели нового святого.

Тексты, которые могут войти в канон Священного писания, должны утверждать доктрину, лежащую в основе представлений о человеческом поведении и добродетелях и выдвигаемую канонической нормой. Но это не все: сама их структура должна способствовать легкой реализации канонической модели формирования имитативной личности. Иными словами, канонизация человека или текста ни в коем случае не может быть произвольной, она подчиняется строгим, в такой же степени каноническим, правилам.

И если проследить процессы канонизации авторов и текстов в литературной истории, невозможно не отметить сходные черты процессов церковного и литературного канонов. Канонизированные авторы всегда обладают одним и тем же качеством: исключительностью, принципиально разграничивающей их от простых людей. Вопрос о том, чем мотивирована эта исключительность: гением, как это принято у представителей Романтизма, неповторимым писательским стилем, особой миссией литературной личности или чем-то еще – существен лишь в связи с типом литературной истории. Он не сказывается на ее фундаментальной функции – из рассказов о деяниях исключительных личностей сотворить свое независимое послание, призванное исполнять функцию памяти для сообщества, его опорной точки, его легитимации и идентификации в соответствии с утвержденной в этом сообществе системой ценностей.

Что касается формирования текстовых канонов, оно подчиняется той же логике – тексты рассматриваются как особое проявление творческой исключительности канонизированных авторов. Каждый текст – это послание, но их совокупность содержит новое, другое послание, кодифицирующее основные принципы ценностной доктрины сообщества. Неважно, каковы именно ценности, формирующие данное сообщество, – они могут быть самыми разными, иногда

даже противоположными. Важен механизм создания литературного канона, который неизменно состоит из двух неразрывно связанных частей: из Деяний святых апостолов и Посланий святых апостолов.

Однако созданная таким образом „память" не является чисто литературной, скорее всего она часть памяти сообщества – данного этноса, нации, класса. Здесь литература – всего лишь компонент, составная часть самосознания сообщества, а не активно воздействующий на формирование, проблематизацию, трансформацию и развитие этого самосознания фактор. Иными словами, этот тип создания литературной истории не помогает нам выяснить собственно активность литературы в отношении духовных процессов в обществе, а также собственно литературную „память", которая формируется из внутренних взаимосвязей между отдельными произведениями. Трудно восстановить процесс внутреннего общения между художественными текстами, процесс порождения нового текста из проблематики предшествующих, который основывается не просто на интертекстуальных отношениях на уровне образной близости, ссылок, внутренней полемики, цитирования, пародии и т. д., но и на внутреннем развитии отдельных полемико-проблематических ядер, с помощью которых литература стремится принимать активное участие в регулировании духовных вызовов и кризисов в общественном самосознании и ценностной системе.

Создание литературной истории можно сравнить с восприятием театрального представления. На наших глазах происходит некое действие, однако для того, чтобы осознать его и превратить в свой собственный эстетический опыт, мы упорядочиваем свои впечатления и делаем их удобными для своей памяти. То же самое происходит и с вышеупомянутыми историями действующих лиц и с их посланиями. Однако, в то же время, события на сцене обладают своей внутренней логикой: мы не можем предположить, что герой выйдет через правую дверь, если перед этим он не вошел через левую; принц Гамлет не может жаждать возмездия, если его отец не убит и т. д. И еще: сюжет драмы не может развиваться нормально, если в четвертом действии герои забыли, что происходило в первом, – ведь

все их действия мотивированы именно событиями, последовательно происходившими в каждом действии. Иными словами, драматургическое действие нуждается в своей собственной „памяти“ для того, чтобы оставаться единым и идентичным самому себе, а не расколоться на отдельные, не связанные между собой эпизоды.

Это значит, что мы можем изменить направление создания литературной истории. Вместо того, чтобы описывать как сообщество подбирает лиц, факты и явления и упорядочивает их по своему усмотрению в канонические списки, чтобы сотворить свой собственный образ прошлого („культурную память“), мы можем заинтересоваться обратным процессом: как литература пытается оказать влияние на сообщество, будучи адекватной ему, но в то же время проблематизируя его духовное бытие. Чтобы сделать этот процесс более ясным, приведем пример на материале болгарской литературы. Так как эта проблема относится ко всем обществам, несомненно, в любой национальной литературе можно найти соответствующие эквиваленты.

Речь идет о духовном и моральном кризисе, охватившем болгарское общество тогда, когда в процессе модернизации начинается постепенное разрушение основ патриархального общества в материальном, экономическом, правовом, социально-психологическом, моральном и духовном планах. Давайте представим себе, что мы наблюдаем за реакциями условного человеческого индивида, оказавшегося в этой ситуации. Вначале он растеряется и, подобно древним людям, объяснит распад своего родового космоса процессом всеобщего нарушения космической гармонии. В таких условиях зарождается так называемая народная баллада, чьи мотивы и сюжеты встречаются еще в древнегреческой трагедии – например, чума, карающая сообщество за несоблюдение родового закона или за кровосмешение брата-янычара, изнасиловавшего родную сестру, не узнав ее; или участие всей живой и неживой природы в наказании или спасении братьев, один из которых хочет убить другого, чтобы забрать его дом и т. д.

Потом, осознав исторический характер перемен и то, что они яв-

ляются результатом вторгающейся современности, наш условный герой попытается замкнуться в своей консервативной и утопической вере в то, что сохранение старого положения вещей возможно, если разоблачить и отбросить чужой образ жизни, если согрешивший член сообщества покается и попросит прощения, а все остальные примут его с открытым сердцем и жизнь потечет в своем многовековом русле. В Болгарии такие сюжеты можно найти у так называемых народников – писателей конца XIX века, чья наивная вера в сохранение народной добродетели сохраняется до первых десятилетий XX в. Но наряду с этим, если наш герой окажется более дальновидным, он продемонстрирует нам жестокий и болезненный процесс распада всех ценностей патриархального общежития и вытекающие из него беды и пороки (что-то вроде ящика Пандоры конца XIX века), как это делает, например, Елин Пелин в своей замечательной повести „Гераците".

В то же время, как известно, понятие кризиса содержит не только негативное, но и позитивное значение – именно в периоды кризиса рождается новизна. Если наш условный герой окажется из числа тех, чье индивидуальное восприятие мира было сильно ограничено строгими законами патриархальности, неумолимым общественным мнением, узким горизонтом бытия, он воспримет возможность сбросить теснящую его патриархальную одежду с первичной и пьянящей радостью. Родной край он назовет „мертвым царством", от жизни он будет требовать только волнений, а альфа и омега всех его житейских радостей сведутся к пресловутому возгласу Wein, Weib und Gesang – „женщины и вино, вино и женщины". С таким жгучим нетерпением встречает распад патриархальности болгарский поэт Кирил Христов где-то в 1897 г.

Опять же в это время, однако, наш условный герой мог бы задуматься о том, что эмансипация индивида от патриархальности может означать не только анакреонтическую жажду наслаждений, но и возможность принять на себя истинную ответственность, которая превратит его из инструмента коллектива в настоящего сознательного и ответственного субъекта своей собственной жизни, подчи-

няющего свое поведение категорическому моральному императиву. Основной ценностью этого процесса становится совесть – только ее рождение может привести к рождению человека в настоящем смысле этого слова. А как рождается совесть? Конечно, на руинах патриархального общества, в момент, когда наш условный герой сумел погубить все живое, связанное с ним кровными или брачными узами, во имя какой-то якобы модной химеры. Так, между прочим, поступает герой поэмы „Бойко“ родоначальника европейского индивидуализма в Болгарии Пенчо Славейкова.

Проходит одно поколение, и наш условный герой, с такой радостью встретивший новую свободу, которая уничтожила его патриархальные ограничения, уже живет вполне современной анонимной городской жизнью. Но ему все так же неуютно, и, вслед за тремя чеховскими сестрами, он постоянно ищет невозможного пути к давно потерянному прошлому: к отчему дому, к тихому дворику в белом цвету вишен, к старенькой матери на пороге и к жизнерадостному шепоту и смеху – чтобы они избавили его от „тюрьмы“ современного отчуждения.

Было бы бесполезным рассказывать эту историю дальше, но у нее действительно длинное и интересное развитие. Для нас здесь важно установить, что движение литературы можно представить и рассказать как драматургический сюжет, в котором герой действует и чувствует, ведомый желанием найти выход из сложившихся обстоятельств – каждый эпизод ведет к следующему, но нельзя понять смысл следующего, не сопоставив его со смыслом предыдущего. Таким образом, между отдельными произведениями порождается связь, куда более сложная и куда более органическая, чем та, которая обнаруживается в простых интертекстуальных сопоставлениях, анализирующих процессы ссылки, цитирования, споров или поддержки, населяющие литературоведческие исследования последних двух десятилетий.

И так как мы сравнили развитие литературной истории с драматургическим сюжетом, мы могли бы говорить о литературно-исторических сюжетах в развитии данной национальной литературы.

Конечно, здесь название „сюжет“ используется скорее метафорически, но все-таки с ясным сознанием о том, что оно необходимо для обозначения того факта, что художественное развитие организовано вокруг нескольких устойчивых центров и каждое отдельное произведение занимает определенную позицию в отношении этих центров и таким образом формируются внутренне связанные серии, развивающиеся почти как драматургический сюжет.

В любой национальной литературе таких организующих центров немного, а это значит, что литературно-исторических сюжетов тоже не бесконечное множество. С момента национального обособления болгарской литературы в ней можно насчитать четыре основных историко-литературных сюжета. Первый из них, конечно, связан с самим установлением понятия национального космоса, выражающегося в создании устойчивого символического образа родного и национального пантеона героев (соответственно – антигероев или смеховых героев), в прослеживании превратностей национальной судьбы, в отграничении родного от чужого и т. д. Этот сюжет, зародившийся еще в первой книге болгарского Возрождения – „Истории Славяноболгарской“ Паисия Хилендарского, развивают некоторые из наиболее значимых произведений болгарской литературы: „Записки о болгарских восстаниях“ Захария Стоянова, „Под игом“ и „Эпопея забытых“ Ивана Вазова, „Бай Ганю“ Алеко Константинова и др. и даже работы современных болгарских авторов – таких, как Емилиан Станев, Вера Мутафчиева, Генчо Стоев, Антон Дончев и пр.

Второй сюжет, появившийся тоже в эпоху Возрождения, связан с вышеизложенной историей о распаде родового космоса, наступившем под напором вторгающейся современности. Как ни странно, но этот сюжет актуален и продуктивен в художественном отношении даже в наше время, например в романе „Облава на волков“ Ивайло Петрова.

Третий, очень продуктивный для болгарской литературы, сюжет можно назвать „в поисках индивидуальных и универсальных ценностей“. Он зарождается в конце девятнадцатого века в произведе-

ниях Пенчо Славейкова, Пейо Яворова, Петко Тодорова, получает теоретическое обоснование идеологами художественного общества „Мысль“ д-ром Крыстевым и Пенчо Славейковым, развивается в творческой активности символистов, послевоенных авангардистов, успешно сочетается с идеей о родном в творчестве Йордана Йовкова и до сих пор сохраняет свою художественную продуктивность.

И наконец, четвертый сюжет болгарской литературы связан с мечтой и утопией о справедливо устроенном мире. Он появляется на свет вместе с предыдущим сюжетом – на границе девятнадцатого и двадцатого веков, но по объяснимым причинам переживает свой золотой век в период между Первой и Второй мировыми войнами в творчестве таких поэтов, как Христо Смирненский, Гео Милев, Никола Вапцаров. Несмотря на негативы его чрезмерной идеологизации, этот сюжет художественно продуктивен и сейчас в разных утопических представлениях о мировом устройстве.

С появлением этих четырех основных сюжетов между ними складываются сложные взаимоотношения, зарождаются споры, привлечение и переплетение. Однако самый главный результат заключается в том, что нельзя разобраться в смысле отдельного произведения без обращения к этим сюжетам. Именно это обстоятельство превращает их в один из самых мощных носителей собственно художественной памяти болгарской литературы, сохраняет их органическую целостность и идентичность. Меняются художественные подходы, школы, поэтика, стратегии воздействия, организация литературной жизни, но внутренняя логика „действия“, заложенная взаимодействием четырех сюжетов, остается. И так как их носителями являются разные символические образы, сформированные в культурном сознании, можно сказать, что они, так же, как и жанры, выполняют роль своеобразных художественных институтов, организующих взаимодействие между разными уровнями художественной деятельности – семиотическими, поэтологическими, дискурсивными, воздействующими, культурологическими и т. д., и обеспечивают их внутреннее единство, как это происходит с драматургическим действием, которое держится на внутренней зависимости

между элементами и эпизодами, обеспеченной сюжетом. Таким образом, художественная литература вырабатывает специфический механизм создания своей собственной „памяти", которая конкурирует „память" канона, так как принципы строения сюжетных серий не всегда вполне совпадают с каноническими списками. А исследование взаимоотношений между этими двумя типами литературной памяти, толкование совпадений и расхождений между ними может предоставить нам интересный материал для размышления над самим осуществлением художественного процесса и над его дальнейшим применением. Но это уже тема для другого разговора.

A. PANOV

THE LITERARY-HISTORICAL SUJET AS A FORM OF ARTISTIC MEMORY

A literary history of authors exists. It usually presents the artistic development of literature as a sequence of individual creative activities – the Acts of the holy Apostles.

A literary history of texts exists – the Books of the holy Apostles. The Canon.

Both come together to form a literary history of the collective 'memory' – of the means of self-perception, legitimization and identification of the community, yet they do not form a literary history that would show us the way in which literature builds up its internal, unique 'memory' that preserves the information of literature's own struggle to take part in the decision of the community's spiritual issues.

But there is another way for the literary-historical process to be perceived – as a drama. With the dramatic analogy we want to demonstrate how literature works out its own processes of continuity and interaction between the different

literary works. These mechanisms beget logically connected sequences of texts, artistic gestures and activities that aim to resolve basic cultural discrepancies. We could imagine the literary activity as the actions of a single imaginary human subject – a literary hero who, when into a problematic situation, seeks practical and spiritual solutions to it that motivate his entire conduct. In one case he tries to join a group, then he tries to emancipate away from it and show the grandeur of his individuality, then again he feels the need of community support, but this time that of a different group, etc. At the same time, however, he preserves the memory of his past problems, motivations and actions and every new act bears the imprint of the ones before it. All this reminds us a lot of a dramatic plot and thus we consider it appropriate to name the different lines in a literature's development 'literary-historical sujets' which have their own logic of development. The research of these sujets will allow us to touch upon the artistic process's own 'memory'.

CLEO PROTOKHRISTOVA

VISUAL EMBLEMS AND LITERARY YEARS
(FROM *TWO BEAUTIFUL EYES* TO *PRETTY EYES AND BRAND MY GLASSES*)

The present study stems from two methodological assumptions. The first one, related to the view that the philosophical discourse of modernity and – respectively – modern culture in general can be considered oculacentric, is that in the context of such a spectatortial epistemology memory should be interpreted predominantly in terms of visuality. The second assumption is derivative of certain empirical observations and consequent analysis of Western culture of the Twentieth century. Reduced to a simple statement it would claim that in the history of the 20th century there are several moments of unsurpassable creative intensity and it was in those moments that the most significant events in that culture occurred and – consequently – its most representative artifacts emerged. It is in this methodological frame that the following experiment to rationalize the way we remember and create 20th century cultural heritage will be held.

