II 8090

СТАТУИТЕ НА МИСЪЛТА

THE STATUES OF THOUGHT

В чест на професор Иван Младенов
In Honorem Professor Ivan Mladenov

Издателство на БАН „Проф. Марин Дринов"

BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE FOR LITERATURE

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In Honorem Professor Ivan Mladenov

Sofia • 2016

Prof. Marin Drinov Publishing House
of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Boyan Penev Publishing Centre

Изданието е спечелило конкурс на Министерството на културата – програма „Помощ за книгата“.

ASL20
(безин)

БЪЛГАРСКА АКАДЕМИЯ НА НАУКИТЕ
ИНСТИТУТ ЗА ЛИТЕРАТУРА

СТАТУИТЕ НА МИСЪЛТА

В чест на професор Иван Младенов

БАН
БИБЛИОТЕКА

София • 2016

Издателство на БАН
„Проф. Марин Дринов“

Издателски център
„Боян Пенев“

82.01 (082)+
+801.73(082)

В483828

Редакционна колегия:
Андрей Ташев, Елка Трайкова, Миряна Янакиева, Пол Кобли, Рая Кунчева

Editorial board:
Andrey Tashev, Elka Traykova, Miryana Yanakieva, Paul Cobley, Raya Kuncheva

Членовете на редколегията и участниците в сборника благодарят на Александра Кунчева за безвъзмездната ѝ работа по оформлението на корицата.

The members of the editorial board and the contributors to the Festschrift express their gratitude to Alexandra Kuncheva for her gratuitous book cover design.

II 8090
Инв. № 133885/16

БАН
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БАН - Институт
за литература
БИБЛИОТЕКА

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ISBN 978-954-322-832-4
ISBN 978-954-8712-96-5

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КЪМ ОБЩНОСТТА ОТ ПРИЯТЕЛИ

Иван Младенов

Сборниците по случай кръгла годишнина съставляват едно голямо клише като жест и изпълнение. Затова най-често те не се правят от самите юбиляри, а от техни ученици, студенти, колеги. Участието в тях е срамежливо, макар и престижно, като вписване в почетна книга, подготовка за мумифициране или препариране в зависимост от заслугите на почетения. Последният е смутен от много неща, най-вече от факта, че макар достигнал зряла възраст, чувството, което изпитва при поднасяне на тома, е непознато. Някак вежливо му се казва, че каквото е могъл, е допринесъл, ако понапише още нещо, потруди се, все ще е от полза, но и нищо да не прави, никой няма да го съди, дори напротив, може да го похвали, че път дава на по-младите, пак достойнство показва. Това е първият слой чувства, които изпитва, после идват останалите. Всички сме виждали как се случва и тайно сме се надявали тази участ да ни подмине или, ако все пак ни сполети, да ни подскаже какво да не правим. Капанът е в това, че освен неизбежна тя е и обречена да изпадне в цял куп клишета, по-лошо, всяко търсене на оригиналност е безнадеждно, точно тук не може да има оригиналност, не го позволява жанрът, не го приемат читателите. Отредената роля е на смирение, прилича на очакваното помъдряване, синтезирано в максимата „Всичко минава".

Прекрасен пример за капана е показан във въвеждащото есе на професор Ото Кронщайнер, сам преминал през тази процедура, дочул изщракването „в негова чест". И постъпил като типичен учен – изложил историята, фактологията и структурата на ритуала. Ами какво друго, спестил ми е тази задача съвсем по приятелски. Като си помисля как недоубитите българо-съветски тайни служби демонизираха точно този светъл човек, искрено обичащ нашата култура и милеещ за нейното име извън България. Друга неизбежна клопка е, че какъвто и текст да напиша, той ще прилича на оправдание. Трябва да се оправдая, че съучаствам в заговор против себе си, като заставам пред приятели и колеги, които още не са на мое място и не те се притесняват – хем е добре да те хвалят, хем е неудобно да следваш условностите на жанра, преминавайки невидима граница, отвъд която пороците на младостта се превръщат в добродетели на зрелостта.

Приятелят Кронщайнер е посочил пътя – да се насладим на повода и да се усмихнем на ритуалите му. Противно на очакванията суетата вече не

е фактор: каквото е имало за хвалене, е отдадено, каквото за критикуване – също, равносметката не е на юбиляря. Последното най-трудно се възприема, а поучителните истории са безчет. Поне една с библейска давност си спомням. Един човек приключвал земните си дела и повикал всички роднини около предсмъртния си одър. Заразказвал им за себе си, какво бил направил за дома си, за децата си, за общността, за близките си – все богоугодни дела. Разчувствал се човекът, приятно му станало, добра излязла равносметката му. А през нощта ангел го навестил и с гръмовен глас го запитал: „Кой си ти да оценяваш земния си път според собствените си мерки, делата си, постъпките си, грешките си? Не е дадено на човека да мери и оценява живота си.“ Така говорел ангелът, а човекът разбрал последния си грях – не е редно сам да си дава преценка, че и да се радва на постигнатото. Поуката не е само за най-древния грях, възгордяването, но и за помъдряването, не идва то задължително с годините. Това, което получаваме с тях, е възможност да изпитаме болка, само тя усилва опита, не възрастта. Няма прозрение без страдание, а мисълта е отрадното му украшение.

Аз бях благословен да получа знание от най-добрите и двойно честит те да са между участниците в този том. И досега нямам ясна представа какво ми нашепна да изучавам философията на Чарлс Сандърс Пърс като нещо трето от моето обучение. Първите бяха литература и обща семиотика, с които се занимавах повече от десетилетие. Така триадата се изпълни може би в максималния за един живот обем. Най-важният трети етап започна с дълъг престой в Центъра по семиотика в Блумингтън, САЩ, няма да кажа „под ръководството“, а с приятелството на незабравимия Томас Сибиък. След около година работа в Центъра бях готов и започнах с философията на Пърс. „Започнах“ означава нещо, за което не подозирах какво ще ми донесе – години благодатен труд в близко сътрудничество с Нейтън Хаузър, който нагласи пръстите ми върху клавишите, така че да не прозвучи фалшиво онова, което щеше да излиза изпод тях. После още и още труд, който с всяко ново усилие се отблагодаряваше така, както при отварянето на следваща ниша от пещерата на Аладин – несметни богатства на мисълта и бляскави метафори, великолепието на науката за знаците. Нямах никакво съмнение в мисията си да разпръсвам богатствата на това знание след завръщането си в Европа навсякъде, където имах възможност да пътувам и преподавам: в Залцбург, Хелзинки, Ювескюла, отново в Блумингтън, в Естония, Германия, Франция, Скандинавия, разбира се, в България. Мисля, че тази мисия е уловена най-добре от Винсънт Колапиетро, който е видял в мен и двете – сколар (учител) и теоретик. Така трябваше да бъде, философията на Пърс не е особено позната в Европа, присъединих се към онези, които я разпространяват, за да покажат блясъка ѝ. Заедно с всичко, съпровождащо академичната кариера – безчет конференции, школи, курсове, обучение на студенти и докторанти.

Това, което получих, е неосъществената приживе мечта на Пърс – да бъде сред „общност от учени“, където да продължи изследванията си, све-

рявайки своите хипотези с идеите и тезите на колеги и съмишленици. Не е измислен друг начин – каквото смятаме за наш принос, ще се превърне в такъв заедно с множество други. Ще се утаи първоначално като мисловен пласт от „изтощен разум“ (effete mind) със замръзнали метафори, съхраняващи смисъл, който след време може да получи криле и да се устреми към свят с кристализирал разум, където всички хипотези ще са по-близо до всички истини. Или в парк с фигури, създадени, като е отстранен горният слой на камъка, за да се открои хармонията на въплътените в тях статуи мисли. В това русло са изследванията на учените от този том, към които се обръщам като към „общност от приятели“.

Чувствам, че това, което казвам, е недостатъчно, истината е, че много от участниците в този том са съучастници в моя живот. С техните статии, книги, съвети съм живял – какво друго е животът, който продължава, ограничеността му е онтология, траенето – прагматика, всички обобщения на опита са извлечени от нарастването на знанието, което е друго име на мисленето.

Студиите и статиите на тези великолепни учени са щедри и даващи: тук е един от най-плодовитите съвременни философи, Джон Дийли, автор на над хилядастраничното изследване *Four Ages of Understanding*, което попълва белите петна по пътя, по който хуманитарната мисъл не поема след изключителния опит за *Semiotica magna* на Джон Поансо, чието дело Дийли неуморно популяризира. Статията на посветилия цялата си кариера на изучаването на Пърс Нейтън Хаузър е като свръхинтензивен курс върху доктрината за знака и прагматизма. Дългогодишен директор на Центъра за изследване и публикуване на наследството на Пърс, той е най-надеждният източник за представянето на тази мисъл. С поетично вдъхновение е пропита работата на Иво Ибри, намерил изворите на метафоричното мислене на Пърс в натурфилософията на Шелинг. Време, битие и реалност, разработени от перспективата на Пърсовите прозрения, представляват статиите на Еро Тарасти, Винфрид Ньот, Винсънт Колапиетро, Веселин Петров, Динда Горлее, Друде фон дер Феер, Андрей Ташев, Михали Шивош, Рая Кунчева, Рени Янкова, Николай Иванов. Няма да успея да се отблагодаря на Мичико Арима, която преведе книгата ми, за да представи скромните ми усилия пред японската общност от експерти. Тук тя е внесла скъпоценен принос върху употребата на прочута фраза на Шекспир от Пърс, като е активирала исторически контекст назад до Библията. За интерпретации и означаване при Аристотел говорят Анита Касабова и Владимир Маринов. Алфред Нордман осветлява едни от най-важните твърдения на Витгенщайн, звучащи объркващо и неясно. Към библейски сюжети възхожда работата на Милена Кирова, в която имплицитно присъства семиотика, а към исихасткото Средновековие отвежда поетичното заглавие от статията на един от малцината философи на православието в света – Георги Каприев.

С благодарност приветствам линията на литературоведските работи в тома, които покриват интересите ми към литературна теория и методо-

логия. Приносни са статиите на Радосвет Коларов за диалога между две велики произведения на Кафка, за трансформациите и репрезентациите на градското във френската литература на Хари Вейво от силната финска семиотична школа, както и статията на Анисава Милтенова върху мита за инцеста, използващ теза от последната ми книга. Върху разработки от тази последна книга и подобни тези на други автори е изградила своята статия Мари Врина-Николов, която от точни и верни позиции възразява срещу моя теоретична трактовка. Респектиращ труд за означаването с привличане на идеи от Лайбниц до Витгенщайн е предложила Миряна Янакиева, а Яни Милчаков представя слабо познати страни от монументалното дело на Роман Ингарден. Оригинално е хрумването на Пламен Антов да представи четенето на български символисти през по-маргинални критици, на Цветан Ракьовски – за последната пиеса на Яворов, на Мариета Иванова-Гиргинова и Елизария Рускова – отново за Яворовата драматургия, на Надежда Александрова – за края на списание „Хиперион“. Моят първи студент по прагматизъм Морис Фадел е направил анализ на анималистични мотиви в българската литература със смели препратки към модерността, а Галин Тиханов е интерпретирал две трудни творби на Елиас Канети. Изненадваща трактовка на Радичкова драма като абсурдистка предлага Николай Кирилов. Вихрен Чернокожев пише за антитоталитарната ни литература. Анна Алексиева се спира на културната травма, причинена от османското владичество, която отзвучава в статията на Николай Чернокожев за появата на нова България на европейската карта. Моят скромен принос е в двете очертани полета – изваждането от заповяданата забрава на първия български прагматист Иван Саръилиев и анализ в максимално широк контекст на една мисъл на Пърс, която смятам за ключова в неговата философия.

Изброяването на участниците с техните приноси не е по задължение, нито според норма. Изчитането на техните приноси ще открои нещо изненадващо – успели сме да покрием отрязък от време с енциклопедични параметри – от предсократиците и Аристотел до днес. Мисля, че и Пърс не би възразил срещу такъв похват: предпоставяме твърдения с висока степен на правдивост и ги доказваме с достатъчна близост до истината. Така изпълняваме формата на гигантски абдуктивен силогизъм, може би единствената честна научна позиция. Вероятно учените от моето поколение ще са в началото на абдукцията, а студентите ни – в нейния завършващ стадий, който… на свой ред ще се превърне в обект на нова интерпретация.

Нека това представяне бъде израз на най-дълбоката ми благодарност към тях и на моята гордост, че сме заедно в една „общност на приятели“.

Моят първи докторант върху философията на Пърс – Андрей Ташев, свърши работата по комплектуването на този том, което означава – по неговата концепция и поетика. Инициативата е била на колеги от Института за литература при БАН, който е бил единственото ми постоянно работно място. Те са от най-вътрешния кръг приятели и съмишленици. Искрена благодарност към тях и към колегите от Издателството на БАН.

TO THE COMMUNITY OF FRIENDS

Ivan Mladenov

The genre of Festschrifts usually falls into a giant cliché: words of appreciation, list of publications, words of praise for the celebrated person's merits. That is why such volumes are not prepared by the celebrated persons themselves but by their students, followers or colleagues. However prestigious the participation in such volume may be, the text often has the ring of a condolatory address. Alternatively, it resembles a taxidermy for a "future" life. In the face of this, the personage is to suffer the embarrassment that, in spite of his mature age, the feelings aroused are unfamiliar. He is kindly told that anything s/he has contributed so far is highly recognized, and it would really matter if s/he puts some more effort and manages to write a thing or two in addition. But even if s/he does not write anything else, it is still fine; nobody is going to blame him/her. On the contrary, s/he will be praised for giving way to the junior colleagues, which in itself is a show of dignity. This is the first wave of feelings, all others follow after. We all have seen how it happens, and we secretly cherish the hope that this fate will not befall us. If, however it reaches us, our hope is that we should know what not to do. The trap consists in the inability to avoid the custom – the occasion is averse to any originality. Worse, any search after creativity is doomed; the situation does not allow it, the genre does not tolerate it, the readers are not expecting it. The celebrated person's destined role is to wait humbly for the wise adage "This too shall pass" to take its course.

An excellent example of the mentioned trap is described in the introductory essay by Professor Otto Kronsteiner, who has himself passed through the same procedure and has heard the catchphrase "In Honorem …". He has done what a typical scholar would do when he outlines the history, the facts and the structure of the ritual. What a friendly gesture, to spare me the task. I still feel sorry for what the not-quite-dead Soviet-Bulgarian secret police did to demonise this enlightened man who loves Bulgaria so much. Another unavoidable trap is that whatever I write, it would be taken as a vindication. I have to vindicate myself for participating in a self-conspiracy by standing up in front of my colleagues and friends, who have never been in my shoes. It is nice to be praised, but at the same time it is embarrassing to follow the formalities of the genre by crossing over the borders, where the sins of youth turn into virtues of maturity.

My friend Kronsteiner showed the way – to enjoy the occasion and to smile at its rituals. Contrary to expectation, vanity no longer matters: what deserved merit has been acknowledged, what was disputable – too; it is not up to the celebrated person to calculate the balance. This insight is not easy to reach, the cautionary tales are numberless. At least one of biblical age is worth recalling. A man was about to conclude his earthly deeds so he gathered all his friends and relatives around his death bed. He told them the story of his life, all about the good he did for the community, for his family and friends – all pious things. The balance turned out well, he was quite pleased and gave way to his feelings. In the night that followed, an angel visited him, and asked with an angry voice: "Who are you to judge your own deeds, your actions and mistakes according to your own measure? It is not given to man to appraise his life and to measure his achievements." This is how the angel talked and the man realized he had sinned, he was not supposed to judge his own life according to his own measures. The lesson does not only concern the most ancient of sins, pride, but maturity as well, which does not come with aging alone. What we get from the passing of the years is the opportunity to experience pain and sorrow, only they bring about wisdom, not the years alone. There is no insightfulness without suffering and thought is its satisfying prize.

I was blessed to learn from the best and to have those same people among the authors in this volume makes me even happier. Even today, I have not the slightest idea what inspired me to study the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce as a third field of my overall education. For a decade previously I had been immersed in the first two, literary theory and general semiotics. And so the triad was complete and on a scale big enough to fill a lifetime. The most important third period started in Bloomington, Indiana, under the supervision, or should I rather say "with the friendship" of the unforgettable Thomas Sebeok. After a year in the Centre, I was ready to start on Peirce's philosophy. "Starting" was a notion, whose meaning I had not anticipated. It meant years of hard work mastering the instrument, in close collaboration with Nathan Houser at the beginning, who arranged my fingers on the keys so that no sound was out of tune. Then more and more effort was necessary, each step rewarded by the opening of a new niche in this cave of Aladdin's before my mind: the unimaginable richness of thought and the splendid metaphors, the glory of the science of signs. After my return to Europe I had no doubts about my mission ahead – to spread the treasures of this knowledge wherever I travelled to teach: in Salzburg, Helsinki, Jyväskylä, back to Bloomington, in Estonia, Germany, France, Scandinavia, and of course, in Bulgaria. I think this sense of mission is best grasped by Vincent Colapietro in depicting me as both a scholar and a researcher. It had to be like this – Peirce's philosophy is still not much popular in Europe and I gladly joined the efforts of those who were already spreading it in the desire to demonstrate its brilliancy. I did this alongside the usual academic duties: numberless conferences, congresses, summer schools, tutorials etc.

My academic career has rewarded me with what was for Peirce an unfulfilled dream during his lifetime – to be among a "community of inquirers", where he could continue his research, verifying his hypotheses against the ideas of others. There is no other way around – what we think as our own accomplishment and contribution will become such only when multiplied by many others. It will first settle as a mental "sediment" of "effete mind" containing frozen metaphors, their meaning locked inside, only to grow wings at some future time and rise towards a crystalized mind where all hypotheses would get close to all truths. It could eventually turn into a park with sculptures chiselled out by removing the upper layers to uncover the harmony of the embodied statues of thought. In this train of thought are the searches of the scholars from this volume whom I address as the "community of friends."

I feel that what I am saying is insufficient; the truth is that most of the participants in the volume did participate in my life as well. I have lived with their papers, their books and their advice, what else lies ahead? Life is going on, its wholeness is an ontology, its duration – pragmatics. Generalized experience is abstracted from the ever expanding knowledge, which is just another name for thinking.

It is time to conclude that all contributions to the Festschrift are generous and giving. Here is the contribution of one of the most prodigious contemporary philosophers, John Deely, author of a thousand-page inquiry, *Four Ages Of Understanding*, which fills the blank spots on the "road not taken", the one not followed by humanitarian thought, after the remarkable attempt for a *Semiotica magna* on the part of John Poinsot, whose work Deely tirelessly popularizes. The paper by Peirce's devotee Nathan Houser resembles a highly specialized, intensive course on the doctrine of the sign and pragmatism. Houser's lifelong career as a Director of the Peirce Edition Project guarantees the highest reliability of his insights. The inspiration of a poet permeates the study of Ivo Ibri who has found the source of Peirce metaphorical thinking in the natural philosophy of Schelling. Time, Being and Reality from a Peircean perspective are presented in the papers by Eero Tarasti, Winfried Nöth, Vincent Colapietro, Vesselin Petrov, Dinda Gorlèe, Drude von der Fehr, Andrey Tashev, Mihály Szívós, Raya Kuncheva, Reni Yankova, Nikolay Ivanov. I would not be able to thank enough Michiko Arima, who translated my book, thus presenting my modest achievements to the Japanese community of experts. In this Festschrift, she contributes greatly by throwing light on a famous Shakespearean phrase, used by Peirce, bringing forth a wide historical context that reaches back to the Bible. Anita Kasabova and Vladimir Marinov discuss signification and interpretation according to Aristotle. Alfred Nordmann sheds light on some ambiguous phrases of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Back to biblical plots goes the work of Milena Kirova with an implicit semiotic layer. To the "Hesychast" Middle Ages returns the topic of the poetically entitled paper by one of the very few philosophers of the Orthodox past worldwide, Georgi Kapriev.

I welcome with gratitude the literary theoretical studies in the volume, which align with my own interests in this field. These are the enlightening pa-

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pers by Radosvet Kolarov on the dialogue between two great pieces of Kafka's; a work on the transformation and representation of cities in French literature by Harri Veivo of the famous Finnish semiotic school, as well as Anissava Miltenova's article on the incest-myth, which uses a thesis from my last book. Picking up and critically assessing a thesis from my last book is in the focus of Marie Vrinat-Nikolov's study, which involves similar theses of other Bulgarian theorists. An impressive work on the signifying methods from Leibniz to Wittgenstein is offered by Miryana Yanakieva. Yani Milchakov presents less known sides of Roman Ingarden's monumental work. Highly original is the idea of Plamen Antov to view the reading of some Bulgarian symbolists through the interpretation of some marginal critics. In this line are the articles by Tsvetan Rakyovski on a dramatic piece of Yavorov's; by Marieta Ivanova-Girginova and Elizaria Ruskova on Yavorov's dramaturgical work; by Nadezhda Alexandrova on the discontinuation of the *Hiperion* literary journal. My first student on Peirce, Maurice Fadel analyses the animalistic motives in Bulgarian literature with some bold parallels to modern times; Galin Tihanov interprets two less often interpreted pieces by Elias Canetty. A surprising interpretation of one of Radichkov's dramas as an absurd is offered in Nikolay Kirilov's paper. Vihren Chernokozhev writes on the anti-totalitarian literature under communism. Anna Alexieva reviews the cultural trauma from the Osman rule in Bulgaria, a theme which also reverberates in Nikolay Chernokozhev's work on the emergence of Bulgaria on the European map. My modest contribution is in the two fields of my interest: I wrote on bringing out from imposed oblivion of the figure of the first Bulgarian pragmatist, Ivan Sarailiev. In another piece, I analyse, against a broader historical context, a thought of Peirce's, which I find of great importance for his overall development.

Listing all participants with their contributions has not been an obligation, nor is it due to any standard. Their works amount to something quite surprising – we have managed to cover a historical period of encyclopaedic proportion, from the Pre-Socratic philosophy and Aristotle to the present day. I do not think Peirce would have objected to such an approach, where we put forward a case with a high degree of veridicality and then work it out to a degree of high probability. In this way we fulfil the form of a giant abductive syllogism, which is probably the most honest scientific position. The scholars of my generation are at the bottom of the syllogism and our students will meet us at the top, which in its turn will become the object of a new interpretative chain – in a semiosis *ad infinitum*. May this presentation be an expression of gratitude to my colleagues, as well as of my pride and joy that we are together in a "community of friends".

The compiler of this volume is my first PhD student on Peirce's philosophy, Andrey Tashev, which means that he authored its conception and worked on its poetics. The initiative came from my colleagues from the Institute of Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, that is, the inner circle of friends and collaborators. My deepest gratitude goes to them and to the colleagues from the Publishing House of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

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BRIEF AN DEN JUBILAR PROFESSOR DR. IVAN MLADENOV ZUM 60. GEBURTSTAG

Otto Kronsteiner

Verehrter Professor, lieber Ivan!

Die Einladung Deiner Freunde, für eine Festschrift zu schreiben, hab ich zunächst aus den gleichen Gründen wie der Grazer Romanist Hugo Schuchardt vor schon fast hundert Jahren weggelegt. Man bekommt ab einem bestimmten Alter ständig solche Einladungen. Man könnte es physisch kaum schaffen. Festschriften sind zu einem akademischen Ritual geworden, über das der Gefeierte sich kaum noch freuen kann.

Festschrift ist eine einem Gelehrten/*magister* gewidmete Sammlung von Aufsätzen. Die Beiträge werden von Schülern/*discipuli*, Freunden und Fachkollegen zu einem runden Geburtstag verfasst. Meist enthalten sie eine Literaturzusammenstellung der Schriften des Gefeierten und sind daher eine bibliografische Quelle. Englisch heisst sie oft *Essays in honor of* , in slawischen Ländern *In honorem*. Die erste erschien angeblich 1640 in Leipzig anlässlich des 200. Jubiläums der Erfindung der Buchdruckerkunst, herausgegeben von Gregor Ritzsch. Manche Gelehrte werden auch mit mehreren geehrt. Der häufigste Anlass ist der 60. Geburtstag, nach dem gewöhnlich die Emeritierung folgt und der Gefeierte zu publizieren aufhört. Sie stehen dann in Bibliotheken: weil keiner sie kauft, und keiner sie liest.

Kritisch vermerkt werden die fehlende Selektivität und die starke Heterogenität der Beiträge. Manche Autoren lassen sogar für andere Geschriebenes, von Zeitschriftenredaktionen Abgelehntes, aus der Schublade sozusagen, publizieren. Der deutsche Germanist und Linguist Werner Zillig hat sich in seinem Roman *Die Festschrift* (Tübingen 2004) satirisch mit diesem Thema auseinander gesetzt. In jedem Fall ist sie zu einem akademischen Ritual geworden, an dem man teilzunehmen hat. So ergeht es auch mir. Ich will aber Dir, lieber Ivan, einem wenig konventionellen Menschen, das alles nicht antun und hab mich zu einem commemorativen Brief á la *erinnerst Du Dich?* entschlossen. Wir haben ja nicht wenig gemeinsame Aktivitäten gegen dunkle Kräfte inszeniert.

Lieber Ivan! Du bist weltweit bekannt im Kreis der Semiotiker. Ich hab dazu wenig zu sagen. Es gibt also diesbezüglich keinen Anknüpfungspunkt. Näher bist Du mir als Literaturwissenschafter. Am nächsten aber als mittlerweile 60-jähriger Freund, mit dem mich ein Stück bulgarischer Geschichte und Politik verbindet. Du hast Dich in allen schwierigen und kritischen Fällen ohne Rücksicht auf Dein persönliches Schicksal und Deine Karriere für die Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit eingesetzt. Solche Professoren gibt es nicht viele!

Ich hab Dich an einem späten Nachmittag in den 1980er Jahren im damaligen unterirdischen Ikonenmuseum der orthodoxen Kathedrale von Sofia kennen und bewundern gelernt. Deine Frau Detelina war zuständig für meine Betreuung während eines der zahlreichen bulgaristischen Kongresse. Sie wollte, dass Du mir die intimen Schätze der Heimat aus Deiner Sicht, mit Deinem Kommentar vorstellst, – ohne den unerträglichen kommunistisch/nationalistischen Zuckerguss. Es war die Zeit, als ich als frisch ernannter Ordinarius der Universität Salzburg die Absicht hatte, dieses vergessene Eck Südosteuropas den Europäern, meinen Landsleuten und den Slawisten bekannt zu machen. Das war nicht leicht bei den steinzeitlichen politischen Verhältnissen vor der Wende. Die grossen Momente der bulgarischen Geschichte waren die Freiheit, die Religion, die Sprache, – nicht die Schrift. Die grösste Leistung war die Übersetzung der gesamten Heiligen Schrift, – nicht die Schrift selbst. Das wäre die Glagolica gewesen, die schon in den Anfängen wieder abgekommen ist und in Bulgarien nie populär war. Die Kirilica war in Bulgarien die längst verbreitete griechische Schrift, – mit ein paar glagolitischen Buchstaben. Das musste man einmal klar stellen und die zuständigen Kreise in Politik und Wissenschaft überzeugen. In zahlreichen Publikationen, Vorträgen und Gesprächen hab ich es versucht. Meine Ansichten zum Glottonym *altbulgarisch* (gemeint ist die Sprache, also Texte) sind in ganz Bulgarien ausnahmslos akzeptiert und rezipiert worden. Sie haben wahrscheinlich auch zu der am 23. Mai 1990 erfolgten, für mich unerwarteten Verleihung des Titels *doctor honoris causa* einer neu gegründeten Universität geführt, mit der mich bis dahin nichts verbunden hat, die man kaum kannte, mit dem ungewöhnlichen Namen *Sv.sv. Kiril i Metodij* der alten Zarenhauptstadt Veliko Tarnovo. Man hat meine damalige Popularität benützt, um sich als *up to date University* zu profilieren. Die internationale Slawistik ist beim altmodischen und missverständlichen Terminus *altkirchenslawisch* geblieben. Die Feinheiten des Unterschieds zwischen *altbulgarisch* und *altslowenisch*, über den ich viele Jahre geschrieben hab, hat man in Bulgarien in Unkenntnis der lateinischen Sprache, der lateinischen Quellen und des mittelalterlichen Zentraleuropas ohnehin nie verstanden. Dass die Kirilica nicht die älteste slawische Schrift ist, auch nicht vom „Bulgaren" Kyrill erfunden, wurde so zu einer staatsfeindlichen, gefährlichen Häresie. Armes Bulgarien!

Erinnerst Du Dich an die Diskussion 1988 nach meinem Vortrag in Sofia anlässlich des Internationalen BulgaristenKongresses, wo die Bulgaren mit leuchtenden Augen und die anwesenden Russen kopfschüttelnd und grimmig verärgert zuhörten? Es war ein Versuch, den bulgarischen Wunsch nach Un-

abhängigkeit vom „Kommunistenjoch", von Moskau, zu internationalisieren. In meiner „Dankesrede" an den bulgarischen Präsidenten bei einem anderen Internationalen Bulgaristenkongress und dem „privaten" Mittagessen bei ihm, was mir die deutschen und österreichischen Vertreter des Internationalen Slawistenkomitees als „Umarmung der Kommunisten" vorgeworfen haben, hab ich offen darüber gesprochen. Es war, glaub ich, die einzig öffentliche Kritik am Regime. Jedenfalls erinnere ich mich nicht, von irgendeinem westlichen Slawisten oder Historiker etwas in dieser Hinsicht gehört oder gelesen zu haben.Von vielen bulgarischen Zuhörern hab ich am nächsten Morgen vor meinem Hotelzimmer Nüsse, Äpfel und Kilims als Dank für meinen Mut vorgefunden. Ich war zutiefst gerührt. Das ging lang gut so und ich konnte mich der Ehren kaum erwehren.

Erst als von 1999 bis 2001 die Annäherung an die Europäisch Union reeller wurde und ich den Vorschlag machte, zum besseren Verständnis der bulgarischen Kultur für die Europäer als Zweitschrift für topografische Aufschriften und Namen die *Latinica* einzuführen, hat ein nur des Bulgarischen mächtiger kommunistischer Professor der Universität von Veliko Tarnovo die Chance gesehen, sich und die provinzielle Universität in die Medien zu bringen und eine völlig unverständliche, absurde Kampagne begonnen. Ich wurde plötzlich zur *persona non gratissima*, zum Agent des Vatikans und der Amerikaner. Man hat mir vorgeworfen, ich will den Bulgaren ihr Heiligstes, die Schrift, wegnehmen, ich hätte behauptet, die Kirilica sei eine „kommunistische" Schrift und anderen Unsinn. Erinnerst Du Dich?

Ich hab nie vorgeschlagen, die *Kirilica* abzuschaffen, wie man mir allgemein vorwirft, sondern nur meine Hilfe angeboten, das Bulgarische international, europäisch verständlicher zu machen. Ich war entsetzt über die imbezilen Argumente der Professoren von Veliko Tarnovo und von AkademieMitgliedern gegen alltägliche „pragmatische" Erfahrungen. Der kluge Bürgermeister von Sofia hat später längst begriffen, was ich wirklich gemeint hab. Heute heissen die zweischriftigen Strassenaufschriften in Sofia (lateinische in englischer Orthografie) scherzhaft oder ernst *po Kronštajnerovski*.

Das alles hat mich zum allmählichen Entschluss gebracht, aus Verachtung über diese Kleinkrämerei mein Ehrendoktorat der Universität zurückzugeben. Ich wollte mit dieser Provinzgesellschaft nichts mehr zu tun haben. Ich hab dies in einem offenen Brief (deutsch und bulgarisch) an den Rektor der Universität am 11. September 2001 mitgeteilt. Aus Zeitungen hab ich erfahren, dass die Universität Tarnovo eine Woche später, am 17. September, mir den *doktor honoris causa* „aberkannt" hat. Das Protokoll der Sitzung könnte von unserem österreichischen Satiriker und Kabarettisten Johann Nestroy sein! Es wurde mir bis heute offiziell nicht mitgeteilt, dass ich nicht mehr *Dr.h.c.* bin. Ein Professor (er bleibe *anonymus*), Mitglied der bulgarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften hat dazu ein Buch (mit staatlichen Geldern?) zusammengestellt: *„Slučajat" Oto Kronštajner* („Der Fall" Otto Kronsteiner). Unser Freund Marin Georgiev, der Chefredakteur des damals angesehenen *Literaturen Forum* hat Reihenfolge

und Argumente genau dokumentiert (Broj 29, 18.09. – 24.09.2001 g.). Damals hast Du, lieber Ivan, darauf bestanden, die Wahrheit über Professor Kronsteiner (*Istinata za profesor Kronštajner*, Sofia 2005) in Buchform mit ins Bulgarische übersetzten Artikeln erscheinen zu lassen. Die ursprünglich deutsch, französisch, englisch, slowenisch publizierten konnte die ehrenwerte Professorenschaft ja nicht lesen. Unvergesslich für mich darin Dein flammender Beitrag *Nauka i sram* (Wissenschaft und Schande). Das Buch war in Kürze ausverkauft. Vielen herzlichen Dank für Deinen Mut zu Lasten Deiner akademischen Karriere!

Als ich die Literaturgeschichte unseres am Trumersee in Salzburg begrabenen Freundes Christo Ognjanov 1999 neu herausgegeben hab, warst Du sofort bereit, Deinen ursprünglich englisch verfassten Essay, in deutscher Übersetzung *Die bulgarische Literatur. Eine Perlenkette* als methodisch ergänzende, andere Darstellung mitdrucken zu lassen. Immerhin: Der gute Ognjanov war ein von den Kommunisten zum Tod verurteilter Bulgare im Salzburger Exil.

Gern denk ich an unsere schönen MittagsGespräche beim Mostwastl, am Mittwoch, während Deines Aufenthalts in Salzburg als Gastprofessor und Lektor 1998–2001, aus denen der KKK (Kronsteiners KulturKlub) entstanden war. Wir haben den Mostwastl später in *Ost*wastl umgetauft. Damals hast Du uns auch erzählt von Deiner eigenartigen Erfahrung mit Kommunisten. Auch ich hab geglaubt, sie spielen nur Kommunismus. Sie tun „als ob". Nach der Wende hat sich herausgestellt, dass sie in ihrer ganzen traurigen Bildung und Überzeugung wirklich Kommunisten waren. Aber, es ist ihnen mit ihrem Opus ergangen wie die russische Nestorchronik über die Awaren schreibt: *ihže něstь plemeni ni naslědьka*.

Wir alle im „freien Europa" haben Deinen Mut, Deine Unbestechlichkeit und Deine wunderbare Haltung in jener schwierigen und für Dich und Deine Familie gefährlichen Zeit bewundert. Auch dafür sei Dir Dank!

Trotz Festschrift zu Deinem Sechziger, weiterhin: *Ad multos annos!*

Otto

Em. O.Univ. Prof. Dr., Dr. h.c. (1990–2001), Dr. h.c. Otto Kronsteiner
Ritter der Stara Planina

Част I
ПЪРС – КОНТЕКСТУАЛИЗИРАН

Part I
PEIRCE – CONTEXTUALIZED

PEIRCE ON PRACTICAL REASONING

Nathan Houser

> [T]he "unconscious or semi-conscious irreflective judgments of mother-wit, like instinctive inferences of brutes … are seldom totally mistaken." (W6: 387)

I've devoted much of my career to Peirce's philosophy, and his logic plays a central role, but it's a complicated pursuit and only recently have I begun to focus close attention on his idea of practical reasoning[1]. Most of what I will say concerns that topic but, since Peirce was an architectonic thinker whose ideas can usually be best comprehended in the broader context of his larger system of thought, it may seem that I'm drifting rather far afield. I'll try to restrain myself from saying more than is necessary about such topics as Peirce's theory of signs and classification of the sciences. However, it will not come as a surprise to readers of this volume that any serious consideration of Peirce's views on reasoning must include reference to his theory of signs.

When I refer to Peirce's idea of practical reasoning, I may be deviating a bit from ordinary usage, but not greatly. In his little book, *Reason and Argument*, Peter Geach says, simply, that "[t]heoretical reasoning is concerned with how things are" while "practical reasoning" is concerned with "what is to be done" (Geach 1976: 96). When a more normative stance is taken, it is said that theoretical reasoning concerns what *should* be *believed* while practical reasoning concerns what *should* be *done*. It is generally accepted that practical reasoning

[1] This paper was originally presented to the Center for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric, University of Windsor, Ontario, 3 May 2012.

is supposed to deal with the connection between reasoning and action and, with some caveats, Peirce would have agreed. It is how the connection between reasoning and action is explained that I suspect distinguishes Peirce's account of practical reasoning from standard views. Consider R. Jay Wallace's account of practical reason in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* – I take it to be a typical. According to Wallace, "Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do." He goes on to say that "Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act." Peirce would surely have agreed with Wallace that practical reason is practical in its consequences; as a pragmatist he would claim that to be true for all reasoning, at least with respect to conceived consequences. But Peirce might have disagreed with Wallace's claim that reflection about action *directly* moves people to act. Peirce would argue that a material cause is required and how that material cause can arise from reflection is problematic. But Peirce's main objection would be to Wallace's claim that practical reasoning is a matter of reflection and deliberation. Deliberation, for Peirce, is characteristic of reasoning proper but not of practical reason.

According to Peirce, "*Reasoning* is the process by which we attain a belief which we regard as the result of previous knowledge" (EP 2: 11). Peirce was well aware that reasoning depends on a complex underlying cerebral process but he maintained that what is at issue is "the relation between the premisses and the conclusion" not the "operations of the mind … in passing from the one to the other" (CP 2.183). Genuine reasoning is always deliberate, voluntary, critical, and self-controlled (CP 2.182; 4.476) and it can't be unconsciously performed (CP 2.182). There is a related cerebral process that occurs more or less unconsciously by instinct or by habit that is not reasoning, properly speaking (CP 4.476). Yet it is this more or less unconscious process that constitutes practical reasoning on Peirce's view. This seems to be recognized by Gabbay and Woods in their 2005 second volume of *A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems*:

> For Peirce, [they write,] scientific reasoning stands in sharp contrast to practical reasoning or, as he also says, to reasoning about 'matters of Vital Importance' [EP 2: 33]. … Peirce's writings on abduction are important in a number of ways, but especially for its emphatic rejection of the possibility of a practical logic, hence of a logic of abductive reasoning in practical contexts.

I think Gabbay and Woods chose well in going to Peirce's 1898 discussion of practical affairs, or, as Peirce says, matters of vital importance, for his views on practical reasoning and I believe they are on target in associating practical reasoning with abduction – although more has to be said about that. But I believe they are mistaken in thinking that Peirce rejected the possibility of a practical logic; I think they have confused Peirce's dismissal of the prudence of applying

a practical logic on-the-spot, as it were, with a rejection of the possibility of a logic of abductive reasoning about practical matters. Here is what Peirce said in the lecture referred to by Gabbay and Woods:

> But in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination. Man is so vain of his power of reason! It seems impossible for him to see himself in this respect, as he himself would see himself if he could duplicate himself and observe himself with a critical eye. Those whom we are so fond of referring to as the "lower animals" reason very little. Now I beg you to observe that those beings very rarely commit a mistake, while we! We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they come to unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! (EP 2: 31)

I take Peirce's point to be that in practical affairs *in actu*, rather than in theory, it is existential circumstances as they are happening that require responsive action, and in many cases immediate action, and to consciously formulate premisses about those conditions in order to draw deliberate conclusions about what to do is unrealistic. On-the-spot reasoning proper (real deliberation) is not prudent in practical affairs. Even when there is ample time for deliberation, as in the jury trial example that Peirce used, where the vagaries and ambiguities of actual human events are at issue, reasoning is often dressed up to be far more dependable than it really is. Peirce's idea was that the basis for action in practical affairs should be established beliefs and practices, or habits, whether instinctive or acquired purposefully or by convention, not on-the-spot deliberative reasoning.

The underlying assumption here is that the habits we depend on when on-the-spot decisive action is required are habits that have been acquired because they facilitate behavior that would generally be adopted if there were capacity and time for conscious deliberation. In this era of computing, we might think of these habits as programs or stored routines that are triggered by relevant data of a specified type. Viewed in this way, the cognitive processing that enables us to maneuver through the world of our immediate experience and to cope with what Peirce called "matters of vital importance," what he conceived of as practical reasoning, is an automatic, non-deliberate sort of processing of a kind with executing a stored program. Since cognitive processing of this sort does not satisfy Peirce's conditions for reasoning proper why does he concede to designate it as reasoning in any sense?

To answer this, I'll resort again to a computing analogy. It may seem that computing analogies are inappropriate for elucidating the thought of a 19th century philosopher, but in Peirce's case I believe it is appropriate: he was as computer literate as anyone could have been in the late 1800's, even being distinguished as the first person ever to propose using electrical circuitry and logic operators for faster, more powerful computers (what in Peirce's

day were called logic machines). Arthur Burks, a principal designer for the ENIAC, wrote that the "most plausible interpretation" of certain remarks made by Peirce is that he foresaw that electromechanical technology could be used "to replace the mechanical technology of Babbage's planned analytical engine" with "an *electrical analytical* engine," which in modern terminology, according to Burks, would be "an electrical general-purpose programmable computer" (Burks and Burks 1989: 346–347). So invoking computing to delimit reasoning proper while exemplifying practical reasoning seems expedient and all the more illuminating since Peirce, himself, used the example of computing for the same purpose. Peirce knew that machines could perform logical deductions. He was well aware that Venn had constructed a logic machine, as had his own student, Alan Marquand. Peirce called these logic machines "mills into which the premises are fed and which turn out the conclusions by the revolution of a crank" (W6: 65). But granted that these machines performed deductive logic operations, did they reason, or could any machine, however advanced, really reason? Peirce was ambivalent about this (CP 2.59) but believed that the investigation of "precisely how much of the business of thinking a machine could possibly be made to perform, and what part of it must be left for the living mind," could be expected to "throw needed light on the nature of the reasoning process" (W6: 65).

It was not uncommon for Peirce to compare human thought to machine computation and even once he wrote a paper comparing human senses to a reasoning machine. He said he didn't much care whether or not the operation of a logic machine is called reasoning but that what is revealing is that humans function like machines in much of their cognitive processing (CP 2.59) – and he believed we should be glad of this because our unconscious machine-like processing is far more efficient and dependable than real-time deliberation: the "unconscious or semi-conscious irreflective judgments of mother-wit, like instinctive inferences of brutes … are seldom totally mistaken" (W6: 387). The important point, Peirce thought, was not whether or not mechanical (unconscious) processing, whether in a computer or in a brain, is called reasoning, but that whatever logicality, or rationality, it has derives from its programming. Peirce believed that even if a machine could be made to reason indistinguishably from a human, the source of its rationality would be in its design and programming, not in the data processing per se. Likewise, in humans, the rationality of our on-the-spot practical reasoning derives from our programming, our instincts and habits, not in cognitive processing per se. So even though neither computer processing nor cognitive processing in real life situations (our practical reasoning) meet the conditions Peirce set down for reasoning proper, he yielded in allowing that they do constitute reasoning insofar as they execute programs or habits that contribute its rationality. But how much this was really yielding I'll come back to in what follows.

First, though, I should say something about what no doubt appears to be my rather relaxed references to reasoning and rationality. It would seem that I

am representing Peirce to have regarded actions resulting from instinctive or habitual behavior as conclusions of a reasoning process. But even if we accept the Aristotelian view, as I understand it anyway, that practical reasoning is reasoning that concludes in a physical act, it is generally supposed that prior to the physical act there must be a mental state that is the real conclusion of the reasoning. As expressed by John Broome "reasoning is a mental process, which takes place in the reasoner's mind. Its conclusion must be a mental state or a mental event; it cannot be a non-mental act" (Broome 2001: 175). The final bit of causation and the concluding act itself fall outside of the scope of the practical reasoning that somehow brought them about. This concern, I suppose, is related to the view championed by Sellars and his followers, that the space of reasons is separate from the scientific world of causes and effects. For Sellars, the space of reasons is linguistic: reasons are said to be always language-based which entails that only language users can reason. John McDowell has argued that Sellars account of reasoning can be extended to bring non-human animals into the picture:

> If we make language a requirement for occupying the space of reasons strictly so called, we insist on a discontinuity in animal life, between our lives and those of all other animals (at least so far as we know). What I have been urging is that this does not prevent us from also acknowledging a continuity. We do not need to suppose that the relation between a reason and what it is a reason for springs into being out of nothing with the onset of language. It has intelligible precursors in the relations between goals, awarenesses, and behaviour that already shape stretches of the lives of animals without language. (McDowell 2004)

But the continuity of human and non-human animal life that McDowell is promoting does not go very deep:

> [T]here is clearly more to coming to occupy the space of reasons than this transfiguration of *practical* intelligence. I suggested that it is the ability to say how things are that enables a distanced attitude towards a feature of one's environment. The ability to say how things are presupposes responsiveness to *theoretical* reasons. And that brings into play stretches of the space of reasons that, unlike the most basic practical reasons, have no counterpart in shaping the lives of non-rational animals. (McDowell 2004)

So the space of reasons, strictly speaking, is reserved for reflective conceptualization – a stepping back to consider how things are – or for what Peirce regards as reasoning proper involving real deliberation. It is a space reserved exclusively for mental entities or events, as Broome requires.

If practical reasoning has to conclude with a mental state, we are left with a puzzle: how do we deal with the gap between the reasoning and the act. The reasoning does not take us all the way to the result that makes it practical. Broome's solution is to "identify practical reasoning as reasoning that concludes in an in-

tention, which is a mental state."[2] That, Broome says, "is as practical as reasoning can get." So the gap remains: the concluding intention to act "is in turn likely to cause the intended act," Broome maintains, but "that last bit of causation is not part of the reasoning process" and it is not at all clear why the intention to act, if it truly is a strictly mental state, as Broome requires, can be thought likely to cause the intended act, which is not a mental state.

The landscape spreads out if we expand our idea of what counts as a mental state beyond language-based states to the full range of semiotic states that Peirce regarded as mental. As is well known, Peirce endorsed the view that all thought is in signs, and by "thought" he meant to include all conscious mental events: "whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign" (EP 1: 38). But Peirce went further and held that there are unconscious mental events that are inferential, and are therefore reasoning in a generalized sense, even though they are not thought, properly speaking. But they, too, are signs. What distinguishes signs from ordinary physical objects is that they are fundamentally temporal and relational and always somehow represent an object in some way or other to an agent. More standardly, signs are said to mediate between objects and interpretations (or what Peirce called interpretants, the mental effect of the sign on an interpreting agent).



We can experience objects directly in a brute way by physical causation, which is dyadic, but we can only know about objects, or be informed about them, indirectly through the mediation of signs. This semiotic mediation, which Peirce calls semiosis (or semiosy), is triadic and is a form of final causation. I will abstain from attempting any explanation of Peirce's conception of final causation beyond just mentioning that he distinguished it from efficient causation, which he considered to be "a compulsion determined by the particular condition of things … and acting to make that situation begin to change in a perfectly determinate way" with no aim whatsoever, whereas with final causation it is the end, a result fitting a general description, that somehow determines the compulsion to bring it about by whatever means possible (CP 1.211–212). So semiosy is action for the sake of an end and is not brute compulsion. I suspect that Peir-

[2] All of the quotations in this paragraph are from Broome 2001: 175.

ce's claim that sign action is the mark of the mental is similar to Brentano's idea that intentionality is the mark of the mental[3].

Probably Peirce's best-known classification of signs is his early division into icons, indexes, and symbols, which classifies signs by how they are related to the objects they represent (or are about). Iconic signs represent objects by virtue of similarity or shared qualities; indexical signs represent objects by virtue of existential connection; and symbols represent objects by convention or because of rules.

THREEFOLD DIVISION OF SIGNS

The Sign's Ground (the Nature of the Sign in Itself)	QUALISIGN (tone)	SINSIGN (token)	LEGISIGN (type)
The Sign's Relation to its Object	ICON	INDEX	SYMBOL
How the Sign is Represented in its Interpretant	RHEME (term)	DICENT (proposition)	ARGUMENT

Peirce also divided signs by what he called their ground (by what they are materially, or in themselves): qualities, existents, or laws. These kinds he called qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns. And he divided signs according to the three main alternative ways they can be interpreted or taken to represent objects: as signs of possibility (which he called rhemes), as signs of fact (which he called dicent signs), or as signs of reason (arguments). This division corresponds to the traditional division of logical elements into terms, propositions, and arguments.

TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS

1. Rhematic-Iconic-**Qualisign**
2. Rhematic-**Iconic-Sinsign**
3. Rhematic-**Iconic-Legisign**
4. **Rhematic-Indexical-Sinsign**
5. **Rhematic-Indexical-Legisign**
6. **Rhematic-Symbolic**-Legisign
7. **Dicent**-Indexical-**Sinsign**
8. **Dicent-Indexical-Legisign**
9. **Dicent-Symbolic**-Legisign
10. **Argument**-Symbolic-Legisign

[3] See Short 2007a for an in-depth account of Peirce's theory of semiotic final causation and see pp. 6–11 for a discussion of Peirce's views in comparison with Brentano's idea of intentionality. Also see Short 2007b, pp. 669–676, for some further considerations and clarifications regarding final causation and see p. 669 for corroboration that Peirce's idea of significance exemplifies Brentano's idea of intentionality.

From these three divisions of signs, Peirce identified ten classes of signs (I'll skip the details)[4]. What I want to emphasize is that of the ten sign classes only one is a class of arguments. The other nine kinds of signs, although inferential processes, are not understood to be signs of reason. Peirce did not rest content with three divisions and ten classes of signs; starting around 1903 he began adding divisions and revising terminology and he ended up with ten divisions of signs which yielded sixty-six sign types. Peirce never believed he had finished his sign taxonomy, but his more advanced work is revealing in a number of ways.

TEN DIVISIONS OF SIGNS

Characteristics	Firstness	Secondness	Thirdness
Nature of the Sign	Qualisigns (tones)	Sinsigns (tokens)	Legisigns (types)
Nature of the Immediate Object	Descriptives (indefinites)	Designatives (singulars)	Copulatives (generals)
Nature of the Dynamic Object	Abstractives	Concretives	Collectives
Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object	Icons	Indexes	Symbols
Nature of the Immediate Interpretant	Hypotheticals	Categoricals	Relatives
Nature of the Dynamic Interpretant	Sympathetics	Percussives	Usuals
Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant	Suggestives	Imperatives	Indicatives
Nature of the Final Interpretant	Gratifics (feelings)	Practicals (efforts)	Pragmatistics (habits)
Relation of the Sign to the Final Interpretant	Rhemes (sign of possibility)	Dicents (sign of fact)	Arguments (sign of reason)
Nature of the Assurance Afforded the Interpreter	Abducents (assurance of instinct)	Inducents (assurance of experience)	Deducents (assurance of form)

The final division in this expanded classification divides signs according to the nature of the assurance they give interpreters. Signs can be either abducents, inducents, or deducents, which give assurance either through instinct, experience, or form. Now, in this sixty-six class taxonomy, there are just three classes

[4] See Houser 2005 for some further discussion of Peirce's sign classes but for an in-depth interpretative discussion see Romanini 2006 (also see his website: www.minutesemeiotic.org).

of arguments: abduction, induction, and deduction. But that leaves sixty-three classes of signs that are what we may consider to be inferential mental event types, although not arguments proper where a set of premisses is deliberately taken as implying a conclusion. Of these sixty-three, fifty-five are abducent, signs relying somehow on instinct.

When I began this digression on Peirce's theory of signs, it was to assist in elaborating his rather expansive view of what we might call the space of mind. Since, for Peirce, semiosis is the mark of the mental, his mapping out all these divisions and classes of signs is tantamount to a mapping of the space of possible mental activity – his sixty-six classes of signs constituting sixty-six kinds of mental operations or varieties of inference. If we consider the division of signs based on the nature of the final interpretant (the interpretant that would truly fulfill a given sign's function), we notice that Peirce has identified three kinds, which he named "Gratifics," "Practicals," and "Pragmatistics," and which, he described as being of the nature of feelings, efforts, and habits. Since our concern is with Peirce's account of practical reasoning, it would seem that mental operations that properly result in what Peirce calls "efforts," his "Practicals," are the kinds of signs that are relevant. An example of a sign with a practical interpretant which Peirce offers is a military officer's command to "Ground arms!"

> [W]hen a drill-officer gives a company of infantry the word of command, "Ground arms!", if this is really to act as a sign and not in a purely "physiological" way (I use this inaccurate distinction, rather than waste time in explanations), there must first be as in all action of signs, a feeling-interpretant, – a sense of apprehending the meaning, – which in its turn at once stimulates the soldiers to the slight effort required to perform the motion. This effect caused by the sign in its significative capacity is, by the definition, an interpretant of it. (EP 2: 430)

I said above that if practical reasoning has to conclude with a mental state, we are left with a puzzle: how do we deal with the gap between the reasoning and the act? I expressed doubt that Broome's postulation of intention as the necessary bridge was a satisfactory solution; if an intention is really a mental state, as he requires, how can it initiate the chain of efficient causation necessary to result in the intended action? Does Peirce's feeling-interpretant, which he alleges will stimulate the soldier to make the required effort, provide a better solution? It seems that Peirce believed that if an act is understood by an interpreter to be the proper response to a sign, and is performed accordingly, it is not then the effect of a purely physical cause but is really an "effect caused by the sign in its significative capacity." Whether this is of a kind with Broome's intention, I'm not sure, but I'll come back to this a bit further on.

But first I want to remark that however unusual and complicated Peirce's theory of signs may seem, it is at least thought provoking and potentially quite revealing. His taxonomy of signs, alone, understood as a mapping of the space of mind, offers a massively expanded variety of inferential states beyond those

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commonly studied, including even silence itself as potentially rich in meaning[5]. I'll grant that to really take advantage of Peirce's full taxonomy, one has to go far deeper into his theory of signs than most are willing to go. For example, if we want to study all of the classes of practical signs that can be distinguished on the basis of Peirce's ten divisions, we'd have to consider twenty-four kinds, sixteen of which are abducent and eight, inducent. That study couldn't be pursued without first mastering Peirce's overall theory of signs (which, itself, requires a good grasp of his categories and his classification of sciences). This is not to say that Peirce has nothing to offer on short notice – only that getting to the bottom of what he has to offer is not a project for a rainy afternoon or weekend.

Still, though acknowledging that we are sailing rather lightly over some deep waters, we can take a few more soundings. For example, we might ask why none of the three kinds of arguments properly conclude in actions. Peirce understood arguments to be deliberate inferences from recognized premisses and he required that the conclusions be conceptual (although he maintained that the final interpretant of an argument is a habit). But there are also inferential processes (sign actions of various kinds) that conclude straightforwardly in feelings or efforts more or less automatically and without any conscious appeal to reason. Insofar as these mental operations are rational, as Peirce believes they are, it is because they execute programs or procedures encoded in the operating instinct or habit, and these instincts and habits may be said to have been generated rationally even if not deliberately.

It might be doubted whether instincts in the sense of an inherited disposition could be supposed, even in a very liberally extended sense, to be called rational. Perhaps it could be argued that the development of an instinct must have been a lengthy process of trial and error tending to select for organisms capable of responding on-the-spot to typical environmental urgencies. Maybe the most we could ascribe to this developmental process, this encoding, if you will, is a "quasi rationality" – it is a development that reason could have endorsed if the point was to adapt organisms to their environments for the sake of future propagation of the type. We might be a bit more willing to attribute rationality, or reasonableness, to what Peirce sometimes called conventional instincts, habits "due to infantile training and tradition" (CP 2.170), for it is easier to accept that habits of this kind are propagated to inculcate automatic behaviors that are either beneficial or socially prudent. But even in this case it may be thought a real stretch since the rational agent seems to be a social group and not an individual. But even if we discount the alleged rationality of instincts and conventional habits, it is habit nonetheless, rather than intention, that Peirce counts on to bridge the divide between reasoning and action in practical reasoning.

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[5] See Ivan Mladenov's discussion in chapter 3 of his book, *Conceptualizing Metaphors* (Mladenov 2006), for a revealing treatment of the significance of silence and for an important comparison of Peirce's semiotic ideas with related ideas of Bakhtin's.

In his first Lowell Lecture of 1903, Peirce went into some detail to explain how he believed actions could be brought under rational control. He accepted as substantially true that "when we act, we act under a necessity that we cannot control… But our *future* actions we can determine in a great measure… To deny that were mere gabble and word-twisting" (EP 2: 245). Later, in a letter to Schiller, he summarized the main constituents that enable us to have rational control over future actions:

> [Rational control over future actions consists] first, in comparing one's past deeds with standards, second, in rational deliberation concerning how one will act in the future, in itself a highly complicated operation, third, in the formation of a resolve, fourth, in the creation, on the basis of the resolve, of a strong determination, or modification of habit. This operation of self-control is a process in which logical sequence is converted into mechanical sequence or something of the sort. How this happens, we are in my opinion as yet entirely ignorant. (Peirce to Schiller, 1906, CP 8.320)

In his Lowell Lecture, Peirce had pointed out that even though we don't know "by what machinery the conversion of a resolution into a determination [the efficient agency] is brought about," we know that it happens because we can predict a person's future conduct based on our knowledge of such resolutions. And we can program ourselves in this way. Peirce liked to give the example of his brother's reaction at the family table when his mother spilled burning oil on her skirt:

> Instantly, before the rest of us had had time to think what to do, my brother, Herbert, who was a small boy, had snatched up the rug and smothered the fire. We were astonished at his promptitude, which, as he grew up, proved to be characteristic. I asked him how he came to think of it so quickly. He said, "I had considered on a previous day what I would do in case such an accident should occur." (CP 5.538)

Herbert had imagined how he would act in such a circumstance and had resolved to act accordingly. Somehow, according to Peirce, Herbert's resolve had become a determination, a deliberately formed habit based on imagined happenings. This illustrates why we can conceive of practical reasoning as a species of moral conduct.

Several pages ago I said that because practical reasoning failed to meet the conditions Peirce set down for reasoning proper he had to yield to allow that it was a form of reasoning at all, and I said I would later consider how much he really had to yield. I was thinking of Peirce's pragmatism, born, as it was, during the first flush of excitement over Darwin's theory of evolution and in a group made up mainly of scientists and lawyers who were driven by the realization that humans are natural beings, living, interacting organisms, in a changing world, and that our capacity for thought is part of our natural endowment. Peirce's doubt/belief theory of inquiry, the basis of his pragmatism, in effect explains in-

telligence as the accretion of beliefs that prepare us, as the organisms we are, for future experience. Thought (or inquiry) is motivated by states of doubt (states of irritability resulting from environmental cruxes) and ends when those states of irritability have been resolved by suitable actions (which initiate habit formation). Peirce says that the function of thought is to produce belief and that belief is a rule of action – a habit. So the purpose of thought is to produce habits of action – not individual acts, but habits, or rules. Understood in this way, we might say that the logic of thought is a sort of practical reasoning and that pragmatism in the Peircean vein is a theory of practical reasoning. I say pragmatism in the Peircean vein because Peirce was less inclined than many other pragmatists to extend the domain of pragmatism into such areas as religion and politics and, unlike some of the other pragmatists he did not confuse pragmatism, as a theory of practical reasoning, with formal logic and theory of validity.

I want to distinguish the sort of logic of thought that I have in mind from any psychologistic enterprise that studies reasoning descriptively instead of normatively. Practical logic on Peirce's view is not a theory of how we do reason to achieve ends but of how we should reason to achieve ends. But unlike formal logic, practical logic has to take into account that we are embodied organisms subject to external (environmental and social) pressures and that our capacities for thought (cognitive processing) are limited in various ways. Thus a logic of thought, where thought's function is taken to be the formation of habits of action, not in theory but in fact, has to take contingencies into account that would be quite irrelevant for the purely formal logician. To the extent that reasoning is limited to the rule-governed manipulation of logical forms or linguistic expressions, and without time constraints, then Peirce certainly did yield in granting practical reasoning that designation. But if we will grant that there can be a normative theory of reasoning, informed by formal logic but that takes into account the capacities and limitations of the reasoners, which is what I believe Peirce did, then I don't think he had to yield much.

This is not to say, however, that Peirce did not recognize a fundamental difference between theoretical and practical reasoning. In the 1892 lecture that Gabbay and Woods used as their source for Peirce's views on practical reasoning, Peirce made the much debated claim that

> ... pure theoretical knowledge, or science, has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters, and nothing even applicable at all to vital crises. Theory is applicable to minor practical affairs; but matters of vital importance must be left to sentiment, that is, to instinct. (EP 2: 33)

But Peirce is not building a divide between kinds of reasoning, but, rather, is making the point that science is, and should be, guided by what I have called reason proper, with the test of experience coming in due time, while actions in response to matters of vital importance should be guided by instincts and traditional sentiments because: 1) urgency requires immediate action, and 2)

the fallibility of instincts and developed sentiment has *already* been mitigated over time by trial and error. So it does not seem to me that this view, which Peirce labels sentimental, or true, conservatism (CP 1.661), contradicts the recognition, compelled by his pragmatism, of the inseparable union of theory and practice.

I think it is worth noting that in his *Logic and Ethics* (1991), Peter Geach offered what he called a pragmatist response, to Bernard Williams and others "who try to dig a deep ditch between theoretical and practical reasoning" (Geach and Iołówka 1991):

> Peirce says that beliefs are *maxims of conduct*. In saying this he does not distinguish between practical and theoretical beliefs… Williams by contrast, starts with theoretical beliefs as paradigms of belief and hence finds practical beliefs to be defective specimens of belief, or not to be properly qualified to be called beliefs at all. The contrast looks sharper still when Peirce goes on to declare that all reasoning and all enquiry is 'a species of controlled conduct', and so is subject to *ethical* standards: 'Logic is the ethics of the intellect.' (Geach and Iołówka, 1991: 13)

Geach endorses Peirce's view:

> What persuades me that Peirce is right is not any formal argument that he offers. It is the faithfulness and coherence of his description of the perceived and experienced character of enquiry, both theoretical and practical. He is realistic about the facts of our reflective life at points where Williams is unrealistic, and where his unrealism betrays him into simplification; into what Wittgenstein called the imposition of a *requirement* on phenomena that should be described in their natural habitat, not caged in a theory. (ibid.: 14)

In his account of practical reasoning, Peirce went so far as to include actions and material objects to a degree in the reasoning process itself. In his inaugural article on pragmatism he remarked that for Darwin "questions of fact and questions of logic are curiously interlaced" and in the same paper he described Lavoisier's chemical experimentation as having led to "a new conception of reasoning, as something which was to be done with one's eyes open, by manipulating real things instead of words and fancies" (EP 1: 111). This is an expansive conception of practical reasoning that does not just bridge the gap between cognition and action, between the reasoner and the world, but that minimizes, if not erases, the distinction between the internal and the external.

In a recent paper, John McDowell points in the same direction:

> The theme from pragmatism that I want to work from is the suspicion that other philosophical approaches over-intellectualize their conception of how practical intelligence is manifested in action, and thereby tend towards a problematic interiority in their understanding of intelligence or the ability to think in general. If when we think about practical thought, we concentrate on actions whose details are planned in advance, we shall be inclined to see practical intelligence as prima-

rily located in the planning and the thinking as opposed to the acting. From here, we are close to a picture in which thought, even though we acknowledge that it can be practical in its point and culmination, is conceived as happening in an inner mental sphere, in principle separable from any publicly available behavior. We are now at risk of familiar philosophical difficulties, which might be summed up by saying that our conception of the inner looks Cartesian. (McDowell 2011: 119)

As a pragmatist corrective to this "tendency to depict thought as a problematically interior phenomenon," McDowell proposes "that actions are themselves informed by thought" (McDowell 2011: 121). I believe McDowell is moving toward Peirce's understanding of practical reasoning and that it is a promising direction to take.

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Abstract

It is generally agreed that what distinguishes practical reasoning from reasoning more generally is that practical reasoning properly results in action rather than in conceptual conclusions. There is much disagreement, however, as to how appropriate actions can follow from practical reasoning and it is commonly supposed that the connection between reasoning and action can neither be truly inferential nor truly causal. Peirce appears to challenge this common assumption. Although he would agree that conscious and deliberate argumentation results in conceptual conclusions (mental states) rather than in practical action, his extended semiotic account of mental activity allows for unconscious (instinctive or habitual) cognitive processing that, while properly inferential, genuinely concludes in action rather than in conceptual states. Peirce acknowledges that for practical reasoning to properly conclude in action, it is necessary for final (semiotic) causation to operate in conjunction with efficient causation and how this can be explained remains problematic. But his account is rich and promising and has much to contribute to contemporary research on practical reasoning.

TIME AS A SIGN, SIGNS OF TIME, AND THE TIME OF SIGNS: INSIGHTS FROM PEIRCE

Winfried Nöth

The semiotics of time is the study of signs of time in nature and culture. Time manifests itself in clock time, in instances, intervals, or durations, in the sequential order of events, rhythm or patterns of recurrence, vegetation (seasons), and in the age of objects or living beings. Since signs are themselves events in time, and their temporal characteristics may also be significant, the semiotics of time is also the study of the time of signs. How and in which form is time represented in signs? When does time become significant? Such are the questions of the semiotics of time.

Peirce's laws of time

Charles S. Peirce, the founder of modern semiotics, was also a philosopher of time, but Peirce's contributions to a general semiotics of time have not yet been investigated in a very systematic way, although some light has been shed on the topic from individual perspectives: Helm (1980, 1985) from the perspective of American pragmatism and its approaches to the study of time, Santaella (1992, 1998) from the perspectives of semiosis as a process and Peirce's categorial system, Öhrström (1995) from a logical point of view, Pinto (1998) from the perspective of literary and narrative semiotics, Sfendoni-Mentzou (1998) from the perspective of the history of philosophy (Aristotle and Peirce), Nöth (2000: 287–291, 320–322; 2007) from the perspectives of general semiotics and the semiotics of media, Colapietro (2012) from the perspectives of reality, continuity and consciousness, and De Tienne (2012) from the perspectives of the semiotics of perception, the logic of continuity, and the role of temporality in the interpretants.

Peirce distinguishes between *real time*, *time as a law*, and *time as an idea* (CP 1.492, c. 1896). His view that time has a "reality" of its own differs from the views of those who held that time only exists as a "form of inward intuition" of human minds (CP 1.492, c. 1896). Peirce's real time is the one of a reality that "is as it is irrespective of what any mind may represent it to be"

(CP 5.565, 1901). Peirce's *laws of time* (CP 1.488, c. 1896) define the nature of time in its continuity in minds and the evolution of the universe. Among these laws are the following:

1. *Time as change*. Time has no sensory qualities. Only through the experience of something else changing in space can it be known: "Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot exist unless there is something to undergo change and to undergo a change continuous in time there must be a continuity of changeable qualities" (CP 6.132, 1891).
2. *Mediated taking account of*. Due to its immateriality, time can only be mediately present to consciousness: "If we are to suppose the idea of Time is wholly an affair of immediate consciousness, like the idea of royal purple, it cannot be analyzed and the whole inquiry comes to an end" (CP 4.642, 1908).
3. *Unidimensionality and unidirectionality*. The flow of real time is unidimensional and unidirectional: "The law of mind is that it makes time to have a definite direction of flow from past to future" (CP 6.127, 1891). "A two-dimensional anteriority is easily shown to involve a self-contradiction" (CP 1.273, c. 1902).
4. *Continuity and homogeneity*. In many respects, time is a "continuum par excellence" (CP 6.86, 1898), which is absolutely homogenous: "Every part has parts; and [...] every sufficiently small part has the same mode of immediate connection with others" (CP 4.642, 1908). This means that any instant or "point in time" is actually only "a span of time capable of infinite division" (Parker 1998: 110–111).
5. *Topical singularities*. However, there are also respects in which the continuity of time is imperfect. First, the flow of time from the past to the future is interrupted by the present because "the actual instant differs from all other instants" so that in our consciousness, "the past is broken off from the future" (CP 6.86, 1898). Second, the change of objects in time makes their self-identity discontinuous (cf. CP 1.492, 1893; cf. Parker 1998: 91, 110). Third, the continuum of time has "topical singularities, or places of lower dimensionality where it is interrupted or divides" (CP 4.642, 1908) so that "we have no reason to think that even now time is quite perfectly continuous and uniform in its flow" (CP 1.412, c. 1890).

Peirce describes the imperfect continuity of the flow of time in a poetic image reminiscent of the way static pictures in rapid succession create the illusion of motion in a film. The scenario is the one of a boat traveler looking through the cabin window during a thunderstorm and getting the impression that not the boat, but the landscape, illuminated by intermittent flashes, is moving. The landscape that does not, and yet seems to, move illustrates how the distinction between self-identity and self-contradiction does no longer apply to things changing in time. The same is no more the same in the moment it changes position on the traveler's retina:

> If Time can be analyzed, the way to go about the business is to trace out in imagination a course of observation and reflection that might cause the idea [...] to arise in a mind from which it was at first absent. It might arise in such a mind as a hypothesis to account for the seeming violations of the principle of contradiction in all alternating phenomena, the beats of the pulse, breathing, day and night. For though the *idea* would be absent from such a mind, that is not to suppose him blind to the *facts*. His hypothesis would be that we are, somehow, in a situation like that of sailing along a coast in the cabin of a steamboat in a dark night illumined by frequent flashes of lightning, and looking out of the windows. As long as we think the things we see are the same, they seem self-contradictory. But suppose them to be mere aspects, that is, relations to ourselves, and the phenomena are explained by supposing our standpoint to be different in the different flashes. Following out this idea, we soon see that it means nothing at all to say that time is unbroken. For if we all fall into a sleeping-beauty sleep, and *time itself stops during the interruption*, the instant of going to sleep is absolutely unseparated from the instant of waking; and the interruption is merely in our way of thinking, not in time itself. (CP 4.642, 1908)

For Peirce, time in its continuity is a phenomenon of Thirdness, the category of laws, generality, signs, and mediation between a first and a second. In its continuous flow, time mediates between the past and the future: "By the third", says Peirce, "I mean the medium or connecting bond between the absolute first and last." Peirce teaches that the chronological order from the past to the present and the future differs from their phenomenological order. Not the beginning in the past comes first, and end in the future comes last, but: "The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third" (CP 1.337, c. 1875). In some respects, time can also be a phenomenon of Firstness or Secondness. The not yet actualized, merely possible time, of some event is a phenomenon of Firstness (CP 1.494–495, c. 1896), whereas the *thisness* (the *hic* and *nunc*) of a specific event makes it a phenomenon of secondness.

Time as a sign and signs of time

According to the laws of time, signs of time are signs of change. Such signs can be found in ongoing processes (events, duration, order, frequency, etc.) and in the results of processes, as indicated by signs of age, historical epochs, times of the day, seasons, etc. But what is a sign? According to one of the many definitions given by Peirce, a *sign* is anything (1) that represents "in some respect" something else, called its *object* (2), and "addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign" called its *interpretant* (3) (CP 2.228, c. 1897), which is "the idea to which the sign gives rise" (CP 1.339, ca. 1893) and more generally, the "significant effect" of a sign (CP 2.302, 1901). There is thus time in the object which the sign denotes, in the sign itself, and in its interpretant.

All sign processes (processes of *semiosis*) are processes in time: "At no one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the

relation of my states of mind at different instants there is", argues Peirce (CP 5.289, 1868). The moment at which a sign is interpreted is the present. The object of the sign is situated in the past in relation to the moment of its perception since the object is something with which we must have some prior acquaintance (some "collateral experience", CP 8.178, 1909). Finally, the interpretant of a sign lies in the future in relation to the sign since the latter is the effect of the former.

Ideas of time, other signs of time, and time as a sign

The *idea of time*, the third form in which time manifests itself according to Peirce, is time as represented in the form of a sign. Is there a difference between a sign and an idea of time? Ideas are symbols which are not yet materially embodied. Peirce calls them "those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within that mind" and specifies that "their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them" (CP 6.455, 1908). Thus, the words of the vocabulary of time, clocks, or calendars are ideas of time as long as they are not uttered or used at any specific moment. Whether uttered or not, these words as well as our ideas of time are symbols. Natural signs of age, by contrast, are not symbols but indices of time, as we will show below.

Signs of time are natural manifestations of time or cultural forms in which time is represented and organized. Among the latter are visual and acoustic signs, spoken, written, or mentally represented signs of time, gestures and bodily symptoms, signs of the age of natural or cultural objects, etc. In language there is the vocabulary of time and the morphology of grammatical tense. Gestures denoting time do exist in sign languages, but they are rare in the context or oral communication (but see Le Guen and Pool Balam 2012). Natural objects and artifacts denote time either as indices of their age or through the forms of their motion in space (e.g., sun, moon, etc.). Time as age is denoted by natural signs of time, such as symptoms of decay or old age. Plants and animals give evidence of their age by signs of growth and decay as well as through physiological changes due to the seasons and times of day. Objects of material culture denote the time in which they were produced. A car, for example, has the year of its production and hence a form of time as one of its significant attributes. Machines and instruments with mobile parts can indicate time (e.g., as clocks, watches, or hourglasses do).

The time it takes to produce any sign whatsoever, to read it, to listen to it, or to watch it, can be interpreted as a sign itself. The length or brevity of a message, the frequency of its repetition, the order in which its items are presented, and the specific moment when they are communicated may be significant aspects of a message. These are examples of how time may become a sign of its own. The temporal characteristics of spoken language and music, such as length, pause,

rhythm, or tempo, may have significance. The study of the temporal features of speech is a branch of paralinguistics (cf. Nöth 2000: 365–368). Such features can be signs of emotion or affect, of a physiological disposition, indices of hesitancy or embarrassment, fluency or lack of it, etc.

Time can also be a modality of nonverbal signs, such as the time in which bodily or gestural movements are performed, the duration of meetings, the sequential order of events, punctuality and delay, speed of reactions or responses, the length of pauses or silences, etc. In social semiotics, some of these signs have been studied under the designation of *chronemics* (for a survey, see Nöth 2000: 320–322). Signs of time in gestures and nonverbal behavior may be intended or not. Among the nonintentional signs of time are the indices of age resulting from the transformations of the human body in the course of life.

Peirce distinguishes three ways in which something can function as a sign. If it is a sign because of a "mere quality" of its own, it is a *qualisign*. It is a *sinsign* if it functions as a sign that actually exists under particular circumstances, and it is a *legisign* if it is a sign determined as such by a general law (CP 2.243–246, 1903). All words of the time vocabulary are legisigns, and so are the divisions made by clock time and calendar time in general. The same signs become sinsigns when they are embodied in actually existent signs under specific circumstances. The word *hour* or the system of clock time in general, for example, whether they are used or not, are symbolic legisigns, but in actual utterances, they are sinsigns (replicas of a legisign). The clock time of *this* or *that* particular moment is always a sinsign. Time cannot function as a pure qualisign since it has no qualities of its own. Qualities are timeless (CP 1.420, ca. 1896). But sinsigns and legisigns do have temporal characteristics, and these are qualisigns included in them. For example, the length or brevity of a syllable, or the duration, speed, and rhythm of a speech are temporal qualisigns included in the sinsign of their utterance. The rhythm of a piece of music (three-four time, long vs. short, etc.) is a typical temporal qualisign included in the legisign of a movements, such as largo, presto, waltz, or polka.

The objects of signs of time: Real, cultural, or imaginary

The *object of a sign* of time may be real time in Peirce's definition of time as continuity, for example, when time is the object of philosophical reflections, but more commonly, signs of time denote culturally determined forms and aspects of temporality. Clock time, e.g., is like real time in the sense that it is continuous, but insofar as it measures time spans, fixed points in time as moments or instances, it divides the continuum of time according to a cultural convention which makes it different from real time. This means that the object of a sign of time is usually time with characteristics that lack in real time, time which has a beginning and end, duration, etc. Nevertheless, cultural signs of time that mark discontinuities in the continuity of real time, have real time as one of their objects in the sense that they presuppose real time.

Peirce distinguishes two kinds of objects of the sign, the real (or dynamical) and the immediate object (CP 8.183, 1909). The former is "the Object as it is regardless of any particular aspect of it" or: "the Object that [...] 'Objective' science can investigate" (ibid.). The dynamical object of a sign of time is not only "real time". Points in time, beginnings, and end, which do not exist in real time, also have dynamical objects, namely time as it is experienced in the reality of biological and cultural life. The immediate object of a sign of time, by contrast, is "the Object as cognized in the Sign and therefore an Idea" (ibid.), by which Peirce means the incomplete knowledge which we may have of time, or: "what we at any time suppose the real object to be" (Ransdell 1977: 169).

Imaginary time, the time represented in literary fiction, drama, or film, is certainly not real time in the sense introduced above. Does this time, considered as a sign, have a real object at all? Peirce says that fictional time is not as different from real time as it seems. After all, fictional discourse uses the same vocabulary that is also used in real life, when it narrates its story. Imaginary time is simply the idea of a time imagined to be real: "A historical romance connects itself, more or less definitely, with real time; but that is because it 'makes believe' they [the imaginary events] are real events" (CP 1.492, c. 1896).

Time in fiction has thus the same characteristics as time in real life, with the exception that the two kinds of time belong to two different universes of discourse. Peirce illustrates what a discourse universe of historical facts and one of fiction have in common and how they differ by contrasting Napoleon's historical life with the one of Shakespeare's Hamlet. Not only do the biographical signs of the life of Napoleon have a real object, but also the time about which we read in Shakespeare's Hamlet, despite its fictionality. The real or dynamical object of Hamlet's biography is the "Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it" (CP 2.231, 1910), whereas the real object of the signs of the time about which Napoleon's biographers give us information "is the Universe of Existence so far as it is determined by the fact of Napoleon being a Member of it" (ibid.). Both signs, the one that represents a historical fact and the one that represents fictional actors and events, have thus real objects, but only the discourse universe to which Napoleon belongs is a universe of facts. The real must not be confounded with the factual. The fictional time about which we learn in Hamlet's discourse universe illustrates Peirce's insight that the object of a sign can be "created by the sign" itself (CP 2.231, 1910). The historical scenario created by Shakespeare becomes real because it has real effects on its interpreters' minds.

Signs of time in relation to their object: Iconic, indexical, and symbolic time

The classification of the sign from the perspective of its relation to its dynamical or "real" object results in the well-known trichotomy of the *icon*, a sign that has qualities in common with its object, the *index*, a sign which "points" to

its objects or attracts our immediate attention, and the *symbol*, a sign by habit or convention. Signs can be icons, indices, as well as symbols of time, and time, too, may function in any of the three ways.