Needless to say, it would be a most difficult and demanding project to create an inventory of the images that constitute our memory of the Twentieth century. There are though certain elements whose presence in that inventory we might take for granted. Most certain among them seem the spectacles. Wearing glasses in public is a cultural achievement of the last century. On their own accord, both magnifying spectacles and dark

glasses happen not only to be a most significant element of 20th century's visual culture, but also provide a reliable sign for the identification of the age.

Prior to the beginning of the 20th century most people didn't wear glasses in public since wearing those was considered a sign of old age and weakness. Parisian aristocrats, for example, would use reading aids only in private. Spain of the 19th c. was an exception being the only country where it was generally believed that wearing glasses made one look more important and dignified. Even in the early years of the 20th c. glasses were never to be worn in public especially by ladies. It was around 1914 that spectacles with large round lenses and tortoise shell frame appeared. In the 20's the fashion required enormous round spectacles and although people were still reluctant to keep them on their faces, glasses were successfully adapted to the flapper fashion representative of the Jazz age. During the early 30's special emphasis was given to style. And it was at the end of the same decade that sunglasses were introduced. Thereafter, it did not take much time before glasses finally moved from the realm of vision to the world of style and fashion.

So it was actually into the scope of two decades that spectacles acquired sociability, then their never before interrogated affiliation to the sphere of optics was shaken and finally shifted to the field of socializing practices. Once incorporated in their new functional field, glasses enormously intensified their social presence and began to cast a rich spectrum of significations.

For all the obviousness of their persistent availability in the landscape of the time though glasses were not accompanied by a relevant process of ideological construction. The latter remained in the limits of discreteness and impulses for meaning production emitted by glasses continued to be mostly unidentifiable.

During the last decades of the 20th c. glasses turned into a specific modern myth. Cases such as *Men in Black* or Goran Bregovich, who according to his own confession wouldn't take off his dark glasses even when alone and in front of a mirror, or the centrifugal refunctionalizing of glasses – starting from the banality of ceaselessly wearing them even

when not needed, often just lifted above the forehead like a diadem, to the sophisticated symbolism in *The Matrix* – all these imply that "glasses is not just glasses".

The mechanisms by means of which the emblematics appropriated to glasses have been constructed are multiple and their exploration requires in most cases a very specific competence. One of the modes of acquiring indexicality that seams to have been almost totally neglected is literary thematising. Therefore this paper will focus on glasses in literary texts and arts.

The potential for thematisation of a given phenomenon is a variable quantity. Hair, for example, for all its associations with traditional symbolism – strong enough to ground all kinds of plots ranging from *Samson* to *The Rape of the Lock*, was transformed into an object of active thematisation during the1960s. The relevant process that culminated in the musical *Hair* (1968) and the subsequent screen version directed by Milosh Forman (1979) triggered the rationalization of long hair as an emblem of a sort for that same turbulent decade.

The great moment of glasses is quite earlier. Paradoxically enough they abound in literature and arts throughout the whole 19th c. before ever becoming a social practice. In E.T.A.Hoffmann's work of 1810-1920 their role is sinister. In a short story of 1850 entitled *The Spectacles* Edgar Allan Poe narrates a grotesque situation stemming from the character's refusal to wear glasses. Short sighted to the degree of incapacity he falls in love at first sight while attending an opera performance and ends up married to his great grandmother.

In a more ambitious and large scale story – *Glasses*, written in 1896, Henry James tells about a beautiful young lady who ruins her eyes to the degree of complete blindness also because of her unwillingness to accept spectacles. In both narratives glasses are interpreted as an object of disgust, wearing them makes the beautiful face "glazed and barred", a spectacled person provokes pangs of resentment.

The ambiguous status of glasses seems to have been overcome in the beginning of the 20th c. and by the early 20s literature appears to articulate much better human necessity of vision aids. It was not before 1924

though that spectacles started to produce specific meanings, independent of their basic function, thus gradually acquiring indexicality. This precursory and rather hypothetical chart requires verification that could be easily provided if we compare literary texts that have been written or completed in the years between 1922 and 1926 and works of the same authors created in the period preceding WWI. In Thomas Mann's novella *Death in Venice* for example for all its focusing on old age and personal degradation the fact that Gustav von Aschenbach is spectacled is mentioned only one single time – in the introducing portrait. In *The Magic Mountain* though, whose writing was initiated before World War I but was completed and published in 1924, glasses appear with consistency that although incommensurable with the intensity of the eyes leitmotiv maintained throughout the whole novel invests their presence with special significance. Even admitted that the recurrent motif of the greedy student's spectacles seems more like a component of the background, Nafta's sparkling glasses, intensifying his irony are far from being a trifle.

The same historical distance marked by different susceptibility to glasses is implied in James Joyce works standing on the opposite sides of the World war. In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* although glasses are given a dramatic role in the episode with the humiliation and punishment of Steven at school, they signify nothing but the prosthesis that makes the boy's adequate functioning possible and mark his alienation. And In *Ulysses* glasses – including those belonging to the same Steven – are already capable to produce various significations. Among those one deserves special attention, since glasses are qualified as "revolting" and found "accountable for any and every falling off in the calibre of the race".

All these seemingly nonsystematic instances of "literary spectacles" from the early 20s of the twentieth century conveyed so far are triggered into motion by mid-decade. Their dynamics is to be perceived in the perspective of the specific interpretation glasses get in the novel *The Great Gatsby*. A most striking evidence provide the so called *Dr. T. J.*

Eckleburg's Eyes – the gigantic blue eyes without a face that look out at the valley of ashes from behind a pair of yellow eyeglasses. Their omniscient presence on the billboard advertisement's takes on added significance later as grief stricken George Wilson refers to them as God. Glasses appear in *The Great Gatsby* couple of times more to match the recurrent motif of eyesight thus getting to signify the difficulties of obtaining a clear picture of reality and the impossibility of adjusting one's eye to get a faithful reflection of the outside world. This moment has been specifically emphasized and multiplied in Jack Klenton's film version of 1974, where the distorting effect of reflections plays an important part and spectacles, not least those on the face of the menacing billboard ad, seem to stand as metaphor for obscured vision and poor judgment. The importance of this symbolic image was emphasized by utilizing it for the book cover of the first *Gatsby* edition The designer positioned Doctor Eckleburg's eyes on the background of the valley of ashes thus bringing together two of the major metaphors of modern life – the spectacles and the Waste Land.

Beyond their symbolic meaning, in *The Great Gatsby* glasses appear as an amplified expression of a general tendency characteristic of the period, discernible already in Scot Fitzgerald's earlier *This Side of Paradise* (1920), and *Tales of the Jazz Age* (1922) – horned-rimmed glasses are incorporated in Flapper culture to become one of its basic constituents, where spectacles appear in accord with the overall orientation of this fashion style to emphasize nonconformity.

It is a stunning coincidence that one of the most unconventional usages of spectacles in Bulgarian poetry, to be found in the work of Atanas Dalchev, belongs to the same period. Dalchev's poem *Youth* (*Младост*) with the famous statement that the poet used to go to bed spectacled so that he could better see his dreams, was written in 1925 – exactly at the time when Piet Mondrian, following pre-war modernist artists identified glasses as his privileged object.

Summing up the findings we can make the conclusion that in the 1920s glasses were appropriated new meanings. Not considered disfigurement

anymore they still stood for certain personal and social incapacity. At the same time spectacles could mark individual independence and present a gesture of unconventionality. Thus they were associated with flapper culture and feminist movement. More likely glasses would appear as a sign of behavioural peculiarity. And during that same period they come to function as a metaphor. All these semantic developments pave a path to glasses in Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* (1949), William Golding's *Lord of Flies* (1954), Max Frisch's *Gantenbein* (1964), Kundera's *Immortality* (1991).

The indexicality of glasses and their rationalization as a sort of an emblem for the 1920s is also the result of a later, secondary contextulization of literary texts written before 1930. This statement could easily be justified if we refer again to *Death in Venice* and Gustav von Aschenbach's glasses. Although in the novella they are mentioned and described only once, for any reader belonging to a later period of time Gustav von Aschenbach's image appears as a face inevitably decorated with spectacles. This is somehow in conflict with the authentic facts – for regardless of the fact that the devises in question are defined by Thomas Mann as *Goldbrille* it is apparent that what is at stake in the text of *Death in Venice* is actually a pince-nez. Written there literally is *Der Bügel einer Goldbrille mit radnlosen Gläsern schitt in die Würzel der gedrungenen, edel gebogenen Naze ein*...(The nose-piece of his rimless gold spectacles cut into the base of his thick, aristocratically hooked nose).

Aschehbach's association with spectacles does not result from what has been stated in the text – after their initial indication the glasses as if permanently disappear. Rather it reflects the readers' visual experience acquired during the next couple of decades that appropriates automatically spectacles as a pertaining attribute for the type that von Aschenbach represents. It is a result of exactly that same kind of secondary contextualization that in Lucino Visconti's *Death in Venice* of 1974 Dirk Bogarde is in horned spectacles that have nothing to do with the time presented in Thomas Mann's novella.

A similar effect is to be observed in the comparison between Henry Pierre Roche's novel *Jules et Jim* written in 1953 and Francois Truffaut's

cinematic version of the same story of 1962. The most dramatic part of the relations inside this *ménage a trois* is in the years following World War I when life has abruptly changed and people look absolutely different. In the novel which is strictly reminiscent and autobiographical this fundamental shift has been described and explicitly commented on. The clothes of the three young persons, the commodities that build up their everyday life appear as an integral part of the narrative. In general Truffaut keeps close to Roche's description. But he introduces additionally a pair of fancy glasses that pop on Cathy's nose and incidentally appear even on her daughter's face. These glasses are a sign of that character's unconventionality. They also designate Cathy's behavioural style and her inclination to disregard anything that stands in her own way. In the system of Truffaut's visual messages glasses appear as an emblem of the roaring 20s together with plated skirts, bicycles, and bathing suits, to mention just a few of that time's identification signs. There is much sunbathing in Truffaut's film, much more than in the novel and in comparison to what was likely to occur in the 20s. Very much like the emphasis on glasses, this next deviation is semantically charged. It appears also related to glasses since focusing on sunbathing has to do with the expansion of a new modus of pastoral *dolce vita* whose emergence is related to the *Belle époque* – the culture of the beach. Among this culture's generally accepted emblems a prominent role play dark glasses.

Once adopted as a social practice dark glasses not only develop a dense texture of symbolism but eventually efface the difference between dioptric spectacles and sunglasses (especially after the invention of compact lenses). Glasses become a matter of fashion and standard. Simultaneously they change their functions.

A concise history of the social status of glasses is to be found in Milan Kundera's novel *Immortality* (1991). The prehistory is presented by means of an anecdote referring to the rather specific relations between Goethe and Bettina von Arnim, née Brentano. Those relations were turned into myth and developed in a literary plot by Bettina who later edited the correspondence between Goethe and herself in such a manipulative manner that identified her as "the last Goethe's love". The anecdote narrates

an encounter between Bettina and Goethe's wife Christiane. They meet at an art exhibition and there Christiane hits Bettina so that her spectacles fall on the ground and break. The glasses are the critical point in this awkward situation and the heart of the conflict. Interpreting the incident Kundera specifies that Goethe used to consider wearing glasses in public, especially by women, disgusting and abominable. Thus Bettina's spectacles, popping defiantly on her nose, happened to be interpreted by Christiane as a challenge addressed directly to her notorious husband.

Already in the context of contemporaneity, in an intricate parallel to the historical reconstruction, Kundera represents a scene where broken is a pair of dark glasses. The conflict underlining the situation is between two sisters. The younger appropriates everything that comes on her way including her sister's life. She imitates her sister's beautiful gesture and her love for a definite kind of music, then after a series of failed relations identifies her sister's husband as the man of her own dreams. She usurps also her sister's habit of wearing dark glasses. Exactly as in other cases of misappropriation, once recognized as personal the attributes in question change their meaning. For the younger sister dark glasses become a sign of her permanent melancholy as well as of the insistence to keep her eyes hidden. So in stead of concealing their probable redness, consequence of supposed crying – a metaphor of her unhappiness and sentimentality, she actually satisfies her wish to exaggerate the facts of her private life and make them public. The dark glasses in question get broken on purpose. It is when the older sister finds her husband kissing the younger one and breaking the glasses appears as a kind of retribution with the hypocrisy and displacement materialized in them. Sunglasses inhabit Kundera's novel along with other signs of the contemporary world of appearances and simulations – a world in which ideology has been replaced by imagology.

The ongoing functional shift of glasses is paradoxical to a great extent. Once meant to be used as an aid to vision now glasses turn against vision. As a shield obstructing others' gaze dark glasses help those who wear them not to be subjected to direct observation. Having helped human eyes for centuries to better mirror the world in the simulacrum con-

dition glasses mirror back the others' gaze and offer the world its own image. In the context of imagology spectacles stand for the person, beautiful eyes humble themselves to brand glasses. To a certain extent this metamorphosis can be traced back to a definite historical moment and to its literary texts.

In the context of imagology glasses not just offer identity for the self and not just dare to designate this identity. They appear to be identity's reliable substitute. There is a repeating, refrain-like cue in a contemporary play – Viripaev's "Oxygen" that says "But the most important thing about her was she wore expensive sunglasses". Beautiful eyes have finally yielded to luxurious lenses and brand frames. One of the most expressive trajectories of this metamorphosis is to be followed through the literary texts of the twentieth century.

КЛЕО ПРОТОХРИСТОВА

ВИЗУАЛЬНЫЕ ЭМБЛЕМЫ И ЛИТЕРАТУРНЫЕ ГОДЫ

В этой методологической рамке будет сделана попытка рационализировать то, как мы помним и конструируем культурное наследие XX века. В качестве объекта исследования выбран образ очков. В статье исследуются процессы превращения очков в визуальную эмблему XX века.

EWA SZCZĘSNA

MEMORY IN THE ADVERTISEMENT

Memory plays an important role in advertising. It allows to recognize objects, situations and atmosphere created in the advertisement and combine it with the advertised object. Connotations between advertised object and atmosphere created in the advertisement imprint the advertisement deeper into the receiver's mind. Repeatedly administered fragments of music, film, slogans etc., as well as placing product name at the beginning and at the end of a message participate in the required creation of a brand image.

To analyze the importance of memory in advertising it is necessary to answer why advertising exists. What is it made for? It can be answered that advertising plays nowadays a role of former adviser, familiarizing people with new products and helping them to choose the best product of a kind. Progressive industrialization and commercialization result in the appearance of numerous new products on the market. Some of them, thanks to their attributes, will be attractive enough to find their place on the market and, if there are no competitive products, will require no further advertising. Most of new products will vanish from the market and even the best and the most intense, even brutal, campaign will not change this. But in every single case the new product has to be introduced to the audience (i.e. forthcoming customers) to appear in their minds, to be recognized among thousands of others. Recognizing the brand or product is the first goal of advertisement.

The second goal is memorizing an advertised object. Other goals are to attract the receiver's attention and to make him desire the product. Recognizing the product is the first step in memorizing it. Many similar advertisements and strong competition between them make the consumer indifferent in attempts to memorize an advertised object in a conscious way. Familiarizing the receiver with an advertised object helps to memorize the product or brand. Moreover, an advertised product should be linked with positive associations and emotions created in the advertisement. For this purpose authors pay a lot of attention to make the situation presented in the advertisement attractive: they employ handsome young actors or actresses, use new models of luxury cars, place the action in a picturesque landscape. Every detail is of high importance, since it may have an impact on the consumer's decision.

Another aspect of functioning memory in advertising is recalling knowledge, imaginations, and beliefs functioning in the customer's memory and using them for advertising purposes, often using persons, motives and events that are well known in general public.

The aim of this paper is to present the mechanisms and methods applied in commercials which force the audience to memorize advertised products, including mechanisms which increase attractiveness of the message, applying an interesting action, often with a piece of humour or emotion, using positive or sometimes also negative feelings, with a hint of eroticism, recalling well known and widely accepted persons and ideas. Persuasion is supported by special means of the message, including repetitions, intersemiotic paraphrases, metaphors and modern technical tricks making the commercial more attractive.

Repetitions are among the most common tricks in the advertisement. They may occur in the single advertisement or in series of advertisements (sometimes in a modified form). In the first case multiple calling of an object by the same name (even if it would be possible to avoid it for better stylistic result) breaks the rules of co-reference. But for advertising it is typical to repeat the whole phrase. These repetitions familiarize the receiver with an advertised object and associate it with everyday situations. Two separate kinds of repetition can be distinguished: repetition

in time (e.g. the same TV commercial repeated several times in the subsequent months or years) and repetition in space (similar commercials shown on billboards, on TV, published in newspapers, magazines, the Internet, means of transport, even in public toilets).

Repetition refers both to an advertised object and the way it is shown, image and music sequences, as well as a variety of colours. Recalling it again and again, especially using different techniques of textual expression (vocal, visual and acoustic), fixes the message deeply in the receiver's memory. Moreover, connotations created by the situation presented in the advertisement allow remind the whole original message from its fragment. It is applied in advertising campaigns, when at the beginning of the campaign an advertised object is presented in a special situation, usually being located in a short story, which is presented in a shorter version as it becomes recognized by the audience. Thus, original TV commercial lasting 30-60 seconds can be finely shortened even to 5 seconds without compromise of its persuasion, with all its economical and practical consequences. It is the receiver's memory, which guarantees campaign's continuity and efficiency. Nevertheless, this mechanism of connotations has very important limitation – the message has to be repeated regularly. An audience's memory is too often exposed to advertisements of similar products of different brand to preserve the message of a particular advertisement. Satisfactory campaigns apply the entire set of instruments to reach an audience, including newspapers and magazines, radio and TV, billboards and the Internet. Therefore, repetition is the most extensively applied among others mechanisms.

But sooner or later repetitions start to bore the audience. Moreover, receiver is exhausted with messages attacking him from every TV station, every newspaper or magazine. To protect himself, he simply changes the channel or turns off TV as soon as commercials occur and throws out every advertisement mail without even opening it. Several tricks could be done to prevent these unwanted side-effects of repetitions in advertisements.

First of all, commercial message has to be attractive. It has to be aesthetic (funny situation, attractive actress and smart actor, beautiful

landscape), emotional (relation with children or pets), and educational (modern art, NASA news, etc). It could be also attractive by the employment of widely accepted people or values. Intersemiotic paraphrases allow describing the same subject or idea in many different sign systems, such as iconic, verbal, or musical. It refers to advertisement tricks that are presented at the same time. It concerns moods, emotions, which are related to the advertised object. Expressing the same idea in different semiotic systems makes the message internally cohesive, but diverse at the same time. It also leads to hyperbolization of presented texts and fixes them stronger in the receiver's memory.

To attract the message, commercials often contain elements that surprise an audience. An unexpected element that is not coherent with an established pattern, will be certainly better noticed and memorized then that expected by the receiver. Sometimes it means breaking off the stereotypes or accepted esthetical and ethical norms, shocking an audience with combination of intensive colours, loud and aggressive music, photographs violating respected norms. In Benetton's Company campaign contrasting colours were sometimes combined with shocking situations, for example a priest and a nun kissing each other, a sick person with AIDS on a white sheet, a black woman breast-feeding a white baby, copulating horses evoked world-wide public discussion on the borders of commercial message, good taste and morality. But it also fixed this company deeply into the receiver's memory, making it well known, even if not fully accepted. The process of memorizing is more effective when shocking presentations are not closed with conclusion, forcing the receiver to analyze and summarize the message, to participate in the process of creation of the advertisement (Stayman, Kardes, 1992).

Engaging the receiver in the creation of a message is one of the most important ways of fixing his attention on the commercial and its subject. It is realized with the use of ellipse (insinuations) combined with parallel suggestion of the way of completing insinuations. Engaging the receiver in the act of creation of the message switches the role between an author and receiver. An audience participates in the process of creation of con-

notations, desires and aspirations of the message. Those connotations, desires and aspirations depend on the audience and are strictly determined by age, sex, educational and material status, lifestyle etc. Thus, targeted audience becomes co-author of the advertisement, engaged in the creation of its structure and content (Myers, 1994). This is most obvious in the most sophisticated commercials, especially multimedia advertisement published via the Internet. The receiver can literally create a message deciding, which parts to include into it and which not just by clicking the mouse.

Most advertisements do not shock the audience. They attempt to attract the receiver's attention referring to unusual properties that are new among advertising objects or ideas. Many of them regularly introduce new concepts trying to override ordinariness. Postcards advertising the *Absolut* vodka account for an example. The campaign was based on a concept of using natural spatial structures, in particular architectural ones, with shape resembling a bottle of the advertised drink. The subsequent postcards show an entrance to the Paris underground, a monumental pump in the Old Town market in Warsaw, an apartment house in Amsterdam and Downing Street 10 (an entrance to a Prime Minister office in London). Shape of the bottle could be also recognized at a scooter parked in front of a monumental fountain in Rome.

Commercials also often refer to stereotypes functioning in a particular society. Association of an advertised object with simplified, well recognized and remembered signs causes that an advertised object seems to be familiar, coming out from the tradition. It is much easier to fix an object in a social memory when the advertisement is based on the stereotype. Advertisement links an advertised object to emotions and associations that are related with the particular stereotype. Thus the stereotype of traditional, happy family is bound with food, insurance (security), bank loans and household products. Satisfaction and happiness coming out from a happy family are transferred onto an advertised object and in each case are logically related with it. Thus "beauty products" (cosmetics and perfumes), which are to increase the attractiveness for the contrary sex, are combined with attractive women and men. Every product for child-

ren bases on the image of loving mother and medicines or tooth paste are presented by a physician or a chemist. Also numerous references to tradition of a particular society or human civilization are used. A piece of famous classical music (Chopin, Beethoven, Mozart and Wagner) or picture presenting famous people (Leonardo da Vinci, Albert Einstein) ennobles an advertised object through connotations with something significant for our civilization. Another and more important consequence is manipulation affecting the receiver's memory. The advertisement, referring to events and facts already present in the receiver's memory, reinterprets them linking them with an advertised object. An attempt of the authors of advertisement is to set the advertised object into the receiver's memory so deeply that it would become an element of culture and history, necessary for social existence. It is memorized and appreciated basing on an impact from history, tradition and public believes.

References to tradition and history do not appear only by recalling events and people from the past, but also taking advantage of historical scenery and costumes. Recalling an atmosphere of traditional aristocratic lifestyle in an advertisement of alcohol beverages evokes connotations of unlimited luxury with advertised drinks, but also underlines their uniqueness, as unique are people drinking them and situations, in which they are served. They also invoke to collective memory and contribute to idealization both of an advertised object and the past, transforming them into the myth (Barthes, 1957).

Association of an advertised product with already accepted values and people results in a positive perception of the product. In this case, narration is based on positive emotions associated with these values and people. The narration further establishes positive emotions and connects them with an advertised product.

The narration, being a traditional form of expression, fixes events and characters presented in the commercial in the memory much easier than any other form of expression, regardless if these events and people are real or fictional. Paradoxically, the art of the narration, not facts or level of culture (high or popular culture), decides whether the receiver will memorize the Cinderella story or the history of the Roman Empire con-

quests better. Julius Caesar and Superman, Raskolnikov and Mr. Muscle may stay side by side at the same memory level. The process of memorizing does not differentiate truth, myth and plain lie, if the narration is good enough. The reality shown in the ancient-like stories is not necessarily based on true stories. Moreover, the narration in the advertisement uses tricks that additionally attract the receiver's attention, rendering an advertised object easier to memorize (Szczęsna, 2001: 165-182). Suspension, for instance, strongly engages the receiver's emotions increasing his capabilities to memorize details of accompanying events (Prieto-Pablos, 1998: 109).

Strong emotional stimulation strengthens memorizing of the advertised objects (Reeves, Nass, 1996). The information with high emotional impact is memorized faster than neutral one, since messages with both positive (e.g. sexual) and negative (e.g. violence) content are perceived equally. Also TV news combine information of a neutral character (stock exchange news) with those of a very strong emotional character (accidents, crimes). Analogically, commercials evoke a strong emotional influence, usually taking advantage of positive emotions, transferring those emotions to advertised products or ideas. Engagements of positive emotions in advertisement, especially humour and sex, facilitate the maximal condensation of messages (Szczęsna, 2003). Their use allows to reduce the number of presented features of the advertised object in the commercial. Less the data in the advertisement and stronger the emotions evoked by it, the better it is remembered.

Humour allows to shorten the message as humorous situations do not require further explanation (Kołakowski, 1959: 83). Moreover, any attempt to explain the humour simply destroys it (Ziomek, 1980: 340). Thus, applying the humour allows condensing the message with its strictly marketing (effectiveness) and economical (cost effectiveness) consequences. One should imagine that redundancy of signs and symbols simplifies the message making it more persuasive, faster and deeper penetrating into memory, thus more effective. Moreover, such a shortened, simplified message sinks into the memory regardless the receiver's will and out of his control (Pytlak, 1977: 142). Another aspect of applying hu-

mour in the commercial presentation is an increase in its attractiveness, as it enters the spectator into good mood. The process of understanding of the clue of humour, sometimes hidden quite deeply, proves the cleverness of the receiver, gives him the feeling of controlling the situation, the feeling of having power. In conclusion, humour impressing its intellectual and emotional influence, attracts the message, condenses it and assists its remembering (Reeves, Nass, 1996). It is obvious that different media, also commercials, have an impact on the receiver's emotions just like real experiences.

Eroticism and sex, apart from humour, are also capable to evoke positive emotions. Analogically, they support memorizing of an advertised object, having an influence on connotations evoked in the receiver's mind. But in contrast to humour, one should be careful with of application of eroticism and sex as their interpretation can bring about negative connotations, resulting in total abnegation of values and ideas presented in the advertisement. Binding together eroticism and humour allows avoiding those negative connotations, as joke is able to break the taboo, reduces or eliminates the shame obligating the sphere of sexuality.

The metaphor is also beneficial for the advertisement, as it allows compressing and shortening the message, thus enabling application of short cuts. Aristotle's *Poetics* characterizes the metaphor as abbreviated comparison. According to Derrida, metaphor expresses an idea better than any long descriptions, since it directly expresses the idea (Derrida, 1972). Benefits that advertisement takes from the metaphor come from the fact that metaphor, due to application of various semiotic means, is more condensed, compressed, thus more cost-effective and more efficient. It is revealing and stimulating imagination as it offers a new insight into an object. Using structures originating from many rhetorical figures that stimulate the auditor's mind evoking various connotations, leads to occurrence of various personal perceptions according to the receiver's previous experiences and knowledge. It is more persuasive as it fixes the advertised object very deeply in the mind.

Metaphor is a conceptual structure based on social, cultural and educational factors modified by personal knowledge and experiences

(Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Gibbs, 1994). Its meaning is always created in the receiver's mind as a result of the imagination process. In consequence, receiver becomes engaged in the process of characterization of the advertised object. The process of understanding of the metaphor is a conceptual process that could be compared to the solving a riddle. It requires conceptual thinking and quite often a lot of intellectual effort. In return, the solution is rewarded by a satisfaction coming from performed conceptual work. It improves receiver's intellectual capabilities, distinguishing him from the impersonal mob. This simple trick causes identification of the receiver with the situation performed in the advertisement; keeps positive emotions associated with it and helps to accept advertised objects and values. Additionally, an advertisement is characterized by very expansive usage of the newest techniques of presentation. It creates multisemiotic structures, where meanings are expressed in various semiotic systems, e.g. motion, picture and sound in TV commercials, picture and text on billboards (Forceville, 2000), etc. Those multisemiotic structures (figures and narration) activate more senses than the monosemiotic ones. According to the metaphor, an intellectual perception is supported by an emotional one. Introducing an emotional perception moves the metaphor from the area of realized processes into semi- or even unrealized ones. At the same time the metaphor, as an emotional and intellectual structure, activates the receiver's consciousness.

Using many semiotic systems, such as image, sound, word and movement enables activation of visual and auditory memories. Linking an advertised object with certain picture, colour or music phrase results in recalling an advertised object in the receiver's memory after the same sounds or pictures are presented. This way of influencing the memory can be observed in the case of advertising campaigns, in which subsequent messages are created in relation to preceding ones. For instance, it is sufficient that radio advertising uses a sonic motive present in a television advertisement and the receiver's memory recalls images, scenes that have been shown in a television advertisement. In such cases message, originally introduced as complex one, composed of many semiotic

means, compressed later on to the total minimum can easily be repeated unlimited number of times with simplified transmission techniques, thus reaching the wide audience more cost-effectively.

Fixing in the receiver's memory, reminding, transforming new items into known ones and manipulating the receiver's memory are issues inevitably related to the concept of memory in the advertisement. All of them determine the way of using advertising tricks and the very structure of the message; its verbal and audio-visual layers. Making the memory a basis for advertising activities leads to multiplication of mnemotechnical tricks. The very idea of memory becomes subject to reinterpretation, which is expressed in reduction of its historical and cultural dimensions exposing at the same time its practical, commercial dimension.

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ПАМЯТЬ В РЕКЛАМЕ

С проблемой памяти в рекламе связаны запоминание, напоминание, преобразование нового в известное и манипулирование памятью, которое проявляется в связывании предмета рекламы с тем, что закреплено в памяти получателя и оценивается им как положительное. Статья показывает способы воздействия на память – мнемотехнические приёмы, как структурные (использование повествования, метафоры, всякого рода повторений), так и тематические (призывание традиции, юмора, стереотипов). Все эти элементы в рекламе обусловлены риторично. Стремление врезаться в память получателя ведёт к согласованию противоречий: с одной стороны, призывание того, что повтаряемо и стереотипно, а с другой стороны – является оригинальным и даже шокирующим. В статье показано мнемотехническое использование интерсемиотической парафразы. В процессе воздействия на память важную роль играет эмоциональное и интеллектуальное вовлечение получателя, которое ведёт к перемещению ролей отправителя и адресата в результате приспособления перевода к потребностям, жажде и индивидуальным особенностям получателя, а даже – в случае интернетовской рекламы – дословного включения адресата в творческий акт.