Iconic signs of time are signs whose temporal characteristics are the same or which resemble those of the time of their objects, but it is necessary to distinguish with Peirce three subclasses of icons, image, diagram, and metaphor (CP 2.277, 1903), in order to determine more precisely how time can function as an icon or how icons can represent time. Images are icons which function as signs because they "partake of simple qualities" of their objects (ibid.). Since images in this sense are rhematic qualisigns, the above observation on the impossibility of a qualisign to be a genuine sign of time applies also to iconic images. Icons of time can only be diagrams or metaphors. Examples of temporal diagrams are representations of length or brevity or of rhythms in music, poetry, drama, or films, which represent events with similar temporal characteristics. Analogical clocks are diagrammatic icons of time insofar as the watch hand moves in a speed which corresponds to the rate of change in time. Metaphors of time abound in language as well as in the visual arts, especially insofar as we speak of time in a vocabulary that is etymologically a vocabulary of space. – The expressive potential of speech tempo or rhythm can serve as an icon of speed, for example, when a speaker complains that her PC is "sooo *sloooow*". In fact, the opposition of *fast* vs. *slow* in English is a diagrammatic icon insofar as the meaning of *fast* is expressed by means of a syllable with a short vowel, whose utterance costs little time, whereas the idea of *slow* is expressed by means of a syllable whose utterance costs relatively more time.

Indexical signs of time are signs which indicate a specific point in time, whether here and now, in the past, or in the future. Among them are deictic words, such as *now*, *tomorrow*, or *yesterday*, dates of past or future events, indices of youth or age, indices of the time of the year (winter or summer), the day and hour of a particular event, etc. Temporal indexicality is either self-referential, when the sign points to the very moment in which it is produced or alloreferential ('other-referential'), when it refers to a different time, either in the past or in the future. The object of an indexical sign of time can be a point in time or a period of time. All speech acts have a peculiar self-referential indexicality of their own in the sense that the speaker's speech as well as he hearer's listening is an index of the time in which they do so.

Symbols are general in their meaning, and they are related to their objects because of habits or conventions so that they must be learned. All terms denoting units of time, such as *second*, *hour*, *day*, or *week*, are symbols, and so are the names of the days of the week and the months of the year. Insofar as the reading of clock and calendar time needs to be learned, it contains symbols, whereas the arrangement of numbers on the clock face is a diagrammatic icon of the order of the hours and their cyclical recurrence. Nonverbal signs of time may be indices of respect or disrespect, competence or incompetence, but they may also be icons, for example, when they serve to imitate fast or slow movements. As symbols they occur in customs, rituals, or ceremonies.

Interpretants of signs of time: Rhemes, dicents, and arguments

As introduced above, the interpretant is the significant effect of a sign. Since all signs have meanings inherited from other signs, all signs are interpretants of some other sign. An essential difference between a sign and its interpretant is thus a temporal one: the sign and its object precede the interpretant in the process of semiosis.

All interpretations of time as it presents itself to a mind and all effects of signs of time are interpretants. Reflections on time are interpretants insofar as they are the result of observations of signs of time. The chronological arrangement of events in time, memories of the past, visions of the future, actions and reactions in response to time, a dance interpreting the rhythm of a piece of music, a feeling caused by a memory, stress due to lack of time, boredom due an excess of waiting time are some examples of interpretants of signs of time. In interpretants that have a significant temporality, for example, when a reply to a request is slow or fast, the interpretant sign is time itself, but time alone cannot create such interpretants. Signs of decay may be natural interpretant signs of the neglect of some object in time and long pauses or silences can create an interpretant which is embarrassment, etc., but it is never time alone that is interpreted in this or that way.

With respect to their interpretants, signs of time are rhemes, dicents, or arguments (CP 2.250–252, 1903). Rhemes are signs that are roughly like words, but they can also be nonverbal signs, such as gestures, as long as they do not affirm anything and are undetermined by predicates restricting their interpretation, as single words are. Dicents have the characteristics of propositions, and arguments involve forms of deductive, inductive, or abductive reasoning. Verbal signs of time can evidently belong to any of these three types of sign, since there are words as well as sentences representing time, and there is a logic of time that can be represented in the form of verbal as well as nonverbal arguments (e.g., by moving pictures). Time itself can also be interpreted as a sign in any of the three ways. Consider the semiotic potential of a clock. The hours, minutes, and seconds marked on its dial as well as its hands are each of them a rheme, a sign of a possible time. The specific time indicated at a specific moment is a dicent sign. It affirms, for example, "It is now 6 o'clock." An example of a sign of time which is an argument would be the utterance: "If the train arrives in time, we will reach home by 6."

The embodiment of time in the media

The present paper cannot pretend to offer a full-fledged semiotics of time. Its scope is restricted to an outline of some elements of such a research project. High on the list of the topics of this project to be addressed in further studies is the question of the forms in which time is embodied in the media. Only one of them can be discussed in this concluding section.

If time can only be perceived as change, how can we have evidence of time in pictures? Photographs, posters, drawings, or paintings depict scenes in which time seems to stand still. Nothing moves and the depicted events are frozen in an instant in which they loose the continuity of which they participate in real time. The law according to which time can only be perceived in the form of something else that changes (in time) means that time, in order to be perceived, requires embodiment.

Real time has no embodiment of its own. It needs to be embodied in space. How is time embodied in the space of the media? Can it be embodied in pictures? Embodiment of time can mean inner embodiment in the form of mental representations of the interpreters of these signs or outer embodiment in the form of events or objects in space, which change or which have changed in time. The very concepts of "body" and "embodiment" presuppose space since nothing can be a body unless it is a body in space. Space is even presupposed in mere ideas or mental representations of time, for ideas, too, exist in space, not only, somewhat trivially, in the space of the body of the one who has the idea, but also in the imaginary spaces which cognitive scientists define as *mental spaces*.

Gotthold E. Lessing, in his essay *Laocoön; Or The Limits of Poetry and Painting* of 1766, opposes poetry as an art of time with painting as an art of space. However, "static" pictures do not represent entirely timeless scenes. Not only does a picture cost time to be "read", but also does it give much indexical evidence of time. In static pictures, time cannot be represented by means of movements: chronometric devices (clocks, calendars, etc.) represented within the picture, natural or cultural objects to which various forms of temporality are inherent, for example, in the aging process of human physiognomy or of plants whose foliage gives evidence of the time of the year, cultural objects into which age is inscribed, speed lines representing speed and hence time, etc. The rule that evidence of time can only be obtained from change holds also for these signs of time, but what they show is the result of a change, not the change itself.

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Abstract

Against the background of Peirce's phenomenology, his philosophy of time with its "laws of time", his theory of continuity (synechism), and Peirce's general theory of signs, this paper presents elements of a semiotics of time. It distinguishes between time as a sign, signs of time, and the time of signs. The study argues that qualisigns cannot represent time; only sinsigns and legisigns can. It investigates the temporal sign as such, its objects, and interpretants, distinguishes between real, imaginary or fictional time, and it offers an analysis of the roles of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs in temporal semiosis.

BEING, EXISTENCE, AND REALITY: TAKING SERIOUSLY HINTS PROVIDED BY PEIRCE AND LATOUR ON THE MODES OF BEING

Vincent Colapietro

Introduction

There are various ways to honor a scholar or theorist[1]. One is to write about that individual's work. Another is to translate that work[2]. Yet another is to situate that person's contributions in one or another context, apart from which their significance and force is all too easily missed, if even discernible. On this occasion, however, I intend to honor Ivan Mladenov by taking up a topic at the center of his work and to do so from the perspective of a theorist upon whom he himself has so creatively deployed in his own efforts. What, after all, could be more central to Prof. Mladenov's work than the topic of metaphor? And what theorist has offered to him greater inspiration and instruction than Charles S. Peirce?

It is one thing to write from the margins and from that peripheral location to move toward the center, quite another thing to try occupying the center and from *that* vantage point to move toward the periphery. Prof. Mladenov's work displays a complex movement, one wherein he self-consciously takes apparent marginalia to be central and accepted claims regarding centrality to be not so much marginal as susceptible to suspension, at least provisionally. Accordingly, his thought moves from margin to center and then back again, thereby deepening the centering and expanding the periphery.

On this occasion, I want (1) to focus on a theme, at once, central and peripheral to Prof. Mladenov's writings, namely, that of the modes of being and (2) to connect this theme to the metaphor of dialogue. That is, my concern is not so much with understanding metaphor in general as it is with taking a particular metaphor to have profound significance for comprehending not only the human condition but also one of the thorniest questions confronting a philosophical inquirer (the question of the modes of being). This concern might appear to be

[1] Prof. Ivan Mladenov is obviously *both* a scholar and theorist, so in this essay I intend to honor him in both of these roles.

[2] Prof. Mladenov has honored me by translating my *Glossary of Semiotics* into Bulgarian. This is, however, only one way in which I have benefited from his generosity and erudition.

peripheral to Prof. Mladenov's preoccupations. But it is not. So, in this essay, I am in effect joining him in his efforts to make sense out of just how the human animal, precisely as a finite, fallible actor, struggles to make sense out of itself and its world. Indeed, what could be more central to Prof. Mladenov's project than the effort to make sense out of just how we not only strive to render reality intelligible but also actually succeed, at least some of the time, in this endeavor? And what thinker is more important to him and me in this undertaking than the elusive yet illuminating genius to whom he and I have spent so much time reading? That genius is of course Peirce. The central texts are only fully comprehensible in light of the marginalia, while the seemingly (or actually!) marginal jottings only have their salience and significance in their power to direct us ever closer to what is truly central. Finally, what better way is there to honor the dialogue between Ivan Mladenov and myself than to take dialogue itself as seriously as Peirce took it and to draw out the implications of this for an understanding of nothing less than being (or is it Being?)?!

I

Being is, at once, the most concrete and abstract of philosophical topics. It is both that in which reflection is inextricably rooted (and might root itself ever more deeply) *and* that from which reflection inevitably takes flight. It is that from which we cannot abstract; yet in our efforts to conceive it, Being is as often as not framed in utter abstraction from the defining features of any determinate being (*ens*)[3].

If anything is given (cf. James; also Marion), Being is[4]. In a sense, it is that from which we *cannot* abstract, since even at the highest level of abstraction we are inescapably entangled in whatever it is we are endeavoring to identify, describe, or explain in some fashion. Indeed, we are, even at what might appear our grea-

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[3] Justus Buchler (1990: 2) proposes "natural complex" as a substitute for being. "The concept of natural complex permits the identification of all discriminanda generically, without prejudicing the pursuit and the analysis of differences …". Moreover, it "not only permits satisfactory generic identification; it permits various distinctions and categorizations. It encourages striving after the functions of generalizing precisely and portraying uniquely" (ibid.: 3). But this concept, as a term of discrimination, has at least several rivals, not least of all "being" and "existence." "So far as sheer generic breadth is concerned, 'being' remains the inevitable term. So far as philosophic value is concerned, 'being' and other traditional terms of generic identification, mainly 'reality' and 'existence,' are required in certain types of context …" (ibid.). But Buchler judges the disadvantages of these traditional terms to outweigh their advantages. I however deploy here the term *being* since it most readily connects with the efforts of those such as Peirce, Weiss, and others who devote themselves to discriminating or differentiating the modes of being. Also, the very breadth of this term, as Buchler himself notes, recommends it to me for the purpose at hand.

[4] This is the point to which I shall return, rather than the contrast between being as concrete and abstract. One of the main emphases of my reflections is that Being avails itself of us and indeed all else.

test distance from Being, implicated *in* Being, also implicated as those beings for whom Being is a question (cf. Heidegger). But Being is lubricious (cf. Emerson's "Experience"): the harder we squeeze to grasp it, the more ungraspable it proves. Our touch must be deft, hence subtle and also gentle. If anything escapes us, Being does. Discourse about Being hence tends to be irreducibly and inescapably paradoxical: Being is at once that from which we cannot escape and that which we cannot hold, at least for very long. To a degree hard, if not impossible, to appreciate, it is that to which we cannot do justice. Even in our most comprehensive and penetrating utterances, we fall far short (Is it simply hyperbole to say "*infinitely* short?") of what we feel compelled to undertake. Here, as much as anywhere, William James's "ever not quite" and "ever not yet" are especially apposite.

For many of us, at least, our claims regarding Being are primarily responses to *its* claim on us. Whatever *is* has the capacity to claim our attention, to demand our acknowledgment. Whatever is utterly negligible in all conceivable contexts would be, by virtue of this, effectively nothing at all. (Of course, even nothingness is paradoxically not negligible: it too demands our acknowledgment, invites our query.) Without question, things act on us and we on them; we feel their effects and they absorb ours (in countless instances, they *feel* as well as absorb our effects). In our efforts to frame a more adequate understanding of Being and its modes, however, causal nexũs should not entirely eclipse our dialogical condition. As an experiment, at least, causal models and metaphors might be replaced – at least, supplemented – by dialogical ones[5].

This is at least my intention here. C. S. Peirce insists, "Some [signs] address themselves to us, so that we fully apprehend them [e.g., someone knocks on the door and we grasp the import of the sound, at least sufficient for the immediate purpose of granting entrance to an anticipated visitor]. But it is [Peirce continues] a paralyzed reason that does not acknowledge others that are not directly [or even intentionally] addressed to us, and that does not suppose still others of which we know nothing definite [if anything at all]" (*NEM* 4: 297). To

[5] "Things speak," Karsten Harries in "Metaphor and Transcendence" insists, "to us. Is that more than a metaphor that betrays man's incurable tendency to project himself into the things of the world rather than describe these things? To answer this challenge one would have to show that such talk about projection rests on an inadequate analysis of man's being in the world. Things speak to us, although our subjection to the rule of the letter, to what has already been said and written down, may make it difficult for us to hear and, even if stuttering, interpreting that usually-passed-over speech. A conception of poetry emerges that takes leave from aestheticism and its ideal of aesthetic self-sufficiency and completeness, a conception that seeks to recover the traditional view of genuine discourse as a more or less inadequate and fragmentation of that speech in which nature, or perhaps God, addresses us" (Harries 1979: 88; cf. Marin Buber). In *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Richard Rorty bluntly asserts, "The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak in. Only other human beings can do that" (Rorty 1989: 6). In contrast, Harries boldly asserts, "Things speak to us." The dialogical exchanges between, or among, human speakers is for Harries, but not Rorty, embedded in and dependent upon an enveloping dialogue between humanity and nature (possibly divinity).

the extent that we are finely and deeply attentive, we get on countless occasions to overhear exchanges (e.g., the song of birds – an illustration used in honor of Charles Hartshorne). While not addressed to us, discovering the significance of these sounds requires us to hear them in the context of a give-and-take between members of a species far different from our own. Some signs are, however, addressed to us (that is, at least *in effect* addressed to us, though sometimes "purposively"[6]). The refusal to acknowledge the extent to which we are addressed by signs, far beyond those intentionally produced by other human beings, is not a mark of sophistication[7]; it is rather a stultification of our reason. "To say that [only humanly produced signs are addressed to us] would be," Peirce suggests, "to paralyze reason. But if it is not mere chance then evidently it has some cause or reason. To say that this is a sign is merely to say that it has its being in producing that union of Form and Matter" (*NEM* 4: 300).

There is too much here to explain, but for our purpose two points immediately merit notice. *First*, there is the suggestion that beings in effect address us. This reverses the dominant orientation in the modern epoch: from this perspective, *we* make sense out of phenomena. The accent falls on *our* agency, not the agency of the signs themselves (cf. Peirce). The roots of their intelligibility are, from this perspective, to be traced to our reason or intelligence, not to Being itself. In its more extreme forms, intelligibility results from the *imposition* of our adventitious categories or forms upon what is, in itself, chaotic and hence unintelligible. In addressing themselves to us, however, signs to some degree impose themselves on us: they elicit and, in some instances, demand our attention, invite and (again, in some cases) facilitate our inquiries and interpretations. However extravagant or fantastic it might sound to some, things address us (indeed, their very being is knowable only in light of their manner of addressing beings other than themselves).

Second, there is Peirce's attention to the *being* of signs themselves (a sign "*has its being* in producing, etc." [emphasis added]). The signs by which beings disclose themselves and, in doing so, disclose their very mode of Being are, arguably, inseparable from the being of those very signs and, indeed, *the being of signs* more generally[8]. Stated more succinctly, the signs of Being and the be-

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[6] While we run by a tree, a bird takes flight from her nest and swoops down upon us, thereby warning us to stay clear of her territory (in particular, the eggs she has recently laid and now is fiercely protecting).

[7] Many of us suppose that we are avoiding anthropomorphism by rejecting this manner of speaking. It is imperative to note, however, that we are not avoiding metaphor. Whether mechanism or dialogism provides the more adequate description of the human condition is, at bottom, a question regarding the more apt metaphor.

[8] In MS 641 (1909), Peirce reveals that he is struck by an analogy between the modes of being and those of meaning. He in effect suggests here that an analysis of the modes of meaning might provide invaluable clues for one regarding those of being. "One is struck," Peirce notes elsewhere ("What Pragmatism Is"), "with the inexactitude of thought even analysts of power, when they touch upon modes of being" (EP 2: 343). I will leave it to the reader to decide whether Peirce and I following me are examples of this inexactitude.

ing of signs might be inextricably intertwined. For the moment, however, let me insist simply on the need to attend to the being of signs. The intelligible denial of signs *having* a mode of being other than that of either perceptible objects or (again) perceptible events standing in causal relationship to one another manifestly depends upon the meaning of the words in which this denial is articulated. Put otherwise, any such intelligible denial itself rests upon the being of signs *as signs*, the efficacy of words precisely *as words* (not brute causal forces). The denial of the being of signs, at least insofar as it is comprehensible, unwittingly pays homage to the *being* of signs. To the state the matter more fully, the denial of the being of signs, qua signs, *either* is meaningful (in which case it carries an implicit acknowledgment of the being of signs) *or* consistent with the stricture denying the being of signs (in which case the denial would appear to be meaningless). In brief, such a denial either betrays itself or destroys itself.

Two implications, however, are no less worthy of notice than these two points. *First*, there is the implied connection between these two points. Conceiving Being as that which addresses us, in myriad, often bewildering, but also sustaining, and (somewhat paradoxically) very often unnoticed ways[9], implies that the scene of dialogue is more primordial than we are likely to imagine. The push-and-pull of causality might be a limit case of the give-and-take of dialogue. In any event, it is instructive to recall a fundamental difference (at least an *apparently* critical difference) between Mikhail Bakhtin and Peirce. "The entire methodological apparatus of the mathematical and natural sciences is directed," Bakhtin in *The Dialogic Imagination* (specifically, in "Discourse in the Novel") contends, "toward mastery over *mute objects, brute things*, that do not reveal themselves in words, that do not *comment on themselves*" (2010: 351)[10]. Peirce would of course grant that natural objects do not reveal themselves in words, moreover that they do not comment on themselves, but he would hesitate to characterize them as mute beings. Allegedly, mute objects reveal themselves irrepressibly and variously in signs of an exceedingly complex character. It may even be not entirely inappropriate to suggest that the history of any being is, in effect, a commentary by that being on its Being. However this may be, *their* prodigious semiotic fecundity contrasts sharply with our somewhat restricted semiotic literacy. Artists and scientists in quite different ways feel or sense the claims made on them by the Being of the beings encountered in and through their experience (cf. Latour on *sens*). Yet neither (especially artists) is too quick to suppose that this characterization is an unjustifiable instance of crude anthropomorphism. Jim Harrison, however, is himself quick to note, "I'm a poet and we tend to err on the side that life is more than it appears rather than less" (NPR,

[9] Most of the signs in effect addressed to us are ones we miss. Such a situation is however far from unimaginable. Indeed, stunning obliviousness is one of the more obvious traits of the human animal.

[10] Of course, Bakhtin is correct in denying that natural objects reveal themselves in linguistic signs. But he quickly moves from this observation to the position that they are mute.

December 11, 2002). Being no less than life is more than it appears, though we have no access to being but also no inkling of this facet of Being *except* on the basis of the way Being appears to us. *Logos* itself is, as it appears to and indeed in us, the capacity to come to terms, however inadequately, with the manifestations or disclosures of Being.

In any event, we are acted upon in diverse ways, not least of all by being addressed. This suggests that the metaphor of dialogue might be stretched to encompass nothing less than our mode of being in the world. Of course, any characterization of anything so complex calls for a number of metaphors, not a single figure of speech. So, in drawing this implication regarding metaphor, I should not be taken by my readers to be advocating that this is the sole or even necessarily the most illuminating metaphor to be advanced in this context. Given the regnant forms of ontological reductionism, however, this metaphor might offer as needed a corrective as any other. If we could begin to do even minimal justice to human utterance in its irreducibly different forms (cf. Latour), then we might also begin to do justice to Being itself. To identify these as utterances is not to reduce them to instruments of cognition; rather it is to locate them in the context of dialogue, an ongoing give-and-take[11]. The beginning of any such beginning is, therefore, the realization that the scene of dialogue, especially when envisioned as one in which we are in the first instance, at least, thrust into the role of addressee or respondent, serves well as a metaphor for our condition (cf. Harries 1979: 88). Such a scene is full of passion, desire, and emotion, hence it is one dramatically involving identification and opposition, seduction and betrayal, affiliation and exile. It is, as Peirce notes, a paralyzed reason that is oblivious to the innumerable signs addressing themselves to the human animal. Insofar as reason refuses to acknowledge the array of such signs beyond the intentionally produced ones encountered in a linguistic exchange, reason is *self*-paralyzed.

This is the first implication of the two points made above. The second implication has already been touched upon. To repeat this implication as it was drawn above, the signs by which beings disclose themselves and, in doing so, disclose their very mode of Being are, arguably, inseparable from the being of those very signs and, indeed, the being of signs more generally. Stated more succinctly, the signs of Being and the being of signs might be inextricably intertwined. The being of signs calls for our attention. But, then, so too does the possibility that the signs of Being, including the words by which we attempt to bear witness to what we encounter in experience, cannot be comprehended without also attending to the being of signs. The *actuality* of objects such as tables and chairs no less the

[11] There is an irreducibly cognitive dimension to human utterance, since even our most unreflective and indeed inchoate responses are human responses (those of a sign-using and symbol making animal), not simply mechanical reactions. But these utterances cannot themselves be reduced to cognitive affairs. I am indebted to Brian Henning for helping me appreciate the need to stress this point.

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actuality of events such as a lighting flash or that of states such as the perduring configuration of a mountain range, despite its multiple alterations (imperceptible and monumental) need to be given their due. But the *reality* of the words and other signs by which such actuality is identified, described, and explained (cf. Smith) also needs to be given *its* due.

Being inescapably presses upon us and invincibly eludes us. No matter how fully we have rendered an account of it, it remains as an inexhaustible residuum (to use James's word) and, no matter how fully we have been caught up in a mutual embrace between Being and ourselves, it flees from us as an impalpable sound. After even our most adequate articulations, accordingly, something always remains and hence something more remains to be said (though a protracted prologue of reverential silence might be the most appropriate response after encountering the utterances of that all too presumptuous and garrulous cult of thinkers known as metaphysicians). But, then, something has always already escaped the most painstaking attention or the most comprehensive formulation. What we say about Being in this context carries implications for other contexts and possibly for *all* other ones. It is not absolutely tied either to *this* time and place or to *these* speakers and their circumstances (cf. Ortega), though it pertains to each of these particulars. In other words, we can abstract what we say here and now; moreover, we can even trace the implications of our utterances for what occurs anyplace and anytime. But this claim is, in truth, too weak: whatever we say, quite apart from our intentions, ineluctably carries implications for other occasions and encounters, other scenes and entanglements, other speakers and interlocutors. Our utterances carry us beyond, often far beyond, the particular occasion of their enunciation. [Abstraction and generalization might be the negative and positive sides of the same coin. To abstract from determinate instantiations ordinarily opens a vast range of applicability, a range far beyond what otherwise would be available or imaginable. Abstraction is here an abstraction *from*, while generalization is an application *to* – hence, my suggestion that they are negative band positive sides of the same coin.]

Of course, what I have just asserted needs itself to be placed in the context of utterance or assertion. Being and saying, especially as present participles, are inseparable, at least from the perspective of a tradition going back as far as Parmenides and Heraclitus, one running through Plato and Aristotle, taken up by Hegel and Heidegger, though refracted in Dewey and (to some extent) Derrida and Deleuze. For as garrulous a tribe as ours, the ineffability of Being is not likely to be allowed to stand as the last word or, if it is, it is allowed to stand as such only after a long-winded discourse – and then to stand only very briefly! Being has been far more beholden to saying than saying has been to Being. This is, however, the reverse of what ought to be the case, at least for those of us who are animated by the spirit of realism (without necessarily adhering to any doctrine of realism) (cf. Cora Diamond).

If we attend to generalization rather than abstraction, to the process whereby our utterances are applicable *to* (in the first instance) more or less straightfor-

wardly identifiable phenomena and then (in our heuristic adventures) ever more problematic applications [if we attend to this process] rather than abstractable *from* such phenomena and, thereby, are allowed to remain indefinitely suspended from any act of ascription, then we can open for ourselves an important field of philosophical inquiry. In truth, what we are actually doing by this is *recovering* a field opened by Plato (if not one of his predecessors) and cultivated by countless thinkers after him.

II

Within this tradition, one of the most fundamental questions regarding Being concerns the modes of being, indeed, whether Being needs ultimately to be understood in a univocal or polysemous way (that is, whether Being is at bottom one or is *properly* said in many – at least, diverse – ways). Here, as in so many other contexts, we can observe a largely implicit presumption in favor of monism: there is presumed to be one paradigmatic and originative mode of Being, all other modes being conceived as problematic and derivative. Even if a thinker is convinced that Being is, at bottom, one, however, it is possible for that individual to be equally convinced that Being, at the very least, permits of boundless multiplicity and contrasting modes. One might even be inclined to think that the oneness of Being inherently calls for self-fragmentation or self-differentiation (perhaps even limitless self-differentiation).

We are, seemingly, confronted with innumerable instances of individuality and irreducible modes of Being. In their efforts to do the fullest possible justice to individuality, to accord individuals (more precisely, spatio-temporal individuals) paradigmatic ontological status, however, some thinkers have tended to strip other features of reality of their ontological import. (One reason why this position is linked to nominalism is that universality or generality are ontologically denigrated.) For such thinkers, the existence of individuals is the mode of Being *par excellence*. The individual as such must actually exist *hic et nunc* (the expression from which Scotus derived his notion of *haecceity*); having actually existed there and then, also continuing to exist beyond the present moment, tend to be subordinated to existing here and now. The paradigm of *existence*, to be actually existent here and now, is hence accorded the status of nothing less than *the* mode of Being. To be is to exist and, in turn, to exist is to occupy some determinate (at least determin*able*) spatio-temporal location, in the midst of other such existences. Insofar as the occupation of such a locus is due to forces or factors other than the existent itself, if only due to the inertia flowing from past existents, the ontological status of the individual existent is, in effect, compromised or lessened. Hence, the advocates of this position (at least the most consistent of them) stress the individual as energetically occupying the here and now: the existent asserts itself, *hic et nunc* (it actively makes room for itself in a field of relations).

In contrast, other thinkers have tried to do the fullest justice possible to other aspects of Being, not least of all intelligibility. Among them, some have in effect (or even by intent) effaced Being of the innumerable multiplicity of individual existents. Only Being, in its invincible oneness, is an individual, all else being but attributes, modes, or some other feature of Being.

Still other thinkers however have tried to do equal justice to individuality and intelligibility (cf. Brian Martine). Peirce would be a notable example of such a philosopher. Both the nominalistic impulse to reduce Being to existence and the contrasting urge simply to subordinate existence to an allegedly higher mode of Being is, in his judgment, unsatisfactory. While Peirce occasionally tends toward the subordination of individuality to generality (to the demands of intelligibility), he provides critical resources for understanding intelligible individuals. None are more important than his categories. This essay exhibits how Peirce's categories guide him in arguing for three irreducible modes of Being but also invite him to see Being itself as one (so his ontological speculations culminate in affirming being, existence, and reality as well as Being itself). It does so, however, in explicit appreciation of the Platonic identification of Being with power. The distinct modes of being are, on this account, distinct ways in which Being exerts itself in a discernible manner. As much as anything else, Peirce takes pains to distinguish the brute compulsion of *existence* and the suasive influence of signs (i.e., the more or less gentle influence of *reality* over the course of thought and other forms of conduct, an influence operating in accord with the innermost integrity of rational agents). In his judgment, then, the ontological status of intelligible individuals, in their irreducible plurality but inherent relationality, requires acknowledging more than one mode of Being. They specifically require acknowledging qualitative possibility, brute opposition, and boundless intelligibility. But the analyses of the modes of Being are not to be performed with an axe, such that we are left with utterly "unrelated chunks or being" as the ultimate elements (cf. CP 7.570). This essay sketches, if only in broad, quick strokes, Peirce's account of such individuality. It is most closely connected to his understanding of actuality, but also inseparably conjoined to his insistence upon possibility and continuity (especially continuity as generality). Even the individual is, at bottom, a continuum, one in which possibility vastly outstrips actuality, also irreducible singularity conspires with unbounded intelligibility to confront us with (in Aristotle's incomparable expression) τόδε τι.

An irenic *conception* of continuity is, however, one in which the parts are taken to be harmoniously integrated, whereas an agonistic *conception* is one in which the very function of continuity is to generate, as much as anything else, occasions for conflict and opportunities for ramification. Given the scope of this paper, however, it is necessary to limit our attention to being as otherness or othering (the form of continuity most manifest in our experience, even in those instances where it appears otherwise!).

Being as *othering* is far from a uniform or linear process, also far from a necessarily gentle or gradual development. It is rather the most stagge-

ringly multifarious and recursively complex process imaginable. Indeed, it is infinitely beyond the reach of our imagination, though keenly glimpsed or, at least, differentially *felt* by all of us. The emergence of any given complexity generates an indefinite number of other complexities but also simplifications. The juxtaposition of these complications and simplifications is, however, anything but an unmistakable step toward either complexity or simplicity, diffusion or unity.

Whatever happens to be the *mode* of utterance deployed, being stands ready to thwart utterance and utterer (insofar as these can even be distinguished, let alone separated), to arrest or to redirect the force and trajectory of the utterance, to defeat or to redefine the purposes and self-understanding of the utterer. Being is that which has the *power* to call both question and questioner (utterance and utterer) *into question* in the very act of questioning; that which has the power to assert itself against any assertion about it; that which in the face of any claim about it has the power to claim otherwise, to proclaim itself in opposition even to what we have the warrant to assert.

Such a characterization may seem unduly to elevate the relationship between Being and saying (or articulation). This is, in a sense, true, but its justification is historical. That is, my reason for focusing on this relationship is that other relationships (above all, that of cause and effect) have historically eclipsed those pertaining to utterance or articulation. Beings appear to stand in causal relationships to one another, while they appear to stand in discursive ones *only to us*. What they are in themselves hence seems to stand in marked contrast to what they are *for us*. The world of our experience is quickly – given the immense, largely indiscernible influence of our inheritance, is "immediately" – rent asunder[12]. A gulf between Being and us opens and, in an instant, it widens to the point that we cannot discern at all the precipice on the other side of that divide. Our modes of articulation insert themselves in such a way that a wedge is driven between Being and saying.

As a consequence, it becomes especially critical to recall that we are addressed by beings other than ourselves (other than one another) and our very status as speakers (our very being as utterers) is in large measure due to this fact or, better, this fate. Our fate is to be addressed by beings in ways transcending our comprehension. There is here what Latour calls a recoil effect. Hence, it is not only intelligible but also not completely unreasonable to suppose that the forces by which the cosmos has been *called into being* are so often in archaic myths portrayed as communicative agents. In any event, if nature is the matrix out of which spirit emerges (cf. Hegel), nature prior to the emergence of spirit is an arena in which the analogues of expression, articulation, and communication are discernible, in however inchoate a form.

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[12] Logos is either the weapon which inflicts this wound or the instrument which repairs it – or both (it perhaps being the case that only the hand that inflicts the wound can, as Hegel (1830: 43) suggests, heal it).

Our acts of pointing are experiments in identification, ones necessarily undertaken in a *historical* situation. To identify any situation as historical is to insist upon a constitutive past and radical openness to future possibilities. The present is in part defined by a past (it is a site of inheritance) but also in part by tendencies and trajectories beyond anything yet realized or instituted. However much an act of pointing seems to be confined to the present, the present is here historical. An act of pointing, taken to be an attempt at identification, draws upon a past and drives toward one or another future.

However much brute compulsion might be an integral part of indexical signs (the type of signs on which our acts of pointing principally rely), the functioning of such signs is conjoined to that of other types of signs, most obviously, that of icons and symbols. We do not so much start with the semiotically austere situation of indexical signs stripped of any relationship to icons and symbols as with a semiotically effulgent situation. We are immersed in thirdness, committed to intelligibility, to a degree impossible to measure. Our access to firstness and secondness is always complexly mediated and, consequently, the sheer delight we can take in qualitative immediacy or the severely disciplined attention we can give to brute causality are achievements. We do not so much begin with firstness and secondness as we get to them. Moreover, we get to firstness and secondness *from* thirdness. We are always already inhabitants of the space of signs (a *far* more expansive and dangerous order than what Wilfrid Sellars and his progeny call the "space of reasons"). On the one hand, the space of signs cannot be torn apart from the forces operating in our world. Indeed, signs might need to be counted among these forces (cf. Peirce). On the other hand, the forces operating in the world cannot be discovered apart from the perceptible traces of their operative presence; that is, apart from one or more species of signs. The forces *qua* forces provide us with a tutelage in ascertaining the *significance* of what is taking place. Put briefly, forces are significant and signs efficacious. The significance of the forces operating in our world is bound up with intricately woven patterns in which causal and semiotic factors become at certain points indistinguishable. The efficacy of the signs securing the possibility of thought and, thereby, whatever prospects for knowledge are available to us – this efficacy – is, in turn, so caught up with brutally compulsive actions that at critical junctures the relationship between an index and its object is at once causal and semiotic. So, whether we approach the matter from the angle of signs or forces, we are led to the same conclusion: forces are significant, while signs are themselves efficacious.

Being in itself, apart from all else, is the opposite of what it has been taken to be. Ontologically, it is not the default position. Being as it discloses itself to us in our experience is anything but self-contained. It is wildly – at least, irrepressibly – self-diffusive (cf. pseudo-Dionysius; also Thomas). Epistemologically, Being *in itself* does not provide the basis for objectivity but rather renders objectivity unattainable. Insofar as it is still felicitous or simply appropriate to use the expression, being *qua* being is, paradoxically, being *qua* otherness or, more precisely, othering (cf. Latour). Being in its effects – in its efficacy – hence, what things are

in relationship to one another – alone secures the possibility of objectivity or any insight into the integrity of whatever being with which we are engaged.

What any being is in relationship to other beings is and must be the focus of our concern. Paradoxically, only this focus captures anything approximate to what might be meant by the traditional expression "being in itself." Whatever a being happens to be *for us* is more than what it immediately appears to be in this relationship. That is, its relationship to us is inextricably entangled in its relationship to countless other things, so much so that its being *for us* cannot be the whole of its *being* for us (cf. Latour). In any event, the meaning of Being cannot but be the significance it bears for us, though this too is not necessarily limited to us. The meaning of our utterances ineluctably drive beyond, ordinarily far beyond, the occasion of their utterance. More specifically, the question of being is first and foremost one pertaining to meaning. The meaning of this question, however, carries in its wake questions concerning the question*er*. Indeed, the question of being tends to transpose itself into a query regarding the being of the questioner, the question of the meaning of the one into that of the aspirations, motives, drives, and purposes of the questioner. The existential depth of metaphysical thought demands to be acknowledged, for the existence (or being) of the questioner is here as much as anywhere else at stake. What we say about Being is always (in effect) a self-portrait, perhaps inevitably a self-betrayal, just as what we say about ourselves is always, by implication, nothing less than a cosmology and an ontology (since any identification of the self carries with it, however implicit or undeveloped, some sense of the world in which such a self came to be and continues to maintain itself over the course of time). We are beings who in superficial and profound, trivial and fateful, enlivening and destructive, ways are called into question. In turn, Being (or reality) is, at the very least, whatever has the power or force to call into question the questioner, to call us to account and, therein, to expose our errors and simply our limitations. In an all too narrow manner, Peirce defines reality as that which has the force to thwart or impede the habitual modes of human conduct (including most critically, our beliefs conceived as habits of action, that upon which we are prepared to act). Our entanglements with the world are so intimate, multifarious, and integral to our being that they sustain and indeed encourage the fluency of our exertions, the unimpeded flow of our more or less integrated dispositions (cf. Dewey). At the same time, however, these entanglements are so prone to becoming themselves tangled and knotted that doubt, in the Peircean sense, is inescapable. It is understandable why these complementary facets receive unequal attention. Being sustains us in our endeavors; equally it thwarts us, impedes us, frustrates us. The agential disorientation into which we are thrown by the experiential disruption of what until such disruption occurred were efficacious habits (including adequate beliefs) is what Peirce intends by "doubt." It is primarily an agential state, not a cognitive one (though of course "doubt" signifies the agential disorientation of a cognitive being).

The beliefs on which we are prepared to act are not only integral to our agency, in its actual constitution, but also indicative of our world, in *its* mutually

implicated character (we are implicated in the world and, in turn, the world is implicated in our appearance, strivings, successes, frustrations, and failures). The adequacy of our beliefs is a function of their attunement to the world in which we *as agents* are forced to make our way, just as their inadequacy is a function of the lack of such attunement. Insofar as our beliefs facilitate our endeavors to make our way through the world, insofar as our purposes conjoined to these beliefs are realized, however imperfectly, our success is more than simply ours: we are, to repeat, sustained by factors and forces other than ourselves. But insofar as our beliefs contribute to our frustrations and failures, insofar as our purposes yoked to *these* beliefs are undermined or defeated, some of the factors working against the realization of these purposes have a reality apart from us. We are frustrated and defeated in part by forces other than us. That which sustains us no less than that which obstructs, even defeats, us needs to be taken into account.

One way to do so is to explore the consideration that Being *avails itself*, that the Being of this or that or any other being avails itself to that of countless other ones and it does so in ways that have various and not unusually even contradictory consequences. Being is whatever avails itself in such a way that the inheritances, disavowals, intensifications, ramifications, diffusions, and solidifications (to name only slightly more than a handful of the more humanly important consequences of ontological availability) becomes themselves sites or processes in which what is other than themselves can become available. The present is, for example, a site of inheritance[13]. As such, it is one wherein the past becomes available to the present and possibly also to the future. But the availability of the past at least makes possible the availability of the present to itself in ways that would be impossible were it not for the resources and perspectives inherited from predecessors.

Being avails itself but not necessarily so that it is immediately or, better, readily available to that which – or to whom – it avails itself. To return to the example just used, the Being of the past avails itself to the present, as a site of inheritance, but not necessarily in a way that those in the present can readily understand or use. Indeed, the availability of the Being of the past might be felt to be a burden or weight, something to be thrown off rather than taken up.

Being avails itself to us in such a manner that our status (to invoke William James's telling expression) as ontological beggars is impossible to overlook, perhaps even by philosophers who are most insistent on self-givenness, or self-constituting, or self-positing. With our being, our coming into being, everything and anything else is *graciously* given – before we know enough even to ask! We are beings in the womb of Being for whom everything is provided with far from sufficient awareness of all that we lack for the purposes and desires defining our endeavors and simply strivings[14]. This means that Being is first and foremost a

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[13] It is, however, equally true that the present is the scene of exile, at least one wherein the impulse to distance ourselves from our inheritances is re-enacted countless times.

[14] I am indebted to Alan White for helping me see how my use of beggar here can be misunderstood.

gift. We are indeed *responsible for* it, but above all by being *responsive to* it and, in being so responsive, becoming otherwise than we were. We cannot derive it from anything more primordial, though by addressing the question "Why is there anything rather than nothing?" we can be assisted in coming to see the depth and ways in which Being is "infected" with nothingness, that is, is inherently and ineluctably precarious, ceaselessly "perishing" or, put more neutrally, becoming other. Being as othering claims our attention and deserves our acknowledgment, but Being in just this sense is what we have so strenuously and ingeniously resisted.

As ontological beggars, though beings infinitely graced by countless gifts far beyond anything our finite imaginations could even suspect, we are forced to *acknowledge* our conditioned status, in a sense, our finite being (our being as limited in countless respects and, beyond this, as significantly defined by these limitations). Of course, these *defining* limitations are very often enabling constraints, not merely or even primarily limiting, much less debilitating, constraints. Hence, the word "limitation" and its cognates are in this context as likely to be misleading as illuminating. The principal justification for using this set of terms is that it underscores our finitude. It is nevertheless imperative to avoid begging the question – more accurately, *any* question – regarding the conjunction of finitude and infinity in our constitution or engagements. Human transcendence, insofar as it is possible, depends on the dynamic interplay between the limited and limitless, the finite and the infinite. But what is even more crucial than such avoidance is the need to realize that our conditioned status, our finite being, does not preclude an unconditional responsibility for this conditioned status itself: we are indeed responsible for not only our selves but also for the world in which those selves have emerged, developed, and (as a condition for their own maintenance) altered themselves, sometimes in the most dramatic fashion imaginable (cf. Miller). In our words, our existential responsibility extends to a cosmic responsibility and, in its most immediate practical referent, such cosmic responsibility encompasses global solicitude (cf. Latour): the world is ours in ways, also to depths and degrees, that we struggle against acknowledging. The history of humanity has been, in no small measure, that of trying to escape our humanity (cf. Cavell), in particular, that of fighting against acknowledging our finitude, fallibility, animality, situatedness, temporality, and of course mortality. The most obvious and yet disconcerting name for humans is "morals," the name we properly bear in our relationship to the gods (beings whose destiny is not death).

In the end (and, indeed, at every step along the way), the question of Being when honestly addressed transforms itself into the question of our comportment toward whatever we encounter in our world. However illuminating it might be to distinguish them, the *ontic* cannot be separated from the *ontological,* questions concerning especially beings encountered in the everyday contexts of human life from the question of Being. The Being of the beings with whom our own Being is bound up is suggestive of irrepressible otherness, including alteration, and indeliminable intelligibility, including, in some important instances, nomothetic explicability.

Conclusion

We can only approach Being from the perspective of sign-using animals (cf. Smith). The "basic situation of experience" is, as John E. Smith notes, "the complex interaction between what there is and man as a sign-using animal" (1971b: 104). While signs and especially language make available to us *diverse* modes of disclosive experience, in turn experience itself makes available to us nothing less than the world itself: "the entire range of man's experience of himself and the world – what there is – becomes available for use as a medium through which religious [and indeed other forms of] insight is to be made intelligible" (1971a: 109). Experience itself is on this construal a medium of disclosure and a resource for articulation. However fragmentary, perspectival, and (due to these and other features of our distinctively human manner of encountering the world, including our selves) distorted, our experience is nonetheless a medium of disclosure in and through which aspects and depths of Being become available to us.

Our minds are however *symbolific* (Langer): our experience tasks us with creating or generating novel symbols and deploying customary ones in innovative ways. Moreover, indexical and iconic signs play such a massive and intricate role in our encounters with whatever avails itself to us that symbolic – and especially strictly linguistic – signs must be seen as playing a vital yet coordinate (perhaps in many instances, a *sub*ordinate) role vis-à-vis other species of signs.

To repeat, Being avails itself. And as a consequence, we are its beneficiaries, its conspirators, its accomplishes, its victims, and indeed its assassins. Let us however tarry a moment regarding how Being so often avails itself to us as to oppose itself to our endeavors. Nothing could be more manifest than that, in the course of our lives, our dispositions are undermined, beliefs overturned, exertions arrested, imaginations deadened. In addition, our questions are sometimes nullified as questions, our rationality is driven to the very threshold of madness (if not beyond). So, too, our ascriptions (e.g., we are disposed to believe the candle, so delightful to sight, must also be delightful to touch; more simply, the burner on the stove is now cool) meet nothing less than the objections of reality itself: objects object (cf. Dewey), they in effect issue counterclaims to our claims. The dynamical objects of the indexical signs woven into the very fabric of our most circumspect ascriptions and indeed our most unproblematic identifications always have the power to expose these ascriptions and identifications as erroneous.

Being has to be accorded *its* say, just as saying needs to be accorded its status as a mode of being not reducible to the play of forces (albeit not entirely separable from this play). Our inferences are defeasible and our utterances fallible because Being insists upon asserting itself, often in unmistakable opposition to our own assertions. Being is available to us precisely because its own inherent modes of articulation and ramification, alteration and othering,

are in such a fundamental way the source and support of our own attempts at articulation.

Saying as a mode of being, one wherein the being of signs is manifest, provides us with an indispensable clue for discovering one of the most humanly significant features of Being itself. Insofar as saying, even in its most rudimentary forms, so fully depends on the complex interplay of indexical, iconic, and symbolic signs, saying as a mode of being ramifies itself into three distinct yet related modes of being. The continuum of utterance (cf. Miller) suggests nothing less than that of Being itself and, in turn, this suggests processes of ramification, intensification, involution, and much else, processes in which othering is more salient than any other dynamic. In countless ways, saying attests to being just as in boundless forms beings avails themselves to articulation. Reflections on the modes of being, as differentiated by C. S. Peirce, point to nothing less than this entanglement.

There is more to Being than saying or what might be disclosed by following the thread of our experience of saying (cf. Latour). But Being is not less than this. The whole of metaphysics might be envisioned as an attempt to give Being *its* say. In turn, the burden of my essay might be taken to be an attempt to show some of the important respects in which beings utter themselves and, in doing so, define the contexts for our own utterances, not least of all those regarding Being itself. My aim has *not* been to provide an exhaustive or definitive enumeration of the modes of being; rather it has been to highlight a mode of being (the being of signs and hence of words) especially in danger of being occluded and, then, suggesting how this mode is inseparably linked to the rough and tumble world of cause and effect. The dreams generated by symbols no less than the symbols encountered in dreams work to attenuate the ties between sign and actuality (or existence), but indices work to re-establish just these ties. Thought by its very nature entails a distance from actuality, while actuality not only demands acknowledgment but also invites query – that is, it at least solicits reflection. This distance and entanglement however intimate modes of being other than actuality, also characterizations of these modes other than the ones paralyzing (to use Latour's designation) the moderns. If Peirce, Latour, and countless others insist on there being more than one mode of being, it is not to populate the world with fantasies; rather it is *to accredit our experience of being addressed by what is irreducibly other than us* and, then, to grant this commonplace yet momentous experience its full ontological weight. If these thinkers insist on the plurality of the modes of being, it is not to slight the intricate interconnections or yet undiscovered relationships among the beings and eventualities encountered in our experience. It is rather to grant intelligibility an importance no less than actuality or eventuation. Put positively, it *is* (as Latour suggestions) to trace out the direction of sense, as this sense emerges and operates in the flux of our experience. To do so, carefully and attentively, can lead in the direction of ever deeper receptivity to the irrepressible chorus of cosmic voices.

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Abstract

It is one thing to write from the margins and from that peripheral location to move toward the center, quite another thing is to try occupying the center and from *that* vantage point to move toward the periphery. Prof. Mladenov's work displays a complex movement, one wherein he self-consciously takes apparent marginalia to be central and accepted claims regarding centrality to be not so much marginal as susceptible to suspension, at least provisionally. Accordingly, his thought moves from margin to center and then back again, thereby deepening the centering and expanding the periphery.

On this occasion I want to engage the work of two authors (C. S. Peirce and Bruno Latour) in this manner. It is crucial, as Prof. Mladenov's work so admirably shows, to conceptualize metaphor, but it is no less important to offer illuminating metaphors for our conceptual endeavors, including our attempts to conceive nothing less than the modes of being. His own work on metaphor and conceptualization, no less than his explorations of Peirce's writings, is thereby honored by being developed in a novel direction.

PEIRCE'S USAGE OF THE PHRASE *GLASSY ESSENCE*

Michiko Arima

Peirce uses the phrase *glassy essence* in several of his writings: (1) Lowell Lecture XI (W1: 491 and 495, 1866), (2) Some consequences of four incapacities (W2: 242; CP 5.317, 1868), (3)"Essence" in *The Century Dictionary* (W5: 418, 1886), (4) Man's glassy essence (W8: 165; CP 6.238, 1892) (5) Consequences of critical common-sensism (CP 5.519, c. 1905). Nowhere in these writings, however, does he give any explanation as to the meaning of this phrase in the context. This may be taken to mean that the phrase is used poetically in each context in which the suggestive meaning is left to be resolved metaphorically depending on the given context.

What is especially remarkable is the usage of the phrase in the case of (4), where the phrase is used only in the title as "Man's glassy essence". This usage of the phrase certainly calls the attention to, and makes it difficult to neglect the relationship of the phrase and the main topic of the paper. And yet, here too, Peirce gives no explanation whatsoever about the meaning of the phrase related to the context of the paper. As can be expected from this situation, the poetic and enigmatic usage of the phrase *glassy essence* has so far resulted in various interpretations which we can find in the latest laborious annotation for the text of "Man's glassy essence" (W8: 400–401, 2010).

According to this annotation, the present scholastic interpretation of the meaning of the word *glassy* Peirce may have seen in it is roughly divided into the meaning of the "mirror analogy" and that of the "glass analogy": these analogies are indicated possibly to include such meanings as "amorphousness, brittleness, clarity, fallibility, frailty, its relative durability, luster, pellucidness, plasticity or ability to take any shape, reflection, representation, smoothness, or transparency."

The purpose of this paper is to observe these apparently unrelated meanings carefully and to see if we can select one, some, or all of the meanings proposed in order to provide some significantly consistent interpretation of the phrase which may be applied to any usage in the contexts of the above mentioned writings.

The approach to be taken here for this purpose is to identify a hitherto neglected aspect of the meaning of the word *glassy* going back to the original

context in the Bible, particularly "I Corinthians 13:1–13" and to throw light on the contextual meaning of the phrase *glassy essence* from Peirce's physical-psychical monistic pragmaticism which necessitates the fallible and synechistic semiosis basically distinguished from Descartes' physical-psychical dualism compatible with the idea of *tabula rasa*.

1. *Glassy essence* in Shakespeare and the Bible

The phrase *glassy essence* is found in Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, (II, ii, 179) as part of Isabella's plea to persuade the tyrant Angelo, the Deputy, who has refused mercy, to spare her brother's life:

> … but man, proud man,
> Drest in a little brief authority,--
> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
> His glassy essence,--like an angry ape,
> Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
> As make the angels weep…
> (my underlining)

In the application of Shakespeare's *glassy essence* to the title of his own paper, Peirce changed "His glassy essence" to "Our glassy essence" and then, in the galleys, to "Man's glassy essence" (see W8: 166, 1892).

Shakespeare's title of *Measure for Measure* is known to be quoted from the Bible, St. Matthew 7:1–4. "Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again" (my underlining).

The word *glassy* is found in the Bible, I Corinthians 13 as follows: "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known…" (my underlining).

Historically and technically speaking, *a glass* here must mean "a looking glass" probably made of some polished metal or stone, not a mirror made of glass as we use nowadays. This kind of looking glass must have made the object reflected in it look rather obscure, which may explain the above underlined description "we see through a glass, darkly." Of course we know this is also a metaphorical expression of the religious worldview of this world in the Biblical context. The context for this phrase is given by "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things." This context makes us infer the meaning of the description as that we speak, understand, and think depending on the condition given to us so that we are essentially fallible in our inference. This meaning of *glassy essence* may be appropriately applied to the context we see in Shake-

speare's *Measure for Measure*, where Isabella seems to regard Angelo as a man of fallible essence of which Angelo is ignorant.

But before going to apply this meaning of *glassy* to Peirce's texts, it will be necessary to note the meaning given to this phrase by Shakespearean scholars. Some representative meanings include:

1. (Bevington, ed. 1988: 47) [of what … essence] his own spiritual essence, his natural infirmity and need for God's grace, something his faith should make him certain of. [glassy:] reflected from God but also fragile and illusory, like the image in a mirror.
2. (Bawcutt, ed. 1991: 128) glassy usually glossed as (a) brittle like glass, and (b) as though seen or reflected in a mirror. But (b) is not supported in OED or elsewhere in Shakespeare. … Perhaps the word is used in OED's sense 3a, 'transparent as glass'; man's outward appearance, the clothing of authority referred to in l. 120 is contrasted with his invisible essential nature.
3. (Lever, ed. 2002: 46) [Most ignorant … essence] 'most ignorant of his own spiritual entity, though religion should make him most certain of it'… His glassy essence: …'Man's essence is his intellectual soul, which is an image of God, and hence is glassy for it mirrors God'. For 'glassy' in this sense (not in O.E.D.), he compares Ham., IV. Vii. 168 … Cunningham adds: '"Brittleness", "clarity", and "pellucidness"… are… beside the point'. But it would be quite Shakespearean for all these secondary meanings to be co-present without impairing the primary one.
4. (Nosworthy, ed. 2005: 162) glassy essence. The phrase has been learnedly [academically] related to the medieval notion of the human soul as a fragile glass vessel, but the obvious interpretation, man's essence as he himself sees it in a mirror, best fits the context.

Provided that Peirce's use of the word *glassy* is based on Shakespeare's use, which is in turn based on the Biblical use, the meaning of "mirror" for *glass* in 1, 3, 4 of the above list may be appropriate, while the meaning 2 taken to be "transparent as glass" would be inappropriate, because the mirror is not transparent as is noted already in W8: 401, ll.2–3 (2010). And if the meaning of man's essential nature is contrasted with his outward appearance, it would be the invisible or a darkly obscure one which would not be transparent.

Thus among the various meanings of *glassy* taken by these Shakespeare scholars, the meaning of "mirror" for *glassy* in the views 1, 3, and 4 is retained, and the object reflected in the mirror should be respectively "God's grace reflected from God" in 1, "the image of God reflected in man's intellectual soul" in 3, or "man's essence as he himself sees it in a mirror" in 4. In those days, the image of God was thought to have been man's essence, which is man's intellectual soul (see W8: 401). And the latest interpretation, 4, indicates a somewhat universal interpretation of man's essence not necessarily connected with Christianity. We find that all of these three interpretations share the idea that the image reflected in the mirror is not itself an object like God himself or man himself,

but a somewhat false image, as we know from the fact that any reflected image in a mirror is not the object itself. Thus in Shakespearean scholarship, we have found the meaning of *glassy* as "some fallible image of the object" reflected in the mirror, just as we reached this meaning as a result of our interpretation of the Biblical text.

2. Peirce's usage of *glassy essence* in his writings

As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, Peirce uses the word *glassy* or the phrase *glassy essence* in his five writings of (1) "Lowell Lecture XI" (1866), (2) "Some consequences of four incapacities" (1868), (3) the definition of " Essence" in *The Century Dictionary* (1886), (4) "Man's glassy essence" (1892), and in (5) "Consequences of critical common-sensism" (1905). In this section, we will see how and in what context of his writings Peirce uses the word *glassy* and phrase *glassy essence.*

In (1) "Lowell Lecture XI", the phrase *glassy essence* is used twice. First in W8: 491 where the question, "what is man?" is asked. And second in W8: 495 where it is written, "we may think we distinguish between the man and the word when we do not". This lecture argues that man is a symbol. "Man and words reciprocally educate each other" (W8: 496). Peirce asserts: "A man makes the word, and the word means nothing which some man has not made it to mean" (ibid.); "Consciousness *is* not the man" as Descartes says, "but it is in man" (W8: 491); "every state of consciousness is an inference so that life is but a sequence of inference or a train of thought" (W8: 494), and "as thought is species of symbol" (ibid.), man is a symbol. In this context, "Most ignorant of what we're most assured / Our glassy essence" may be taken to mean our ignorance of the reality that man is a symbol. It is interesting to learn the reality that men and words reciprocally educate each other by the examples Peirce gives: how much more the word *electricity* means now than it did in the days of Franklin. We can be easily persuaded to learn that perception is the possibility of acquiring information, of meaning more; now a word may learn. Here is semiotically growing man going through fallible inferences.

In (2) "Some consequences of four incapacities", the phrase *glassy essence* is used at the end of the paper which argues that "… the existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community," (CP 5.316) and that "The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation" (CP 5.317). Peirce writes that the identity of a man consists in the consistency of his thought and action, rather difficult for man, who tends to identify himself "with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force." We find here that the essence of man is given to continue the semiosis of fallible inference.

In (3) Peirce's definition of "Essence" in *The Century Dictionary*, he defines two sorts of *essence*. He calls the one the real, and the other the nominal where the phrase is used "Man, proud man, / Most ignorant of what he's most assured / His glassy essence". Thus we are led to infer realist Peirce's idea that the nominalist's view of essence should be regarded as the *glassy essence*, that is, "false essence".

In (4) Peirce does not use the phrase *glassy essence* except in the title of "Man's Glassy essence". Therefore we are compelled to find the metaphorical or metonymical connection of the phrase within the content of the paper. This is the fourth paper in his most famous *Monist* series (1891–1893) which have replaced the ideas of *Quality, Relation*, and *Representation* with those of *First, Second*, and *Third*, and introduced the ideas of "chance", "spontaneity" and "synechism". The fourth paper is the biological application of synechism to the relation of the physical aspect of a substance and its psychical aspect, in a frame of a molecular theory of protoplasm.

Protoplasm has two states: solid and liquid. "When it is disturbed in certain ways, it becomes liquid. The liquidity starts at the point of disturbance and spreads" (W8: 158), but if the disturbance is not continued, the flow gradually ceases and it becomes solid again. Even without disturbance, it may flow under the action of gravity and spread. It assimilates food and grows, and it also wastes. And it feels.

Protoplasm takes habits; the path which "the spreading of the liquidity follows, is more frequently than otherwise that which it has happened previously to have most frequently taken, especially on recent occasions and on occasions of great disturbance" (ibid.). In this way protoplasm seems to be able to learn from the habit-taking. In the beginning the state of liquid seems to have no order and appears to be chaotic, but in spreading in more or less similar way to the previous occurrence, protoplasm seems to learn habit-taking and comes to produce molecular order in a state of solidity. This monistic change of state from chaos to order seems to have been produced by the process of habit-taking, which is quite different from Cartesian dualism of the distinguished physical and the psychical aspect.

What is the essence of protoplasm? Is it the order of a solid state, or more or less chaotic movement of a liquid state? We may say the essence of protoplasm must be a synechical one of chaos and order, the physical and the psychical aspect synechically associated in the process of habit-taking. We may call this *glassy essence*, whose physical aspect darkly reflects the feeling of the psychical aspect. Peirce says,

> all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in a more or less regular way; so that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter. Hence, it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and the physical aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct. Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of action and reaction with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from inside, looking at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness. (W8: 181)

Order or mechanical laws are nothing but acquired habits, including the tendency of habit-taking.

If we replace protoplasm with man, its action of spreading may be likened to a kind of inference which reflects our feeling or consciousness. Here man's essence / protoplasm's essence is the fallibleness reflected in the mirror of inference / spreading.

Now in (5) "Consequence of critical common-sensism", answering the question that "so passionate a lover of doubt would make a clean sweep of his belief," *Pragmaticist* replies that if the infant's mind is supposed to be a *tabula rasa* and the adult's a school slate, doubts written on them will be cleaned off easily, but "if they are marked with talc on man's "glassy essence," they may disappear for a long time only to be revived by a breath."

The last phrase "by a breath" may be taken to suggest an idiomatic phrase of "by a breath of suspicion." In this context, it is easy to see that *Pragmaticist* Peirce says that as the man's glassy essence is to make fallible inference, when a breath of suspicion or doubt is given to it, soon the fallible inference should be made.

So far we have examined all the contexts of the quoted word *glassy* and the phrase *man's glassy essence in Peirce's writings*, and we have found that in all of these contexts man's *glassy essence* should mean "to make a fallible inference." This interpretation of *glassy essence* does not contradict what Fisch left in his notes which belongs to the meaning of "mirror analogy":

> As what I see in the glass (mirror) is not (strictly speaking, I would say) myself, so when I turn away from the glass and turn my thoughts inward, I do not find a self which is not a sign but only other signs of my self. And if I look among all the signs of myself for those … which, more than others, may be said to constitute the self, it will be the thought-signs that I shall choose. … So in any case the way I find myself in the thought-signs is not radically different from the way I find myself in the glass. In that sense my essence may fairly be said to be a 'glassy essence'. (Max H. Fisch Papers, slip "Man's glassy essence" [MHF 3/26/80], quoted in Annotations, W8: 400)

3. To make fallible inference in synechism

As we have examined, man's *glassy essence* quoted in Peirce's writings may be taken to mean primarily "to make fallible inference." This is a simple answer to be applied consistently to any of his usage of the phrase *glassy essence* in his writings, and this meaning of *glassy essence* belongs to the *mirror* analogy, not to *glass* analogy, because strictly speaking not *glass* but *mirror* has a quality of reflecting the object fallibly. Thus we are led to choose as the meaning of *glassy*, first of all, "fallibility", and then as the secondly related meanings "reflection" and "representation."

If we limit the usage to the context of protoplasm in his writings, other versatile meanings of the glass analogy such as "frailty, brittleness, plasticity

or ability to take any shape, luster, smoothness, its relative durability, or amorphousness" also may be metaphorically possible, but such meanings are certainly far from the primary ones, nor may be consistently applied to all the other contexts, possible as subsidiary ones only in the context of protoplasm, and may not be suitable for other contexts.

Peirce's highly creative article "Man's glassy essence" argues the relationship of habit and order, how habit-taking fallibly i.e. after trial and error, comes to produce order, and how the psychical aspect of a substance is related to its physical aspect. It is only quite recently and still only by a few people that mind-matter monism, life-nonlife continuity, and such semiotic synechism have seriously come to be studied.

In Japan, Kinji Imanishi (1941) was aware of this problem early in his fieldwork as an ecologist and cultural anthropologist, he found it difficult to distinguish an individual organism from its surroundings including food, and he regarded the surroundings as the extension of the individual organism.

Yoshimi Kawade, originally a molecular biologist, has long pursued this problem and recently published the remarkable semiotic results of his work (Kawade 2009, 2013). Kawade (2013) writes: "The primordial form of mind in single-celled organisms eventually evolved into the human mind by virtue of the adaptive value of mind for survival. Life seems to have originated from nonliving matter in processes that are continuous… Inasmuch as matter exists in a hierarchy of levels of complexity extending from quarks up to the whole universe, mind must also be presumed to exist in a hierarchy of levels of complexity associated with matter." From another viewpoint, Hoffmeyer (1996: 95) says on the semiotic synechism of the individual: "Inside us there is 'someone.' Life is based on the principle of 'someone' inside 'someone' inside 'someone' inside…"

Peirce's usage of the phrase *glassy essence* demonstrates that he had already anticipated all these semiotic continuity in his theory of fallible inference by man with physical and psychical aspect, by man as symbol, and by the individual organism as a part and a member of a community and universe.

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Abstract

Peirce uses the phrase *glassy essence* in several of his writings without giving a specific explanation, which has invited various interpretations of the phrase as we find in the latest laborious annotation for the text of "Man's glassy essence" (W8: 400–401). The purpose of this paper is to provide some significantly consistent interpretation of the phrase that may be applied to any usage in his writings. The approach taken here is to examine Shakespearean scholarship and Biblical usage (particularly "I Corinthians 13") and to illuminate the contextual meaning of the phrase from Peirce's physical-psychical monistic pragmaticism which necessitates the fallible synechistic inference basically distinguished from Descartes' physical-psychical dualism, compatible with the idea of *tabula rasa*. Thus this paper aims to demonstrate that Peirce had keenly anticipated the recent awareness of semiotically monistic continuity between physical and psychical aspects and between the individual organism and community.

THE ONTOLOGY OF ACTION IN PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY

Ivo A. Ibri

> I have seen more thoroughly than I used to do that it is not mere action as brute exercise of strength that is the purpose of all, but say generalization, such action as tends toward regularization, and *the actualization of the thought which without action remains unthought*... (CP 8.250 – my italics)

1. On Peirce's categories

1.1. Phenomenology of pragmatic reason

I have stated in other papers that the thought of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) is structured on his three categories. Understanding them distinctly, within two philosophical scopes, namely, the phenomenological and ontological planes, provides a master key to consider the entire system of doctrines that shapes Peircean philosophy[1]. On the phenomenological sphere, Peirce affirms that the categories are the modes that exhaust the forms of our human experience. Following on the classification of the sciences, the three categories join the normative sciences, defined as Esthetics, Ethics and Logic. Firstness, secondness and thirdness are related to them, in this order[2].

It is interesting to see that up to the normative sciences, the categories are associated with the human sphere, whether as related to the phenomenological experience, or in what the normative sciences dictate as how the ideals of reasoning and conduct should be, and what should be admired as the self-justified purpose of human action[3]. In such philosophical contexts, these are, one could say, *anthropocentric.* The whole difference of a *non-anthropocentric* philosophy, as is Peirce's, will only appear when one studies his Metaphysics, where the idea of

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[1] Other insightful approaches about the role of the categories in Peirce's philosophy can be found in: De Tienne 1989,1993, and Hausmann 1993, chapter 3.

[2] See, for an interesting analysis of Peirce's Classification of Sciences, Anderson 1995, chapter 2. See also Parker 2003.

[3] About this point, see Calcaterra 2010.

a real world will configure the reasons by which our forms of representation are frequently contested by experience. This is certainly the greatest evidence that shows that we cannot simply assume the constitution of our language as the constitution of the phenomenic world in which we are inserted, for fear of not being able to justify *why* factual contingency, in its particularity, would be authorized to deny the theories that seek to represent it as stable and continuous space-temporal processes, i.e., as general instances of phenomena (see also Ibri 2012a).

Much of Peirce's work is directed to show that, in order to justify the adjustment of our theories to facts, we need an ontology that symmetrizes a correspondence between theoretical generality and factual generality. In this effort by the author, which he himself calls *realism of the continua,* in a modernization of the old scholastic issue of the universals, is the key for the transposition of anthropocentrism to a non-anthropocentric philosophy. It is thus my emphatic opinion that Peirce's true philosophy, in its most genuinely distinctive aspect, can only be apprehended through the study of his metaphysics. It is also evident that this area of Peircean philosophy cannot be studied without a necessary passage through Phenomenology and Semiotics. The former because such philosophy begins by *being in a world* that interacts with otherness, with the omnipresence of *non-egos* from which we distinguish our own *ego* in an immediate manner, under a genuine experience of secondness. Being in a world of otherness is to experience the strongest feature of reality evidenced by this experience of the reaction of facts against our consciousness. Dream and imagination do not reveal this reactive characteristic, and this distinction between real and dreamlike worlds that is, first of all, experientially constituted, is also a significant feature of Peirce's philosophy.

In Phenomenology, the potential presence of what is *reality* is announced, whose concept will be complexified in metaphysics, maintaining, nevertheless, the notion of otherness as a central fulcrum. This notion, in Peirce's philosophy, assumes a very general statute, beyond its reduction to intersubjective relations, as commonly occurs in philosophies centered on the idea of *subject* and, somehow, exclusively interested in phenomena of a psychological nature. *Otherness* is a generalized property in Peircean philosophy, namely, it is implicated in the possibility of factual reaction of all that, notwithstanding its immediate appearance, can be an object of cognitive representation, or, to use the Semiotic vocabulary, of *semiosis*[4]. In pronouncing this word – semiosis – we now touch on an equally ubiquitous experience considered by Phenomenology, namely, that of conception of mediations, or the third element that embodies the temporality of thirdness in the non-temporality of secondness. This has to be observed in order to corroborate some degree of redundancy that allows its insertion in rep-

[4] It is important to remark that this epistemology and semiotics dates back to the so called Peircean cognition series, written between 1868–1869, particularly "Some consequences of four incapacities" – W2: 211–242.

resentations endowed with continuity[5] – indeed, those that will enable thinking of experience in its predicates. The conduct of the *other* has to be represented in light of some rule, some supposed habit attributable to it, so that we can predict how it will act in the future – in fact, it is the only opportunity we have to adjust our own conduct to a supposedly factual situation that may occur. This is all that reason can do in its pragmatic sense, that is, to produce semiosis that allow us to make *choices* (see Ibri 2012a) – and choices that are only established by the possibility of lighting up the dark region of time – the future. It is there that we can exert our self-control, that is, act toward some desired purpose, in the face of a potentially reactive context, of otherness, therefore. It does not seem inappropriate to affirm that we have the *experience* of making choices – we experience, in fact, the exercise of rationality in the formation of mediations in the face of otherness. In principle, we are, in this context, *problem solvers*, insofar as we are part of a world potentially reactive to the ends we may seek.

The impossibility of making choices is characterized by the experience that Peirce called *brute force,* which could not be reduced to any continuity. This is the case where we know absolutely nothing about the factuality in which we are involved leaving to us just the alternative of formulation of a hypothesis to start a semiosis process to enable us to choose the conduct to adopt. This is the hope of reason: possibly to find a system of signs that helps *to think* otherness and, thereby, propose a mediation that allows subject and object to cohabit[6]. Mere brute force is not reducible to thought because, by not evidencing the redundancy of phenomenological conduct, prevents the construction of its concept with which its future path could be foretold.

Alternatively, it may occur that this factuality is completely fortuitous and contingent, not subjected to any rule whatsoever and, thus, devoid of factual redundancy – its replicas do not indicate any form of *habit* or *law.* Any hypothesis that can be made about this factuality is doomed to failure, since no *logical form* can adjust to it – any adjustment is simply illusory for its contingency, since all forecasts of the conduct of the object of cognition are implausible, without any *adherence* (see for instance Ibri 2013) between theory and the course of phenomena. This experience is not one of brute force imposed by some form of uncognoscibility, as one might think, but one with no regularity that, thus, shows no future continuity of conduct. As far as random phenomena are concerned, we may often find some form of statistic distribution, albeit with a high deviation content, such as Gaussian functions with a high standard deviation, which would allow some form of prediction heavily affected by an intense level of uncertainty. Predictive functions of this type, however, in the practice of applied sciences, for instance, have methods of *compensation* of uncertainty through what is called *safety coefficients,* widely used in various fields of technology and

[5] About Peirce's concept of continuity, see Ibri 1992, chapter 4. See also Calcaterra 2011; Moore 2007, 2010.

[6] An excellent approach about this point can be found in Colapietro 1989.

engineering. These coefficients express the adoption of *preventive* procedures in face of the uncertainty associated with the possibility of fortuitousness.

Under the point of view of the categories, the presence of *firstness* in phenomena occurs in various manners[7], generating its most characteristic trait, that is, deviation of rules, erraticity, and *resistance* to generalizations. This incidence of irregularity in the phenomenon provides an important epistemological lesson: the models of representation should abdicate from absolute precision, total adherence to phenomena, coexisting with a level of erraticity that definitely introduces the notion of uncertainty. The last word is with the facts, not only as a fundamental issue of what may be considered reality in its metaphysical formulation, namely, as an inference of an independent general structure of all representation or opinion of it, but also, as to the level of deviations in relation to a supposedly logical relation of a deterministic nature. Under this aspect, all theoretical models are, thus, considered as being of a probabilistic nature, in light of a convincing indeterminism that characterizes Peirce's epistemology.

It is interesting to note the extent to which these experiences remain phenomenological or, in other words, how they should be recognized as remnants grounding the entire construction operation of mediations. Although every investigation that implies inferential knowledge beyond the mere categorial taxonomy, as intended by Phenomenology, requires appealing to Semiotics, all semiosis so produced always has the phenomenological grounds that justifies and motivates it.

This concept of reason that is made as an *efficient form* and which can, first of all, be experienced as generator of mediations in the face of phenomena, also falls within the scope of common sense, escaping from a merely theoretical-speculative exclusivity. As a faculty associated with the life choices that shape our human conduct, such reason is nothing more than *pragmatic reason*, permanently willing to learn from experience. The commitment of this reason so conceived is to keep itself dialoguing semiotically, so as not to yield to dogmatisms, in the sense that the latter impose principles that shun the dynamics of the flow of phenomena in its otherness, and crystallize as truths distant from any dialogue (see also Fabbrichesi 1992).

The hope of knowing is, ultimately, under the view of pragmatism, the hope itself of reaching general ends that maintain a permanent dialogue with experience. These ends being constituted as such, we must reject the crystallization of representations that distance themselves from the dynamics of their objects. Again recalling the vocabulary of Semiotics, the *immediate object* cannot sever its phenomenological relations from the *dynamic object,* under penalty of handing over reason to dogmatisms in their nuances of installations of belief by authority, or sustained by any modes of transcendence[8].

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[7] I have discussed the role of Firstness in Peirce's philosophy, for example, in Ibri 2009, 2010.

[8] See "The Fixation of Belief": W3: 242–257/CP 5.358–387/EP 1: 109–123; see also Peirce's essentials texts about Semiotics in SS.

It is important also to consider how, in the realm of factuality, totally random occurrences can intrude as phenomena without any regularity and, thus, be unable to sustain the formulation of predictive concepts. In this case of complete fortuitousness, possibly exemplifiable through equiprobable distributions that could be characterized, exemplarily, by a game comprising a finite number of dices, logical mediations can only evaluate the possibility of occurrence of a given combination of results. Equiprobable distributions do not allow distinguishing probabilities and, thus, the results of their moves are unpredictable. We know, however, that the rules of some games provide distinct probabilities of results, as, for example, the game of poker. In the former case, equiprobable games, any result would be under pure secondness, pure otherness not reducible to any predictive concept. Evidently, the ludic nature of the games is precisely in the risk that it involves and, for this reason, certain games only deal with bets, and never choices. Choice is confined to the decision of playing or not playing, and not of predicting results, which would indeed deprive the game of its characterization as such, notwithstanding our being conscious of the levels of risk that can be calculated for games not equiprobable[9].

Let us transfer the sphere of these games to phenomenological life situations. Indeed, we can acknowledge fortuitous events, whose unpredictability is not due to the ignorance of some form of law that may lie *behind* the facts, but because these facts do not allow the formation of predictive concepts in a way that their occurrence would be foreseen and, thus, provide an adjustment of conduct because of them. This is an interesting point that, due to the refusal of incognoscible instances in Peirce's philosophy, would require the consideration of alternative forms of mediation other than those that include experience in the usual interpretant signs. What kind of mediations would these be?

It is reasonable to speculate that human experiences, derived from a factual fortuitousness in human life, can have meanings conditioned to variable degrees of influence in conduct that, being so, could be somehow considered as having a pragmatic nature. Evidently, randomness may signify nothing in the face of its ephemeral effect, or it may cause some consequence in the conduct that has some duration, or even and finally, cause a brute shock that may significantly alter a life path. The two former cases may perhaps waive mediations in view of their weak influence on conduct. However, the third case generates *emotional interpretants,* whose transposition to *logical interpretants* is not feasible, in view of the factual fortuitousness that does not logically support the construction of the concept. It is also interesting to observe that this stronger presence of firstness in experience correlates *feeling* phenomenologically with the *factual spontaneity* of Chance, this being one of the Peircean theses that only assume

[9] It is interesting to highlight here, albeit briefly, that the consideration of the ludic character of games somehow brings to mind the concept of *Spieltrieb*, the ludic impulse, present in Schiller's Esthetic Letters, which exerted strong influence in Peirce's work, inspiring him to formulate his idea of *play of musement.*

explanatory consistency through his cosmology, hampering, unfortunately in this short reflective space, a further development of this idea.

Anyway, Peirce's refusal of the incognoscible, one of his strongest anti-Kantian theses, must also have, as a consequence, to admit forms of mediation of a texture that may not be logical-predictive in view of the lack of phenomenological support that would be provided by a factual redundancy, absent in the case of fortuitousness (see Ibri 2011). Supposedly, thus, the emotional interpretants, non-transposable to logical interpretants, must dialogue semiotically with mediations provided by signical forms that fundamentally represent the firstness of phenomena, which, to my mind, are provided by the various expressions of art, in the production of a poetry that seeks to translate an unreachable meaning through mediations of a logical nature that depend, for their nature, on facts subjected to laws or habits of conduct. This thesis of mediations of a poetic nature[10] calls for additional reflections incompatible with this text; it is solely mentioned to express the emphatic refusal of incognoscible instances in Peirce's philosophy.

1.2. On ontology of action

The passage of phenomenological categories symmetrically to an ontological sphere, that is, as ways of being of reality, is not a task of unjustified predication of the *things in themselves* that would express some form of interiority to which any access is prohibited. It is, on the contrary, an inferential operation that seeks to find the general principles responsible for a reducible *appearance* of the three categories that, being so, cannot do without Semiotics, which, let us remind ourselves, is another name that Peirce attributes to Logic (see Ibri 1992, chapter 2).

In any event, in Peirce's philosophy, the forms of appearance do not represent, by themselves, realities, as occurs in Husserlian phenomenology, for example, in an attempt to avoid a metaphysics that speculates on what would lie *behind* phenomena. However, by attributing to phenomena the sole instance of reality, abdicating from finding a real constituted of general ontological principles responsible for the appearance, one have to initiate philosophy by a nominalism that has to find those forms in the instance of language and thought. This is not the Peircean way, as we know it[11]. It would be designed through a realism of the universals that, in the maturity of his thought, generalizes to a *realism of the continuous,* consummated in the doctrine he called Synechism. In fact, the concept of reality is supported by the three categories, as forms of *potentiality, determination* and *order,* provided by the principles of Chance, Existence and Law that, respectively, correspond to firstness, secondness and thirdness.

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[10] I have discussed the remarkable predominance of Firstness in various forms of artistic expression in Ibri 2012b.

[11] See for instance Nathan Houser's brilliant analyses on the Introductions of *The Essential Peirce*: Houser 1992, 1998.

In Peirce's philosophy, there is a very strong meaning as to what is the real world, why it *is*, what its *role* would be. His metaphysics correlates not only with his epistemology, but also with a general sense wherein we find even the logical form of pragmatism, as a principle of learning, in the relationships between internal and external worlds, beyond merely subjective or intersubjective relations.

In this structuring of Peircean philosophy we undoubtedly feel Kant's influence, more perhaps as regards an epistemology that surpasses empiricism and rationalism, conciliating them, and in the formulation of a heuristics based on the power of discovery of the diagrams, notwithstanding emphatically refusing the notion of uncognoscibility, as mentioned before. However, we can visualize very intense aspects of the philosophies of both Schelling and Hegel in the final form of his metaphysics. From Schelling, the idea of a cosmic history of an Absolute that is pure possibility in its origin. From Hegel, the idea that human history assumes meaning when it is consummated as community, by revealing an Absolute that is pure Reason. Schelling surpasses Hegel in this influence, however, and the study of Peircean Cosmology corroborates the affinity between the two authors. Philosophy, if genetic, must be based on some principle of possibility, and not on some ready-made form as in Hegelian Reason[12].

Thus, Peircean cosmology is a logical saga from possibility to necessity, in which infinite possible forms are transformed into real general forms. The condition of possibility of such a saga is the existence of a theatre of reactions, which consummates a passage from a world of indeterminate interiority to a world of exteriority of determinations. In the latter, forms of otherness, whose conciliation occurs in forms of mediation generated from an eidetic tendency of generalization, confront each other. The permanent duet between the general and the particular constituting an evolutionary philosophy is ubiquitous throughout all aspects of Peirce's philosophy. Generality, within this scope, is modal: possibility and necessity interrelate cosmically and complete a history of the categories in its reality. This is the trajectory of a radical realism that is enhanced in the maturity of Peirce's work, whose backdrop is his Objective Idealism, a metaphysical doctrine required to explain the possibility of this realism. It has, in fact, the sole function of proposing a necessary pragmatic monism between mind and matter, to explain why the cosmic movement is vectorial for forms that make the mere brute force of the determination of the particular to be mediated by the representation of law (see Ibri 1992, chapter 5).

We seem to be going very far to justify an ontological concept of *action.* But this is the systemic context of Peircean thought, where its diverse areas interrelate and support themselves reciprocally. To act is, in the light of Peirce's categorial structure, the passage of the general to the particular, entering an external world of otherness, a theatre of reactions, a factual theatre of secondnesses. It may be done as bets or choices, but every possibility of improvement

[12] Insightful approaches about this themes can be found in Dilworth 2010, 2011.

and learning of the forms requires such passage from potentiality to an internal world that, in the human plane, predominantly comprises feelings or rational thought, in which both merge in variable levels in the forms of emotional and logical interpretants, to an external world where it will confront the *other*. The world of actions, through which one exercises the ends desired, becomes the external side, subsumed in the category of secondness; on the internal side, associated with the categories of firstness and thirdness. The external is the revelation that allows cognition, and this is the substratum of what will constitute semiotic community, namely, community comprised of forms cogitated in experience, thus consummating what Peirce meant by pragmatic meaning.

2. A final word

Much more could be said to better dilute the density of this text. But here, at least, there is a path and a suggested task to be carried out within the context of Peirce's philosophy. Acting may cause anguish, undoubtedly, as no one wants to make a mistake. Thus, we must seek to transform our bets into choices, doing what seems transparently the best. Acting distresses because all action will be instilled as visible history, if not contingently to other interpretant minds, at least to ourselves – it will become irrevocable past and may return in the present, under the semiotic form of reflection. By acting, we abandon countless other ways of doing it. They will remain as unfulfilled possibilities in that contingency.

There is in all this, along with the logical forms implicated in its ontology, an evidently ethical face and, we may say, also humanely psychoanalytical. Choices, more than bets, make us regard our actions with a greater possibility of forgiving our mistakes, the paths that, perchance, we did not follow. There is no avoiding the anguish: we can only lessen them by making choices that seem more reasonable to us. Existing always implies some form of action, following the logical saga that, basically, explains the maxim of pragmatism: the internal world has to be outside itself to collimate some form of meaning when it returns to itself as a form improved by learning.

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Abstract

The concept of *action* is key in various streams of pragmatism, particularly those that consider it as an end that justifies itself by generating *practical effects,* namely, effects that ultimately matter for the meaning of theories whose semantic universe is geared to the solution of *human* problems, or, in other words, *vital.* On various occasions, Peirce placed restrictions on this concept of action that, derived from his contemporaries James and Dewey and – we now know – extensible to Rortyan neo-pragmatism, was considered as an end in itself, under an erroneous and nominalist understanding of the concept of *practical effects* (see also Hausman 1993, chapter 5, and Hausman 1991). According to Peirce, this conception left aside the necessary and constitutive generalization of the conceptual growth that action provided, that is, without considering the semantic core of pragmatism, in its reflexive aspect related to the semiotic dialogue between the particular in action, and the general in thought (see Houser 2003, and also his excellent Introduction for W8: Houser 2010).

On the other hand, adopting Peirce's categories as a focus for reflection in his philosophy, the concept of action assumes an ontological aspect connected with the metaphysical ideas of *existence* and *external world.* This approach provides a differentiated concept of *meaning* that expands and harmonizes with a realistic, and not anthropocentric, philosophy, such as Peirce's.

Thus, this text aims to show Peirce's criticism of the reductionist views of the concept of action and, sequentially, an ontological approach to the concept, in light of the author's categories.

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FROM ABSOLUTE SPIRIT TO THE COMMUNITY OF INTERPRETATION: JOSIAH ROYCE (1855–1916), THE AMERICAN CLASSIC BETWEEN HEGEL AND PEIRCE

Eero Tarasti

1. Josiah Royce as a historical figure

Josiah Royce's name may not immediately leap to mind as one related to current semiotics. Peirceans, however, know of his role in the life of Charles S. Peirce, whose fame has greatly overshadowed his contemporary colleague, although Royce had a firmly established position in the American academic life of his time. My interest in Royce is as a possible link between Hegel and semiotics. This is not only because in Peirce's system do we encounter those "Hegelian" triadic distinctions, but rather because Hegel is one of the most important background figures in European semiotics, in this more "hermeneutic tradition" of sign theories. In my own version of it – existential semiotics – many issues raised by Jaspers, Heidegger or Sartre come originally from Hegel. This holds true as well for the early, still phenomenologically oriented structuralism of Merleau-Ponty and Greimas, not to mention those again phenomenologically oriented post-Greimassians in France and elsewhere.

What Max H. Fisch (1986) has written about the relationship between Peirce and Hegel, in his lifelong studies of Peirce's various philosophical sources, is of course seminal. It was my privilege to meet and get to know this philosopher at the Annual Meetings of the American Semiotic Society in the 1980s. Moreover, some years ago I received a book entitled *La philosophie americaine, peut-elle être americaine?* (1995) by the eminent Peirce scholar, Gerard Deledalle. In it the author interprets the entire American pragmatist movement: Peirce, Royce, William James, side by side. Deledalle says this about Royce:

> Born in California, Royce, after studies at the University of California followed courses by Lotze in Göttingen then by the Hegelian G.S.D. Morris at Johns Hopkins University. Upon the advice of William James, he decided to dedicate his life to philosophy. He first taught in California and then, again upon the recommendation of James, obtained a chair at Harvard where he taught until his death. Under the influence of Coleridge, Emerson had introduced Kantian idealism to

> America, and there Royce, until the beginning of the 20th century, imposed an absolute idealism, which not only resisted pragmatism, but ultimately absorbed it into an absolute pragmatism [...]. Royce's idealism is a typically American phenomenon, not only in its pragmatist aspect, but especially by the logical dimension which Royce gave it, whose origin is certainly in Lotze, but whose true inspiration was the inventor of pragmatism and the first modern logician, Charles S. Peirce. (Deledalle 1995: 115)

In my own efforts to penetrate Roycean philosophy, I first located his *Basic Writings* (McDermott 1969), but those two volumes did not contain Royce's semiotically most exciting essays. I next got an edited version of his *Lectures on Metaphysics* (1915–1916), and thereafter read his main work, *The Problem of Christianity* (1913). Many works of Royce refer to Christian doctrine, but this does not mean that they represent pure theology. The same is also true, for instance, reading Kierkegaard: Christian theology is there, but what is interesting is the manner of philosophizing which has to be read through the lines. Quite similar is the case of the great Russian contemporary of Royce, Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1900), a very influential Russian philosopher who remains almost completely unknown in the West. As with Royce, in his theology and his philosophy, Christian (in this case Greek Orthodox) doctrines are mixed with Hegelian and speculative German rationalism. Figures like Royce and Soloviev might be topical at a convention of semioticians, in a session on Forgotten Pioneers of Semiotics, as there used to be at meetings of the American Society. But those figures are current for anyone who is seeking new philosophical bases for any semiotic approach. As to spiritual connections between two such extremely different thinkers as Soloviev and Peirce, both scholars are "synechistic" in nature. In his essay Synechism, fallibilism and evolution, Peirce writes the following: "Synechism is that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance in philosophy and in particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity" (CP 6.169).

And where else would the idea of "continuity" come than from Hegel. Max Fisch writes:

> But though for his first attempts at a definition of continuity he turned to Aristotle and Kant, Peirce the synechist thought of Leibniz and Hegel as his leading forerunners among philosophers, because it was they who, in their different ways, and Hegel more than Leibniz, had made continuity a central principle of philosophy. (Fisch 1986: 263)

We must add that Peirce never studied Hegel deeply and was in no phase of his life a typically Hegelian thinker. But among his close friends there was one who had studied Hegel deeply, and it was Royce. Fisch has verified that as late as in May 1902 – when Peirce was already over sixty – he wrote to Royce and proposed that he come to Arisbe, Peirce's country home in Delaware and spend the summer there, so that "you and I could pitch into the logical problems and I

> I always had that feeling of Royce that he was a celestial insect. Time was nothing to him. He was just as fresh at the end of a two hours' disquisition as at the start. Thinking refreshed him. Royce had a phenomenal memory; his mind was a card-indexed cyclopaedia of all philosophy. Many of his admirers like William James saw this also as his weakness. It was said: if only he had never been taught to read Royce would have been a very great man. (Chapman 1919: 372)

Royce's life touched Peirce's on many levels, and he is mentioned in Joseph Brent's Peirce biography in at least six major sections. Brent claims that "the professionals of the American academy, with a few exceptions such as William James and Josiah Royce, were unable to appreciate Peirce's originality of mind and his real achievements until well after the turn of the century" (Brent 1998: 136–137).

The years 1883–1891 marked the destruction of Peirce's career and the beginning of his descent into ruin and poverty. He was dismissed without warning from Johns Hopkins University and accused of negligence of his duties at the Coastal Survey. Royce was one of his very few defenders. Peirce, with his wife Juliette, would visit Royce's house where the two would talk about synechism. In 1886 Peirce visited Cambridge and his brother Jem's house, where James, Royce, Fiske, Francis Abbott and Ralph Barton Perry were present. Apart from Royce, no one understood Peirce's triadic logic. Later, in 1891, Peirce tried to save his classmate Francis Ellingwood Abbot in a dispute which is one of the most unpleasant in the history of American philosophy. It started with Royce's "professional warning" in the International Journal of Ethics, where he accused Abbot, one of the original members of the Metaphysical Club and author of the book *Scientific Theism*, of fraud and plagiarism. Peirce took Royce's attack as wrong-headed and wrote to *The Nation*: "Prof. Royce's article was written with the avowed purpose of ruining Dr Abbot's reputation. Royce was plainly, overtly trying to injure Abbot and take away his bread and butter" (Peirce 1891: 372).

Both Abbot and Peirce were outlaws of a sort, and Abbot later committed suicide (1903). He wrote in his diary: "I am still toiling to finish my great work, yet with no hope of a hearing now or after my death" (quoted in Brent 1998: 221). Peirce wrote five years later in despair: "Nobody understands me, America is no place for such as I am. I detest life and just as soon as I can frame up a plausible excuse to myself, [...] I shall follow Frank Abbot's example – except that I shall leave no unreadable book behind me. No, no" (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Abbot episode was soon forgotten, and a year later Peirce and Royce became allies, and Royce studied Peirce's logic.

To conclude this introduction, it should be said that one reason for my foregrounding Royce is that his philosophizing deals with problems of relevance also to my own reflections in existential semiotics, some basic ideas of which easily be interpreted in the light of Roycean philosophy, starting with the nature of the concept of Dasein, and what it means.

To speak of Dasein and transcendence, affirmation and negation, and the like, is possible only on the basis of Hegelian logic. But Royce's ideas might help to us develop also a theory of social semiotics as something existential, since for Royce the social nature of things was quite fundamental, an aspect that remains to be developed since my original foray into existential semiotics (Tarasti 2000a)[1].

2. Why Hegel?

In an essay on Soloviev who, like Royce, was deeply interested in moral issues, I tried to define a "Romantic semiotics", the basic axioms of which are these: (1) Meanings exist even before one starts to analyze and explicate them (the hermeneutic principle of preunderstanding, *Vorverständnis*). (2) Meanings are based upon processes; that is, they reveal themselves gradually during changes and in the development of time, place and subject. (3) They take shape immanently, within a certain "system". (4) They emerge from differences within a system. Such principles have, as their inner law, that the immanent gradually becomes manifest, a process called much later the "generation" of meanings, as in Chomsky's linguistic "trees" and Greimas's "generative course" and similar semiotic constructions. We shall later see whether Royce's philosophy fulfills these criteria.

For now let us see how Royce's experience of Hegelianism may be taken as an analogy to what happened in Finland in the nineteenth century. There Hegel's doctrine is connected to the name of Johan Wilhelm Snellman, the great statesman and awakener of the national spirit, whose statue stands before that National Bank in Helsinki and whose portrait hangs in Helsinki University among the gallery of national heroes. First, Snellman was a philosopher and visited Germany only thirty years earlier than Royce. Even he felt the colonialist pressure, and the typically Finnish inferiority complex (like that among the American Puritans, mentioned above, in elevating simplicity as a virtue). Snellman wrote interesting cultural-semiotic descriptions of his travels in Germany in which he ironized the *Schöngeist* culture of Berlin. In 1848 Snellman defended his thesis in Tübingen on the topic *Die idee der Persönlichkeit*.

But does the fact that Snellman was Hegelian justify the currency of Hegel now? Now that the idea of the national is gradually fading away in the European Union and becoming only a picturesque regional quality, an object of semiotics of tourism rather than a semiotics of political culture? Now that the last castles of totalitarian thought, based on one version of Hegelianism, have collapsed in Europe, does Hegel retain any kind of actuality? Indeed it does. The fact is that we live a more Hegelian time than ever, but in a completely

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new sense than the Marxists could imagine. Electronic mass communication has made the world into a kind of Hegelian or synechistic continuum, in which *tout se tient*. Anything that happens in one place is known everywhere. The Absolute Spirit of our time is communication, media, hypermedia, internet, virtual reality, and more.

In the case of Snellman, he as a statesman exemplifies how practical action can be based on a consistent philosophy. Snellman's successor in the chair of philosophy at Helsinki University, K. G. T. Rein, wrote that Snellman was a significant man in spite of his Hegelianism. There are, however, valid reasons to suppose that semiotics could serve as a theory of the contemporary world in the same way as Hegelianism did in its time. It might be interesting to make idea historical comparisons in this sense[2]. But this is enough background for my also taking Royce seriously in semiotics.

Arnold Schoenberg once asked, Why is there no Great American Music? In a similarly polemical way one might ask, Why is there no Great German Semiotics? The answer is simple: German semioticians rarely use their own roots in the history of philosophy from Hegel and Kant to Heidegger, but have subordinated themselves to Anglo-American empiricism. Nevertheless, great semioticians all over the world are indebted to German speculative philosophy: from Peirce to Lévi-Strauss, from Lotman to Kristeva. Greimas said he felt much more empathy with those Romantic scholars than with the empirical positivists who, among other things, tried to show that ancient Finns were ridiculous in their worship of stones or trees: in fact, no one worshiped a stone or a tree, but the spirit that was living in them. And how Hegelian is Marcel Proust, in his belief that a spirit looms in every object, which a person provided with the right instinct can free. One might thus interpret Hegel's Absolute Spirit (*Geist*) simply as the semiotic content. Such a semiotics could become a cornerstone of new semiotic thought, just as medieval (Scholastic) Catholic theology and philosophy have become for Umberto Eco and John Deely.

Now, an essential distinction in semiotic theory is whether we think that the binary opposition, the relation between two contrary terms – which Greimas considered the beginning of all semiotics as early as in his Sémantique structural – prevails on the same level of reality (like s1 and s2), or whether they are thought to be situated on two different levels of reality (Greimas's distinction, *paraitre/être*). The first-mentioned semiotics investigates a text first as a linear unit; whereas the latter catalyzes the semiotics operating in depth. One might argue that the latter type of semiotics already appears in Saussure's notions *signifiant/signifié* or Hjemslev's expression/content, such that from the signifier, one proceeds in depth into the signified.

Hegel's science of logic can be interpreted as a kind of presemiotic generative course, if we take into account both aspects – the parallel contrasts of

[2] At least in a country like Finland, the confrontation of semiotics and Hegelianism may prove to be very exciting.

Being/Not-Being – as well as those phases proceeding in depth, namely Being, Essence, and Existence. The internal Hegelian auto-movement of the concepts was a movement on both levels. It would not be difficult in this sense to "Hegelianize" Greimas's semiotics. The basic modalities of Being and Doing, their negation, and the semiotic square which they form could be put into a spiral, such that Being would lead linearly or syntagmatically to the appearance of the term Not-Being, from there into Doing, and on to Not-Doing. Thereupon the next phase would again start with Being, but Being on a new qualitative level, one step higher than at the starting point.

Hegel says, "Logic has to be conceived as the system of pure reason, the realm of pure thought. This realm is the truth as such, without a veil, both in itself and for itself" (Hegel 1986b: 44). If we replace the word logic with the term "semiotics", we get a new definition of semiotics.

In Hegel's thought, all the variety, alterations, and contingencies of Being – the stable, durable element – are represented by the concept and the generality hidden within it. Even this is compatible with semiotics, since such a phenomenon, too, can be seen as a product of semiotic concepts and mechanisms, and can at the same time be reduced to abstract notions and to their articulations as certain engagements and disengagements of spatio-temporal-actorial substances. Hegel conceived it as his task to make us conscious of "the logical [read: semiotical] nature which animates the spirit, strives and acts therein" (ibid.: 27). For him, there is nothing in the object other than what has been invested therein. Hence, we may say that the "object" is a semiotic object, constructed by the Doing, Being, Acting, Knowing, Capable, Believing and so on, of a *modal subject*. To Hegel's mind the object is nothing but the totality of a concept. In other words, the object consists of all those semiotic articulations and operations which we invest therein and by which we interpret it. One may see this corresponding to semiotical "analysis without residue", that is to say, that nothing may remain in the object that was not semiotically construed. Hjelmslev's exhaustivity principle would thus be fulfilled.

On the other hand, there is a danger in Hegel's system and in some semiotic theories as well, which is that of launching a heavy conceptual mechanism in order to solve a relatively small problem. Complexity is needlessly multiplied. Therefore one should also learn the *bon usage de la sémiotique*. Using the Greimassian system, for instance, one must know to situate the analysis only on a certain level of the generative course. Unnecessary complexity is the aspect of Hegel strongly criticized by Bertrand Russell. The latter remarked that, in order to use the word "John" correctly and reasonably, I do not need to know everything about John but only enough to recognize him. He no doubt participates in manifold relationships, close or distant, with everything that exists in the world, but we can speak about him while ignoring all that which is not immediately present in what is said. In Russell's view, Hegelian doctrine is related to the premise that there is more truth in the whole than in the parts. This premise was taken up later by the structuralists.

Hegel says, "The truth is a totality. But totality is only an essence completing itself through its development" (Hegel 1986a: 24). The totality is essentially the result: only at the end is it what it is in truth or reality. In this sense, Hegel connects the concept of truth to the aspect of temporality and the seme of perfectivity.

He divides his logic into three parts. First come objective and subjective logic, these being the logics of Being and Concept, which can be easily paralleled with the distinction between empirical semiotics, investigating various pragmatic conceptual sign systems, and the theoretical-intepretative semiotic tradition. These two Hegelian branches join into a third, mediating and reflective branch: the logic of essences (*Wesenslogik*).

Is there also a mediation between the corresponding two kinds of semiotics? What would mediate between objective semiotics – say empirical studies of signs, biosemiotics, and the like – and more subjective semiotics, such as the Greimassian system, Kristevan semiotics, Derridean desconstruction, and so on? If objective semiotics gives us taxonomies of things – like Sebeok's taxonomy of the drums and whistle system – then subjective semiotics, similar to Hegelian subjective logic, organizes taxonomies into various kinds of semiotic models, by such notions as isotopies, *débrayage*, figures, difference, khora, etc. How this shift takes place would form a proper "Wesenssemiotik". This would mean a particular hermeneutic realization, in which the semiotic essence or nature of a phenomenon is suddenly revealed. The observer suddenly realizes – this is in fact a semiotic problem! This is not necessarily a momentary intuition, say, of this type: in a bank the first number of the queuing number denotes the cashier, and the second number one's turn. Rather, it involves a more complex series of inferences, as in Peirce's abduction. Greimas never explicitly presented such rules of inference; but they must exist – otherwise semiotic analysis would not be possible. There is very little research about the "path" by which one recognizes a phenomenon to be of a semiotic nature. If both Hegel and his Finnish pupil Snellman emphasize "self-consciousness" and "the movement of the spirit", then let us presume that our analogy with Hegel is not far-fetched, if we want to develop this sphere of knowledge based on understanding.

Now, Hegel's *Wesenslogik* went no further than definitions of identity, difference, and contrast. In Greimassian terms, such a reflection went no further than the relationships included in the semiotic square. Hegel says that in science one has to develop from a notion an idea that represents the reason in the object. He moreover states that to approach something as reasonable (read semiotically: meaningful) signifies that one does not bring the reason to a phenomenon from the outside, but that the object is reasonable as such already. This recalls the anthropological principle of emic observation: the phenomenon is studied immanently, with its own concepts.

For Hegel, the catalyzing force of a concept lies in its dialectics. And yet, it has been argued that a dialectical method has to be sensitive to its object and that the method cannot be separated from its object and be elevated to the status of an abstract generality. Is semiotics an object-sensitive method, which would

always be based upon the "inner motion" of the empirical facts and adapt to that motion? At least generation in the Greimassian method meets the requirements of such a dialectics.

That is to say, the generation can be started or stopped at whatsoever level. Accordingly, there must be a kind of "superlogic" or "metalogic" that determines which semiotic notions are reasonable for the portrayal of a phenomenon. In Hegelian logic, the motion from being to absolute ideas can be interpreted simply as moving from a text to a code, from the substance of a phenomenon and its semes and phemes, to its deepest isotopy. Such reasoning is of course inductive, but we can also turn the Hegelian/Greimassian logic upside down and proceed from the deductive starting-point axiom – the absolute – towards being; or if the reasoning is abductive then the movement may well stop on some level.

Hegel tied his logic to a sense of history and temporality: "No one can truthfully transcend his time as little as to peel off from his skin [...]. Philosophy is completely identical with its time" (Hegel 1986c: 74). We see this as well in the history of semiotics. Semiotics is always bound up with the level of knowledge reached in each epoch and unfolds from a total epistemic situation prevailing in the sciences and various national scholarly traditions. When we think of the intellectual climate in Germany at the time Snellman and Royce were there, we notice analogies to semiotics. When Snellman visited Tübingen, it was said that some had come from Hegel's school and some from empirical research; whereas the first-mentioned tried to complete their philosophical speculation with criticism and history writing, the latter aimed at explaining empirical facts. Therefore despite the variety of disciplines and views represented there at the time, family resemblances dominated in scientific thought. The same can be said about semiotics and semioticians, whether biosemioticians, social semioticians, Greimassians, Peirceans, Lotmanians, Derrideans, or otherwise.

We need go no further with hypothetical analogies between the Hegelianisms of the mid-nineteenth century and semiotics of the turn of the twenty-first century[3]. With this background in Hegel, we can return to Royce.

3. Back to Royce

Royce's early thought was very much under the influence of Hegel, and thus was to a large extent based on a distinction between the absolute and the individual. Such a statement is found in his essay "The Conception of God" from 1897, in the middle of his career. But from this moment on Royce gradually moves from the Hegelian concept of the Absolute, certainly under the influence of Peirce, and heads in a more empirical direction with his new concept

[3] It has, however, not been said (yet) of any semiotician as was said about Mr. Axel Adolf Laurell, a docent of theoretical philosophy and Hegelianism in the 1840s in Helsinki; namely, that he had taken ten years to get familiar with Hegel, and another ten years to get rid of him.

of "interpretation". A common thread throughout his writing is the idea of community, which displays itself also in his more journalistic writings, such as his essays "The Squatter Riot of 1850 in Sacramento" (1899), "Race Questions and Prejudices" (1908), and "Provincialism" (1908).

In existential semiotic terms, Royce confronts the problem between the Absolute in the form of some ideas which are imperfectly realized in the life of an individual, that is to say, the problem between transcendental ideas and the world of Dasein. The latter is certainly the Roycean World of Doubt as he puts it: "When we turn from our world of ideals to the world actually about us, our position is not at once a happy position. These ideals … do not make the world, and people differ endlessly about what the world [in our terms, Dasein] is and means" (Royce 1885: 227). Still Royce thinks it necessary to study the world in its eternal aspect. He admits, however, the possibility of error in dealing with what we have called "transcendental ideas":

> That there is error is indubitable. What is however an error? … No single judgement is or can be an error. Only as actually included in a higher thought, that gives to the first its completed object, and compares it therewith is the first thought an error. It remains otherwise a mere mental fragment, a torso, but the higher thought must include the opposed truth, to which the error is compared in that higher thought. The higher thought is the whole truth, of which the error is by itself an incomplete fragment. (ibid. 431)

From this Royce infers that thought is infinite, clearly sounding the Hegelian tone of his early writings. In his massive work, *The World and the Individual* (1899–1901), the fundamental theme is the relationship between the "idea" and "being". But from here Royce takes a new, more semiotical path. Alongside the concepts of conception (idea) and perception (being), he brings in the concept of interpretation. In psychological terms he characterizes interpretation as an essentially social process that transforms our inner life into a conscious, internal conversation, a form of auto-communication through which we "interpret ourselves". From this position Royce ends up with the idea of a community of interpretation, which obtains metaphysical dimensions in his thought when he comes to the idea of the Hope of the Great Community. Whether semioticians form this kind of ideal community of interpretation I am not sure. Such a community is at the least very controversial and certainly not "unified". In Royce's late work, *The Problem of Christianity* (1913), Peirce's impact is particularly strong; and in his lectures on *Metaphysics* (1915–1916) he offers a synthesis of all his earlier achievements (see Tarasti 2001).

4. Toward the world of interpretation

In his preface to *The Problem of Christianity*, Royce describes it as a result of research that first appeared in his book of 1908, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. He believes also that it is compatible and in harmony with his earlier *The World*

and the Individual from 1899–1901, but confirms that it is not a repetition of the old. Royce says:

> I now owe much more to our great and unduly neglected American logician Mr. Charles Peirce, than I do to the common tradition of recent idealism, and certainly very much more than to the doctrines attributed to Hegel. It is time I think that the long customary, but unjust and loose usage of the adjective "Hegelian" should be dropped [...] my own interpretation [...] despite certain agreements with the classical Hegelian theses, differs from that of Hegel's school, in important ways. (Royce 2001: 39)

The titles of the various chapters of Royce's book give us a flavor of his thinking. The chapters in Part One, called "Lectures", are the following: Lecture I – The Problem and the Method; II – The Idea of the Universal Community; III – The Moral Burden of the Individual; IV – The Realm of Grace; V – Time and Guilt; VI – Atonement; VII – The Christian Doctrine of Life; VIII – The Modern Mind and Christian Ideas. Part II continues the lectures: IX – The Community and the Time-Process; X – The Body and the Members; XI – Perception, Conception and Interpretation; XII – The Will to Interpret; XIII – The World of Interpretation; XIV – The Doctrine of Signs; XV – The Historical and the Essential; XVI – Summary and Conclusion. In what follows I shall not pay too close attention to the theological content of the book, but concentrate rather on its philosophical and semiotical essence.

Royce starts the first Lecture by pondering the sense in which a modern man can be a Christian. Interesting here is what Royce considers "modern". He takes it as a completely fictive entity, such that the creation of our day's discussion will be replaced as early as tomorrow by a new type of modern man: "For by modern man most of us mean a being whose views are supposed to be in some sense not only the historical result but a significant summary, of what the ages have taught mankind" (ibid.: 63). So modern man is the product of what history has taught mankind. Such a definition is certainly far from the so-called Project of the Modern, or "modernity", meaning the separation of Man from the cosmos, as Charles Taylor puts it. Of course even Royce's type of modernity includes the aspects of history and education, and thus the possibility to change, to redefine one's essence, and in this sense his view might be interpreted in parallel to later philosophical definitions of modernity.

For Royce the Christian doctrine contains three essential ideas. First is the assertion that the way of salvation lies in the union of the individual with a universal spiritual community. The idea of a union becomes a constant theme in Royce's philosophy following his early experiences with Puritanism. Second is the idea of the individual's moral burden, including that apart from the spiritual community, which the divine plan provides for his relief; in short, the individual is powerless to escape from his innate and acquired character – the character of a lost soul. This idea of guilt and a plan to get rid of it may be interpreted as a particular narrative program. For example, there is in Proppian theory an

initial lack and a special narrative program to remedy it: to be disjuncted from the dysphoric object of guilt and conjuncted with the euphoric object of grace. Royce's view could be semiotized in this manner. The third point is much the same: the only escape for the individual, the only union that he can obtain with the divine spiritual community, is provided by the divine plan for the redemption of mankind. In terms of modernity, the crucial thing here is union with a community and not with the cosmos itself. In Roycean terms, the idea of community intervenes between the individual and his salvation; hence he gives this level of community more and more emphasis as time goes on.

In Lecture II Royce speaks of the idea of a universal community which again evokes semiotic interpretations. He writes: "As an essentially social being, man lives in communities, and depends upon his communities for all that makes his civilization articulate" (ibid.: 80). Royce believes also in the metaphor of organic unity:

> [Communities] have a sort of organic life of their own so that we can compare a highly developed community, such as a state, either to the soul of a man or to a living animal. A community is not a mere collection of individuals. It is a sort of live unit, that has organs, as the body of an individual has organs [...]. Not only does the community live, it has a mind of its own, a mind whose psychology is not the same as the psychology of an individual human being. (ibid.)

Here we see the influence of Wilhelm Wundt as well as the organistic tradition of philosophy.

The next point is the concept of Loyalty, by which Royce understands "willing and thoroughgoing devotion of a self to a cause, and which is therefore the interest of a community" (ibid.: 83). We could thus also interpret Loyalty to be the principle which holds the community together, and if the community is the same as the Dasein of existential semiotics, then loyalty is the principle whereby an individual can transcend his own Dasein, both toward other Daseins and toward pure transcendence. Royce eloquently describes empirical cases of loyalty: the individual revels in his service, as a player to his team, the soldier to his flag, the martyr to his church. He speaks of a social enthusiasm which thus animates individuals. And he says that loyal motives are not only moral but also aesthetic: "The community may be to the individual both beautiful and sublime" (ibid.: 84).

This remark calls to mind the ways in which some semioticians and aestheticians view our postmodern world. Wolfgang Welsch (1996, 2008), for example, holds the Nietzschean view that the whole contemporary world can be understood only as an aesthetic phenomenon. But can the whole world of media and worldwide electronic communication be seen otherwise, as the realization of Royce's Great Community? Deeper analysis may prove this "community" to be an illusion, however, since the effect of all these modern technological means of communication has been rather the contrary one: to isolate people from real loyalty and communication, each in his or her own "bubble" world.

Moreover, Royce says that those who are loyal are essentially alike. Such a universal community that Royce has in his mind is in essence a community of the Same, of people thinking and acting in similar ways. Maybe through the media power of the modern world people become loyal in that sense; that is, similar in their values and enterprises – the instantiation of what is called "globalization". Even here Royce remains very Hegelian, when he states that loyalty is "a practical faith that communities, viewed as units, have a value which is superior to all the values and interests of detached individuals" (Royce 2001: 85). How different this view is from that of the great British contemporary of Royce, John Ruskin, who emphasized the individual, not the group, as the one who thinks and judges and evaluates, not the group.

5. The moral burden of the individual

Royce believes in original sin and the moral burden of the individual, who unaided cannot escape it. This leads him to reflections on social matters, which are more relevant in our semiotic context. Anyone who studies human nature must make a distinction between the conduct of men and their consciousness of it, says Royce. In his view, all of our more complex conduct and consciousness is trained by a specific sort of environment, namely a social environment. As solitary beings we could never develop ourselves. If a man or an animal were to live in a totally unsocial state, he as a solitary creature could find no other instance of conduct with which to compare his own. Whatever occurs in our actual social life, can be and often is repeated with endless variations in our memory and imagination. Thus these thoughts and memories enrich our social environment. In this way we are able to compare ourselves with others, and this comparison makes us view ourselves and attend to the social will, which is "law".

His reasoning here comes very close to that of George Herbert Mead and his view on the origin of symbols, namely his distinction between "I" and "me", the latter being our ego as seen by others. This type of Will (*vouloir*) represents a special modality: a co-actorial, social Will.

But Royce is quite a realist in his ideas about the nature of the social, and he has no illusions. True, the aforementioned comparison leads to self-consciousness, but also to rivalry, contest or criticism, about which Royce gives the intuitively obvious rule: "The greater the social tension of the situation in which I am placed, the sharper and clearer does my social contrast with my fellows become to me" (ibid.: 111). Hence the greater the social tension, the more I am aware of my own conduct. Therefore conflicts are an inevitable part of one's spiritual, or as we might say, existential development. This does not mean that we should be at war with our fellows, but rather that we become self-conscious as moral beings through the spiritual warfare of mutual observation in the course of rivalry. He gives us the maxim that "the moral self, then the natural conscience, is bred through situations that involve social tension" (ibid.).

Thus we see that Royce is not a mystic recommending withdrawal from the world. Rather, our level of moral being depends on the social community in which we live, on the whole Dasein, which includes our fellows as well.

On the ethical side, this situation increases the moral burden of an individual, making it every more heavy. Society always breeds men who are inwardly enemies of each other, because every man in a highly cultivated social world is trained in moral self-consciousness by his social conflicts. High social cultivation breeds spiritual enmities, for it instills what we call "individualism". The higher the cultivation, the vaster and deeper the more spiritual and more significant of these inward and outward conflicts. Therefore Royce argues that individualism and collectivism are tendencies, each of which, as our social order grows, intensifies the other.

To see how true this is, one need only follow the history of the arts – not to speak of the sciences, and not least in semiotics: ongoing polemics, various schools fighting each other, eminent artists and scholars at odds. In semiotics, Are you Peircean or Greimassian? was the question for a long time, the answer leading immediately to an unavoidable and unresolvable conflict.

In the next Lecture, "The Realm of Grace", Royce tries to resolve the above-mentioned problem. The solution lies in the nature of the community to which one belongs, a community that can be either good or evil, beneficent or mischievous. Royce postulates an ideal group, however, which he calls the "Beloved Community". It embodies values that no individual as a detached being could even remotely approach. Such a society is based upon the principle of Loyalty. It is taught by a great leader, but such a person must himself be loyal, and in order to be loyal he must first find his lovable community. Loyalty is thus a concept that is fulfilled in our Dasein.

The next Lectures, on "Time and Guilt" and "The Atonement", are of a more theological nature. More to our present concerns is the chapter on "The Community and the Time-Process", in which Royce addresses the problem of existential loneliness.

Royce adheres to the Leibnizian doctrine of monads. One man cannot feel the physical pain of another man. What he feels is his own emotional reverberation at the sight of its symptoms. Royce believes that each of us lives within the charmed circle of his own conscious will and meaning; each of us is more or less clearly the object of his own inspection, but remains hopelessly beyond the direct observation of his fellows. My act is my own – an echo of contemporary social pluralism – but when one belongs to a social community, the situation changes. Our ethical pluralism makes us proudly state, My deed is my own! But our collective life makes us say not "I act thus", but "Thus the community acts in and through me" (ibid.: 240)[4]. So he in fact draws the same conclusion as that of the later structuralists, from Lacan to Foucault.

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[4] Royce quotes the German: "Ich denke nicht, sondern es denkt mir."

At this moment Royce introduces the notions of history and memory. The individual self is no mere present datum or collection of data but is based upon an interpretation of the sense and value of life, which in turn carries the memory of its own past. Royce asks, Can many different selves, all belonging to the present time, possess the identically same past as that of their own, personally interesting past life? Royce's response: A community constituted by the fact that each of its members accepts, as part of his own individual life and self, the same past events that each of his fellow-members accepts may be called a "community of memory". Further, a community whose members accept the same future for themselves can be called a community of expectation and ultimately a community of hope. Clearly such ideas are intimately bound with the idea of temporality, as it explains metaphysically the emergence of an historical community.

The next Lecture, on "The Body and the Members", adds much to the value of temporality. Royce thinks that the first condition upon which any kind of community depends is the power of an individual self to extend his life, in an ideal fashion, so as to regard it as including past and future events which lie far away in time. The self is essentially a life that is interpreted in a certain way and that interprets itself. Royce believes memory and hope to be the strongest forces to function as such extensions.

In modern semiotic terms, such extensions are nothing other than the modalities postulated by Greimassian semiotics. Without modalities a communication would not be possible, insofar as every act of communication entails an effort to fill or bridge the gap between subjects s1 and s2. Heidegger, on the other hand, spoke about *Sorge*, care or worry, as the basic human attitude in the life of a Dasein (community). Heideggerian "care" would be the same as modality as such, but without any particular manifestation as Will, Know, Can, and so on.

Thus the real deeds of a community are cooperative. Every individual, in his own extended life, includes also the cooperative deeds of other members of the society. Men form a community only in so far as they cooperate.

With this Royce has laid the foundation for what follows in the book: sign theories in the proper sense. This part starts with Lecture XI, on "Perception, Conception and Interpretation". Here Royce relies heavily on Peirce, and one might be tempted to think that the whole significance of Royce to semiotics would be simply that he managed to insert Peircean sign theory into a social semiotic context.

The concept of interpretation is crucial. Royce adduces concrete cases familiar to anyone: a stranger in a foreign country, a philologist rendering the meaning of a text, a judge construing a statute – always interpretation is involved.

Royce admits his indebtedness to Peirce, and regrets his earlier misunderstanding of the latter's thought. He reports that Peirce in fact invented pragmaticism, which at that time was being much developed by William James. Moreover Royce says that Peirce was in no way under the influence of Hegel or German idealism. Royce even says that, twelve years ago, Peirce wrote the fol-

lowing in a letter to him: "But when I read you, I do wish you would study logic. You need it so much" (ibid.: 277). We shall later see that Royce's understanding and usage of Peirce were quite unique.

When defining the difference between *perception* and *conception* Royce quotes Bergson's metaphor of a gold coin as perception and a bank note as conception. The notes constitute promises to pay the cash, and conceptions are useful guides to possible perceptions. This is illustrated by the case of our travels abroad. In one's own country his coins are valid, but beyond its borders those bank notes may have no value. When we communicate with our fellow men, we are like these travelers: crossing the boundary into a new country, we encounter there a largely strange world of perceptions and conceptions. We are never sure about our neighbors' *perceptions*, but their *conceptions* are so generally communicable that they can be taken as identical with our own. This process of passing from conceptions to perceptions is precisely *interpretation*. When Hamlet says to Ophelia, "I never loved you", and Ophelia answers, "But that is what you made me believe", then we have a typical case of interpretation – and of misunderstanding.

Royce gives as another example of interpretation an Egyptologist who translates an inscription. At first, two things are needed: the translator and his text. But he also needs a language into which the inscription will be translated. So the translator interprets something, but he interprets it only to one who can read English. If the reader knows no English, we do not have interpretation. Here already we have a triad: the Egyptian text, the Egyptologist-translator, and the possible English reader. They are all equally necessary. The mediator (translator, interpreter) must know both languages, and thus be intelligible to both persons whom his translation is to serve. We have a triadic relation: (A) Somebody interprets (B) somebody/something (C) to somebody. And this is essentially a non-symmetrical relation; that is to say, the terms must be in this order. When a man perceives something the relation is dyadic. A perceives B. But when A interprets B to C we need three terms. Royce goes further, reasoning that when a man undertakes conscious reflection, he interprets himself to himself. Even here the triadic relationship obtains.

Man interprets his past self, say, as a promise to his future self: "This is what I meant when I made that promise." Here three men are present and taking part in the interior conversation: the man of the past whose promises, notes, old letters, etc. are interpreted; the present self who interprets them; and the future self to whom the interpretation is addressed.

Royce insists that this process of interpretation differs psychologically from perception and conception, in these ways: (1) There is always someone who addresses someone. (2) The interpreted object is itself something of a mental nature. Peirce uses the term "sign" to designate this mental object. (3) Since the interpretation is a mental act, the interpretation itself is a Sign, and this new sign calls for further interpretation. Hence the social process is endless, as with infinite semiosis. Perception terminates in the object perceived, and conception is

satisfied with defining a universal type or ideal form of somebody's thought. But interpretation both requires the sign to be an interpreter and a further interpretation of its own act, because it addresses some third being. In Royce's opinion, only death can stop this process of interpretation.

The next lecture bears a very Schopenhauerian title, "The Will to Interpret". The will to interpret makes its three members into a community of interpretation. Royce correctly points out that all this evokes the Hegelian dialectic, wherein thesis, antithesis, and higher synthesis play their roles. But Royce says that Peirce's idea of the mediating third has, historically speaking, nothing to do with Hegel. Peirce's concept is a very general process, of which the Hegelian dialectic is only a special case. Hegel's illustrations of his own processes are ethical and historical. Still, says Royce, there is no incompatibility between Peirce and Hegel. When we take on the role of interpreter we enter the Community of Interpretation. Nevertheless, the problem remains: how can we know that any community of interpretation exists? This question brings us again to the very center of metaphysics. Royce answers that, since we all have the will to interpret, there must be somewhere a community that is aiming towards such a goal. So for him the ultimate instance of reality is the Community itself. Any conversation with other people, as any process of our inner self-consciousness, unfolds only as it is based on the thesis that we are all members of a community of interpretation. This is the real world for Royce, and his definition of reality. He simply sees it, like Peirce, as a semiosis, a process of interpretation, the only difference between him and Peirce being that for Royce the process of interpretation is essentially social.

6. Royce's metaphysics and last insights on interpretation

Royce's *Lectures on Metaphysics* in 1915–1916 were drawn from notes taken by his pupil Ralph W. Brown, these forming a synthesis of all his earlier thought. Now reality, knowledge and truth cannot be separated from the community of interpretation. The earlier Hegelian Absolute has been replaced by the idea of interpretation. He confirms his idea of the self as being a kind of community of its own. I am not merely my physical organism, is his first argument. The so-called individual man is in certain respects a social group. He consists of various selves. Royce's view of the self is thus pragmatic: the self is nothing given; rather, it is expressed in a life. You are yourself by virtue of the fact that you are engaged in doing something. One has memory and expectation, and in consequence every man has a past and future life as essential parts of him. One has three different selves: past self, present self, and future self. Thus Royce calls the self a "social group" and lists concrete empirical cases of communities:

1. The judicial community consisting of A. Plaintiff, B. defendant, C. judge;
2. The banker's community: A. borrower, B. lender or depositor, and C. banker;

3. The agent's community: A. agent, B. principal, and C. client; and 4. the insurance community: A. insurer, usually a corporation, B. an "adventurer", C. beneficiary. (Royce 1998: 21)

All these communities display the same triadic morphology. If I buy insurance, it is my future self who gets the money in an accident; a money-lender is in the present, but the person who is going to receive the loan is in future. So there is not particular psychological continuity between past, present, and future selves. Their stability establishes an ethical relation among the various selves.

The general formula for identity is coherence of life plan or what we might in semiotics call a narrative program. Royce reasons that the self is defined as a life lived in accordance with a plan, or to use the word idea, as a life with a coherent idea. In existential semiotics this would mean a life that is following some transcendental idea and is in this manner becoming something existential.

Perhaps the most important passage in Royce's lectures, for us at least, unfolds his notion of "The Triadic Community of Interpretation". The cooperation of A and C brings them into some sort of social unity, which makes them think and feel as if they were one person. The same sort of unity may characterize an individual. He is not an individual because he has an individual organism. Rather, a self is a self by virtue of the fact he or she is doing something that constitutes a plan having unity or coherence. Royce then says, contrary to behaviorism, that this unity is something one cannot grasp by merely observing the organism, but only by discerning what a man means, what he is after. This parallels our understanding of narrativity, when we speak of a desire as the catalyzing force: the actors are defined by what they are seeking. In communities of interpretation, the most important function is the inter-mediation brought about by B. Thanks to it, A, B, and C act as if they were one man. To bring about such solidarity is the main task of B.

The interpreter, we recall, is the one who addresses C on behalf of A; and as Royce defines it, a self is a self by virtue of some coherence of plan. B is a self who desires to carry out a plan which furthers not only A's will alone, nor C's will alone, but rather the united will of all three. Therefore B must be loyal, the willing servant of the cause and plan of C and A. Accordingly B is always the most important member of the community in question. It is B who both defines and expresses the community's united purpose. He more or less invents its united purpose. Thus B as mediator is a truly active and creative person. He brings C into touch with A and A into touch with C. The combined will of A and C has to be created constantly, and that is B's task. Hence he is the most obviously and explicitly loyal member of the community.

For Royce, no activity of man is too lofty to be interpreted by a community of interpretation. As an example he takes the scientific community as based on three roles: collector of facts, the theorizer, and the verifier. These three phases correspond to Peirce's definitions of various ways of reasoning: collector – retroductive methods, theorizer – deductive methods, and verifiers – inductive methods.

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Thus we can now see that Royce in his late philosophy not only studied and followed Peirce, but gave Peirce's thought a new interpretation. Royce is only minimally a nominalist; that is, he does not turn philosophical problems into problems of language and naming. There is always something of a pragmatic attitude in Royce's reasoning. But some of his theories of the social nature of knowledge and truth anticipate later theories of epistemes as social constructions. When he emphasizes the role of B, the interpreter or mediator, he comes close to some present-day media philosophers. It seems to us that many things exist only as mediated by what we call "media".

In science, as well, some people who only mediate others can have crucial value – a comforting thought to organizers of scientific congresses, publishers of journals, editors of others' texts. Royce gives much value to such activities. Some philosophers have levied the charge that, when we say something is a sign, we diminish the "existentiality" of anything we are speaking about. It is "only" a sign instead of being something real. Royce shows how erroneous such a view is. Something is real only through the process of interpretation, which always entails a corresponding community of interpretation. What position Royce will retain in the development of social semiotics is hard to say. Yet, as I have tried to show above, it is certain that he at least makes a genuine contribution to the understanding of Peirce's thought, as it reflects upon the possibilities for social semiotics in the context of existential semiotics.

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Abstract

One can say that Josiah Royce is a somewhat ignored American philosopher at least in the context of semiotics. There he has been overshadowed by his colleague and friend Charles S. Peirce. If the Hegelian traits in Peirce's semiotics are known and once studied thoroughly by Max H. Fisch, Royce is definitely even more 'Hegelian'. Peirce even planned to study Hegel with Peirce, rather late in 1902 at Arisbe, Peirce's home, but the plan did not get realized. However, Royce's thought has an authenticity, originality and actuality also in the present paradigm of, say, existential semiotics. Particularly Royce's ideas on interpretation and communities of interpretation are challenging and could be referred to as a possible foundation of a semiotic theory on meaning and social activity.

PEIRCE'S PRAGMATIC MAXIMS[1]

Dinda L. Gorlée

Five pragmatic maxims

Peirce's chronologization of rational meaning is stated and restated in his successive versions of the pragmatic maxim, written by him in 1878, 1902, 1905, and 1907. The time factor has a dual role to play in the emerging concept of pragmatism. On the one hand, semiosis, the meaning-producing actions of the semiotic sign, is a triadic process developing in time to grow further into the future. Each interpretant is a new sign interpreting a previous sign by mediating between the earlier sign and what it signifies, its object. On the other hand, Peirce defined and redefined his conception of meaning many times, thereby placing it within the framework of his own intellectual development and range of scholarly concerns, including the emergent linguistics, psychology, and sociology of his time. In both cases, there is an arrow of time invariably pointing forward, towards a future, not to return. Peirce's future-orientedness is a main characteristic of achieving the goal of thirdness, the category which he defined with rationality and logical meaning, which was in Peirce's work explicitly "located in future time" (CP 5.427, 1905).

One implication of the arrow of future time is that meaning is wholly an affair of logico-temporal progression, but with a slightly religious background. In Peirce's mature semiotic conception, signs are in pragmatism qualified as "sign-burdens" (CP 5.467, 1907), aimed as evolutionary agents at creating different interpretations. The interpretant-signs are burdened by past time with too many informational responsibilities, to realize the subjective force of "idea-potentiality" (MS 283: 101, 1906, see CP 1.218, 1902) in future action. Each following interpretant-sign is endowed with a higher coefficient of objective truth, until there ideally remains nothing in the system to contradict the logical truth. Subsequently, the truth is permitted to unfold all its functional consequences, on all possible levels (biological, social, and/or cultural). Peirce's concept of sign-burden is the human refuge against the light and heavy burden of religious

[1] The first draft of this paper was prepared for *Semiosis: Internationale Zeitschrift für Semiotik* (Gorlée 1993). *Semiosis* is now out of business and I thank Prof. Elisabeth Walther-Bense to publish this in a corrected, modified, and expanded edition.

belief: "Come to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest" and "For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light" (Matthew 11: 28, 30).

In Peirce's semiosis, the sign acts as a first, the object as a second, and the interpretant as a third. But meaning is also a threefold interaction when viewed from other time-bound semiotic perspectives. Signs have effects that follow from their correspondence with certain co-textual and contextual features and non-linguistic conditions. Therefore, the meaning of a concept, an utterance, or other symbolic sign cannot be fully established under the attitude of mind (under the aspect of thirdness) until the referencial context (the aspects of secondness) has been established. For Peirce, logical semiosis involves the pure qualities of illogical sensation or emotion (firstness) attached to thirdness, meaning that logical meaning must also be comprehended and understood the illogical meaning. To be sure, a sign of thirdness, meaning objective and public truth, implies the intersubjective, half-public and half-private second and the subjective and private first. Only in this singular combination can thirdness be a general sign (applied to every purpose and every intention) governing future action through the exercise of self-control of illogical signs.

The processuality of illogical and logical meaning also includes that meaning needs to crystallize itself in increasingly firm and progressively true beliefs about social signs, establishing habits of personal thought for the community. This growth of knowledge by settlement of opinion makes it possible to predict the future conduct of the sign under investigation. Peirce's inquiry is a struggle to overcome doubt and becomes a search of truth by asking questions, which leads the inquirer from interrogation and doubt to certainty and truth.

Peirce's meanings wander between emotion, experience, and understanding (in other words, the will, energy, and knowledge, the matter, energy, and information) to make choices responding to the "chaotic" world around. The immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants can be limited to the successive stages of semiosis, in contrast to the emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants of the speaker, who can reflect the intimate and intricate pattern of language and culture in human pseudo-semiosis. The "rational purport" (CP 5.412, see CP 5.428–429, 432–433, 438, 1905) of the mental thirdness of the word and other expressions shows in this paper the "practical" aspects of Peirce's pragmatism.

Peirce's 1878 pragmatic maxim is marginally and almost unwittingly formulated in his paper "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (CP 5.388–410, 1878). His ideas and thoughts about the biblical "thorny path" (CP 5.10) of the problem of penetrating the clearness and distinctness herald Peirce's advent of American pragmatism, of which he must be considered the pioneering figure. First, Peirce wrote in 1878 that "It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows," and he continued as follows:

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP 5.402, 1878)

This first rule of the pragmatic maxim was explained in a long footnote, written later in 1893 (CP 5.402 fn. 1, 2), quoting a biblical formulation to illustrate pragmatism. Peirce mentioned Jesus, speaking spiritually as well as logically to the disciples, who were sent out to preach against false prophets. Jesus advised the disciples that "You may know them by their fruits" (Matthew 7: 16). In Peirce's footnote, he identified the "sceptical and materialistic principle" of pragmatism by the best fruits of the harvest to share as spiritual "burden" in order to "carry his own load" (see also Gal. 6: 2, 6). The seasonal celebrations of nature and ecology cultivate the soul of the community serving as a prelude to a better world. Peirce restored the vision when he distinguished the grade of "making ideas clear."

Peirce's clear vision consisted not merely in taking action (secondness, accompanied by some firstness in the personal plural of the imperative mood) but in exchanging habits of thirdness to one another. Peirce's early exposition of the moral principle of pragmatism hinged on the system of his categories, but the pragmatic maxim laid itself open to the quite different misunderstandings, away from making the "stoical axiom" (CP 5.4) to the ultimate end of thought.

Peirce's dynamic method of understanding must be interpreted to have meant that the action of thinking in inquiry seeks to establish the problem of ascertaining facts to follow with the idea of meaning. As mental action of the art of the possible, meaning removes doubt by establishing a belief which is supposed to lead to a habit of thought. For early Peirce, meaning is thus an affair of vital concepts which generate in the "architectonic construction" (CP 5.5) of pragmatism. The pragmatic goal is achieving the logical "effects," the interpretive effects of Peirce's interpretants. The interpretated "effects" lead in time from first to second and then to the third and final stage of clearness of thought. The good reasoning of "practical bearings" lead to the objective truth, but prior to pragmatism, Peirce had twice used the term "object" in the non-technical sense of "thing studied."

Note that Peirce constantly used in the first pragmatic maxim the expression "conception" (and other derivates of Latin *concipere* in "conceivable," "conceive", "conception") to reinforce the thirdness of the pragmatic argument (CP 5.402 fn. 3, 1878). By the same token, "conceivably" and "conceivable" returned again in all versions of the maxim (except CP 5.438, 1905). By a "conception," Peirce fully explained in a footnote he meant to be "speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of *intellectual purport*" (CP 5.402 fn. 3, 1878, Peirce's emphasis). The "conception" would return in later versions (1902, 1905; in 1907 "concept" is used). In the 1905 formulation, Peirce redefined "conception" as the "*rational purport* of a word or other expression" (CP 5.412, 1905), as discussed before.

Also note the conditional use of the imperative mode in Peirce's "consider", now used in the first personal plural by analogy with the "as-if" phraseology of the "conceivably practical" habit (CP 5.400) of the would-be or would-do experiments, which it is meant to replace. The imperative reference to the future is meant here is a "soft" way, as a neutral invitation or advice rather than as a command or obligation. As shall be shown in adjacent paragraphs, this synthetic

verbal form is expressed more analytically and more strongly in the later statements. The 1870s and 1880s (and part of the 1890s) were Peirce's most productive years as a professional mathematician and research analyst (as a chemist, astronomer, geodesist, metrologist, and scientist in other hard disciplines), while his sign-philosophical work was for these decades marginal to these multiple pursuits, and stood alone.

According to Max Fisch, the pragmatic maxim (1878) is a "recipe for sign-interpretation; more exactly, for translating certain kinds of categorial propositions (or propositional functions) into certain kinds of conditional propositions (or functions) (Fisch 1986: 189), but no more than that. This question is answered by Olshewsky, who stated that:

> To construe [the pragmatic maxim] as a theory of meaning rather than a rule about meaning is to misconstruct Peirce's whole enterprise. The maxim is a didactic tool for improving inquiry. It is a guide for how to make your ideas clear, for discriminating the significance of one conception from another. This does not mean that it is concerned with the meaning of *all* conceptions or that it is concerned with *all* of meaning. He came to see it implying a theory of meaning, but that theory… is not equatable with the maxim itself. (Olshewsky 1983: 200, my emphasis)

As a pragmatic logician, Peirce was in his early work not so much interested in seconds (real facts) as in the imperial nature of logical thirds. In Peirce's words, this signified not an accident of "any particular event that did happen to somebody in the dead past" but implied in general kinds of "*experimental phenomena,*" in "what *surely will* happen to everybody in the living future who shall fulfill certain conditions" of the future (CP 5.425–426, 1905). What is conditionally true *in futuro* can only be a rational description, or third, which is applicable to particular events, or seconds. Importantly, therefore, what is de-emphasized in later versions of the pragmatic maxim, is the earlier limitation of significative "effects" to "actions"; and what is emphasized here, is the future dimension of semiosis.

In 1902, when William James' psychological cosmology applied pragmatism to the individual guide of life to the pragmatic philosophy of pure experience of the practical truth of prayers (see James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* [1902] and *Pragmatism* [1907]) had gained popularity, Peirce's rewrote the 1878 pragmatic maxim to suit the rhetoric of logical belief:

> *In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.* (CP 5.9, 1902, Peirce's italics)

To express the idea of conditional futurity, the original imperative has been changed into a persuasive construction: "In order to… one should consider." Note especially the modal auxiliary verb "should." The previous "effects" having "practical bearings" are rephrased as "practical consequences." Yet Peirce added here one important element: the "truth" or "entire meaning of the concep-

tion." The mention of the "truth" indicates that Peirce's pragmatic meaning has definitively reached beyond the practical secondness and is identical with rational purpose. The "scientific procedure" of Peirce's inquiry is no longer guided by personal, practical beliefs as in Peirce's early thought, but by theoretical, scientific beliefs and experimentally verifiable judgments. This change is further elaborated in Peirce's 1905 version of the pragmatic maxim.

From April to October of the year 1905, Peirce published three essays in *The Monist*, in which he attempted to wed, so to speak, the categorial scheme (and the earlier logic in the form of the three categories) into the evolutionary cosmology of "pragmaticism" (Peirce's later version of pragmatism). In its new formulation, pragmaticism was to play a central role in his semiotics. Beginning with a very "soft" universe consisting of pure irregularity and chance, the pragmaticist embarks upon a process of making such a universe an ever "harder" process of meaning. This evolutionary process is nothing but experimental science itself; because science, for the laboratory-man Peirce, consists not in doctrine, but in inquiry. Experimentation is the "rational experimental logic" (CP 5.430, 1905) of investigative inquiry.

In two of the *The Monist* essays, Peirce proposed in 1905 two successive restatements of his pragmatic maxim. Chronologically, the following from "What Pragmatism Is" (CP 5.411–437, 1905), came first:

> … the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and *there is absolutely nothing more in it*. For this doctrine he invented the name *pragmatism*. (CP 5.412, 1905, Peirce's emphasis)

Here we have an emphatic verbal construct consisting of no less than two logically and grammatically consecutive sentences connected by a semicolon. The first is only conditional in an implicit way, because it is advanced as an indicative statement, in a non-subjective, rather peremptory form; while the second is phrased as conditional, but with a double main clause, which underscores certainty in the future at the expense of conditionality. Truth as the final result of pragmatic inquiry is graphically represented in the emphasized finale.

The triple negation of "nothing," "not," and the negative noun "denial" (in contrast with "agreement") will serve to enhance the validity of the practical experiment as the scientific method to maximize the knowledge of what is called first a "word or other expression," twice a "concept," and subsequently the third, using the key-term in Peirce's passage: the "experiment" of pragmatism (repeated in the form of "experimental phenomena"), instead of the more neutral "test" or "trial" of experiments. Pragmatism clearly indicates that here speakes the laboratory-man, the exact scientist. This is also stressed by the terms "accurately" and "conduct of life."

Later, in this year 1905, Peirce rewrote in his essay of the "Issues of Pragmaticism" (CP 5.438–463, 1905) his pragmatic maxim once again in semiotic terms, see:

> The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. (CP 5.438, 1905)

What Peirce had originally referred to as the "object of our conception" (1878), the "intellectual conception" (1902), and, as stated above, he had called in the same year (1905) the "word or other conception" and "concept," he called, in unreservedly semiotic terminology, the "symbol." The sign of thirdness stands in an arbitrary relation to the (absent) dynamical object which it nevertheless signifies. In order to function as the genuinely sign with triadic predicates with an intellectual basis, the symbol needs "acceptance" by the community of its users. The symbol needs to be interpreted according to some previously agreed general rule. As argued before, the symbol needs, beyond the immediate or emotional and dynamical or energetic interpretants, to produce the final or logical interpretants, called earlier the "general modes of rational conduct" (1878), shown by contrast and comparison to the "effects" and "practical consequences" (1902). Final or logical interpretants, however, need to be built upon "all the possible different circumstances and desires," that is, upon seconds and firsts, to prompt in Peirce's degeneracy of signs into regenerated thirds (Gorlée 1990).

With "conditionally" and "would ensue" taking central stage in Peirce's upgraded 1905 version of the pragmatic maxim, conditional futurity has definitively found a semiotic foundation as well as a semiotic or even semio-logical space. As opposed to the semiotically still "underdeveloped" versions of the previous pragmatic maxims, the future dimension of infinite semiosis is now fully exploited by Peirce's semio-logical formulation.

Finally, let us stress Peirce's mostly unpublished MS 318, written in 1907, with the title "Pragmatism." This crucial manuscript consists of several drafts, only parts of which have so far been published (Robin 1967: 36–37). In one published passage, Peirce one again described mainstream pragmatism as a "method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, 1907), whose experimental character follows the "older logical rule, [stating] 'By their fruits ye shall know them'" (CP 5.465, 1907). The quotation followed Peirce's biblical footnote to the history of the first pragmatic maxim (1878). Two paragraphs later, Peirce rephrased the biblical saying used by Jesus in the Gospels to suit the "pragmatistic ingredient of [his own] thoughts" (CP 5.466, 1907), in the final words:

> The *total* meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept is contained in an affirmation that, under all conveivable circumstances of a given kind… the subject of the predication would behave in a certain general way – that is, it would be true under given experimental circumstances… (CP 5.467, 1907, Peirce's emphasis)

One implication of Peirce's latest pragmatic maxim (1907) is that logical meaning is, like semiosis, by definition an inexhaustible and open-ended form of human pseudo-semiosis. Meaning is an infinite would-be or practical would-do for an inquirer (speaker, agent), but meaning stays an incomplete work, which can only make itself increasingly known by actual experience and experiment to the community. Yet truth and untruth remain forever a puzzle of practical degree.

In this final version of the pragmatic maxim, the meaning of thirds is rearranged in semio-linguistic terms. Thus, the meaning of a linguistic utterance (in Peirce's text called the "subject") is determined by the different "circumstances" (or contextual seconds), in which it may be successfully used in communication. These circumstances of life are mentioned twice, first as "all conceivable circumstances of a given kind" and second as "given experimental circumstances." In modern parlance, one would conclude that the meaning of Peirce's evolutionary speech-act theory is both performance-bound and co-text- and context-functional expressions.

However, in order to act as a genuine third (symbol), the sign must be underpreted as standing for something else, its object. The requirement of signification through interpretation of having "effects," "practical bearings" (1878), or "practical consequences" (1902) can also be interpreted to mean that not only seconds but also firsts can be attached or regressed to it in the interpretants. Peirce's argument of 1907 meant exactly what "predication" is about: namely, that a word or other linguistic utterance evokes similar images (or even worlds) in the minds of its sender and the reviewer of the signs. These imaginations result from the immediate object of the surface of the sign, but in actual communicative situations refer back to the real deepness of the dynamical object – referring secretly to the truth of the sign.

Let me wrap up the argument of the fivefold pragmatic maxims. In his 1878 maxim, Peirce initiated pragmatism theoretically in formal logic. Soon, pragmatism took an overly "practical" turn in the hands of his peers (Scheffler [1974]1986), whereupon Peirce, the logician and exact scientist, reformed pragmatism as "pragmaticism" (CP 5.414–416, 1905). He developed the pragmatic movement into a theory showing how logical concepts can be worked out for the "virtual, not actual" meaning of an intellectual predicate in what called the "thought experiments" (Brent 1993: 12). The 1902 version of the original pragmatic maxim stressed that truth is the highest goal of inquiry. Under the label of his "semeiotic," Peirce combined pragmaticism with his categories and the pioneering work of the evolutionary speech-act theory. In 1905 he rewrote the pragmatic maxim twice to demonstrate its basis in the semiotic doctrine of signs; while in 1907, Peirce construed the fifth version of the pragmatic maxim into what seemed like the contemporary semio-linguistic terminology.

Time, in the guise of threefold semiosis, is ubiquitous in Peirce's pragmatic maxims. Not only does the threefold sign relation develop its meaning through time into new academic areas, also the intellectual development of Peirce, the polymath, has reflected, and was reflected in, his successive statements and re-

statements of the semiotic maze in the pragmatic maxims, each one serving as an interpretant-sign to the previous sign, as well as being in its turn interpreted to achieve the pragmatic truth.

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Congratulations

With this essay I would like to offer my good wishes to Ivan Mladenov on his 60th birthday. The jubilee as semiotician and scholar celebrates the *Festschrift* with the searching problems of Peirce's inquiry. Peirce was an experimentalist thinker, who sometimes wrote "essays," but often his philosophical interest had an abiding faith in his separate words of semiotic wisdom. Mladenov successfully shows in his writings how profoundly he decrypted the enigmas of Peirce's fragmentary paragraphs. He decided to travel and to study in scholarly "pilgrimages." Intrigued and transported in semiotic studies, Mladenov worked during stays at the *Peirce Edition Project* in Indianapolis and other "holy places." Travelling worldwide to study and write, he became a devoted Peirceophile. During many semiotic encounters, congresses, and working stays, we became semiotic friends. The friendship shares the proverb "As iron sharpens iron, so one friend sharpens the mind of his friend" (Prov. 27: 17), wise and profitable discourse sharpens man's intelligence. And our graces are sharpened by intellectual conversation with our friends and colleagues to be actively fit for the main subject: the semiotic thought and ideas of Peirce's own writings.

ABDUCTION AS THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND BIOLOGY

Drude von der Fehr

This article is based on my introductory chapter in a book that I am currently editing, entitled *The Live Body*[1]. The book is an interdisciplinary cooperation between different aesthetic disciplines; literary, theater and musical studies; biosemiotics; philosophy; and theology. In this version of my introductory chapter I focus on the possibility of a creative meeting between aesthetics and biosemiotics. In order to do so, I argue for a *field of possibility,* shaped by the event of a concept coming into life, thus pointing to a place where disciplinary diversity can express itself[2]. For the idea that a concept can form the basis for a creative field, evidence can be found in Gille Deleuze's and Félix Guattari's theory that concepts are aspects of reality. In *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* from 1991, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that concepts are living and creative and bring something new into the world. Any concept refers back to a problem and only when the problem is solved the meaning is understood[3]. Abduction is such a concept. It is both a concept *regarding* creative thinking, and *in itself* creative[4]. So it is only in retrospect that a solution appears and a concept can gain meaning. Therefore, this *field of possibility* will not become truly meaningful until the entire book has been read and the impressions have settled in the reader's experience of the book. And it is only in hindsight that we are able to see the effects of a concept, and are able to understand that an abstraction such as a concept is real and living.

This chapter is my view on the *field of possibility* that is addressed in all chapters. To my thinking, abduction is that which takes place inside this field,

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[1] The book is written in Danish and Norwegian because we have the ambition of reaching out to a broader public than the customary academic public.

[2] The term "field of possibility" is my own, but in the *Introduction* to the Danish translation of *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* the editors use the concept *begivenhedsfelt* (1996: 10), a term which I have used in the formulation "the event of a concept coming into life".

[3] In the book there is the following quotation from the Danish translation: "Ethvert begreb viser tilbage til et problem, til problemer uden hvilke det ikke ville have nogen mening, og som selv kun kan isoleres og forstås efterhånden som deres løsning viser seg"... (1996: 36).

[4] This is a pragmatic concept of meaning. See Peirce's *The Maxim of Pragmatism*: "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have: then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object" (Peirce 1998b: 135).

and which collects the book's various elements in a single field. It is also a concept that can reveal something about how the body "thinks".

The field works as a creative hypothesis. The hypothesis is that the body knows. But what does it know, and how do we know that it knows? According the Argentine biologists Maturana and Varela, all forms of life possess the capacity of cognition. Because each organism is struggling to survive, each must "know" what will aid its survival chances (Maturana and Varela 1980). But the body's knowledge is obviously not knowledge in a deductive or inductive sense. John Krois in "Image Science and Embodiment or: Peirce as Image Scientist"[5] stated that, even if deduction has a 100% probability, it still is only able to explain that which we already know, while induction can only falsify or confirm our deductions (2011: 199). The body's knowledge is more in line with the hypothetical and uncertain quality of the abductive inference. On the other hand, our knowledge of its knowledge is scientifically defensible in each and every chapter, from the epistemological assumptions of each discipline.

Abduction as a concept brings the participants together in a fellowship. As the Danish biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer states in his book chapter "Viten og kropp", an abduction also comes to act as a premise for a common assumption, namely that "the world is fundamentally made of the same stuff as our own body". Hoffmeyer in his chapter connects this assumption to his rejection of transcendental philosophy's distinction between an observable *phenomenon* and undefinable *noumenon.* He argues that projecting our own physical experience of causality onto a non-causal world, and actually gaining a credible knowledge of it, makes it possible to abductively join a world which is made of fundamentally the same stuff as oneself (p. 2)[6]. Causality results from "physically anchored experiences gained though our lives, going back to our first actions as an infant" (p. 3)[7]; it does not result from an *a priori*. The Norwegian literature researcher Elisabeth Løvlie, in her chapter "Jeg vet noe jeg ikke vet", draws in the newborn infant's so-called *amodal perception*, a form of knowledge that is immediate and incomprehensible. "And new experimental science makes it ever more clear that the body possesses this special kind of knowledge which does not rely on reflection" (p. 5)[8]. An infant has an immediate experiential and developmental relationship to its environment. The infant's experiences are based on effects and causality, and thereby on learning.

This type of knowledge has long been a prerequisite for aesthetic and literary thinking and has been something which attempts have been made to attain, among others by emphasizing the aesthetic experience. Having an interest in an

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[5] This has been published as a chapter in Krois 2009.

[6] The references are to the page numbers in the manuscripts for the individual chapters, because the book is still forthcoming.

[7] "… kropsligt forankrede erfaringer gjort gennem vores liv tilbage fra spæbarnstadiets første bevægelser".

[8] "Og med nyere eksperimentell vitenskap blir det stadig tydeligere at kroppen besitter en slik egen form for kunnskap som ikke er avhengig av å gå veien via refleksjon."

aesthetic and perhaps also religious form of "thinking" has been a prerequisite for this project. But the work that the Danish historian of ideas and philosopher Dorthes Jørgensen did on Gottlieb Baumgarten's sensitive aesthetics of the 1750s has increased our reflection on the epistemological meaning of the art forms. In this project, we have therefore seen the field of possibility as a space where the body's abductive, prelogical guesswork can encounter the sensitive and performative acting aesthetic[9].

Clearly, Hoffmeyer's chapter also functions on another fundamental and related premise, namely that in this book we base ourselves on an epistomological and semiotic realism in Peirce's sense of the word. This realism implies a break with Kant because, as we shall see in this book, every organism is in a perpetual causal, and therefore realistic, relationship to its environment. Simply put, semiotic realism assumes that we know the world exists simply because we are aware of its effects on the body. Certainly it is impossible, linguistically and mentally, to get past our ideas and beliefs. There is no immediate communication between the organism and our mental and linguistic world. Nevertheless, we are certain to die, regardless of what types of ideas and beliefs of death that we may have.

But if we acknowledge the existence of something prelinguistics or presemiotic, we can at least attempt to form concepts that can limit the determinism in the world of ideas that we inhabit as creatures of language and symbolism. In the arts, it has always been accepted that a reality exists before we have formed our ideas about it. This is why the humanistic-aesthetic contributions to this book play an important role in the development of concepts. After all, aesthetes have strived to say that which cannot be said, that which concerns physical effects, feelings, interactions and causality. Perhaps the aesthetic disicplines are better than other disciplines in capturing the living aspects of language? Considering the great discoveries that are being made in biology and related fields of exact science, I believe it is only natural that humanists and biologists will eventually meet in the field of activity, in abduction's field of possibility.

Realism is based in something which comes before the sign, for instance in the immediate interaction that an infant has with its environment. The semiotician Frederik Stjernfelt, in his *Diagrammatology*, emphasizes something of great interest within our context, namely that the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce, who considered all mental and physical processes to be sign processes, maintains a realism which implies that something fundamental and real must exist before the sign. In line with Husserl's views, that which exists before the sign must be based on a "metaphysics of presence". Peirce offers a "present instant", something which has not yet been mediated through the sign. Peirce's term for this pre-mediated something is *icon*. An icon is not a complete sign. It has the capacity to communicate various aspects of experience in the present moment (Stjernfelt 2007: 29). The *index*, which is the existential, experiential sign, always incorporates an icon.

[9] The performative potential of art is discussed in particular in theater aesthetics; see Erika Fischer-Lichte in the references.

Not only is it important, in relation to Peirce's realism, that something exists before the sign process begins, but we must also acknowledge that the icon, because it is not a fully realized sign, stands for something that is not realized but only a possibility. The icon is an aspect of an actualization of reality, but exists in itself only as something possible, something that can come to be. A semiotically realistic perception of man and of the universe therefore relies on anything (existing in the perceptive process) that is hypothetical, potential and possible (or more likely abductive) rather than actual.

If we assume it to be true that we have a biological, physical cognitive ability and thereby an ability to anticipate the consequences of choices, as Hoffmeyer argues even the simplest of organisms has[10], then we should be able to state that the possible is an important factor in this ability to recognize. And we can then argue that the possible is as real as the actual; it just has not yet been realized at an indexual level, an actual experience.

Also playing an important role in Peirce's realism is that the iconic sign, which exists as something potential, something not yet realized in this world or actualized as an idea, also carries a possible generality (ibid.). The fact that something exists that is not related to the actualization or mediation (we could also say symbolization) may, in Peirce's understanding of what is real, his realism, also include the general and thereby universal, as we have heard.

When the possible is real, are concepts also real?

Peirce's realism includes the idea that universals exists and are real. They are found in legitimate forms such as tendencies, dispositions, and patterns, and these can exist not just as actually existing but also as possibilities. Universals are products of consciousness, but are based in the possible (Stjernfelt 2007: 35). Because the presemiotic exists as a possibility that leads to actualization and conscious thought, we can safely speak of a form of precognitive *knowledge*, and we can also place concepts in this category. Concepts are legitimate and therefore possibilities, as Deleuze also stated. They actually exist in this world, even if we cannot observe or measure them. They are as invisible as consciousness is, but we would not deny that there is such as a thing as consciousness, would we? Stjernfelt connects Peirce's idea of realism to the idea that the universal "is through and through a product of the mind, but this creation has in certain cases a basis – a condition of possibility" (ibid.).

This ability to be possible is what is articulated by poetic expression and action, or what is staged in an infant's immediate relation to its environment, as Løvlie remarks in her chapter.

[10] "All living creatures are goal-seeking systems feeding on their ability to anticipate" ("Alle levende væsener er målsøgende systemer, der ernærer sig af deres evne til at anticipere"), p. 5. This corresponds with Maturana and Varela's views on the cognitive ability of the living.

Abduction and perceptual judgments

So what actually is abduction? It is a form of inference that forms part of Charles Peirce's logic. Abductive inference is in the following form:

> The surprising fact, C, is observed;
> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189)

In his book, *Kant and the Platypus. Essays on language and cognition*, Umberto Eco states that, to Peirce, perceptual judgment was the starting point for all critical and controlled thought. He saw perception as a process ending in perceptual judgment. But the process begins with what Peirce called the percept. The precept is not yet a perception; it is a first stimulus that is "an index of the fact that there is something to perceive" (Eco 2000: 114). The precept is somewhere between icon and index. Something appears, but this something is still unclear and does not require any sense: "It is pure individuality, in itself 'dumb'" (ibid.). Already in the perceptual judgment, "primary iconism shades off into a generic equality..." (ibid.: 115). The moment we get an impression, its singularity – its characteristic of being a unique event – has changed into something universal. In Peirce's terms, we have reached thirdness, that is to say, the sign as well as its rationality and interpretation.

So, perception ends with perceptual judgment, and Peirce argues that "... abductive inferences shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them" (Peirce 1998a: 227). The perceptual judgments can therefore be considered extreme cases of abductive inference which surely differ from "in being absolutely beyond criticism" (ibid.). In other words, behind abduction, as hypothesis-generating inference, there is something that is considered to be absolutely certain. And that which is absolutely certain does not belong to our cognitive level of conciousness, but to something precognitive. This is how Stjernfelt puts it: "the inferences at stake in perceptual judgments are of a peculiar type – they take place without any control and are immediately given without any possibility of doubt" (2007: 332). Hoffmeyer introduces the concept of perceptual semiotics in his chapter. An example of perceptual semiotics is an impression on the retina resulting in a coordination of the brain between perception and memory. This may be the cause of a physical feeling of certainty "that can make us 'believe' with a surprising certainty, without any involvement of consciousness". Here, Hoffmeyer provides a biological explanation for the perceptual judgments' physical sense of certainty. The perceptual judgments are perceived as faith.

In reference to Peirce, Umberto Eco calls that which precedes cognition, and is a prerequisite for abduction, *primary iconicity*. The very first, that which sets the perceptual process in motion and which, following the perceptual judgment, leads to semiosis or the process of interpretation, does not exist as an object or a phenomenon, as we have seen. In some ways, it does not exist at all.

Nonetheless, this is the prerequisite for everything that follows. Peirce considered this primary iconicity to be pure qualia (quality) and pure possibility (Eco 2000: 100–101).

The biosemiotician Kalevi Kull refers to Umberto Eco's concept of primary iconicity and indexicality in *Kant and the Platypus*, stating that Eco has demonstrated that the icon is a sign that not only reflects similarity, but also actively acts in a similar way (Kull 2012: 16).

The prerequisite for all abductive activity therefore is that something appears, and that something, which does not have any substantial or phenomenal existence, nevertheless has an influence, and we could call this a performative abililty. Something is done in a similar way (in our perception).

When it comes to providing evidence, on the other hand, abduction is a weak type of inference. But despite that, Peirce still allowed this type of inference a creative function. He believed abduction to be the only form of inference that could bring something new into this world[11].

> The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation. (1998a: 227)

This agrees well with the emphasis that Kull places on the ability of primary iconicity to create similarity: possible similarities are realized as similarity through the index. It is here that abduction has a function. Something has actually become similar, at least in a hypothetical sense[12].

What does it take for abduction to become more than a vague guess?

Because what does it take to make abduction something more than a private glimpse of meaning? We have seen abduction as a form of inference in search of explanations for surprising phenomena (Paavola 2004: 268). In his article

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[11] What Peirce says here has been the subject of much criticism. Sami Paavola in his article "Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery: The Importance of Strategies" discussed this criticism, but he believes abductive inference has gained increased attention in modern times. His 2004 article has played a decisive role in my argumentation where abduction is concerned.

[12] An example that phenomenal abducation is also being applied in humanistic studies is Wendy Wheeler's article "The Biosemiotic Turn: Abduction, or, the Nature of Creative Reason in Nature and Culture". The article deals with personal and cultural creativity from the point of view of abduction. Peirce's concept of the "play of musement", and the idea of not knowing, assumption, or the vitality affects forming the backdrop for feelings, affects the ability to know. Wheeler states that, "As I hope will become clear, this involves a semiotic and biosemiotic turn concerning both the nature of reasoning and reason in nature" (Wheeler 2011).

"Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery: The Importance of Strategies", Paavola refers to Jaakko Hintikka's work with two forms of rules in thought and logic: the "definitory rules" and the "strategic rules". Paavola uses the game of chess for examples to illustrate the meaning of this division. To play chess, one must learn the rules that define the game, but one does not become good at chess merely by learning the rules. To become a good chess player, one must also master the rules of strategy (ibid.: 269). Rules of strategy are related to goal-oriented activity where the meaning of being able to anticipate things and being able to choose between different options is important (ibid.: 270).

What makes this interesting in our context is that Hintikka emphasized the strategic aspect in relation to abduction. This is how Paavola cites him: "the validity of an abductive inference is to be judged by strategic principles rather than by definitory (...) rules' (Hintikka, 1998, p. 513)" (Paavola 2004: 270). The conclusions we can draw from this are that it is essentially not that the basis for the hypothesis is already given as a premise[13], but that abduction can gain a creative function if it is expanded into a hypothesis that can work on a more general basis for providing a credible solution to a problem (ibid.: 273). Backed by Paavola's arguments, I believe that the credibility of abduction is not based on whether it is fundamentally an entirely new glimpse of insight or not. Abduction is a starting point for expanding a hypothesis into a space for thought that has its basis in strategic principles. The important thing is that the *field of possibility* must be goal-oriented. Something like this requires making choices and being able to anticipate. Does that allow us to say that the field of possibility works the same way as a biological organism?[14] By virtue of having determination, the field of possibility is guided by a final causality[15]. That which I aim to expound is, in other words, a creative and strategic space which includes sufficient knowledge to make it possible to jump ahead and give the initial hypothesis – namely that the body knows – credibility and the possibility to exist in this world.