БОЖЕНА ВИТОШ

ВИДЕНО „ГЛАЗАМИ ПАМЯТИ“
(ПРОБЛЕМЫ КОНСТРУКЦИИ ТЕКСТА)

В заглавии моего доклада, который будет посвящён некоторым вопросам, касающимся структуры текстов, описывающих добывание из индивидуальной памяти фрагментов действительности, я даже слишком выразительно ссылаюсь на зрительную перцепцию, как бы противореча очевидным фактам, что в памяти ничего нельзя увидеть, что-нибудь можно себе только – в акте напоминания – ***представить***. Однако в словарной дефиниции лексемы *представить (себе)* читаем: „увидеть в воображении, восстановить силой воображения“[1].

Вызывать что-либо перед глазами значит что-либо себе напоминать, оживлять в памяти. В исследованиях феномена памяти подчёркивается, что напоминание приводит в движение визуальную память, эйдетизменную, представления которой – чёткие, живые, детальные, имеют черты наблюдательных представлений[2].

Автор *Искусства памяти* обращает внимание на роль, которую в формировании умения запоминания сыграло зрение, как самое острое из наших органов чувств.

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[1] Słownik języka polskiego. под ред. M. Szymczak, t. III, Warszawa 1981, s.826

[2] Сравни: M. Zaleski, 1996, *Formy pamięci. O przedstawieniu przeszłości w polskiej literaturze współczesnej,* Warszawa 1996, c. 40 Изд. IBL.

Метафора, которую использовала исследовательница: „память, видящая места и накопленные в них представления“[3], обосновывает мой замысел – сравнение литературной записи ***акта видения*** и ***акта напоминания***, так как описывание вышеназванных действий имеет характер образного представления, в котором чувство зрения играет существенную роль. Хочу поразмышлять над тем, возникает ли то, что видено (образ конструированного объекта в ситуации смотрения) из текста другим способом, чем то, что субъектом запомнено и в какой-то другой субъективной ситуации „призвано глазами“. Иначе говоря, хочу установить (если это возможно) разницу между ролью глаза видящего здесь и сейчас, и ролью „глаза памяти“, смотрящего на воображение того, что было когда-то видено.

В исследованиях феномена памяти подчёркивается, что акт напоминания соединён с воображением. В этом, разумеется, трудно сомневаться. Одновременно (это имеет для наших рассуждений существенное значение) в современном диспуте, касающемся визуальной перцепции и частично связанных с её механизмами правил литературной репрезентации света, совершается ревалоризация чувства зрения; ревалоризация, направленная на уменьшение его роли в контактах человека со светом[4]. Здесь напомню только вопросы, широко обсуждаемые в других теоретических контекстах.

В сегодняшнем диспуте на тему литературной категории *mimesis* подчёркивается особая роль ***посреднических сфер*** в процессе художественного воспроизведения действительности: черты верно-

[3] Цитата: F.A. Yates, *Sztuka pamięci.* Пер. W. Radwański, Warszawa 1977, c. 15-16, PIW.

[4] Сравни: M. Jay, *Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought,* Berkeley 1993.Обширный фрагмент III раздела этой книги издан под заглавием: M. Jay, *Kryzys tradycyjnej władzy wzroku. Od impresjonistów do Bergsona.* пер. J. Przeźmiński, в: *Odkrywanie modernizmu*, под ред. R. Nycza, Kraków 1998.

го отражения заслоняет экран культурной традиции, эстетических конвенций, языка и т.п[5].

Также работы антропологов, физиологов и психологов нарушают (или ослабляют) тезис об универсальном и непосредственном размере зрительных впечатлений, указывая на ***культурную медиатизацию видения***.

Ernest H. Gombrich утверждал, что „... много из того, что называем видением, обусловлено привычкой и ожиданием"[6], а J. Bruner указывал, что восприятие является „решительным процессом", свидетельствующим об ориентации („перцепционной готовности") субъекта[7]. По мнению французского феноменолога Мерло-Понти, соотношение человека со светом является соотношением взаимных реляций: „смысл вещей рождается в отклонении между текучим от них созывом к наделению их значением и „особенной деформацией", которую мы на них накладываем, деформацией вынуждённой нашей, такой а не другой, перспективы, через наше единичное расположение, и наконец, через нашу экспрессию, всегда творческую по отношению к вещам, которые подвергаются преобразованиям"[8]. На роль ***познаваемых схем*** и ограничения, которое в зрительном восприимании набрасывает язык, обращают внимание психология познания[9]

[5] Литература, касающаяся этой темы, очень богата. Нет возможности назвать хотя бы большинства изданных работ. Назову лишь несколько, которые были изданы за последние годы: Z. Mitosek, *Mimesis. Zjawisko i problem,* Warszawa 1997; R. Nycz, *Tezy o mimetyczności,* в: тот же *Tekstowy świat*, Warszawa 1995; тот же: *Literatura jako trop rzeczywistości. Poetyka epifanii w najnowszej literaturze polskiej,* Kraków 2001; R. Barthes, *S/Z.* Przeł. M.P. Markowski, M. Gołębiowska, Warszawa 1999; M.P. Markowski, *Pragnienie obecności. Filozofie reprezentacji od Platona do Kartezjusza,* Gdańsk 1999.

[6] E.H. Gombrich, *Sztuka i złudzenie. O psychologii przedstawiania obrazowego.* пер. J. Zarański, Warszawa 1981,c 91.

[7] J.S. Bruner, *O gotowości percepcyjnej,* в: там же: *Poza dostarczone informacje. Studia z psychologii poznania.* пер. B. Mrozak i in. Wybór i red. J.M. Anglin, Warszawa 1978.

[8] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Proza świata. Eseje o mowie.* Выбор, обработка и введение S. Cichowicz, Warszawa 1976, с. 202, 225; цит. по M.P. Markowski, *Anatomia ciekawości,* Kraków 1999, с. 78-79.

и современная теория литературы: „Прошлое как память является похороненным и разрушенным, является колодцем, в котором находятся фрагменты, неспособные показаться свету памяти без сложного устройства языковых конструкций и представлений“[10].

Затем, если утверждать, что описывание света в литературе никогда не имеет прямого и прозрачного характера, надо также предположить, что нет „нейтральных“ зрительных ощущений. Здесь надо вспомнить слова Ф. Ницше, что ни одна точка зрения никогда не может быть независимой, так как она всегда нагружена стоимостью[11], или слова философа Макса Вартофского: „Человеческое видение является артефактом, образованным другими артефактами“[12].

Наиболее радикальные слова были высказаны художником. Приведу более длинный фрагмент из заявления Оскара Уайльда:

„Кто если не импрессионисты создали эти чудные, тёмные туманы, что тянутся по нашим улицам... В настоящем люди видят уже туманы не потому однако, что они существуют, а потому, что поэты и живописцы объявили им таинственную красоту этого явления... Их не было, пока их искусство не открыло“[13].

Зрительное переживание соединяет чувственные испытания, интеллектуальные и представительные операции. Визуальная перцепция – подобно памяти – также каким-то способом связана с представлением. Современный польский писатель Andrzej Stasiuk на

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[9] Сравни I. Kurcz, *Język a reprezentacja świata w umyśle,* Warszawa 1987; T. Mądzrycki, *Deformacje w spostrzeganiu ludzi,* Warszawa 1986.

[10] E. Donato, *Ruiny pamięci: fragmenty archeologiczne i artefakty tekstowe.* Przeł. D. Gostyńska, „Pamiętnik literacki“ 1986, z.3.

[11] F. Nietzsche,*Tako rzecze Zaratustra. Tłum. W. Berent, Warszawa 1990,* c.146.

[12] M. Wartofsky, *Picturing and Representing,* в: *Representation and Pictorial Representation,* New York 1979, c 314; цит.J Przeźmiński, *Z perspektywy Martina Jaya, czyli o tym jak "przymknąć" oko,* в: Odkrywanie modernizmu, под ред. R. Nycza, Kraków 1998, c.332.

[13] O. Wilde, *„Zanik Kłamstwa“.* Пер. M. Feldmanowa, в: *Moderniści o sztuce.* Обраб. E. Grabska, Warszawa 1971, c.169.

вопросы собеседников: „Что для вас действительно?...“ „Действительна ли эта зима за окном действительна?“ ответил: „В момент описания нет... Тогда является даром представления“[14].

Итак, метафорой *глаза представления* можем воспользоваться и при описании акта перцепции, и при описании акта напоминания.

Хотя надо согласиться, что существенную роль в акте восприятия играет чувство зрения, то оно, наверное, не является единым фактором, учреждающим этот акт. Смотрение требует присутствия субъекта[15], который – повторим за феноменологами – испытывает пространство всегда всем ***телом***, несмотря на доминацию одного чувства[16].

Предмет в акте перцепции никогда не является только визуальным феноменом[17], поэтому тяжело в конкретном описании отделить изображение умственного объекта от перцептуального[18], именно тогда, когда имеем сознание, что описание предмета одновременно является описанием переживания перцепции субъекта[19].

Много доказательств „сознания телесных измерений видения“[20] доставляет литература, формируя неоднородные конвенции так называемых сенсуалистических описаний, экспонирующих чёткое соединение (иногда до непонимания автономии их функций) видения

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[14] См. *Andrzej Stasiuk o widoku z okna*, в: *Rozmowy na nowy wiek*, ведут K. Janowska, P. Mucharski, т.2, Kraków 2002, Znak.

[15] Обращает на это внимание также M. Zaleski, *Formy pamięci,* Warszawa 1996, c.40, IBL

[16] См. работы: H. Bergson, *Materia i pamięć*. Пер. W.Filewicz, Warszawa 1926; M. Merleau-Ponty, *fenomenologia percepcji. Fragmenty.* Пер. M. Migasiński, P. Stefańczyk, Warszawa 1998; M. Maciejczak, *Świat według ciała w fenomenologii percepcji M. Merleau-Ponty'ego,* Warszawa 2001

[17] См.: M. Jay, *Kryzys....*, op. cit., c.304

[18] Мысль о трудном разделе связи перцепции и воображения выразил тоже P. De Man, *Struktura intencjonalna obrazu romantycznego.* Пер. A. Labuda, „Pamiętnik literacki“ 1978, z. 3

[19] Сравни также L. Brinton, *„Percepcja uobecniona“: studium z dziedziny narracji.* Пер. M. Adamczyk-Grabowska, „Pamiętnik literacki“ 1990, z. 4; D. Korwin-Piotrowska, *Problemy poetyki opisu prozatorskiego,* Kraków 2001, c.32.

[20] M. Jay, *Kryzys....*, op. cit., c.299

с чувствами „контакта“: осязания, вкуса, запаха. Такие описания ссылаются на известное по познавательной психологии явление перцепционной синестезии, которая полагается на усиление ощущений, принимаемых разными чувствами[21]. В работах, посвящённых стилистическим фигурам и тропам, обращается внимание на то, что синестезийные метафоры, соединяя явления из сферы разных чувственных ощущений, выражают интегрированность переживаний, которые обычно воспринимаются как раздельные. Итак, „явление синестезии может опираться на реальное переживание, имеющее обоснование в способе реагирования на слаженные толчки. Их объясняет психофизическое единство человека“[22]. В ситуации смотрения, когда объект перцепции находится относительно близко к предмету, возникает особенно полезная возможность активизации остальных чувств. Оказывается, что даже живописцы не полагаются только на свидетельство зрения. Как писал Пьер Франкастель, Ренуар „писал с близкого расстояния натурщика, почти касаясь, ощущая его рукой и глазами, он приклеивался к нему, более чувственно к качеству формы, чем напр. Дега к обычным аспектам очертания“[23].

То же самое происходит с памятью. Так как перцепция имеет телесное измерение, память также записывается во всём нашем теле. Н. Бергсон утверждал, что память состоит как из образов, которые мы хотим вызвать при помощи интеллекта, так и из телесно интериоризованных „механизмов движения“, которые накапливаются в теле. В то время как эти первые находятся в виде образов в уме, то вторые являются действиями, повторяющимися без никакой ингеренции со стороны воображения[24]. Итак, тело не

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[21] См. J.S. Bruner, *O gotowości percepcyjnej,* в: Idem, *Poza dostarczone informacje,* пер. B. Mroziak, Warszawa 1978

[22] См. T. Dobrzyńska, *Metafora,* Wrocław 1984: 228-229

[23] P. Francastel, *The destruction of a plastic space,* в: *Art. History: An Anthology of Modern Criticism,* под ред. W. Sypher, New York 1963, c.394; цит. M. Jay, *Kryzys....*, on. цит., c.299

[24] H. Bergson, *Materia i pamięć,* M. Jay, *Kryzys....*, on. цит., c.323.

только участвует в процессе перцепции, но является также камерой хранения информаций, сохранённых в памяти и приведённых в движение в акте напоминания[25].

Информации, призываемые памятью тела, не имеют языкового характера, их тяжело описать в разговоре. Память тела – из очерка Яна Котта – является „памятью без названий и понятий“, „памятью подушечек ладони“[26] или, как определил её Чеслав Милош – „мышцевой памятью в ногах“[27].

Обратим внимание ещё на следующий фрагмент:

Только время от времени, когда утром, до выхода в школу на Тополёву, с обыкновенной старательностью застёгивал поплиновую рубашку, как далёкое эхо **просыпалось в пальцах воспоминание** *прикосновения шёлкового рукава с вытачками и перломутровыми пуговицами на узком манжете*[28].

Думаю, что после вышеизложенного настало время отказаться от тропа, усматривающего специфику образа вызываемого в памяти только в той особенной роли, какую в его конструкции могло бы сыграть воображение.

Следует подробнее приглядеться к „артефактам текста“[29].

Языковое представление акта зрительной перцепции приобретает – в своём каноничном виде – форму описания, которое актуализирует структуру воспринимания в виде предикативного выражения (глагола „видения“) и аргументов, определённых как::

- воспринимающий субъект;
- часть тела, орган воспринимания, quasi – инструмент чувства;

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[25] Сравни J. Przeźmiński, *Z perspektywy* ..., op. cit., c.341.

[26] J. Kott, *Pamięć ciała,* в: тот же: *Kamienny potok. Eseje o teatrze i pamięci,* Kraków 1991, c.492.

[27] Cz. Miłosz, *Zaczynając od moich ulic,* Wrocław 1990, c.12

[28] S. Chwin, *Hanemann*, Gdańsk 1995, c.119

[29] Определение из статьи E. Donato, *Ruiny pamięci*..., on. цит. c.319 и 336

- прозрачное тело, предоставляющее возможность восприимания;
- воспринимаемый предмет, внешний по отношению к субъекту;
- Воспринимаемый предмет, внешний по отношению к субъекту и отличный от фигуры (фон);
- источник света.

Эти элементы, строящие структуру дескрипции и раскрытые эксплицитно (развернуто) или способом менее или более скрытным и неоднородным в языковом отношении, создают сеть вариантных структурально, семантически и стилистически описаний[30].

Надо помнить, что литературные беседы часто представляют разные способы утраты автоматизации воспринимательных привычек[31].