Qualitative possibility, consciousness and experience

Can that which only exists as a "qualitative possibility" play a decisive role in human existence? In his two chapters in this book[16], the Danish biosemiotician and philosopher of science Søren Brier states that abduction is tied to the

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[13] Much of the criticism of abduction has focused on the idea that there is a hypothesis behind the fact that one can experience a surprising fact at all. In consequence, the hypothesis that arises cannot be creative (Paavola 2004: 268).

[14] See Hoffmeyer's chapter "Viden og kropp".

[15] Final causility is related to Peirce's pragmatic maxims. See the definition, p. 1.

[16] The chapters are entitled "Kropsfænomenologisk virkelighed: En cybersemiotic transdisciplinær forståelse" and "Cybersemiotics; At indsætte den kybernetiske komponent i det semiotiske paradigme".

creative part of the human ability to know. Fascinatingly, the creative element is tied to the possible rather than the actual – that which we are able to categorize or about which we are able to theorize. In this context, it is intereresting to note Jesper Hoffmeyer's assertion that consciousness is something which does not exist in a traditional scientific sense (Hoffmeyer 2012).

Hoffmeyer's 2012 book *Overfladens dyb* examines how evolution has been able to produce a phenomenon such as mental life, and argues that the psyche's role in nature is to bring the world into the organism and the organism into the world (ibid.: 7). From this thesis follows the assertion that consciousness is a surface or *interface*, a place without materiality which nevertheless is real, a place for communication between the *mindbody*[17] and the world beyond. That which characterizes this interface consciousness is that it is predictive. In other words, it can act strategically (in the meaning of "strategic" that we have employed here), and it is has a certain freedom. This means that it has the freedom to make a choice between different options.

Based on this, it does not seem unreasonable to pose the question: is there an abductive function to consciousness' characteristic of mediating between the inner and outer? In other words, is consciousness abductive? And if consciousness is abductive in a biological sense, would it not be abductive not just at higher cognitive levels, but also at lower levels of consciousness?

If William James is correct in stating that faith is related to the interaction between the body and its surroundings, then it is interesting to see this in relation to Hoffmeyer's understanding of consciousness. Based on this, can we imagine that consciousness has belief – the sense of certainty – that forms the basis for its communicative exchange which in the course of evolution has become that which we call the mental? Then belief is not a phenomenon which one can simply decide to discard. The function of belief is in fact a prerequisite for biological life and cannot be separated from it[18]. But that which one actually believes is an entirely different matter, one which concerns religion, not science.

In his 2012 book *Overfladens dyb*, Hoffmeyer states that the psyche is not:

> ... a mysterious appendage of the brain's nerve processes, and the body is not a lifeless carrier of an illusory world of experience. In reality, the body's inner world consists of the unfolding of a self-organizing myriad of communicative processes, and our mental tools are nothing more than the visible part of this bodily myriad – the top of the iceberg, as they say. (2012: 143)[19]

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[17] This term, hjernekroppen, translated as mindbody, Hoffmeyer introduces in order to circumvent the body/soul dualism that is so ingrained in our daily language.

[18] Hoffmeyer concludes his chapter with the statement: "Our world springs from a body that believes." ("Vores verden stammer fra en kropp der tror.")

[19] "... et mystifistisk vedhæng til nerveprocesser i hjernen, og kroppen er ikke en livløs bærer af en illusorisk oplevelsesverden. For kroppens indre er i virkeligheden udfoldelsen af et stort selvorganiserende mylder af kommunikative processer, og vores psykiske beredskab er intet andet end den oplyste del af dette kropsmylder, toppen af et isbjerg, som man siger."

What Hoffmeyer is saying is that large parts of our cognition is subconscious and related to the organism's own anticipatory life. I believe it is this subconscious cognition that so concerns the aesthetics in this book, and which is expressed in Løvlie's chapter because she so explicitly relates it to the infant's immediate relation to the world. But such an immediately and physical cognition can only be expressed as a qualitative possibility. It can of course never be formulated in language or be expressed as a symbolically mediated sign.

Consciousness or psyche has served a function in evolution – it has enabled the organism to better interact with its environment. On the other hand, it does not exist as a physical, measurable quantity. It does not have any weight, volume, color, or substance. And, it cannot be reduced to the method of functioning of certain neural areas, but exists by virtue of the brain's billions of communicative processes (ibid.: 145, 143). Hoffmeyer asserts that the capacity to experience has developed in the course of evolution with the aim to better equip the organism to handle challenging situations. If experiences are real and not illusions it follows from this that the psychic has an effect on the physical world and that the psyche or consciousness[20] and the capacity to experience have a biological function (ibid.: 30).

However, such subconscious knowledge cannot of course be directly communicated in language. On the other hand, all of the participants in the project, which belong to the aesthetic disciplines, are of the opinion that subconscious knowledge can be staged indirectly in the aesthetic expression, be it musical, literary or theatrical. In other words, our hypothesis implies a perspective that is not only a biosemiotic but interdisciplinary – because we believe that art can express that which the body knows (and keep abduction alive).

The work of art guarantees human presence in this world as existential and ethical

Hoffmeyer quotes from the "cover" of the most recent book by American anthropologist, neurobiologist and evolutionary researcher Terrence W. Deacon, in conjunction with a meeting of the Danish *Seminar i Videnskabsteori* (Seminary on the Theory of Science):

> As physicists work toward completing a theory of the universe and biologists unravel the molecular complexity of life, a glaring incompleteness in this scientific vision becomes apparent. The "Theory of Everything" that appears to be emerging includes everything but us: the feelings, meanings, consciousness, and purpose that make us (and many of our animal cousins) what we are. These most immediate and incontrovertible phenomena are left unexplained by the natural sciences because they lack the physical properties – such as mass, momentum, charge, and

[20] In daily language, we use consciousness as a synonym for mental life. This means that we also use the term the "consciousness" for the subsconscious.

location – that are assumed to be necessary for something to have physical consequences in the world. This is an unacceptable omission. We need a "theory of everything" that does not leave it absurd that we exist[21].

Traditional natural sciences are therefore, in all of their near-incredible progress, at risk of making human existence on earth not just inexplicable and unimportant, but actually absurd. When we take the human ability to survive into account, these exclusions may lead to a unnerving simplification of what life is. Just the fact that the natural sciences disregard the study of the mental – and emotional – life can be grounds enough to argue that human awareness of the body (and thereby the body's knowledge) should be a central object of study in our postmodern times. In his chapter in this book, Hoffmeyer states that the ability to understand has its own natural history. It is not beyond the nature which it acknowledges, because it springs forth from it. In combination with Sørens Brier's two chapters, Hoffmeyer's chapter forms the foundation for the point of view that some essential elements of human life cannot be explained by the traditional natural sciences. Søren Brier studies Gregory Bateson's cybernetics to explain experience as a phenomenon, but this is not quite sufficient to enable him to reach his goal. By including Peirce's semiotics and expand it in a cybernetic direction, he can, however, construct a dynamic model that appears to be capture all knowledge, also from a subjective experiential perspective. With this, we have acquired a model that does not dismiss knowledge about humans as absurd. Nevertheless, I remain somewhat in doubt. What does it mean that everything interacts with everything – or, in Bateson's words, what differences do we find the model to make that actually make a difference?

Jesper Hoffmeyer states in *Overfladens dyb* that:

> Having followed the debate about nature and nurture quite closely throughout my professional life, I have come to the humble conclusion that world literature still provides a better approach than scientific theories to giving us an understanding of what kind of creatures people are. I am not saying that we do not need scientific theories. I am not saying that we do not need scientific insight into the human psyche and its connection with our hereditary resources. I just think that a sober assessment must be that on the current basis – and by that I mean within the conceptual framework currently being constructed within science – science does not have a chance of reaching insights that make us any wiser about humans than great art has already done. (2012: 169)[22]

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[21] This appeared on the website of Studiekreds i Videnskabsstudier, seminar i Videnskabsteori, under "Det næste møde", on Friday March 1st, 2013. Jesper Hoffmeyer provided an introduction to the discussion based on Terrence W. Deacon's book *Incomplete Nature: How mind emerged from matter.*

[22] "Efter ret nøje at have fulgt debatten om arv og miljø gennem hele mit professionelle liv er jeg nået til den ydmyge konklusion, at verdenslitteraturen fortsat giver en bedre indgang til forståelse af, hvad mennesker er for nogle væsner, end de videnskabelige teorier. Jeg siger ikke dermed, at vi ikke har brug for videnskabelige teorier. Jeg siger ikke dermed, at vi ikke har brug for videnskapelig indsigt i den menneskelige psyke og dens forbundethed med vores

Umberto Eco, in his chapter "On Being" in *Kant and the Platypus*, states that "the poet conveys to us the nuances of color in a leaf, but he doesn't tell us what Color is" (2000: 32). And he continues:

> What do the Poets reveal to us? It is not that they *say* Being, they are simply trying to emulate it : *ars imitator naturam in sua operatione*. The Poets assume as their own task the substantial ambiguity of language, and try to exploit it to extract a *surplus of interpretation* from it rather than a surplus of being. The substantial polyvocity of being usually obliges us to make an effort to give form to the formless. The poet emulates being by reproposing its viscosity; he tries to reconstruct the formless original, to persuade us to reckon with being. But he offers us an ersatz and does not tell us anything more about being than being has already told us or than we have had it say, in other words, very little. (ibid.: 34)

True enough, though it does not sound very promising for the aesthetic disciplines. However, Eco adds that: "the discourse of Poets does not replace our questioning of being, but sustains and encourages it". This fits with what the aesthetes are seeking in this book. The aesthetic disciplines, music science, literary science and theater science have understood the importance of the body for aesthetics, and usually resort to phenomenology in order to incorporate the body in their argumentation. Danish historian of ideas Dorthe Jørgensen's work on experience as an analytical category or a category within the history of ideas enabled both aesthetes and theologians to discover Baumgarten's concept of aesthetics as sensitive or sensory knowledge. We will see that German theater researcher Erika Fischer-Lichte's book on performative aesthetics is cited in several chapters on aesthetic topics. This is, of course, first and foremost because the phenomenon of performativity allows aesthetics to avoid a rational concept of meaning and move towards a sensitive or sensory dimension of experience.

According to Søren Brier, the primary advantage of the humanities over the exact sciences is that the humanities work with meaning. Generally speaking, I would agree with him. But in our project, the aesthetes' most exciting challenge is revealing itself, rather than how the aesthetic hermeneutics' concept of meaning can be temporarily set aside in favor of something presemiotic or precognitive. Of course one could say that the task which they have taken on is precisely to give this – nonverbalised – meaning. It is here that I see possibilities for rapprochement between biosemiotics and the aesthetic disciplines. I also see the possibility that theology can have something to say in this area, where verbal language, despite its unquestionable sign character, can stage or express a primary indexicality or iconicity, and thereby acts in an underpinning and creative way in relation to our experience of that which *exists*.

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arvelige ressourser. Blot tror jeg, en besindig vurdering må være, at på det nuværende grundlag – og hermed mener jeg inden for den forståelsesramme, der for tiden anlægges i videnskaben – har videnskaben ingen chancer for at nå til indsigter, der gør os klogere på menneskene, end den store kunst har gjort det."

In his account of what poets do, Eco concludes that the experience of art is not something that is radically different from the experience of speaking about something, be it in philosophy, science, or daily language. It is, simultaneously, a moment in time and a permanent corrective. According to Eco, art can talk about the weather and, by doing so, keep this discourse alive in an interpretative process.

Art, in other words, keeps *the existing alive*. We can see this in the light of the indirect communication of an immediate experience of reality, as the infant would experience it. But we can also formulate it semiotically: Art makes *the existing alive* by removing itself from the dimension of meaning, seeking instead to approach a presemiotic existence that can express or stage the particular in the experience of the percept at the moment it becomes an index and thereby a sign that something exists. And – that which exists must exist in the body. This enables aesthetics to show that the body exists. And when aesthetics knows the body exists, it holds a belief of absolute certainty. It believes in this fleeting moment which cannot be verbalized, but nevertheless will always be a first stimulus for an endless interpretative dynamic that keeps this first meeting alive in the dynamic process of interpretation and learning which experience is.

As mentioned earlier, Elisabeth Løvlie puts forth that which she – in reference to Daniel Stern and more recent research on infants – calls *amodal perception*, that is to say a form of sensory and immediate knowledge. Løvlie introduces Stern's concept of the *vitality affects of an organism*, which form a backdrop for our feelings. Based on the idea that language has an inherent emphatic dimension, which may belong to this precognitive level of consciousness (see Hoffmeyer 1993), one could argue that language is relational. If emphathy is related to ethics, it would open the way for ethics that include language and its inherent emphatic dimension. Elisabeth Løvlie advocates that language and thereby the dimension of meaning, from which aesthetic theory takes great pains to disassociate itself, through empirical observation, can actually be said to express an immediate knowledge of the body. I consider this especially interesting because, if it is indeed correct, then there actually is an immediate and direct connection between body and aesthetics, which is of course related to the way the brain functions, but can be explained not by collections of neurons (such as the much-discussed mirror neurons) but by evolutionary necessity. The infant's chance of survival is dependent on the establishment of contact with a trusted caregiver.

The natural sciences alone are not sufficient to explain human existence

The work on this book has gradually come to rest on the premise that the natural sciences alone are not sufficient to explain humanity and human existence. I therefore join Søren Brier's vision as expressed in his cybersemiotic model in the second of his chapters, even though I have already discussed this

with a certain reserve. Regarding the human world of existence, Brier states that it is as if we are standing with each of our four limbs in four different worlds of existence, each complementing one another and highlighting different sides of a reality which in its hypercomplexity surpasses them all. This applies to the physical world, the mental condition, culture, language, and physical nature. All these fields create their own distinctive explanatory models, but the fields are in constant dynamic interaction and can meet one another. Brier, following Kull, states that abduction finds the similarity between phenomena. It is precisely here, in this abductive field of possibility, that the work on this book has raised a vision of a body which is uniform (the mind body), anticipatory, dynamic, based on experience and thought, and having a qualitative capacity to experience. If these phenomena are not added to the materialistic understanding of the body, we are left with a world view that makes human existence not just inexplicable but, as Deacon states, absurd.

Even though the natural sciences cannot explain everything, they can alert us to some very concrete phenomena which should not be overlooked. For instance, Hoffmeyer in his chapter states that we can perceive the world simply by interacting with it. We accept some things, reject others, and so on. From our infant days, we learn that things have consequences. And because we have learned that things have consequences, we learn to anticipate – to look ahead and make a choice. Hoffmeyer notes that causality is experience, and that the causal finality is of decisive importance for all life, which is anticipatory and, in a biological sense, able to make choices. The body is not mechanical but living, and ruled by learning through experience and final causality, namely that which Peirce formulated in his pragmatic maxims. We could say that abduction creates similarity on the basis of final causality.

Interaction and aesthetic experience

In the tradition of Peirce, the philosopher William James argues that belief is a form of interaction between the body and the outer world (James 2002). Could we not imagine that this interaction is abductive? Could we not imagine that interaction is based on the anticipation of the organism, that is to say, the possibility of interpreting and, in a certain sense, choosing? Concerning the relationship between belief and biology, Peirce himself called abduction a form of guessing by the body. An in any case, we know that the body's inner life is a myriad of communicating processes and that living systems, including bodily consciousness, can predict or anticipate (Hoffmeyer 2012: 24).

James' understanding of belief as "a feeling of certainty" is very close to what John Dewey[23] terms aesthetic experience. In *Art as Experience* he considers aesthetic experience as a life-saving qualitative interacting between the

[23] Dewey is one of Peirce's heirs within the field of pragmatic philosophy.

organism and its environment. Richard Shusterman is an important mediator of Dewey's views on art. He states that:

> For Dewey all art is the product of interaction between the living organism and its environment, an undergoing and a doing which involves a reorganization of energies, actions and materials. Though the fine arts have become increasingly more spiritualized, "the organic substratum remains as the quickening and deep foundation," the sustaining source of the emotional energies of art which make it so enhancive to life (AE: 30–31). This essential physiological stratum is not confined to the artist. The perceiver too, must engage her natural feelings and energies as well as her physiological sensorimotor responses in order to appreciate art in aesthetic experience. (Shusterman 1992: 6–7)

Art, in other words, is connected to physiological or biological relationships. If one adds the emphasis that art as experience, as Dewey views it, is strikingly similar to Hoffmeyer's notion of the function of consciousness, could one not image that the aesthetic experience is simply a consequence of the way in which consciousness functions?

Regardless, belief is a prerequisite for abduction, being a weak type of inference. It is based on belief that we are able to form creative hypotheses. As Eijsing notes, forming a hypothesis involves a hope that it will bring us closer to some form of truth. A hypothesis is not the truth, but it lives within us and causes us to act. We could say that it has a performative force. It stages things that can cause questions to be answered or can cause new hypotheses to be formed. In the context of this project, I will perhaps receive answers to some questions, or some hypotheses may be refuted, but this can lead to new and more important questions. So the meaning of this book is perhaps not that my questions will be answered[24], but that it will generate new questions. Is this how future knowledge is generated? Some surprising observations are made, questions are asked that cannot be answered without interdisciplinary collaboration, and solutions are sought, but the most important thing that happens is that new questions are generated – new questions which do not necessarily provide answers to the original questions.

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[24] Here I am referring to the book *Når kroppen tenker* (2008), where I ask a question about belief (in Peirce's sense of the term or, following James, as a feeling of certainty). Based on a memory of an experience I had while I was in a state of unconsciousness, I ask whether belief can be physical (biological), and whether it has some impact on a religious view of belief.

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Abstract

In the forthcoming book *The Live Body,* which I am currently editing, I present the cooperation between different aesthetic fields (literature, music, theatre) and biology as *a field of possibility.* The cooperation makes abduction happen as an event forming the meaning of the book. According to Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari in *Qu`est-ce que la philosophie?* a concept cannot be understood unless the problem is solved. This means that concepts gain meaning in retrospect and so does the book. Only by being used and rethought in different practical and theoretical contexts the book gains a definite meaning. *The field of possibility* works as a creative hypothesis. The hypothesis is that the body knows. But what does it know, and how do we know that it knows? We seem to think that what the body knows is in line with the hypothetical and uncertain quality of the abductive inference. The Norwegian literature researcher Elisabeth Løvlie, in her chapter "Jeg vet noe jeg ikke vet", draws in the newborn infant's so-called *amodal perception*, a form of knowledge that is immediate and incomprehensible. Ac-

cording to her, new experimental science makes it ever more clear that the body possesses this special kind of knowledge which does not rely on reflection. An infant has an immediate experiential and developmental relationship to its environment. This type of knowledge has long been a prerequisite for aesthetic and literary thinking and has been something which attempts have been made to attain, among others by emphasizing the aesthetic experience. The Danish biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer's claim, namely that we have a biological, physical cognitive ability to anticipate the consequences of choices, and that even the simplest of organisms has it, is most important in understanding what the body knows. Charles Peirce's understanding of realism is important in this connection, because a semiotically realistic perception of man and of the universe relies on something that is hypothetical, potential and possible (or more likely abductive) rather than actual.

That which I aim to expound in this book, is a creative and strategic space which includes sufficient knowledge to make it possible to jump ahead and give the initial hypothesis – namely that the body knows – credibility and the possibility to exist in this world. As biological organism we have a "knowledge" which art struggles to express aesthetically and performatively. And this "knowledge" is real, semiotically speaking.

ТРИЛИКИЯТ *АЗ* ВЪВ ФИЛОСОФИЯТА НА ЧАРЛС ПЪРС

Андрей Ташев

В класическия си труд „Личност: психологическо тълкуване“ американският психолог Гордън Олпорт споменава за петдесет различни дефиниции на понятието „личност“ (Olport 1937: 37 и сл.). Като имаме предвид, че това е преглед отпреди повече от 75 години, обхващащ само англоезични психологически източници, можем да си представим пред какъв сериозен обем и многообразие от изследвания за същността и структурата на Аза сме изправени днес.

Въпреки че този проблем е разработван от представители на почти всички хуманитарни науки, психологията е тази, която дава най-голям брой теории за личността. Те са много и разнообразни, но почти всички страдат от един и същ недостатък: „Всеки голям психолог-персонолог, създател на самостоятелна теория за личността, обявява собствените си психологически (личностни) проблеми за универсални, общовалидни проблеми на всички хора“ (Василев 2000: 206). С други думи, тези теории са попаднали в плен на субективизма, който подкопава тяхната общовалидност и научна стойност.

Точно този недостатък се опитва да избегне в работата си създателят на прагматизма и семиотиката Чарлс С. Пърс. Като учен със солиден опит в емпиричните и природните науки той въвежда във философията логиката на отношенията, преминала през експериментални доказателства. Същевременно, поне по отношение на концепцията си за личността, той запазва и използва ценните нишки, съдържащи се в неприеманите от него методи: „Подходът на Пърс към личността е критика на психологическите и социалните аналогии, но заедно с това предлага път, по който прозренията на всеки от тези два подхода могат да бъдат обединени…“ (Robinson 2010: 313). В резултат от тази симбиоза се ражда една от най-оригиналните доктрини[1] за личността, толкова необичайна в определени нейни аспекти, че предизвиква недоумение у някои от ранните изследователи на Пърс (Thompson 1953; Bernstein 1971), които неоснователно я определят

[1] В тази статия ще използваме думата „доктрина“, когато говорим за възгледите на Пърс. Тя е по-подходяща от „теория“, защото значението ѝ съдържа нюанс на по-голяма свобода и гъвкавост, което е характерно за философията на Пърс.

като най-слабата част от цялата му философия. Другата основна причина за неразбирането се крие във факта, че Пърсовата доктрина за личността не се съдържа в завършен вид в един текст или група текстове. Отделни, често привидно противоречащи си фрагменти по тази тема са разпръснати из многобройните публикации и ръкописи на Пърс. За да се разбере неговият цялостен възглед за личността, той трябва да се реконструира, като се подредят парчетата от пъзела. И за да стане задачата още по-сложна, някои части от този пъзел липсват и получилите се празнини в него трябва да се запълнят с помощта на други доктрини на Пърс. Правени са немалко опити в тази посока, като най-сериозните от тях (Colapietro 1989; Short 2007) интерпретират възгледите на Пърс за личността в контекста на неговата семейотика[2]. Но в настоящата статия ще подходим от различен ъгъл.

Две тези за Аза

За да илюстрира съществуването на външен за Аза свят, Пърс си служи със следния пример:

> Човек се разхожда по Уолстрийт, разсъждавайки върху съществуването на външния свят. Но ако в своята вглъбеност той се блъсне в някого, който отстъпи ядосано и после с удар го събори на земята, скептикът едва ли би стигнал в своя скептицизъм дотам, че да се съмнява дали нещо друго освен Аза има роля в това събитие. (CP 1.431)

Пърс използва термина „съществуване“ в неговия строг философски смисъл: да съществува нещо означава то да реагира спрямо други неща от собствената му среда (CP 6.495). Думата произлиза от латинското *existere*: *ex* (из) и *sistere* (стоя стабилно). От цитирания по-горе пасаж следва, че Другият съществува за мен именно по този начин. Той е нещо различно, строго разграничено от мен, със свои собствени установени и уникални характеристики; той се налага над мен и ми се противопоставя; предизвиква реакция от моя страна и реагира на моите действия спрямо него. Или поне е способен да го направи. Така той дефинира и легитимира и моето собствено съществуване, защото аз съществувам за него по същия начин. Азът и Другият са представени като две отделни вселени, които съществуват, доколкото се сблъскват една с друга, като не е задължително този сблъсък да е физически. Тоест те са дефинирани изцяло в термините на взаимното им противопоставяне. В този пример не откриваме нищо, което да противоречи на традиционната трактовка, според която личността е съвкупността от характеристики, които правят човека уникален, различен от останалите.

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[2] Пърс предпочита да нарича доктрината за знаците „семейотика“, за да подчертае гръцкия произход на думата.

Но в кратката си статия от 1893 г. „Безсмъртието в светлината на синехизма“ („Immortality in the Light of Synechism“), останала непубликувана приживе заради неразбирателство между него и редактора на сп. *The Monist* Пол Карус, Пърс пише: „Вашите съседи са самият вие в много по-голяма степен, отколкото бихте повярвали без задълбочени психологически изследвания. Индивидуалността, която обичате да приписвате на себе си, е най-вулгарната заблуда на суетата“ (CP 7.571). Азът и Другият вече не са рязко разделени и противопоставени, напротив, те са идентифицирани един с друг.

Но оттласкването на Пърс от традиционния възглед за личността не спира дотук. Нашите собствени мисли и воля, намиращи се в нашето собствено тяло (т.е. мислите, волята и тялото), обикновено се приемат за елементите, които съставят личностната ни идентичност. Пърс обръща това традиционно виждане с главата надолу. Първо, той не приема твърдението, че има фундаментална разлика между ум и тяло, която да ни дава основание да поставяме рязка граница между тях. Според него всеки феномен, включително и материята, е ментален. Живият разум е първичният съставен елемент на Вселената. С времето той „замръзва“ и се втвърдява в навици, създавайки материята. Или, казано с думите на Пърс: „Единствената разбираема теория за Вселената е тази на обективния идеализъм, че материята е изтощен разум, втвърдени навици, превърнали се във физически норми“ (W8: 106). Следователно разликата между отделните феномени не е в същността им, а само в степента на тяхната детерминираност.

Този обективен идеализъм води Пърс и до отхвърляне на възгледа, че нашият ум и мисли се намират в тялото ни. Отношението между човек и мисъл според него е следното: „Както казваме, че тялото е в движение, а не движението е в тялото, би трябвало да казваме, че ние сме в мисълта, а не мислите – в нас“ (W2: 227, бел. под линия 4). Не ние сме тези, които мислим, а мислите се развиват чрез нас. Когато чувстваме, че не можем да изразим ясно „нашите мисли“, това не се дължи на несъвършенството на посредника – човешкия език, – а на факта, че мисълта не се е развила напълно в нас (De Waal 2001: 84).

Така че ние нямаме наши собствени мисли, които идват от нашия собствен ум в нашето собствено тяло. Какво тогава формира нашата личностна идентичност? Пърс твърди, че тя е съгласуване на идеи или чувства, което той нарича и „сноп от навици“ (CP 6.228). „Навикът съгласува чувствата… Чувства, съгласувани по определен начин и в определена степен, образуват личност; когато те се разделят (тъй като навиците понякога се разпадат), личността изчезва“ (CP 6.585). А навикът според специфичната терминология на Пърс е предразположеност да се действа по определен начин при определени обстоятелства. Той не се ограничава само до човешкото поведение. Природните закони също са навици. От тази гледна точка цитираното определение на Пърс разширява неимоверно идеята за личност и я прави много по-пластична и динамична, защото снопът от навици не съответства единствено на това, което наричаме човешко самосъзнание.

Ние сме личности, също както жокеят с неговия кон и ученият с неговата библиотека и апаратура (De Waal 2001: 84). Невидими нишки ни свързват с хората и предметите около нас и тези нишки дават началото на различни личности. Отделните елементи преливат и се сливат един с друг. Вероятно това има предвид Пърс с парадоксалното на пръв поглед изречение „Вашите съседи са самият вие…".

Човек може да участва в повече от една такава комбинация, което значи, че ние можем да сме на повече от едно място едновременно:

> Има едно жалко материално и варварско разбиране, според което човек не може да бъде на две места едновременно; сякаш той е *предмет*! Една дума може да бъде на няколко места едновременно, *шест шест*, защото нейната същност е духовна; човекът с нищо не е по-малко от думата в това отношение. (W1: 499, курс. авт. – Ч. П.)

От друга страна, много от навиците на човека се определят от „родовата душа на семейството, класата, нацията, расата, към които принадлежи" (W1: 499), т.е. от различните личности, в които той участва.

Свързващото звено

В обобщение на казаното дотук, във философията на Пърс откриваме два взаимноизключващи се възгледа за личността. Първият е близък до традиционния и условно можем да наречем Аза, който той представя, установен, докато чрез втория авторът защитава тезата за една по-скоро флуидна личност. Но как да ги помирим?

Бихме могли миролюбиво да избегнем противоречието, като приемем, че първата теза се отнася само за физическото съществуване на човека, а втората – за неговата духовна същност. Тоест да припишем на Пърс имплицитен картезиански дуализъм. Примерите, които авторът дава, на пръв поглед насочват именно към такава интерпретация. Но тя не е подкрепена от фактите. Във философията на Пърс няма нито едно доказателство за наличието на картезиански или какъвто и да е друг вид дуализъм. Дори и да не вземаме под внимание множеството директни антидуалистични изказвания на Пърс, лесно ще забележим, че неговото мислене е изцяло триадично. Той смята, „че докато не е възможно да се образува чиста триада от каквато и да е модификация на диада, без представяне на нещо, което е напълно различно по природа от единица и диада, то четири или пет или всеки по-голям брой може да бъде формулиран от просто усложнение на три" (W6: 174). Неговите доктрини за категориите, за знаците, класификациите му на науките доказват това.

Много по-продуктивно би било да интерпретираме двете тези не като взаимноизключващи се възможности, а като етапи, съответстващи на Пърсовите категории Първичност, Вторичност и Третичност. Досега са правени няколко опита концепцията на Пърс за личността да се разглежда в

контекста на неговата фанероскопия[3] (Muoio 1984; Aydin 2009), но никой от тях не е доведен докрай.

Категориите са универсалните концепции на битието, крайните родове или идеите, до които може да се сведе всеки обект на познанието. Според Пърс думите „качество", „реакция" и „посредничество" най-точно изразяват значението им, „но когато става въпрос за научни термини, Първичност, Вторичност и Третичност са за предпочитане, защото са напълно нови думи и не предизвикват никакви погрешни асоциации" (CP 4.3).

Една от по-пространните дефиниции на категориите гласи:

> Категорията „Първичност" представлява идеята за това, което е такова, каквото е, независимо от каквото и да е друго. Това е, така да се каже, качеството на чувството.
>
> Категорията „Вторичност" е идеята за това, което е такова, каквото е като второ по отношение на някое Първо, независимо от каквото и да е друго и особено, независимо от каквото и да е правило или закон, въпреки че би могло да потвърждава някакъв закон. Това е, така да се каже, Реакцията на един елемент от някой феномен.
>
> Категорията „Третичност" е идеята за това, което е такова, каквото е едно Трето, или един посредник между Вторичност и Първичност. То е, така да се каже, представянето на един елемент от някой феномен. (CP 5.66, преводът е според Младенов 2011: 129.)

Първичност е нещото в себе си, качествената непосредственост. Вторичност е съпротивляващото се, бруталното противостоене. Тя е близка до това, което в съвременната хуманитаристика се нарича „другост". А Третичност е междулежащото, динамичното опосредстване.

От това кратко представяне на Пърсовите категории не е трудно да забележим, че установената личност със своя акцент върху реакцията, сблъсъка съответства на категорията Вторичност, а флуидната личност, чиято основна характеристика е свързването, сливането – на Третичност.

Липсващото звено

В представената дотук картина обаче липсва съответствието на Първичност. И това е напълно разбираемо. Дефиницията и на трите категории е крайно абстрактна (неслучайно Пърс предупреждава аудиторията си, че неговите категории са *идеи* (а не *обекти*), които са „толкова общи […] че трябва да изглеждат неясни" (NEM 4: 332), но най-неуловимата и трудна за илюстриране е именно Първичността. Това се дължи на нейната същност. Тя може да е в сферата на чистите чувства, на чистите цветове, на чистите аромати, изобщо на всичко, което е такова, каквото е, преди да бъде въплътено в нещо друго. Първичност би била идеята за чисто качество, да

[3] Така Пърс нарича доктрината си за категориите.

кажем – „черност“. Но ясно е, че качеството не съществува извън обекта, в който е въплътено. „Черността“ няма как да бъде разбрана сама по себе си. Друг пример е чувство, в което „няма сравнение, отношение, разпозната множественост (тъй като частите биха били различни от цялото), няма промяна, няма въображение за каквато и да е модификация на позитивното в него, няма рефлексия – няма нищо освен просто положително качество“ (CP 5.44). Очевидно такова чувство не може да съществува и да бъде описано, преди да се превърне в нещо друго. За това е нужно второ, в което то да се въплъти, а след това и трето, което да ги свърже. Първичността предполага Вторичност, а тя – Третичност. С други думи, „да познаем Първичността на Аза означава да го видим в пълната му уникалност и качествена цялост“ (Colapietro 1989: 74), като го абстрахираме от всичките му връзки и взаимодействия с външния свят. А това на практика е невъзможно, защото според Пърс Азът се открива и развива именно чрез взаимодействието му с външната действителност.

Все пак в текстовете на Пърс има достатъчно индиректни податки за наличието в структурата на личността и на Аз, съответстващ на категорията Първичност (ще го наречем чист Аз), например: „…хората са егоисти, т.е. заблуждават се, че съществуват изолирано. Но до известна степен наистина съществуват така“ (CP 8.82). Изразът „до известна степен“ тук означава „не напълно“, с което Пърс още веднъж подчертава, че абсолютната изолираност е невъзможна, но също и „донякъде“; в контекста на настоящото изследване бихме могли да добавим: „само на нивото на чистия Аз“. И още един пример от съчиненията на Пърс: „Опитът на отделния човек е нищо, ако остане изолиран. Ако някой вижда нещо, което другите не могат да видят, говорим за халюцинация. Трябва да се мисли не за „мой“, а за „наш“ опит. Това „ние“ има неограничени възможности“ (CP 5.402, бел. под линия 2). Това откъснато от опита на „ние“, изолирано и ограничено Аз е възможно най-близо до категорията Първичност.

Нарастващият Аз

Винаги, когато пише за отделния изолиран човек, който не е част от общност, Пърс подчертава неговата слабост и ограниченост. Оставането на нивото на чистия Аз той оценява като погрешно и неестествено. Така стигаме до следващия важен въпрос: Какво е отношението между условно наречените от нас чист, установен и флуиден Аз? Директен отговор на този въпрос от трудовете на Пърс не получаваме. Но ако структурата на личността според неговата философия съответства на категориите му, както изследването дотук показа, то логично би било трите лица на Аза да се отнасят едно към друго по същия или поне по приблизително същия начин, както Първичност, Вторичност и Третичност.

Трите категории на Пърс по дефиниция се съдържат в акта на познание за всеки феномен. Те са неразделни една от друга, като във всеки кон-

кретен случай някоя от тях доминира над останалите. Чистата Първичност, Вторичност и Третичност са недостижим идеал. Освен това те са йерархично подредени. „Няма Третичност без Вторичност, нито Вторичност без Първичност“ (De Waal 2001: 11). Идеята за Вторичност съдържа в себе си Първичност, но добавя нещо ново, а именно – втория елемент; идеята за Третичност включва Вторичност, но добавя още нещо – връзката между двата елемента.

Когато приложим тази постановка към идеите на Пърс за личността, се оказва, че трите лица на Аза всъщност са етапи, степени, през които последователно преминава личността при всеки допир с външната действителност. (Нека отново подчертаем, че личността се проявява единствено и само при взаимодействието ѝ с външната за нея действителност.) Но целият процес протича много бързо, трите състояния светкавично преливат едно в друго и на практика не могат да се отделят. Затова по-коректно би било да ги представим като три окръжности, вписани една в друга, които се появяват при всяко взаимодействие с външния свят. Централната, най-малката окръжност е чистият Аз, средната е установеният, а външната – флуидният. Първият е ядрото на личността, вторият осигурява запазването на нейната уникалност, докато чрез третия се осъществяват връзката със заобикалящия ни свят и превръщането на Аза в органична съставна част на други личности. Всяко следващо ниво съдържа в себе си предишното, но добавя и нещо ново. В такъв случай флуидният Аз въплъщава най-пълно идеята на Пърс за личността, защото съдържа в себе си другите две лица. Той е най-важен и поради друга причина. От така изведената структура следва, че „това, което наричаме идентичност, никога не е напълно установено множество от взаимодействия, управлявано и регулирано от определени навици, закони или идеи“ (Aydin 2009: 426). То непрекъснато се променя и развива, и то именно благодарение на третото ниво. То отваря Аза за всевъзможни комбинации с други и за създаването на нови личности, които от своя страна също могат да се комбинират, и така процесът продължава непрестанно, подобно на безкрайния семиозис на Пърс.

Щом личността е сноп от навици, то с всяко придобито ново познание и нов навик Азът се увеличава, и то именно в третия си, най-широкия кръг – останалите два не се променят. Така нарастването на познанието осигурява и нарастване на отделния Аз, и на възможностите му да образува нови личности. Разбира се, възможно е и обратното – ако навиците намалеят, Азът да се стесни и да изчезне. Но според еволюционната космология на Пърс Вселената се развива от тотален хаос към абсолютен порядък и някой ден в необозримото бъдеще „светът ще се превърне в напълно съвършена, рационална и симетрична система, в която умът най-накрая е кристализирал“ (W8: 110). Тогава ние ще имаме точния навик за действие при всяка ситуация, нашият Аз, който по дефиниция е сноп от навици, ще се разшири неимоверно и цялата Вселена ще се слее в една-единствена гигантска и съвършена личност.

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THE THREE-FACED SELF IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES PEIRCE

Andrey Tashev

Abstract

The article interprets Charles S. Peirce's ideas on the self in the light of his doctrine of categories. Peirce's views on the person are scattered as particular fragments in his publications and manuscripts. In these fragments, however, we find ostensibly contradictory statements, such as: the self is the sum total of characteristics by means of which an individual is recognized as being unique, and "your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe" (CP 7.571). These statements go to their proper places when we use Peirce's phaneroscopy as an interpretative key. Thus, the inquiry in this article reaches the concept of a triadic structure of the person. Each of the three levels, or faces of the self (called *pure*, *fixed* and *fluid* here) correspond to one of Peirce's categories Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. The last section of the article discusses the relations between these three faces and shows how and why they make growing of the person possible.

THE TRIADIC SIGN RELATIONSHIP IN CARNEADES' AND PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY, AND ITS TREND IN THE HISTORY OF SEMIOTICS

Mihály Szívós

It seems to be a widely accepted fact that theoretical semiotics consists of three sub-disciplines (Posner, Robering and Sebeok, eds. 1997). This triadic division was introduced by the semiotician Charles Morris, a follower of Charles Sanders Peirce. The germ of this conception can also be found in Peirce's writing, although it could not be proven that Peirce would have given only three sub-disciplines in his semiotics in his final period. One of the main objectives of this study is to examine the correctness and sufficiency of these divisions. Otherwise, this triadic structure has spread very quickly within both linguistics and logic. It is worth investigating the rationality of this division as, if one sees the division of other sciences every fifth year, we can see considerable changes within their structures. That is why the internal division of semiotics, including theoretical semiotics, ought also to be examined from time to time. Perhaps it is high time we also reconsider the structure of theoretical semiotics.

Actually, theoretical semiotics deals mainly with the sign relationship. If one looks at the application of semiotics in very different fields, the picture is much more multicoloured. The realm of descriptive semiotics, which is extensively cultivated in ethnography, folklore, socio-semiotics and in the different fields of arts, also seems to be immense. Systematicity can mainly be based on theoretical semiotics: if there are incorrect concepts and there is also considerable disorder there, it also exerts influences on applied and descriptive semiotics.

As biosemiotic research proves, the sign relationship is much older and earlier than human language and speech. Much before the appearance of humans, species within the animal world followed signs and that determined their behaviour and survival. The word is not a sign in itself, nor a model of sign as it developed from the biological variants of sign. A word or a sentence constitutes a sign only if they become themselves parts of sign relationships. It very often happens to a word that it enters a sign relationship. There are, however, situations where a word is not a sign. Ontologically, the sign relationship preceded the emergence of human language and speech, moreover, the latter could develop only due to

the former. That is why it is wrong to take the word, the language as the starting point of theoretical semiotics and to consider it as a sign model.

In the history of semiotics, two parallel traditions or trends formed from the earliest times. In one of them, the sign relationship is based on language, on the word as a sign model, as Augustinus already indicates. In his semiotics, a significant change took place probably due to his conversion to Christianity. Earlier he was a follower of sceptic philosophy, and, consequently, he had to interpret the sign relationship in a more general way and using an epistemological background. His new standpoint of the word as the primary sign can be attributed to the influence of the Christian concepts according to which the words of the Bible are the signs of divine knowledge. For him, the Bible had a mediating role like the sign.

From this one-sided language-centred theory there will be a straight pathway to the communication-theory concept of semiotics seen in later centuries, which does not take into consideration the cognitive function of the sign relationship, or deals with it except within the communication process. Contrary to this, the other, the epistemological line in the history of semiotics has interpreted the sign relationship more generally, giving greater attention to signs outside language. The sign relationship in this other trend has been modelled at an epistemological level. That is why this trend has been able to integrate the whole cognitive function of sign relationships.

Fundamentally, the triadic (three-component) character of the sign relationship indicates that it consists of three sub-relationships. From the three sub-disciplines of semiotics, semantics is centred around the relationship between the object and the sign. Pragmatics deals with the relationship between sign and the interpreter or sign-user. There is, however, a third sub-relationship which has no sub-discipline in Morrisian semiotics. Syntactic cannot be this third sub-discipline as it examines the relationship between signs and not their parts. Thus a sub-discipline, or at least its name – the theory of meaning – is missing from present theoretical semiotics, which ought to deal with the third sub-relationship within the sign relationship. This sub-relationship occurs between the interpreter or sign-user (his mind) and the object. Thus the Morrisian structure of semiotics is 2+1 sub-disciplines, and does not coincide with the triadic structure of the sign relationship.

It is a very old philosophical discovery that there is also a relationship between the human mind and sense impression, in addition to the other relationships between this impression and the object which caused it. This idea is, at the same time, the oldest correct formulation of the triadic sign relationship as one knows it today. The roots of this early concept of sign relationship go back not to the medieval but to ancient Greek philosophy. It is worth examining this first form, on the one hand, because it turns out that it emerged from an epistemological and not from a linguistic context. Thus this first formulation belongs to the trend of the epistemological sign model, and is, at the same time, its starting point in the history of the philosophy of sign and semiotics. On the other hand,

this formulation clearly expresses that the element mediating knowledge is that between the object of cognition and the human mind. In a sign relationship, this mediating function involves two sub-relationships: on the one hand, between the human mind and the mediating element, and, on the other, between this element and the object to be recognized. Finally, this old formulation shows that there are three components in this cognition process: the object, the mediating element which is the sense impression, and the human mind.

Carneades of Cyrene, the eleventh head of the Platonic Academy created the basis for the sign model of epistemological background. He realized first that a relationship exists not only between the object and the sense impression from it, but also between this sense impression and the human mind. Carneades was born in Cyrene in 214/3 and died in Athens in 129/8. He became a member of the Academy but was also serious student of stoic philosophy, especially that of Chrysippus (280/76–208/4 BC), the third head of the Stoic school. In 156/5 BC, Carneades with Diogenes of Babylon (c. 230–151/140 BC), head of the Stoic school, and Critolaos of Phaselis (c. 200–118 BC), head of the peripathetic school was sent as the Ambassador of Athens to Rome. He became very famous in the Roman empire as a result of two speeches made in Rome. In the first, Carneades spoke of the possibility of justice, the following day of its being impossible. He was a master of the arguing method for and against any given opinion, which had been elaborated and steadily improved in the sceptical period of the Academy (c. 268/4–84/3 BC). The sceptics used each good argument to support the opposite view, without judging one to be correct or better.

Many results of the sceptic Academy were born in sharp debates with other philosophical schools. That is especially true in the case of the discussion of the Academy with the Stoic school because its founder, Zeno of Cition (334/3–262/1 BC) who studied with the fourth head of the Academy, Polemon (c. 354–270/69 BC), claimed, against this school, that his own new school was the true adherent of Socrates (470–399 BC) and Plato (427–347 BC). That is why the sharp philosophical debates between the Academy and the Stoic school became permanent for over two hundred years. From the stoic faction, the most outstanding thinker was Chrysippus who philosophically re-founded the school, by renewing and improving its doctrines in every field. As with Zenon, he started his studies at the Academy. The debate between these schools especially sharpened in epistemology, and within it around the concept and cognitive value of sense impression – *phantasia* in Greek. The word *phantasia*, stemming from the Greek word *phaos* (light), had a completely different meaning in the *koiné*, the Greek language of the Hellenic period, when compared with the modern word "fantasy".[1] The sceptics doubted whether sense impressions could convey precise and reliable knowledge to the human mind.

[1] The English translation of *phantasia* is "sense impression" or "representation" or "presentation" in the recent literature. In my opinion, the "representation" is a wrong translation. I made the interpolations of [*phantasia*] in Carneades' thesis.

The academic adversary being worthy of Chrysippos appeared only after his era. Carneades believed his main task was to refute all the theses of this great stoic thinker. At the same time, he enlarged the scope of academic debate by criticising the views of all philosophical schools. He proved to be the most profound and most successful sceptic academic thinker. Unlike Plato, whose theory of ideas and epistemology were refuted not only by Speusippus (408–339/8 BC), his own nephew and successor as the next head of the Academy, but also by Aristotle, his most talented pupil, Carneades' philosophy was taught even by the third generation of pupils. Four of his personal pupils followed him as head of the Academy. Two outstanding personal pupils, Metrodorus of Stratoniceia (170/65 – died after 110 BC) and Charmadas (c. 168/7–95 BC) founded their own schools, presenting and developing the philosophy of their master. In antiquity, his extraordinary abilities and achievements were already well appreciated by contemporary philosophers and scholars who considered his leadership at the Academy as the overture of a new era, naming it the New Academy.

As Carneades did not write philosophical works, his three pupils, Clitomachus (187/6–110/109 BC), Zeno of Alexandria (2nd century BC), and Hagnon of Tarsos (2nd century BC) made summaries of his lectures and debates. From these works, fragments and compilations remained for the posterity, including the summing up which discusses the double relationship of the sense impression (*phantasia*). This thesis of extraordinary importance is in the *Against Logicians* by Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–210) who gave a summary of sceptic philosophies:

> The presentation [*phantasia*] is, then, the presentation [*phantasia*] of something, – of that, for instance from which it comes and of that in which it occurs; that from which it comes being, say, the externally sensible object, and that in which it occurs, say, a man. And, such being its nature, it will have two aspects, one in its relation to object presented, the second in its relation to the subject experiencing the presentation [*phantasia*]. (Sextus Empiricus 1935: 167–169)

Because of its mediating function in the epistemological process, the *phantasia* can also be considered as a sign of the object of cognition. Thus this thesis also gives the description of the two kinds of relationship of sign in an epistemological context. Examining these two relationships more exactly, three elements constituting a triadic relationship can be seen, which contains the former two. Carneades named these elements as follows: man, the object of cognition and *phantasia* which mediates between the former two, linked to both of them. Semiotically speaking, Carneades grasped just two (sub-)relationships serving as the bases for semantics and pragmatics. It follows from this triadic construction that each element is linked to the other two elements via two sub-relationships, as there are two legs at every vertex of a triangle. The third sub-relationship is between the man and the object of cognition, in which it gives context to the meaning.

Moving away from extremely radical scepticism, Carneades also discussed meaning because he turned more and more towards probability theory, suppo-

sing that there are sense impressions (*phantasia*) enabling real knowledge, that is, having real meaning. The sense impression conveying real meaning to the human mind was called by Carneades *phantasia pithané*. The conception of the Carneadesian *phantasia pithané* clearly shows, that taking into consideration the necessity of meaning in a triadic relationship, also inspired the great sceptic philosopher to transform his radical scepticism into a probability theory. Separating very clearly existence and consciousness, thus refuting the immediate identity of which had an outstanding role in ancient Greek philosophy, the Carneadesian thesis of the double relationship of sense impression (*phantasia*) is also important from an epistemological point of view. Therefore Carneades' thesis is also of extraordinary importance as it decisively refutes the immediate identity of existence and consciousness or its closer variants, which began to spread from the appearance of Parmenides' and Zeno's doctrines onwards. That enables the philosophical elaboration of individuality at the level of cognition and knowledge and opens the way to the multiple division of human knowledge. All that makes the gradual building up of the concept of personality possible, which supposes an individual, internal intellectual world for each person.

In the Middle Ages, this great philosophical achievement of the sceptic Academy could not exert any influence on scholastic and non-scholastic philosophy and philosophical logic as the all-embracing Christian reception of the Platonic-Aristotelian heritage made it impossible. According to recent literature, Sextus Empiricus' name was first mentioned only in 1441 in a letter of a humanist scholar named Filelfo (Floridi 2002: 28). From this time onwards, the philological traces indicating the study of his works were slowly growing. Sextus Empiricus' works were published relatively late in printed form (1562 and 1568). These editions guaranteed quite late on that the two main trends of ancient scepticism, that of the academic variant and that of the Pyrrhonian, could spread throughout Europe.

On the basis of his texts, it seems to be obvious that Peirce was not aware of the Carneadesian thesis because he probably did not read Sextus Empiricus' summing up. The question is brought up as to how he arrived at the concept of the triadic sign relationship and how he joined the epistemological trend of sign relationship. The details of this problem cannot be discussed in the framework of this paper in detail, that is why I can only emphasize the fact that the thesis *aliquid pro aliquo* (something stands for something) which was very well known in the Middle Ages (Nöth 2000: 8) refers only to the semantic sub-relationship linking the object with the sign. The other sub-relationship serving as basis for pragmatics, however, had already been established in the other branches of philosophy as a special and individual relationship of mind to experience and sense impressions as the concept of personality was known and extensively used. Further, Peirce was very familiar with the Humean variant of scepticism based on ancient scepticism.

He could mostly rely on these philosophical antecedents when he criticised Kantian epistemological construction, excluding the thing in itself from it. Within his philosophy, he made it possible with this act for sense impressions

to have individual objects as their denotatums, which constitute the elements of the external world. Thus it was an essential aspect of Peirce's semiotics and philosophy that their starting point was not language but the epistemological model of the sign relationship. This very general sign model enabled Charles Morris to involve the phenomena of the living world into semiotic analysis, initiating biosemiotic research in that way, an important step which would have been almost impossible from the point of view of language-based semiotics. His Hungarian pupil, Thomas A. Sebeok continued exploration in this important field.

The idea that the triadic sign relationship, consisting of three sub-relations, and, consequently, semiotics needing three sub-disciplines – excluding syntactic from this triad, – cannot be found in Peirce's semiotics. From the notion of the three-component model, however, this division immediately follows. Thus in addition to the sub-disciplines – semantics and pragmatics, attached to the sub-relationships, and the theory of meaning, syntactic is already the fourth, so a structure of 3+1 presents itself. As the example of mathematics or logic demonstrates, the number of new fields and sub-disciplines steadily grows, nor is it worth keeping the old division of 2+1 in semiotics. The new results, sooner or later, also require the acknowledgement of new fields and sub-disciplines in theoretical semiotics.

Both in linguistics, and logic and semiotics, much knowledge has accumulated in sub-disciplines such as semantics, pragmatics, the theory of meaning and syntactic. In parallel, the appearance has arisen of independent sub-disciplines impinging upon other disciplines. It is worth taking into consideration that if semantics, pragmatics and syntactic constitute separate and independent sciences, then linguistics, logic and semiotics are unified by them. Whereas these latter are considered as separate and independent sciences, it is better to indicate the former as linguistic, logic and semiotic semantics, pragmatics and syntactic, respectively.

My introductory thesis highlighted the link between triadic – three-component – sign relationship and the possible division of theoretical semiotics into three sub-disciplines (semantics, pragmatics and the theory of meaning). I have explained that the germ of the idea of triadic sign relationships stems from Carneades, the outstanding leader of the sceptic (New) Academy. His theory of the double relationship of the sense impression (*phantasia*) was the starting point of the trend of epistemological sign model, which enabled a more general approach within theoretical semiotics, contrary to the language-based semiotics established first of all by Augustinus. I have pointed out that three sub-disciplines from which one is connected to each sub-relationship, respectively, better fit into a theoretical semiotics of the triadic sign model. Syntactic being the sub-discipline of the relationships between signs does not have a link to the internal structure of a sign relationship itself and thus constitutes the fourth sub-discipline. The conservative conception concerning sub-disciplines is better supported by the trend of the language-based sign model and thus it distorts theoretical semiotics which needs a new structure.

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Abstract

The study aims at examining whether it is pertinent to maintain the old division of theoretical semiotics into three sub-disciplines (semantics, pragmatics and syntactic). It discusses the epistemological sign model and its philosophical and semiotic history in order to solve this problem. This sign model which stemmed from Carneades of Cyrene, the outstanding leader of the sceptic (New) Academy in the second century BC was the germ of the idea of triadic sign relationships. His theory of the double relationship of the sense impression was the starting point of the trend of epistemological sign model, which enabled a more general approach within theoretical semiotics, contrary to the language-based semiotics established by Augustine and some thinkers of Middle Ages. The Carneadean epistemological model consists of three elements: object of sense impression, the sense impression itself, and a man who initiates this relationship which is at the same time a sign model, too. Charles Sanders Peirce, American philosopher and semiotician also used this sign model, introducing the separation of sign vehicle and meaning as two parts of sign. From the Carneadean-Peircean model, the necessity of the existence of three sub-disciplines follows and each of them would pertain to a sub-relationship within the sign relationship. Three sub-disciplines from which one is connected to each sub-relationship, respectively, better fit into a theoretical semiotics of the triadic sign model. Syntactic being the sub-discipline of the relationships between signs does not have a link to the internal structure of a sign relationship itself and thus constitutes the fourth sub-discipline. The conservative conception concerning sub-disciplines is better supported by the trend of the language-based sign model and thus it distorts theoretical semiotics which needs a new structure.

MOTION AND THOUGHT. A GENERIC METAPHOR

Ivan Mladenov

> Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us. (CP 5.289 fn.)

This footnote, hardly two-lines long, which appeared in the "Four Incapacities Claimed for Men" can be easily attributed to Peirce's reading of Berkeley or dismissed as insignificant. It is a footnote marked solely by an asterisk. Linguistically, it is a simple comparison, framed by two big elements bound by the conjunction "just as".[1] In fact, it is a variant of a frequent and powerful metaphor which can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle.

However, it did not emerge in Peirce's review-article "Frazer's *The Works of George Berkeley*" (1871) but in the earlier essay "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" from 1868. The text generating the footnote supposedly clarifies the nominalism of Berkeley. Peirce's concern with the nominalists is important for a number of issues in the interpretation of his own thought, but the focus of the present article is not on the arguments he debated. We will concentrate on the metaphor itself, its immediate contexts, and the consistency wherein its three elements appear: body, mind, and motion. Do they bear more than just a higher expressiveness? Do they indicate something constant that must be "imprinted" in the reader's consciousness, or is Peirce embedding a new meaning in an old metaphor? If the latter, does he achieve new results?

The immediate reference to the footnote is this: "At no one instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the relation of my states of mind at different instants there is" (CP 5.290). Cognition arises only if it includes *relation* that is *generality*, this is what Peirce establishes. The real generality correlates the instances of mind in any act of knowledge. It embraces them into wholeness (thought) that closes the cognition act. In the passage that precedes the one discussed here, Peirce clarifies the three functions of thought: representational, relational, and qualitative. A shared characteristic is their existence. During his lifetime his view about the three elements in the act of cognition

[1] In the present article I will refer to it as a footnote and as a metaphor.

did not change. He gradually conceded reality to Thirdness, than to Secondness, and finally to Qualia (Firstness). Yet, only Secondness is said to necessarily *exist*.

Peirce sees the inadequacy in the treatment of the real and existing as the key nominalistic problem, where the distinction between the representation in mind and the reality of the external objects has not been resolved. In the text under discussion he stresses the real nexus which brings one thought into relation with another (CP 5.290). But what does the footnote stand for? It oddly refers to thought as unknown wholeness or as universe for itself. The metaphor is surprisingly vague and points at the meticulous explanation in the text, but also carries on reminiscences of the Berkeleyan "thinking minds", "souls" or "spirits". Was it at all meant to contribute to a clarification? Or, was this loose comparison merely dispersing and dissolving the details of the text into much broader associations from the footnote? And what were these?

Following Peirce, we will proceed to draw a hypothetical conclusion: although Peirce might have had Berkeley's nominalism on his mind in this footnote, he embedded in it an entirely new concept on thinking as a triadic process. By rearranging its well-known components, Peirce empowered the metaphor's enormous potentiality to summarize and abstract the thought relation. The metaphor was employed in both a traditional and innovative way: as a common speech figure, and as a tool for modifying a new concept. In the sentence under discussion Peirce elucidates the connectedness of instances of mind as the only condition wherein knowledge occurs – but he also goes a step further, introducing continuity as necessary condition for the same process. Generality must embrace the tri-lateral unity of thought. Only then does the act of knowledge take place and start to flow as a continuous process. The explanation supports the last of the four big denials stated in the beginning of the essay: that we have no conception of the absolute incognizable. It was famously rejected by claiming that no actual thought unmediated by another thought can have any meaning without being represented by subsequent thoughts. When representation is mediated by an effective force "behind consciousness" knowledge begins to flow in a continuous stream. But what is this force and how does it act? We may only guess that it might be the Aristotelian innate pursuit of knowledge; some bioelectrical stimuli, produced by the "circuit" of all participants wired in the chain; or the force runs as a molecular model, where the movement springs up from the difference of gravities and distances of the elements. However it might be, the rule is that all components must work simultaneously. They need not only to be present, but an inward vibration must link them together to ensure a permanent run.

Are there other passages in the essay where analogous figures appear? No need to go further than to the previous sentence to find such: "But this is a fallacy similar to saying that, if in no one of the successive spaces which a body fills there is room for motion, there is no room for motion throughout the whole" (CP 5.289). Again, the same three components – the body, the movement, and the motion combined to visualize the continuity, which is the "upper" layer of thinking. And a bit further: "There is some reason to think that, corresponding

to every feeling within us, some motion takes place in our bodies" (CP 5.293). The contextual surrounding similarly emphasizes continuity as the condition for a cognition process to begin.

This essay contains a number of issues upon which Peirce worked through his lifetime: on the thought-sign and a man as a sign; on thinking as a train of signs; on continuity and the tri-relational nature of thought processes; on the quality of sign and the representational function of thought; on words which are not that different than humans; on the hypothesis, etc. Although the topics here are in an embryonic stage, they clearly show all the characteristics of their later versions. Peirce groups them together in triads similar to the one of the footnote metaphor. The metaphor enables him to enhance their expressiveness to extremes. The entire list above is a good example: the relationship between thinking and sign becomes "thought-sign", "man as sign", "train of signs", later – "semeiosis". The notion of continuity developed towards the synechistic doctrine from his cosmology, and the one of hypothesis evolved to the concept of abduction.

Does Peirce consistently use equivalent figures in the review-article on Berkeley's translation by Alexander Fraser? Why did we say at the beginning that the footnote is, at first sight, attributable to Berkeley? In this essay Peirce argues with the nominalist "cliff" between external and existing which stops Berkeley's realism from advancing beyond the realisms of Ockam and Scotus. According to Peirce, this comes from the inability of Berkeley to admit realness to generality. If generality is not real then existence is attributable to singular objects only. General types or laws as mental constructions are excluded, so they do not have real existence. On this occasion Peirce proceeds to make his distinction of what is real and what is existent in order to surpass Berkeley's collapse of the former into the latter. In fact, Berkeley made some concession to his own claim by saying that he is opposing the existence of Locke's *abstract* general ideas only. He allows that abstract ideas can be mere signs of particulars and even that a sign can stand for more than one particular idea. Yet, he still rejects any possible connectedness between ideas. For him, ideas are inert and "visibly inactive" (Berkeley, Sec. 25: 160). Therefore, the connection between them does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but is only a mark or a sign, which the objects signify. For this reason he made his turn to the sign notion and to the combination of effects and action which becomes knowable if this combination is made by rule and with "wise contrivance" (Berkeley, Sec. 66: 177). The "wise contrivance" cannot be found in the external objects, though, but in the "free spirits" again.

Berkeley employs the three elements: body, motion, and mind (rarely thought) throughout his treatise[2] and even more frequently in the dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. There is barely a page without him bringing the elements together to illustrate his chief argument that they exist in the mind only. He asks, for example: "Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion

[2] *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710.

... shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object? (Berkeley, Sec. 14: 156). Then he goes even further by doubting it can be claimed a body is in motion at all, moved by any force. He argues that we rather see it changing its distance, though we do not see any force applied to it: "As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore itself in motion" (Berkeley, Sec. 113: 196). The examples with the triple relation figure pile up to strengthen his famous rejection of the existence of matter out of mind. His metaphor is finally embraced and shaped by a higher mind. The material thing (a body) in its only existence as idea will last as long as some mind perceives it. However, its permanent existence is secured in the mind of God. Bodies and movement exist within a thought, a giant pre-thought, His thought.

But this is not the entire truth and Peirce argues with such oversimplification of Berkeley's view on the material thing, summarized usually as follows: "if every mind ceases to think it for a while, it ceases to exist". As he remarks, for Berkeley the thing obtains its existence in the mind, but it is not dependent on the thought about it, being composed as a thought through its correlation with experience in general. The reality of sensible things resides in God's mind as forms of archetypes. For Peirce this is only a platonistic attempt to avoid the problem where knowing the divine mind also requires generality in terms of analogy, relation or symbol.

Whatever arguments Peirce brings out against Berkeley's nominalistic platonism, idealism, and Scotistic realism, he is crediting him for his individualistic pragmatist view and for his semiotic insightfulness. And he continues to explore the same metaphor from the footnote for different purposes. Its configuration varies but the elements remain the same: body, motion, and thought. As we said, the two big parts of the footnote joined with "just as" are clearly a comparison. Yet, with only an adverbial and a conjunction ("in thought") Peirce created a captivating metaphorical expression – we are inside of thought. Did he imply that thoughts are lightning-fast flashes shed over massifs of comparisons, relations, and correlation, stored in the brain, arriving at conclusions which otherwise seemed to be reached after a long process of reflection? We have good reasons to assume so, while just reading the following:

> The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation. (CP 5.181)

Although this is from his later writings on pragmatism, the components and the meaning of the metaphor remained unchanged. This is even clearer from the way Peirce mastered the abductive syllogism emulating the way he used to combine the three elements in the analyzed metaphor. He inserts one of the components of the syllogism ("we") into a quite unusual place, as a conclusion, rather

as a premise, so that it strikes the routine perception: "we are in thought". Thus, instead of being placed under God's ultimate "archness", thought becomes a vibrant and active part of the wholeness of the metaphor. Thought is now not finishing the metaphor's entirety, but flashes with the inward force of the triad. It grows wings to catapult the new meaning in it.

Where are those ratiocinations coming from? In the footnote Peirce pictured the thought in a similar fashion to Berkeley and gave no implication for any activity in it. We are inside thought, is what is being said, and the expression finishes. We can imagine that while being "in thought", the only thing we can do in order to produce another thought is to somehow "scratch" it out from the divine one. We can say so if we were under a strong Berkeleyan influence. Berkeley's loci: "within"; "framed"; "shaped" (always by Him) have literally encircled and sealed the elements of the metaphor. In other words, its "upper layer" is where the process ends, closed under an unknown "lid". This is why the other two elements remain passive, regardless of the fact that one of them is "motion". There is no inner power to move them. Their qualities are determined by His reason.

However, in Peirce's reasoning, for a thought to be perceived it must be, first, related to subsequent thoughts and second, to run in a continuous process. This is a moving, circulating, dynamic thought. As Douglas R. Anderson and Peter S. Groff noted (again in a footnote):

> Peirce's realism also tries to outflank the question of externality by understanding our ideas to be dimensions of a community of thought. Peirce often tried to get at this by stating that we are in thought; thought is not in us. (1998: 170)

And here is Peirce's view from the side of reality: "Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge" (CP 5.311). The notion of a community means "within the community of thought" – in other words, inside a manifold of thoughts. This is pretty similar to the way Peirce created another illustrious metaphor – on ideas in consciousness moving upward as if from a bottomless lake, where one idea is catching another so they move up towards a more vivid stage of knowledge. And here is the same view of him from the point of existence: "In this way, the existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community" (CP 5.316). Thus, "we in thought" is not the Berkeleyan thought, unmovable and passive; it is a diverse, and community determined, vivid thought that secures the unlimited growth of knowledge. For the sake of justice, we can remark here that Berkeley's frequent attempts to exchange "thought", "mind", "free spirits" in the metaphor maybe show his struggle to make it more dynamic. In other words, Berkeley was not thoroughly "Berkeleyan".

We can speculate on whether Peirce was indeed not trying to continuously use the same metaphorical "shell", inserting in it new elements: sign (instead

of body); material character of it (motion) and relation (thought). Cause-action is not excluded. The elements change places but the conditions of relation and continuity remain. We can also apply a similar analysis of the same metaphor to Hume and Locke's work and see for not a big surprise that these authors have frequently employed it. But it will be another topic of a broader context. It is tempting though to find the same figurative ensemble in an unexpected thinking model, for example, in Wittgenstein:

> I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. (Wittgenstein 1969–1975: 152)

It does not seem that he contributed new meaning to the old metaphor in this rather "engineered" construction. But did we not say the same about Peirce? We would be advised to stop here and reaffirm our rule-conclusion, based on accumulated cases: the old and very powerful metaphor we discussed here can elevate thought to the unforeseen heights of human reason. It is capable of preserving and carrying on meaning in an embryonic stage to be revealed for a new interpretation. Peirce mastered it to signify with all three parts it possesses – as a fascinating composition for ideas to be developed by future minds. A truly generic metaphor.

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Abstract

This article presents the diachronic and synchronic context of a favorite quotation from Peirce on which I provided my comments. It appeared in a volume that has the same purposes, 91 Peirce scholars have been asked to select a favorite quotation from Peirce and provide their interpretations on it. I choose a quotation in which Peirce combines three elements: motion, body and thought in a surprising way. Although those elements were known by ancient scholars such as the British empiricists and others they were finally elevated by Peirce to a generic metaphor on the way he understood thinking process. It has been shown that this metaphor is a powerful devise for generating thought in dynamic dimensions.

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY NEOPRAGMATISM AND PROCESS PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF PEIRCE'S VIEWS OF CONTINUITY

Vesselin Petrov

1. Introduction: general comparison between pragmatism and process philosophy

Classical pragmatism has been exhausted at the end of 1940s and in 1950s; however, it has been unexpectedly revived in 1970s with new ideas and with the rediscovery of the original ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce. The result is that in the present days pragmatism has begun to be considered even as an alternative of the great divide between analytic and continental philosophy. More than that, the future of Western philosophy is viewed as a convergence of pragmatism, analytic philosophy and continental philosophy (Margolis 2010: X; Margolis 2006: 5–6, 9). Pragmatism itself – both classical and neopragmatism – is a multifarious stream of philosophy one of whose main parts is metaphysical pragmatism (pragmatism as an ontological theory of the nature of reality) (Rescher 2000: 55). In the present paper by pragmatism I shall have in mind namely that form.

On the other hand, there are recent claims that pragmatism together with process philosophy is the predominant American contribution to systematic philosophy (Rescher 2000: IX). Considering of pragmatism at an equally high level with process philosophy is not an occasional fact, because pragmatism since its very beginning is a philosophy of process though the concept of process and its relation with the events has not been investigated systematically by pragmatists. The first philosopher who systematically undertakes this task is Alfred North Whitehead whose great merit is the attempt for a first systematic reconsideration of all main philosophical problems from the perspective of events and processes on the basis of complete investigation of the structure of process (Whitehead 1978). Whitehead did not attempt to investigate the connection between his own systematic thinking and pragmatism; this task has been left for the next generation of philosophers and nowadays it has begun to be realized in the successfully developing form of pragmatism under the name of process pragmatism (Debrock 2003). The name itself suggests that it is a combination or at least a close interaction of ideas of pragmatism and process philosophy. Maybe it is

justified to think that even the whole contemporary neopragmatism is process pragmatism. The roots of such claim lie in the fact that the founders of pragmatism Peirce and James are at the same time predecessors of process philosophy (Griffin 1993). Contemporary process pragmatism rejects the false alternatives and erroneous dichotomies in the present day philosophy through a reconstruction of the way for further development of metaphysics in which the thread of the process pierces entirely its systematic model. Pragmatic process philosophy suggests a new understanding of nature and of the value of metaphysics through uniting the insights of traditional speculative philosophy and some of the contemporary confessions of its limitations (Rosenthal 2003: 19, 22).

In the present paper I will not consider the whole vast theme about similarities and differences between contemporary pragmatism and process philosophy; the aim of the paper is to focus on their comparison on the concrete topic of continuity – discreteness that is widely investigated by process pragmatism. The reason for that choice is that the investigation of this topic is an essential part of the investigation of metaphysical problem of time. The ideas of Peirce have greatly influenced contemporary pragmatists on that problem. Their arguments are based to a great extent on their interpretation of Peirce's views of continuity. I shall not consider Peirce's own views on the problem, because the evolution of Peirce's views of continuity has been widely investigated in pragmatic philosophy (Potter 1977, 1996; Murphey 1961: 260ff). As we know, Peirce with his teaching of synechism supports continuity and not discontinuity. In fact, there are a lot of similarities between Peirce's synechism and Whitehead's views though there is not direct influence of Peirce on Whitehead. The leading idea of Peirce's synechism is the idea of gradually emergence of ordered matter from the original chaos as "effete mind", as clusters of "lawfulness" in cosmos. This reminds us to Whitehead's idea of "concrescence" (Coppock 2008: 47; Whitehead 1978: 348–349). What has not been investigated enough up to now is, on the one hand, how Peirce's ideas has influenced contemporary pragmatic treatment of the dilemma of continuity – discreteness and how the present day process pragmatists combine Peirce's ideas with process philosophical ideas in their attempts to find a solution of that dilemma, and on the other hand, how process pragmatists attempt to reconstruct Whitehead's views on continuity and discreteness and if such attempts are successful. The investigation of these two problems will be enough for the achievement of the aim of the paper and forms its two main tasks that determine the corresponding structure of the paper.

2. Attempts of contemporary neopragmatists to combine Peirce's ideas with process philosophical ideas in their solution of the dilemma continuity – discreteness

The contemporary American philosopher Sandra Rosenthal inspired by Peirce's views explains the meaning of the durational stream of experience that is in the center of process metaphysics, and critically reconsiders many prob-

lems of contemporary pragmatic philosophy claiming that they would win from a change of perspective in the direction of pragmatic process philosophy. According to her the transition from temporality as a basis of valuable experience to process metaphysics as a basis for the understanding of the ontological character of experience is present in all pragmatic philosophers (Rosenthal 2003: 15). However Rosenthal thinks that though the common rejection of substantialistic metaphysics and though the common acceptance of the view of reality as dynamic and organismic, pragmatists and process philosophers go in a fundamentally different ways (Rosenthal 1996: 561). It is widely accepted in the circles of contemporary American pragmatism that pragmatists consider the problem of time seriously, but Whiteheadians do not take it seriously (Allan 2008: 329). Rosenthal claims that Whiteheadian philosophy and American pragmatism are two versions of contemporary process philosophy the differences of which are rooted in different intuitions of the nature of time and consequently in different perceptions of nature and interrelation of continuity, discreteness and contingency (Rosenthal 1996: 542). Whitehead's intuition of time is like a "fusion-together-of" elements in discrete atoms of actuality, while the pragmatic intuition of time is like a process of "emergence-of-elements-in" a dynamic continuum, like emerging "quasidiscretenesses" (ibid.: 553).

Rosenthal claims that for the pragmatists continuity is primary, while for Whiteheadians time is discrete. The process is understood as a concrescence of different past elements, as harmonizing of differences. The achieved as a result actuality has to be completely determined and as determined it should perish, so that a new process of actualization to begin. The arrow of time is determined by the contrast between the entirely determined and unchanging past and the new occasions that inherit it. Consequently, temporality is not a feature of the actual occasions, but their atomic succession gives rise to time (ibid.: 543). Rosenthal criticizes this view of time, because it means that change is not a process, but is an opposition between established definitenesses, and the novelty is possible only through the inclusion in time of something nontemporal. According to Rosenthal Whitehead's atomic theory of time is an example of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (ibid.: 553).

What is the reason for Rosenthal's position? She points that the sense of time flow embedded in the interpretative activity is at the same time a sense of the time dynamics of a process universe that includes our own dispositional tendencies or "living meanings" as inseparable part of it (Rosenthal 2003: 16). So, the reason is in the close following of Peirce's position and in not complete understanding of Whitehead's position. Whitehead has been motivated by the necessity to escape Bergson's duration without edges, the understanding of time as an absolute container and to ensure the arrow of time though the reversibility of the laws of science. However, the alternative of Bergson is not necessarily the idea of ontological discretenesses. The process metaphysics of pragmatism is structured through alternative decisions of the same problems that have motivated Whitehead. What is controversial is whether the completely constant,

completely determined, completely unchanged has its place in a view that takes time seriously, whether the ideas of constancy, invariability and determinacy are due to some firmly established habits of thinking that have to be left away (Rosenthal 2000: 20). This is a difficult problem. What is important for us is that classical American pragmatism suggests powerful means for moving beyond traditional alternatives and dilemmas. Rosenthal investigates the systematic nature of that structure as intertwined with the understanding of the role of the process that pierces it. For all pragmatists the structure of things as grasped by the knowing mind does not reach to anything more ultimate than process interactions of the timely based experience (Rosenthal 2003: 11, 15).

Robert Neville, another contemporary pragmatic philosopher, also attempts to combine pragmatism with process metaphysics. He objects to classical pragmatic understanding of time, but instead of pointing to "overfuturism" of pragmatism he puts stress on its "overpresentism". According to him the limitations of pragmatism are manifested more clearly in its theory of time, because pragmatism is a philosophy of the present and cannot support a serious theory of the temporal reality: it sees the future and the past as reduced to the present reality. According to Neville pragmatism is not able to cope with the temporal reality, because it reduced metaphysics to what follows the structure of the interpretation (Neville 1989: 50–51). However, the pragmatic radical reconstruction of the relations between continuity and discontinuity, potentiality and reality in thinking over the temporal dimensions of the past, the present and the future escapes these critics. Let me remind in this respect Peirce's analysis of time.

Peirce's understanding of time is closely intertwined with his understanding of continuity, because Peirce considers time as a model of all other types of continuity, as "the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86). Peirce's synechism, i.e. "the tendency to regard continuity, in the sense in which I shall define it, as an idea of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103), is a doctrine that is valid for the whole universe. Let me remind how Peirce himself introduces synechism in his work *Immortality in the Light of Synechism* (1893):

> The word synechism is the English form of the Greek **συνεχισμός**, from **συνεχής**, continuous. For two centuries we have been affixing –ist and –ism to words, in order to note sects which exalt the importance of those elements which the stem-words signify. Thus, materialism is the doctrine that matter is everything, idealism the doctrine that ideas are everything, dualism the philosophy which splits everything in two. In like manner, I have proposed to make synechism mean the tendency to regard everything as continuous [...]. I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it. (EP 2: 1)

Peirce insists that we have immediately to be conscious of the past in the process of its losing. If there were no such process of remoteness, then there would be a gulf between the past and the present and the consciousness of the

past (and consequently of the present) would be impossible. According to Peirce the existence itself of memory is an evidence for continuity, otherwise no one could have memory (Rosenthal 2000: 121).

Sandra Rosenthal stresses that according to Peirce we cannot be conscious of the present for a finite interval of time, but rather the present is connected with the past trough successions of infinitesimal steps. Saying that, it should be noted first that Peirce differentiates between a twinkling as a point of time and a moment as an infinitesimal duration. Peirce supports the view that even a point of time, one twinkling, as opposed to a moment as an interval, is not like cut with knife slice of time, but rather points of time are intervals every one of which can be understood as including beginning, middle and end. Consequently Peirce says that what is a present for our mind in every usual twinkling is everything that is a present in the course of the moment of happening of that twinkling. In this way, the present is half a past and half a future (ibid.: 121–122).

The radical meaning of Peirce's view can be understood in the way he rejects St. Augustine's position about time. St. Augustine claims that the present cannot have extension, because if it had, it would contain a small part of the past and a small part of the future. Analogously, the change cannot become in the present, because the change requires movement from a previous to a later stage, however, the present cannot contain an earlier and a later (St. Augustine 2000: Book 11, chapters 14–31). For Peirce a usual twinkling is not either an atomic point or atomic timeless duration, but is a measuring off of an infinitesimal duration of time as a unit. Peirce does not have in mind some time independence of the twinkling, and says that it is rather an absolute independence in some respects. The respects in which the twinkling is independent are functional. This is the beginning of the new at all in the temporal course of experience though this "beginning" consists in fact of infinitesimal intervals which are inherently continuous. Peirce stresses also that the achievement of new experience is never a momentary work, but is an event that takes time and that goes to the past trough a continuous process (Rosenthal 2000: 122–123).

There are some differences in the contemporary pragmatic philosophical literature interpreting the texts of Peirce. For example, Brian Noble points that at earlier stages of the development of Peirce's views of continuity (namely at his so-called Cantorian period) Peirce's definition of continuum has the same deficiency which he has found later in Cantor's definition: it presupposes that a continuum is composed of separate moments that are infinitesimally close to each other. Noble discusses the way in which Peirce has reached to the confession that an interval of time does not consist of multitude of moments. There are no real points or moments in a true continuum, but rather a multitude of possible points or moments, and this multitude exceed every non-enumerable multitude (Noble 1989: 161–171). On the other hand, Murray Murphey argues (Murphey 1961: 395) that the change of Peirce's conception of possibility is a result of his new concept of continuum, while Brian Noble claims the opposite. However,

both philosophers accept the existence of interrelation between Peirce's evolution of the conception of possibility and his evolution of the conception of continuity.

3. Attempts for process pragmatic reconstruction of Whitehead's views of continuum

There are two types of attempts in contemporary pragmatism to interpret and reconstruct Whitehead's views of continuum: one is from the perspective of continuity, the other is from the perspective of discontinuity. The motive for the first type of reconstruction comes from the inexplicit awareness of the problem that persists in the claim that every continuum is derivative from a sequence of discrete units. The American philosopher Jorge Nobo claims that if we do not interpret the extensive continuum as a metaphysical principle of Whitehead's philosophy, a difficulty appears in giving a meaning of the mutual immanence of discrete realities (Nobo 1986). Briefly speaking, it is not possible to understand adequately solidarity or continuity, or connectedness, if the extensive continuum is not given the ultimate metaphysical status opposed to the status of drawing an inference from the actual world (Rosenthal 2000: 16).

Nobo differentiates two meanings of the extensive continuum: the first is derivative, the second is metaphysically ultimate. The extensive continuum in the first sense is conditional and derivative from the flowing succession of actual occasions. The extensive continuum in the second and the most general sense is necessary and metaphysically primary in comparison with the first sense. It is something like eternal "receptacle" inside of which becomes a creative development of reality. It is not becoming, but all actual occasions become in it (Nobo 1986: 208).

In fact, Nobo makes a difference between two meanings of extensive continuum that could be understood as analogous to the two meanings of potentiality: the eternal potentiality or possibility and the "real" potentiality as conditioned by what is given by the actual world. He suggests a reconstruction of Whitehead that emerges from the problem of continuity and discontinuity though Nobo himself does not define it in this way. Perhaps the problem to which Nobo has directed himself can be expressed best with the help of Whitehead's expression "becoming of continuity". Whitehead says it in regard with time pointing that:

> The extensive continuity of the physical universe has usually been construed to mean that there is a continuity of becoming. But if we admit that 'something becomes', it is easy, be employing Zeno's method, to prove that there can be no continuity of becoming. There is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming. The actual occasions are the creatures which become, and they constitute a continuously extensive world. In other words, extensiveness becomes, but 'becoming' is not itself extensive. (Whitehead 1978: 35)

I agree with Sandra Rosenthal that the insight of Nobo here consists in the acknowledging of a problem if we accept the becoming of continuity from non-continuous ontologically discrete units (Rosenthal 2000: 17).

In the discussion of the required properties of continuum as metaphysical – properties that can explain connectedness of the discrete occasions – Nobo claims that though Whitehead's understanding of continuity as unlimited and infinitely divisible though undivided is enough for the consideration of the mutual immanency, it is not enough to explain "not just mere immanence but the mutual immanence of actual entities having non-overlapping extensive standpoints" (Nobo 1986: 220). In addition Nobo claims that "no explicit consideration of the properties in question is to be found in Whitehead's works" (Nobo 1986: 220).

Nobo constructs a property of the extensive continuum which takes into account the discreteness of actual occasions through an extension of the separateness of actual entities to separateness of extensive regions. Though the extensive continuum is divisible, due to its separable character it is actually divisible only into discrete or separate regions. Thus the separability of the extensive continuum ensures the metaphysical imposing of the discreteness onto all actual entities (ibid.: 223).

If the extensive continuum is accepted as primary, then the absolute discreteness can be preserved only be means of refusing of continuity in favour of contingency of discrete parts. The interpretation of Rosenthal who criticizes Nobo is that preserving the ontologically discrete units though the metaphysical priority of continuity, Nobo in fact again gives up continuity for the sake of discreteness, and as a result he rejects an insight which has a strong though inexplicit stimulus for his whole project. According to Rosenthal a sequence of contiguous and ultimately divided parts gives at best pseudocontinuity. The lack in Whitehead of including of separating properties for the extensive continuum or of the complex of events as their potentialities seems to be far from oversight. The considered attempt of Nobo for a reconstruction is indicative of the necessity to be present in Whitehead's orientation of something overcharged eternal which should overcome the difficulties at drawing nearer of the different components of the temporal. However, according to Rosenthal even a further overcharging of the eternal does not solve the problem of establishing continuity from ontologically discrete units, but rather introduces the problem again, though from a different direction (Rosenthal 2000: 17–18).

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Let me now consider the second type of attempts for a reconstruction of Whitehead's position. The problem of the reconstruction of the interrelation between continuity and discontinuity in Whitehead from the perspective of discreteness can be illuminated in the example of Donald Sherburne's reconstruction. He suggests a modification that enables the contiguous past occasions to be causally effective and consequently this modification does not require God

and the eternal objects. He suggests the possibility according to which in the moment in which an occasion ends and a next moment begins the first moment to be at the same time becoming and causing (Sherburne 1971: 220–223).

The contemporary process philosopher Lewis Ford objects to Sherburne's suggestion that such interpretation would mean that two occasions have to possess a common "point" of interaction, while Whitehead's theory of the outer relations of the discrete actual occasions means that two contiguous acts of becoming are so closed in time that there is no point between them and that they have no common area. Ford says also that it is not understandable that an occasion can continue to be present as a causal factor in its ultimate satisfaction, if it instantaneously ceases to exist at the end of the concrescence (Ford 1983: 326).

Sherburne's suggestion, though very different from Nobo's one, resembles to it in the fact that it is a reconstruction that has to mitigate the radical atomism of the actual entities in Whitehead's theory so that connectedness to have a sense. As with Nobo the answer is found in the contingency. However, while Nobo at the end transforms the continuum in contiguous units, so that discreteness to have its place, Sherburne transforms the discrete units in contiguous successions to escape the problems with the ontological gaps. As a result Rosenthal thinks that the first of them loses the true continuity, while the second of them does not reach it (Rosenthal 2000: 18).

Sandra Rosenthal underlines that according to Whitehead potentiality and actuality are fundamentally isolated. There cannot be any residuum of potentiality in the completely actual otherwise it would not be completely actual, completely definite. Actuality and potentiality are isolated mutually in a strange manner similarly to continuity and discontinuity; the past, present and future; neighboring and invariability. According to her the relation of the past to the present is constant problem in Whitehead's position (ibid.: 19).

In the formation of his position Whitehead has been urged from the necessity to escape Bergson's duration without edges, and to escape the understanding of time as an absolute container and the metaphysical divisions of his contemporary epoch, as well as to guarantee the arrow of time though the reversibility of scientific laws and though plurality of the systems of time in the theory of relativity. According to Rosenthal, however, it is not necessarily the alternative of Bergson to be searched by all means in the acceptance of the ontological discretenesses. It is not necessarily the alternative of time as an absolute container to be the emergence of time atoms as building elements of time. And it is not necessarily the alternative of the metaphysical divisions of the contemporary epoch to be the claim that the space-time point relations of science are obtained through extensive abstraction of space-time relations based on discrete units of duration. The alternative of the reversibility of time is not necessarily to include the absolute invariability or definiteness of time atoms that perish consecutively, so that to become an absolute immutable definite past. Rosenthal concludes that the problem is if our notions of constancy, immutability and definiteness devoid of any residuum of contingency and changing potentialities, of discrete

sequence of time atoms in contrast to the continuities of becoming, are due to firmly established habits of thinking that have to be abandoned if the time process has to say its proper word (ibid.: 20).

I agree with Rosenthal that indeed, it is not necessarily the alternative of Bergson's position to be in the above enumerated claims. The question, however, arises if Whitehead had really followed the described by Rosenthal alternative or the suggested by him alternative was a little bit different, i.e. if Whitehead was correctly understood.

One creative attempt to combine the pragmatic focusing on continuity with Whitehead's underlining (according to Rosenthal's interpretation) of atomicity can be found in the works of Robert Neville. He claims that the impossibility of all three modes of temporality – the past, the present and the future – to unite them into one is an illustration of an important characteristic of the general problem of the one and the many, which in the present context is translated in the problem of the relation of continuity and discontinuity. This fact can be illustrated more convincingly with focusing on his view of time, stemming from a slightly different direction than his understanding of the course of time as composed of time atoms. He declares that "there is a least unit of time in a thing's temporal flow" (Neville 1993: 97). For Neville an atomic indivisible unit of time is not pointlike, but is indivisible extension or temporal magnitude. He underlines that the course of time is smooth. "At no time is there a break between the finish of one emerging present and the beginning of the next; at the next time there is already a new emergent becoming. At no time is there a transitional bump from one present to the next" (ibid.: 105). In this way "The flow of time is continuous" (ibid.). This "emergence" of continuity from the connection together of atomic units is present in his claim that the atomic moments of the present become continuous when they are integrated from the past. However, Rosenthal thinks that the connection of atomic units can give only a pseudocontinuity of contiguous parts (Rosenthal 2000: 23).

Whitehead's ultimateness of the ontologically discrete reveals itself further in his characterization of two magnitudes of the richness of the world at the level of metaphysical abstractness. As time is ultimately composed of atomic building elements, so things in time are understood from the perspective of harmonies of infinite atomic components or units. Analogously, time is a conjunction of past, present and future. According to Rosenthal, in his attempt to synthesize the pragmatic and Whitehead's insights about continuity and discontinuity in a united position Neville ultimately has to fall inescapably into the one camp or in the other, because the insight of the first camp reject the insights of the second camp. The first one suggests the appearance of quasidiscretenesses in continuity, while the second one suggests a connection of ontological discretenesses for the constituting of pseudocontinuity. Both suggestions together are impossible (ibid.).

Though Neville's philosophy is impregnated with an insightful intuition of the difficulty for Whitehead to bring closer radically different aspects of time,

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nevertheless the necessity of bringing closer has never been questioned. The intuition of the connection of discretenesses has pervaded and has defined to a great extent Neville's philosophy itself.

4. Conclusion

The above analysis of the discussions of contemporary pragmatists on the dilemma continuity – discreteness displays, first, that these discussions are still at their height and hardly will go to some end, and second, that there is not enough understanding of Whitehead's position in the circles of a great part of contemporary pragmatists, though there is a clear awareness of the meaning of Whitehead's process approach and thought there is a willingness and many attempts for its mastering in the contemporary neopragmatic conceptions in the form of process pragmatism. Obviously the discussions will continue until finishing (if it will finish at all) of the process of that mastering. Such conclusion may sound a little bit pessimistic, however, the course itself of that process of discussion is a very clear evidence for the great meaning of Whitehead's conception of continuity and discontinuity and for its powerful influence on other contemporary philosophical trends, in particular, on neopragmatism.

On the other hand, let us remind again the prognosis for the future of pragmatism and of philosophy at all formulated by the American philosopher Joseph Margolis that the Europocentric philosophy of the new 21st century will combine its best opportunities for achievement of agreement between the main tendencies of pragmatism, analytic philosophy and continental philosophy (Margolis 2010: 47) and that if it succeed in achieving an Europocentric union of the continental themes and analytical strictness, then we shall be ready for conceptual inventions that are delayed maybe with some 50 years because of the tenacity of philosophy at the end of the 20th century (ibid.: 38–39). I would add that this would not be possible without the combination also with the efforts of process philosophy for a co-ordination of the main tendencies of pragmatism, analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. It is not an occasional fact that great hopes for the achievement of such coordination are reposed namely to process philosophy. The road for the achievement of that aim, however, is still long.

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Abstract

Pragmatism in the present days experiences a kind of renaissance and the interest in it has grown even so that the future of Western philosophy has begun to be viewed as a convergence of pragmatism, analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. It is due to a great extent to the rediscovery of the original ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce. On the other hand, analogous great interest has received the ideas of process philoso-

phy and in particular Whitehead's ideas. That is why the task naturally arises to make a comparison or even to combine ideas of both great trends in contemporary philosophy. This task has begun to be realized in the successfully developing contemporary form of pragmatism under the name of process pragmatism. It is not possible to trace out all aspects of the fulfillment of that task in one paper.

The aim of the present paper is to make a comparison of the ideas of pragmatism and of process philosophy on the concrete topic of continuity – discreteness, because this topic is widely discussed in process pragmatism. The arguments of contemporary pragmatists on that problem are based on their interpretation of Peirce's views of continuity. The aim of the paper divides into two tasks: first, how the contemporary process pragmatists combine Peirce's ideas with process philosophical ideas in their attempts to find a solution of the dilemma of continuity and discreteness, and second, how process pragmatists attempt to reconstruct Whitehead's views on continuity and discreteness.

The differences of Whiteheadian philosophy and American pragmatism are rooted in different intuitions of the nature of time and consequently in different perceptions of nature and interrelation of continuity, discreteness and contingency. Some American philosophers think that pragmatists consider the problem of time seriously, while Whiteheadians do not take it seriously, because for the pragmatists continuity is primary, while for Whiteheadians time is discrete. However, some pragmatists show not so good understanding of Whitehead's position. Whitehead has been motivated by the necessity to escape Bergson's duration without edges, but the alternative of Bergson is not necessarily ontological discreteness. There are two types of attempts in contemporary pragmatism to interpret and reconstruct Whitehead's views of continuum: one is from the perspective of continuity, the other is from the perspective of discontinuity. However, in the one case, a sequence of contiguous and ultimately divided parts gives at best pseudocontinuity, and the other case suggests only the appearance of quasidiscreteness in continuity. The analysis of the discussions of contemporary pragmatists on the dilemma continuity – discreteness displays, first, that these discussions are still at their height and hardly will go to some end, and second, that there is not enough understanding of Whitehead's position in the circles of contemporary pragmatists. The efforts for a fruitful combination or co-ordination of process philosophy with pragmatism should continue, though the road for the achievement of that aim is still a long one.

THE MYSTERIOUS CIRCLE OF UNDERSTANDING

Reni Yankova

Charles Peirce's philosophy is distinguished by its aim to establish a complete dynamic system of knowledge or actually several complete systems, according to Peircean researchers. The main axes of his philosophy are the concepts of sign, categories, habit, the method of pragmatism and evolutionary cosmology. His objective is to cover not only the multiple dimensions of experience, but also the possibility of the system's self-correction and improvement of its instruments by including new elements in line with current scientific discoveries. On that account, the system's foundation is not just the concept of the sign but the understanding of the relation between things existing in reality from the point of view of sign-processing. The sign-processing is simultaneously the bearer of something universal – which ensures global understanding – and of particularity – something representative of the specific sign. This is like the "billet" of the sign, which is completed once correlated to an interpretant in the process of semiosis. Peirce's concept of the sign grounds the "atomic level" and the "spirit" of that level of foundation is kept throughout all the higher levels of analysis. The atomic level is determinate for his "semiotics" and the higher levels, including that of the categories, are filled with the same conceptual understanding of the semiotic. Thus the sign in Peirce's philosophy could be compared to similar fundamental terms-concepts of other philosophers, such as Leibniz's monads, Schelling's key concept of the subject–nature relation, the British empiricists' ideas of the real and the existing or Kant's categories. Summarily speaking, Peirce's understanding of the sign is the concept of 'signification', being by itself a broader phenomenon, which represents his viewpoints in all the other analyses.

The dynamics of semiotic thinking and the sign in its capacity of a mediator between the mind and the outer reality, represent for Peirce the spiral in which knowledge is concentrated. He develops the conception of the sign with reference to the common denominator of activity, considering the active nature of external reality. That way Peirce puts an emphasis on the relations which the sign forms or is able to form. According to him: "Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C" (CP 1.346). Thus signification is not a direct relation between an external object and a sign. Rather, it is presumed by the function of the interpretant, which is itself a "series

of behavioural attitudes with which the perceiver should form a relation, so that he can understand the sign" (Mladenov 1991: 25). Peirce's semiotic doctrine is thoroughly analyzed by many scholars, but in the present paper, signification and its three elements will be scrutinized in the light of another, gratuitously neglected Peircean idea – namely, that of habit. Within Peirce's philosophical system, the term 'habit' should not be confused with the homonym used in everyday life. In the philosophy of Peirce, habit is a stable structure, facilitating the process of thinking. It is like a "furrow" through which thought flow before casting itself in the form of interpretants (its correspondent interpretations). It can be taken for a cliché or a mould; a model, arising out of the sustained use of repetitive thoughts which leave tracks – traces in the mind through which conclusions from interpretations are more easily reached. This customization occurs at the beginning of each and every new thought, which is rooted after some time and, stamped as a path, which is then ready for the next use. In that respect, every fluently expressed thought indicates that our mind has made use of a habit of thinking. The emergence of customization in the environment of an initial chaos means that a process of realizing the nature of that form of existence has started and this is the beginning of how the habit of thinking in a particular way is formed. Habit allows for knowledge to continuously expand by saving mental energy in daily life, offering to the mind "ready-made schemes" for understanding signs and undertaking actions in repetitive situations. It opens up the space for the evolution of thought, preserving mental energy, which can then be used for obtaining new meanings and discovering a new reaction under unknown circumstances.

Thus the present text poses three questions:

- Could it be that the concept of habit represents a new starting point for the understanding of the signifying process and its elements (sign, object, interpretant)?
- Could the concept of habit shed light on a problem: that of the essence and function of the two triads (immediate, dynamic and final interpretant and emotional, energetic and logical interpretant) deduced by Peirce?
- Is it possible to broaden Peirce's concept of the immediate object; through the idea of habit?

Peirce worked on the sign's nature and effects throughout his life, frequently revising his views. In his early years he was strongly influenced by the work of Kant, accepting some of his ideas concerning logic but rejecting the allegation of the unknowable essence of objects in themselves. Contrary to that allegation, Peirce adheres to the conception that everything is cognizable. Taking into consideration the dynamic nature of the outer reality, he emphasizes the connections that the sign forms or is capable of forming. Peirce defines the sign as follows:

> both a phenomenon and noumenon. It is not a priori provided, neither is coming into being out of the experience only. There is an initial moment when the sign embeds itself into the mind (of the new-born) in the form of "this (particular) sign"

> appertains to "this (particular) object" [...] The difference to the Kantian view is the assertion that every time we are thinking, an instantaneous analysis (by means of comparative operation) is going off, instead of predefined, thoughts to arise. (Mladenov 2011: 141)

With that view Peirce gives the concept for the sign its first significant move away from the static which is the premise for acknowledging continuous emerging of signs, Peirce's so-called 'infinite semiosis'.

In his early essays Peirce points out that all objects in reality, even those non-existent to the mind, can be included in the signifying process. Thus the whole world turns out to be built on representations, a view which has earned Peirce the title of 'representative philosopher'. In the essay "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" he forms the concept of the sign-founded thought: "whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign" (CP 5.283). Hence, the mere thought of an object turns that object into a sign, even though the object itself can exist no matter whether we think of it or not. In order to emphasize the correlation between the two phenomena, Peirce introduces the term 'thought sign', further concluding that all thinking is full of signs.

Yet the connection between thinking and the sign is insufficient for addressing the issue of the growth of knowledge. After a few centuries of attempts to formulate highly accurate (and often too complicated) explanations, Peirce's conclusion sounds short and to the point. He states that knowledge is accumulated due to the triadic correlations that the thought sign forms with its object and interpretant. Each thought sign is interpreted by a subsequent one, with the main characteristic of the thoughts themselves being their mutual engenderment. Semiosis does not represent a direct link between an external object and a sign; rather, it is presupposed by the role of the interpretant, being a psychic image, action or an attitude which is needed for understanding the sign. The interpretant provides the opportunity for affirming semiosis as an infinite process, because the interpretant and its changing of position is what allows for the other two elements to enter the next triad. The interpretant, for example, can become a sign with another object, engendering that way yet another interpretant, as an object itself can have different interpretants, depending on the situation, which makes the above-described process essentially endless. Or otherwise, thanks to the dynamics of the elements within Peirce's sign-model, the reality infinitely multiplies the signs representing it and the sign itself is no longer detached and passive, turning into an active element, capable of relating to infinite number of objects and interpretants.

In Peirce's semiotic system the concept of the interpretant is transformed and developed, taking the shape of two triads of interpretants which present a problem for researchers to the present day. We will approach the "mystery of the interpretants" in terms of its invariable core, although Peirce keeps elaborating on that idea almost to the end of his life. This invariable core is the statement

that the interpretant is a mental substance, which can exist as both a thought or a feeling. Here a note on the term "feeling" is needed – that term is to be understood not within its regular, everyday usage as an emotional phenomenon, but as a particular type of perception that is still unrealized and hence pertains to the realm of pure potential. Initially Peirce presumes that only current thoughts and feelings, which are becoming interpretants, are existent. Yet, such a concept limits the signifying process and its occurrence, to the here-and-now. What would then be the function of the phenomena which hold the potential of being signs that are yet to be spoken? In order to resolve that case, in his later essays Peirce develops that concept further by including *possible* interpretants. He kept on developing that idea of the interpretant, although in the meantime he established the doctrine of pragmatism and his series of metaphysical essays. In a letter sent to Victoria Lady Welby dated March 1909, Peirce deduces his first triad, distinguishing immediate, dynamic and final interpretant. "My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter" (SS: 111). The immediate interpretant is the pure potential of the sign for conveying meaning – a kernel out of which the significance could emerge. Still, that potential can remain unrealized since the existence of that particular interpretant is not dependent on external reality. It is not subject to that reality's conditions, being only the opportunity for the passing of a process of significance. Similar to everything that is in potential within the reality, the immediate interpretant can be updated by an external object or event. This is when it already becomes an active interpretant which is "a single, actual event" (SS: 111). According to Peirce, with the occurrence of each single act of signifying, the dynamic interpretant can be different since it is a "direct effect actually produced by a Sign upon an Interpreter of it" (SS: 110). Hence, a particular sign and object can have different dynamic interpretants, depending on the conditions under which they are fulfilled. Namely the dynamic interpretant is the one ensuring the continuous appearance of signs in the world or otherwise – the one ensuring the infinite semiosis.

To this point there are no contradictions arising from Peirce's concept of the different types of interpretants. There could hardly be an argument about the potential for signifying, regarding the phenomena, or about the fact that the same sign can convey different meanings, depending on the conditions and the interpreter. Yet the attributes used by Peirce for defining the essence and the function of the third type of interpretant, called by him "final interpretant" are not that explicit. In the same letter to Lady Welby, we read: "The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends" (SS: 111). And in another part of his works, it is defined as "the Final Interpretant, which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself to be related to its Object" (CP 4.536). Further, and immediately after this part, Peirce adds: "I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536). Nevertheless, how is the final interpretant to be conceived? If the dynamic interpretant is an independent current event, then "the final interpretant is a rule",

which could be formed as such in the interpreter (Deledalle 2000: 74). But still, provided that the sign is capable of conveying different meanings in line with the changes undergone in its dynamic interpretant, how is the existence of a permanent final interpretant, which is a rule, possible? In order for these two, ostensibly contradicting, theses to be explicated, our consideration of them should be broadened through some other Peircean concepts. Among these, a key one is Peirce's concept of the habit-taking tendency. It presents the natural drive of the mind towards setting thinking rules, and thence acting rules, aimed at saving mental energy in everyday life. Not only humans, but everything in the universe is subject to that principle. Yet the setting of habits or rules itself is in a state of potency: it may occur in regard to a certain event, or it may not. If we consider the final interpretant in the context of the habit-taking tendency, its controversy with the dynamic interpretant strongly decreases. "The final interpretant produces in the long run a habitual tendency" (Mladenov 2006: 45), while the dynamic one is a current event which already happened and respectively already determined the sign's meaning. Depending on its actuality, the final interpretant can result in the emergence of a habit (but this may also not be the case), which is potentially present. Thus the two theses are actually not contradictory to one another but actually complement each other. At this point we can draw the conclusion that the Peircean concept of the interpretant contains two potentialities and an actuality, which makes the signifying process altogether dynamic and infinite. The prevailing of the potential in the events, compared to their actual realization is an idealistic state. On the other hand, the case of the different types of interpretants is correlated to one of Peirce's late ideas – the idea of tychism, the idea of the presence of an absolute chance in the universe – the starting point of each and every new process.

That relation of the final interpretant to the habit answers another question, namely: how is it possible for a sign to be interpreted in the same way by all members (not necessarily humans) of a certain group? Many scholars from Antiquity till the 19th c. explain that fact through the thesis about the common convention of meaning. By contrast, Peirce addresses that question in a completely different way – through the concept of habit, which is set as it is present in man, as well as in all the phenomena in reality. Even a rough comparison of these two theses shows the ambiguity of the first one and the logical consistency of the second. If we accept the idea of the convention of meaning, which is fixing the meaning of the sign itself, other questions will instantly arise: when and in what way does that convention occur? Why do all the members of the group accept it (this is by itself a far too idyllic idea)? Was there a sign present and what was its status before the common agreement upon it was reached? Notwithstanding, the 'common convention' thesis cannot address these unclear points, which leads to losing confidence in its correctness.

Developing the concept of the sign over the years, Peirce suggests a second classification of the interpretants, distinguishing this time emotional, energetic and logical interpretants. The first one confirms with the feeling, emerging upon

the perception of a sign. "If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant" (CP 5.475). To define the nature of that "further effect", which is of mental nature, Peirce denotes it by the term "logical interpretant" and describes its meaning and effect as follows: "the only mental effect that can be so produced and that is not a sign but is of a general application is a habit-change" or the change of men's attitude towards action (CP 5.476). Correlating the logical interpretant to the area of habit misled several researchers about the idea of close reference, even sameness between the logical and the final interpretant of the first triad. Peirce does not compare the two classifications in any of his writings, nor does he point out which one of the two is of greater importance in his semiotic doctrine. There are even parts of his writings in which the final interpretant is replaced by the term "normal interpretant" without any explanation, or reason for the change. And after all, why are two triads of interpretants conceptually close to each other but have never merged into an universal doctrine? Deledalle points out that the first triad (of immediate, dynamic and final interpretants) is limited to the level of the interpretation process, while the second one (of emotional, energetic and logical interpretants) corresponds to the signifying process (Deledalle 2000: 44). And this explanation is still unsatisfactory.

As a point of reference for unveiling the mystery of the two triads, we can take Peirce's early statement that the interpretant can be a thought or a feeling. Isn't it the case then that the first triad represents thought-interpretants and the second one – feeling-interpretants? Although such a note is not made by Peirce himself, considering this hypothesis useful, the concept of the interpretant is one of Peirce's most indistinct concepts, additionally muddled by the two separate triads. As a starting point we should consider whether thought has the characteristics of the immediate, dynamic and final interpretants. Peirce takes the mind as a borderless sphere of potentiality for arising thoughts, which are by nature signifying (immediate interpretant). Once formed, the thought becomes an actual event, as every particular sign can form itself different thoughts-interpretants, depending on the conditions and the interpreter (dynamic interpretant). In the process of perceiving a sign, the striving for making a habit of understanding that the sign is always present, fixing the meaning (final interpretant). To confirm, Peirce points out that the thinking is to a great extent ruled by solidified habits, constantly increasing in number.

On the other hand, certain types of signs (e.g. the musical ones) arouse feeling, which is an emotional interpretant. Further, that feeling can affect the interpreter in such a way that the latter turns into a thought. Yet Peirce claims that the purpose of each thought is the causing of action, which reveals that the emotional interpretant has the potential of taking the form of an energetic interpretant. Therefore causing a new type of feeling forms a new thought, which then breeds a new type of action (energetic interpretant). The action on its part can break or transform the set of habits (logical interpretant). Thus,

considered in the light of the thought interpretant concept, the two Peircean triads increase in accuracy when analyzed. In conclusion, it could be affirmed that when the sign initially raises a feeling, this is the case of an emotional, energetic or logical interpretant; and when it raises a thought – of an immediate, dynamic and final interpretant. By distinguishing these two triads Peirce not only achieves thoroughness in the analysis of the signifying process, but also extends his concept of the habit. At the end of the first triad, the final interpretant comes as a manifestation of the habit-taking tendency and the natural drive of the mind for using an increased number of accumulated solidified meanings. On the other hand, the logical interpretant from the end of the second triad maintains the dynamic, bearing the opportunity for the transformation of the habits already set, as well as for the formation of new ones. Therefore the identification of the final with the logical interpretant is inaccurate. If the latter is considered as true, that would mean an automatic elimination of the signifying process's dynamics, transforming the sign into a fixed phenomenon, insusceptible to changes and reformation. Yet any kind of understanding of any of Peirce's concepts, implying a lack of the dynamics within, is by itself a clear sign of misunderstanding this latter.

And still, the subject of the two triads is not as easily exhausted. Another more thorough explanation, given by Peirce in regard to the second triad, should be taken into account as well:

> "emotional interpretant," as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings. If a sign produces any further proper significate effect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will always involve an effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. The effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case of the command to ground arms; but it is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort. It never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since it is a single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. But what further kind of effect can there be? In advance of ascertaining the nature of this effect, it will be convenient to adopt a designation for it, and I will call it the logical interpretant [...] Shall we say that this effect may be a thought, that is to say, a mental sign? No doubt, it may be so [...] so that it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant of the concept. It can be proved that the only mental effect that can be so produced and that is not a sign but is of a general application is a habit-change. (CP 5.475–476)

The second triad begins with a feeling, which moves the process of interpretation in a new direction. We already considered the beginning of the first triad in which an impression gives rise to a thought; and that thought has the potential of being fixed into a universal rule or a habit of understanding. Hence the first triad is only a manifestation of the tendency for setting habits. Peirce

notes that the final interpretant is correlated to the way mind is functioning and therefore it can be admitted as a mental habit, valid for a certain group. In this case the direction is from individual to general; from the potential to the determinate. But still, what is new in that second triad, what makes it necessary? Starting off with the feeling (emotional interpretant) and the individual mental effort (energetic interpretant), Peirce reverses the process back to the case where the interpretation is individual. In addition, in two different parts of his writings he deduces two general conclusions which are at first glance contradictory. The above citation contains the statement that the logical interpretant is correlated to the change of habit, while in another part of his essays Peirce states that it "remains only habit, as the essence of the logical interpretant" (CP 5.486). By that account, the final and logical interpretants are often accepted as identical. Although it is true that in both cases Peirce is referring to habit-taking and a major difference has been omitted. The first triad by itself sounds and seems complete and is clearly following the Peircean evolutional cosmology. Why, then, is the second one needed? It is exactly what ensures the dynamics and freedom for the habit to be changeable in time. Moreover, the second triad goes even further, being indirectly concerned with the ways for the habit change to happen. While the first triad begins with a personal impression and goes all the way to the formation of a universal mental habit – a final interpretant, the second triad reverses the process back to the individual feeling, which causes a mental effort and the opportunity for reconsideration of the already fixed habits, which will apparently lead to their transformation.

The thesis that the logical interpretant leads to the transformation of the already set habits through the formation of new ones is indirectly supported by Peirce's following statement:

> Logical interpretants stimulate us to various voluntary performances in the inner world. We imagine ourselves in various situations and animated by various motives; and we proceed to trace out the alternative lines of conduct which the conjectures would leave open to us [...] The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a relatively future tense. To this may be added the consideration that it is not all signs that have logical interpretants, but only intellectual concepts and the like; and these are all either general or intimately connected with generals, as it seems to me. This shows that the species of future tense of the logical interpretant is that of the conditional mood, the "would-be". (CP 5.481, 482)

But how can this conditionality of the logical intepretant be explained? It is to be explained precisely by the return from 'determinateness' at the end of the first triad, back to the dynamics and the potentiality found at the beginning of the second triad. It is clear, on the other hand, that the interpretation of the sign does not always lead to establishing a new habit, which replaces the old one. Thus the logical interpretant has the potential to arise when a new feeling and thought emerge, and some concepts (habits of thinking) are still stable in the mind to the extent of hardly allowing rejection. Because of that, Peirce points out that the

logical interpretant should be perceived in terms of the future – more like a possibility for change, rather than one inevitably happening.

Through the analysis of the above set-out concepts, another conclusion could be drawn. Even today there persists a widely accepted view that habits change under the formation of a new type of thoughts (which are generally referred to as ideas or beliefs) or otherwise stated: once a new type of dynamic interpretant arises. Yet a closer look into the two Peircean triads leads us to the realization that the above statement is incorrect. The second chain of interpretants clearly shows that, in order for a change of habit to be executed, a new type of feeling needs to initiate that process, as only a new feeling has the power needed for moving the mind in a new direction of thinking, of inciting it into the formation of a new concept, capable of changing a certain mental habit. Thus the Peircean interpretants' classification leads to the conclusion that habit transformation is always initiated by a new type of feeling and not by a new type of thought. This could be well illustrated by an example taken from everyday life. It is a well-known fact that smoking is dangerous for health and seriously harmful. It is even a common practice in different countries for health warnings to be printed on the packs of cigarettes. When a smoker looks at the pack this action breeds a thought (immediate interpretant) about the dangers they are exposing themselves to. But despite that undeniable fact they do not quit smoking. At the same time there are lots of reported cases of smokers who, after learning that their lungs are seriously harmed as a result of years of smoking, quit cigarettes on the very next day. The second case scenario is made possible by the fact that the disease causes a new type of feeling (emotional interpretant) which leads to a new thought, having the power to change a habit which has been active for years. In both cases, it is not easy to draw a differentiating line between the feeling and the breeding of thought, but an observation of the effects clearly shows that a new action is at hand once a new signification is completed. A new type of feeling stands at its beginning, forming a different interpretative chain, effecting the efforts to quit smoking.

The complexity of the issue with the interpretant is predetermined by its dynamics, by the fact that it is something individual and universal at the same time, and while it is fixed, it can also provide a change. Actually Peirce's two triads of interpretants are an entrance to infinite semiosis and the evolution of thinking. The first triad addresses the question concerning the ways of interpreting the sign, through which it covers the path from the individual perception and thinking to the birth of a universally validated habit for understanding in a group. That triad contains the answer, sought for so long, addressing the simultaneous individual and universal nature of the sign. And the second triad itself provides the process of transforming thinking about a certain sign, following the rise of new feelings, from which emerge new meanings, eventually forming new habits of thinking.

Apart from the sign and the interpretant, the Peircean semiotic model contains an object which is capable of not only influencing but also defining the interpretation's direction. Peirce's view on the object's essence and its role in the signification seems clear: it can be a completely mental phenomenon or

bear material characteristics, but at any rate it always occupies the beginning of semiosis, forming the interpretant. In Peirce's works even the differentiation between immediate and dynamic object does not seem to be problematic, yet this remains a topic for more thorough consideration. The term "object" is, by itself too generic for Peirce, who always strives for precision in the formation of a concept. The differentiation between the immediate and the dynamic object appears rather late – in his essays written after 1903. It is a result of Peirce's mature semiotic thinking in which the object is dual-existent. Peirce defines the first type of objects as: "The cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element, which may therefore be called, also, the immediate object" (W2: 204). But let us consider a more thorough explanation on the issue:

> We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, – i.e. the Object as represented in the sign, – and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience [...] For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards she wakes up and inquires, "What sort of a day is it?" This is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains [...] I reply, let us suppose: "It is a stormy day." Here is another sign. Its Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine – not the character of it, but the identity of it. (CP 8.314)

The above differentiation made by Peirce seems clear, as it determines the immediate object as the fixed common notion shared by all who perceive the sign and the dynamic object as the actual event which forms the mental picture. Peirce himself states that the first type of object has the nature of a rule or law, while the second one – of an actual event, as it looks like the latter explanation exhausts that question completely. Yet if the above is sufficient for the understanding of the two types of objects, it means that a final point of the interpretation process is posited. Further, a statement as the one set out above suggests that a person may have a big but not unlimited number of fixed notions (immediate objects), subject to transformation by different events (dynamic objects). It is already confirmed that in Peirce's view the object forms the interpretant and, if it is assumed that the immediate object is only a common rule or a law for understanding of a particular phenomenon, then the question arises of how infinite semiosis would be possible.

To answer the above question, a different hypothesis is advanced, as the truthfulness of the latter should be tested through another Peircean conception – evolutionary cosmology. In order for an infinite semiosis to exist, a phenomenon should stand at the beginning of the interpretative chain; and although that phenomenon forms a certain notion, it does have the potential for transformation in different terms. Hence, in the present paper it is assumed that the

immediate object represents not only a fixed rule of understanding, but also all the possible manifestations of a certain phenomenon, subject to transformation under different conditions. Thus the immediate object has the characteristics of a substance, which, in a Peircean context, means that the existence of the phenomenon is not dependent on external reality but can still be formed as a sign. It has already become clear that when the immediate object occupies the beginning of the interpretative chain, it transforms itself by turning into dynamic one. Therefore, Peirce is not actually referring to two separate, essentially different objects but to the two sides of the same phenomenon. Another note is to be found in his works: "The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is [...] the Percept" (CP 4.539). Yet, the percept is subjective – it is different in every single moment or for every particular perceiver. For example, if a Chinese vase is shown to two people and they are asked to describe it, one of them might define it as an oblong one, while the other would describe a white-blue one. What is more, both participants would accept the other's description as true and that acceptance would not affect the validity of their respective personal subjective perceptions, signified as "white-blue" or "oblong". This example shows that the vase, as an immediate object, has different characteristics, actualized by the individual perception, to form an updated dynamic object in the mind of each of the two interpreters. This is precisely what makes the vase oblong for one of them and white-blue for the other and even so they will both still have similar concepts of the object in their minds, the concepts of which will not be mutually exclusive. Respectively, the differences in the description will be caused by the individual perceptions and due to the fact that the immediate object is full of potentiality, having a world of characteristics through which it can transform itself at any moment and become a dynamic object.

At this point another question arises: is it possible for the immediate object to be a manifestation of habit (carrying a rule for understanding) but at the same time be full of potency? In order to reply a digression from the main question is needed. Provided that the immediate object has a substantial nature, it must have certain characteristics. The whole evolutionary cosmology of Peirce developed in his later essays, is based on the following general conclusion: "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (W8: 106). First of all a clarification on the term "effete mind" is needed, as it remains one of the most puzzling and undeveloped terms in Peirce's work. Mentioned just twice in Peirce's essays, only indirect characteristics could be attributed to that term. Still, Mladenov claims that Peirce himself would have rejected all but the following formulations of the term, even if they are not present in his works: "interstitial layer of the organic and inorganic world", "general context of the complete knowledge", "potential or continual matter", "frozen experience", "source for activating the layer of clichés in which the past experience is kept" (Mladenov 2011: 148). Hence the effete mind can be understood as a substance and a constructive unit of the universe. It preserves experience and is a "prerequisite for the existence of the memory" (ibid.), and the universe itself has the potential

of becoming an effete mind. The Peircean universe and reality are governed by rules (they are lawful) which make them "understandable". Thus reality is "subject to regularity and represents the potential for formation – through self-actualization – of something different from itself – and idea for instance [...] The idea always implies conditions for its realization which makes it "definitely intelligent" (ibid.: 206). The realization of ideas is accompanied by a reaction, since once regularity is added, the transition from alive to effete mind becomes accustomization. Peirce admits the existence of a "fixed reality" – independent of anyone's thought about it. As far as the idea of reality as mind is concerned, it is formed under the influence of Schelling: "The matter is nothing but a mind, balanced in its actions" (Schelling 1978: 120) and can be perceived as mind, rooted within the cliché.

The need for the above digression is predetermined by the fact that Peirce gives peculiar definitions to numerous of ideas (including that of matter). Once again, the answer to the concrete question, of whether the immediate object belongs to the domain of habit would not be convincing if Peirce's concept of matter were not clarified in advance. It has already been proven above that the immediate object can be considered as matter or substance since it is a set of characteristics, subject to realization under certain conditions. But at the same time the immediate object remains independent of our thinking of it. Since reality exists in the form of fixed layer of mental clichés, while matter is governed by laws under repetitive actualization, the latter form habits. If the countless number of immediate objects in the universe does not have the potentiality for creating signs for which interpretative habits are made, knowledge in the world wouldn't be subject to accumulation. Therefore, the thesis that the immediate object belongs to both the domain of habit and the domain of potentiality is not contradictory. Thanks to its multilayered essence, the immediate object ensures semiosis' infinity (through its ability to actualize different characteristics, combined with the possibility for setting rules for understanding signs), which is what opens the gates to the increasing knowledge.

Peirce's semiotic system seizes signs and objects on the move, analyzing them not independently by themselves, but in view of their correlations and effects. That is the reason for every element to be capable of dual (the object) or triple (the interpretant) existence. Most research on Peircean philosophy emphasizes these peculiarities of the doctrine, neglecting the role of habit, which is of the same importance for the processes of knowledge accumulation and signification. Without habit, the sign itself will be unable to hold a universal meaning and neither will the knowledge be subject of accumulation. Habit not only puts order in the human's everyday life; according to Peirce it is a constructive element in the universe. If everything set out so far could be summarized even further and in a more general way, then the Peircean semiotic model can be represented by a new triad. At its starting point can be placed the initial dynamic (Firstness), inherent in all the objects in the universe. And that dynamic is constantly facing and interacting with another equivalent force – the habit-taking

tendency (Secondness). The effect is the continuous formation of a Thirdness which is universal and particular at the same time and which was referred to as 'signification' at the beginning of the present text. It is precisely the triadic nature of the Peircean signification that forms a mystical circle around the knowledge-gaining process. And the key to that mystical circle is the analysis of the complicated relations between the dynamic and universal manifestations of every sign, object or interpretant.

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Abstract

Peircean ideas create a sophisticated net of knowledge where everything is cognizable through the dynamic relations between the sign, the object and the interpretant. There are a few concepts in Peirce's writings which form the solid ground of understanding of his work – the sign model, the categories, the method of pragmatism and the evolutionary cosmology. Here the starting point of the analysis will be another slightly neglected Peircean concept – the habit. The present article has to answer three main questions using the idea of habit as a solid core and starting point which is able to give a new analytical approach. The first question of this paper is to reconsider the triadic sign model of Peirce searching for the role and functions of habit in the semiotic process. The second question is whether the two Percian triads of interpretants (immediate, dynamic and final interpretant; emotional, energetic and logical interpretant) could be clarified through the idea of habit. And the third point in the text is whether the Peirce's concept of the immediate object could be broadened through the idea of habit.

ЮРГЕН ХАБЕРМАС И ТРОИЧНИЯТ МОДЕЛ НА ЗНАКА НА ПЪРС. КЪМ „ПЪРС И КОМУНИКАЦИЯТА“ НА ХАБЕРМАС

Рая Кунчева

Теоретик на публичното пространство, но *и* в публичното пространство, Юрген Хабермас инспирира продуктивни дискусии в множество области на съвременната хуманитаристика. Както посочва Робърт Холуб, той поставя дискусията в центъра на своята теория, но и в развитието си на учен и интелектуалец. Чрез усвояване и диалог, чрез привличане на свои съвременници в дискусия и чрез изясняване на несъгласията и различията на позициите Хабермас не само дава тласък на науката, но и на демократизирането на обществото.

> Perhaps the most important reason why debate has been such an integral part of Habermas's way of being has to do with a consistency he has maintained between his philosophical positions and the putting into practice of these positions in his various talks and writings. Unlike the theorists he would later group under the rubric 'critics of reason', Habermas's project is in harmony with his own philosophical presuppositions. He presents a theory of argument and controversy by means of argument and controversy. The 'performative consistency' that Habermas exhibits throughout his writings enhances the political appeal of his theoretical position. (Holub 1991: 1)

Работата по изграждане на мостове между различни традиции, научни направления и култури е съпроводена и от погрешно разбиране, и от откриване на нови подтици и съмишленици. В най-голяма степен това се отнася за отношенията на Хабермас с американския прагматизъм. Какво означава семиотичният прочит на трансцендентализма на Кант, който Хабермас развива така, че намира в лицето на Пърс подкрепа, е ключов въпрос, защото той буквално прониква в сърцевината на мисълта на Хабермас, било то в теорията на познанието и истината, било то при разграничението на морал и етика. При експлицитното заявяване на принадлежност към прагматизма, при активността от негова страна да обсъжда прагматистки възгледи, в което той има огромна заслуга за европейската мисъл, разширявайки ней-

ните хоризонти, не би трябвало да изненадва, че в срещата между различни мисловни традиции, нагласи и модуси на концептуализиране несъгласията са като че ли повече от съгласията. Но това от фалибилистичната гледна точка на Пърс и на Хабермас е неминуемо. Все пак има разлика между продуктивни несъгласия и такива, които разкриват само закостенялостта на определени отъждествявания. Запознаването с вторичната литература, посветена на темата „Хабермас и прагматизмът", е начинание, което носи както разочарования, така и възможност за среща със строго изведени и последователно отстоявани позиции при осъществяването на спор, при който по-добрите аргументи би трябвало да получат признаване и по-нататъшно развитие. Хабермас, който вижда своята задача в това да „спаси" мисълта на Кант, дава тласък и формулировка на спора между рационализъм и ирационализъм, като търси съвременните измерения и въплъщения на тези противоборстващи нагласи или интелектуални фамилии. През тази призма, и по-точно в превъплъщенията ѝ през XX в., той оформя своята позиция. Тук не е възможно тя да бъде очертана, но трябва да бъде посочена като задаваща рамката и на студията „Пърс и комуникацията", която е обект на разглеждане. Защото самият Пърс именно през 70-те и 80-те години на XX в. с формулировката за безкрайния семиозис получи определен прочит от деконструктивизма. Тази представа за Пърс стои в полезрението на Хабермас, когато пише студията.

Вторичната литература по темата за Хабермас и прагматизма е обширна и засяга както връзката му с класическия американски прагматизъм, така и споровете му с представители на различни насоки в съвременния прагматизъм, особено с Ричард Рорти, които спорове на свой ред са обект на коментар от следващите поколения прагматисти. Именно на страниците на том с изследвания на това по-ново поколение прагматисти, *Habermas and Pragmatism*, на въпроса какво от неговите възгледи среща най-силна съпротива или най-трудно се възприема той отговаря: „квазитрансценденталистът". Но залогът е твърде голям, за да отстъпи пред тази съпротива, залог, който е назован от Хабермас само с една дума: Холокост.

Свързаността на теоретични постановки с възможните социални и политически последици е показана и от Стилиян Йотов в книгата „Хабермас: Претенции на автономността", където идеите на философа са разгледани и като пространство на дискусия с други позиции, и като поставяне на отговорност към нас като съвременници:

> Във времето, когато светът е полярно разделен, Хабермас се стреми към максимална всеобщност: на универсалната прагматика и на общите принципи в морала и правото, както и на общата теория за модернизирането. Но и открива философски достойнства в теории, които са набедени за силно идеологически или за пристрастни. А когато светът престава да е биполярен, собствената му теория не се затваря в кула от слонова кост, а с учудваща сила проявява усет за новите и всеобщи проблеми на съвремието ни. Така редица конкретни предизвикателства се оказват с обща значимост. Това е най-мал-

кото съвпадение, но навярно и нещо повече, защото в прагматистки аспект универсализмът е както в посока на съдържанието, така и в посока на засегнатите. [...] След като няма пречки пред изучаването на теорията му, след като миналото ѝ е догонено, а настоящето ѝ може да се следи непосредствено, трябва ли да се отнасяме към нея само като към теория и да не зачитаме практическите ѝ импликации? Това, разбира се, е въпрос на избор. Но Хабермас ни кара да не забравяме и за миг, че сме длъжни да си отговорим на този въпрос. Защото търсенето и усвояването на знание е едно нещо, а употребата му в живота – нещо друго. (Йотов 2006: 257–258)

Стилиян Йотов посочва универсализма на Хабермас, трансформиран прагматистки, като проявяващ се в два аспекта: връзката към света и комуникативната връзка. Именно разграничението между двата аспекта и тяхното балансирано значение отличават мисленето на Хабермас. То има своите политически импликации и е ключ към разбирането на неговата позиция в осмислянето на философската традиция, както европейска, така и американска. В този смисъл е и акцентът, който поставя, отговаряйки на въпроса за приноса на прагматизма, който той вижда в отхвърлянето на тази линия на мисълта, която се затваря херметически пред решаването на насъщните проблеми на живота и която трансцендира различието на културите, утвърждавайки общочовешки морални ценности пред лицето на антиномиите на модерността:

The pragmatists would have rejected a question suggesting that each of the great philosophers accomplishes one characteristic thought of his or her own. In contrast to this false Heideggerian pretense, Peirce and Royce, James, Mead and Dewey felt the obligation to solve problems, one by one, just in the local context where they actually faced them. But equally, they would have objected to a false generalization of this honest attitude in terms of a contextualism that cheers the local provincialism of our problem-solving capacities. Alongside Marx and Kierkegaard, again, pragmatism emerges as the only approach that embraces modernity in its most radical forms, and acknowledges its contingencies, without sacrificing the very purpose of Western philosophy – namely, to try out explanations of who we are and who we would like to be, as individuals, as members of our communities, and as persons überhaupt – that is, as man. (Aboulafia, Bookman and Kemp, eds. 2002: 229)

Както самият Хабермас свидетелства, американският прагматизъм е сложил отпечатък върху възгледите му в три сфери: в теория за истината – Пърс, в теория за речевите действия – Хърбърт Мийд, и в политическата теория – Джон Дюи, особено относно постановката за публичното пространство.

Всъщност след лингвистичния обрат във философията той преосмисля теорията на Пърс за изследването и развива върху Пърсовата идея за общност от изследователи своята концепция за дискурсивна рационал-

ност, която от 80-те години насам пронизва подхода му в различните сфери, разработвани от него. Не само комуникацията, но именно обсъждането на даден проблем при условията на „идеална речева ситуация" в насоката на постигане на разбирателство са тези универсални условия, в които той разпознава наследството на Кант, спасено от Пърс в неговата теория на изследването. Аргументативната същност на рационалността ще бъде този общ знаменател, който Хабермас ще открива във всички сфери, запазвайки различието между тях. Ричард Бърнстийн, който е в диалог с Хабермас и разработва близки по тематика въпроси и който, тръгвайки от различна методологическа гледна точка, формирана главно от Дюи, разглежда в редица публикации разработените от Хабермас прагматистки предпоставки на комуникативната рационалност, подчертава близостта между Хабермас и представителите на класическия прагматизъм и конкретно Пърс:

> Защото Хабермас е дълбоко прав, като признава, че основната интуиция или съждение, което се намира в центъра на собственото му виждане, е централно също и за прагматистката традиция. И двете споделят разбирането за рационалността като вътрешно диалогична и комуникативна. И двете търсят етическите и политическите следствия на тази форма на рационалност и рационализация. Пърс е този, който пръв постави логическата основа на тази мисъл в идеята си за фундаменталния характер на самокоригиращата се критическа общност от изследователи без каквито и да било абсолютни отправни точки или телеологизми. (Бърнстийн 1996: 53)

Доколкото Пърс, за разлика от Дюи и Уилям Джеймс, разработва теорията на знаците и една критика на философията на съзнанието, която отхвърля ментализма на предишните теории за истината, той е в основата на мисловната линия, представена по-късно и от Витгенщайн, в която проблемът за обективността на опита се поставя по нов начин. Доколкото за нея основен момент ще бъде, че има независим от нас обективен свят, тя ще се разграничава от другата, която ще отхвърля въобще смисъла да се говори за истина (Рорти), ще представя хипертрофирана версия на семиотичната идея на Пърс и ще утвърди в хуманитаристиката един самозадоволяващ се дискурс. В този схематично очертан контекст се появява студията на Хабермас „Пърс и комуникацията". Тя е прочетена като доклад на посветения на Пърс конгрес през 1989 г. в Харвард по случай 150 години от рождението му. Публикувана е в различни издания през 90-те: в „Текст и контекст" (*Texte und Kontexte*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991); в английското издание на „Постметафизично мислене" (*Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 1992), включена от съставителя и преводач Уилям Хохенгартен, а през 1995 г. е публикувана в сборника „Пърс и съвременната мисъл" (*Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries*, 1995, с коментар от Klaus Oehler „A Response to Habermas"). Цитатите тук са по това издание. Тя не е първият текст, написан за Пърс от Хабермас. През 1968 г.

е публикувана книгата му „Познание и интерес“, теоретично изследване, в което той разглежда появата на саморефлексия в науките. Сега няма да очертавам нейната цялостна концепция. Ще посоча само, че Хабермас се придържа към разделението на науки за природата и социални науки, като ги представя съответно чрез Пърс и Дилтай. Техните теории са разгледани в две отделни глави, всяка разделена на две подглави. Посветените на Пърс са: „Логиката на изследването на Пърс: дилемата на схоластичния реализъм, реконструиран чрез логиката на езика“ и „Саморефлексията на природните науки: прагматистка критика на значението“. Тази структура показва, че Хабермас се придържа към разграничаване на проблемите на Пърсовата теория на познанието от Пърсовата семиотика. В това той следва самия Пърс, който разграничава аргументативния процес на утвърждаване на претенциите за истина от теорията на значението, която се отнася до опита. Без да обсъждам по-обстойно този първи „портрет“ на идеите на Пърс, само ще посоча, че той е създаден от Хабермас в научна парадигма, която е преди лингвистичния обрат, парадигма, която е в отговор на повдигнатите въпроси при т.нар. спор за позитивизма. Целта на Хабермас е да отвори пътища, които са били запушени от позитивизма. Използването на понятието „интерес“ е малко объркващо. Става дума за антропологично заложени интереси, които се диктуват от репродукцията на човешкия живот. Единият от тях е свързан с явленията от природното обкръжение и се изразява в целенасочени действия към природата. Този интерес, наречен от Хабермас технически, е съпоставен с другия, свързан със сигурността, която носи взаимното разбиране, както и себеразбирането. Съответно на този интерес отговарят социалните и културните науки. Разглеждайки концепциите на Пърс, Хабермас ги отнася към инструменталното действие. Дискусиите, които „Познание и интерес“ поражда, както признава самият Хабермас, го насочват към коригиране на общата концептуална рамка, но методологическото разграничение между обяснение и разбиране ще остане водещо за него и съответно разликите в двата вида рационалност.

Следва разгъване на идеята за това комуникативната рационалност да се базира върху принципи като разбирателство и консенсус, която е осъществена в мащабното му изследване „Теория на комуникативните действия“, публикувано през 1981 г. В този труд теорията на Пърс за изследването вече е намерила много по-адекватно място. Тук ще привлека важното наблюдение на Стилиян Йотов, че именно трайният интерес на Хабермас към езика го кара да държи в хоризонта на вниманието си връзката със света:

> Школата на херменевтиката, през която минава Хабермас, и прагматиката, която усвоява на нейно място, му позволяват да запази жива класическата нагласа, че философията е длъжна и може да осигури поглед върху целия свят. (Йотов 2006: 107)

Самият Хабермас е посочил моментите на преодоляване на общата концепция за познанието и истината в „Познание и интерес“. Затова и по повод критиката в статията на Т. Рокмор „Епистемологичното обещание на прагматизма“ в сборника „Хабермас и прагматизмът“ философът възразява възгледите му за истината да се разглеждат фокусирано само върху „Познание и интерес“ и да не се вземат предвид по-късните публикации и по-специално книгата му „Истина и оправдаване“ (1999). Ако приемем тези две книги като два значими пункта в развитието на теоретичната мисъл на Хабермас върху проблемите на познанието и истината, между тях трябва да бъдат ситуирани теорията за речевите действия и дискурсивната етика като разработване на комуникативната рационалност, в която идеята за дискурса дължи много на Пърс. Паралелно на тях през този период е развита концепцията му за незавършения проект на модерността, разгръщат се спорът с деконструктивизма и спорът с Р. Рорти за края на философията, спор, в който въпросът за истината е един от централните.

На този фон в края на 80-те Хабермас откликва на покана да участва в Харвардския конгрес и както се разбира от текста, темата, посочена от организаторите, съдържа понятието „комуникация“. Понятие, което в търсенията на Хабермас има централно място и в хода на развитието на концепциите му съответно неговата роля се преосмисля. Така, след като е открил у Пърс идеи, които предчувстват неговите ключови теми, сега Хабермас пише текст в „жанра“ на т.нар. реконструкция, към който вече е прибягвал – достатъчно е да спомена например ранната му студия за Валтер Бенямин. Същностното за реконструкцията на Хабермас е да се проследи чрез нея ходът на мисълта, така че да стане ясно какви са били нереализираните или слабо реализираните възможности за развитие на дадена концепция в определена насока. В този смисъл да се реконструират дилемите, пред които философът е изправен. Този метод е повече от релевантен за Пърс и е следван от всички, които търсят подход към нехомогенността на неговото творчество било като подновяване и връщане към решаването на определени задачи, било като паралелни проекти. Защото е необходимо да се реконструира търсената от Пърс цялост на неговото дело. Най-често вътрешната сложност и трансформацията на идеите му се вписват в хронологичното противопоставяне на ранния и на късния Пърс. Но както постъпва Кристофър Хукуей в *Peirce: The Arguments of the Philosophers*, вместо да се заобикалят трудно вписващите се в съвременното постметафизично мислене постановки на Пърс, е необходимо да се посочи на какво той се е натъкнал в своите търсения и защо ги е формулирал по начина, по който го е направил, но в хоризонта на своята нереализирана система.

> In an influential study published in 1950, Thomas Goudge is forced to acknowledge two Peirces. He finds a reasonable, tough-minded naturalistically inclined philosopher who tends to lapse into indefensible ‘transcendentalism’ when he turns to aesthetics, spinning metaphysical stories and speculating about

> the reality of God. Other scholars have tried to avoid this unwelcome hypothesis by stressing the extent to which Peirce's thought evolved, finding a succession of different philosophical systems and no finished view (e.g. Murphey, 1968). Others claim that Peirce's underlying motivations were always in speculative metaphysics, that he was an heir to Hegel and Schelling (Esposito, 1980); while yet others, for example, Skagestadt (1981) have recommended that interpretation should focus on Peirce's contributions to relatively small concrete issues, with attempts to grasp the systematic importance of his thought being postponed. This last approach cannot but distort the character of Peirce's thought: he was the most systematic of philosophers, and one can only understand his discussions of, for example, relatively concrete issues in the logic of science if the systematic structure of his thought is kept in mind. And although interests in metaphysics and in reconciling science and religion were always important to him, we shall not understand his arguments unless we see that his metaphysics was, in an important sense, subordinate to his work in logic and epistemology. (Hookway 1992: 2)

Реконструкцията на Хабермас е в тази насока, защото в един сравнително неголям текст той „портретира" Пърсовите идеи в областта на епистемологията и значението в едно цяло. Всъщност предложената от организаторите тема за комуникацията Хабермас можеше да развие в посоката на теорията на познанието, изтъквайки за пореден път концептуалния пробив на Пърс с положения като: „very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge". Но той пише студията „Пърс и комуникацията" в отговор на съвременната за 80-те години доминираща функция на интерпретацията, която е придобила самозадоволяващ се характер, отхвърляйки въпроса за истината. Именно през 80-те години Хабермас влиза в спор с Рорти, критично разглежда деконструктивизма във „Философският дискурс на модерността", продължава дискусията с Гадамер. В „Реконструктивни срещу разбиращи социални науки" (1983) между различните фактори, допринесли за методологическата картина в хуманитарните науки, говореща за затваряне в „играта на означаващи", той посочва и неоконсерватизма, налагащ се като нагласа. Убеждението, което го води в тези спорове и дискусии, е, че трябва да се очертае възможността и на друга линия на мислене в противовес на доминиращата, която той определя като синдром, изразяващ се

> и в широкоразпространената вяра, че всичко, което в човешката култура напомня за универсални черти, се свежда по-скоро до природата на човека, отколкото до рационалната инфраструктура на човешкия език, познанието и действието, т.е. до самата култура. (Хабермас 1999а: 31)

Природа и култура. Хабермас се противопоставя на това културата да попада изцяло под знака на различието, защото по този начин универсалността (а нейният залог е Холокостът) ще бъде редуцирана. След лингвистичния обрат във философията той актуализира концепцията на Хумболт

за двойствеността на употребата на езика, в която функционира концептуално схемата природа–култура:

> Или *се казва как са или не са нещата,* или *се казва нещо на някой друг*, така че той да разбере какво е казано. Само вторият модус на езиковата употреба е свързан вътрешно или понятийно с условията за комуникация. Това да се каже как стоят нещата, не зависи по необходим начин от някой вид реално проведена или поне представена комуникация; не е нужно да се прави някакво изказване, т.е. да се осъществява речеви акт. [...] напротив, да се разбере какво е било казано на някой друг, изисква участие в комуникативно действие. Трябва да е налице речева ситуация (или поне да бъде представена), при която един говорещ в комуникация с един слушащ относно нещо дава израз на иманото предвид от него. (Хабермас 1999а: 32)

Чрез това разбиране на комуникацията Хабермас цели да обособи епистемологията от херменевтиката и по този начин да се противопостави на „поглъщането" на епистемологията от херменевтиката, както е при Рорти например. Но от друга страна, като ги разграничава, Хабермас може да се съсредоточи върху херменевтиката и там да потърси „обективността", която е отличителното изискване на епистемологията. Моделът на значението в херменевтиката е аналогичен на троичния модел на знака при Пърс в смисъл, че знакът едновременно замества нещо и е знак за някого:

> Ако, напротив, езикът се употреби с цел разбирателство с някой друг (било дори само за да установи накрая едно несъгласие), тогава възникват три такива отношения: когато един говорещ дава израз на едно свое мнение, той комуникира с някой друг член *на* своята езикова общност *за* нещо в света. (Хабермас 1999а: 33)

Няма да навлизам в дискусията за херменевтиката. Въвеждам го само като една от илюстрациите на тезата ми, че както тук, така и в дебата с Рорти имплицитно стои моделът на Пърс за знака, видян като едновременно осъществяващ връзка с обективния свят и с интерпретанта. Именно в края на 80-те в студията, посветена на Пърс, троичният модел е представен вече експлицитно от Хабермас чрез тези две отношения.

Не е изненадващо, че постановката на Хабермас не среща широко разбиране. От страна на семиотиците в линията на структурализма и постструктурализма той е заподозрян, че „придърпва" към социологията (Tejera 1996), а семиотиците, които са фокусирани върху различието между Сосюр и Пърс, го обвиняват в сосюрианство и не отчитат усвоената от него методология на речевите актове (Oehler 1995).

Хабермас е изправен пред следния проблем. Вече е очертал комуникацията като речева ситуация между говорещ и слушащ. Но логикът Пърс спокойно може да се лиши от тази ситуация. И наистина, в теорията на знаците той въвежда субекта единствено като съзнание, което съдържа само

знакови отношения, а „диалогичността“ е между квазисъзнания в самия знак. Спирайки се на ранния Пърс, който има идеята да въведе субекта чрез личните местоимения като категории, Хабермас иска да покаже, че Пърс е бил воден от определени основания, за да се откаже от този проект. Кои са те? В каква връзка с другите идеи стои тази за безкрайния семиозис? Тези и подобни въпроси, които възникват от конкретната ситуация на дебати през 80-те години, могат да получат отговор, като се вземе под внимание новият статут, който дискурсът получава в теорията на Хабермас за рационалността. Той вече има един „ресурс“ на универсалност, чийто източник е теорията на Пърс за изследването. Сбито този нов момент е представен от Стилиян Йотов така:

> [С]амата ни практика е просмукана от рационалност, чиято същност е комуникацията, а най-доброто средство за управлението ѝ – процедурализмът. Всяка форма на човешкия опит е езиково опосредена и затова може да се изясни само ако се реконструира самата езикова практика. Във всяка елементарна единица на речта се съдържат претенции за валидност, а тяхното оправдаване зависи в най-голяма степен от взаимното разбирателство. Като природни същества хората се отнасят към света и инструментално. [...] справянето с дадена задача не е достатъчно и необходимо обяснение и оправдание на едно успешно действие. Самото осмисляне на инструменталното действие вече ни отвежда в измерението на основанията, а достъпът до тях е само през езика. [...] да защитаваш претенцията – да предлагаш и да отхвърляш основания е свидетелство за друга рационалност – комуникативната. Дори инструменталната практика, при опитите за рефлексия върху нея, се разкрива като просмукана от комуникативен разум. (Йотов 2006: 134–135)

От тази позиция Хабермас си поставя задачата да реконструира теорията на значението на Пърс. В „Пърс и комуникацията“ той пише:

> Now, the question that interests me is: What considerations could have brought Peirce to turn away from the intersubjective aspects of the sign process? I want to defend the thesis that it is impossible to give a satisfactory explanation of the interpretant relation of the sign without having recourse to the conditions for reaching an intersubjective agreement, however rudimentary these may be. This remains impossible as long as sign-mediated representation is conceived, as Peirce conceived it, in terms of truth and reality – for these concepts refer in turn to the regulative idea of a community of investigators that operates under ideal conditions. As long as Peirce stuck to his main intuition, that the pragmatic turn cannot be consistently carried through without accepting these similar counterfactual presuppositions, he could hardly do without an intersubjectively based semeiotic. (Habermas 1995: 247)

Троичният модел на знака на Пърс е разгледан от Хабермас не чрез понятието „детерминация“, а чрез понятието „връзка“. Така знакът функционира чрез връзка към света и чрез връзка към интерпретатора.

He integrated the representative function of the sign (standing for…) with its interpretability (standing to…) in such a way that the sign determines its interpretant according to the relation in which the sign itself stands to the object it represents. (Habermas 1995: 247)

Според Хабермас привилегироването на връзката към света води до изчезване на интерпретатора и редуцирането му до „квазисъзнание" при Пърс. Следователно тази постановка е следствие от други елементи на концепцията на Пърс, а не е изходна позиция. От реконструкцията, която прави Хабермас на Пърс сега, през 1989 г., следва, че философията на Пърс съдържа потенциал към интерсубектност, който не се изчерпва само с идеята за неограничена във времето и пространството общност на учените и за истината като постигане на консенсус, винаги отворен към преразглеждане, когато се появят достатъчно аргументи. С този текст Хабермас коригира едностранчивостта в трактовката си от края на 60-те години, като премества вниманието си върху семиотиката на Пърс.

Ако с „Теория на комуникативните действия" (1981, 1987) Хабермас конституира социалната теория не фундаменталистки, а изграждайки една универсална прагматика чрез трансформиране на теорията на речевите актове на Остин и Сърл, то именно през 80-те Хабермас се обръща към обосноваването на една дискурсивна етика („Морално съзнание и комуникативни действия", 1983), която се опира вече в много по-голяма степен на дискурса, на това, че със самия акт на изявление вече са предявени претенции за валидност и ако те биват оспорени, следва да бъдат обосновани с аргументи. Този преход е ясно очертан в изследването на Стилиян Йотов и новият етап е разгледан под наименованието „Трансцендиращата сила на дискурса".

Хабермас позиционира Пърс откъм страната на природните, точните науки, а не в полето на хуманитарните, което за първи път е заявено в „Познание и интерес" (1968) с въвеждането на типологията на когнитивните интереси. Пърс илюстрира инструментално-стратегическия интерес, докато Дилтай – практическия, като първият е свързан с ориентацията към труд, а вторият – с ориентацията към взаимодействие. По-късно Хабермас ще признае, че точно това обвързване на научни дисциплини с тип когнитивен интерес е спорно. Всъщност, както посочва Йотов, в „Познание и интерес" Хабермас отдава дължимото на двата подхода – на прагматисткия и херменевтичния, за отварянето на познанието към всекидневния свят, за свързването на теорията със света.

Издигайки незаинтересоваността в идеал, теоретичното познание е загубило собствено присъщия си интерес и е започнало да се подчинява на силата на произведените от него идоли. Копнежът по обективност е бил изместен от „онтологическа привидност за чиста теория" и откупен на цената на пренебрегването на елементи, от които зависи израстването на духа и на самия човек. Затова е важно зад науката да се търсят водещи общи интереси. Тогава ще

стане ясно, че част от науките дефинират предметната си област като контролируеми обекти, а стандартите им имат предвид управление. (Йотов 2006: 78)

Разглеждането на Пърс откъм страната именно на тези науки и в перспективата на една трансформирана трансцендентална философия е в посоката на постановките на Карл-Ото Апел, представени в неговия предговор към немското издание на Пърс (през 1967 г. първи том и през 1970 г. втори том). По-късно, през 1976 г., в „Що е универсална прагматика?“ Хабермас ще разграничи своето разбиране за трансцендентални изследвания от това на Апел, но откъм ракурса на американския прагматизъм, колкото и условно да е употребено тук единственото число, приликите между тях изпъкват на преден план (Misak 1994).

И прагматизмът, и херменевтиката допринасят за преодоляването на епистемологичната парадигма, назована от Хабермас „философия на субекта“, и замяната ѝ с нова парадигма – на интерсубектността.

На мястото на самостойния субект, който се насочва към предметите и който в рефлексията се превръща в предмет на самия себе си, застава не само идеята за едно езиково опосредено и отнесено към действието познание, а връзката на всекидневната практика и комуникация, в която са заложени от самото начало интерсубективни и заедно с това кооперативни познавателни постижения. (Хабермас 1999а: 16)

Наистина през 60-те Хабермас се запознава с прагматизма и открива в него алтернатива на позитивизма в социалните науки, формулирана от него като „разгръщане на саморефлексията, с която човешкият род проумява конструирането на себе си и своя свят“ (Йотов 2006: 90). В интервюта, давани десетилетия по-късно, Хабермас неизменно ще посочва именно Пърс като философа, който е разчупил типа методология, неминуемо водещ до сциентизъм.

Това, което искам да подчертая, е, че Хабермас в този свой първи опит за обосноваване на социалната теория, придържайки се в голяма степен към критическата теория на Франкфуртската школа, все пак търси единството, търси един нов синтез на науките.

Той трябва да изхожда от класическата представа за единна наука и за вътрешна връзка между разум и воля. Нужно е *единството на рефлексията* да се пренесе върху цялата наука, едновременно върху науките за природата, културата и обществото, за да може човешкият род да се възпроизвежда автономно. Рефлексията ще покаже наяве, че обособяването и парцелирането на науката по типове осакатява рационалността в съответните културни сфери и само създава привидност за автономността им. (Йотов 2006: 87)

Не само чрез поставянето в курсив, но и избирайки за заглавие „Единство и драма на рефлексията“ на тази част от изследването си за Хабермас,

Стилиян Йотов подчертава този нов момент в постановката на Хабермас, който може да бъде открит като тенденция още в хода на дискусията за позитивизма. Там може да се проследи как той постепенно се отдалечава от позицията на Адорно (Holub 1991).

В „Познание и интерес" Хабермас подхожда с една антропологична визия, която още в самото начало включва наред с междусубектните, и субект-обектните отношения. Това е определена позиция от страна на Хабермас на фона на доминиращата през 60-те години констелация, характеризираща се с неоконсервативно оспорване на позициите на разума във философията, в епистемологията, с утвърждаване на релативизма и гневни изблици на критика срещу универсализма. През 60-те години е спорът на Адорно с Попър, именно през 70-те започва да се говори за интерпретационен обрат и изглежда, че интерпретацията завладява методологически социалните науки. Именно тогава неопрагматизмът в лицето на Рорти ще отхвърли „метода" в полза на „реториката" и ще утвърди „речниците" за сметка на „истината".

> Дали интерпретативният обрат е смъртоносният изстрел срещу строго научния статус на всички необективистки начинания. Трябва ли да се придържаме към препоръките на Рорти, не само да приравним социалните науки към науките за духа, но изобщо към литературната критика, поезията и религията, дори към образования разговор изобщо. (Хабермас 1999а: 38)

В контекста на оспорване на обективността на научното познание в рамките на една нагласа към приемане на релативистичната, а не на универсалистката трактовка, Хабермас, от една страна, утвърждава интерпретацията за социалните науки (реконструира Дилтай), но от друга, в спора си с Гадамер защитава правата на когнитивното и универсалното чрез изясняване на предпоставките за рационалност в херменевтиката.

> Интерпретацията – чрез неизбежното ѝ ангажиране в процеса на разбирателство – да се отказва от привилегията на неучастващия наблюдател или от третото лице, тя обаче на същото основание разполага със средства, за да запази отвътре една позиция на извоювана безпристрастност. (Хабермас 1999а: 16)

Според мен в подстъпа към Пърс в текста на Хабермас от 1989 г. можем да открием начинание към прагматизма, аналогично на извършеното от него спрямо херменевтиката в спора му с Гадамер. Аргументирайки, че рационалността (която погрешно е приравнена до обективността на наблюдателя, на учения) е съвместима с херменевтиката, а не е нейна опозиция, и наблюдавайки едно погрешно приравняване на концепцията на Пърс за семиозиса като самозадоволяващ се свят на знаци, която бива подета на вълната на структурализма и постструктурализма, в този нов контекст той иска да посочи приноса на Пърс за създаването на концепция за знака, която включва интерпретацията и връзката със света.

И прагматизмът, и херменевтиката са подходи, които връщат контекста, връщат опората в жизнения свят и оспорват „кулата от слонова кост“ на сциентизма. Това е голямата заслуга и на Пърс, и на Дилтай. В същото време пътят не е извървян докрай. И двамата, но по различен начин, оспорват субекта на Декарт; и двамата тръгват от Кант, за да го опровергаят критически и в хода на тази критика да изградят своите постановки. Така категориите на Пърс са критически отговор на категориите на Кант. И двамата, но по различен начин, разработват понятието „опит“, но докато Дилтай остава в линията на психологизма, разбира се, трансформирайки основно заварените концепции, Пърс решително се освобождава от него. Всъщност тази линия е много по-близка за Хабермас, защото той се опира на една формална прагматика и макар че дължи много на Мийд, прагматист от второто поколение, и опирайки се върху него относно социалната същност на индивида и символната интеракция, той ще „издърпва“ теорията за размяната на ролите в речевата ситуация от психологизма на Мийд. Затова и говори за идеално поемане на роли:

> Вместо това Джордж Хърбърт Мийд предлага едно състояние на идеално поемане на роли, което изисква морално съдещият субект да се поставя в положението на всички онези, които биха били засегнати от осъществяването на едно проблематично действие или от провеждането в сила на една съмнителна норма. (Хабермас 1999а: 233)

Пърс логикът се разграничава както от психологизма, така и от номинализма и представлява една от двете линии в американския прагматизъм (другата е олицетворена от Уилям Джеймс и Джон Дюи), която според някои автори е затъмнена от популярността на втората, а това на свой ред има своите последици за интелектуалния климат не само в Америка.

> …Pragmatism has not had a single form. As we have seen, it was James who made Pragmatism famous, but the doctrine has its origin in the work of C. S. Peirce. Both men were opposed to those forms of scientism which arose in the nineteenth century and were variously known as Scientific Rationalism or Materialism or Positivism. As I hope to show, however, Pragmatism was transformed during the present century into a version of that scientism to which both men were opposed. This was possible because, in important respects, James misunderstood Peirce's views so that the Pragmatism he developed was not the one developed by Peirce himself. In effect, there were two Pragmatisms. (Mounce 1997: 2)

Така спорът между Хабермас и Рорти има своите проекции и върху първото поколение прагматисти. Хабермас познава Дюи, но не изпитва от него продуктивно влияние, докато основни идеи на Пърс влизат в същината на неговото мислене, което той в голяма степен саморефлексивно потвърждава.

Има емпирицистко подводно течение при Дюи и емотивистко при Уилям Джеймс. И двамата заплашват кантианското наследство, което е запазено, в прагматистки превод, от Пърс. (Aboulafia, Bookman and Kemp, eds. 2002)

Хабермас държи на „кантианското наследство“ и на свой ред го разработва. Понякога го нарича квазитрансцендентализъм, но винаги има предвид предпоставки, които са общи и неизбежни при процесите на разбирателство, т.е. при интерсубектни процеси, включително и тези, свързани с действието и със стратегия, целяща обективизиране на действителността. В „Що е универсална прагматика?“ (1976) той прави препратка към постановката в „Познание и интерес“:

Трансцендентално насоченият прагматизъм, основан от Ч. С. Пърс, се опитва да докаже такава структурна зависимост между опит и инструментално действие, а тръгващата от Дилтай херменевтика прави опит – в противовес на този опитен априоризъм – да придаде валидност и на един друг, на априоризма на разбирането или на комуникативния опит. (Хабермас 1999б: 40)

Виждаме, че Хабермас е изоставил първия си проект за обосноваване на социална теория чрез когнитивни интереси и в контекста на т.нар. лингвистичен обрат във философията открива в езиковата комуникация, в разглеждането на езика като действие основа за своята морална и социална теория. Следвайки проекта си за реконструктивни науки, той открива в компетенцията на всеки владеещ език универсални, т.е. независими от културните различия принципи, които могат да се експлицират в една теория. Тук важна е изходната му интуиция:

Универсалната прагматика има за задача да идентифицира и реконструира универсалните условия за възможно разбирателство. В други взаимовръзки се говори и за „общи предпоставки за комуникация“; аз предпочитам да говоря за общи предпоставки на комуникативното действие, тъй като смятам за фундаментален типа действие, насочено към разбирателство. Следователно (без да привеждам тук някакво доказателство) изхождам от това, че други форми на социално действие, например борба, съревнование, стратегическо действие изобщо, представляват деривати на действието, ориентирано към разбирателство. (Хабермас 1999б: 11)

Така започва студията, публикувана през 1976 г., и след малко повече от десет години, през 1989 г., в доклада за Пърс отново срещаме същата характеристика – търсенето на истината от общността на изследователите е тип действие, насочено към разбирателство, а не борба и съревнование. В първата постановка стратегическото и комуникативното действие в антропологичен план са равнопоставени, несводими едно към друго и очертаващи две отношения – на субекта към действителността и на междусубектните връзки. На фона на критиката срещу инструменталния разум

на Франкфуртската школа с тази постановка е предложена различна парадигма, която изхожда от понятието „действие“. Наследството на Франкфуртската школа се проявява в отделянето на трети когнитивен интерес – еманципаторския.

Но както казва самият Хабермас в едно интервю, интелектуалният климат през 80-те години е твърде различен от този в края на 60-те. Книгите, които той публикува през десетилетието след първия том на „Теория на речевите действия“, бележат както навлизане в нови научни полета, така и отваряне на дискусионни фронтове. Всъщност именно през 1981 г. в „Малки политически статии“ е публикувана студията „Модерността – един незавършен проект“, която е опониращa теза на възгледа за изчерпаността на модерността. Основателността на критиката срещу противоречията на модерността не може да оправдае според Хабермас трите вида консерватизъм в съвременния интелектуален пейзаж. Рорти, започнал своя път с изследване на Пърс, открива паралели между него и Витгенщайн, но с времето изцяло се обръща към Дюи и дори е склонен да недооцени мястото на Пърс за модерното мислене.

Трябва да подчертая важността на изследванията на Иван Младенов, що се отнася до българския контекст. С последователния и задълбочен интерес към Пърс той прокарва една линия на мислене, в опозиция на традиции, нагласи и опити, имащи като свой източник психологизъм и номинализъм от типа на този на Уилям Джеймс.

Логическата позиция на Пърс е теоретично по-близка на Хабермас от структурно-лингвистичната на Сосюр. Защото първата позволява, от една страна, да се постави въпросът за истината, а от друга, да се запитаме дали твърдението притежава комуникативност, т.е. дали отговаря на съответните условия, за да може да пренася информация. Тези две перспективи са изключени, невъзможни са при структуралния подход към знака.

Моделът на Пърс съдържа две страни или две връзки – едната е епистемна, т.е. свързана е с познанието на света, а другата е комуникативна и се отнася към процеса на интерпретация. Така репрезентация и комуникация са взаимно необходими. Но Пърс настоява за анонимността на интерпретативния процес. Тук имплицитно стои спорът на Хабермас с фоновите следи на значението при Дерида. Безкрайният семиозис, който се осъществява като игра на означаващи и съответната представа за субекта като пресечна точка на различни анонимни знакови разклонения, като намиращ се в лабиринт или в затвора на своя свят, свят, чиито граници се чертаят от неговия език – тези постановки, които могат да се разглеждат като последица от „лингвистичния обрат“ във философията, обясняват характеристиката **анонимно**. Скриване на самоличността, но именно скриване, а не липса на самоличност, не безличност. Изборът на тази дума от Хабермас подсказва, че при Пърс става дума за редуциране, а не за отказ, за скрито наличие, а не за липса. Троичният модел на знака и регулативната идея за общност от изследователи ще бъдат основанията Хабермас да покаже,

че в концепцията на Пърс има ресурс, който е загубен в представата за безкраен семиозис като игра на означаващи и в речниците на Рорти. При постепенното отъждествяване на логика и теория на знаците, при разбирането на Пърс за научно изследване, при критиката, която той отправя към номинализма, най-малко трябва да очакваме някакво наличие на персонализъм в неговите разсъждения. Интерпретаторът е премахнат – осъществявайки логическия си подход, Пърс вижда в психологизма опасност от грешни постановки. Той тръгва от ежедневния език и провежда операция, която Хабермас нарича логически генезис. За да построи фундаментална семиотична структура, той трябва да изостави перспективите на говорещ и слушащ. Постановката, при която ги редуцира, е например съобщение, поставено в бутилка и хвърлено в морето, оставено на случайността някой да го намери. Но дори и това да не се случи, налице е знак, защото има потенциална възможност бутилката да бъде намерена.