Вопрос текстовой организации описания визуальных испытаний в значительной степени решает категория точки зрения[32] – предмет показывается так, как воспринимает его в данный момент перци-

[30] Литература на тему структуры текста описания уже богата. Напомню здесь только некоторые более обширные разработки: Ph. Hamon, *Introduction a l'analyse du descriptif,* Paris 1981; Ph. Hamon, *Czym jest opis?,* Пер. A. Kuryś, K. Rytel, „Pamiętnik literacki" 1983, z.1; B. Witosz, *Opis w prozie narracyjnej na tle innych odmian deskrypcji,* Katowice 1997; D. Korwin-Piotrowska, *Problemy poetyki opisu prozatorskiego,* Kraków 2001. Много интересных замечаний по теме семантики и структуры перцепционных предложений даёт работа K. Termińskiej, *Sensualizm w prozie Jarosława Iwaszkiewicza. Hermeneutyka i składnia,* Katowice 1998

[31] Стоит здесь напомнить очень интересные рассуждения W. Szkłowskiego, *Sztuka jako chwyt.* в: тот же *O prozie. Rozważania i analizy.* Пер. S. Pollak, Warszawa 1964

[32] Этот термин, встречающийся в работах по поэтике (он введён в современную теорию повести), ..., обозначает – шире – позицию, исходя из которой нарратор рассказывает о событиях в мире литературной фикции, напр. точка зрения всёзнающего нарратора, нарратора с ограниченным знанием, точка зрения героя и т.п. В более узком значении категория точки зрения обозначает сознание, что мир указан всегда из какой-то перспективы, так, как выразительно видит его намеченный личный нарратор. Точка зрения видна в приведённой речи лица, в пределе наррации ввиду косвенной речи.

пирующий субъект. Список детерминантов зрительной перцепции длинен и содержит разнородные критерии: кроме указанных выше ситуационных определителей, таких как вид света, размещение предмета по отношению к объекту, вид фона, тип ситуации (прогулка, путешествие, разговор и т.п.), существенную роль в профилировании объекта[33] играет категория смотрящего субъекта: его общественный статус, принятая система достоинств, интеллектуально – эмоциональное состояние, и т.п.[34].

Способы литературной артикуляции акта видения, которые иллюстрируют сознание напряжения между испытанием восприятий и их передаванием, между реконструкцией и воплощением, реляцией и представлением[35], приобретают форму записи, приближающейся к конвенции „напоминания перцепции“[36], или к форме описания, иллюстрирующего спекулятивное сознание субъекта.

Описание представляет, если можно так это определить, осмотр с расстояния; во время смотрения субъект одновременно совершает интеллектуальные, вербальные операции в виде оценки, сопутствующей рефлексии, комментария, а также интерпретации текста, указывающих на структуральную организацию текста, напр., отбор и иерархизация соответствующих атрибутов и т.п. „Перцепция осознаваемая“, как часто подчёркивают, являлась бы языковой копией зрительных и слуховых явлений ещё не охваченных струей рефлек-

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[33] Термином профилирование пользуюсь вслед за исследователями из круга когнитивной лингвистики. вслед за тем: *Profilowanie w języku i w tekście,* под ред. J. Bertmińskiego i R. Tokarskiego, Lublin 1998

[34] Шире об определителях порядка в тексте описания я писала в книге: B. Witosz, *Opis w prozie narracyjnej na tle innych odmian deskrypcji,* Katowice 1997, c. 79-105.

[35] D. Korwin-Piotrowska, *Poetyka...,* op. cit., c.8.

[36] По Laurel Brinton: Перцепция напоминания это литературный стиль, при помощи которого автор вместо описания внешнего мира прямо выражает восприятия лица, касающиеся того же мира, так, как они выступают в сознании лица. См.: L. Brinton, *„percepcja uobecniona“: studium z dziedziny narracji.* Пер. M. Adamczyk-Garbowska, „Pamiętnik literacki“ 1990, z.4., c.320-321

сии[37]. Такая запись – так как отчётливо определяет данный объект как воспринимаемый сознанием субъекта – соединяет внутреннюю перспективу субъекта с тем, что является внешним[38]. То, что видено, не является уже только сигналом того, что реально, но признаком человеческого сознания – существует только в виде вербальных сознательных чувственных испытаний[39]. Заканчивая эту тему, повторим самое важное, что очевидный характер субъективного акта видения решает вопрос о том, что чувственные испытания переплетаются в нём с работой воображения.

Оба акта (восприятия и воспоминания) направлены интенционально на определённый объект.

На эффект образа, вызванного из депозита памяти, накладываются, так же как и в случае акта видения, действия реконструкции и языковой артикуляции, предшествующие ещё одному конститутивному для „памятной репродукции" акту – воспоминаниям, актуализированным при помощи предикативного выражения в виде глагола *помнить* или *напоминать о себе, воспоминать*.

Попробуем коротко представить ситуацию „памятного восприятия", чтобы определить её размеры, имея точкой соотнесения ситуацию зрительной перцепции. Остановимся сперва на категории субъекта – его точке видения и перспективы, из которой призывает он образ прошлого. Воспринимающий прошедшее в акте напоминания „видит" что-то, что было произошло раньше, однако повторю за М. Залеским : „в нашей работе памяти прошедшее, меньше, чем было раньше, но одновременно больше того, что было потом"[40]. КАК в этом контексте работу памяти характеризует современный писатель:

... Пытаюсь вспомнить лица, которые я видел тогда у магазина, пытаюсь вспомнить персонажи и голоса, пытаюсь восстановить

[37] Там же, с.329.
[38] Там же, с.331.
[39] Там же, с.332
[40] M. Zaleski, *Formy pamięci,* op. cit., с.7.

в памяти число тракторов, их цвета и типы, пытаюсь услышать звуки и запахи, наполняющие долину, пытаюсь установить, что где стояло, где кончалась глинистая дорога и начинались бездорожья, ведущие в пустоту гор и в сторону границы, которая была тогда границей чехословацкой. Всё это напрасно, так как уже давно правда перемешалась с фикцией, выдуманное с действительным, виденные истории с теми заслышанными, с теми вообразимыми и с теми, которые никогда не произошли, но могли и должны были произойти[41].

То „большее“ в образах памяти часто обозначает – благодаря применяемому механизму временного синкретизма – накладывание перспективы помнящего субъекта и того, которого припоминаем в памяти, перемешание точек зрения, соединение актуальных испытаний с прошлыми[42].

Ещё один литературный пример:

... Тогда стояла у окна. Закалывала волосы. Взяла длинные шпильки рассыпанные на столе, поддерживала свободный локон, которого блеском всегда восхищался, и ловко пододвинула пальцы под тёмную прядь. Ведь (теперь был в том убеждён) сделала это медленнее чем обычно, движение руки – как мог этого не заметить? Стояла у окна, профиль отражённый в оконном стекле, за которым голубело море, профиль так близок, что только протянуть руку, ведь чувствовал, что что-то возникло между ними как занавес, чуть видно; придающий лицу более яркий чем обычно цвет – более холодный, более белый. Оттенок кожи? Холод? Лунная бель? Ведь должен это увидеть тогда, когда стояла у окна, щуря глаза от солнца[43].

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[41] A. Stasiuk, *Tekst.* b.: *Świat. Fotografie dzieci z Jasionki i Krzywej*, Wołowiec 2002

[42] См. тоже R. Korwin-Piotrowska, op. cit., c.33.

[43] S. Chwin, *Hanemann*, Gdańsk 1996, c.15.

Объект, который является созданием памяти, не подлежит правилам прямой перцепции. Механизм памяти может только восстановить прежнюю (припоминающую) перцепцию вместе с сопутствующей ситуацией. Вспоминающий субъект замечает тоже себя (прежнего) и свою роль как (тогда) смотрящего. Память хранит в своих складах образы, значит, действительность уже записанную; блеск памяти добывает их из темноты забвения. Другой чертой, выделяющей структуру текста, описывающего напоминающую вещь, является соединение утверждённого в памяти образа предыдущей ситуации зрительной перцепции и актуальной ситуации напоминающего субъекта, элементы которой – как объекты и детерминанты воспринимания – становятся тоже строительным материалом акта напоминания.

Это особенно видно в текстах, обращающихся к категории *бессознательной* памяти, когда *теперь* акты напоминания становятся импульсом, стимулом, активизирующим работу воображения. В литературной записи субъект воспринимания „открывает" место для образа памяти, и поэтому его роль раскрывается в начале текста; а во внутреннем пространстве высказания обращается к актуальной ситуации, служащей характеристикой позиции субъекта, обоснованием его нужды реконструкции и реинтерпретации прошлого[44].

То, что можно увидеть в наглядном осмотре, детерминировано в большой степени ситуационными факторами: видом и напряжением света, пространственным расположением субъекта по отношению к объекту, присутствием тел, закрывающих видение, видом фона и т.п. Такому поставлению в зависимость – внешнему по отношению к субъекту перцепции – не подлежит „глаз памяти", имеющий намного большую автономию, чем орган зрительного восприятия. Благодаря „памятному видению"субъект может составлять и произвольно придумывать образы прошлого из разных миров: действительного, мира воображения, мечты, снов; синхронически соединять прошлое время и актуальное время, время перцепции. Несмотря на пространственное и временное отдаление воспомина-

[44] M. Zaleski, *Formy....*, цит. соч., с.9.

тельного объекта от *здесь и сейчас субъекта*, „глаз памяти“ – похож на „глаз камеры“ – способный увидеть как самую мелкую деталь, так и охватить с высоты птичьего полёта широкое пространство. Может остановить объект (как на фотографии или образе) или, вводя в движение стоп-клетку, изменить статичный вид в кадр образов. Отдаление в пространстве не делает призываемого образа беднее в испытаниях т. наз. контакта чувств. Память хранит испытания осязания, ощущения вкуса и запаха. Литературные экспрессии часто экспонируют этот дар памяти, одновременно стирая визуальные качества образа.

Как в первом, так и во втором акте ситуационные отнесения исполняют метатекстовую роль, обосновывающую появление определённого типа текста. В процессе видения они становятся детерминантами описываемого объекта, в акте напоминания в большой степени направлены на субъект высказания.

Субъект, который должен описать визуальные испытания, часто ссылается на топонимику неописуемости, имеющую целью продемонстрировать сознание, вытекающее из ограничения языка и трудностей, связанных с транспозицией иконичных кодов в пространство линеарной языковой последовательности. Субъект, описывающий прошлое, жалуется на другие аспекты несовершенной памяти: на её селективный характер, мерцание, фрагментарность, случайность. Это можно признать метатекстовым мероприятием, доказывающим неполную структуру текста напоминания и неадекватность сохраняемого в памяти образа по отношению к действительному, принадлежащему прошлому:

„*... результатом такой, что вижу сегодня оккупационное прошлое как через густой туман, о многих событиях я забыла или запомнила только факты, и не умею призвать атмосферы, которая их окружала*[45]. “

„*Не остался у меня в памяти никакой след цветов, вкусов, запа-*

[45] J. Olczak-ronikier, *W ogrodzie pamięci*, Kraków 2002, c.274.

хов детства. Не помню тоже книжного магазина. Ведь я должна там быть много раз, но если бы я не знаю как напрягала зрение, не вижу маленькой девочки с модным тогда локоном, закрученным на макушке, которая бегает среди ясеневых полок осматривая иллюстрированные альбомы. Могу себе только представить этот визит[46]*."*

„Очень много важных вещей я не могу вспомнить .... . Помню только этот момент ожидания, когда машина появится в двух километрах дальше, в Кживей, и начнёт медленно спускаться вдоль дырявой дороги"[47].

Пора подвести итоги.

Показательно подобие между описанием воспоминаний и описанием действительности, испытываемой в перцепционном осмотре, вытекающем из факта, что оба вида актов подвергаются схожим принципам литературного представления: именно они в художественной экспрессии играют решающую роль). Однако факт, что ситуация в которой находится субъект, вспоминающий прошлое, играет иную роль, чем в акте зрительной перцепции и по другому „вписанную" в текст, определяет структуральную дифференцию обоих типов высказывания. Напоминаемый образ всегда структурально богаче образа воспринятого (каноническая форма описания, признанная как акт зрительной перцепции, являлась бы составной частью описания, вызываемого из памяти). В акте напоминания прагматические обусловленности (отстранение того, что напоминаемо во времени и пространстве) дают субъекту конструкционную свободу. Хотя большим упрощением была бы констатация, что в акте зрительной перцепции субъект исполняет роль зрителя, а в акте напоминания – режиссёра (так как режиссирует действительность также тот, кто совершает литературную транспозицию образа действительности гляда); свобода создавания „памятного изображения", которое, не-

[46] Там же, с.212.

[47] A. Stasiuk, *Tekst.* в: Świat ...., оп.цит.

сомненно, чаще руководствуется принципом ассоциации. Ничто не препятствует тому, чтобы образ „вызванный перед глазами“ принял типичную структуру для наглядного описания. И ещё одна текстовая особенность, на которую хочу обратить внимание. Если в зрительной перцепции в реляции между предметом и субъектом объект занимает по меньшей мере равносильную позицию, то в акте напоминания выше в иерархию надо поместить категорию субъекта, его впечатлительность и необходимость воспоминания, потому что память служит пониманию и одобрению настоящего.

BOŻENA WITOSZ

SEEN BY AN "EYE OF MEMORY". THE PROBLEM OF THE TEXTUAL STRUCTURE. SUMMARY

The article deals with the problem of structure of texts describing the pictures of reality remembered by the subject. The author compares the literary recording of the act of visual perception (act of seeing) and act of recollection ("bringing back from memory"). The similarities and differences concerning the structures of both types of texts are also presented here.

The structure of the act of visual perception contains in its canonical version predicative expression (the verb of visual perception: look, see) as well as the following arguments: the subject of perception, the organ of perception (quasi-instrument of the sense of sight: eye), transparent body that enables the perception, the perceived object (figure) and the perceived object external towards the figure (background), the source of light.

The structure of the act of recollection is much more complicated. The subject is both the subject recalling pictures from the past as well as the subject perceiving (seeing) in the current situation of the recollection act. The object of the recollection is the whole previous (and memorised) act of visual perception recorded in memory. The picture called to mind from memory is not constrained by the rules and limitations of visual perception therefore the structure of the act of recollection is more flexible.

RAYA KUNCHEVA

THE CONCEPT OF "MEMORY" ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE

REFLECTIONS ON BOOK TEN OF AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS*

In this study I shall examine the concept of "memory" on the basis of Augustine's view on the character of thinking, which is simultaneously contradictory and coherent, searching for a rational expression of a spiritual experience through its deepening. This gives grounds for the concept to be examined as a paradigm of the creative process. By interpreting Book Ten of *Confessions*, I shall attempt to follow *how concepts refer to the thing they conceptualize, i.e. how the explicit refers to the implicit and respectively how the implicit participates in the process of creation of the explicit.*

I will compare Book Ten of *Confessions* with Chapter Two of *On Free Choice of the Will.* In each of these texts explication has been achieved through which the complexity has been increased and their comparison outlines the different approach to reflection in *On Free Choice of the Will* and to introspection in *Confessions.*

As Gilson points out, since Augustine's thinking does not lend itself to be placed into a ready-made scheme, the most favorable approach involves being led by him down the circular way of his thought around the major concept of God.[1] *Confessions* contains many of the themes of

* The text is a part of a larger survey.

[1] Етиен Жилсон, Филотеус Бьонер, Християнската философия, С., 1994, 141

the book, written in the spirit of Plotinus, but it also reveals views which make Augustine radically differ from Neoplatonism.

In Book Ten, confessing not his past, but his present condition, at the moment of writing *Confessions*, Augustine has to augment his analysis because the dilemma is viewed in its complete profundity. If he used to have false understanding of the essence of God, an anthropomorphic and materialistic essence, now after acquainting with the neoplatonist outlook and the Christian doctrine, after his baptism and devoting himself to the church, he has to confess the person as he is.