Може ли троичният знаков модел на Пърс напълно да се освободи от комуникативния личностен аспект? Достатъчно ли е твърдението, че еволюцията на мисълта е винаги диалогична, за да е запазен този аспект при логическото разглеждане? Според Хабермас е необходимо да се запитаме за условията, при които знакът може да изпълнява своята функция. В духа на Кант той пита какви са условията. Не само това въвеждане на трансцендентна постановка – кои условия ще останат валидни за всички знакови употреби, но и формулировката на знаковата функция получава от Хабермас определен акцент. Множеството дефиниции на Пърс за знака тук получават следното тълкуване: интерпретативната връзка не може да бъде лишена от трансцендиращото всяка конкретна комуникация, а то е, че със самото влизане в комуникативната ситуация говорещият изказва претенции за валидност. Те са три: че това, което казва, е вярно, че отговаря на нормите и че е искрен. Това са предпоставки, за да има комуникация, но и за да се постигне съгласие относно нещо в света.

Посочената по-горе интерпретативна връзка на знака изисква да се обърнем към условията за постигане на интерсубективно съгласие/разбирателство. Щом репрезентацията, т.е. знаковата функция, е схваната в рамките на истина и реалност, поставянето на въпроса за условията за постигане на съгласие има основание. Тук в подтекста можем да разчетем спора на Хабермас с Р. Рорти, който е публично активен именно в годините преди изнасянето на доклада. Знаковата функция, знаковият модел е свързан както с прагматистката максима за значението, така и с регулативната идея за общност от изследователи, която, неограничена нито във времето, нито в пространството, е посветена на търсене на истината чрез представяне на аргументи, доводи, които имат своята сила не защото реторично са по-убедителни (Рорти), а защото реалността може да ги опровергае, реалността, която е „независима от мен и от теб“.

Когато Хабермас казва, че докато Пърс свързва прагматисткия обрат с контрафактуални предпоставки, с което има предвид регулативната идея

за общност от изследователи, той трудно би минал без интерсубектно обоснована семиотика, той всъщност казва, че семиотиката на Пърс е интерсубектно обоснована. Хабермас реконструира начина, по който Пърс обосновава интерсубектно семиотиката, в четири стъпки, които формулира така, че да остане верен на насоката на Пърс, но и да постави нови и свои акценти.

Четирите стъпки, чрез които Пърс е предприел интерсубектното обосноваване на семиотиката според Хабермас, маркират хода на неговата мисъл и в хронологичен план, доколкото в ранните си лекции Пърс предприема критика на Декарт, следва преосмислянето на категориите на Кант, фалибилистичната концепция за познанието като процес на съвместни усилия на общност от изследователи и накрая – т.нар. метафизически реализъм.

> First I want (1) to sketch the critique of the philosophy of consciousness that Peirce carried out in the 1860s and 1870s, as well as (2) to recall the two resulting problems that emerge from the semeiotic transformation of Kantian epistemology.
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> The solutions Peirce proposed depend on (3) the premise of cumulative learning processes, which admits a weak intersubjectivistic reading. But instead of this interpretation, Peirce preferred a strong, or cosmological, one. He developed this version in terms of (4) atheory of natural evolution which has problematic consequences for semeiotic and leads to a Platonistic concept of the person which cannot be brought into harmony with our best intuitions. (Habermas 1995: 247)

Философията на съзнанието стъпва върху разграничението между вътрешен и външен свят, а точно то е подложено на семиотично трансформиране от Пърс.

Между тях е светът на символите. За младия Пърс има две сфери, където символите са необходимият медиатор между вътрешния и външния свят. Хабермас посочва религиозния опит като единия от тях, цитирайки изказването на Пърс, че религията не може да бъде открита нито изцяло във вътрешния свят, нито изцяло във външния, а в своеобразната комуникация, която трансценденталистът Пърс открива в религията, а именно сливането в общност с другия. Втората сфера е логиката – „мисълта е знак“ – това е новата постановка на Пърс, която е развита, от една страна, чрез критика на психологизма в логическите изследвания, а от друга – чрез отхвърлянето на трансцендентния Аз. Всеки символ, всеки знак е във времето, доколкото, за да се осъществи знаков процес, е необходимо време. Но в критиката си към Кант Пърс не тръгва откъм критиката на Хегел, т.е. не откъм перспективата на темпорализация на съзнанието, а вместо това въвежда своето виждане за символно въплътено съзнание. Хабермас се позовава на „Времето и мисълта“ на Пърс, като подчертава неговата теза, че всеки знак е свързан с други знаци и че за всеки знак има предходни знаци. Той прави мост между тази концепция на Пърс и идеите на Касирер за символа, адаптирайки модела на троичния знак към една ключова поста-

новка за немската традиция – разликата между връзка на субекта с предмет и интерсубектната връзка, разликата между опредметяващо отношение и отношение като към субект. Именно в това сравнение става ясна преформулировката на Хабермас. Той осмисля троичния знак на Пърс като едновременно функциониране на две връзки – на знака към обекта и на знака към интерпретанта. Правейки тази преформулировка, Хабермас на свой ред може да осъществи нова гледна точка, да направи мост между една европейска философска традиция и мисълта на Пърс. Така темпорализацията на съзнанието, която върви със семиотизацията му, той представя чрез двете връзки на знака: във времеви план отношението към миналото е опредметяващо или към обект, а отношението към бъдещето е в плана на интерпретанта. Хабермас не може да не посочи ролята на Карл-Ото Апел за трактовката на Пърс в посоката на едно детрансцендентализиране на Кант, посока, която той не само споделя, но и провежда още по-радикално. В посткантианската философия прагматизмът на Пърс представлява линия, която съществено се различава от линията на Хегел.

Според философията на съзнанието връзката между субекта и обекта минава през ментална репрезентация, т.е. постулира се, че в съзнанието има ментално състояние, Erlebnis, което едва по-късно получава езиково въплъщение. „Автентичността“ на Erlebnis получава особено наситени конотации, тъй като тя се утвърждава за сметка на неавтентичността на всичко, което би могло да се отнесе към публичността или това, което Хайдегер нарича das Man. Трябва да се подчертае все пак, че Кант не е отговорен за по-късните въплъщения на неговата идея за „вътрешното сетиво“, за това, че по-късно през XX в., при връщането с националистичен привкус към романтизма, именно на Erlebnis се приписва автентичността, а неговото езиково въплъщение се явява в ролята на несъвършен медиатор, на замъгляващ автентичността несъвършен инструмент. Ирационализмът, срещу който се противопоставя Хабермас, има като едно от въплъщенията си идеята, че социалният свят е подчинен или е скрито ръководен от сили, избягващи възможността да бъдат осветлени чрез семиотичния процес, който в разбирането на Пърс, дълбоко подчертано от Хабермас, е един аргументативен процес. Критиката на езика като въплъщаващ социума е силно тематизирана в хуманитаристиката и има своите последици в мощната антиинтелектуалистична вълна през 20-те и 30-те години, но също и в подетата от двете противоположни страни на политическия спектър критика на разума през втората половина на века. В семиотиката на Пърс, във възгледа, че не съществуват ментални представи, които да не са знак, и съответно в елиминирането на възможността да се допуснат неподвластни на самокоригиране позиции, Хабермас намира не само ключови за неговото творчество идеи като тази за общността на изследователите, но и положения, които се нуждаят от съвременна реконструкция в контекста на деконструктивизма и неопрагматизма. Предприетата от Пърс критика на философията на съзнанието намира свои съмишленици в много

от мисловните линии на XX в. В същото време през 70-те и 80-те години като последица от утвърждаването на философията на езика след така наречения от Ричард Рорти „лингвистичен обрат“ се стигна до поставяне в скоби на понятието за истина, до изключване като вече неживи на редица ключови за хуманитарното мислене понятия от Кант насам. В този смисъл реконструкцията, която в този текст Хабермас прави на Пърс, е част от неговата защита на незавършения проект на модерността. Пърс, Хабермас и деконструктивисти като Дерида развиват своите аргументи срещу философията на съзнанието. И Дерида, и Хабермас намират в лицето на Пърс предходник, реформатор и създател на нова перспектива. Но това, което изтеглят като нишки от него, върви в различни посоки. Различно е значението, което всеки от тях влага в осмислянето на концепцията за безкрайния семиозис. И за двамата тя е платформата, на която стъпват в критиката си срещу Хусерл. Но Дерида първо създава концепция за знака, в която темпорализацията на различието няма нужда от референциална връзка със света, и след това наблюдава безкрайния семиозис. Хабермас, напротив, търси да извлече максималния ресурс от интерсубектност в модела на Пърс, защото в линията на неговата идея за истина, която може да бъде постигната чрез общност от изследователи, в аргументацията, превеждането на доводи и приемането на погрешимостта като принцип, интерсубектността е неотменима.

Вероятно във взетата на въоръжение от деконструктивистите теза за безкрайния семиозис Хабермас вижда една редуцирана или едностранна трансформация или интерпретация на идеите на Пърс. Но тук той не изнася дебата на тази плоскост. Държейки на прицел съвременната дискусионна ситуация, той търси вътрешните дилеми в мисленето на Пърс през различните периоди на неговото развитие, моментите на възможност да се поеме в различни посоки, за да покаже, че потенциално посоката, която реализират деконструктивистите, е възможна, но че Пърс поема по пътя, свързващ в едно познание и интерсубективност. Подобно на неговата реконструкция на Мийд – другия прагматист, който има не по-малко централно място за него още от „Теория на речевите действия“ – и тук Хабермас поставя определени акценти, подчертава и извлича определени линии, изгражда един различен Пърс и съответно Мийд, но и ясно очертава техния принос в критиката на философията на съзнанието.

Философията на съзнанието е отхвърлена от семиотизацията на съзнанието, осъществена от Пърс. Но тя има трайно влияние в немската хуманитарна мисъл, включително и в литературознанието, през XX в. На друго място разглеждам критиката, която този тип литературоведска мисъл получава от страна на прагматистки ориентирано литературознание в духа на Мийд. Тук само искам да отбележа, че парадигмата с Erlebnis като източник на сигурност има наистина силно присъствие в немскоезичното литературознание, като получава съответната рецепция и в българското, проникващи на имплицитни нива в стереотипите на мислене.

Предпоставка за него е представянето на познанието чрез субект-обектната връзка, като обективният свят ще представлява целостта от ментално представени обекти, а субективният е сферата на менталните репрезентации, към които субектът има непосредствен, пряк достъп чрез своята рефлексия. Фаворизираната роля на самосъзнанието е оспорена от семиотизацията на съзнанието, което означава и превръщане на двучлен-ната връзка между субект и обект в тричленна, символна репрезентация.

Според Хабермас тази символна репрезентация е невъзможна, ако не е налице претенция за валидност, което означава, че в интерсубектната връзка говорещият, обръщайки се към адресата, вече заявява претенция за истина. Щом Азът влиза в комуникация с Ти, той заявява тази претенция, изказването му или изявлението му имплицира, че казва неща, които, ако се наложи, може да обоснове, да аргументира.

Неговата цел е да покаже, че логиката, която създава Пърс, е от такъв характер, че не може да изключи поставянето на въпроса за условията за една успешна комуникация, че този въпрос е възможен по отношение на семиотиката на Пърс, но е невъзможен по отношение на семиотиката на Сосюр.

По-широкият контекст в методологически план е, че в типа мислене на Пърс е невъзможно да се допусне сфера, която да е натоварена с отноше-ние към истината и в същото време да е извадена отвъд публичния дебат, т.е. достъпът до нея да не е дискурсивен, без значение дали това ще е бити-ето на Хайдегер, което само се разкрива, или установяването на истината ще се мисли като посегателство върху правото да имаш своя гледна точка или свой речник (Рорти) и тогава публичният дебат може само да покаже кой речник е по-убедителен. Твърдя, че този контекст е необходим, за да се разберат тезите и аргументите в текста на Хабермас. Той иска да изясни прагматисткия обрат, който Пърс осъществява не само в критиката си на субекта на Декарт (Бърнстийн), но и по отношение на категориите на Кант, по отношение на интенционалността на Хусерл в теорията на значението, по отношение на връзката между теория и практика, но също и за процеси-те на учене, които могат да бъдат открити и в природата, и в универсума. Така, минавайки през различните периоди на Пърс, да покаже, проясняващ-ки различните перспективи, кои от тях Пърс е предпочел, а по кои е можел да тръгне, но не ги е реализирал. Тези нереализирани посоки са важни за изграждане на образа на един динамичен, непрестанно търсещ Пърс. За Хабермас това е постановката, която той вече е разработил в „Теория на речевите действия“, където оспорва концепцията на Вебер за европейската модерна рационалност, като посочва, че инструменталният разум не може да изчерпи рационалността, че наред с него има и комуникативен разум. Тази постановка прониква и в реконструкцията на Пърс в „Пърс и комуни-кацията“. За разлика от трактовката му в „Познание и интерес“, тук той ще „реабилитира“ именно комуникативния разум, ще покаже неговото дейст-вие в теорията на знака на Пърс.

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JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND CHARLES PEIRCE'S TRIADIC MODEL OF THE SIGN. TOWARD "PEIRCE AND COMMUNICATION" BY HABERMAS

Raya Kuncheva

Abstract

The paper deals with the relationship between Jürgen Habermas and Charles Peirce by focusing on Habermas's essay "Peirce and communication" (firstly delivered as a conference paper in 1989). After the linguistic turn, in this essay Habermas takes a line of argument widely differing from his earlier ideas presented in the book *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1968). He defends the view that Peirce's model of sign cannot be understood without taking into account the conditions for achieving intersubjective communication oriented toward mutual understanding. One of the most important features of Habermas's position is that he is against the relativistic trends of the contemporary theory of truth and the radical critique of reason made by post-structuralists. In his reconstruction of Peirce's theory of meaning, he brings together various strands in order to develop a complex view of the communicative paradigm and semiotics.

РЕЦЕПЦИЯТА НА ПРАГМАТИЗМА В ТОТАЛИТАРНА ПОЛША

Николай Иванов

Увод

Класическият прагматизъм придобива популярност в страните от Централна и Източна Европа още през първата четвърт на XX в. В Русия, Чехословакия и Полша е отделено специално внимание на Уилям Джеймс. Формирането на тоталитарните режими в т.нар. Източен блок след Втората световна война води до временно прекъсване на интереса към прагматизма, което до голяма степен се дължи на господството на диалектическия материализъм във философските среди. След 1989 г. този интерес се възобновява и броят на изследователите на американския прагматизъм в страни като България, Румъния, Русия, Полша, Чехия, Словакия, Унгария постепенно се увеличава. На западната философия като цяло вече не се гледа така негативно и тя не е подложена на критика от догматичната гледна точка на диалектическия материализъм. Днес във философските среди на всички изброени държави витае дух на плурализъм.

Преглеждайки историята на критическата рефлексия върху прагматизма в Източна Европа по времето на тоталитарните режими, се натъкваме на един необичаен факт. Въпреки цензурата и надмощието на диалектическия материализъм в Полша там е налице континуитет на рецепцията на прагматизма. Докато например в СССР един изтъкнат философ, Юрий Мелвил, представя идеите на американския прагматизъм (специално Пърс, Джеймс и Дюи) изцяло в критичен дух, поставяйки си за цел да го обори от гледна точка на диалектическия материализъм (Мельвиль 1957, 1968), то в Полша автори като Хана Бучинска-Гаревич, Мариан Доброшиелски и Кристина Вилкошевска се отнасят към него като добре разработена философия, имаща повече предимства, отколкото слабости. В настоящата статия ще бъде обърнато внимание специално на делото на Бучинска-Гаревич, която разработва оригинална концепция за прагматисткия синтез на факти и ценности. За разлика от Мелвил тя се стреми да демонстрира обосноваността и вътрешната кохерентност на американския прагматизъм, спирайки се на Пърс, Джеймс, Шилер и Дюи. Може да се твърди, че рецепцията на американския прагматизъм по време на тоталитарния режим в

Полша е решително по-малко подчинена на догматични принципи от тази в СССР. Причината за това е атмосферата на плурализъм в полските философски среди, която е характерна за времето още след края на Втората световна война. Следствие от това е провеждането на сравнително голям брой изследвания върху прагматизма, специално през 70-те и 80-те години на XX в., както и многобройни преводи на класиците на прагматизма и видни неопрагматисти след 1989 г.

Някои особености на философския дискурс по време на тоталитарния режим в Полша

В развитието на философията в Полша между 1945 и 1989 г. се открояват няколко периода:

– Първи период (1945–1948/9) – ненамеса на държавата в работата на учените. Слаба цензура. Наличие на свободни философски дискусии. Това е времето на формиране принципите на диалектическия материализъм в Полша (А. Шаф), на марксистка критика към самия марксизъм (С. Осовски) и на противопоставяне между неотомизма и марксизма (Бохенски, Камински).

– Втори период (сталинизация) (1948/9–1956) – налагане на силна цензура и намеса на държавата във философските дебати. Това е и периодът, по време на който Република Полша е преименувана в Народна република Полша и е приета нова конституция на страната (1952).

– Трети период (1956–1980) – десталинизация и „нормализация" на режима. Отслабване на цензурата и възможност за поддържане на философски дискусии между представители на различни философски течения. Възможности за специализация в западни университети, по-специално във Франция. Трябва да се отбележи, че полската академична среда през 1968 г. губи мнозина изтъкнати свои представители от еврейски произход, принудени да напуснат страната (А. Шаф и З. Бауман). Това е периодът, в който Хана Бучинска-Гаревич публикува няколко свои труда върху американския прагматизъм. Тук трябва да се спомене и името на Мариан Доброшиелски, който също като нея има възможност за престой в САЩ с цел да проведе изследване върху класическия прагматизъм.

– Четвърти период (1980–1989) – силна гражданска съпротива срещу тоталитарния режим. Все по-малко философи застават на страната на диалектическия материализъм, който губи своята доминация във философските среди. В този период Кристина Вилкошевска разработва няколко свои естетически труда, посветени на прагматизма и специално на Дюи.

Представената тук периодизация има за цел най-вече да изясни динамиката в развитието на взаимоотношенията между диалектическия материализъм и другите философски течения, популярни в Полша. От това, което виждаме, периодът на засилена цензура е сравнително кратък. Не

може да има съмнения, че до 1989 г. работата на учените и академичните преподаватели в Полша се следи детайлно от съответните държавни органи, но въпреки това интересът към западноевропейските философски течения не е така ограничен, както в СССР.

Забележителен е континуитетът при две от най-популярните в предвоенна Полша философски течения – позитивизма на Лвовско-Варшавската школа и неотомизма. Той се дължи на необичайния плурализъм, доминиращ в първите следвоенни години. Както знаем, Лвовско-Варшавската школа предлага множество изследвания в областта на логиката и епистемологията. Сред най-ярките ѝ представители са Я. Лукашиевич, А. Тарски (и двамата емигрирали в САЩ по време на Втората световна война), К. Айдукевич, В. Татаркиевич. Въпреки тежките последици от войната школата продължава своето съществуване във Варшава (Zachariasz 2001: 41). Интересен е фактът, че в първите следвоенни години привържениците на марксизма се опитват да привлекат представителите ѝ на своя страна. А. Захариаш отбелязва: „При всички случаи Лвовско-Варшавската школа е оказала влияние върху полския марксизъм, и специално по отношение на високата оценка на логическата култура и теоретичната аргументация във философски диспути“ (Zachariasz 2001: 40). Това не е изненадващо, като се имат предвид дългогодишната традиция на школата и нейната известност дори зад граница. На свой ред неотомизмът се развива въпреки политическите промени в страната и в първите следвоенни години оказва философски отпор на набиращия популярност сред академичните среди марксизъм. В Люблин дори е декларирано създаването на нова неотомистка школа, чийто най-ярък представител е С. Каминski (Zachariasz 2001: 41). Полските представители на това течение водят съвсем свободна дискусия с главните защитници на марксизма в страната (като А. Шаф). Нещо повече – те си позволяват критика, която по време на втория период би била опасна за академичната им кариера. Й. Браун например пише през 1947 г.:

> Марксизмът е една от формите на кризата на западната цивилизация, стояща днес някъде между индивидуализма и колективизма. Неговото засилване е поредният продукт на отстъплението на Европа от работата по изграждане на интегрална християнска цивилизация. (Kojkoł 2009: 132)

По-късно представителите на католическата философия в Полша стават обект на силна цензура и политически преследвания.

От голямо значение за изграждането и поддържането на плуралистична философска среда е и публикуването на специализирани издания, стремящи се към изразяване на различни гледни точки. Такова е например списанието „Обществена мисъл“, основано през 1946 г. Редакцията на „Обществена мисъл“ отговаря за плурализма и откритостта при представянето на философски проблеми. В редакционна бележка към първия му брой четем следната декларация:

> Списание „Обществена мисъл“ се стреми да стане научен орган на цялата прогресивна полска интелигенция. Концентрирайки в редакционния комитет представители на различни дялове на науката, различни светогледи и политически направления, „Обществена мисъл“ не възнамерява да се придържа доктринерски към едно определено направление. Разбирайки нуждата от сблъскване на различни гледни точки, „Обществена мисъл“ застава на позиция на свобода на научните изследвания и желае да допринесе за създаването в Полша на силни центрове за научно творчество. Списанието изисква само едно условие от своите сътрудници – надеждност на представеното научно познание. (ibid.: 113, n. 26)

Тази свобода на изразяване позволява подлагане на критика на полския марксизъм, въпреки че той все още не е заел доминиращата позиция, характерна след 1949 г. Марксистките философи възприемат направлението, към което принадлежат, като развиваща се с времето система от философски и научни принципи. За тях саморефлексията е изключително важна, за да не се превърне марксизмът в догматизъм. С. Осовски, който е повлиян от Лвовско-Варшавската школа, критикува възгледите на А. Шаф, въпреки че и двамата са сред авторитетните популяризатори на марксизма в Полша. Първият,

> подобно на много интелектуалци от това време, е склонен да приеме определени елементи на марксизма, преди всичко употребата на неговите методологични директиви, но решително отхвърля догматизма, третирането на марксизма като „разкритата истина“. Той приема критичната му функция, но се бори срещу идеологическата. (ibid.: 120)

Осовски възприема марксизма основно като метод на изследване и теория, описваща обществената действителност. Той отрича опитите за идеологизация и догматизация на тази теория (ibid.: 122). Подобна е и критиката на Й. Хохфелд, според когото марксизмът не може да бъде дефиниран като кохерентна система от научни твърдения, обясняващи всички явления в света – теза, защитавана от Шаф (ibid.: 123). В рамките на дискурса върху марксистката философия се подчертава нейният антидогматичен характер, както и склонността ѝ към развитие в зависимост от най-новите научни открития (ibid.: 136). Както пише Койкол, „това е време, в което все още политическите, идеологическите и философските спорове не водят до административни репресии, а е наличен плурализъм на идеите“ (ibid.: 134). С навлизането във втория период обаче условията за провеждане на философски изследвания и дискусии се променят: марксистката философия, вече в своята съветска версия, позната като диалектически материализъм, започва да доминира. Католическата философия става негов теоретичен, но също и политически противник (ibid.: 138). Парадоксално, както отбелязва Койкол, католическите философски среди оказват дори по-голямо влияние върху съзнанието на полските интелектуалци благодарение на

политическите преследвания и ограничения, на които са подложени през втория период (ibid.: 139). Оказва се, че полската рецепция на значимите западноевропейски направления (логически позитивизъм, неотомизъм, феноменология) в областта на философията не се свежда само до тяхната критика от страна на доминиращия диалектически материализъм, а до опит за създаване условията на нормален, равноправен диалог, при който да се вземат предвид различни гледни точки по даден въпрос. В СССР обаче поради засилената цензура подобна относителна свобода на философския дискурс изглежда невъзможна[1].

Делото на Бучинска-Гаревич за популяризиране на прагматизма в Полша

Относителният плурализъм във философските среди в Полша обаче позволява по-адекватно и точно представяне на водещите течения в западната философия. В този контекст работи Хана Бучинска-Гаревич, която се явява най-големият познавач на класическия прагматизъм по времето на тоталитарния режим в тази страна. Заслугата ѝ се свежда не само до популяризиране трудовете на Ч. Пърс, У. Джеймс и Ф. Шилер, но и в разработването на собствена концепция за прагматисткия синтез на факти и ценности, който според нея води до релативизация на понятието за истина. Въпреки че в нейните трудове също се долавя придържане към догматиката на диалектическия материализъм (особено при анализа на Джеймсовия прагматизъм), трябва да се признае, че те могат да служат като важен източник на информация за прагматизма дори и днес. По този начин благодарение на Бучинска-Гаревич е осигурен континуитет в рецепцията на класическия прагматизъм в Полша.

Също както и в други европейски страни, в Полша прагматизмът прониква в своята Джеймсова версия. Сред най-известните му популяризатори преди Втората световна война са В. Козловски, А. Левкович, Ф. Знаниецки, С. Бжожовски[2]. В Полша обаче не се формира прагматистки кръг, нито пък се поддържат някакви официални контакти с известни прагматисти на Запад. Изброените полски философи се ограничават само до популяризиране на основните идеи на Джеймс и Шилер, приемайки някои от тях и отричайки други. В сравнение обаче със съседни държави, като Чехословакия и Унгария, рецепцията на прагматизма в Полша е изключително многостранна и плодоносна, което има своите видими последици днес.

Според Бучинска-Гаревич главната цел на прагматизма е да премине отвъд теоретичното и практичното, отвъд ценности и факти. В книгата

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[1] Относно цензурата, налагана върху научни трудове в СССР, вж. Андреева 2009: 51.

[2] За повече информация за популяризирането на Джеймсовия и Шилеровия прагматизъм в Полша преди Втората световна война вж. Knapik 2006: 49–58.

си „Ценност и факт“ (започната през 1965, но публикувана през 1970 г.) полската изследователка твърди, че прагматизмът не успява да обясни същността на човешката активност и свеждайки я единствено до действието, той губи от поглед нейната положеност в социално-икономически контекст. По-голямата част от книгата обаче не е посветена толкова на критика на основни прагматистки принципи, колкото на анализ на най-важните идеи на Ч. Пърс, У. Джеймс, Ф. Шилер и Дж. Дюи. Интересно е да се отбележи, че някои от техните доктрини до този момент изобщо не са били разглеждани в полските академични среди, като например семиотиката на Пърс, а Шилеровата епистемология на практика е била игнорирана.

Бучинска-Гаревич стига до идеята за съществуването на реалии, които могат да се нарекат „ценност-факт“. Тя отбелязва:

> Прагматизмът отрича Кантовото деление на теоретически и практически разум… Прагматизмът е основан и се развива в опозиция на немския идеализъм, като се бори със систематичното противопоставяне на ценности и факти… желаещ да сближи тези два полюса чрез смесването им в монолитен свят на целенасочени човешки действия. (Buczyńska-Garewicz 1970: 6)

Прагматистите обаче не преминават отвъд емпиризма – дори напротив, те разглеждат емпиричния свят като единствено съществуващ: „Единствената приета от тях реалност е емпиричният свят на фактите-ценности, който е едновременно съществуващ и деонтологичен“ (ibid.: 7). Както виждаме, полската изследователка не подлага прагматизма на критика от гледна точка на диалектическия материализъм. Анализите на Бучинска-Гаревич са напълно релевантни на целите, които си поставя нейната работа: да представи прагматизма като основан върху принципа на преодоляване на класическата дихотомия ценност–факт. Действително тя се позовава на западни критици на прагматизма, но по начин, който позволява по-дълбоко вникване в същността на това философско течение. Така тя изтъква противоречията в епистемологията на Пърс, стремейки се да ги обясни с големия обем философски трудове, написани от него, и с преминаването му през различни творчески етапи. Джеймсовият прагматизъм е представен като напълно независима версия на прагматизма, която не е просто отклонение от идеите на Ч. Пърс, а резултат от различна интерпретация на принципа на прагматизма.

Друг пример за обективното тълкуване на Пърсовия прагматизъм е едно негово твърдение, което често е обект на възражения. Полската изследователка пише, че у Пърс не откриваме психологизъм, въпреки че концепцията му за вярването може да се интерпретира и по този начин. Основоположникът на прагматизма не може да бъде обвинен в опит да се подложат на съмнение обективната същност на света и познанието. Анализирайки основните принципи на неговата семиотика, Бучинска-Гаревич изтъква мястото ѝ във философията на Пърс като цяло, и

конкретно връзката ѝ с епистемологията му: „Тъй като по дефиниция познанието се състои от знаци, определението на естеството на теорията на знаците е в същото време и определение на епистемологията. Едно от съществените следствия на тази теза е антипсихологизъм в теорията на познанието“ (ibid.: 23). Авторката добавя, че формулираният за първи път от Пърс принцип на прагматизма няма за цел да превърне познанието в инструмент на живота и действието (ibid.: 117). Джеймс и Шилер отиват доста по-далеч, отклонявайки се от първоначалния замисъл на Пърс. Докато Пърс според полската изследователка разработва научна метафизика (или космология, както тя предпочита да я нарича), то Джеймс вече се стреми към обединяването на познание и действие, като по този начин иска да преодолее традиционното разделение на сфери като наука и морал. Според Бучинска-Гаревич Шилер „акцентира на силно практичния, житейски характер на мисленето и познанието, а Джеймс преди всичко подчертава волевия и емоционалния характер на съзнанието“ (ibid.: 170). Докато при Пърс имаме опит за конструиране на научна метафизика, базирана на определени епистемологични принципи, като този на прагматизма, при Джеймс и Шилер виждаме насоченост към проблемите на индивида, към неговите лични потребности и интереси. Според Бучинска-Гаревич по този начин Джеймс разработва една оригинална метафизика, която прави възможно съсъществуването на индивид и свят: „Плурализмът е концепция за хаос, водещ до хармония… Хаосът се превръща в условие за индивидуална хармония“ (ibid.: 202–203). Плурализмът на Джеймс според полската изследователка се стреми към предоставянето на възможност на всеки индивид да се впише в тази универсална хармония, в тази вселена, в която има достатъчно място за спонтанност и случайност.

Джеймсовият прагматизъм е приет добре от полската философска общност дори по време на тоталитарния режим. Бучинска-Гаревич обаче се стреми към реалистичното му представяне, затова подлага на критика епистемологията на Джеймс, която според много историци на философията е слабото звено на неговия прагматизъм. Тя обръща специално внимание на тезата за връзката между полезност и истинност (така както е изразена в книгата му „Прагматизмът“), както и на концепцията за воля за вяра (съгласно едноименното есе). Според полската изследователка не можем да приемем подобна концепция, според която нашето вярване в определен смисъл „произвежда“ факти: „Ако е така, то се оказва, че всичко, в което вярваме, което представлява наше вярване, е в същото време и истинно“ (ibid.: 228–229). В книгата си, посветена специално на Джеймс, тя твърди: „Джеймсовата концепция за истината води до абсурдното заключение, че всяко съждение, което се превръща в мое вярване, или всяко съждение, което приемам, е истинно, като по този начин се заличава границата между съзнанието и истинното познание“ (Buczyńska-Garewicz 2001: 93). Психологизмът на Джеймс се изразява в това, че той анализира

понятието за вярване повече в психологическите му измерения, т.е. като свързано с чувствата на индивида, а не толкова в познавателен план. Бучинска-Гаревич заключава: „Прагматизмът редуцира истината до психични процеси и действия“ (Buczynska-Garewicz 1970: 219). Това твърдение е вярно, що се отнася до концепциите на Джеймс и Шилер. Трябва обаче да се има предвид, че както Пърс, така и Дюи отправят сериозни упреци към твърде фриволното използване на принципа на прагматизма от страна на Джеймс, поради което, както е добре известно, Пърс нарича своята концепция „прагматицизъм“ (CP 5.414).

Според полската изследователка снемането на съществената разлика между ценност и факт довежда до релативизация на познанието. Тя смята, че

> отъждествяването на истината с доброто, в което виждаме същността на прагматистката теория за истината, подрива основни идеи, свързани с понятието за истина, и води до цялостното му заличаване... Прагматистката концепция за истината може да се нарече антитеория за истината, или указание как да се елиминира това понятие и да се замени с категорията полезност. (ibid.: 236, 239)

Въпреки че Бучинска-Гаревич не демонстрира симпатии към определено течение или школа във философията, очевидно е, че тя напълно отхвърля т.нар. прагматистка теория за истината. Критиката ѝ в известна степен не е справедлива, защото не взема предвид многократно формулираните твърдения на Джеймс, че за него истината съществува обективно и независимо от всеки отделен субект и че това, което той би искал да подчертае, е фактът, че истината никога не е завършена, а се открива в рамките на определен процес. Истината не бива да се възприема като фиксирано понятие, нито като нещо, което „очаква“ да бъде открито от хората. Тя се постига чрез изследване и се формира в рамките на това изследване. Не може да се отрече, че някои идеи на Джеймс, изразени например в есето „Воля за вяра“ или книгата „Прагматизмът“, показват склонност към нетрадиционно и дори твърде свободно тълкуване на понятието за истина[3]. Нека обаче не забравяме, че Джеймс в своите философски трудове съзнателно полемизира с представители на абсолютния идеализъм, и особено с Ф. Брадли и Т. Грийн, отричайки тяхното разбиране за знанието като завършено и перманентно надграждащо се. По тази причина понякога той изглежда краен в своите възгледи, което Бучинска-Гаревич и не пропуска да спомене в своята книга. Тя все пак признава, че за прагматизма (на Джеймс и Шилер) въпросът за обективността на истината не стои на дневен ред. По-важно за

[3] Например следното твърдение: „Според принципа на прагматизма, ако хипотезата за Бога работи удовлетворително в най-широкия смисъл на думата, то тя е истинна. Опитът показва, че тя наистина работи, независимо от някои остатъчни трудности“ (Джеймс 1994: 146).

тях е какво следва да прави човек в един свят, пълен със случайности и възможности. Авторката използва някои тези на инструментализма на Дюи, за да заяви: „Прагматисткият свят е действителност на действия и инструменти, действителност на казионна полезност“ (ibid.: 322). Представеното заключение на Бучинска-Гаревич е доста крайно. То може да се обясни с доминиращия по това време диалектически материализъм, но в сравнение с критиката на Мелвил е далеч по-обективно и адекватно представя същността на Джеймсовия прагматизъм.

Както вече бе показано, според Бучинска-Гаревич класическите прагматисти целят преодоляване на традиционното разделение между ценност и факт. Те подчертават важността на действието, но не го обвързват с опит за промяна на действителността, а с придържането към нея и дори със стремежа тя да остане винаги една и съща. Според полската авторка „Прагматизмът е такава философия на действието, чиято главна цел може да бъде само най-добро приспособяване към статуквото. Това е философия на активността, формулираща като свой идеал примирението с наличното положение“ (ibid.: 11). От друга страна, според нея марксистката диалектика показва историческата необходимост от промяна в света. Според Бучинска-Гаревич действието винаги трябва да води до опит за промяна на съществуващото положение. Тя заявява:

> Прагматистката програма за рационализация на действието, базирана върху тезата за нормативното естество на мисълта, намира своята опозиция в марксистката диалектика на отрицанието. Адаптацията и революцията са двата противоположни идеала на прагматизма и марксизма. (ibid.: 333)

Прагматистката редукция, както тя твърди, означава свеждане на основната човешка дейност до действието. Тук трябва да се уточни, че действието наистина има голямо значение за всички класически прагматисти, но те винаги повтарят, че всяко действие трябва да бъде целенасочено. За разлика от Пърс и Джеймс, във Франция например последователите на философията на действието подчертават важността на човешката активност. В Италия т.нар. кръг Leonardini във Флоренция, воден от Дж. Папини, изтъква предимството на практиката пред теорията. Папини до известна степен е повлиян от Джеймсовото есе „Воля за вяра“, но всъщност се отдалечава от първоначалния замисъл на неговия автор[4]. В Полша също има философи, които се опитват да подчертаят ролята на действието, но те никога не се обявяват за прагматисти. От тази гледна точка Бучинска-Гаревич няма основание да говори за прагматизма като „философия на действието“, защото наблягането на действието не е негова отличителна характеристика.

[4] Относно рецепцията на прагматизма в Италия вж. Thayer 1968: 321–345.

Марксистката диалектика (както полската изследователка нарича диалектическия материализъм) много по-добре обяснява социално-икономическите процеси в съвременното общество, смята Бучинска-Гаревич. Няма как тя да бъде съчетана с прагматисткия редукционизъм: „Понятията за живот и действие са областта, в която прагматизмът се засича с марксизма. Въпреки това прагматисткият редукционизъм и марксистката диалектика са взаимно изключващи се“ (ibid.: 329). Следователно въпреки сходните теми прагматизмът и диалектическият материализъм приемат коренно различни подходи за анализ и изследване на човека като индивид и като обществена единица.

От казаното дотук става ясно, че Бучинска-Гаревич се стреми да представи класическия прагматизъм в цялото му разнообразие от идеи, методи и теми, без да го дефинира съобразно определени идеологически принципи. Много е важен фактът, че по времето на съществуване на т.нар. Желязна завеса все пак академичната общност в социалистическия блок има достъп до съвременни тенденции и дискусии във философията. Специално в Полша това осигурява непрекъснатост в рецепцията на класическия прагматизъм. Интересът към Дюи в тази страна води до няколко разработки, фокусирани върху възможността за обосноваване на своеобразна прагматистка естетика. Преведени са книги като „Демокрация и образование“ (1963) и „Изкуството като опит“ (1975). Кристина Вилкошевска публикува книгата „Изкуството като ритъм на живота. Реконструкция на философията на изкуството на Джон Дюи“ през 1988 г.[5] Вилкошевска днес е сред най-големите авторитети в областта на анализа на естетиката на Дюи. След 1989 г. са публикувани трудове върху делото на Мийд (Л. Кочанович), Рорти (М. Квиек, А. Шахай), семиотиката на Пърс (Т. Коменджински), а полски философи (Л. Кочанович, В. Малецки) са сред основните фигури в Централноевропейския прагматистки форум (CEPF)[6]. Всичко това осигурява подходящи условия за развиването на текущия дискурс по въпросите на прагматизма и неопрагматизма и позволява на академичната общност да бъде по-добре информирана за случващото се в средите на едно от най-популярните днес философски течения.

Заключение

В настоящата статия предложихме анализ на рецепцията на класическия прагматизъм по времето на тоталитарния режим в Полша (1945 –1989). Докато в СССР Юрий Мелвил се стреми да представи прагматизма, придържайки се към догматиката на диалектическия материализъм, в

[5] За повече информация относно възприемането на Дюи в Полша вж. Wilkoszewska.
[6] За повече подробности вж. Małecki.

Полша автори като Ч. Пърс, У. Джеймс, Дж. Дюи и Ф. Шилер се възприемат повече във философски, отколкото в идеологически план. Това се дължи на относителния философски плурализъм, характерен за Полша, който позволява провеждането на дълбоки философски дискусии без задължително придържане към нормите на диалектическия материализъм. Следствие от това е осигуряването на континуитет в рецепцията на прагматизма в Полша, който практически не е нарушен, освен в един сравнително кратък период, който тук наричаме „период на сталинизация". Не може да се отрече, че прагматизмът е част от философския дискурс в Полша благодарение на представители на Лвовско-Варшавската школа (Татаркиевич), на семиотици (Доброшиелски), на естетици (Вилкошевска) и най-вече на самостоятелната работа на Бучинска-Гаревич. Това показва, че дори по времето на тоталитарните режими в Източна Европа е възможно реализирането на нетрадиционни философски дебати, разбира се, с известни ограничения. Заслугата на Бучинска-Гаревич се крие в стремежа ѝ да представи класическия прагматизъм по възможно най-адекватния за времето си начин, като по този начин тя спомага за по-лесното запознаване на философите в Полша с философското течение и за неговата бърза популяризация след 1989 г.

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THE RECEPTION OF PRAGMATISM IN TOTALITARIAN POLAND

Nikolay Ivanov

Abstract

The article deals with the reception of classical pragmatism (Charles Peirce, William James) during the totalitarian rule in Poland (1945–1989). Despite the domination of some ideological dogmas, several renowned Polish researchers, among them Buczyńska-Garewicz, carry out research which is relatively free from ideological inclinations. This is due to the pluralism encompassing the philosophical community in Poland even during the totalitarian regime. After 1945 dialectical materialism dominates over Polish academic community, but in spite of that there are opportunities for performing open discussions. Thanks to that phenomenon, Buczyńska-Garewicz analyzes the pragmatism of Peirce and James without being restrained by the dogmatic principles of dialectical materialism, unlike the Soviet criticism of Western philosophy. The Polish author elaborates her own original interpretation, according to which pragmatism aims at overcoming the traditional dichotomy between values and facts by pragmatic reduction. This reduction, in Buczyńska-Garewicz's opinion, puts too much stress on action, thereby eradicating the concept of truth. The work of this Polish scholar makes the popularization of pragmatism possible in a country dominated by censure and ideological norms. As a consequence, pragmatism attracts some representatives of Polish philosophical community after the democratic change in 1989, which ensues in fruitful efforts to translate and research the classics of pragmatism.

THE FIRST STEPS OF PRAGMATISM IN BULGARIA. FROM IVAN SARAILIEV TO TODAY

Ivan Mladenov



Ivan Sarailiev as Diplomat in Bern, 4th of May, 1918

Ivan V. Sarailiev (1887–1969) was a pioneer convert to pragmatism, incorporating the pragmatic viewpoint in his writings as early as 1909. Born in an intellectual family, his father was a lawyer, who graduated from St. Petersburg University. Ivan Sarailiev studied in Paris under Bergson and graduated *summa cum laude* from the Sorbonne in 1909. Although he was fluent in French, English, and German, he wrote almost exclusively in Bulgarian. As a result, his achievements remained largely unknown. To make things worse, his work was heavily suppressed by the communists after they gained power in 1944. However, he might be the first disseminator of pragmatist ideas in South-Eastern Europe and, certainly, the first one in the Balkan.

After his graduation from the Sorbonne, Sarailiev spent a year in England where he had frequent discussions with F. C. S. Schiller (some of Schiller's letters to Sarailiev have survived). Upon his return to Bulgaria, Sarailiev taught at a Sofia high school for the next eleven years. In 1920, he was appointed assistant professor at the University of Sofia, where he became a tenured professor in 1927. Sarailiev's *On The Will* appeared in 1924. That same year Sarailiev returned to Britain where he met again with Schiller and attended H. W. Carr's course on Bergson. In 1934, he published a collection of papers on Bergson under the title *Essays. On some Unclear Moments in H. Bergson's Philosophy* (Sofia).

In 1931, about six years after his return from Britain, Sarailiev traveled to New York, where he spent a year as a Rockefeller fellow at Columbia University. At Columbia he discussed Peirce with William Pepperel Montague and with Dewey. In his diary, Sarailiev made a special note on the pronunciation of Peirce's name, and in 'Charles Sanders Peirce and his Principle', which was published in the Bulgarian journal *Outchilisten Pregled* (Sarailiev 1933) he made sure that the readers knew how to pronounce Peirce's name.

In March of the following year, Sarailiev went to Harvard where he met Ralph Barton Perry, Alfred N. Whitehead, George Allen Morgan, and James Bissett Pratt. Later that year he visited several other American universities. Upon his return to Europe, Sarailiev traveled first to Italy, where he met with several Italian pragmatists, and spent two years in Germany and Switzerland.

In the 1930s, Sarailiev gained recognition among Bulgarian intellectuals because of his debate with a well-known Bulgarian Professor, Dimiter Mikhalchev, on the dilemma between religion and science. Sarailiev used a pragmatic approach with semiotic influences to defend his view that life is not solely a product of physical causality. He argued that we live in a world of 'pre-thought' and that we live and act in accordance with *its* rules and laws rather than with physical ones. Those rules and laws do not contradict modern science but, rather, complete and prove its validity. Somewhat as Peirce had, Sarailiev sought to unify scientific and religious thought and to show how knowledge of God might be gained through hypothetical (or abductive) reasoning. Sarailiev set out his views on science and religion in two essays that were published as *Contemporary Science and Religion* (in Bulgarian, 1931 and 1932). With all this we can consider Ivan Sarailiev the first accomplished Bulgarian pragmatist.

In 1944, however, Sarailiev's career came to a sudden halt after the communists took power in Bulgaria. This brought an abrupt end to his extensive international travels, and immediately isolated him from the international scholarly community. In June of 1946, Sarailiev was elected president of the University of Sofia, but because of his unwillingness to cooperate with the communist authorities, he was compelled to resign within the year. Then he was asked to give up his pragmatist ideas and to teach Marxism. Again Sarailiev refused and was saved from the labor camps only because of his reputation as a scholar. A few years later, in 1950, Sarailiev was forced to retire, and he spent the rest of his life in almost complete isolation. He was banned from publishing and his previous publications were blacklisted. Even his name was classified. Sarailiev died peacefully but in total obscurity, in Sofia in 1969. There are few reliable documentary sources on his life and it is still difficult to obtain any of his books, articles, or papers. Sarailiev was all but erased from history.

This story of Ivan Sarailiev's life and work might not have been told were it not for a pure accident by which I stumbled upon one of his books. The book, entitled *Pragmatism* (in Bulgarian), was published in 1938. *Pragmatism,* with a photograph of the famous Ellen Emmet Rand portrait of William James for its frontispiece, is a remarkable book. It is an important record of Sarailiev's

involvement with the European spread of pragmatism and of his extensive travels in France, England, Germany, and the United States. It also provides a vivid snapshot of pragmatism at this critical period of Europe's history.

In the introduction, Sarailiev identified Peirce as the founder of pragmatism with a reference to the latter's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878). Sarailiev added, however, that this paper remained unnoticed until 1898, when William James published his "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results", in which he credited Peirce with the discovery of pragmatism. The further spread and the European premiere of pragmatism Sarailiev credits to Ferdinand Schiller, in particular his 1891 *Riddles of the Sphinx*.

Sarailiev found the greatest number of pragmatists in Italy, and he discusses Giovanni Papini, Mario Calderoni, Giovanni Vailati, and Giovanni Amendola. Sarailiev also includes a brief discussion of Mussolini. In the London newspaper, *Sunday Times* (April 1926), the Italian dictator expressed his gratitude to pragmatism by saying that it was of great help to his political career, and that he had learned from James that any action must be tested through its results rather than on doctrinal grounds. Mussolini continued: "James has inspired in me a trust in action and a will for living and fighting on which fascism has built its great success." To balance this, Sarailiev also quoted others who were enthusiastic about pragmatism, like the Russian revolutionist Vladimir Lenin. Sarailiev also made sure to include Giovanni Amendola, who died after being tortured by the fascists.

Sarailiev continued his overview of the European expansion of pragmatism with an outline of its influence in German speaking countries. Although weaker than in Britain and Italy, it had some influence; Sarailiev mentioned George Wobbermin, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Julius Goldstein, Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Ostwald, Georg Simmel, among others who were influenced by pragmatic ideas. He then continued to show how pragmatic ideas influenced several of the Logical Positivists in Vienna.

Sarailiev finally follows pragmatism to France, where it was met with more appreciation and played a role in the development of a new religious philosophy founded by Alfred Loisy and George Tyrell. In the 1930s, Sarailiev continued, with further contributions from thinkers such as Maurice Blondel, Laberthonière, Le Roy and others, this developed into a French movement for a renewal of philosophy and religion known as 'modernism'.

The introduction is followed by the essay "Charles Sanders Peirce and his Principle" as well as essays on the pragmatism of James, the humanism of Schiller, and the instrumentalism of Dewey. Also included are an essay on Italian pragmatism, a conclusion, and a supplement with an essay on the meaning of the words 'pragmatism', the adjective 'pragmatic', and Peirce's term 'pragmaticism'. The book is concluded with a lightly annotated and remarkably complete bibliography of pragmatic thought in 20 pages.

Sarailiev's account of pragmatism's invasion of Europe is scrupulously researched and very well written. He described pragmatism as a new theory of

truth, marked its crucial points, and concluded that after the death of its chief representatives the debate about it had begun to fade away.

Also in his own work Sarailiev followed a model of thinking that exemplified Peirce's 'logic of science'. In his *Genetic Ideas* (1919), his *Socrates* (1947), and in his debate on science and religion, he closely followed the pragmatists' doctrine for the clarification of meaning.

Under more fortunate circumstances, Sarailiev would have enjoyed an influence, perhaps a great influence. Instead, he suffered under harsh political persecution and was forced to be a social outcast. His thought was suppressed and was left to drift in the darkness of the following ignorant decades. As Peirce understood so well, thought must not be imprisoned in the monastery of a single consciousness, but it must be let out to fight in the street with other thoughts – for the sake of truth.

'The drift in darkness' continued for decades till the fall of communism in Bulgaria. It was not before then when the first writings on pragmatism became possible. But maybe it is worth noting that the first ever penetration of pragmatist ideas in Bulgaria occurred as early as in 1902 with the appearance of William James' book *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* translated from Russian (see James 1902). This alone is an amazing fact having in mind that talks in the US about pragmatism at that time were just growing wings. The interest to James' and especially to Dewey's pragmatism in Bulgaria continued after The First World War, for example, three lectures from James under the title *What is Pragmatism* were translated and published in 1930 (see James 1930). Pragmatism came as the third big philosophical tendency that influenced Bulgarian philosophy till the First World War after the German and French schools. In the interwar period the impact of Dewey's education methods was considerable with the translation of many of his articles. Still, there was hardly a pragmatic philosopher in Bulgaria before Ivan Sarailiev.

The span between Sarailiev and next writings on pragmatism in Bulgaria stretched over three decades. Scattered mentionings of pragmatist's names can be found in the writings of several Bulgarian philosophers such as Atanas Iliev, Asen Kiselinchev, Ceko Torbov, Sava Ganovski, Todor Pavlov, Ljuben Sivilov and others. Those were mainly officially critics of pragmatism from the standpoint of the ruling Marxist ideology. The first large presentation of Peirce's thought after the fall of the communist regime occurred in the introduction of a two-volume collection of semiotic papers *The Matter of Thought* and *Between Objects & Words* (Mladenov, ed. 1991). Several articles on Peirce's thought followed, as well as conferences and translations of few of his most-known essays. I started teaching Peirce's thought as early as 1994 and continue till today. This became possible, after my two-year stay in Bloomington as a Fulbright researcher, when I worked with Thomas Sebeok, and took the once-only postdoctoral course on Peirce given by Nathan Houser from the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University. Occasionally I return to Peirce Edition Project some more times, including a second stay on a Fulbright grant in 2010. Finally in 2006

my book on some of Peirce's ideas was published under the title *Conceptualizing Metaphors. On Charles Peirce's Marginalia*. The book was translated and published also in Japanese in 2012. Thus, the road for the new undertaking of Peirce's ideas was paved and a whole new generation of young scholars took it. As a great example I would mentioned a new book by a Doctoral student of mine, Andrey Tashev on the first penetrating and spreading of pragmatism in Bulgaria and the ideas of Ivan Sarailiev, which appeared in 2013.

The recent discovery of Sarailiev's work most assuredly confirms, at least, that no authority can hope to forever 'fix' the truth. A good example might be the renaissance of Sarailiev's contribution. Several conferences on his behalf, some with international participation, took part in Sofia. His books were reprinted and used as textbooks or introductions to pragmatism at the Bulgarian universities. Doctoral theses and books on his thought were published, slowly but steadily he gained the reputation he was declined through his lifetime. It is an open question whether today's digging out of Sarailiev represents a pure accident, or resumes a logical end of a human attitude best described in Peirce's beloved quotation of Shakespeare:

> Proud man,
> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
> His glassy essence.

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Abstract

The article represents an account of the first steps of Charles Peirce's philosophy in Bulgaria. It mainly rests on the work of Ivan V. Sarailiev (1887–1969), a pioneer convert to pragmatism, incorporating the pragmatic viewpoint in his writings as early as 1909. Under more fortunate circumstances, Sarailiev would have enjoyed an influence, perhaps a great influence. Instead, he suffered under harsh political persecution and was forced to be a social outcast. His thought was suppressed and was left to drift in the darkness of the following ignorant decades. However, the first ever penetration of pragmatist ideas in Bulgaria occurred in 1902 with some translation work of William James. At that time the ideas of pragmatism even in America were in its embryonic stage.

Част II
ОТКЛОНЕНИЯ – КОНЦЕПТУАЛИЗИРАНИ

Part II
DEVIATIONS – CONCEPTUALIZED

„ПРАГМАТИСТКИ ПРОЧИТ“ (ИВАН МЛАДЕНОВ) И „РЕКОНСТРУКЦИЯ“ (МИХАИЛ НЕДЕЛЧЕВ): ЛИТЕРАТУРНАТА ИСТОРИЯ В БЪЛГАРИЯ *REVISITED*

Мари Врина-Николов

За литературния историк 2011-а е особена година, почти събитие, тъй като тя ни подари два съвсем различни по подход, визия и концептуализация труда – „Отклонена литература. Прагматистки прочит“ от Иван Младенов, литературовед и семиотик (БАН), и „Литературноисторическата реконструкция“ от Михаил Неделчев, литературен историк и критик (НБУ), и двамата утвърдени теоретици.

Както подсказва самото заглавие, „Отклонена литература. Прагматистки прочит“ е книга, замислена и реализирана като монография (а не като сборник статии), чийто подход следва принципите на философията на Чарлс Пърс: „Като използва абдуктивния метод на американския философ Чарлс Пърс, заедно с оригиналните му доктрини, тази книга се стреми да създаде обтекаема, проверима и гъвкава концепция за цялостното развитие на българската литература от възникването ѝ до днес“ (Младенов 2011: VII).

Става дума за опит за концептуализиране на българската *литература*. Тази книга не предлага – и няма такава претенция, нито цел – цялостна история на българската литература, но задава за първи път и по нов начин редица основни въпроси.

„Литературноисторическата реконструкция“, от своя страна, представлява сборник студии, събрани под общия мотив за реконструкцията: „Литературната история е творение. Тя трябва да бъде разказана и разказвана, тя трябва да бъде написана и преутвърждавана. Не е достатъчно тя да се случва в реалния литературен живот. Трябва да се появява измислящият я литературен историк“ (Неделчев 2011: 9).

Става дума за концептуализиране на българската *литературна история*, за необходимостта и възможностите тя да съществува и да се твори. Следователно двата труда се различават по своя обект, поради което те се допълват, задават различни или пресичащи се въпроси и отварят интересни изследователски перспективи пред литературния историк.

В рамките на тази статия ще се спра на един въпрос, засегнат по различен начин от двамата автори: Как да се отчете „непрекъснатата прекъснатост“ (Неделчев 2011: 13) или „несекващата наличност“ (Младенов 2011: 228)? Въпрос, който на свой ред поставя под съмнение както отдавна приети в българската литературна историография понятия, като „ускорено развитие“ и „закъснялост“, така и „големия наратив“ или „констелацията“ (Кирова 2009: 12) от микростудии като подходяща и възможна форма на една бъдеща литературна история.

Иска ми се и да се опитам да подложа на изпитанието на един внимателен сравнителен прочит интересната теза на Иван Младенов за съществуването на „раблезианска линия“ в българската литература, „родоначалник“ на която той вижда в Софроний Врачански и неговото „Житие и страдания грешнаго Софрония“.

Литература и историчност: апология на „големия наратив“

След „История на българската литература“ от Светлозар Игов (2001), написана преди промените, но издадена след тях, няма цялостна литературна история, която да обхваща времето от появата на първите текстове, написани на старославянски на територията на българското царство, до днес. За сметка на това не липсва „констелация“ (Кирова 2009) от студии, чийто списък се увеличава значително през последните години най-вече с множеството трудове, издадени от Пламен Дойнов и посветени главно на „литературата на НРБ“.

За Милена Кирова, изглежда, самата форма на „големия наратив“ е свързана с отминал канон, но без авторката да обоснове това свое мнение:

> Иначе казано, борбата за реформиране на канона трябва да започне от борбата за нови подходи към идеята за литературна история. На първо място тук според мен биха могли да попаднат усилията по разграждане на традиционната монолитност, по пренаписване на „българската литературна история“ като констелация от литературни истории, всяка от тях съсредоточена в свой кръг от автори, проблеми и теми. (пак там: 12)

„Литературноисторическият реконструктивизъм“, за който апелира Михаил Неделчев, „е литературоведско поведение, което носи в себе си уважението и респекта към големия литературноисторически наратив, но знае за неговите хронически болести“. Преди това обаче той определя този голям наратив като „крайно струпище“, „консервативната утопия за една окончателност и неизменност на отложената в паметта литература. Той е едновременно жив и подвижен, твърд и мъртъв“ (Неделчев 2011: 11).

По-нататък в своите „Тезиси за литературната история“ Михаил Неделчев на няколко пъти се опитва да определи мястото на големия наратив в своя подход. Той не го отхвърля априори, но не му дава и предимство

пред частния сюжет: „Драмата на литературноисторическото е в невъзможното, но необходимо съотнасяне на литературноисторическия сюжет към големия наратив. Много често някои литературноисторически сюжети стърчат, сякаш не се побират в големия наратив“ (пак там: 13).

Той предупреждава, че големият наратив рискува да прикрие „непрекъснатата прекъснатост в ходовете на литературноисторическото. [...] Всяка завършена, направена, написана литературна история е скрито/прикрито телеологическа. [...] Периодично националните литературни истории търсят телеологизма на своята завършеност“ (пак там).

Иван Младенов обособява своя „шахматен“ подход като логично произтичащ от избрания метод: „Според избрания метод развитието на българската литература не е проследено линеарно, а *шахматно*, на *проби*, които обхващат основните ѝ жанрове“ (Младенов 2011: VII).

При него отказването от линеарния голям наратив е свързано с желанието му да не „фиксира“ литературата, а напротив – да проследи нейните напрежения и динамика: „Вместо за система, в която отделните компоненти са статизирани като участници, се говори за подвижна и отворена концепция, която може да бъде допълвана, доработвана и изменяна“ (пак там).

И двамата ратуват за отвореност, динамичност, нетелеологичност.

Струва ми се, че се бъркат две различни явления, които често се срещат заедно и преплетени, но ще видим, че принципно може да съществуват независимо едно от друго – цялостният обхват на една литература (в случая българската литература от IX до XXI в.), от една страна, и линеарната (телеологична по дефиниция) хронология, от друга.

Във френската рефлексия за литературната история – която през 60-те и 70-те години на XX в. в лицето първо на Ролан Барт разклати из основи историята на литературата, каквато са я писали и преподавали преди – наблюдаваме от началото на XXI в. известна реабилитация на литературната история и имплицитно – на големия наратив. Това се прави в името на неразривната връзка между литературна история, литературна теория и предаването на литературното наследство на поколенията, която изисква да обсъждаме самия обект „литература“ в неговата връзка с историята. Нуждата от преосмислена, „реконструирана“, концептуализирана цялостна литературна история от нов тип е очевидна за всеки университетски преподавател, който установява рисковете от зеещи липси, породени от изключителното натрупване на „констелации“ без нужното съпоставяне в историческа перспектива.

От друга страна, днес е несъмнено, че такава цялостна литературна история не трябва да се придържа към „логичния“, причинно-следствен, телеологичен ред. Това е впрочем извор на противоречие в голямата „История на българската литература“, написана от Светлозар Игов. В увода авторът отхвърля телеологичността, която обаче не успява да избегне.

Така че в българския случай, ако има нужда от апология (Неделчев 2011), това е апология не на литературната история изобщо – тя има силно

присъствие в научния живот от началото на нашия век, – а на цялостна история на българската литература. Липсата на такава е стряскаща, когато я съпоставим с десетките трудове, посветени на френската литература от възникването ѝ до днес, публикувани от края на миналия век във Франция и САЩ. Част от тях предлагат нова визия и подход към литературната история (Vrinat-Nikolov 2013).

Струва ми се, че френският литературовед, професор по френска литература в New York University Дени Олие показва как е възможно големият литературноисторически наратив да придобие динамична структура, която да не затваря литературата във фиксиран, „статизиращ" хронологичен ред (Hollier 1991: XIX). Ръководеният от него сборник „За френската литература", която – според същия сборник – „започва" през 778 г. и „завършва" през 1989 г., е съставен от 206 самостоятелни есета, подредени хронологично. Пречупвайки обаче „големия национален разказ" и неговите наративни условности, като цяло тези есета поставят под въпрос самата представа за исторически континуум:

> Всяко есе е въведено от конкретна дата с препратка към дадено събитие, нещо като епиграф, който служи повече за хронологичен маркер, отколкото за да определя съдържанието. Събитието може да е литературно – първо издание на оригинална творба, на превод, лансиране на списание, създаване на пиеса, смърт на писател и т.н. [...] Твърде малка част от тези статии са написани като монография. Изобщо, няколко автори могат да съжителстват в една статия и, обратно, един автор може да се яви в различни статии. (ibid.)

Целта на тази организация е „да предизвика срещи, съвпадения, отзвуци, нови избликвания", да посочи „сходства и промени". Такова оригинално представяне на една литература чрез дати, които служат за символи и претексти, е наистина интелектуално съблазнително, тъй като със своята вътрешна логика, но и със самостоятелността на есетата, които го съставляват, позволява по-свободен прочит. Вместо да предложи „голям и строен наратив", то изисква от читателя да участва активно, като сглоби сам своя собствен разказ за френската литература.

Тази парадигма се прилага и в „История на белгийската френскоезична литература", издадена през 2003 г.:

> Всичко това предполага множество гледни точки към обекта „белгийска литература", ако искаме да обгърнем различните ѝ профили. Поради тази причина настоящата история на белгийската литература не представлява традиционната периодизация по епохи или жанрове. Избраният подход, който следва принципа на Дени Олие [...] позволява да изследваме историята на белгийската книжнина от освобождението на страната до днес чрез редица дати-ориентири или събития, които според нас заслужават специфично внимание, защото заемат значимо място в развитието на тази литература. (Bertrand, Biron, Denis et Grutman 2003: 16)

Избраното събитие е внимателно проследено в по-широк контекст – културен, естетически, политически, дори международен, като непрекъснато са застъпени литературното и социополитическото. Авторите наблягат на факта, че при такъв организационен принцип, който спазва хронологичния ред,

> за разлика от традиционния разказ, временната последователност не налага логичен или причинно-следствен ред. Всяка статия представлява кратко есе или кратка монография, която е самостоятелна и невинаги е свързана с предишните или следващите статии. Този подход, който е нетелеологичен и интердисциплинарен благодарение на разнообразието на интегрираните гледни точки, се вписва в актуалната рефлексия за литературната историография. (ibid.: 17)

С други думи, и като първоначално заключение, в словосъчетанието „голям исторически разказ" това, което е под въпрос, не е прилагателното „голям" (в смисъл на цялостен), а съществителното „разказ", който предполага линеарност и стриктна последователност.

Историчност и литература: проблематично развитие и универсалност

„Отклонена литература" се противопоставя на тезата за „развитие", в частност на „ускореното" развитие, застъпена още в началото на XX в. от кръга *Мисъл* и обект през 1964 г. на прочутото изследване на руския литературовед с български корени Георгий Гачев „Ускорено развитие на литературата, опит за теоретична история на българската литература от първата половина на XIX в.", оказало дълбоко и трайно влияние върху българското литературознание, както отбелязва акад. Динеков в увода към българското издание на книгата (Гачев 2003). Още в края на XX в. тази теза е оспорвана в България от Никола Георгиев, който лаконично, но точно възразява: „Скоростомер за литературния процес няма, така че за ускорено развитие на литературата през XIX в. не може да се говори поне в полето на литературната наука" (Георгиев 1999: 395).

На тезата за ускореното развитие на литературата, която предполага някакво „нормално темпо" (кое?, чие?) и абсолютен телеологизъм, при което като мерило на литературните постижения в различните култури се явяват тесен кръг западни литератури, и на широко разпространената представа за българската литература като закономерно прекъсната от чужди владичества и войни в своя „естествен" ход, Иван Младенов противопоставя идеята за една винаги „налична" литература, макар и понякога латентна, с по-голям или по-малък потенциал, с по-голяма или по-малка видимост и обхват. Ключово понятие за мисленето на българската литература като *непрекъсната,* било присъстваща и наблюдаема, било латентна, което из-

яснява и понятията „отклонена литература“, „норма“, „универсалност“, се явява „припомнената чуждост“:

> През различни общи периоди на духовно развитие се натрупват ценности, които се запазват в колективната памет на големи групи хора. В резултат на значителни исторически събития, войни, чужди агресии, завладявания, те биват внезапно осветявани – припомняни, припознавани, вече нито само като свои, нито само като чужди. Припомня се онова, от което е станало отклонението. Някогашният общ ценностен пласт се изтласква в колективната неосъзнатост на общества, които вече не принадлежат нито към времето, когато този ценностен пласт е бил натрупан и съхранен, нито към същата голяма група от хора. (Младенов 2011: 68–69)

Универсалното в литературата, мислено не като обикновено противопоставяне на „локално“, а като следа от много литератури, които са били в контакт или са съжителствали във всяка една като припомняне за тях – не сме далече, мисля, от „поетиката на разнообразното“, заявена от писателя и литературовед Едуар Глисан: „Ние знаем, че пишем в присъствието на всички езици на света, даже да не знаем нито един“ (Glissant 1996: 40). Поетиката на разнообразното е поетика на ризома, т.е. на връзката между мястото, където се ражда литературната творба, и света, връзка, създадена от и във самата творба. Ако съчетаем двете концепции, можем да заявим, че именно припомнената чуждост придава универсалност на българската литература в смисъл, че така тя се свързва с литературите на света. Универсалността не е въпрос на „общочовешки“ теми, както пишат журналистите, които се смятат за критици, а на литературен език и писане.

Раблезианска ли е „раблезианската линия“ в българската литература

Една от тезите, заявени в „Отклонена литература“, е тази за наличието на „раблезианска линия“ в българската литература, прокарана от Софроний Врачански и неговото „Житие и страдания грешнаго Софрония“. След като цитира Георгий Гачев, който твърди, че „житието и плутовският роман не са чак толкова различни, както може да изглежда на пръв поглед (Гачев 2003: 88), Иван Младенов уточнява:

> Не, тук има нещо раблезианско, което споява композицията. [...] Тенденцията към привикване (habit-taking-tendency), към която тя [българската бразда на реализъм] клони, е на *раблезианско осмиване, отхвърляне на канони и спасяване, в името на насладата от живота тук, на земята.* [...] С други думи, раблезианското, както го нарекохме, въпреки чуждия си произход, сигнализира наличие на цял спектър от български качества – склонност към гръмко осмиване на църковните канони, здрав скептицизъм, жизнелюбие. (Младенов 2011: 92)

На пръв поглед тезата изглежда примамлива и интересна, както го заявих в предговора към „Отклонена литература“ (Врина-Николов 2011: 5). След задълбочен сравнителен прочит на „Житие и страдания грешнаго Софрония“ и на „Пантагрюел“ и „Гаргантюа“ от Франсоа Рабле бих нюансирала това твърдение.

Че „Житие и страдания грешнаго Софрония“ е новаторска творба в българската литература, е безспорно. Както знаем, тя е основополагаща на два жанра, свидетелстващи за възникването на Аза в тази литература през XIX в. – на автобиографията (тя е първата, която не е написана нито на църковнославянски, нито на латински, а на език, близък до онзи български, който се е говорил по времето на Софроний) и донякъде на изповедта. Нещо повече, Софроний, разбира се, със самото заглавие на творбата си я вписва в определена традиция – тази на средновековните жития, – като, от друга страна, нарушава канона на същата традиция, но и „канона“ на устната епическа и юнашка традиция. Да, Софроний се представя като „антигерой“, като страхливец, човек земен, телесните мъчения при него надвишават душевните и духовните грижи, ужасът от смъртта е по-силен от надеждата за вечен живот след смъртта, в която всеки духовен човек би трябвало да вярва; да, от време на време долавяме много тънка хумористична струна, но… достатъчно ли е това, за да твърдим, че той поставя началото на „раблезианска бразда“ в българската литература? Според мен не. Неговата поетика и внушение, трагични, защото разказва за трагични, „смутни времена“ (Вера Мутафчиева), нямат нищо общо с поетиката и внушението на Рабле, който впрочем, както и Софроний, известно време е бил духовник. При Рабле, както показва и блестящият анализ на Михаил Бахтин, става дума за дебелашки, карнавален, народен смях (Bakhtine 1970) и хедонизъм: героите му непрекъснато плюскат, пият, отдават се с радост на сексуални игри, със същата радост облекчават своите физиологични нужди (много е богата лексиката за изпражненията и гениталните органи при него). Обемът на съответните творби – 28 страници за един цял живот при Софроний, 150 в „Пантагрюел“ – свидетелства за това, че при първия най-важното са действията, събитийността, но и най-ярките елементи от разказваната случка, без излишни подробности, докато Рабле направо се любува на повторения, подробности, синоними, описания. Четири реда са достатъчни на разказвача на „Житието“, за да спомене за своето раждане и смъртта на майка си. Същите събития заемат цели седем страници в „Пантагрюел“. Жизнерадостта, която избликва от творбите на Рабле, простодушният смях, съпътстващ политическото, църковното и социалното „гръмко осмиване“, отсъстват от страниците на „Житие и страдания грешнаго Софрония“. Разказвачът държи на живота, постоянно го е страх от смъртта, въпреки че този живот е представен като низ от мъки и страдания, и то още със самото му раждане, което причинява смъртта на майка му. Ако Софроний нарушава „канона“ на юнашкото и епическото, Рабле със склонността си към извънмерното и гротесковото,

с пародиите на античния епос и на Стария завет нарушава „канона“ на добрия вкус и приетата мяра в езика и поетиката на литературата. Част от тази поетика намираме наистина, както отбелязва Иван Младенов, при Каравелов („Българи от старо време“) и Алеко Константинов („Бай Ганю“) с още една характеристика, която ми се вижда важна в българската литература – „словесен хедонизъм“, наслада от самото слово, нещо като „Говоря, следователно съществувам“. Тази особеност е типична за някои герои на Каравелов, Константинов, даже на Вазов („Чичовци“) и, по-близо до нас, на Ивайло Петров („Хайка за вълци“) и Йордан Радичков, при когото словото придобива дори плът и кръв:

> Чичо Гаврил много смело боравеше с всякакви думи, не помня дума да го е изплашила, колкото и непозната да е. Всички останали пред вида на непознатата и странна дума се стъписваха или минаваха на пръсти край нея, сякаш това не бе дума, а смок, усойница или пепелянка, свита коварно в тревата. Чичо Гаврил обаче хващаше храбро думата за опашката, плющеше из въздуха с нея и тъй я вместваше в речта си, че тя заставаше там и оставаше за вечни времена. Много по-късно разбрах, че тайната му се състоеше в това, че одухотворяваше всяка една дума, опитомяваше я, вземаше я под свое покровителство. (Радичков 1980)

Но да се върнем към Софроний и към тълкуването на Георгий Гачев. Иван Младенов го цитира, но го измества в посока към раблезианското, докато за Георгий Гачев:

> В цялата тази отчаяна борба за живот нещо май не се забелязва много традиционният лик на житиен герой. Затова пък неочаквано за нас изпъкват черти, близки до героя от европейския авантюрно-битов, *плутовски* роман. Софрониевото „Житие“ е такова продължение на агиографичния жанр, основния жанр на средновековната литература, което го минира отвътре и създава нов жанр [...] Земният, безидейният практицизъм е заменил отвъдната идейност на религията. (Гачев 2003: 88–89)

И така, Георгий Гачев открива в „Житието“ на Софроний „близки черти“ с цяла поредица романи, като „Дон Кихот“, „Хромият Дявол“ и „Жил Блас“. Действително това е първата творба в българската литература, която представя приключенията, патилата и митарствата на един „обикновен“ човек, който се бори срещу превратностите на съдбата, като тази борба го изтласква извън пределите на обществото. В плутовския роман, често представен като мнима автобиография, разказвачът е по принцип маргинален антигерой, произхождащ от по-нисшите слоеве на обществото, който безпомощно е поставен във вихъра на действия и събития, описани с реализъм. Пропит е със същия фатализъм, песимизъм, социална сатира и чувство за наказание свише, които излъчва „Житието“ на Софроний. Някои наративни и идейни елементи кулминират в българската литература петде-

сетина години по-късно в първите повести от втората половина на XIX в., като „Нещастна фамилия“ от Васил Друмев (1860) и „Изгубена Станка“ от Илия Блъсков (1865). И още по-късно – в „Записките“ на Захари Стоянов.

Но нека не говорим за „плутовска“ линия в българската литература, за да избегнем риска – все още често наблюдаван – от неправомерно прилагане на чужди критерии (винаги „западни“ или руски, като че ли италианската, испанската, френската, немската, английската или руската литература са универсални мерила за всички литератури в „Световната Република на писмеността“ (Casanova 1999).

Накрая ще се върна там, откъдето започнах – от 2011 г. и появата на два труда, посветени на концептуализирането на българската литература и литературна история. Тази двойна, едновременна поява, както и „констелацията“ от научни трудове, посветени на даден автор, епоха, събитие, направление, публикувани от началото на XXI в., потвърждават постулата на Михаил Неделчев: „Литературната история се възстановява, регенерира, след като голямата криза отмине, след като поредното методологическо усъмняване се обезсмисли – дори и след като разпадът сякаш е бил извършен и завършен“ (Неделчев 2011: 9–10).

„Отклонена литература“ и „Литературноисторическата реконструкция“ (както и „Тезиси по историята на новата българска литература“ от Никола Георгиев) задават теоретични, концептуални и методологични въпроси, които днешният литературен историк не може да подмине… до следващата „голяма криза“, която ще породи нови въпроси и ще очертае нови посоки за размисъл.

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"PRAGMATIST OVERVIEW" (IVAN MLADENOV) AND "RECONSTRUCTION" (MIHAIL NEDELCHEV): THE BULGARIAN LITERARY HISTORY *REVISITED*

Marie Vrinat-Nikolov

Abstract

For the historian of Bulgarian literature, 2011 is a meaningful year, perhaps even an event in itself, since during that year two pieces of work were written that differ in their approach, their vision and their conceptualization: *Deviated Literature. A Pragmatist Overview* by Ivan Mladenov and *Literary-historical Reconstruction* by Mihail Nedelchev, both prominent theorists.

These two texts challenge literary history as a "grand narrative", arguing it is fated to be both teleological and rigid. Since the beginning of the 21st century, one can notice the publication of a consequent amount of studies which focus on particular aspect of Bulgarian literature (what Milena Kirova called "constellation" of micro-studies).

In this text, I would like to make an apology of the "grand narrative", that is to say of a literary history that accounts for a literature in its entirety, arguing that the teleological vision can be avoided by using an appropriate organization. For this purpose, I rely on *A New History of French Literature*, edited by Denis Hollier.

I also discuss some important concepts and theses that Ivan Mladenov has examined in his book, as "Deviated literature *vs* Accelerated", "Evoked estrangement", and the thesis of a "Rabelais' influence" in Bulgarian literature.

SEMIOTICS AND THE ACADEMY: AT THE TRANSMODERN HEART OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE[1]

John Deely

As far as concerns intellectual culture, perhaps, no revolution has greater importance than the one that took root in the early 17th century, marked so dramatically by the trial and condemnation of Galileo for teaching the twin heresies that the earth is not the center of the universe and that the sun does not revolve around the earth. It was a bad day not only for religious authorities, students of scripture, and theologians, but also for "common sense". For, as Luther pointed out, any man with eyes to see can tell that – just as the Scriptures tell us[2] – it is the sun and not the earth that moves "as if someone moving by carriage or by ship thought himself to be stationary and the land and trees to be moving. But", he added[3], concerning the work of Copernicus on whose shoulders Galileo stood:

> One who wants to appear clever cannot go along with what everyone seems to observe; he must come up with something different. So this clever soul, who wants to turn the whole science of astrology[4] upside down. Yet even in those difficult matters I put my faith in the Sacred Scriptures, for Joshua commanded the sun to stand still, and not the earth.

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[1] For my definition of "transmodernity", I am indebted directly to conversations with Farouk Seif.

[2] The passages are set out in Deely 2001a: Chap. 11, esp. 494, text and note 11.

[3] Entry no. 4638, dated 4 June 1539, in Luther 1538–1540: 412–413: "De novo quodam astrologo fiebat mentio, qui probaret terram moveri et non coelum, solem et lunam, ac si quis in curru aut navi moveretur, putaret se quiescere et terram et arbores moveri. Aber es gehet ikunder also: Wer do wil klug sein, der sol ihme nichts lassen gefallen, das andere achten; er mus ihme etwas eigen machen, sicut ille facit, qui totam astrologiam invertere vult. Etiam illa confusa tamen ego credo sacrae scripturae, nam Iosua iussit solem stare, non terram."

[4] The distinction between "astrology" as divination and "astronomy" as science would only later become established, the term "astrology" covering both in Luther's time. From the OED: <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12267?redirectedFrom=astrology&>: "With the rise of modern science from the Renaissance onwards, the modern semantic distinction between astrology n. and astronomy n. gradually developed, and had become largely fixed by the [late] 17th cent." The situation is comparable to the reluctant transition from "teleology" to "teleonomy" (see Deely 2001a: 65–66), or from "final causality" to "ideal causality" as rather "extrinsic formal causality" in today's discussion of how signs *qua* signs work (see Deely 1994a, 1994b, 2014a).

1. The demise of "common sense" as an unresolved problem

Of all the victims of this fiasco known as "the Galileo Affair", "common sense" was by far the hardest hit. To this day it has not managed to regain a serious semblance of credibility in learned circles. The 18th century attempt by Reid (1764) to identify, as the *Oxford English Dictionary* summarized, a "complement of cognitions or convictions which we receive from nature: which all men therefore possess in common; and by which they test the truth of knowledge, and the morality of actions", fell by the wayside, for reasons I have elsewhere discussed (Deely 2001a: 548, 552n12); and the common Enlightenment view, namely, that knowledge scientific in the modern sense – based on systematic observation, experiment, using instruments, and mathematization – could ultimately replace all of prescientific human opinions, became the accepted view. And indeed today who would trust an opinion that has not received something of scientific scrutiny?

Yet there remains at the heart of human knowledge an unresolved problem, a problem that the rise of modern science serves rather to underscore than to resolve. This problem is the inescapable conundrum that, unless human awareness as preceding all scientific training and refinement – that bodily awareness with which each of us begins upon escaping the environment of the womb (and indeed no doubt to some measure even before such emancipation) – has *some validity* in its own right, then even nothing of science can truly be knowledge, inasmuch as to begin the study of science we must already have this common awareness of human animals out of which the development even of science as species-specifically human becomes possible in the first place. Frederik Stjernfelt has put the matter plainly in semiotic terms. Contrary to the thesis of mainstream modern "epistemology" and "critical philosophy" (what Leibniz [1704: 64] aptly termed "the Way of Ideas") that human knowledge begins and ends in mental self-representations thrown up by mind's own activity, in order for it to be true that the Way of Signs "leads everywhere in nature" (Emmeche 1994: 126), it must also be true that "science is continuous with everyday knowledge which is, in turn, continuous with animal cognition and so on indefinitely down the scale of evolution" (Stjernfelt 2007: 8).

In the early modern philosophers, notably Berkeley and Hume, this problem never came to be recognized as such. Instead, they assumed that mental representation was the beginning of *all* awareness, an assumption that led to the famous "problem of the external world", for even though they followed by preference Locke rather than Descartes, yet they failed to observe or comment upon *the fatal assumption that Locke shared* with Descartes in his belief that the direct objects of our apprehension are mental representations formed by our own minds. The "problem of the external world" arose in modernity from just this assumption – that the mind itself makes whatever is the direct and immediate object of our awareness. Locke and Descartes identified this immediate object with ideas, and Kant rejected this as "too subjective", as "subjectivism". But in proposing his alternate solution of the senses as giving rise to phenomena

distinct from the things provoking sensation, phenomena to which reason then by its a-priori forms contributes objective necessary structure, Kant thought to preserve the universality of scientific knowledge. Yet his "objectivism" was no less idealistic than was the criticized subjectivism of Descartes and Locke, that is to say, Kant's own view was no less divorced from an awareness "scientific" in the sense of giving us an actual knowledge of the "way things are" in their subjective constitution and intersubjective relations obtaining independently of whether we are aware of them or not.

2. Cryptosemiotics, an historical interlude

No wonder semiotics was forced underground, as it were, in the modern interval (what has come to be called, after Sebeok, the "cryptosemiotic interlude") (Deely 2006), for the very theory of knowledge or "epistemology" upon which the leading modern philosophers all agreed as the starting point of human knowledge (see Deely 2009a, 2013) already presupposed that the Way of Signs did not exist as a route in its own right. For the Way of Signs is a path that categorically rejects the idea that only mental representations of whatever sort are the immediate final terminus of knowledge. On the contrary, the Way of Signs reveals a path that, as we cited from Emmeche above (1994: 126), "leads everywhere in nature, including those domains where humans have never set foot". And that idea proves incompossible with the so-called "epistemology" which modern philosophy came to call their various theories of knowledge united in the common assumption that representation is somehow the heart and essence of human knowing. This notion of epistemology as the *ne plus ultra* for modern philosophy, thus, becomes for semiotics no more that a "midmost target" (Sebeok 1991: 2); for what the doctrine of signs reveals is precisely what Peirce calls the "meaningless surplusage" (from CP 5.525, c. 1905) in the Kantian notion of things as "unknowable in themselves". The problem is not the things in themselves. The problem rather is the *theory* of knowledge which makes of them something "unknowable". That is a thesis that the natural sciences in their modern development never fully bought into, unlike the philosophers. The doctors studying cancer want to know precisely what this deformation of cells is as it occurs whether we understand it or not, precisely because only by our coming to know it can we then come to do something about it, namely, *cure* the cancer, precisely according to the formula for these matters that Thomas Aquinas (following Aristotle on the point) proposed well before the modern era opened: human understanding of the way things are constituted in their own being becomes practical by extension[5].

[5] Aquinas 1266: *Summa theologiae* I, Ques. 79, Art. 11, *sed contra*: "... intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae potentiae." See Ashley 2006.

Borrowing a term from Jeremy Bentham (1816), then, and anticipating a key point to be made below[6], we might well follow Peirce in calling the species-specifically human critical control of objectification which experimental science in the modern sense presupposes "cenoscopic knowledge or 'science'," while calling that knowledge called "science" in the modern sense of knowledge that could never be acquired without instruments to extend sensory awareness, experiments to develop such extensions, and mathematization of the results obtained by experiment "ideoscopic knowledge or science".[7]

3. Semiotic consciousness, its nature and levels of development

Semiotics began with the general proposal by Augustine that the difference between nature and culture is irrelevant to the action of signs, for *whenever* one thing comes to make something other than itself present in our awareness, signs are at work: whether the one thing or the other thing has its origin inside or outside of our minds and bodies, from nature or from culture, is irrelevant to the action of signs. It was the beginning of a long development, but when Augustine's proposal was first and finally vindicated in the demonstration that the being proper to signs consists not only in relations according to their distinctive being as suprasubjective connections or modes linking otherwise subjectively distinct realities, but in relations irreducibly triadic[8] (inasmuch as what we call signs, actually the vehicles supporting the triadic relations in which the signs strictly consist as signs[9]), it also came to light that there are in the web of human experience no less than three irreducibly distinct types of signs at work in semiosis as the action common to all signs. For concepts in our minds, "ideas", as the moderns called our cognitive psychological states, *far* from being themselves objects of apprehension, are much rather but the *foundations* or basis, the "fundaments", of relations whose *terminus* is the object apprehended; and this notion of object as always the terminus of a cognitive relation, a relation of apprehension, proves to admit of two distinct but not incompatible conditions or states[10]: there is the state of an object which is an object and nothing more than that, a purely objective re-

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[6] See p. 236 below, at note 25.

[7] There is a minor and yet important issue of spelling here, "ideoscopic" vs. "idioscopic", the latter being Peirce's own, the former being my substitution for Peirce's spelling re the naming of science in the specifically modern sense. I refer anyone interested in the details of this terminological "quibble" (important, as I say, even though minor in the grand scheme of things) to the discussion in Deely 2014a: 255 note 11.

[8] This demonstration was first achieved by Poinsot 1632, in Book I, Question 3 of his *Tractatus*, but was recovered somewhat independently (see Beuchot and Deely 1995) by Charles Peirce in his break with mainstream modernity in philosophy.

[9] See on YouTube: <http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF>, a condensed dramatization of Deely 2004a.

[10] Extended analysis of details in Deely 2009b, 2010b, 2011.

ality, like Hamlet or Sherlock Holmes; and there is the state of an object which, besides existing objectively as the terminus of a cognitive relation, *also* exists here and now as a physical reality that can be seen and touched, like Napoleon or his Josephine. The lover longed for or even deceased illustrates the first state, while the lover embraced and fondled illustrates the second.

An Altzheimer patient far advanced may not recognize the woman standing before him as his wife. It is a tragic situation, but one that illustrates a fundamental point of semiotics. Signs as Augustine originally defined them were material objects affecting our senses which make us aware of more than the sense impressions. Thus the patient may well recognize that a woman is standing before him, yet he fails to recognize that that very woman has been his wife of forty years. How is this possible? Because material objects sensed, in order to be recognized as this or that, require, in addition to the sensations, concepts, ideas in the mind which relate the one sensing to the object sensed as *also* interpreted to be this or that – wife, in the case under consideration. Failing the psychological state which presents the woman before him as wife, the woman is perceived by the sense but not recognized by the understanding.

So we see that material objects which are also themselves signs existing outside of us presuppose cognitive qualities inside of us which are themselves *already* signs as manifesting something other than themselves, something that they themselves are not. The wife is not the *idea* of wife; yet when the idea of wife fails the woman sensed cannot be recognized as wife.

So there are material objects external to our bodies which can be signs only when perceived in conjunction with concepts internal to us which relate us to those very material objects recognized as this or that – wife, mother, lover, whatever. But still we are not at the heart of the matter.

For human beings in the first place are animals, and all animal awareness begins with sensations – not with *ideas* of sensations, as Locke followed Descartes to disastrously postulate, but with *sensations* as that incipient experience of objectivity brought about by the action of some sensible thing upon the animal body in its organs of sense.

Let us take the case of sight. Light reflects off different bodies differently, and when this differently reflected (or refracted) light strikes the organ of sight of some animal, what the animal will "see" will depend not only upon the surface refracting the light but also upon the constitution of the eye which the animal possesses. The effect will be some color, differentiated light. And how does this color exist? *Neither* simply "in the thing stimulating", as some medievals thought, *nor* simply "in the eye of the beholder", as the early moderns postulated[11]. No. It exists precisely *between* the two as a relation connecting the one to the other resultant from the action of stimulation here and now. So far so good.

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[11] See "The Qualities Given in Sensation: a comparison of modern and medieval treatment", in Deely 2001a: 522–534.

But there is more, and the "more" is the point decisive from the semiotic point of view. For the animal sensing a color *also and simultaneously* senses a shape and a position or a movement: and though the shape is not the color, the shape is revealed *dependently upon* the color; so that the relation of color to shape and position or movement etc. is *already* a sign-relation: the color is the vehicle on the basis of which the shape and position is revealed to or for the animal sensing. There is no moment of awareness in which the action of signs is not at work, for *all objects are significates* (note, even though not all objects are *things*).

All concepts are vehicles supporting (founding or "provenating"[12]) interpretive sign-relations, and now we see that *from the very beginnings of sensation* – prescissively distinguished (distinguished analytically, that is to say, not experientially)[13] from perceptions and intellections – our awareness depends upon signs which *precede* concept-formation[14].

But notice how different this action of signs within sensation prescissively considered is by comparison with the perception of a woman as wife: whereas the *perception* of a material object requires and presupposes concepts formed within the perceiver, *sensation* of basic qualities precedes the formation of concepts and, indeed, provides the materials which concepts are precisely formed initially to interpret. The animal interprets what it senses according to its biological constitution first of all as something to be sought (+), something to be shunned (–), or something safe to ignore (0). The human animal – the semiotic animal – *adds* to these concepts of perception concepts which *further* interpret these objects of perception (correctly or incorrectly, as the case may be) according to what they *are in themselves*[15]. But the signs of sensation, considered as prior to objects perceived and/or objects understood, objectify something of the animal's surroundings *wholly and solely on the basis of the physical interaction of the animal's body with the bodies surrounding* the animal in its immediate physical environment.

Sense experience thus, analytically considered, even though we do not experience sensations wholly separated from or within our perceptions, differs both from *sense perception* and from *understanding*, in that the latter two require and presuppose those psychological qualities or states that we call concepts or ideas, while *sensations* prescissively identified as such are prior to concept-formations and presuppose only the awareness resultant upon the ac-

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[12] The first explicit definition of "provenate" in this Latin derived usage from the 1632 work of Poinsot is spelled out in Deely 2010a: xiii–xiv.

[13] From Peirce 1905, as developed in Deely 2001a: 310n125 and *passim*.

[14] The importance of this technical point as establishing a semiosis foundationally common among all animal is developed most fully (so far) in Deely 2009c: Section 12.7 "Neither inner signs nor outer signs: sensation itself prescissively taken", 157–160; and 12.11 "Sign-vehicles between mind and world distinguished from sign-vehicles in the world and sign-vehicles in the mind", 161–163.

[15] Details of this activity elevating objects perceived to *intelligible* objects in Deely 2007.

tion here and now of the physically surroundings bodies upon the animal body in its organs of external sense.

Sense experience semiotically considered is defined by contact with physically present aspects of objects[16]. We can imagine or remember an absent object, but we can suffer resistance only of what is present here and now[17]. Between an object acting physically on an organ of external sense and that organ itself as a physical attribute of the organism there is no disproportion[18], as there is between a perceived object and the sensory stimuli *taken as basis for* the perception that the *internal* senses develop (not to mention the understanding of humans). Yet ideas or images are required only to supply *either* presence for an object otherwise absent, *or* to supply proportion between what is sensed and what is perceived. Neither of these reasons for supposing an image at work within cognition apply to the case of external sensation: this is the point that the moderns in common (i.e., early and late) missed. Hence the supposition of images, required for perception and intellection, in the case of external sense is gratuitous, superfluous, simply without warrant[19]. Semiotic analysis of sense experience thus confirms what brute experience seems to testify, and what semiosis within sensation requires: sensation is concerned directly with aspects of *things* physically present as objects here and now in the environment[20].

There are simply no grounds – *pace* Hume 1748[21] – for holding that external sense, prescissively distinguished as such within perception and understanding, attains directly as its proper object only an image (a "*species expressa*" in Poinsot's terms[22], a "representation" in the moderns' terms[23]) produced by the

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[16] See Poinsot 1635: Phil. nat. 4. p. q. 6. art. 1., Reiser ed., III., 172b13–173a30. This is part of what I have called the missing "Third Preamble" to the *Tractatus de Signis*, in which see Book II, Question 2, esp. notes 2, 3, 4, 8, and 22; Book III, Question 2, 311nn8 and 9. And the qualification "physically present aspects of objects" is important, as can be seen from the consideration of extinct stars yet "seen here and now" on the basis of the light long-since emitted (discussed in Maritain 1959, among many authors).

[17] Ibid., 172b20–36, 173a21–30, 174a1–22. This is at the heart of what Peirce calls the category of "Secondness".

[18] Ibid., 172b14–19: "sensus externi ... immediate continuantur ipsis rebus, a quibus accipiunt species, et magis materiales sunt inter omnes potentias cognoscitivas" – "the external senses ... are immediately continuous with the things themselves of the surrounding environment, and are the most material of all the cognitive powers".

[19] See Poinsot 1635: Phil. nat. 4. p. q. 6. art. 4. An interesting discussion of "after-images" such as one experiences from a bright light can be found at 194a23–b20.

[20] Poinsot 1632: Book III, Question 2, 311/23–312/2.

[21] "No man who reflects has ever doubted", as Hume ignorantly put it: full context in Deely 2009c: Sections 12.7 and 12.8, 152–156.

[22] See Deely 2007: Chap. 4 – for this term "species" ('spay-chee-ehs', as it were) as a *form specifying awareness* (not at all a biological "species"), Maritain rightly notes (1959: 115 Section VI), quite lacks any full and proper counterpart in modern philosophy.

[23] But the moderns think only of what Poinsot distinguishes as ***self***-representation, in contrast with signs which are *ex necessitate naturarum suarum* ***other***-representations: see Deely 2014b for full discussion of this key distinction between *objects* as self-representing and *signs* as other-representing.

mind itself. The semiosis of sensation, the sign-relations at play within sensation prescissively distinguished from perception and intellection, gives rise to an awareness, a *nascent objectivity*, that simply cannot be classified as "epistemological" or "ontological" in any modern sense, because the relations upon which objectification depends at this level are *prior* to any such differentiation.

Thus *semiotics takes us to the very heart of the problem of knowledge*, the problem of how it is (in Emmeche's marvelous summation) that signs are able to lead us everywhere in nature. At its origins in sensation, human awareness of the world is not grounded in representation but rather in the causality of interacting things subsumed within the sign-action whereby a dyadic interaction of Secondness is made to reveal ("Thirdness") to the animal what of its immediate surroundings calls for interpretation through the development of concepts.

4. Enter the academy

But there is another aspect to this situation that I want to point out, which is the aspect more pertinent to the academy.

The university is not the only institution that is devoted to the life of the mind and the advancement of human knowledge, but it is arguably the principal one, the greatest achievement of medieval Latin culture, and the greatest heritage that culture bequeathed to human-kind at large. For research in the universities is not properly pursued primarily for profit or success in the market-place, but for the sake of learning *more of what is true* in the various areas and disciplines that human beings have developed and want to explore, and in the service of communicating what is learned to the next generation of an ever-expanding "community of inquirers", as Peirce put it (cf. CP 5.311, 1868), which is at the heart of the scientific enterprise as species-specifically human over the long run.

In the 17th century when science in the modern sense began to take hold, *specialization* from the first presented itself as a *sine qua non*, a *necessity for scientific advance* (for the development of "science" in the modern, or ideoscopic, sense) to occur. In its first five-hundred-years or so, progress in research within the universities had been based primarily on disputations rooted in common human experience, to be sure (what we see in retrospect as the limited *cenoscopic* control of objectification, incapable on its own of reaching beyond culture and "authority" within culture), but disputation considering that experience before all else in the light of opinions formulated in books written by men (Aristotle especially – the commentary tradition of Latin scholasticism).

But this tradition now, ancient Greek no less than medieval Latin, in reaching the 17th century, had come a-cropper over the Galileo Affair. Here the "books of men" cenoscopically based (whether "theological" or "philosophical") had run afoul – seriously afoul – of the "book of nature", and patience was running out, in early modern times, with the *over-attachment* of the late Latin Scholas-

tics to opinions derived primarily from cenoscopically limited books. It was the beginning of the scientific revolution, the revolution which made the modern world (*despite* the "epistemology" of the modern philosophers).

5. Facing the problem of specialization vis-à-vis the fragmentation of intellectual life

As the specialization required for scientific advance in knowledge took hold, the general opinions of previous philosophy fragmented. By the late 19th century, the diversity of specializations threatened the very notion of a unity of human knowledge, and the teachers and administrators within the universities began to cast about for some way of gaining an overview, some way of restoring or at least minimally preserving the intellectual development of humankind as a *common* heritage, something in which each of us shares and has a stake. Perhaps the two main avenues of attempt were the introduction of so-called "interdisciplinary courses", and the introduction of programs of study based on a reading of so-called "great books".

Both approaches had their merits and limited success, but neither cut to the heart of the matter. The interdisciplinary programs simply put together two or more specialists in the same classroom and subjected the students to the dialectic of the professors making sense first to one another and hopefully then also to the students speaking (the professors, that is) from within their specialized perspectives, yes, but accommodating themselves to what they had to listen to from the *other* perspective or perspectives of specialization represented here and now by their colleague(s) in the classroom. Thus interdisciplinary programs of the 20th century proved invariably to be personalities-dependent, gerrymandered affairs, more or less valuable depending upon the talents of the professors involved, but "interdisciplinary" in no more than a *de facto* fashion, not at all intrinsically "interdisciplinary" *in principle*.

The "great books" approach fared no better. We were back with learning entirely bounded by the "opinions of men", back to the tradition of the Latin scholastic universities, only now with a plurality of sources replacing the centrality of Aristotle. Since the "great books" which have shaped the modern world within which the university today exists come from a variety of specialists, from Chaucer and Shakespeare among the humanists to Newton and Einstein among the scientists, a great-books-based education indeed broadens the students' minds and opens them to an understanding which in some sense goes beyond specialization; but this approach in the end feeds inevitably into the split between what C. P. Snow (1959) so well characterized as "the two cultures" – the sciences on one hand, rooted in specializations aimed to interpret the book of nature, and the humanities on the other hand, rooted in broad reading interpreting the books written by men. Again the "interdisciplinarity" achieved was more *de facto* than *de jure*. No unification *in principle* is achieved between "the two cultures" by either approach.

6. Enter semiotics

Precisely here, precisely at this point of impasse, is the entry point of semiotics as the doctrine of signs, the "one undivided science" which does "not depend upon new special observations" (CP 8.342, 1908)[24], yet directly addresses that upon which all new special observations and common observations alike depend, namely, the action of signs or semiosis[25]. So-called "STEM education" – education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics – contrasts with "liberal arts education" as yet a further extension of C. P. Snow's "two cultures".

But an individual, student or faculty, who comes to understand the standpoint and perspective that semiotics engenders transcends precisely this division.

At Indiana University, when Thomas A. Sebeok became the Director of the Research Center for Language Studies in the early 70s, one of his first official actions was to change the name to the Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies, and everyone expected him to launch an MA and PhD program in semiotics. He did not. Instead, he introduced what he called a "Certificate in Semiotics", which students could acquire only after or in conjunction with graduate study in an established discipline, be it linguistics, anthropology, biology, English, physics, sociology, or whatever.

Sebeok's argument was that semiotics is not so much a discipline in its own right as it is a "field" including all the disciplines, inasmuch as not only is "all thought in signs", as in the famous formula that Peirce borrowed from the Conimbricenses (Conimbricenses 1606/1607: q. 2. art. 3, p. 27; Peirce CP 5.253, 1868), but *so is the* ***whole*** *of experience* beginning from sensation as not itself and directly involving the "other-representation" characteristic of concepts as interpreting the surrounding world which nascently and initially manifests itself through sensations where objectivity and the subjectivity of "things in themselves" factually coincide.

As a consequence, Sebeok considered, semiotics as an area of study within the academy ought not to be treated as one more specialization among others, but rather needed to be seen as *that which makes specialization in the first place possible*, because it establishes the experiential ground from which (first in sen-

[24] See also CP 2.227, c. 1897: "Now the whole process of development among the community of students of those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths which must hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is an observational science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding its strong contrast to all the special sciences which arises from its aiming to find out what must be and not merely what is in the actual world."

[25] In technical terms (borrowed from Jeremy Bentham 1816), semiotics is a *cenoscopic* science in the Latin sense of *doctrina* (see Deely 1976, 1977, 1982, 1986, 2006, etc.). Sciences which are such in the specifically modern sense (presupposing specialization as *indispensable*), by contrast, are *idioscopic* (or rather *ideoscopic*: see note 7, p. 230 above). But here I can no more than refer my audience to the detailed cenoscopic/idioscopic contrast as I draw it in *Descartes & Poinsot. At the crossroad of signs and ideas* (Deely 2008a).

sation, then also in perception and conception) *the whole* of human knowledge springs (see Deely 2012). Thus, someone already master of or on their way to mastering a given subject matter – physics, chemistry, literature, sociology – turning to semiotics would discover that their chosen specialization *already depends upon* – is not *reducible to*, indeed, but completely *depends upon* – the action of signs as revealing and distinguishing in the first place the very subject-matter which is the object studied by the specialization.

Hence, the student of semiotics is made to realize that, in seeing signs at work within a given academic discipline, he or she is seeing something that is true of *all* specialized disciplines, because true of *the whole* of human knowledge, namely, that underneath all else in awareness, in the background, as it were, the fertile soil from which awareness in all its branches springs, is the action of signs thanks to which it becomes possible to know objects in the first place, and subsequently also the differences between objects which define the different disciplines as "areas of specialization" within scientific inquiry as a whole.

7. Objectivity: removing the antinomies in the modern notion

Semiotics thus casts a whole new and quite unexpected light upon the very notion of "objectivity", a key notion of modernity, if ever there was one, but a notion so distorted by modern "epistemology" or "critical philosophy" (with its intractable "problem of the external world") as to constitute perhaps the single factor most necessitating what Peirce calls the backwood's task "of clearing and opening up" (CP 5.488, c. 1907) the entry into the Way of Signs.

In modern philosophy, "objectivity" has come to be opposed to "subjectivity", with the latter meaning especially the *psychological* subjectivity of each of us. In semiotics, subjectivity is seen rather as the constitution which makes a physical component of the environment be what it is, that which separates you or me (every "I") or any organism or physical reality, from the rest of the universe. *Subjectivity (and intersubjectivity, the relations as consequent upon physical interactions) is precisely the condition of "things in themselves"*, the condition of being this or that type of phenomenon. And note that *intersubjectivity*, the *relations* between existent things as interactive, is that very reality which Ockham, and, after Ockham, every mainstream figure of modern philosophy (with the partial exception of Hegel) down to the present time (see Weinberg 1965), denied to have anything of awareness-independent reality, but which turns out to be the ground of the prior possibility of the action of signs (see Deely 2014c). Peirce, you may remember, drew the line between "pragmatism" as a general intellectual movement of the early 20th century, and his own notion rather of "pragmaticism", on just this point (Deely 2001a: 616ff.; Houser 2009) – and with good reason.

"Objectivity" in semiotics is distinct from but hardly opposed to subjectivity. A subject, as just indicated, is simply an actually existing physical reality,

with or without a psychological dimension. An object, by contrast, is anything which exists as known, i.e., exists in a relation to a finite mind, *regardless* (beyond sensation prescissively taken) of whether it is a subjective reality or not. Thus an object may be *purely objective*, when it exists as an object and in no other way, as in the case of a mistaken hypothesis in physics, a fictional character in literature, or an outright lie cast as a truth. But an object may be subjective *as well as* objective, as each of us while reading this essay is a biological organism existing subjectively but at the same time as an object of our own awareness here and now. Indeed, we might, and no doubt will, think of each other at a later time when we are no longer physically present at hand, no longer "able to be met in person"; yet we will be no less *objective* and *public* in principle in that case of "awareness in absence only".

How so? Because a thing as such exists regardless of whether it happens to be related to some finite knower, but not so an object. An object, in order to be such, is necessarily involved in a relation to some knower, and not just any old relation or in any old way, but involved precisely as ***terminating*** a cognitive relation, as *terminus* of a relation of awareness – as, in a word, a *significate*. In sensation, as distinct alike from animal sense-perception and human understanding, the action of the material reality that is a sensible object upon the outer sense organs of the animal sensing gives rise to mind-independent relations (dyadic relations of Secondness) between organism and stimulating source which make the animal nascently aware of its surroundings: that is to say, which partially *objectify* the surroundings to or for the animal (thereby making the surroundings in part enter into the semiotic realm of Thirdness), in response to which stimulated awareness the animal further forms concepts *interpreting* what is sensed to engender its objective world or Umwelt which consists of things to be sought (+), things to be avoided (–), and things (supposedly – rightly or wrongly so interpreted!) safe to ignore (0).

Of course the *human* animal, able to know objects as more than reducible to sense, and hence able to grasp relations in their difference from related things, by adding to the Umwelt the mind-dependent relation of objects as self-identical, also severs the exclusive relation of objects to itself as organism, thus opening the way to science and philosophy, i.e., to the investigation of "the way things are" (precisely) in the subjective constitution that those "things" have as independent of their relation to me in awareness. Indeed, the possibility of this knowledge is the whole basis of medicine and technology and, in general, the ever-expanding human control over our surroundings, according to the formula of Aquinas cited above[26] (*pace* Kant and modern epistemology to the contrary). Semiotics is neither modern nor late modern; it is determinately and decisively *post*modern, for the very reason that pragmaticism is not pragmatism; yet it is also *trans*modern in its assimilation to the future of intellectual culture not only

[26] See p. 229 above, note 5.

the Greek and Latin past (reduced to nothing so far as possible by philosophy in its distinctively modern mainstream development) but also the achievements of modernity on the scientific side, as including the social sciences and the "hard" sciences alike.

Being able to become aware of relations in their difference from related things (the latter being initially sensible and subjective, while the former – the relations themselves – are neither directly sensible nor subjective, but rather able to be understood only, and understood to be *suprasubjective* in their being as relations (and suprasubjective regardless of whether they are also intersubjective or not) (see Deely 2014d), the human animal is the only animal that, as Maritain was (so far as I am aware) the first explicitly to note (Maritain 1957: 53)[27], not only makes use of signs but can come to know that there are signs. For "signs" as related things we can see or hear or touch or point to are *things* by reason of their subjective constitution, but these things, *besides* being things, are *also* signs *because and only because* of their occupation within a triadic relation of the foreground position of representing something other than themselves to or for some third, and it is *this* position in *this* relation which constitutes the sign in its proper being *as* sign (perhaps better called "representamen", as Benedict [1985: 265ff.; Deely 2014b] has suggested), as Peirce (and Poinsot before him[28]) so trenchantly stated:

> in its genuine form, Thirdness is *the triadic relation* existing between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, *considered as constituting the mode of being of a sign*. (CP 8.332, 1904, italics added)

We are now in a position to see, perhaps, that "object" and "objective" say in a confused and disguised way what "significate" and "signified" say in a clear and open way; we are in a position to see that "object signified" is a redundant expression made useful or even necessary only by reason of the confusions of modern epistemology which opposes "objectivity" to "subjectivity", instead of seeing them for what they are, namely, distinct in principle but not necessarily in fact.

Since an object is always the terminus of a relation, and a relation is in every case something suprasubjective, semiotics puts us in a position to explain how it can be that, in sensation, objectivity and subjectivity, though distinct in principle, often enough partially coincide in fact. At the next level "up", so to speak, in animal awareness, namely, in sense-*perception*, concepts enter in, but not, as Descartes and Locke postulated, as mental *self*-representations. Not at all. Insofar as concepts are mental representations (which they are), they are

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[27] For the fullest development so far, see Deely, Petrilli, and Ponzio 2005, and Deely 2010a.

[28] Poinsot 1632: *Tractatus de Signis*, Book I, Question 3, 154/27–29, where he says that "by one single relation is the sign united to the object signified and the organism perceiving, and this relation is the proper and formal rationale of sign".

determinately *other*-representations, that is to say, foundations in subjectivity of relations which transcend subjectivity and terminate at what is *other* than the animal knowing, namely, the *object* of its awareness (whether or not with that dimension of subjectivity that defines "thing"), the *terminus* of its relation of apprehension. When the thing perceived is present-at-hand and simultaneously sensed, then the object is *also* a subject, *also* a thing here and now. But should the object perceived be physically remote, or perhaps even (unbeknownst to the perceiving animal) no longer existent physically, or even (as happens most notably in cults of human culture) never physically existent at all, in that case it is considered by the animal no less objectively but without the added coincidence of objectivity with subjectivity exercised here and now in the causal interaction which has come to be called in semiotics an instance of Secondness, and not of Thirdness alone.

In the conceptions of the understanding, not only is the same coincidence of object and thing possible, as happens in the perception of brute animals (see Poinsot 1632: *Tractatus de Signis*, Book III, Questions 1 and 2), but so also is purely objective awareness possible, without in any way *reducing* to the psychological subjectivity of the knower. This is the case, even though the psychological subjectivity of concepts as founding sign-relations terminating at objects manifested to the one conceiving is indispensable as providing the vehicles or "representamens" sustaining the triadic relation of signification having the object (the significate) as its direct terminus and the animal knowing as its indirect terminus, all three – sign-vehicle, object-signified, and interpretant or knower (in the case we are considering; for not every interpretant is a knower) – being necessary for there to be an "action of signs". But such further considerations as the not necessarily mental status of interpretants, or, for that matter, of representamens or significates, are another chapter in the unfolding story of semiotics that we have not time and space to go into here[29]. Here we make only the essential point that in semiosis a triad, a unity made of three terms, is constituted by the one single relation constituting, as Peirce put it, "the being of the sign".

8. Semiosis as the presupposition of objectivity

A sign, it thus turns out, is *what every object presupposes* (see Deely 2001b, 2004a, 2009b, 2010b, 2011; or "dramatically" at the condensed version of Deely 2004a), or, to put it another way: every object is a significate, the product of the "other-representation" in which the action of signs consists consequent upon the being of signs as triadic relations.

We thus see that semiosis, the action of signs, beginning in sensation without the help of concepts as mental (other-) representations, continues in perception

[29] E.g., see the treatment in Deely 1990: Chap. 6, "Physiosemiosis and Phytosemiosis"; Deely 1996, etc., to 2014e.

and in human understanding now with the indispensable assistance precisely of mental other-representations or concepts. Thanks to these latter alone objectivity is able to transcend the physical present-at-handness of the immediate environmental surroundings of the animal, and is able to transcend also the subjective divisions of being – not only the nature/culture divide, as Augustine originally envisaged, but also the inner/outer divide which confounded the early moderns and led the modern mainstream down the Way of Ideas leading to the solipsism of modern "epistemology" and "critical philosophy" as laying down a boundary of "unknowability" (a *ne plus ultra*) which semiotics has shown to be what Peirce dismisses as "nonsensical", a "meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905).

Becoming *aware* of this action, then, becoming *aware* of semiosis, may be regarded as the antidote to the specialization which modern thought as scientific necessitated. Such awareness is the antidote as well to the poisonous subjectivism introduced into intellectual culture by the failure of modern philosophy to recognize the dependency of all experience – not just of all thought, but of *experience itself* as the very ground of thought receiving its fertility and openness to semiosis from the singular being of relations as able to transcend subjectivity of every sort and able to pass back and forth between mind-independent and mind-dependent objective being depending only upon the circumstances under which the relation happens to exist here and now[30] – upon the action of signs as the consequent of the being of signs consisting in relations irreducibly suprasubjective as relations, but further irreducibly triadic as *sign* relations.

9. In sum – transdisciplinarity

For the question before us, then, "semiotics and academe", semiotics is indeed "transmodern", but it is also "*post*modern" in a double sense. Not only does it show us the way beyond the epistemology of modern philosophy, but it provides us at the same time with the remedy for the seeing the unity of human understanding beneath and within the development of specializations that was essential to the establishment of modern science. Specialization, as positive in

[30] In the 2013 corrected 2nd edition of Poinsot's *Tractatus de Signis* of 1632, p. 617, I had occasion to note that "The original idea for this book had one over-riding objective: the presentation of Poinsot's semiotic so as to make unmistakable its revolutionary conceptual architecture respecting the traditional divisions within philosophy between speculative and practical, and between an orientation to *ens reale* versus *ens rationis*, which divisions the standpoint required for developing a doctrine of signs transcends. In modern terms, of course, this amounts to a standpoint transcending the opposition between 'realism' and 'idealism' in its various forms, as also the oppositions between nature and culture, and 'inner' and 'outer'. "The problem was how to make a presentation of this work from the Latin past by an author of conservative credentials that credibly conveyed a content as revolutionary as this?" The problem of this work, in sum, was in effect the problem of semiotics itself respecting the specialized disciplines of the modern academy!

its achievement of science as modern philosophy was negative in its achievements (on the speculative, not on the practical, side), is itself a manifestation (and a very positive, species-specifically human manifestation) of semiosis. But within modern scientific specialization simply considered objectively *in the modern sense* (contrasted with objectivity semiotically considered, as I have presented the notion in these pages), as Stillman Drake (1992: x) observed, "each of us moves in a necessarily restricted circle and remains untouched by the labors of persons outside it on matters that are of no interest to us and our immediate associates."

Yet semiotics is able to show that such isolation is in some crucial measures illusory. For, as Daniel Taylor put it in a paper written for my Spring 2008 course on the Poinsot: "Semiotics investigates what all the other disciplines seem to take for granted" (Taylor 2008: 6). What the doctrine of signs manifests – the "cenoscopic science of signs", as we might also say – is that, within each specialization, as the very ground of its possibility, is at work the action of signs creating a path which opens the way beyond the specialized boundaries, which opens to each inquirer a path which (to quote again the marvelous formula of Emmeche[31]) "leads everywhere in nature, including those domains where humans have never set foot".

If we contrast semiotics to the various attempts so far to set up "interdisciplinary programs" in our universities and to teach our students the limits of specialization, we can only be struck by one central fact, namely, that – while all other such attempts either return virtually to the scholastic method as it prevailed in the universities of Galileo's and Poinsot's day, relying wholly on books written by men (the "Great Books" approach); or develop *ad hoc* personalities-dependent courses by two or more specialists working together but as specialists – semiotics stands out as *the first and only perspective* on the world of learning that is *inherently* interdisciplinary, *inherently* transdisciplinary.

The reason for this singularity of semiotics is that the study of the role of signs in human life directs the student's attention and reveals to the student's mind an action without which there would be no specialization nor even awareness or knowledge at all, to wit, the action of signs, *semiosis*, rooted in the singular reality of relation itself as indifferent to and transcendent of the subjective and intersubjective divisions of being, while making all those divisions in their own proper being knowable as such as signifiable. Semiotics, as the knowledge that results from the thematic study of the action of signs, is both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary, yes; but it is also *predisciplinary* in providing that common ground of animal awareness out of which even the uniqueness of human understanding emerges in the fulness of time, as semiotic animals come to dominate the processes of life on earth. Semioethics is the next step in this development (see Petrilli 2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Petrilli and Ponzio 2003, 2004, 2009; Deely 2004b, 2008b, 2009d), but that is another subject for another time.

[31] See p. 229 above.

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Pages in this volume are set up in matching columns of English and Latin, with intercolumnar numbers every fifth line. (Thus, references to the volume are by page number, followed by a slash and the appropriate line number of the specific section of text referred to – e.g., 287/3–26: see, in the 2nd ed. "The Plan for the Book and the Three Who Made It Work", pp. 617–618.)

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Abstract

The action of signs transcends or "over-rides" the many divisions which separate things from one another, most notably, as concerns human beings, the divide between "nature", as the awareness-independent aspects of reality, and "culture", as the species-specifically human dimension of reality which comes into existence only through and as a result of the awareness of human animals which, like that of all animals, begins with objects directly instantiable in sensible ways and partaking indeed of the physical (or awareness-independent) dimensions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity which constitute the *environment* (in its contrast to the objective world of animals which is organized in cognition and cathexis precisely around the needs of animals for nourishment, shelter, and reproduction to achieve flourishment), but which goes beyond the sensibly instantiable through the ability of human animals to directly objectify relations (uninstantiable to direct sense-perception) in their difference from related things, and on this basis to establish a *cultural order* within but irreducible to the animal social organization which culture then transforms into the Lebenswelt as a species-specifically human version of the otherwise generically animal Umwelt, or "objective world". Ancient and medieval thought concentrated on the knowability of nature, but modern thought in philosophy (as synthesized in Kant) denied that knowability, the very feature of being which semiotics restores. In this sense, semiotics is decisively *post*modern, a new era of intellectual culture which not only succeeds and "replaces" the modern denial of awareness-independent being as knowable with a comprehensive recovery or "re-trieve" in the Heideggerian sense of the "natural philosophy", the "physics", of Aristotle and the medievals; but inasmuch as semiotics *also learns* from modernity the dimension added to reality by the *social construction* of objects which become regulative of animal life and include something of but are by no means reducible to things in the sense of the awareness-independent dimensions of objects as dealt with by animals, semiotics as *post*modern is also *trans*modern – i.e., the development of the cenoscopic science or "doctrine" of signs has *learned something essential* not only from the ancient Greeks and medieval Latins as regards the knowability of *ens reale* but also as regards the objective status of *ens rationis* as entangled with and constitutive of the fabric of Umwelt and Lebenswelt alike. Hence the subtitle of this paper. The *title*, by contrast, concerns the problem of how is the university world to assimilate to its curricula the development of semiotics, and why such assimilation is inevitable in the long run.

EINFALL UND AUSSPRUCH: WITTGENSTEINS DOPPELSINN

Alfred Nordmann[1]

In seiner oft zitierten, 119. Bemerkung der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* erklärt Ludwig Wittgenstein:

> Die Ergebnisse der Philosophie sind die Entdeckung irgendeines schlichten Unsinns und Beulen, die sich der Verstand beim Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache geholt hat.

Der "schlichte Unsinn" heißt auf englisch "plain nonsense" und nach einer einflussreichen Interpretation der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung*, bzw. des *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, erscheint diese Rede vom schlichten, einfachen, gewöhnlichen Unsinn und dem Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache bereits im Vorwort zu seinem frühen Werk:

> Das Buch will dem Denken eine Grenze ziehen, oder vielmehr - nicht dem Denken, sondern dem Ausdruck der Gedanken: Denn um dem Denken eine Grenze zu ziehen, müßten wir beide Seiten dieser Grenze denken können (wir müssten also denken können, was sich nicht denken lässt).
>
> Die Grenze wird also nur in der Sprache gezogen werden können und was jenseits der Grenze liegt, wird einfach Unsinn sein.

Dieser Passage möchte ich mich hier zunächst in zwei Abschnitten relativ ausführlich zuwenden und zwei konkurrierende Lesarten entwickeln. Die erste Lesart stammt vornehmlich von Cora Diamond (2001) und James Conant (2001), sie kommt also aus Amerika und in der Tat nennt sich eine dieser Lesart gewidmete Aufsatzsammlung "*Wittgenstein in America*" während eine weitere Aufsatzsammlung nicht weniger bescheiden "*The New Wittgenstein*" verkündet. Im deutschsprachigen Raum hat sie zuerst Logi Gunnarsson in *Wittgensteins*

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[1] Dem feierlichen Anlass einer Festschrift gemäß, ist dieser Beitrag essayistisch ganz auf Lesbarkeit angelegt und verzichtet auf weitere Fußnoten, kritische Positionierungen und weitgehend auf Literaturnachweise. In einer ausführlicheren Fassung dieses Texts und in der genannten englischen und bald auch auf Deutsch verfügbaren Einführung in Wittgensteins *Tractatus* lassen sie sich finden.

Leiter aufgegriffen, der auch die Grenzen dieser Interpretation vorführt. Die zweite Lesart habe ich in meiner zuerst 2005 bei Cambridge University Press erschienenen Einführung in den *Tractatus* dargestellt. Im letzten Teil dieses Beitrags möchte ich diese Lesart auf den ganzen *Tractatus* oder das Ganze des *Tractatus* anwenden.

Da meine Lesart an durchaus geläufige, fast möchte ich sagen: klassische Vorstellungen von Wittgensteins Frühphilosophie anknüpft und auch mit diesen den hohen Anspruch der ersten Lesart einholen will, argumentiere ich in meinem Buch entsprechend vorsichtig für meine nur scheinbar radikalen Schlussfolgerungen. Es kam mir insbesondere darauf an, dass meine Interpretation nicht etwa in die Nähe der heute von mir gar nicht berücksichtigten mystisch spekulativen Interpretationen des *Tractatus* gerückt würde. Für die Zwecke dieses Beitrag lasse ich jedoch alle Vorsicht fahren und mute denWeggefährten Ivan Mladenovs meine Schlussfolgerungen im Schnellverfahren zu. Dieses Schnellverfahren bedient sich einer Abkürzung. Statt mich vorsichtig von der mystischen Lesart abzugrenzen, beginne ich mit dem Vorwurf an die amerikanische Lesart von Conant und Diamond, dass sie bloß anti-mystisch sei, dies aber nicht ausreiche, um den anti-metaphysischen Wittgenstein stark zu machen.

I. Einfacher Unsinn

Die Lesart von Diamond und Conant ist voraussetzungsreich, da sie tief im Verhältnis von Frege und Wittgenstein verwurzelt ist und eine äußerst genaue Exegese Freges voraussetzt. Ihr zufolge hat der *Tractatus* eine Pointe, die sich nur auf eine ganz bestimmte philosophische Praxis bezieht, nämlich die philosophische Praxis Freges. Wittgensteins berühmte Entlarvung allen Unsinns und seine Mahnung, wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber müsse man schweigen, büßt somit ihren allgemeinen Gehalt ein und erscheint nun geradezu esoterisch. Unsinnig seien nicht gewisse Formulierungen, die nichts auszusagen vermögen und darum von ordentlichen Sätzen unterschieden werden müssen. Unsinnig sei vielmehr die philosophische Anmaßung, wir vermöchten uns über die Klassifikation von Sätzen und über die Unterscheidung von Sinn und Unsinn zu einer Einsicht verhelfen.

Es mag paradox erscheinen, dass eine derartig esoterische Verengung der Perspektive Wittgenstein gerade vor seinen Mystifizierung retten soll. So gehört es ganz emphatisch zum Selbstverständnis von Diamond und Conants Interpretation, dass sie der unerbittlichen Konsequenz Wittgensteins ins Auge schauen. Statt eines "chickening out" und anstelle einer "ineffability interpretation" oder einer Auslegung im Sinne des unsagbar Erhabenen entwickeln sie ihre strenge, sparsame, nüchterne "austere conception." Am "schlichten Unsinn" verdeutlicht sich die Unterscheidung zwischen der "ineffability interpretation" und der "austere conception". Während die erstere Auslegung nämlich zwei Arten von Unsinn anerkennt, sehen Conant und Diamond eine derartige Unterscheidung bei

Wittgenstein nicht: Aller Unsinn sei bloßer, schlichter, einfacher Unsinn. Daran ist auf jeden Fall richtig, dass der *Tractatus* uns keine Anhaltspunkte gibt, nach denen wir zwischen Arten des Unsinns unterscheiden sollten, etwa zwischen einem vielsagenden Unsinn, der etwas Höheres oder etwas Tiefes substanziell bedeutet, und einem nichtssagenden, bloßen Unsinn. Dies jedoch hat ernsthafte Konsequenzen für die Leser des *Tractatus*, denn Wittgenstein gibt ihnen erst ein Beispiel für philosophischen Unsinn und nennt dann seine eigenen Sätze unsinnig. So heißt es zuerst:

> Die meisten Fragen und Sätze der Philosophen beruhen darauf, dass wir unsere Sprachlogik nicht verstehen.
>
> (Sie sind von der Art der Frage, ob das Gute mehr oder weniger identisch sei als das Schöne.) (TLP 4.003)

und dann ganz am Schluss des *Tractatus*:

> Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie – auf ihnen – über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.)
>
> Er muss diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig. (TLP 6.54)

Wenn es nichts als bloßen oder schlichten Unsinn gibt, dann sind die Sätze des *Tractatus* um nichts besser oder schlechter als die Behauptung, das Gute sei identischer als das Schöne. So könnten sich die Leser schnell betrogen fühlen oder verwirrt und verärgert nachfragen, wie sie denn auf Grund eines solchen Unsinns Wittgenstein "verstehen" können oder "die Welt richtig sehen" lernen sollen. In seiner Einleitung zum *Tractatus* empfahl Bertrand Russell daher schon den ersten Lesern des Buchs, diese Aussage Wittgensteins nicht allzu ernst zu nehmen.

Die von Conant und Diamond empfohlene Strenge bedeutet nun aber, dass wir Wittgenstein hier beim Wort nehmen sollen. In der Tat, ihre Interpretation empfiehlt sich gerade dadurch, dass sie diese Stelle ernst nehmen kann, ohne etwa mystisch zu behaupten, dass gewisse unsinnige Sätze womöglich etwas vielsagend Unaussprechliches bedeuten und vermitteln können. Dem entsprechend rekonstruieren sie Wittgensteins Bemerkung wie folgt.

Es gibt bestimmte philosophische Sätze, die etwas erläutern wollen. Erläuternde Sätze im Sinne Freges zielen darauf, Sinn vom Unsinn zu unterscheiden. Wer sich wie Wittgenstein auf dieses Projekt der Erläuterung einlässt, macht dabei die Erfahrung, dass er an eine Grenze stößt, an der sich diese erläuternde Sätze als bloßer Unsinn erweisen. Wenn Wittgenstein also schreibt, "Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt," so ist das keinesfalls gleichbedeutend mit "Alle meine Sätze in diesem Buch, einschließlich dieser hier, sind als unsinnig zu erkennen". Stattdessen verweist "meine Sätze" auf "meine (im Fregeschen Sinne) erläuternden Sätze". Conant schreibt ausdrücklich in seinem Aufsatz „Elucidation and Nonsense“ aus dem Jahr 2000:

Frage: *welche* Sätze sind unsinnig (als unsinnig zu erkennen)? Antwort: diejenigen, die erläutern. In Bemerkung 4.112 heißt es nicht "Ein philosophisches Werk besteht ausschließlich aus Erläuterungen". Es heißt dort "Ein philosophisches Werk besteht wesentlich aus Erläuterungen". Nicht jeder Satz des Buchs ist unsinnig (als unsinnig zu erkennen). Denn nicht jeder Satz dient als Erläuterung.

Zu den nicht unsinnigen, weil nicht erläuternden Passagen des *Tractatus* gehört insbesondere, was Conant und Diamond als seinen Rahmen bezeichnen, nämlich das Vorwort mit der anfangs zitierten Stelle, derzufolge das Buch dem Ausdruck der Gedanken eine Grenze zieht, dann der Schluss mit der Aussage, dass zumindest gewisse Sätze Wittgensteins als unsinnig zu erkennen seien, und schließlich auch eine Passage in der Mitte, in der Wittgenstein den Zweck der Philosophie bestimmt und feststellt, dass ein philosophisches Werk wesentlich aus Erläuterungen besteht (TLP 4.112–116).

Conant und Diamonds nüchterne Auffassung erweist sich somit als überraschend freizügig bezüglich des Rahmens und einiger leicht für unsinnig zu haltenden Sätze wie "Das Buch will dem Denken eine Grenze ziehen". Bezüglich der erläuternden, unsinnigen Sätze jedoch kommt das ganze Ausmaß ihrer Strenge zum Vorschein. Besonders deutlich wurde dies in ihrer Debatte mit Peter Hacker. Dabei ging es um Wittgensteins Bemerkung

> So kann man z.B. nicht sagen "Es gibt Gegenstände", wie man etwa sagt: "Es gibt Bücher". (aus TLP 4.1272)

Für Conant und Diamond ist der Satz "Es gibt Gegenstände" ein erläuternder Satz, der sich vollständig auflöst, wenn wir versuchen, ihm eine Bedeutung zuzuschreiben. Und diese Auflösung vollzieht sich in vier Schritten. Ich zitiere wieder Conant (2000):

> Erst begreife ich, dass es etwas gibt, was sein *muss* [z.B. es muss Gegenstände geben, damit unsere Sätze etwas bedeuten können]; dann sehe ich, dass das nicht gesagt werden kann; dann begreife ich, dass es nicht gedacht werden kann, wenn es nicht gesagt werden kann (dass die Grenzen der Sprache die Grenzen des Denkens sind); und dann, schließlich, wenn ich ganz oben an der Leiter ankomme, begreife ich, dass es die ganze Zeit schon kein "etwas" gab, dass ich begreifen konnte (dass ich auch nicht "begreifen" kann, was ich nicht denken kann).

Auf den Satz "Es gibt Gegenstände" bezogen heisst das:

> Wenn der *Tractatus* einer nüchternen Auffassung von Unsinn folgt, dann wird uns die Erläuterung letztlich an den Punkt führen, an dem sich unsere Überzeugung, wir verstünden auch nur, was ein Satz wie "A ist ein Gegenstand" sagen will, vollständig auflöst (und alles, was uns bleibt, ist eine Abfolge von Worten, an denen wir nicht einmal den gescheiterten Versuch erkennen können, etwas zu meinen).

An diesem Vorschlag der vollständigen Auflösung in vier Schritten erkennt Peter Hacker (2000) – und ich pflichte ihm hierin bei – nur zwei bis zweieinhalb an. Etwa so:

> Erst begreife ich, dass es etwas gibt, was sein *muss* [z.B. es muss Gegenstände geben, damit unsere Sätze etwas bedeuten können]; dann sehe ich, dass das nicht gesagt werden kann [weil es unsinnig ist]; dann begreife ich, dass es damit unmöglich geworden ist, überhaupt darüber zu urteilen, ob mir in meinen Gedanken das Wort "Gegenstand" etwas bedeuten konnte oder nicht.

Der Satz "A ist ein Gegenstand" ist laut Hacker und den meisten, Conant nennt sie: "positivistischen" Interpreten des *Tractatus* schon darum Unsinn, weil in ihm das Wort „Gegenstand" keinen Gegenstand vertritt, der Satz also der logischen Syntax widerspricht und gar nicht erst ein grammatisches Gebilde ist, dessen Wahrheitsbedingungen zu bestimmen wären. Nun hat Wittgenstein aber Russell in einem Brief erklärt, dass ein einfacher Satz wie "Das rote Buch steht neben dem schwarzen Buch" zwar

> nicht sagt, dass es zwei Dinge gibt, denn er sagt etwas ganz anderes; *aber ob er wahr ist oder falsch, er* ZEIGT was du mit "es gibt zwei Dinge" *ausdrücken* willst. (19.8.1919)

Es ist also keineswegs klar, dass Wittgensteins nüchterne Weigerung, Arten des Unsinns zu unterscheiden, auch schon bedeutet, dass es in jedem Fall nichts gibt, was ein unsinniger Satz ausdrücken will.

Interessant ist nun, dass Diamond und Conant meinen, ihr nüchterner Ansatz würde weiter gehen, als der von Hacker, der keine letzte Konsequenz zieht und etwas offen hält, was Diamond vermutlich als "chickening out" bezeichnen würde, nämlich als Versuch, bestimmte Sätze zwar für unsinnig zu erklären, aber unter der Hand und stillschweigend weiterhin an die Existenz von Gegenständen zu glauben. Hierzu lässt sich meines Erachtens feststellen, dass Conant und Diamond eine weitreichend anti-mystische Interpretation vorlegen, während Hacker eine anti-metaphysische Lesart vertritt. Wenn Diamond und Conant meinen, dass das am Ende des *Tractatus* empfohlene Schweigen nur ein "Symptom des philosophischen Diskurses" sei, dass nichts als Leere bedeutet (Conant), meine ich und wohl auch Hacker, dass es sich bei diesem Schweigen beispielsweise um ein Schweigen über Werte, Gefühle, Intentionen oder Gedanken handeln mag und dass sich über Werte, Gefühle, Intentionen und Gedanken nur sagen lässt, dass sie nicht wie beispielsweise Bücher existieren und womöglich überhaupt nicht in der Subjektposition eines Satzes auftauchen können.

Gegen die kritische Selbstbeschränkung der Philosophie macht sich also die anti-mystische Lesart von Conant und Diamond die metaphysische Mühe, zu bestreiten, dass es Gegenstände gibt und dass mit dem Wort "Gegenstand" der Versuch verbunden sein könnte, etwas Unaussprechliches auszudrücken.

Und wo sich Hackers anti-metaphysische Haltung agnostisch oder indifferent verhält, wollen sie entscheiden können, dass das Schweigen nur Leere bedeuten kann.

Dieser rasche Aufriss der Interpretation von Diamond und Conant erlaubt es mir nun, sie auf die anfangs zitierte Passage zu beziehen.

> Das Buch will dem Denken eine Grenze ziehen, oder vielmehr - nicht dem Denken, sondern dem Ausdruck der Gedanken: Denn um dem Denken eine Grenze zu ziehen, müssten wir beide Seiten dieser Grenze denken können (wir müssten also denken können, was sich nicht denken lässt).
>
> Die Grenze wird also nur in der Sprache gezogen werden können und was jenseits der Grenze liegt, wird einfach Unsinn sein. (TLP Vorwort)

Diese aus dem Rahmen des *Tractatus* vielzitierten Sätze sollen als Beleg dafür dienen, dass erstens die Grenzen der Sprache auch die Grenzen des Denkens seien, dass es daher zweitens keinen Unsinn geben könne, der in dem vergeblichen Versuch besteht, einen unaussprechlichen Gedanken auszusprechen, und dass also drittens aller Unsinn einfacher, schlichter, bloßer Unsinn sei. Auch wenn sich dies nicht auf den ersten Blick erschließt, so wird die weitere Diskussion doch zeigen, dass keine dieser drei Aussagen aus der zitierten Passage folgt, und dass ihr insbesondere die erste und mittelbar auch die zweite sogar widersprechen.

II. Einfach Unsinn

"Was jenseits der Grenze liegt, wird einfach Unsinn sein" – diese Formulierung Wittgensteins übersetzen Conant und Diamond "will be plain nonsense" und lehnen sich dabei vermutlich an die oben zitierte Bemerkung aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* an, in der vom "schlichten Unsinn" die Rede war. Die richtige Übersetzung hieße natürlich "will simply be nonsense", und so klein der Unterschied erscheinen mag zwischen "einfach Unsinn" und "einfachem Unsinn", verbirgt sich hinter diesem kleinen Unterschied eine grundsätzlich andere Lesart der Passage.

"Was jenseits der Grenze liegt, wird einfach Unsinn sein" charakterisiert nicht den Unsinn als mehr oder weniger gehaltvoll, sondern charakterisiert die Methode des *Tractatus*, nämlich den Automatismus, mit dem sich der Unsinn als all das erweist, was jenseits einer gewissen Grenze liegt. Es geht hier also um das Verfahren, mit dessen Hilfe das Problem der Grenzziehung bewältigt werden soll. In fünf Punkten lässt sich das von Wittgenstein im Vorwort benannte Verfahren zusammenfassen. Erstens lässt sich dem Denken selbst keine Grenze ziehen. Zweitens lässt sich aber dem Ausdruck der Gedanken eine Grenze ziehen. Drittens will der *Tractatus* eine solche Grenze ziehen, indem er dem Ausdruck der Gedanken in der Sprache eine Grenze zieht. Viertens, wenn diese Grenze einmal gezogen ist, wird, was jenseits der Grenze liegt, einfach Unsinn sein.

Fünftens gibt es einen Grund, warum dem Denken zwar keine Grenze gezogen werden kann, wohl aber dem Ausdruck der Gedanken in der Sprache: Jenseits einer dem Denken gezogenen Grenze gibt es gar nichts mehr, denn wenn es da etwas gäbe, müssten wir es auch denken können und dann wäre dem Denken keine Grenze gezogen. Jenseits der in der Sprache gezogenen Grenze gibt es dagegen sehr wohl noch etwas, nämlich den Unsinn, und tatsächlich können wir auch auf beiden Seiten der Grenze sprechen, nämlich Sinn hier und Unsinn dort. In der Tat – und erst an dieser Stelle füge ich Wittgensteins Formulierung etwas hinzu – könnte es sogar wirklich nötig sein, Unsinn zu sprechen, um die Grenze ziehen zu können, so wie es nötig ist, eine Leiter erst heraufzuklettern, ehe sie auf dem erreichten Plateau fortgeworfen werden kann. Immerhin meint Wittgenstein ausdrücklich, dass die Grenze des Denkens nur bestimmt werden könnte, wenn beide Seiten auch wirklich gedacht werden können. Und der stattdessen tatsächlich vorgenommenen Grenzziehung des *Tractatus* entspricht, dass um dem Ausdruck der Gedanken in der Sprache eine Grenze zu ziehen, wir auf beiden Seiten dieser Grenze sprechen können müssen. Dass wir Unsinn reden müssen, ehe wir ihn überwinden und die Welt richtig sehen können, drückt sich somit nicht nur in der den *Tractatus* abschließenden Metapher von der Leiter aus, sondern schon im Vorwort des *Tractatus*. Die einzige Art, dies zu umgehen und immer nur sinnvoll zu sprechen, erklärt Wittgenstein an einer dritten Stelle, besteht darin, nicht selbst Unsinn zu reden, sondern dies anderen zu überlassen:

> Die richtige Methode der Philosophie wäre eigentlich die: Nichts zu sagen, als was sich sagen lässt, also Sätze der Naturwissenschaft – also etwas, was mit Philosophie nichts zu tun hat – und dann immer, wenn ein anderer etwas Metaphysisches sagen wollte, ihm nachzuweisen, dass er gewissen Zeichen in seinen Sätzen keine Bedeutung gegeben hat. [...] (TLP 6.53)

Diese einzig streng richtige Methode der Philosophie hat mit Wittgensteins tatsächlich gewählter Methode gemeinsam, dass es in beiden Fällen um den Versuch geht, etwas auszudrücken und dass dieser Versuch schließlich scheitert. Dies haben beide Methoden übrigens auch mit dem logischen Verfahren der *reductio ad absurdum* gemeinsam, in dem zunächst versucht wird, eine Annahme zu behaupten, dieser Versuch dann an einem auftretenden Widerspruch scheitert und daraus eine Zurückweisung der Annahme folgt. Auf diese Analogie werde ich noch zurückkommen. Zunächst muss aber vor allem auf eine Konsequenz dieses Verfahrens hingewiesen werden, die im Widerspruch zur Lesart von Diamond und Conant steht. Wenn es denn so ist, wie von den meisten Interpretationen des *Tractatus* angenommen wird, dass sich der Sinn oder Unsinn eines Satzes dadurch erweist, dass er auf seine Bedeutung, also auf seine Wahrheitsbedingungen hin geprüft wird, dann ist der Unsinn nicht auf Wittgensteins im Fregeschen Sinne erläuternden Sätze beschränkt, und dann kann insbesondere der Rahmen des *Tractatus* nicht ausgenommen werden. Wenn Wittgenstein also meint, seine Sätze seien schließlich als unsinnig zu erkennen, so muss

das auch von diesem Satz selbst gelten können. Nur so lässt sich Wittgenstein beim Wort nehmen, also so streng auslegen, wie es sich die "austere conception" vorgenommen hat.

Meine Deutung dieser Passage aus dem Vorwort des *Tractatus* ergänze ich schließlich mit drei Feststellungen dazu, was Wittgenstein hier nicht sagt. Dies vertieft den Kontrast zur "amerikanischen" Lesart von Conant und Diamond und wird sich für die weitere Darstellung als wichtig erweisen. Erstens setzt Wittgenstein das Denken und den Ausdruck der Gedanken eben nicht gleich. Es gibt hier keinerlei Anhaltspunkt dafür, dass die in der Sprache gezogene Grenze auch dem Denken eine Grenze setzen wird. Zweitens heißt es im gegebenen größeren Zusammenhang der "philosophischen Probleme" und dessen "was sich überhaupt sagen lässt" die Grenze könne "nur in der Sprache gezogen werden". Damit wird von Wittgenstein aber keineswegs unterstellt, dass sich Gedanken nur in der Sprache, also in sinnvollen Sätzen ausdrücken können. Im Gegenteil betont er in seinem kurzen Vorwort mehrmals, dass der Wert seiner Arbeit darin besteht "dass in ihr Gedanken ausgedrückt sind". Sein Buch oder seine Arbeit kann also Gedanken ausdrücken und Wittgenstein selbst kann verstanden werden, auch wenn es seine letztlich unsinnigen Sätze nicht können. Offen bleibt somit, ob Werte, Gefühle, Intentionen oder Gedanken beispielsweise in Handlungen oder Gesten, in Musik oder dem von uns geführten Leben ausgedrückt werden können. All dies zusammengenommen führt drittens auf einen Vorschlag, den ich im letzten Abschnitt entwickeln möchte. Um dem Ausdruck der Gedanken in der Sprache eine Grenze zu ziehen, muss Wittgenstein auf beiden Seiten der Grenze sprechen, also auch unsinnig mit Sätzen, die keine Gedanken ausdrücken können. Im Verlauf dieses Sprechens führt die anfänglich naiv unterstellte Annahme, philosophische Gedanken ließen sich in philosophischen Sätzen ausdrücken, in einen Widerspruch, der die in der Sprache zu ziehende Grenze erweist. Gerade dieses philosophische Verfahren jedoch und das *reductio*-Argument, das die Vergeblichkeit philosophischen Sprechens vorführt, macht den Wert von Wittgensteins Arbeit aus und drückt seine Gedanken aus.

III. Gedanken ausdrücken

Aus meiner Kritik an der amerikanischen Lesart habe ich nun einen Gegenvorschlag entwickelt, aber noch nicht nachgewiesen, dass er wirklich zu leisten vermag, wodurch sich die Lesart von Conant und Diamond besonders empfiehlt – dass sie nämlich Wittgensteins Äußerung über den Unsinn seiner Sätze ernst nehmen kann, ohne mystisch zu behaupten, dass eine besondere Art unsinniger Sätze etwas Höheres vielsagend bedeuten könne. Inwieweit auch mein Gegenvorschlag dies leistet, soll abschließend grob skizziert werden. Dafür will ich alle vorsichtigen Abgrenzungs- und Verortungsbemühungen fahren lassen und recht mutig mit einer Art spekulativ-historischer Rekonstruktion davon beginnen, wie

Wittgenstein seine Gedanken ausdrückte oder – was laut Karl Kraus und nach Gottfried Gabriel auf das gleiche hinausläuft – wie er seine Aphorismen schrieb.

Als Wittgenstein in den ersten Weltkrieg aufbrach, nahm er ein Notizbuch mit sich, das ihm einerseits als Tagebuch, andererseits als Manuskriptsammlung für seine tagebuchartig datierten gesammelten Einfälle diente, von denen viele auch im *Tractatus* Verwendung fanden. In der Gegenüberstellung von privaten Notizen – sie wurden separat als *Geheimes Tagebuch* veröffentlicht – und den als "Tagebücher 1914–1916" bekannten philosophischen Notaten ist vor allem interessant, was daraus über seine Arbeitsweise hervorgeht. Gegenstand der privaten Notizen ist nämlich häufig, ob und wieviel er gearbeitet hat, wie und ob er unter diesen Bedingungen überhaupt arbeiten kann. Und so findet sich beispielsweise am 10., 15. und 28. September 1914 die Feststellung, er habe heute gearbeitet, aber an keinem dieser Tage trägt er eine philosophische Bemerkung ein. Am 24. September, 2. und 6. Oktober heißt es sogar, er habe gut oder viel gearbeitet und an diesen Tagen finden sich zwei Zeilen und bis zu vier kurze Bemerkungen. Ob er arbeitet oder nicht, bemisst sich also nicht an der Anzahl der philosophischen Notate. Und so heißt es auch am 15. September, er könne beim Kartoffelschälen am besten arbeiten und würde sich darum immer freiwillig dafür melden. Demnach heißt Arbeiten zunächst wohl Denken und beim Denken entstehen Einfälle und diese Einfälle oder Gedanken, zumindest einige davon, schreibt Wittgenstein auf. Als er sein Buch später dem literarischen Verleger Ludwig von Ficker anempfiehlt, so darum, weil es ein äußerst gedrängtes System enthalte, das darum so knapp und ehrlich ausfällt und ohne philosophisches Geschwafel auskommt, weil darin nur aufgezeichnet sei, was ihm – und wie es ihm – eingefallen ist.

Wittgensteins philosophische Arbeit bestand somit daran, sich denkend Bedingungen zu schaffen, unter denen ihm Gedanken einfielen, die er dann zunächst so aufschrieb, wie sie ihm einfielen. Was für Bedingungen dies im Falle des *Tractatus* waren, das lässt sich aus dem vielleicht berühmtesten Einfall dieser Tage rekonstruieren. Am 29. September 1914 schreibt Wittgenstein nämlich:

> Im Satz wird eine Welt probeweise zusammengestellt. (Wie wenn im Pariser Gerichtssaal ein Automobilunglück mit Puppen etc. dargestellt wird.)
> Daraus muss sich (wenn ich nicht blind wäre) sofort das Wesen der Wahrheit ergeben.

Dieser Einfall gilt Vielen als Inbegriff, vielleicht Auslöser der so genannten Bildtheorie des *Tractatus*. Und im *Tractatus* erscheint er auch, leicht verändert, in unmittelbarer Nähe zu Wittgensteins allerdings anders akzentuierten "Grundgedanken":

> 4.031 Im Satz wird gleichsam eine Sachlage probeweise zusammengestellt.
> Man kann geradezu sagen – statt: dieser Satz hat diesen und diesen Sinn –: Dieser Satz stellt diese und diese Sachlage dar.

4.0311 Ein Name steht für ein Ding, ein anderer für ein anderes Ding und untereinander sind sie verbunden, so stellt das ganze – wie ein lebendes Bild – den Sachverhalt vor.

4.0312 Die Möglichkeit des Satzes beruht auf dem Prinzip der Vertretung von Gegenständen durch Zeichen.
Mein Grundgedanke ist, dass die "logischen Konstanten" nicht vertreten. Dass sich die *Logik* der Tatsachen nicht vertreten lässt.

Wie nun soll der Leser mit diesen Einfällen umgehen? Wie kommen wir insbesondere auf den engen Zusammenhang zwischen dem, was Wittgenstein über ein Gerichtsverfahren in Paris gelesen hat, und dem Grundgedanken, dass die logischen Konstanten nicht vertreten? Und was genau soll Wittgenstein oder uns Lesern bedeuten, was sich in dem Pariser Gerichtssaal abspielte?

Selbst sein berufenster Interpret Georg Henrik von Wright (1982) kann diesen Einfall in seinem Buch *Wittgenstein* nur ansatzweise rekonstruieren:

> Das Modell diente hier als ein Satz, das heißt, als eine Beschreibung eines möglichen Sachverhalts. Dies Funktion hat es dank einer Korrespondenz zwischen den Teilen des Modells (den Miniaturhäusern, -autos, -personen) und Dingen in der Wirklichkeit (Häuser, Autos, Personen). Nun fiel Wittgenstein ein, dass sich diese Analogie umkehren und sagen lässt, dass ein *Satz* als ein Modell oder *Bild* dienen kann, dank einer ähnlichen Korrespondenz zwischen *seinen* Teilen und der Welt.

Selbst von Wright, der aus Wittgensteins eigenem Mund erfuhr, wie er mitten im Krieg auf das Geschehen in einem Pariser Gerichtssaal stieß, verfährt mit der Bemerkung nach dem Schema von Einfall und Klärung, das in der germanistischen Literatur immer wieder für aphoristisches Schreiben reklamiert wird. Danach ist der niedergeschriebene Einfall der Niederschlag eines systematischen Gedankengangs, die Spur einer Denkbewegung oder die Pointe eines Gedankenexperiments. In seiner Verdichtung und zumindest partiellen Losgelöstheit aus seinem Entstehungszusammenhang provoziert dieser Einfall einen Vorgang der Klärung, die Rekonstruktion des Gedankengangs, eine eigene Denkbewegung und ein erneutes Gedankenexperiment, das dieser Pointe den Anlass geboten haben könnte. Wie bei von Wright eilen diese vom Einfall angeregten Klärungen über das im Einfall Fixierte hinaus. So finden sich in Wittgensteins Schriften keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass er erst das Modell für einen Satz hielt und dann die Analogie umkehrte, um den Satz für ein Modell zu halten. Trotzdem ist von Wrights Analyse ganz adäquat, weil es ihr gelingt, den Einfall in seiner Zentralität für die Bildtheorie zu rekonstruieren.

Einzig die unmittelbare Nähe dieses Einfalls zum Grundgedanken des *Tractatus*, wie sie sich in den beiden Teilen von 4.0312 ausdrückt, kommt in von Wrights Darstellung nicht zum Ausdruck. Dazu verhilft einem eher schon Wittgensteins eigene spätere Rekonstruktion seines Einfalls. Demnach ist das Erstaunliche am Geschehen im Pariser Gerichtssaal keineswegs, dass ein Mo-

dell dazu dienen kann, einen Sachverhalt darzustellen. In der Tat kann hierin für Wittgenstein als Leser von Hertz und Boltzmann nichts Neues bestanden haben. Seine Frage ist vielmehr, wie man angesichts der theatralisch puppenspielerischen Vorstellung im Pariser Gerichtssaal zwischen einem selbstgenügsamen Kinderpuppenspiel und der Darstellung eines Sachverhalts unterscheiden kann (Wittgenstein 1994: 279). Wittgenstein beantwortet seine Frage selbst: Wir tun dies, indem wir den Puppen und Spielzeugautos nur im letzteren Fall eine bestimmte Bedeutung zuweisen, derzufolge sie Personen und wirkliche Autos vertreten: "Die Möglichkeit des Satzes beruht auf dem Prinzip der Vertretung von Gegenständen durch Zeichen". Wenn nun aber das Puppenspiel zunächst einmal Spiel ist und darin seinen eigenen Regeln folgt, so sind es nur bestimmte Elemente des Spiels, die Gegenstände vertreten, diejenigen nämlich, denen wir diese Bedeutung zuweisen. Andere Aspekte des Spiels und insbesondere seine Regeln vertreten jedoch weiterhin nichts. Sie fungieren genau wie in einem bloß fiktiven Puppentheater: "Mein Grundgedanke ist, dass die 'logischen Konstanten' nicht vertreten".

Die Bildtheorie der Sprache hätte hiernach ihren Anfang in der Einsicht, dass etwas ein bloßes Spiel sein kann, aber nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen dazu dient, etwas zu sagen. Unser Sprechen ist ungebunden bis es unter bestimmten Bedingungen darum geht, in der Sprache Gedanken auszudrücken und was jenseits der Grenzen dieses Sprachgebrauchs liegt, ist einfach spielerischer Unsinn. Dies erlaubt uns, noch einen weiteren Aspekt von Wittgensteins gedankenexperimentellem Einfall gedankenexperimentell zu klären:

> 4.031 Im Satz wird gleichsam eine Sachlage probeweise zusammengestellt. Man kann geradezu sagen – statt: dieser Satz hat diesen und diesen Sinn –: Dieser Satz stellt diese und diese Sachlage dar.
>
> 4.0311 Ein Name steht für ein Ding, ein anderer für ein anderes Ding und untereinander sind sie verbunden, so stellt das ganze – wie ein lebendes Bild – den Sachverhalt vor.

Wenn im Satz eine Welt probeweise zusammengestellt wird, was für eine Welt stellt dann der eben dies besagende Satz selbst zusammen – und inwiefern probeweise?

Eine kurze Antwort lautet so: Die Welt, die hier zusammengestellt wird, ist die im ersten Satz des Tractatus behauptete Welt. Diese Welt ist alles was der Fall ist, also die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen und nicht der Dinge. Und probeweise wird sie zusammengestellt, weil dies eine Welt ist, die angenommen werden muss, damit wir uns sinnvolles und verständliches Sprechen erklären können. Die philosophische Probe also und das Gedankenexperiment um das es hier geht, zielt auf eine transzendentale Fragestellung. Insofern diese Fragestellung auf das Verhältnis von Gedanke, Sprache und Welt zielt, beginnt der *Tractatus* mit der Setzung der Ontologie, die die Möglichkeit dafür begründet, dass wir uns wahre oder falsche Bilder von der Welt machen können (TLP 2.0212). Dass

nun aber diese Probe zunächst nicht darauf beschränkt ist, ob es wohl gelingen könne, die Übereinstimmung beschreibender Sätze und den Tatsachen der Welt zu erklären, sondern dass das Problem des sprachlichen Ausdrucks ganz allgemein auf dem Spiel steht, dafür spricht viel im *Tractatus*, in den Dokumenten seines Entstehungszusammenhangs und im Lebenswerk Wittgensteins. Die Frage, die sich Wittgenstein beim Kartoffelschälen stellte und die die Bedingungen schuf, unter denen ihm Gedanken über das Verhältnis von Sprache und Welt einfielen, mochte in etwa dem entsprechen, was er am 26. September 1914, also kurz vor seinem bildtheoretischen Grundeinfall notierte:

> Worauf gründet unsere – sicher wohl begründete – Zuversicht, dass wir jeden beliebigen Sinn in unserer zweidimensionalen Schrift werden ausdrücken können?!

Wohl begründet oder nicht – diese Zuversicht entspricht dem Vertrauen, dass es nichts Unaussprechliches gibt, dass aller Sinn in der Sprache, in der Welt liegt.

Diese Zuversicht und dieses Vertrauen werden im *Tractatus* auf die Probe gestellt – und zwar einmal als theoretische Hypothese und zum anderen als praktische Voraussetzung. Theoretisch behauptet wird, dass es nichts Unaussprechliches gibt, und zu prüfen ist nun, ob sich diese Behauptung aufrecht erhalten lässt. Praktisch vorausgesetzt wird, dass sich diese und derlei Behauptungen, gar eine Bildtheorie der Sprache in der Sprache ausdrücken lassen. Die theoretische Zuversicht und das praktische Vertrauen stellen die Bedingungen für Wittgensteins Gedankenexperiment, sie stellen somit die Hypothese seines *reductio*-Arguments – und um im Bild der zu erklimmenden Leiter zu bleiben, sind sie die Leisten, die die sieben Sprossen zusammenhalten.

Wie jedes *reductio*-Argument mündet auch Wittgensteins Gedankenexperiment in die Negation der Hypothese: "Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches" heißt es am Schluss des *Tractatus* (6.522) und der allerletzte Satz "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen" (7) ist nur noch ein Korrelar dieser Negation des hypothetisch vorausgesetzten Vertrauens, auf dem das Gedankenexperiment des *Tractatus* basiert. Und wieder ist es kein bloß antimystischer, sondern ein konsequent anti-metaphysischer Wittgenstein, der sich in dieser letzten negativen Schlusfolgerung ausdrückt. Denn nach der hier vorgeschlagenen Rekonstruktion bleibt "Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies *zeigt* sich, es ist das Mystische" zweideutig und unentscheidbar: Mag sein, dass dies "Es gibt" eine Existenzbehautpung impliziert und auf *etwas,* nämlich den merkwürdig unausspechlichen Seinsbereich des Mystischen verweist. Es mag aber genauso gut sein, dass hier nur das Scheitern unserer Zuversicht benannt ist: Wir wollten Gedanken über das Verhältnis von Sprache und Welt, wir wollten Werte in der Sprache ausdrücken, aber wir fanden, dass sich nicht jeder beliebige Sinn in der zweidimensionalen Schrift ausdrücken lässt. An diesem Scheitern zeigt sich das Unaussprechliche – und die mit diesem Scheitern verbundene Erfahrung, dass wir nämlich an eine Grenze stoßen, ist das Mystische.

Wiederum scheint mir, dass sich diese Interpretation gerade darum empfiehlt, weil sie kein Urteil über diese metaphysische Frage beinhaltet.

Freilich gehört mehr zu einer *reductio ad absurdum* als eine transzendental abgeleitete Hypothese und deren allein im Text vorfindliche Negation. Darum an dieser Stelle wenigstens ein Verweis darauf, dass Wittgensteins hypothetisches Gedankenexperiment auf die Gleichwertigkeit aller Sätze führt, und dass diese Gleichwertigkeit und Kontingenz aller Sätze unser vorausgesetztes Vertrauen in einen für jede *reductio* entscheidenden Widerspruch verwickelt, wenn wir nun nämlich einen Wert oder den Sinn der Welt in der Sprache ausdrücken möchten: In der Welt, in der Sprache, befindet Wittgenstein, gibt es keinen Wert – und wenn es ihn gäbe, hätte er keinen (6.41).

Aber statt hier die technischen Details des Gedankenexperiments zu verfolgen, soll es abschließend um Sinn und Unsinn Wittgensteins eigener Sätze gehen, also um die Frage, wie uns unsinnige Sätze erlauben können, Wittgenstein zu verstehen und die Welt richtig zu sehen.

Auf einer recht elementaren intuitiven Ebene habe ich die Frage womöglich schon beantwortet: Wittgensteins aphoristische Bemerkungen provozieren uns, sein Gedankenexperiment zu reproduzieren, somit die darin ausgedrückten Gedanken selbst zu denken, also auch die im Verlauf des Experiments gemachte Erfahrung nachzuvollziehen. Diese Erfahrung bestand nun im Scheitern der Zuversicht, jeden beliebigen Sinn in der Sprache ausdrücken zu können. Indem wir dieses Scheitern erfahren können, verstehen wir den Autor Wittgenstein, der vor unseren Augen die gleiche Erfahrung gemacht hat, und können daraus auch etwas lernen, z.B. dass es Unaussprechliches gibt, auch wenn sich schon dies nicht sinnvoll in unserer Sprache sagen lässt. Es sind somit also keineswegs Wittgensteins unsinnige Sätze, die uns doch noch irgendwie etwas mitteilen können, es ist vielmehr die schmerzliche Erfahrung mit diesen Sätzen, aus der wir lernen, die Grenzen der Sprache und der Welt anzuerkennen. Nichts spricht also dagegen, Wittgenstein bezüglich seiner unsinnigen Sätze ernst zu nehmen und den *Tractatus* dennoch für ein Buch zu halten, dessen Wert darin besteht, dass in ihm und mittels seiner Denkbewegung Gedanken über die Grenzen des Ausdrucks der Gedanken in der Sprache ausgedrückt sind.

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SIMPLY NONSENSE: WITTGENSTEIN'S THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

Alfred Nordmann

Abstract

On some interpretations of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein draws a limit to language and thought, thereby exposing as nonsensical the very terms that are used to draw the limits. The so-called austere reading rejects this equivocation – as if there were two kinds of nonsense, ordinary and higher. Instead, Cora Diamond and Jim Conant propose that Wittgenstein exposes as plain nonsense any attempt to draw such a limit. According to a third interpretation, Wittgenstein engages in a thought experiment that reduces to absurdity the presupposition that we can express in language any sense whatsoever. As this presupposition runs up against the limits of language it discovers that what lies beyond that limit is simply nonsense. On this interpretation, the *Tractatus* distinguishes between what can and what cannot be expressed in speech and does so without equivocating between different kinds of nonsense.