Augustine has to regard himself as a person who has made his fundamental choice but who loses and wins the battle with himself, his habits, his hesitant decisions, the temptations of the senses and the flesh, and the temptations of pride and conceit.

He has to judge himself once again as a creation of God, who demands love and obedience, who is kind and whose punishment is just; God, who created in the free act of his will a perfect world of harmony, in which all creations promote and display this harmony and order. But man has directed his love not towards his Creator but towards the creations for themselves. Man's condition is one of dispersion and not concentration, as he cannot help himself and only God and Christ, his son, can help man.

In this most generally outlined framework Augustine rationalizes memory in such a way that it differs both from Plato's idea about cognition as the memory of eternal ideas and from the two dominant in modern times ideas of consciousness as a passive reception of what comes from the senses and retention of these imprints and as autonomous from the external world action of the Ego, expressed in the construction of its own world.

In Augustine we can trace lots of the ideas and concepts of Platonism. At the same time he is the founder of the interiority; he initiates the conceptualization of the subject in the European thought as well as the concept of the sign, which synthesized the antique ideas and prompted inquiries into this field. He is a key figure in both directions not for the system he created but for the process of his thinking, for the combina-

tion of contradictory and strictly coherent nature of the arguments, for discussing universal essences from the position of personal experience or as he himself defines the road of cognition, from faith, at that uncompromising and integral, to the understanding of God as a central idea, in relation to which everything else is given a meaning. It is not science but wisdom, not theory of cognition but an outlook on cognitive processes as integrally connected to convictions, taking of decisions, i.e. immersed in situations, processes, practices and taking of positions.

Book Ten is divided into forty-three chapters and respectively into seventy subchapters. Four parts can be thematically outlined: introductory chapters, two central parts, the first devoted to the work of the senses and consciousness, the second – to sins, and concluding chapters. In this study I shall explore only the part devoted to the senses and the mind.

It is necessary to say a few introductory words about Book Ten in the structure of *Confessions*. It is the first book after the nine autobiographical ones, which, as a story of the past, comprise a complete whole. That is why doubts have been voiced whether the last four books (Book Ten is about what Augustine is like in the present, at the time when he writes *Confessions*, while the last three books – Book Eleven, Book Twelve and Book Thirteen – contain an interpretation of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis) are organically connected to the autobiographical chapters.

In the studies on Augustine, a dominating opinion is that there are enough grounds to acknowledge the overall character of this literary masterpiece.

For the purposes of the theme explored here, it is sufficient to point out that the elated lines on memory, which render the image of its infinite spaces, are present Book Ten and not in the books, relating about the past. A thorough study of memory is revealed through it, a theory, which features under the term "memoria" in the studies on Augustine. In Book Ten we get acquainted with Augustine's ideas on cognition and thinking in the mature period of his spiritual and intellectual life. Let me recall this image of memory:

And I enter the fields and roomy chambers of memory, where are the treasures of countless images, imported into it from all manner of things

by the senses. There is treasured up whatsoever likewise we think, either by enlarging or diminishing, or by varying in any way whatever those things which the sense hath arrived at; yea, and whatever else hath been entrusted to it and stored up, which oblivion hath not yet engulfed and buried. When I am in this storehouse, I demand that what I wish should be brought forth, and some things immediately appear; others require to be longer sought after, and are dragged, as it were, out of some hidden receptacle; others, again, hurry forth in crowds, and while another thing is sought and inquired for, they leap into view, as if to say, "Is it not we, perchance?" These I drive away with the hand of my heart from before the face of my remembrance, until what I wish be discovered making its appearance out of its secret cell. Other things suggest themselves without effort, and in continuous order, just as they are called for,--those in front giving place to those that follow, and in giving place are treasured up again to be forthcoming when I wish it. All of which takes place when I repeat a thing from memory. (10,8,12) Summarizing, at the end of the book, Augustine once again would prefer to present memory through this impressive image:

Where hast Thou not accompanied me, O Truth,' teaching me both what to avoid and what to desire, when I submitted to Thee what I could perceive of sublunary things, and asked Thy counsel? With my external senses, as I could, I viewed the world, and noted the life which my body derives from me, and these my senses. Thence I advanced inwardly into the recesses of my memory,--the manifold rooms, wondrously full of multitudinous wealth; and I considered and was afraid, and could discern none of these things without Thee, and found none of them to be Thee. (10, 40, 65)

The praise to memory is understandable against the background of Plato's doctrine about cognition as a reminder of the eternal ideas.Augustine develops his own outlook, in which undoubtedly the themes and language of Plato and his disciple Plotinus can be discovered, but fundamental differences also appear. The limited size of the article prevents me from considering these issues, thoroughly studied and emphasized by the ones who read Augustine mainly through Platonism. Even the very

close reading of Book Ten with the abovementioned two central parts, the one devoted to memory, and the other devoted to sins, makes us keep in the centre of our attention both Platonism and the Christine doctrine. Indeed, as the most insightful scholars of Augustine point out, he does not fit into one coherent system.

Before commencing with the analysis of the part, devoted to memory, it is necessary, even briefly, to consider also the introductory chapters given that the theme of cognition is stated in them, though in a very concise way, often presented through antitheses or in the form of a paradox. The aim of the rational search, which Augustine undertakes, passing through the consecutive stages of the order *sensory – soul – God*, is the Truth. His point of departure is founded on the security, which he derives from faith, and in this sense he is staunchly certain about God, but uncertain at the same time about knowing his own self. Augustine establishes his starting point in the following way: *Not with uncertain, but with assured consciousness do I love Thee, O Lord. Thou hast stricken my heart with Thy word, and I loved Thee. And also the heaven, and earth, and all that is therein, behold, on every side 1;hey say that I should love Thee; nor do they cease to speak unto all, "so that they are without excuse." (10, 6, 8)*

The main principle, on which Augustine's epistemological views are founded, is that the inner truth is the basis for assessment. *I, the inner man, knew all this--I, the soul, through the senses of my body. I asked the vast bulk of the earth of my God, and it answered me, "I am not He, but He made me." (10, 6, 9)*

He juxtaposes the voice heard from the outside with the inner truth. For him the external, the sensory is only an incentive, a reason, while the decisive authority is inside.

Turning inward and not outward is Plotinus' theme. In Book Ten of *Confessions,* it is presented as a conclusion on people and not as Augustine's problem. Truly indeed, turned inward towards himself, he will search for the Truth through his soul. Augustine delineates three functions of the soul in relation to the body: it gives life, it gives sensory perceptions; however as these two functions are not inherent only to man

because he shares them with animals, Augustine arrives at the third function – reason, memory, going through which he will attain what stands above it. Thus the movement is inward and upward, the model of ascent being acquired as a conceptual inheritance from Plato – Plotinus. What lies behind the upward movement in *Confessions*?

First, it is necessary to point out the differences between his stance, which is rationalized as a stance in life as well, and the philosophical contemplation of a non-committed intellectual elite such as the circles of neoplatonists. Second, this ascent should be differentiated from mystical experiences, one of which he had together with his mother, Monica, and which is described in Book Eight.

Alluding to mysticism is a past stage in characterizing Augustine's understanding of cognition.

The passing through the stages of the ontological order to the fleeting glimpse of eternity and the ensuing impetuous plunge into the world of the habit and the transitory has been described many times by Augustine. Book Seven of *Confessions*, in which he relates of the period of his acquaintance with Plotinus' books, contains a description, listing all the stages that we can see in Book Ten as well.

And thus, by degrees, I passed from bodies to the soul, which makes use of the senses of the body to perceive; and thence to its inward faculty, to which the bodily senses represent outward things, and up to which reach the capabilities of beasts; and thence, again, I passed on to the reasoning faculty, unto which whatever is received from the senses of the body is referred to be judged, which also, finding itself to be variable in me, raised itself up to its own intelligence, and from habit drew away my thoughts, withdrawing itself from the crowds of contradictory phantasms; that so it might find out that light by which it was besprinkled, when, without all doubting, it cried out, "that the unchangeable was to be preferred before the changeable;" whence also it knew that unchangeable, which, unless it had in some way known, it could have had no sure ground for preferring it to the changeable. And thus, with the flash of a trembling glance, it arrived at that which is. And then I saw Thy invisible things understood by the things that are made? But I was

not able to fix my gaze thereon; and my infirmity being beaten back, I was thrown again on my accustomed habits, carrying along with me naught but a loving memory thereof, and an appetite for what I had, as it were, smelt the odour of, but was not yet able to eat. (7, 17,23)

The passing through the consecutive stages of reasoning, which here as well as in other of Augustine's texts, reflects in his opinion the ontological order, namely, the material or the sensory, perceived from the senses, and everything that is common between man and animals –the reason, in which the data from the senses is subjected to judgment, the light and the major insights about the essence of God and the memory of the moment of insight, which remains after the return in the world of the transitory. Certainly, this is a value-oriented ontology. Examining, thinking, in terms of hierarchy, that is, which is better, which is closer to the Truth, are Augustine's endless questions. The premise for the passing, the ascent from stage to stage, is the logic of negation, which rests on a basic postulate of the Christian doctrine: The Creator and the creation are essentially different. This is the meaning of the question: "And what is it? I asked the earth…" and the answer is "I am not He, but He made me." (10, 6, 9)

The spatial parameters, above-below, are only a subsidiary means, as are all spatial metaphors, while their interpretation in terms of markers in the world of objects is explicitly rejected.

And I entered, and with the eye of my soul (such as it was) saw above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Unchangeable Light? Not this common light, which all flesh may look upon, nor, as it were, a greater one of the same kind, as though the brightness of this should be much more resplendent, and with its greatness fill up all things. Not like this was that light, but different, yea, very different from all these. Nor was it above my mind as oil is above water, nor as heaven above earth; but above it was, because it made me, and I below it, because I was made by it.(7,10,16)

I deliberately use quotations from Book Seven, devoted to that moment of Augustine's intellectual development, when he gets to know Plotinus' works. But these issues, compared to reflections on the same theme

in Book Ten, help outline more clearly the thing that Taylor calls interiority. How is the radical taking of a position of the Ego in *Confessions* revealed in examining the epistemological problems? In relation to the visible world, the Ego asks the questions and the beauty of the creation gives the answers. On the road to cognition, he is led by the inner truth; he is led by the omnipresence of God. The circle is closed because what man knows, he knows only due to God.

Still the detailed analysis of the cognitive processes as well as the processes of perception leads to the outlining of the inner instances of judgment; each act of the mind is presented as having a meaning and a purpose. Thus this general frame of predestination, of full dependence on the will of God, who is infinitely mighty, omniscient and just in Augustine's works, is filled with diverse, segmented activities, observed by the eye of the mind – reason, at which actions of explication endlessly take place.

They can be also observed at a purely textual level. As we shall see in the gradual unfolding of the issues, the repeated forwarding of a given question or the summary is always a step forward in the clarification or the movement of thought; another common device in textual unfolding is to present a given situation first in the most synthesized form, which shall be developed later.

The process develops step by step, indeed, but in Book Ten the attention is particularly focused on the issue of memory, and all other aspects of perception and thinking are seen through the aspect of memory. If we put together the comprehensive analysis of the work of the senses in *On Free Choice of the Will* with what is presented here, in the form of asking questions to the visible and receiving the answers from the sensory world, it becomes clear that in Book Ten of *Confessions* the point of view is not that of reflection, as we find it in *On Free Choice of the Will,* but that of introspection. The work of the senses is studied with a view to the content of memory but not the link between external object and sense. Or, in other words, the ontological order of sensory – mind – God, although observed, is not presented in an abstract way but from the viewpoint of the inner world. Augustine develops in some

of his other works the notion of a harmonious world, in a coordinated and eternal order, in its degrees of proximity and distance from eternal forms. Such a view, which is close to Plotinus' one, is replaced here with a point of view, situated inward, and this point of view provides the opportunity to create a new notion – an inner Ego as one's own space. The placement of the point of view inside is both an approach, characteristic of Book Ten, and the very object of study. For Augustine, in Book Ten, memory does not mean remembering in the conventional sense of retaining in the mind given information with the possibility of its later reproduction.

Prior to commencing to the exploration of memory, he has presented the major principles on which his "theory" of the mind rests.

- God knows everything about me, to hide something from Him is self-deception.

– And from Thee, O Lord, unto whose eyes the depths of man's conscience are naked. what in me could be hidden though I were unwilling to confess to Thee? For so should I hide Thee from myself, not myself from Thee.(10,2,2)

But Thou, Lord, who hast made him, knowest him wholly. (10, 5, 7)

- The knowledge that I have of myself cannot be finite.

I indeed, though in Thy sight I despise myself, and reckon "myself but dust and ashes," "yet know something concerning Thee, which I know not concerning myself. ... but for myself I know not what temptations I am able to resist, and what I am not able.s (10, 5, 7)

- What I know of myself, I have attained only owing to God. Knowledge, as everything else, is his creation.

O Thou strength of my soul, enter into it, and prepare it for Thyself, that Thou mayest have and hold it without "spot or wrinkle. (10, 1, 1)

For neither do I give utterance to anything that is right unto men which Thou hast not heard from me before, nor dost Thou hear anything of the kind from me which Thyself saidst not first unto me. (10, 2, 2)

...in the love of Thy mercy and the sweetness of Thy grace, by which he that is weak is strong? if by it he is made conscious of his own weakness (10, 3, 4)

• First comes the faith, then the understanding. We differ from the other creatures in that we understand.

Nor do I it with words and sounds of the flesh, but with the words of the soul, and that cry of reflection which Thine ear knoweth. (10, 2, 2)

Not with uncertain, but with assured consciousness do I love Thee, O Lord. Thou hast stricken my heart with Thy word, and I loved Thee. And also the heaven, and earth, and all that is therein, behold, on every side 1;hey say that I should love Thee; nor do they cease to speak unto all, "so that they are without excuse." (10, 6, 8)

• The possibility of knowing is given but as with other things given by God, people do not use it in the right way, they direct it outward, towards transitory things, not inward and upward.

But what is it that I love in loving Thee? Not corporeal beauty, nor the splendour of time, nor the radiance of the light, so pleasant to our eyes, nor the sweet melodies of songs of all kinds, nor the flagrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs pleasant to the embracements of flesh. I love not these things when I love my God; and yet I love a certain kind of light, and sound, and fragrance, and food, and embracement in loving my God, who is the light, sound, fragrance, food, and embracement of my inner man--where that light shineth unto my soul which no place can contain, where that soundeth which time snatcheth not away, where there is a fragrance which no breeze disperseth, where there is a food which no eating can diminish, and where that clingeth which no satiety can sunder. This is what I love, when I love my God. (10, 6, 8)

On Gilson's advice, I shall make an attempt to follow the course of Augustine's thought in the part devoted to memory. Since I shall observe the dynamics between the explicit and the implicit as well as how the implicit meaning functions at the different levels of explication and as this problem is not only semantic, I shall state as an original motto of what ensues the following phrase of Augustine: «Thou, who art with me, even before I am with thee.» (10, 4, 6).

Let us return again to the impressive image of the vast spaces of memory, cited earlier. The rhetoric shouldn't distract our attention from

the first differentiation made here by Augustine, namely, between images on the one hand, and "any thought with which we alter what has been received from the senses" on the other hand. After this brief description of what memory contains, structured in two groups, there comes the description of how it works. We can see a full control over memory or memory as a powerful force, which can only excite admiration. Whatever I wish, memory gives me. Even if false decisions are imposed on me, I am capable of rejecting them. There is not a slightest intimation of weakness or ability to make mistakes.

These infinite spaces and halls of memory are in contrast with the image of the narrow soul in Book One of *Confessions*.

Cramped is the dwelling of my soul; do Thou expand it, that Thou mayest enter in. It is in ruins, restore Thou it. (1, 5, 6)

Lord, teach me to know and understand which of these should be first, to call on Thee, or to praise Thee; and likewise to know Thee, or to call upon Thee. But who is there that calls upon Thee without knowing Thee? For he that knows Thee not may call upon Thee as other than Thou art. Or perhaps we call on Thee that we may know Thee. "But how shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? or how shall they believe without a preacher?" (1, 1, 1)

The activities of memory are also divided into two types.

The first type presents the search for meaning: *I demand that what I wish should be brought forth, and some things immediately appear; others require to be longer sought after, and are dragged, as it were, out of some hidden receptacle; others, again, hurry forth in crowds, and while another thing is sought and inquired for, they leap into view, as if to say, "Is it not we, perchance?" These I drive away with the hand of my heart from before the face of my remembrance, until what I wish be discovered making its appearance out of its secret cell. (10, 8, 12)*

The second one is a recollection of an already existing meaning and the example is with a memorized text, while it should be pointed out that Augustine uses an example analogous to that to present the passing time.

What lies behind the Augustine's statement that in memory everything is in my power, nothing escapes me and nothing resists me?

The analysis of … on Augustine's theory of the act of choice in *On Free Choice of the Will* shows, that every act of choice contains demand and search. However, they rest on the condition that I can, I am capable of. This condition is given the following explication: it is in my power to do something, if whenever I decide to do it, I do it and whenever I decide not to do it I do not do it.

In the context of this analysis it becomes clear, that the concept of the inner free movement of reason, unlimited and always successful, showed as Augustine's conceptual discovery, the Ego as an inner private space, should be supplemented or corrected in the sense that it is purposeful, searching and meaningful!

Let us examine the two types of processes in greater detail. The first is the search of something in the memory, which exists there for certain (there is no description of a case of something completely forgotten, or of a negative or a faulty result from the search). The thing, being looked for, has a certain power over the one looking for, because making one's choice, one doesn't accept and rejects all approximate or irrelevant suggestions of the memory. That is a powerful implicit knowledge exists in the search. The second type presents a process of recollection of an already existing meaning, in which there is no choice or intrusion of precipitate, incorrect decisions. Things appear arranged and their order is a paradigmatic example for Augustine of the passing of time, or of the time in its mutability, in the succession of passing, the way material things, the things composed of parts, pass and give way to the coming of others. His reflections over the nature of time in Book Ten have another aim and they can be presented as paradoxes. While in a story or a poem, which are read or recited, as well as in speech, for the consciousness there is no problematic situation, no search and to say in a metaphysical way, we are in the world of the transitory.

Whatever by her thou feelest, is but in part; and the whole, of which these are portions, thou art ignorant of, and yet they delight thee. But had the sense of thy flesh been capable of comprehending the whole, and not itself also, for thy punishment, been justly limited to a portion of the whole, thou wouldest that whatsoever existeth at the present time should

pass away, that so the whole might please thee more. For what we speak, also by the same sense of the flesh thou hearest; and yet wouldest not thou that the syllables should stay, but fly away, that others may come, and the whole be heard. Thus it is always, when any single thing is composed of many, all of which exist not together, all together would delight more than they do simply could all be perceived at once.(4, 11, 17)

But the transitory is what is perceived by the senses.

In the next, 13th chapter of Book Ten, Augustine examines in particular the data from the senses. The main issues can be presented in brief as follows:

- The five senses are an entrance to the innermost and here comes the first distribution and classification of sensations.
- What is present is a memory of a perceived, in the sense of experienced aspect or quality, but not a memory of the object of perception. It is a pre-conceptual memory, in which objects are perceived as images but images of their aspects or sensory qualities. The senses perceive only sensory realities.
- The perimeter of every sense is strictly defined. According to Augustine, memory works similarly to the way in which an artist, standing before an unfolding panorama, will see the harmony of colour, the light and the shapes and will not wrap this in concepts: *"light, and all colours and forms of bodies, by the eyes; sounds of all kinds by the ears; all smells by the passage of the nostrils; all flavours by that of the mouth; and by the sensation of the whole body is brought in what is hard or soft, hot or cold, smooth or rough, heavy or light, whether external or internal to the body. All these doth that great receptacle of memory, with its many and indescribable departments, receive, to be recalled and brought forth when required; each, entering by its own door, is hid up in it. (10, 8,13)*
- Only the things themselves and not their images enter the memory. Nothing material can be present in the soul.
- These images are available to consciousness even when the senses do not work.
- Depending on the focusing of attention, not outward but inward, towards consciousness, in the search, in the process of introspection the

data of one of the senses is actualized while the data from the other senses is only implicitly present.

- Everything is under control.
- A much more detailed picture of the link between the senses and reason is given in the treatise *On Free Choice of the Will*. In it he introduces the instance of the inner sense, which is inherent in other living creatures as well.
- The assessing function, which is observed at all levels of work of the senses in relation to objects, is examined in great detail in the treatise.
- The hierarchy between the assessed and the assessor is traced and it is valid up to the level of reason. The hierarchy does not concern the latter because reason is not above wisdom and eternal truths.
- Reason is what evaluates everything as well as itself. This self-reflection is not observed in the senses.
- In *Confessions* Augustine speaks from the position of the inner space and observes what is already present there, while in memory what remains from sensory things is images and that is enough.

The self-reflection as a theme is explicated in the next, 14th subchapter, since memory is the place of the meeting of the Ego with its own self. There also do I meet with myself, and recall myself,--what, when, or where I did a thing, and how I was affected when I did it. (10,8,14). As regards memory of himself, Augustine differentiates between what he has experienced personally, situations in which he has been and his reactions to them, on the one hand, and what he has received in his memory, based on somebody else's experience, on the other hand, but he immediately adds, that he has accepted that one, relying on his own experience. In this way once again the decisive authority is the inner one. Given that all concepts of Augustine are developed to their logical end, the unconditional form of this idea cannot be easily accepted. But it shakes to the ground the manner of thinking, which assigns a passive role to the consciousness in relation to the data from the senses, as well as in relation to what has been received in the form of interpersonal information.

The analytical work performed by Augustine within this frame is im-

pressive. One can come across the principles of the Christian doctrine, explicitly and categorically formulated, as well as self-analysis and the typology of mental phenomena or more precisely, numerous typologies, and the rudiments of such.

Augustine has written a lot about the role of authority in cognition, but this theme cannot be examined here because of the limited space. I am going to remind us of only one of the questions Augustine asks his interlocutor in the dialogue *On Free Choice of the Will*: 'Do you know one or do you believe in some authority?'

Augustine links the meeting with himself in the memory with two themes of particular significance, namely, about the taking of decisions, the so called dialogue with oneself, about all the projections of thought in the personal future of the Ego, which are built in the present from the material of the past. This inner dialogue is achieved with the help of words, which have their meanings in the memory. In other words, in the taking of decisions, in the formation of hopes or apprehensions, the past experience is a material, which is used in a definite way, and here we should recall one of the basic statements of Augustine in relation to man, i.e. he, the man, does not use correctly what has been given to him. As I explained earlier, in the chapters devoted to memory, we shall not encounter a negative development of a given possibility. In this marvelous apology to the power of memory (here the notion of power has the meaning given by Augustine in *On the Immortality of the Soul*), the leading idea is that all existing as good, on the one hand, while on the other hand, drawing on the already completed analysis of the will, given to man to do good, because if man were given will to do ill , the punishment of God would be unjust and that, as Augustine says, is absurd.

The second theme is that of language. The dialogue with one's self is verbal. This gives grounds to Augustine to see the participation of memory via the language: *Thus speak I to myself; and when I speak, the images of all I speak about are present, out of the same treasury of memory; nor could I say anything at all about them were the images absent. (10, 8, 14)* I would like to emphasize that the theme about language appears for the first time here and Augustine did not need it in the part devoted to the

sensory data. It is present in the memory as images, while the meeting with one's self, which can also be interpreted as the one with the sensory things: *"For there are nigh me heaven, earth, sea, and whatever I can think upon in them, besides those which I have forgotten. There also do I meet with myself, and recall myself,--what, when, or where I did a thing, and how I was affected when I did it"*, in fact has another basis because feelings, the inner states or data are not sensory and therefore, as we shall see in the next chapters, they are present in the memory in another way. The fact that reason as an inner eye observes the inner space, and *"future actions, events, and hopes, and upon all these again do I meditate as if they were present"* , should not be interpreted as images before the inner sight.

On the other hand, the parameters through which Augustine presents the recollection of himself – what, when and where, suggest changeability, which is a characteristic sign of sensory things.According to Augustine, the soul is variable in the course time, but constant in relation to space, in the sense that the spatial dimensions are irrelevant for it.

In fact, the 14th subchapter appears as an intermediate "stop" between the categories of the sensory and the soul. This intermediate position is reflected in the two different points of view – I meet myself and I talk to myself. This duality, the meeting of the Ego with itself as an object, on the one hand, and the meeting with itself as a subject, on the other hand, suggests, in my opinion, the possibility of one more dividing line.

Language is presented as a parallel and attendant activity, the words appear as if in the background; they draw on the resources of memory. *There are all which I remember, either by personal experience or on the faith of others. Out of the same supply do I myself with the past construct now this, now that likeness of things, which either I have experienced, or, from having experienced, have believed; and thence again future actions, events, and hopes, and upon all these again do I meditate as if they were present. (10, 8, 14)* It is also illustrative that the word as a sign is presented through its sound and that is its material side, which presents itself in the memory as an image. This image is connected with its meaning which is in the memory. The sign function of the word, namely as

replacing a missing object, that is presenting itself instead of the object, here in the situation of thinking of future is clearly visible. Because just when we are talking about possible and not present things, happening now, everything is closed in the mind.

The next subchapter further elaborates on the problems of self-observation: *Great is this power of memory, exceeding great, O my God,--an inner chamber large and boundless! Who has plumbed the depths! thereof? Yet it is a power of mine, and appertains unto my nature; nor do I myself grasp l all that I am. Therefore is the mind too narrow to contain itself. (10, 8, 15)* It goes in parallel with the reflections on language. Each utterance of the name of an object is accompanied by its vision in the memory even in the case of absence of the sensory perception of the respective object. And Augustine over and over reminds us that what enters the memory is not the object but its image, since he wants to maintain the boundary between the material and the spiritual visible for the reader. Nothing material can enter the soul, only the image of the material, therefore what enters is not the sound but the image of the sound, not light but the image of light and so on. Thus, after he consolidates this fundamental boundary, he sets to scrutinize those things, which, unlike objects, are nonmaterial, non-sensory. However, he first presents in the preceding Chapter 11 his understanding of the process of thinking – the careful gathering of the things that are dispersed in the memory. But Augustine's use of the concept of "gathering" should be understood not as a casual combinatorics but as an aspiration that corresponds to the inward and upward movement. "Gathering" is a concept of particular importance to Augustine. It is rationalized as a counterbalance to dispersion, the state of sin. Once again the theory of thinking is vested in the concepts of the spiritual search for integrity, the truth.

Let us now examine how the non-sensory things are present in the memory. Augustine ranks first the knowledge of liberal arts. How is the concept of literature, for example, present in the memory?

Since the changing things, the sensory things are presented in the memory though images, the unchanging, universal knowledge, which the reason has accepted as true, or in other words, the truth, it will be

present in the memory in a different way from the one of the sensory things. *But truly when I hear that there are three kinds of questions, "Whether a thing is?what it is?--of what kind it is?" I do indeed hold fast the images of the sounds of which these words are composed, and I know that those sounds passed through the air with a noise, and now are not. But the things themselves which are signified by these sounds I never arrived at by any sense of the body, nor ever perceived them otherwise than by my mind; ' and in my memory have I laid up not their images, but themselves, which, how they entered into me, let them tell if they are able.* The words, by which knowledge is presented, are matter. What is in memory is something different; these are the things themselves, such as they are, because they are untouched by a sense and they have been seen only in the soul, i.e. they have been seen only by reason. Augustine doesn't know how they have entered the soul, because for man the only channels to contact the world are the senses, but he has discerned them right in his heart. Then the only logical conclusion is, that they have been in the memory, but deeply hidden but when prompted from outside, they come out. Let us juxtapose this model of cognition with the theory of Karl Popper, who also showed reserves towards the inductive approach. In his opinion, cognition passes through the building of a hypothesis, which should be corroborated, but not through the accumulation of data, out of which a theory might be built up.

With Augustine it cannot be argued that there is an initial moment, since from point of view of introspection, even if he knew and remembered when certain knowledge had become a reality for him, a certain worldly moment, for example, the reading of Plotinus' books, this appears to be only an "intimation" of the already existing knowledge in his consciousness.

The well-known argument ever since Plotinus, that as long as the soul contains eternal truths, it is immortal, is not necessary here. The problems are traced through the use of language: *But truly when I hear that there are three kinds of questions,"Whether a thing is?what it is?--of what kind it is?" I do indeed hold fast the images of the sounds of which these words are composed, and I know that those sounds passed through*

the air with a noise, and now are not. But the things themselves which are signified by these sounds I never arrived at by any sense of the body, nor ever perceived them otherwise than by my mind; ' and in my memory have I laid up not their images, but themselves, which, how they entered into me, let them tell if they are able. (10,11,18) The typology of the questions represents knowledge of thinking, the way it clarifies its object. This typology is presented in the respective verbal expressions and upon hearing them, the images of the sounds of the words enter the mind while the sounds themselves pass away the way each material, transitory thing passes away.

The signified is in the memory and it is present there not via an image, but by itself.

We discover the questions given by Augustine as examples in the argumentation of *On Free Choice of the Will.* This succession of questions, and in particular, the first one, about existence, seems to be as if imposed on Augustine, since the question whether God exists is void of meaning for him. But in order to reach his aim and show that the choice of will is good given by God, he has to build the concept of God by means of the three questions stated before. Thus in the context of the obligatory requirements of "dialectics", he investigates the question of whether God exists, and not because this question is fundamental for him. I am not going to look into the question of tradition of thought, which this stance opens for the European thought of modern times. But it is in the foundation of the formation of the modern Ego, as claim such scholars as Gilson and Taylor. In his book *Augustine and Descartes*, Tzocho Boyadjiev presents in great detail their "arguments".

As regards the question we are concerned with, it is necessary to discern the paradoxical, from our point of view, status of these statements in the mind. On the one hand they are accepted as true, moreover not only via reason, as Augustine says: *"when I learned them, I gave not credit to the heart of another man, but perceived them in my own; and I approved them as true",* but on the other hand, they have a universal nature. It is exactly their representation as an experienced meaning is what goes beyond Plato's theory of the eternal ideas. In *Confessions*, when Augustine

observes how his own mind works in the process of creation of a new meaning, that is, when he observes the work of the implicit meaning in the process of accomplishing of any logically acceptable explication, then it becomes easy to explain the active and decisive part of the inner instance. Then the exclamation "Yes, it's true!" sounds with the tone of inner conviction and determination, which would be out of place in the philosophical contemplation, which is the aim of Platonists. Also when he explains that this knowledge, which I present here as implicit knowledge, is hidden deep, as if in secret recesses, it is hardly necessary to resort to Freud' terminology.

Self-observation makes the next step in Chapter 11. After he "proved" that this knowledge is in the memory, he presents the process of learning "this, which we see internally on its own" as "gathering with a marvelous quickness". If we have believed that Augustine means something analogous to the contemporary understanding of intuition, when he speaks about the involvement of the inner sight, we have to give up this view after this statement.

As is pointed out by … on Augustine's epistemology, the established opinion about him in literary studies is that the explanation with the resort to mysticism has been overcome. Gilson, one of the most insightful researchers of Augustine, indeed uses the term "mysticism" but more as a response to the intellectual traditions from the beginning of the 20th century. The notion of "gathering", through which the process of thinking is presented, has not only a cognitive meaning but also a spiritual and ethical one. The symbiosis between the cognitive and the ethical is an essential characteristic of Augustine's thinking. The cognitive is intentional and emotionally intense.

But the "gathering" of the "scattered and neglected" meanings as if does not give access to the appearance of a new meaning. Indeed the trajectory of thinking is circular but also purposeful – aiming at rationally proving some basic principles for Augustine as regards his views on God, which have been already formulated in their most important aspects by the time he wrote *Confessions*. As shown above, when clarifying the implications of these statements, and that is what Augustine actu-

ally does in all his texts, it becomes obvious that they are contradictory and incoherent. *Confessions* and in particular Book Ten are unique in that the logical speculation is performed in a regime of self-observation, of introspection. We may not agree that that the boundary between the sensory and the non-sensory has such a great importance, as it is given by Augustine, but if we turn to our own experience and do not resort immediately to ready-made concepts, we shall acknowledge that lots of his observations are true.

The next chapter, Chapter 12th, introduces the category of numbers, a theme, which has a long tradition in the classical thought. The soul contains the principles of numbers, but as it is shown in the exquisitely refined analysis of rhythm in "On Music" these abstract essences are examined as having a sensory aspect, which has its own image in the mind and this image encounters "a mathematical line", which the mind possesses and it is the authority that assesses. In *Confessions* the issues about numbers once again go through the situation of the use of language. As in the other cases, here he prefers examples with speech and oral communication but analyzing geometry, he touches on aspects, concerning a visual sign, where the same logic of distinction between the sensory perceptible and the inner presence is applied.

The universal character of numbers is emphasized against the background of the difference in the vocabulary of separate languages languages. *I have heard the sound of the words by which these things are signified when they are discussed; but the sounds are one thing, the things another. For the sounds are one thing in Greek, another in Latin; but the things themselves are neither Greek, nor Latin, nor any other language. (10, 8, 19)* Putting together these considerations with the detailed analysis that the issue of numbers receives in *On Free Choice of the Will*, we can see another interpretation. The senses comprehend things as composed of parts, and therefore, they cannot comprehend number one, while all numbers contain it. Here comes the principal impossibility for the senses to perceive numbers; or the infinity, which cannot be grasped through either image or through phantasm, but only through inner light, or the comprehension of numbers and wisdom as phenomena of the same

kind; consequently it becomes clearer than ever in what way numbers are included in Augustine's introspection. Apart from their presence on their own, the other important feature is their universality – "everyone knows them and intuits them". However, it should be immediately pointed out that Augustine attributes to numbers a place which is after i.e. higher than the knowledge of the liberal arts. This is part of his view of mathematics as a paradigm of scientific cognition. As in the previous stages, the next step here is to observe these contents of memory in the context of the specific experience – how they have been acquired, including also the false counterarguments. What is present for the first time is the differentiation between truth and lie which implicates that the memory also contains things he would like to get rid of; that is to be precise, while condemning them, he continues to keep them in his memory. He also remembers different stages of his own in the differentiation between truth and lie and the difference in the interpretations. *I now see that it is one thing to distinguish these things, another to remember that I often distinguished I them, when I often reflected upon them. I both remember, then, that I have often understood these things, and what I now distinguish and comprehend I store away in my memory, that hereafter I may remember that I understood it now. Therefore also I remember that I have remembered; so that if afterwards I shall call to mind that I have been able to remember these things, it will be through the power of memory that I shall call it to mind. (10, 13, 20)* Exactly the different stages, the different arguments and interpretations placed in the passing time give a new aspect to the rationalization of memory. *I remember that I have remembered.* The memory possesses the ability of self-reflection; it remembers not only the content, but the existence of an act of remembering at a certain time in the past. In his next Book Eleven of *Confessions*, Augustine develops his idea about time in which the memory is a soul stretched from the present to the past, while the expectation is a stretching of the soul into the future. In Book Ten, while presenting the present state of his mind, Augustine creates his concept of memory, but as we saw earlier, he describes also how projections about the future are present in the mind. In fact in what he calls "the things as they are", the very processes of cog-

nition could be discerned. From the point of view of theories in contemporary semantics, it could be claimed that Augustine uses the image of the container for his concept and he imagines the concept as a container. This is the so-called classical view, which in semantic surveys is named after Aristotle. The concept has clear boundaries, because it has features which make it different from other concepts.

The idea of a concept with changeable borders, a concept built up on the analogy of family kinship, as created by Wittgenstein, is not acceptable in Augustine's manner of thinking, because his thinking is grounded on postulates, independent of the situations. The theme Augustine – Wittgenstein is too important for the issues examined here to be superficially mentioned. It requires a special attention, which is impossible to achieve here. But, as it was repeatedly demonstrated, the semantic field in Augustine's epistemology is abundant in value aspects and hierarchies. In this sense he creates a dynamic and not a static model of the concept. Without being able to examine the issue more thoroughly, I shall content myself with advancing the hypothesis that by "things of their own" Augustine meant processes. I am proceeding to the next category, present in Augustine's work, namely the feelings, which he calls called by him motions of the mind.

If the order we have followed with the senses, the knowledge of liberal arts, numbers and now the emotions of the mind, is value-oriented, and this is so, since it represents the way to approach God, then placing emotions above universal, eternal truths is a remarkable fact, which crucially changes the interiority in comparison to Plotinus, for example.

But let us see what feelings are, as a possession of memory, according to Augustine, how he develops these problems in the text of Book Ten. The first division he makes concerns the feelings in the mind and the feelings in the memory. The feelings in the memory are from previous states and these states might not tally with the state at the moment of recalling. *For without being joyous, I remember myself to have had joy; and with out being sad, I call to mind my past sadness; and that of which I was once afraid, I remember without fear; and without desire recall a former desire.(10, 14, 21)*

Now the differentiation between the body and the mind is not in the focus of attention, that is, for Augustine there is nothing strange if the state of my body, which I recall, is different from the state in which I am, though it is too strange to be recalling, that is, to keep in my memory a state of the mind, different from the state in which the mind is, when it is recalling. "Isn't the mind memory itself?" But the immediate experience, the introspection presents as an apparent fact the presence of two different states, one in the reminiscence, the other during the actual moment of recalling. Without delving into a comparison between Augustine's ideas and principles of modern psychology, I shall give as an example William James's opinion, who thinks that the senses themselves are not recalled. In the interpretation suggested here, I use the concept of state, which is not used by Augustine.

In order to deal with the difficulty created by the logic of concurrence between two things, united in one category, namely, between the mind and the memory in the category of the "mind", Augustine resorts to the following example *: The memory doubtless is, so to say, the belly of the mind, and joy and sadness like sweet and bitter food, which, when entrusted to the memory, are, as it were, passed into the belly, where they can be reposited, but cannot taste.(10, 14, 21)*

The senses are retained in the memory, indeed, but they are devoid of "flavour". In few cases does Augustine admit the helplessness of his conceptual apparatus and use directly comparison. The problem he faces is to admit a difference in the functions of things, united in one category or within the frames of one concept, which contradicts the principles of building up the semantic space as a homogeneous one. The mind and the memory in terms of feelings do not function in a synchronized manner. The memory of joy does not make me joyous straightaway, or in other words, the joy in the soul is experienced, while the joy in the memory is memorized; it is retained but not as an image, unlike sensory things, and in contrast to knowledge and numbers, it is present not as it is, but different, "void of flavour". As it often happens in Augustine's reflections, the result is a typology, which confirms in a new way the initial postulates. The mode of presence of the recollection of the feelings in

the memory does not impair the main division 'sensory – non-sensory'. What is present is a new type of concept in a germinal state.

The comparison chosen by Augustine, as well as the negative characteristics, "without flavour", creates the impression as if in his value system the joy in the soul is positioned higher than the joy in the memory. (I use the example with the joy, following Augustine's text, since in his argumentation the examples he examines are of particular importance. The fact that of all feelings he chooses to speak about joy has further grounds in the development of the text.) However, this would have been a completely wrong impression, not only from the point of incongruence with his stance in life, expressed in an aspiration towards restraint and asceticism. The comparison from our viewpoint is rather strange. It is true that processing occurs both in the mind as in the belly but obviously Augustine means something else. To present the food in the belly as void of flavour means not drawing on a direct experience but an execution of a logical operation of total abstraction, stripping the object of its characteristic features, while the senses adopt features. Once again we discover the act of discerning between the sensory and the non-sensory. Through the comparison, the differentiation between the joy in a present experience and the joy in the memory acquires the meaning of differentiation between the sensory and the non-sensory. But in the category of the sensory Augustine makes differentiations which also build up hierarchy. I shall use again *On Free Choice of the Will*. There is a meticulous survey on food in the part devoted to senses and the objects, which they perceive. Augustine makes the following typology: sight and hearing differ as abilities for every single person, but this difference does not influence the general for everybody object of perception, which remains unaffected. It is not the same with food. As an object, it is transformed in the "parts of our body", it becomes our private property, in contrast to light and sound, which remain available for everyone and are not reduced to something private. And the general, the public is ranked higher than the private. Consequently, the intertextual link between the treatise *On Free Choice of the Will* and *Confessions* gives additional meanings to the strange and as though irrelevant comparison of memory as the soul's

belly in the paragraphs, examining the way in which feelings are present in the memory. They are present but void of qualities and they constitute a private sphere of possession but have no features of public property. If we take the next step in interpreting Augustine's strange comparison, we shall have to take into account that the process of abstraction, which is in the foundation of thinking, is what corresponds to the stripping of the sensory. In the memory, feelings are present neither as images, nor on their own, but in an abstract form, stripped of their features. It is because retained in this way, they can be retrieved anew and they can be spoken about. It is because *"for who would willingly discourse on these subjects, if, as often as we name sorrow or fear, we should be compelled to be sorrowful or fearful?" (10, 14, 22)* The transformation of the feelings in the memory, their transformation into reminiscences, insures the necessary distance from them, so that they can become an object of thought, so that we can speak about them. By examining the presence of feelings in the memory, Augustine creates a third view of a concept, namely, the abstraction, which, however, possesses the features of something personal, a result of an inner transformation. Hence the logic becomes clear, by which the "step" of the feelings is situated above the steps of the everlasting, universal truths – the knowledge of liberal arts and the numbers. They are abstractions themselves and therefore they are present themselves, while for the feelings to be retained in memory, a more intensive work of the abstracting mind is needed, a much deeper transformation. In this exactly the victory over the sensory is the greatest.

What else could memory possess?

It possesses a concept about itself. *I name memory, and I know what I name. But where do I know it, except in the memory itself? Is it also present to itself by its image, and not by itself? (10, 15, 23)*

For the time being this question has no answer, but a second one follows, seemingly more difficult: how is "forgetfulness" present in the memory? It is a rather strange question for us, as it is difficult not to resort to the well-known concept of "oblivion". Meticulous arguments follow on the fact that forgetfulness cannot be present either as an image or on its own. Indeed, these are complicated questions that make Augustine

acknowledge: *"Truly, O Lord, I labour therein, and labour in myself. I am become a troublesome soil that requires overmuch labour. For we are not now searching out the tracts of heaven, or measuring the distances of the stars, or inquiring about the weight of the earth. It is I my-self-I, the mind-who remember."(10, 16, 25)*

The issue of how forgetfulness remains present in the memory is meaningful only if by "presence" we understand state, not a concept, because the state of forgetfulness excludes the state of memory. But again the habit of handy solutions misleads us. What is easier than juxtaposing memory to forgetfulness? However, Augustine is uncompromisingly logical – if we remember forgetfulness, and this is obvious from our experience, when we hear the sounds of the word "forgetfulness", we know what they mean. If it were not present in our memory, we wouldn't know the meaning. Consequently, when we recall forgetfulness, it is retrieved but memory also comes with it. The speculation as if encounters an insurmountable difficulty. Then Augustine states the main goal of his quest: *I will pass beyond memory also, but where shall I find Thee, O Thou truly good and assured sweetness? But where shall I find Thee? If I find Thee without memory, then am I un-'mindful of Thee. And how now shall I find Thee, if I do not remember Thee?*

РАЯ КУНЧЕВА

ПОНЯТИЕ „ПАМЯТЬ“ СОГЛАСНО АВГУСТИНУ. НАБЛЮДЕНИЯ НАД 10-ой ГЛАВОЙ „ИСПОВЕДИ“

Статья рассматривает понятие „память“ исходя из взгляда на характер мышления Августина – одновременно противоречивого и когерентного, ищущего рационального выражения духовного опыта через его углубление. Это дает основание рассматривать его как парадигму творческого процесса. Кратко очерчена концептуальная встреча Неоплатонизма и Христианства при оформлении взглядов Августина на такие центральные понятия как Бог, душа, Логос, по отношению к которым выясняется его концепция памяти. Указывается и на некоторые из представительных подходов в литературе об Августине в поиске возможно наиболее адекватного приближения к сложности его мышления. В статье предлагается сопоставительный анализ проблемы чувственного познания в 10-ой главе „Исповеди“ и второй главе „О свободном выборе воли“.

6 Лб



ПАМЕТ И ТЕКСТ

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The collective study ***Memory and Text***. *Cognitive and Cultural Aspects* presents the results of Bulgarian and Polish scholars` common debate on the phenomenon of memory which constitutes one of the most essential anthropological questions and reflects on all fields of human activity including linguistic communication and literary works. This cooperation took place within the framework of a programme of scholarly contacts between two academic institutes: the Institute of Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Sofia (BAN) and the Institute of Literary Research at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (PAN) which held a panel discussion in Sofia, from June 16. to 17. 2003 with the cooperation of researchers from other Polish and Bulgarian university communities.

Сборник научных трудов ***Память и текст***. *Когнитивные и культурологические аспекты* содержит результаты совместной работы группы болгарских и польских ученых, посвященной явлению памяти. Память принадлежит к ряду наиболее существенных проблем антропологии и находит свое отражение во всех отраслях деятельности человека, в том числе, в языковой коммуникации и литературном творчестве. Работа велась в рамках программы научных взаимоконтактов между двумя академическими институтами: Институтом литературы Болгарской академии наук в Софии и Институтом литературных исследований Польской академии наук в Варшаве. 16–17 июня 2003 года в Софии состоялась организованная ими дискуссионная беседа, в которой приняли участие и ученые из других польских и болгарских университетских кругов.