CITIES IN TRANSFORMATION AND LITERARY REPRESENTATION IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH LITERATURE

Harri Veivo

Any co-ordinate movement of our bodies means that a lightning-fast concept has been performed in our mind and we have acted according to this short scheme received from the mind.

Ivan Mladenov (2004)

We have just recently experienced an important step in the history of man. Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, for the first time in history, more than half of the global population lives in cities. It has been estimated that in 2025, the number of city dwellers will be 5 billion, of which two thirds will live in developing countries. In 2015, 27 megalopolises out of a total of 33 will be in developing countries and Tokyo will be the only rich city to figure in the list of the 10 largest cities. These numbers show that the new step in history of man, the urbanization of the majority of global population, will take place in cities that do not resemble the occidental models we in Europe have learned to know and to consider as great cities. The new emerging metropolises like Mumbai, Shanghai or Lagos, are not similar to Paris, Berlin or New York, the cities that once were considered as symbols of urban modernity. In this sense, it is not clear whether we are entering a new urban era, or a (post)urban era where cities are substituted by slums, endless sprawls and urban networks that defy our occidental models of understanding and governance.

Although the epicentre of urban development is situated outside of Europe, one can detect similar kind of changes taking place here. Here also, the modern city has given way to postmodern forms of urban development. Shopping malls, generic suburban landscapes and endless sprawls of urban highways and housing districts juxtaposed with wastelands and extended urban areas have replaced the boulevards, cafés, theatres and other public spaces where modernity was traditionally experienced. This change is starting to affect also the relation between the city and literature, the essential provider of cultural symbols and schemes that are used to understand the city. Historically, the relationship between the

city and literature has been a close one. The modern, industrial and cosmopolitan city of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with its crowds, technological inventions, emerging lifestyles, burgeoning commerce and hard-fought political struggles, constituted the explicit background, if not the efficient cause, that motivated experimentation with writing techniques and modes of narration (see for example Alter 2005). This crucial relation is indicated by the fact that many important works incorporate the city into their title. Charles Baudelaire's "Tableaux parisiens" (1857), James Joyce's *Dubliners* (1914), Andrei Bely's *Petersburg* (1922), John Dos Passos *Manhattan Transfer* (1925) as well as Alfred Döblin's *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929) are all vivid depictions of the new urban reality and literary masterworks illustrating and developing new poetic principles. Today, the city has become demythologized and lost its legibility, coherence and value as a symbol for social or historical evolution. Peripheries of different kinds are ousting the centre and replacing its traditional imagery of excitement with one focusing on the banal, generic, everyday and unspectacular. Steven Jacobs sums up this evolution when he writes that for many contemporary artists the metropolis "instead of a site that concentrates and condenses values and meanings, [...] has come to be a sapped space, a ruinous residue of shattered ambitions and scattered personal initiatives" (Jacobs 2002: 35). If the city still is a symbol, it is one of fragmentation, limited visions, and historical processes (in the Hegelian sense) that failed to materialize.

In this article, I will analyse specific responses by three contemporary French writers, François Maspéro, Annie Ernaux and Jacques Jouet, to the challenge the city poses for literary representation. Given that these responses pertain both to the techniques of literary representation and to cultural interpretations of space, the analysis will be carried out at the level of literary semiotics and cultural semiotics. Focusing on the French context is especially pertinent, given that Paris was the capital of the 19th century, exemplifying modernisation of society and politics, attracting poets, painters and philosophers and spawning artistic and intellectual responses. It is also justified by the fact that in France problems related to urban development have been especially difficult, as all those who have followed during the past years the news on urban riots in Paris or Lyon know. Nevertheless, I do believe that development in France is parallel to those in other countries and that analysing these three writers can have general heuristic value.

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How to write of the city if the city has lost its shape and symbol value and become alien to images proposed by the tradition of urban literature? Maspéro, Ernaux and Jouet have looked for answers in experimentation with consciously elaborated writing projects that offer at the same time methods for action in the (sub)urban space and for its representation in the literary work the action gives rise to. Maspéro's 1990 travel book *Les Passagers du Roissy-Express* can be defined as a systematic displacement of the genre of traditional travel writing into

the alien territory of the suburbia. As the genre defines not only forms of writing, but also typical forms of behaviour, the displacement affects the conditions of action and perception also. The book tells the authentic story of its author – and the photographer Anaïk Frantz who accompanied him – travelling for a month on the R.E.R. metro in the suburbia around Paris, stopping at each station outside of Paris, looking for local attractions, meeting the local people and spending the night in hotels close by before going to the next station the following day. Maspéro observes and writes about the *extra muros* suburbs as if they were typical touristic and exotic destinations for travelling. His action and relations with other people are determined by the models of traditional travel literature that impose a set of typical activities, routines and attitudes (like looking for museums and other sights, discussing their habits and customs with the locals, making notes on the spot, etc.). The work is methodological in precisely this sense, being based on the systematic application of *a priori* defined procedures, both in action and in writing. As these procedures are applied to a foreign context – acting in and writing about "dull" suburbia as if it were Venice or Florence – the project and its methodological realization creates friction through subtle irony and humour that exposes the otherness of suburbia in relation to the genre and, through this, the limits of the genre and of the modes of action and perception that are inherent to it. In a double function, the text elevates the suburbia to the level of a proper topic of travel literature and criticizes the modes of perception and writing that are proper to the genre of travel literature.

Annie Ernaux's books *Journal du dehors* and *La vie extérieure* from 1993 and 2000 focus on the relationship between personal life and suburban environment. As the titles indicate, Ernaux's project seeks to transgress the very distinction between private and public: if the journal has traditionally been regarded as an intimate genre reserved for the daily notation of events and thoughts for private use, Ernaux sets out in her book to explore her life in public spaces, to write down how she reacts to stimuli in shopping malls, the metro or while driving on urban highways. At the level of the form, Ernaux's books are fragmentary, consisting of short descriptive and reflective passages that are not related to each other by any narrative or argumentative structure. For Ernaux, this form reflects the structure of the contemporary city, where the endless sprawl of identical housing districts, urban highways and other generic places makes an overall comprehension of space impossible. This (postu)urban reality does not allow the writer to adopt the external and totalizing God's eye position; rather, it calls for immersion and contact. It puts in question the identity of the writer also. In observing her fellow citizens, Ernaux comes repeatedly to the conclusion that her life is reflected in the lives of the others, and that she is in turn a reflection of the actions and speeches she observes. In this sense, the signs of identity are not singular and private, but rather generic and distributed in the public space, and personal identity in the city and suburbia is based only on a historical and almost random collection of them. If the historical prototype of the urban writer, Baudelaire's *flâneur* as analyzed by Walter Benjamin (2002), maintained a criti-

cal distance towards the crowd of the city, while melting occasionally into it, Ernaux's observer has lost this distance, but at the same time the crowd has lost its opacity and has become a carrier of souvenirs and habits that belong to both the writer and the anonymous by-passers.

The last example of urban writing projects I would like to discuss has been experimented by Jacques Jouet in his *Poèmes de metro*, published in 2000. Jouet belongs to the Oulipo group, which has been developing techniques for the creation of potential literature since 1960. The group is interested in inventing, collecting and classifying different kinds of formal methods that can be used to write texts that satisfy the aesthetic criteria usually set for literature. The emphasis is on the techniques or constraints of production, whereas the end products, literary texts, are interesting mainly as proofs that the methods function. In *Poèmes de métro*, Jouet follows a rule that regulates writing in the public space of the subway. A "metropoem" is always written in the subway. The first verse of a "metropoem" is mentally composed while the train is moving between the first and the second station and written down while it is stopped, and so on until the last verse is written on the last station platform. The final poem has as many verses as there are stations and a switch from one line to another produces a stanza break. This rule establishes a relation of cause and effect between the trajectory in space and the structure of the poem, the first determining the latter. It functions also as a method that determines the writer's physical situation: writing takes place in the subway; all revision elsewhere is prohibited. Because of this, the subway provides the setting, the characters and the themes for the texts in most of the cases. Jouet's poems are about where they were written. This simple procedure achieves an important experimental and critical dimension, since it manages to create a new approach to the urban lifeworld where the daily world of the subway, with its commuters, tourists and down-and-outs, with its advertisements, speech and tiny events, becomes the very substance of poetry, in ways that seek to overcome the frontier that separates art from the everyday world. At the same time, Jouet's procedure makes the subway – with all its aspects, from the rhythm of the traffic to the passengers and the stations – to function as a purveyor of metaphors for poetry in general and metropoems in particular, describing literature with the subway reality and making these two define each other. What makes this possible is, as in the other cases discussed here, the implementation of the writing project through bodily action. Even though Joeut's oulipian project may seem at first instance formal play only, its principal merit, from our point of view, resides in the bodily involvement of writer. It is not question of literature only, but of the work of writing and its commitments, in a very simple but fundamental way.

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The assessment of the critical value of the three authors discussed here must start from a pragmatic-semiotic understanding of literature that emphasises production and performance and the process of semiosis where significations are

engendered and transformed. Maspéro's, Ernaux's and Jouet's writing projects offer guidelines for the writers' action in the urban space and for the texts that result from the action. Instead of considering the text as an autonomous product with a fixed meaning to be discovered, they invite the reader to reflect on literature as a process in which texts are produced and cultural symbols are made to grow and change, and which produces performatively its own legitimacy, both in respect to literature and to the urban reality represented in the text. By acting out the generic rules of travel writing in an alien space, turning upside down the opposition of the public and the private typical the journal genre, or inventing an artificial rule for writing poetry in the subway, Maspéro, Ernaux and Jouet disturb the cultural schemes our understanding of urban space is grounded on and invite us to reflect on new ones. They also call for a new understanding of the figure of the author in which his or her work in the urban space becomes intimately tied to the literary text. Subjecting one's work of writing and observing to *a priori* method – with the advantages and disadvantages it entails – and exposing this in the text function as a strategy to overcome the isolation of the writer. Following the project puts the author in the open, leads him or her to act in the very setting that is to be represented, like an actor on a stage, but with the very important difference that the author reflects on his or her condition and work, and records its failures and successes in the text. The writing projects bring the text into the life-world where it is produced, and the life-world into the text.

This is relevant to textual semiosis and its social signification also. As a result of the methodological implementation of the project in action and writing, the texts become deictically immersed in space. They emphasize the synechdochal part-whole relationship that connects them to the geographical and social context of production. The texts have a strong documentary value, but above all they function as points of connection at which different discourses on space, city and suburbia meet and reflect each other. As synechdoches, the texts stand for all the diverse voices that speak about and within the urban space. At the same time, the texts expose the limits of the project through its actional interpretation. In all cases, the implementation of the writing project as a method for action shows how the field of application – the city as lived space – resists the structure of action and understanding the project imposes. As a result, the texts become means to analyse and criticize cultural forms of representation (such as the genre of travel writing) and consequently of social relations of power. The projects are, in a way, unrealizable, since the forms of action they impose cannot be entirely carried out. Due to this, they are inherently self-reflective, and thus productive of criticism of representations in general.

The importance of methodological writing projects is not limited to reconfigurations of the epistemic conditions of literature only, but concerns the cultural semiotic categorizations of space as well. As we saw, the critical value of the texts discussed is not based on a modernist conception of literature or the city, but rather on programmatic writing as "nonessentialist praxis" of space

and identity that seeks to reconfigurate social and cultural categorizations and thus also the significations locations have (see Natter and Jones 1997). Locations are semiotic, that is, they carry and produce significations, since they are articulated by oppositional, iconic and indexical relations and interpretable with codes and signifying practices that endow spatial features with symbolic values. The central feature of the constitution of a semiotic space is the boundary that marks discontinuities and thus constitutes the ground for the identity of signifying elements. In discussing semiotic spaces, one should understand the notion of boundary as a dynamic process of tracing limits, since boundaries depend on performances where the constitutive oppositions that separate one semiotic space from another semiotic space are repeated, confirmed, and occasionally modified. The oppositions can be expressed by diverse means and be conceptualised in different ways (like "we" vs. "them", "familiar" vs. "foreign"), but in all cases the same function of distinction and limitation is repeated. The border is the line of demarcation and of connection at the same time, since the semiotic space that is separated from its other(s) does not exist without this act of separation and its constituents. Thus, it gives rise also to processes of translation and filtering of elements from one sphere to another.

In France, the inner city – and especially Paris *intra muros* – has been the semiotic space of the bourgeoisie from the late 19th century onwards. Baron Haussmann's spectacular reconstruction works in 1851–1870 transformed the medieval city districts that had been the origin of several revolts against the prevailing order into a space of control, commerce, spectacle and real estate speculation expressing the values of the upper and middle classes through its design, architecture and monuments. For this semiotic space to exist, it had to be distinguished symbolically from its exterior space, the "zones" and suburbs of the working class and the poor. This very act of demarcation and the gentrification of the city centre and the pauperisation of the outer fringes, did not establish clear-cut divisions, but rather a process of categorization, translation and adaptation in which the identities of the semiotic spaces were constantly negotiated. From the mid 19th century to the beginning of the latter half of the 20th, cultural texts of different kinds represented the outer space of the city, the "zones" and the suburbs, as a potential threat to the values and the social order of the bourgeoisie, while at the same time representing elements from the exterior, such as the figure of the working-class juvenile delinquent "apache", within the semiotic space of the bourgeoisies as paradoxical objects of fear and fascination that shape the identity of the bourgeoisie. A great part of the contemporary media and political discourses on the city can be seen as a continuation and a transformation of these semiotic articulations. What is continued is the powerful opposition between the city and the suburban areas that are considered as foreign to it. This spatial opposition, which is more symbolic than physical, is coupled with conceptual ones in a series where the city stands for 'culture', 'order', 'history' and 'safety' and suburbia for their opposites. What is new in this configuration is markedness or dominance: if the city was the main topic

that was constantly focussed upon in the period of modernism, the suburbia has now become the dominant topic as the negative element that seems to be indispensable for discussions on the city as cultural and social space.

Maspéro's, Ernaux's and Jouet's methodological writing projects can be seen as efforts to reconfigure these semiotic articulations in a critical way. As performative work, literary texts have the capacity to reinforce or criticize existing categorizations. The methodological aspect in the writing projects exploits this capacity. The projects, as ways of acting in everyday life and of writing (representing), condition an approach to the urban space that transcends the existing ways of articulating the semiotic space of the city. If suburbia and the derelict fringes of the city were in the urban literature of the 19th and the early 20th century places for occasional interruptions of the existing order that mainly served to reinforce the order, Maspéro's and Ernaux's projects establish from the outset the suburbia as the place where writing takes place and which provides the texts with themes, figures and settings. Here, the outskirts of the city are no longer only an object of fear and fascination, but rather the writer is a figure from the exterior that the inner city is for the outskirts and he or she is the one who has to translate and adapt his or her codes, norms and references to the new environment. The suburbia ceases to be the mirror image of the city, acquiring significations on its own right and questioning in its turn the prevailing cultural stereotypes and hierarchies. Jouet, on the other hand, seeks to exploit methodologically his body at work – acting and writing – in order to change the conditions of perception and representation, and through this, to generate texts that extend the semiotic space of the city towards the banal, the everyday, the "infra-ordinary" that usually resists representation. What he questions is the categorizations, the limitations and the thresholds that separate that which is usually represented from that which is not deemed worthy of representation, and the means of this questioning is the figure of the author as subjected to methodological procedures of acting and writing.

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One should not overestimate the novelty in the writing projects discussed in this article. Authors from Baudelaire to André Breton and the Situationists have excelled in poetic wanderings in the city and its outskirts. What is new, however, is the political and social importance of the suburban districts that have become a major issue in discussions about the present state of French society. It is from this social and political context that Maspéro's, Ernaux's and Jouet's writing projects derive their critical force.

It is interesting to note that these literary works resemble contemporary projects on urban space in other literatures and in the other arts. The transposition of the genre of travel writing into a new context has been practised also by Julio Cortázar and Carole Dunlop in their book *Les autonautes de la cosmoroute* (1983), which shares many features with Maspéro's text, but where the setting is the highway that connects Paris to Marseille. Edward Platt has used another

genre, biography, to write the history of the A40 urban highway in London. His book, *Leadville: A Biography of the A40* (2000), is equally critical of stereotypical representations and open towards the plurality of urban voices and histories as the books analysed here. Gianni Celati's *Verso la foce* (1989) has similarities with Ernaux's and Rolin's text in the critical apprehension of the urban and especially rurban space and in the questioning of the status of the writer. Methodological action as a means to create a new perception of the urban reality is a recurrent topic in performances by Francis Alÿs and the Stalker group, video art by Denis Beaubois and Michael Haneke as well as a basis for work in photography by, among others, Carsten Meier, Andrea Keen and Jean-Louis Schoellkopf.

To close this article, I would like to draw three conclusions that are based on the analysis of Maspéro's, Ernaux's and Jouet's literary works, but may also have wider importance for discussions on the city and its current transformations. Firstly, the texts put in question the polarized and center-oriented understanding of cities typical of modernity and the value hierarchies it is based on. In varying ways, the authors discussed here show that the sprawling networks of generic places, so typical for contemporary big agglomerations and so often negatively characterized as dull, boring and lacking in interest, are actually marked by historical layers and social diversity that has to be considered positively. This, however, is possible only when new approaches to the urban space are consciously developed.

Secondly, and related to the first conclusion, the authors discussed here can no more be defined as variations of the Benjaminian-Baudelairian figure of the *flâneur*, but rather call for new ways to describe the relationship between the individual and the urban others. For Baudelaire, the figure of flâneur was constituted in a relation of differentiation from and assimilation with the anonymous masses of the modern industrial and cosmopolitan city, which always remained faceless, devoid of characteristics and interiority. For the authors discussed here, the masses are not anonymous in the same way, since their writing projects support observation and provoke chance encounters that help to discern individuals with characteristics and history among the anonymous fellow urbanites in the generic places of the contemporary city. Hence, the lived space of the city becomes a place for an ongoing construction of identity for the author also; it is a space of contact, not of observation only.

If these two conclusions have differentiated the Maspéro, Ernaux and Jouet from the tradition of modern urban literature, the last one rebinds this connection. The three authors all seek in varying ways to bring into the text the multiplicity of voices and signifying practices that exist in the city. In this sense, they continue one of the main trends in modernism, the practice of heteroglossia that is characteristic for in other respects unlike works such as for example Joyce's *Ulysses*, Marcel Proust's *À la recherché du temps perdu* and Heinrich Böll's *Gruppenbild mit Dame*. In this sense, they function as a reminder of the fact that the truth of the city, if it exists, it is woven from all the voices that speak in and about the city.

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Abstract

At the beginning of the 21st century, for the first time in history, more than half of the global population lives in cities. The new emerging metropolises like Mumbai, Shanghai or Lagos, are not similar to Paris, Berlin or New York, the cities that once were considered as symbols of urban modernity. In this sense, it is not clear whether we are entering a new urban era, or a (post)urban era where cities are substituted by slums, endless sprawls and urban networks that defy our occidental models of understanding and governance. This change is starting to affect also the relation between the city and literature, the essential provider of cultural symbols and schemes that are used to understand the urban space. Today, the city has become demythologized and lost its legibility, coherence and value as a symbol for social or historical evolution. Peripheries of different kinds are ousting the centre and replacing its traditional imagery of excitement with one focusing on the banal, generic, everyday and unspectacular. The article analyses specific responses by three contemporary French writers, François Maspéro, Annie Ernaux and Jacques Jouet, to the challenge the city poses for literary representation. Maspéro, Ernaux and Jouet have experimented with consciously elaborated writing projects that offer at the same time methods for action in the (sub)urban space and for its representation in the literary work the action gives rise to. Their works disturb the cultural schemes our understanding of urban space is grounded on and invite us to reflect on new ones. They also call for a new understanding of the figure of the author in which his or her work in the urban space becomes intimately tied to the literary text. If suburbia and the derelict fringes of the city were in the urban literature of the 19th and the early 20th century places for occasional interruptions of the existing order that mainly served to reinforce the order, Maspéro's, Ernaux's and Jouet's projects question conventional categorizations of space and establish the suburbia as the place where writing takes place and which provides the texts with themes, figures and settings. The suburbia ceases to be the mirror image of the city, acquiring significations on its own right and questioning in its turn the prevailing cultural stereotypes and hierarchies.

ОТКЛОНЕНИЯТ МИТ

Анисава Милтенова

В научната оценка на античното наследство в славянското Средновековие най-общо се набелязват две традиционни насоки[1]: от една страна, се подлагат на анализ преводите от византийски гръцки, които следват антични образци, тяхната жанрова специфика, стилистика и рецепция, и от друга – античните мотиви и образи се характеризират през призмата на негативната критика на езическите вярвания в православната хомилетика и хронография. Към първата тенденция могат да се отнесат и изследванията върху разпространението на антични сюжети в средновековните славянски литератури. Както е известно, сред тях са някои наративни преводни произведения, завоювали широка популярност: Александрията (романът за Александър Велики), Троянската притча (повест за Троянската война), разказите за Езоп и др. Веднага трябва да се отбележи, че трансформацията на жанровите форми е ясно забележима – по-обемните повествователни текстове мигрират към един или друг тип прозаични жанрове според функционален или тематичен принцип. Така романът за Александър Велики (в двете му най-популярни версии – Хронографска Александрия и Сръбска Александрия) и Троянската притча се възприемат като историческо произведение и се поместват в сборници с исторически съчинения. Текстове от антични автори са включени в редица сбирки от сентенции (Мъдрост на Менандър, Пчела и др. (Кузидова-Караджинова 2012), рамкирани (предхождани или съпровождани според тематичен принцип) в тях от библейски цитати и от мъдри изречения от отците на църквата. В някои средновековни съчинения са вплетени отделни елементи, заети от античната литература (Петканова 1992). Образите и мотивите с античен произход често не се ограничават с позовавания и реминисценции, те функционират като теми, които са пречупени през християнската интерпретация и са преосмислени в духа на християнската дидактика. Втората насока в съвременните проучвания се концентрира върху отхвърлянето на езическите обичаи и почитанието на езическите богове. Както отбелязва В. М. Живов по отношение на руската средновековна литература: „Еллинские хитрецы“

[1] Темата е разгледана изчерпателно в: Буланин 1991.

– от Омира до Аристотеля – практически всегда выступали лишь как носители языческого безбожия и в интеллектуальный кругозор русских книжников не входили“ (Живов 2002: 316). Славянската книжовност в това отношение естествено следва патристиката, в която полемиката с езическата античност е устойчив дискурс: „...описание всякого иноверия по образцу античного язычества оказывается очень устойчивой чертой русской книжной культуры“ (Живов и Успенский 1984: 216). Често темите и мотивите от античните митове се съотнасят с еретичните учения – в заклеймяването дуалистично разбиране за устройството на света – със схващането за „бесовската“ антихристиянска същност на античните богове[2].

Наред с интерпретациите, набелязани дотук, съществуват форми на коренно преосмисляне на античния мит, които представляват метаморфоза на сюжета, търсен като типичен пример (*exemplum*) за силата на Божията милост и опрощение. Митът не само е „опакован“ в коренно различна обвивка, той губи своята сърцевина и това превращение е твърде интересно от гледна точка на формалните структури на текста. В тази насока е християнската интерпретация на мита за Едип, която се явява в няколко различни жанрови форми сред южните славяни и може да се проследи в няколко преплитащи се линии в ръкописните книги. Несъмнено в основата на произведението стои византийски първообраз, който е предназначен за „душеполезно четене“ (Wortley 2010; Euthymiades 2010). Трансформациите на наратива до голяма степен се вписват в концепцията на Иван Младенов за „отклонената литература“ (Младенов 2011: 57–58).

Разпространението на мита за Едип в балканския фолклор и в старите славянски литератури отдавна е привлякло вниманието на изследователите, разгледан е и е публикуван в продължение на повече от век по отделни копия в ръкописите (Novaković 1888; Драгоманов 1891а, 1891б; Драгојловић 1970; Јовановић 2001; Пропп 2002; Јелесијевић 2009). Установена е една пространна версия, приписвана на най-популярния сред християнските автори – Йоан Златоуст (349–407), като повествованието се води от негово име. В нея героят на име Павел е роден след кръвосмешение между принц и принцеса – брат и сестра, поради това, че след смъртта на техния баща те желаят да запазят целостта на царството (в случай, че принцесата се омъжи, царството трябва да се раздели). Детето, плод на този грях (и за да се избегне наказанието), е хвърлено в морето заедно с писмо, в което се разкрива истината за неговото раждане. Отгледано е от монах и израства силен и книжовен мъж. Печели победи във война и е поканен да се ожени за царицата. Едва след венчаването с нея прочита писмото и разбира, че тя

[2] Подходящ пример за полемичната тенденция е Слово за Богоявление на Григорий Богослов, което е преработено от славянския книжовник в съчинение с остра насоченост против езическите обичаи, озаглавено „Слово святаго Григорья изобретено в толъцех о том, како первое погани суще языци кланялися идолом и требы им клали, то и ныне творят“; преработката е анализирана от Д. М. Буланин (1991, с. 34 и гл. 2).

е негова майка. Отива да се изповяда на св. Йоан Златоуст, който му налага покаяние в усамотена кула сред морето, заключва го там и хвърля ключа в морските дълбини. След дванадесет години отецът намира ключа в една риба, сеща се за грешника, оставен в кулата, и отива да го види. Заварва го сияещ като слънце, получил опрощение и спасение. Разказът се предхожда от обширен хомилетичен увод и заключение за Божията милост и опрощението на греховете. Пространната версия има широко разпространение в сборниците със смесено съдържание през Късното средновековие и е известна по 16 преписа, преобладаващата част сред които са български по произход.

Известните днес преписи са следните:

(С) 29 от манастира Савина, Черна гора, ок. 1380 г., л. 30б–36б: Слово Iwана Златоустаго w покаѣаны ѿче бл҃гви. К‘то не дивит‘ се и чюдит се w семь веце како оуставленьна соуть врѣмена сиѣ. Рашки правопис, със следи от среднобългарски протограф (Богдановић и Милтенова 1987)[3].

(А) 109 от манастира „Св. Павел“, Атон, XV в., изгубен днес. Слово Иwна Златоустаго ѿ пророка Исаию w послѣднемь врѣмени и о покаюцихъ се (Лавров 1899).

(О) Canon Lit. 413 = 993, Бодленска библиотека, Оксфорд, XV в., л. 132б–141а: Сло(в) Їwана Златоустаго w дшевних разьборех wче блсви. Кто не дивит сѥ и не чюдит се w сем вѣцѣ[4].

(Н1) 52 от манастира Николяц край Бело поле, Черна гора, XV в. (заглавието не се чете), л. 192б–197б: Кто не дивит‘ се и не чюдит‘ се w семь вѣцѣ како уставлѣнна соуть врѣмена сїа (Мошин 1961).

(В) Cod. Slav. 149 от Австрийската национална библиотека, Виена, XVI в. л. 47а–53а: Сло(в) сто iwна златоустаго ѿ пр(о)рка исаїю. w послѣдни(м) врѣмени w покаци [sic]. Кто не дивит се и кто не чю(д)ит се w семь вѣцѣ. како оуставена сь(т) врѣмена сїа. за оумножени грѣхь наши(х) (Birkfellner 1976: 214–229).

(У) I 26054, от 1566 г., Университетска библиотека, Виена, л. 69б–74б: Слово Iwан Златоустаго w дше [sic] разборех. Кто не вїдитъ [sic] и не чюдит се ѿ овога свѣта како сьтвори бь за грѣхъ чловкы (ibid.: 210–214).

(П) № 433 (Панагюрски апокрифен сборник), НБКМ, София, втората половина на XVI в., л. 26а–32б: Слов[о] Иwа(н) Златоустаго wт пророка Исаиж w послѣднемь врѣмени w покажцыхъ сж. Кто не дивит сж. и кто не чюдит сь w семь вѣцѣ. како оуставена сж(т) врѣмена сиѣ. за оумноженїе грѣхь наших вьнегда прѣдстанем нази iако и рождени (Цонев 1910: 442–449).

(Т) № 677 (Тиквешки) НБКМ, София, от края на XV в., л. 65а–69б: Слово Иwана Златоустаго w доушевнихь разборѣхь. ѿче блсви. Кто не дивить се. и

[3] Преписът е публикуван в: Јелесијевић 2009.

[4] Сборникът е описан най-напред от П. Сирку: Сырку 1907; съвременно описание в: Cleminson 1988: 247–252.

не ѹюдить се w семь вѣцѣ. како уставлана [sic] соут врѣмена сиꙗ. за прѣумноженїꙗ грѣхь наших (Цонев 1923: 208)[5].

(Н2) № 82 от манастира Николяц край Бяло поле, Черна гора, л. 8а–12б (без заглавие и начало, без край) ...ковчегь и написавъ книжицоу. сїе wтроче wбрати wт сестре створене ѥс. и аще ѵлѣкъ wбрѣщеть их да знаѥть и поставише въ море. изврьже море вь землю рекомоу ирwдь...[6]

(Б) № 740 от Държавния архив в Букурещ, XVI в., л. 139б (само начало, без край): Слово сѫго Iwан златоустагw дшевных разворѣхь. Кто не дивит сѧ. и не ѹюдить сѧ w сем вѣце[7].

(Я) № 13.2.25, сбирка на А. И. Яцимирски (№ 26) от Библиотеката на Руската академия, Санкт Петербург, XVI в., л. 44а–49а: Слов(о) сѫго Iwанна Златоустаг w дшевных исправлениx. Кто не дивит сѧ и не ѹюдт сѧ о семь вѣцѣ. како уставлена сѫть врѣмена сїꙗ за прѣумноженныꙗ грѣхы наша. видиши бо имѣнїꙗ многа [sic] оу себе. и не рчеши ꙗко твоеж хытростїж или мждростїж пришло ес к тебѣ[8].

(Пр) Ръкопис № 738 от Народната библиотека на Сърбия в Белград (унищожен по време на Втората световна война), л. 96а–102а: Слово светаго Iwанна Златоустаго w̃ пророка Їсаїе о послѣднем врѣмена и w кающих‘ се. Кто не дивите се или кто не ѹюдите се w семь вѣцѣ како wставлен‘на соуть врѣмена сїꙗ (Стојановић 1903: 306–309).

(Д) Ръкопис № 100 (Даниилов) от МСПЦ, Белград, л. 32а–37а: Слово сѫго Iwнна Златоустаго, о пророка Iсаїю и о послѣднем врѣмени, и w кающих се. Кто не дивит се, и кто не ѹюдит се о семь вѣцѣ. како оуставлена соут врѣмена сїꙗ. злоумноженїе грѣх наших (Милтенова 1986).

(Адж) Ръкопис № 326, НБКМ, София, XVII в., л. 36а–41а: Слово с̃го Iwанна w послѣднем врѣменѣ w покаанїю wуе бл(с)ви. Кто не ѹюдит есе [sic] , кто не дивит се w се(м) вѣцѣ. како wставлена сѹдь врѣмена сїꙗ за оумноженїих грѣхь наших (Цонев 1910: 315–320).

(ЛД) № 21 от сбирката на Народната и университетска библиотека в Любляна, от края на XVII – началото на XVIII в. (Люблянски дамаскин), л. 103б–107б: Слово с(ве)т(а)го о(ть)ца нашего Iwанна злат(о)устаго. о д(оу)шевно покаанїе (Ламанский 1869)[9].

(Г) № 504 (41) от сбирката на Народната библиотека на Сърбия в Белград (унищожен по време на Втората световна война), XVIII в., л. 67а–76а: Слово светаго їwана златоѯстагw w доушевни разбwре. блг̃ w̃ѹе. Кто не дивит се и не ѵѯдит се w семь вѣцѣ какw сѯть оуставлена врѣмена сїа прѣѯмноженїе грѣхь наших (Стојановић 1903: 371).

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[5] Текстът е издаден в: Начов 1893.

[6] Преписът е издаден в: Јовановић 2001: 263–264.

[7] Ръкописът е познат най-напред по описанието: Petriceicu-Hasdeu 1879: 181–188; Яцимирский 1905: 842–844.

[8] Сборникът няма аналитично описание. Някои текстове са издадени в: Яцимирский 1906: 92–93, 95–105, 63–64, 109–119, 122.

[9] Текстът е препечатан в: Драгоманов 1891а: 300–301.

Т. Йованович обръща внимание на още две жанрови форми на същия сюжет, които се разпространяват в късни сръбски преписи: житие на св. Павел Кесарийски[10] и чудо, в което риторичните текстове от началото и края са съкратени. Те са в следните преписи:

(CA1) № 147 от сбирката на САНУ, Белград, от края на XVII в., л.207а –210б (без начало):... (Житие на св. Павел Кесарийски) (Novaković 1888).

(CA2) № 264 от сбирката на САНУ, Белград, 1714 г. (Чудеса на Агапий Ландос), 87а–97а: Повѣсть іоанна златоустаго. д(ѳ)шеполазна. чюдо страш'ное. пр҃ѣ(светые), в(городи)це. Бѣше неки ц(а)рь, по в(а)сеи кнесари. именемъ ан'тонъ.[11]

Т. Йованович смята, че в традицията на текста съществуват един пространен и един съкратен вариант, като към съкратения отнася цитираните сръбски преписи (и по-специално текста от сборника с чудеса на Агапий Ландос № 264), в които поучителният увод и заключението липсват. Към пространната версия той отнася преписа в Тиквешкия сборник (Т) и в сборник № 82 от манастира Николяц (Н2) (Јовановић 2001: 255–256). Както обаче показва С. Йелесиевич, в основата на кратката сръбска версия стои версия, която тя също нарича „пространна“, и отнася към нея следните преписи: С (най-ранен известен, ок. 1380 г.), Д и Н2. Изследователката изтъква основателно, че тази версия (от тук нататък **I**) се различава от една втора (също „пространна“), но преработена, към която спадат сходните по съдържание и специфични характеристики преписи Т, ЛД и вероятно Г (който е унищожен по време на Втората световна война). Не на последно място е важно нейното заключение, че вариантът, представен под формата на чудо в препис CA2 от 1714 г., в който са отстранени риторичният увод и заключението (Јелесијевић 2009: 447), представлява извлечение от преработената версия (от тук нататък **II**).

Можем да обогатим тези изводи, като привлечем към проучването доста по-широк кръг преписи (изброени по-горе) и ги поставим в техния контекст, т.е. съпоставим разказа за кръвосмешението с обкръжението му в състава на ръкописите. Средновековните сборници за небогослужебна употреба (във Византия, България, Сърбия и Русия) и дидактично предназначение обичайно са изградени от синхронни наративни структури (Lenhoff 1987), които взаимно се допълват, обединени от общи теми и мотиви. Въпреки на пръв поглед разнообразното им съдържание, несъмнено съществува един устойчив кръг текстове, които се повтарят в определен ред и притежават определени редакционни характеристики. Това се дължи на факта, че части от съдържанието им са обединени в цикли според

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[10] В справочника на архим. Сергий Полный месяцеслов Востока (т. II, Владимир, 1901; фот. изд., Москва, 1997) се споменават двама светци с името Павел Кесарийски – мъченик († 307–309), като паметта му се отбелязва на 16 (28) февруари, и друг мъченик Йоан/ Павел († 308), който се прославя заедно със сестрите мъченици Алевтина (Валентина) и Хиония Кесарийски на 16 (29) юли.

[11] Преписът е издаден в: Јовановић 2001: 265–267.

тематичен принцип – например цикъл разкази за Авраам в Т (№ 677), А (№ 109), П (№ 433), В (№ 149, Адж (№ 326) и др., цикъл разкази за злите жени в Т (№ 677), Б (№ 740) и др., цикъл разкази за кръстното дърво, чудеса на св. Николай Мирликийски и т.н. Циклизирането е типична отлика на тези сборници като макрожанр и може да се каже, че тя е аналогична на подобно явление във фолклорната проза. Д. С. Лихачов, разглеждайки въпроса за сборниците с циклообразен строеж, ги поставя между сборниците с устойчив и с неустойчив състав като преходен, междинен вид макросъстави (Лихачев 1983: 247). Той подчертава необходимостта историята на текста на всяко произведение, което влиза в някакъв цикъл или показва признаци за постоянно (или относително постоянно) обкръжение, да бъде изучавана в неразривна връзка с историята на цикъла, а също така спрямо предхождащите и следващите го текстове. Обкръжението на едно съчинение в сборниците, в които се помества, е симптоматично за редакционните промени, с други думи, налице е съответствие между съдържанието на ръкописите и версиите на разглеждания текст.

Сборникът от манастира Савина (С) има съответствие в състава си със следните ръкописи: А (№ 109), В (№ 149), П (№ 433), Н2 (№ 82), Д (№ 100), Пр (№ 738), Адж (№ 326). Те представляват определена група, която без съмнение има общ произход, т.е. възхожда към общ архетип. От друга страна, се групират следните ръкописи, които носят белези на вторично редактиране, добавки и преосмисляния на повечето текстове: Т (№ 677), О (Canon Lit. 413), Н1 (№ 52), У (I 26054), Б (№ 740), Я (№ 13.2.25), ЛД (№ 21) и евентуално Г (№ 41). Следите от преработка са налице не само в отделно произведение или цикъл в тях (напр. цикълът апокрифни разкази за Авраам (Miltenova 2006a) или цикълът, поветен на Давид и Соломон (Miltenova 2006b)), но в състава като цяло и често включват не само отделни лексеми и фрази, но прекомпозиране на текстовете. Последователното провеждане на редакционни промени свидетелства за цялостна преработка на съдържанието на сборниците от втората група и за генетична връзка помежду им. В преобладаващата част от изброените сборници разказът за кръвосмешението се вписва в есхатологичната тема, която отчетливо присъства в състава им. Във версия **I** (и в първата група сборници) текстът е в съседство със Слово за смирението, което се приписва на ап. Павел (вероятно е славянска компилация), и е следван от тълкуване на притчата за овошката; във версия **II** три от преписите са поместени в близост с цикъла разкази за злите жени (Т, Б, Я) и следващ текст е отново тълкуването на притчата за овошката. Така по своята стилистика и формална структура произведението илюстрира определена дидактична идея, аналогична на обкръжението от подобни примери (exampla), снабдени с поучителна част.

Промяната на текста при преработката във версия **II** е значителна. В поучението, което предхожда разказа за кръвосмешението, поантата е променена, като е насочена главно към милостинята и към щедростта на

богатите, които трябва да се грижат за по-бедните, докато в първичната версия е концентрирана върху облика на грешниците, получили опрощение след покаяние. Заключителната хомилетична част също е преработена като наставление за добри дела и е насочена най-вече към духовенството, за разлика от първичната версия, в която е обрисувана обобщена картина на Второто пришествие и Страшния съд. Въпреки съществените разлики сравнението между двете версии показва, че те не възхождат към два различни превода на отделни гръцки текстове. Близостта в структурата и стилистиката на самия разказ за кръвосмешението е аргумент в полза на предположението, че версия **II** представлява преработка на славянска почва[12]. Именно тази версия получава разпространение и в сръбската традиция и е преработена под формата на чудо (в ръкописа с чудесата на Агапий Ландос).

Превеждайки на съвременен български език текста от Тиквешкия сборник, Л. Илиева изказва интересна хипотеза – тя съпоставя българската традиция с тази на познатата в Западна Европа легенда за св. Григорий Велики (папа от 590 до 601 г.). Легендата, посочва авторката, е позната в различни варианти, от които най-известна е поемата „Житие на свети Григорий“ (La vie de Saint Grégoire), старофренска легенда в октосилабичен стих:

> Според тази романска легенда, един крал (или граф или император) встъпва в инцестна връзка със сестра си. За да изкупи греха си, поема към Божи гроб. Ражда се син Григорий, който е хвърлен в морето с табличка с надпис, който разкрива неговия произход. Спасен от един монах, той получава образование сред монаси. Когато намира табличката с надписа, узнава кой е и тръгва да търси родителите си. Претърпява корабокрушение близо до родния бряг и е изхвърлен в родните си земи. Междувременно те са завладени от чужденци, а владетелката (която е неговата майка) – пленена. Героят освобождава родината си и получава от благодарните жители ръката на владетелката, за която се оженва, без да знае, че тя е майка му. Двама живеят щастливо до момента, в който тя открива табличката с надписа. Когато му открива истината, Григорий се приковава с верига за пустинен остров в морето. Един рибар хвърля ключа в морето и той бива погълнат от риба. Григорий прекарва прикован към острова 17 години, до момента, в който умира римският папа. Ангел Господен казва на хората да търсят за нов папа човек, наречен Григорий. Когато го намират, хващат рибата и изваждат ключа, с който е заключена веригата, която приковава Григорий към острова. Когато той става папа, при него идва една жена, за да изповяда греховете си, без да знае, че тя е майката на Григорий. Двамата се разпознават и тя става ръководителка на манастир (абатиса). Останалата част от живота си те прекарват в свят и щастлив живот. (Илиева 2010)

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[12] Сравнение между двете версии и анализ на промените са направени в магистърската теза на Габриела Георгиева (1997).

Текстът от версия **II**, коментиран от Л. Илиева, действително носи изтъкнатите от нея характеристики на западноевропейската новела. Идеята за изкуплението и за Божието всеопрощение също е налице. Разликата е, че в балканската традиция разказът е включен в хомилетична рамка и е приписан на св. Йоан Златоуст, като всъщност представлява компилация от извадки от различни поучителни слова и няма аналог в творчеството на християнския автор.

Повествователният (условно наричан „белетристичен“) тип текстове се определят като непродуктивна част от славянската средновековна литературна система и се отнасят по-скоро към нейната периферия (Йонова 1992: 67). За разлика от химнографията и агиографията повествователните творби, най-често определяни като пример, разказ, повест или роман, притежават хетерогенни жанрови характеристики. Съчиненията могат да съдържат няколко първични жанра, които влизат един в друг или се допълват: дидактичен разказ (ἀπόφθεγμα), басня (μύθος), загадка (αἴνιγμα), сентенция (παρμία, γνώμη), притча (παραβολή), беседа (διατριβή), нравоучителен пример (παράδειγμα) и др. (Яус 1998: 150–159). Голяма част от тези първични жанрове имат предхристиянски произход и дълга традиция на употреба както на Балканите, така и в Западна Европа още от античността, често преминават от устна в писмена форма и обратно. Разказът за кръвосмешението е изключително интересен случай, в който се преплитат различни извори, пластове и традиции, много вероятно достигнали до книжовниците не само по писмен, но и по устен път. Ако съдим по състава на сборниците и по езиковите особености на най-ранния препис в сборника от манастира Савина (ок. 1380 г.), проникването на сюжета и неговата обработка са станали преди XIV в. Първоначално пространната версия I е част от паратекста[13] на сборниците с учително съдържание, придобили широко разпространение през Късното средновековие, като впоследствие променя своите формални характеристики във версия **II** (отново в съответствие с промяната на паратекста) – от повече или по-малко преобладаваща есхатологична тематика към християнски катихизис, а след това – трансформиране в чудо (в сборника на Агапий Ландос).

В приложение публикувам преписите от ръкопис № 149, Австрийска национална библиотека, Виена, XVI в. (версия **I**), и от ръкопис № 13.2.25 от Библиотеката на Руската академия, Санкт Петербург, XVI в. (версия **II**).

Виена 149, 47а–53а:

Сло(в) сѵ̃го іѡна златоѵстаго ѿ пр(о)рка исаїю. ѡ послѣдни(м) врѣмени ѡ покаци [sic]. Кто не дивит се и кто не чю(д)ит се ѡ семь вѣцѣ. како оуставена сь(т) врѣмена сїа. за оумножени грѣхь наши(х). възнег(д)а прѣ(д)стане(м) нази. іако и рож(д)ени. тѵ̀ бо трепещѵ̀(т) агг̃лы. книгы разгибаю(т) се а грѣси ѡбличаю(т) се.

[13] Терминът и употребата му са според определението в: Macksey 1997: XVII–XVIII.

тоу нѣ(с) ни кнеsи ни сьдїю ни цр̃ïе. ни патриархи. тоу грѣшни(м) боу(д)еть плачь. и скреже(т) зоубw(м).||(47б) ег(д) на(с) вьстегѫть w грѣ(х) наши(х). w дрѫзи како(в) ѿвѣ(т) ѿвѣщае(м). нъ мл̃еце(с) братїа прострѣте ѫмиваши. помѧните какw(ю) е(с) грѣшни(м) плачь. како ли е(с) праве(д)ни(м) радw(с). агг̃лы бо и вьса нв(с)а ра(д)оуют се. агг̃ли бо ул̃ко(м). а виде(т) поне(ж) г̃ь wблече се въ ульовѣчи wбра(з). помѧнете прѣж(д)е пришествїа г(с)нѣ. колико прогнѣва (с)е г̃ь на ул̃овѣки. за прѣоумноженїа грѣхы и(х). и за безаконїа пото(п) бы(с) ное бы(с) оугодникъ бж̃ïи. и того единого бѣ сътв(о)ри ѿ то(г) оумножит се ро(д) улч(с)кы. помѧни(те) кwлико кра(т) прогнѣва се г̃ь. на земли е(г)упетскои. за безаконїа и(х). потопи и(х). помѧните безаконїа содомска и гоморска. како и(х) потопи г̃ь. w братїа помѧните. где тешкы грѣ(х). пареи лота слегшаше съ дщерами свои(м). и бы(с) самь себѣ зеть и тесть. али г̃ь видѣ ег(о)|| (48а) каещa се и грѣхи прости. помѧните братїа сïе сло(в) еже видѣ(х) азь въ дн̃и м(о)и. бѣше цр̃ъ антонъ. въ алеѫандры. има(ш) единого сн̃а и дщ̃ре. и прïиде см̃рть емѫ и цр̃ци его. сн̃ъ егw(в) ахазь. р(ч)е сестрѣ своеи агазѣ. что намь сьтвори(т). инъ поиме(т) тебѣ себѣ женж. и поиметь ѿ землю наши себѣ ч(с)ть. цр(с)тво wц̃а нашего расипет(с)е. и поетъ женѫ себѣ сестрж свож ахазж. и створише отроче и р(ч)е ахазъ къ агазѣ. не по(д)баеть сïе отроче да бж̃де(т) вь мирѣ. поне(ж) безаконорож(д)енно е(с). и оустроише ковчегь. и въставише отроче вь ковчегь. и написав́ше книгж. ꙗко сïе отроче ѿ бра(т) и ѿ сестрѫ рож(д)ено е(с). да аще ул̃кь обрече(т) ег(о). да знаеть. и вьставише его вь море. изне(с) отрочето море вь землю рекомою родь. и wбрѣте его единь калѫгерь||(48б) и въсхрани его. а книгѫ еже wбрѣте оу отроче скрï ю. и наре(ч) име емѫ павель. и наоучи его книгѫ. и възрасте. и бы(с) крѣпо(к) имжци мждро(с). ѿц̃ь его оумрѣ вь цр̃ьство си. а м̃ти его цр̃твоваше бе(з) мь(ж)а. павель бы(с) храберь и ратни(к). прѣ(д) землю род́ною. и посла кь м̃ры своеи. да п(о)име(т) себѣ женоу. не вѣ(д)ше бо м̃ти его е(с). съставише рѣ(ч) съ м̃рь свою. и прïиде къ ермолае р(ч)е кь павлѫ. w сн̃оу не по(д)бае(т) те(б) цр(с)твовати. павел́ же р(ч)е. оче оче како не по(д)бае(т) мнѣ цр(с)твовати. азь храберъ есмь азь мждрь есмь. ермолае р(ч)е прïими сïю книгѫ. и проучьти како ти гл̃е(т) книга то еси ты. и дадe ем(ѫ) книгж еже wбрѣте при не(м) въ кивѫри. и приемь павелъ кни(ж)цѫ. и пода(с) едино(м) рабѫ и р(ч)е||(49а) съхрани донде(ж) види(м) азь что гл̃е(т). прïиде кь м̃ре своеи агазѣ и вѣчча се. и прѣветь цр(с)тво. ег(д)а хощеше вънити вь полатѫ слещи се съ м̃рь свою. и помѣ(нѫ) книгѫ. кою мѫ бѣ да(л) ермоола(г). и призова раба и р(ч)е. принеси книгѫ. и принесе книгѫ. проче(т) и разѫмѣ како сътворе(н) е(с). и въсъплака вел́ми. и р(ч)е. w горе мнѣ г̃и бе мои. како неисъхнеть. и повѣне(т) землѣ где азь хождѫ. нъ и еще вел(ѫ) да цр(с)твою. егаза видѣ е(г). ꙗко не дрѫзне(т) к неи. и прïде егаза и wбрѣте е(г) въ таинѣ плачѫщи. и ѫпроси единого раба почто плаче(т) г(с)нь почто не прихо(ди) тъ на ложе своеи. раб́ же р(ч)е еи. w г(с)же единоу книжицѫ тою. па(ч) биещи въ пръси свои велико. ег(д)а видѣ агаза кни(г) и позна ю. ꙗко ты е(с) сн̃ъ ею. и въскли(че)|| (49б) гла(с)о(м) велïемь и р(ч)е. о горе мнѣ сн̃оу мои. ти лы еси. пакы недосити ли би мнѣ. съ брато(м) мои(м). нъ хощѫ и (с) сн̃о(м) мои(м). присмѣши се и плакастаа гор́ко. приде павель къ iw(н)ѫ златооустоу. и р(ч)е е(м) о̃че о̃че. исповѣ(с) емѫ вьсѣ. ꙗко слиша iwна рѣ(ч) павлови. и разоумѣ въсе как(о) е(с). дх̃ъ его не бы(с) въ немь. ср(д)це его въстрепета. власи главï его просто въсташе павель

плачеци се гл҃аше. ѡ вл(д)кѡ златоусте. даи сьмрьти пр҃ѣи мнѣ. азь ѡа(н) знаа(х) едино мѣсто. въ сръ(д) море. тѫ бо не приходѣше никто. ни птица пр҃лѣташе. тоу принесо(х) павла вь кораби(и). тѫ бѣ стльпь мраморень. и скова(х) емѫ рѫцѣ и ногѣ къ грълѫ. и заключи(х) въ стльпѣ желѣзни(м) ключове(м). и въз҃пи паве(л) къ мнѣ. и р(ч)е ѡ вл(д)ко ѡ(н)е. ког(д)а хощеши прии(т) къ мнѣ да ме ви(ди)ши. азь връго(х) клю(ч)|| (50а) въ мори. и рехъ ег(д)а клю(ч) из море изидеть. тог(д) а к тебѣ пр҃иде(м). и ѿключи(м) и види(м) тебѣ. пр҃иде ѡ(н)ь въ до(м) свои. и пр҃ѣвы(с) и тако в҃і. лѣ(т). м҃ти его ваза (!) плачюци и ѡблѣкши се въ вр҃ѣтище. на д҃нь изѣдаше .е҃. залага хлѣбь. въ единь д҃нъ емши рыбꙗ и несоше ѡ(н)ѫ. въ едини ри(в) ѡбр҃ѣтоше клю(ч) желѣзны. видѣ(х) клю(ч) и велико дивлѣхѫ се. и не познава(х) и(х) до д҃.го д҃нѣ. позна(х) и(х) скрьбѣ(х) сѣлоо. и р҃ѣ(х) сие соу(т) клю- чи ѿ с(т)льпа г(д)е е(с) павель. и повѣда(х) братїа(м) мои(м). и не еше мнѣ вѣри гле(т). ѡ вл(д)кѡ оче. в҃і лѣ(т) е(с) ѿ толи до селѣ. г(д)е е(с) томѫ. кость ѡстала. где ли хощеть такови гр҃ѣ(х) имать процен҃їе. азь р҃ѣ(х) живь бь. да пр҃иде(м) и да ви(д)мь. и събрахъ брат(и)аю (!) мою. и ванидо(х) въ место г(д)е бы(с) павелъ. и приложи(х) те (к)лю(ч) и ехѫ се ключ҃їе. и .врѫзо(х) и видѣхь павла ꙗко и свѣ(т) свѣ(т)ца се.|| (50б) и не мож(д)а зр҃ѣти на нь. миро исхож(д)аше ис пръси его. и вл(с)вихѫ се ѿ него и вьси бра(т)а моа. и пр҃ѣвы(с) с нами .г҃. д҃ни. и пр҃ѣда(с) дх҃ь свои къ г҃ѫ. и посла с҃сь м҃тери своеи въ алеѯ҃ндрию. и пакы м҃ти его сп(с)е и бы(с) теофанїа.

Видите ли братїа какѡ(в) гр҃ѣ(х) працае(т). понеже вьсѣкь гр҃ѣшни(к) пока- юци се ѡбр҃ѣтаеть сп(с)ен҃їе. г҃ь е(с) прибѣжище гр҃ѣшни(м). а инь никто же за на(с) ра(д)и прорица(х) пр҃рци. да разматраюцїи поу(т) ходиты. и на послѣ(д)наа лѣта. тоу себѣ съхранѣите. тоу бо е(с) брьже сп(с)ен҃їе. тог(д)а бо въстанѫ(т). льжипр(о) рци. а вїе тѣ(х) послѫшае(т). не помѣноусте ли р҃ѣ(ч)и г҃а наше(г) ї҃ѵ х҃а. гл҃юца ѡ пр(о)рцѣ(х) до ѡ(н)а кр(с)тите(л) пр(о)рци съврьши(с). пото(м) вь послѣ(д)не лѣта въстаноу(т) магесници. ѡбадници. митоемци. ненависти(ц)и вь братїа. га- лате. попові не поучитающїи. гьбосници (!)||(51а)въси вражїи вои нарекѫт се. ег(д) а тако ви(ди)те тог(д)а боудеть і кончина свѣтѫ въ прьва бо вр҃ѣмена. на единъ д҃нь оумираше р҃. а҃ ѵл҃кь. а раж(д)аше р҃.в҃ ѵл҃къ оумираю(т) р҃ г. ѵл҃ци. не вѣсте ли бра(т)а на(с) ра(ди) сьниде г҃ь на землю. и ѡблѣче се въ раби образь. да ѡбнови(т) на(с). ѡбр҃ѣце(м) свободѫ ѿ гр҃ѣ(сѣм) наши(М) помѣнѣте ꙗк(о) за х҃а ба наше- го. м(ч)це вѣньце(м) ѵвѣнчахѫ се а ини постомь ѡбр҃ѣтахѫ сп(с)ен҃їе. а дроу(г) мл(с)тинею.а дроузы прав(д)ою. нѫ порѫчю ва(м) братїа. пр҃ѣстанѣте ѿ гнѣва. и ѿ вльж(д)а (!). и ѿ плесанїа то все. то соуть вражїе поутове. встанете с(е) пїанества. о братїе где горша е(с) дїаволь. тоу въ пїанствѣ. тоу бо вьсѣ вражїа. въ ср(д)це его гнѣ(д)ит се. ег(д)а же опїет҃ се. ѡ вогѣ. оумъ его нѣ(с) нъ въсе вражїа дѣла твориге. о братїа .г҃. книгы дадe намь|| (51в)г҃ь бь послоушати ап(с)ль іеѵ(г)лїе и пари(м). и пакы на сж(д)ици. тѣми книгами хощѫтъ на(м) сж(ди)ти. поуто лакомим҃ се златѫ и сребрѫ. ѵто тебѣ боудеть на помо(щ). посеѵеши и напльнѣеши домь свои. въ единь ѵа(с) приидеть. тебѣ съмрьть. п(о)ѵто тебе ѿ того боудеть. ницю д҃ши оуготовиши. нъ дрьзаите. и съхраните- да не пр҃ѣсьхнеть любовь. в оустъ ваши(х) за то тако р(ч)е г҃ь сь хлѣбь. съ любовїю наситить на(с). и води так(о) безмльви пїемь. неѵестиви ненавидѫ(т) бгови(х). ѵл҃кѫненависти(кѫ въсег(д)а

печаль неwскѹдѣеть. ѵ҃кь любезнивъ. въсег(д)а радоует҃ се. зль бо ѵкь wѵима ненасищает҃ се. а праве(д)никъ. въсег(д)а б҃а славить. хвалещи зло и добро. зль бо ѵ҃кь. сътвори(т) мало кь бо҃у. похвалит҃ се. ꙗко фарисеи. и тоу‖ (52а) изгѹбиль е(с). цю даль и дш҃ѹ си погоубить. р(ѵ)е бо г҃ь аще даси десноу рѹкѹ да не зна(т) лѣва. скровно бо зад҃шїе бж҃їапазѹха е(с). w семь вѣдите. аще поореши нїв(оу) велико ꙁѣлоо. а сѣме не посѣеши. помѣни ѵто хощеши (по)жети тако и о б҃ѣ. дарь аще вь таини не сътвориши. ныѵто тебѣ на ползѹ. аще не теѵьши вѣрою и любовїю. и прав(д)ою. ег(д)а въ б҃ѣда(х) боудеши. кого на помощь призовеши. аще г҃ь тебе възгони(т) г(д)е тебѣ прибѣжище боуде(т). того ра(ди) порѹѵаю ва(м) братїе. въ послѣ(д)на врѣмена. съблюдет(с)е. то бо мнози б҃лѣзи по земли боу(д)ть. с(л)нце и лоуна помрькнеть. води прѣсьхноу(т). зли глави оумножоу҃т се въ ц(л)вцѣ(х) (!). бра(т) братаа на съмрѣть прѣда(с). оумножет се крилати змїе вл҃ѵїа ср(д)ца конска трьса.‖(52б) тог(д) висока снижьт се. а нижнѣꙗ више боудоуть. въ то врѣме съматраите г҃ль оусть мои(х). скора блг(д)ть бѹде(т) и сп҃(с)енїе б҃гобоиви(м). и тог(д)а бголюв҃ци въ оукорь боуде(т). а wни сами себѣ възхвалѹть. те(м) бо р(ѵ)е г҃ь сътворити храмь. нъ не прѣбити вь немь. ни виногра(д) насади(т). и не пити ѿ вина тогw. а не прѣстѹпаеть прав(д)оу. и прїемлеть неправ(д)оу. и ѵеда вьзбиють родителъ. ѵеда вьзненавидѹть. же(на) моужа своего вода(с) (!) на съмрьти. ег(д)а на соудъ прѣстанета. женоу правею нарекѹ(т) моужїе рабь свои(х). не въ прав(д) оу тѣ(х) взимаютъ. попове(ж) по митѹ вьсп(ѣ)ютъ. о цр҃кви възнераѵе(т). старимъ лю(д)емъ п(о)рѹгающе се. гл҃юще безѹме(н) еси прѣмльѵи . бль(д). и ненави(с) на зем(л)и.‖(53а) оумножит҃ се. обади фармаки и прѣдающе не ꙗка (!) вь рѹцѣ силнѹ. кнези оубоги(м) на wсоуж(д)енїе. бь(д)еть. ег(д)а же тако бж(д)еть. разѹмѣите ꙗко сконѵанїе вѣка сего е(с). нъ сътворѣте плодь до(с)ень. ни ѡѵима призираите. да не wвреще(т) ва(с) съмрть. и въ тw(м). б҃ѹ же сла(в). ам.

Петербург РАН, 13.2.25, XVI в., 44а–49б:

Сло(в) с҃т҃го ıѡанна зла(т)уста(г) w дш҃евны(х) исправлени(х).

Кто не дивит сѧ и не ѵю(д)т сѧ о семь вѣцѣ. како ѹставлена сѫть врѣмена сїа. за прѣѹмноженныꙗ грѣхы наша. видиши бо имѣнїа многаа оу себе. и не ре(ѵ)ши ꙗко твоеж хытростїж или мж(д)остїж пришло е(с) к тебѣ. не вѣсте ли братїе моа. ꙗко богатїи людїи, или кни(ж)ници. записани сѫть а҃гlw(м) бж҃їемь. за свѣдительство мира за оубогы(х). понеже бо ꙗко биглатори стрѣгж(т) гра(д)[14]. тако и богатїи да стрѣгжть мирь оубогы(х), и да wсаѕѹжть. не вѣси ли ѵ҃ѵе. ꙗ(к) оубогыи приходить къ врато(м) твои(м). долѹ главж‖ (44б) прѣкланѣеть. ѡѵима зрить. еда ѵто добро даси емоу. да аще ѿженеши его. б҃а ѿгониши. понеже оуста ѹбогы(х) б҃їа е(с) ржка. w како не трепещ(т) ѹди твои б҃а ради просаща. ег(д)а слышиши. пон(ж) съ оубогыми б҃ъ е(с). не помѣнете ли ꙗко авраамь имѣше бога(т) ство. храна бѣше оубогы(м). лазарь желааше кроупица. да ег(д)а wбрѣташе, не ꙗдѣше. нж ѹбогыи(м) даваше. и вънидѐ въ раи. не вѣсте ли братїе, где възать оубогь оубо(ж)ство. где ли богатыи бога(т)ство. ратаи бо wреть и къ жатвѣ гото-

[14] ꙗко стража пази(т)ъ ц҃ра ноцию УБ I26054.

вит са съ ра(до)стїѫ. тако и вы. сѣните на земли. да на нб҃си сѫгоубо wбращете. аще бо съгрѣшиль еси. покаи са ѡ҃ ср(д)ца. и обращеши процеиѥ. помѣнѣте петра како покаа са.[15] и прижть ча(с) раискжа. ма(т)деи[16] покаа са. и|| (липсва лист, УБ I26054)прие(т) ев(г)лие лоть wблежа. в҃ дъцери свое и покаꙗ се. марина бл҃дн҃ица сь сльзами покаа се бѣше антонь цр҃ь и ро(д)и сн҃а ахаза и дьцера агаза. и ѫмрѣ антонь цръ сь женою своею и оста снь ег(о) и дъцер(а) ї дрьжахѫ вьсѫ землю и дрѫги цр҃ь просѣхѫ сестрѫ ег(о) и половина ѡ҃ вса земла и пакы дроуги цр҃ь вьзимаше ахаза зета и половина ѡ҃ вса земла и зговорит с(є) а се братъ и сестра како хоцеть расипати цр(с)тво оц҃а нашего и вьзеть братъ сестра и дрьжахѫ все цр(с)тво и родише сн҃а и рекоше не п(о)дбаеть намъ сие дете дрьжати. оты є ѡ҃ сестра и ѡ҃ бр(т)а. и створише кївоурь. и вложише дете и написаше книгоу и рекоше о ты дете ѡ҃ бра(т) и ѡ҃ сестра ѥ(с). а ког(о) кто обрѣще(т) да знаеть и ѫмрѣ(т)ь оц҃ь его матера емоу дрьжеше все цр(с)тво. кывоурь обрѣте единъ калѫгерь име емоу ермола и || (45а) книгѫ. и съкры книгѫ проуѣтше. wтроуа же възхрани. и нареѵе емѫ павель. и възрасте и бы(с) книжникь крѣпокь. и ратникь велеи sѫло. и прѣать зе(м)ла иро(д)скжа. и ины г҃. страны. и посла мт҃и его къ немѫ, да его възме(т) мжа. и съвѣца са съ нея да възметь а себѣ цр҃цѫ. да бжде(т) цр҃ь вьсеи кесарїи. и прїиде къ ермолѣ да бл(с) вит са ѡ҃ него. и да прѣиме(т) цр(с)тво кесарїиско. ѡц҃ь ермоае р(ѵ)е емоу. w сн҃оу павле. не по(д)баеть тебѣ ни по земли ходити. нежели паѵе цр҃ьствовати. павель р(ѵ)е wѵ҃е. поуто не подобает ми цр(с)твовати. азь мждрь есмь. и храбрь. и книжникь. и вьсѣкомѫ добрѫ и злоу разоумѣѫ. он же даде емѫ кнігѫ, жже wбрѣте при немь въ ковчезѣ. и р(ѵ)е емоу проуѣти кнігѫ. да ѵто пишеть.|| (45б) то еси ты. павель възе(м) кнігѫ. и даде единомѫ wтрокоу. и изыде. и вънидe въ кесарїа. и вѣнча са съ мт҃рїа своа. и прѣа(т) цр(с)тво кесарїиское. и въспомѣнѫ книгѫ еже даде емоу ермолае. и вънидe въ таинѫ и проуѣте книгѫ. ег(д)а слыша ѵто пише(т) книга о немь. въсплака горко и вїа въ пръси своа гл҃аше. w како са не провали(т) зе(м)ла по(д) мноа. нж и еще хоцѫ цр҃ьствовати. и не приконѫ са къ мт҃ри своеи. цр҃ца агаза ѵюж(д)ааше са гл҃ащи поуто не приходить къ мнѣ на ложе. павель же ката вечерь въхож(д)ааше въ таиницѫ. и плакаааше са велми горко. въпроси цр҃ца единого wтрока. и повѣда еи. она же иде въ таинѣ и обрѣте книгѫ. и познаѫ и р(ѵ)е. w горе мнѣ сн҃ѫ мои. да недосыт ли ми бы(с) братомь || (46а) моимь. нж и сн҃w(м) мои(м). и сказа емѫ въса истинѫ. и въ тъи ча(с) wблѣѵе са цр҃ца въ врѣтице. и наѵа(т) катати са. въсегда ѭдеше по .е҃. заголь хлѣба с пепело(м) смѣсень. павель же прїиде къ iwаннѫ зла(т)устѫ. и р(ѵ)е. оѵ҃е оѵ҃е. и исповѣда емоу грѣхы w бывшомѫ. азь iwаннь ег(д) ѵю(х) wмалѣ дх҃ь мои въ мнѣ. и власи главы моеѫ просто въсташа. ср(д)це мое възмѫти(с) въ мнѣ. и рѣ(х) где таковыи грѣ(х) има(т) заповѣ(д), или процеиѥ. павель припаде и велїемь гласомь р(ѵ)е. w вл(д)ко зла(т)усте. да понѣ съмр҃ти прѣдаи мене. да не хода по свѣтѫ да скврънa свѣ(т). азь ѫбо iwа(н)нь знаа(х) едино мѣсто посрѣдѣ морѣ. и въ не(м) мрѣморень сталъпь. тоу привезо(х) павла въ

[15] ѡ҃реѵе се г(ц) ѡ҃ г҃а и покаꙗ се.
[16] маден митарь.

лад҃їи. и посрѣ(д) сталъпа скова(х) емѹ ржцѣ и ногѣ. и заключи(х) сталъпь желѣзны||
(46б)ми ключевы. павель въззва къ мнѣ гл҃а. ѡ вл(д)ко іѡанне. когда прїидеши къ
мнѣ да ма пакы видиши. азь въврьго(х) ключа въ море. и реко(х), ег(д)а си клю-
чеве из морѣ изыдж(т). тог(д)а хощж прїитии ѿврьсти, и види(м) тебе. и прїидо(х)
въ келїа своа. и прѣбы(х). в҃ї лѣ(т) пото(м). въ единь дн҃ь на бл҃говѣщенїе пр(с)тыа
бц҃ж. принесоша къ мнѣ рибы. и въ единои рыбѣ обрѣтоша ключевы. азь поюди(х)
са. понеже не позна(х) ѿ толика лѣ(т). въ единж же ноць въспомѣнж(х) о то(м). и
на ѵтрїе іави(х) братїи своеи. ѡни поржгаше ми са гл҃це. ѡ вл(д)ко до нинѣ ни кость
нѣ(с) ѡстала ѿ него. а ты ѵто гл҃еши. азь рѣ(х). живь бъ и жива дш҃а моа. да идж и
виж(д)ж его. и въниде въ корабиць, и прїидо(х) къ сталъпѹ. и приложи(х) ключевы
и приахж(с). и ѿвръзо(х) и видѣ(х)|| (47а) павла съвтаща са іако и слн҃це. и миро
исхож(д)аше изь мышца его. и къ мнѣ ѿвѣща весело гл҃а. ра(д)ѹи са оучителю
добрыи. и наставниче къ сп҃сенїю. и вл(с)вих са ѿ него и причасти(х) его. и прѣбы(с)
съ нами г҃. дн҃їи. и тог(д)а прѣда(с) дх҃ь свои бѹ. и прїидо(х) въ кесарїа къ мт҃ри его,
и та ѡбрѣте сп҃сенїе. и бы(с) деѡфанїа.

Видите ли братїе, каковыи грѣхы бъ працаеть. иже ѿ въсего ср(д)ца кает са.
понеже кажци(х) са дш҃ж срѣтаж(т) аг҃ли. нежели праве(д)ныхь. сего ради мл҃а вы
братїе, послоушаите гласа моего. и покаите са на семь свѣтѣ. на сем҃ бо е(с) свѣтѣ
оулѹчити свѣ(т) незаходимыи. зде е(с) оулѹчити раискаа врата. зде е(с) оулѹчити
бл҃гаа аггл(с)каа себѣ. зде е(с) оулѹчити сждїа крот҃ка и мл(с)тива. зде е(с) ѵлѹ||
(47б)чити десное стоанїе. зде е(с) оулѹчити жизнь вѣчнжа. зде е(с) оулѹчити не
тлѣнныи вѣнець. помѣнѣте братїе, пр(о)рци и м(ч)нци и прп(д)бнїи. на семь свѣтѣ
обрѣтошж жизнь вѣчнжа. едини мл(с)тинѣми. а дроѹзи м҃твами. дрѹзїи же
посто(м). а дроѹзи мжчаще са х҃а ради. и възнидоша въ цр(с)тво нб(с)ное. тако и
вы братїе покаите са. и разѹмѣите пжти добрыа еже къ х҃оу. аще ризж имаши, по-
даи ницюмѹ. аще ризы не имаши, подаи хлѣбь. аще хлѣба не имаши, а ты въз(д)
ыхни и постени. зраще ѹбогаго и не гнѹшаи са его. нж бои са ба и мжкы вѣчныа.
помѣнѣте братїе и попецѣте са, како избыти са въсхыщенїа, страшны ѡкръсть
аг҃ль. помѣнѣте страшно сждице. помѣнѣте огнь неѹгаси|| (48а)мыи. помѣнѣте
скрежеть зжбныи, помѣнѣте ѹръвь неоусыпаемыи. помѣнѣте тъмж кромѣшжа.
помѣнѣте сждїа немл(с)тива. помѣнѣте огньнжа рѣкж. и немл(с)тивы(х) аг҃ль.
ег(д)а поимжть вы ѿсилажще сверѣпо въ огнь. помѣнѣте комѹ хощете мъздж дати
тогда. кто ли оутѣши(т) вы тог(д)а. тоу бо нѣ(с) кназа. ни рода. ни знаанїа. въси
бо нази іако рож(д)еннїи прѣ(д)стане(м). сего ради помѣнѣте братїе. си свѣть хо-
щеть ва(с) ѿ того ѹдалити. помѣнѣте .г҃. книгы ѵто гл҃ать. ихже дадеⷯ на(м) бъ.
ев(г)лїе и ап(с)лъ, и паремїа. помѣнѣте дв҃да пр(о)рка. еже въ гжсле(х) и въ тв(м)
панѣ(х) доброгласны(х). и въ въсѣ(х) игра(х) ба славѣще. и намь р(ч)е. хвалите
его и въ ки(м)банѣ(х)|| (48б) доброгласны(х). сего ради и аще и ѡтиваете са. или
въ въсѣ(х) игра(х) есте. въсегда ѹмь вашь къ боу да е(с). не вѣсте ли братїе. а(ще)
іасте и пїете бж҃їего дара. и спите бес печали. а гь бъ не спить. понеже мысли(т) за
въселенжа. поменѣте дивїа звѣра како лежж(т). да ег(д) въстанж(т). тоу храня
обрѣтаж(т) себѣ готовж. и до изобилїа и(м) есть. понеже гь бъ готовить пицж въсеи
твари. рыбы морскыа. и птица и гады. и ѹръвїе дрѣвѣнїи, и земнїи. ти въси где

възимажть хранѫ. нж въсѣхъ г҃ь питаетъ. помѣнѣте братїе, колижди дн҃ь пр҃ѣмѣ нѣсть б҃ъ. сѹтра инако. въ полѹдн҃ь инако. къ вечерѹ инако. понеже не спитъ б҃ъ, нж мысли(т) о въселен'нѣи. а вы ꙗзънци. иноци наричете сѧ. и злато събираете. и о себѣ печете сѧ.||(49а) да тако ли г҃ь въса тварь хранитъ. а ва(с) мнихы не мже(т) хранити. не вѣсте ли братїе. въсѣка одеж(д)а добра. на добрь дн҃ь сѧ хранитъ. да носитъ е весело ег(д)а къ люде(м) изыде(т). тако и вы иноци храните сѧ въ м҃тва(х). въ стра(д)ни(х). да весело на сѫдище х҃во изыдете. помѣнѣте братїе. где сѫдїа сѣди(т). и книгы разгыбаж(т) сѧ. егда слышимь гла(с). пр҃їдѣте бл(с)вени wц҃а моего. тогда разлѫчатъ грѣшныа ѿ праведны(х). ꙗко козлище ѿ овець. и тоу ꙗват сѧ не мл(с) тивїи а҃ггли. поганѣѫще грѣшныа немилостивно въ огнь. тоу бо а҃ггли несъгрѣшивше и трепещж(т). да мола вы братїе попы цр҃ковныа, и оубогы(х) не забывайте. а вамь ѿ ба сп҃нїе. емоу(ж) слава въ вѣкы аминь.

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DIVERGENCED MYTH

Anissava Miltenova

Abstract

This article examines the history of the myth of incest and its genre transformations in the Middle Ages in Balkan Cyrillic manuscripts. Text critical analysis shows that these transformations are consistent with more general changes in mixed-content miscellanies of the 14th–18th cc., but the Story about Incest also reflects the influence of multiple sources, layers, and traditions, and it probably reached the copyists not only in as part of the written tradition, but also orally. Judging by the composition of the miscellanies in which the Story appears and by the linguistic peculiarities of the earliest copy (ca. 1380 from the Savina Monastery), the text was first translated from Greek before the fourteenth century. The extended version (I) was included in didactic collections that were widespread in the Late Middle Ages, and the formal features of the story changed in the next version (II), more or less as a reflection of the prevailing eschatological Christian catechism. The Story was subsequently transformed into a vita (MS 147 SANU, Belgrade) and into a miracle tale (Agapius Landos's *Salvation of Sinners*, MS 264, SANU, Belgrade).

ИМА СВОЯ СЪДБА И... ЕЗИКЪТ

Миряна Янакиева

В историята на езиковия знак трагизъм и комизъм са съчетани по начин, който твърде много напомня мита за андрогините, разказан от Аристофан в Платоновия диалог „Пирът“. Става дума за събитие, от което произтича може би най-трагичната част от съдбата на човешките същества: лишаването им от цялостност, тъжната им обреченост цял живот да търсят липсващата им половина. В същото време е трудно човек да приеме напълно сериозно и без насмешка описанието как Зевс е разрязвал андрогините, а после Аполон е дооформял отрязаните половини, „като смъквал отвсякъде кожата по посока на това, което днес наричаме корем, както се стяга кесия“ (Платон 1982: 444).

Колкото и недоумение да буди на пръв поглед уподобяването на тази история с историята на знака в хуманитаристиката на XX в., между двете има прилика. С лингвистиката на Сосюр знакът става „силно“ понятие (както са силни андрогините преди тяхното разцепване). Като такова той играе централна роля в голям брой дисциплини – лингвистика, антропология, литературознание, с други думи, навсякъде, където семиотичното изследване може да намери почва. Знакът успява да запази тази своя привилегирована позиция дотогава, докогато бива приеман като единство от двете си произволно, но устойчиво свързани страни – означаващото (*signifiant*) и означаваното (*signifié*)[1]. Това обаче не продължава дълго. Във времето на постструктурализма знакът губи целостта си, връзката между двете му съставки се оказва много съмнителна, дори невъзможна. Едната от тях – означаваното – изпада в дълбока криза. На него започва да се гледа или като на недостижимо, или като на безинтересно. Така вътрешно разделен, знакът се „обезсилва“. Стига се до неговото „абсолютно обезценяване“ (Дерида 2001: 16). Изведнъж се разбира, че както твърди Дерида, „би трябвало – но не можем да го направим – да се откажем от понятието и от думата „знак“ (Derrida 1967: 412).

Усъмняването в смисловата достъпност на знаците, което е в основата на деконструкцията, хвърля в оправдана тревожност човешкото мислене.

[1] Според Якобсон „тези два елемента, съставни за езиковия знак (и за знака изобщо), взаимно се предполагат и се изискват“ (Jakobson 1963: 162).

Знаците вече по никакъв начин не са способни да бъдат гаранти за присъствието на означеното чрез тях – роля, която, макар и с променлив успех, са съумявали да играят повече от две хилядолетия.

В случващото се в съвременната теория на знака обаче има и ирония. Ето един пример от „Курса“ на Сосюр, където се разяснява „природата“ на езиковия знак като единство от акустичен образ и понятие. Сосюр предлага двете съставки на знака да се назоват съответно означаващо (*signifiant*) и означавано (*signifié*). Според него предимството на двата термина е, че маркират както опозицията, която разделя помежду им въпросните съставки, така и тази, която ги разграничава от цялото, чиито части те са. Докато за самия термин *знак* добавя, че „ако се задоволяваме с него, то е, защото не знаем с какъв друг да го заместим“, тъй като обичайният език не предоставя такава възможност (Saussure 1993: 100).

Оказва се, че много преди Дерида да заяви, че името „знак“ трябва да се отстрани, но е невъзможно, Сосюр е бил готов да се откаже от това име и се е сблъскал със същата невъзможност.

Съвпадението, ако наистина е съвпадение, е твърде любопитно. Какво причинява сходно терзание у двама учени, които в синхронното поле на науката трябва да бъдат мислени по-скоро като опоненти? И двамата имат някакви съмнения относно пригодността на една дума, налична в езика, да отговори на техните теоретични интенции, но установяват, че не могат да мислят, било то конструктивно или деконструктивно, това, което тази дума означава, без самата нея. Не води ли това към „еретичното“ допускане, че все пак съществуват някакви независими от езика мисловни съдържания (ако искаме, нека ги наречем *същности*), но че веднъж свързани с дадена езикова единица, те стават неотделими от нея?

Самият Сосюр предупреждава, че настоявайки върху произволността на езиковия знак, той съвсем не иска да остави впечатлението, че означаващите зависят от свободния избор на говорещите субекти. Означаващите са „немотивирани“, подчертава той, само по отношение на произхода си, защото никаква естествена причина не обуславя тяхното свързване със съответните означавани. Веднъж съединени обаче, връзката между тях започва да се проявява така, като че ли е мотивирана. И наистина, ако не беше така, ако никога означаващото не ни препраща към очаквано, предвидимо и устойчиво свое означавано, едва ли бихме могли изобщо да мислим за каквото и да било или да общуваме помежду си по какъвто и да било начин.

Впрочем объркаността около тези въпроси не е от вчера. През XVIII в. Джон Лок е особено радикален в разбирането си за произволността във функционирането на думите в качеството им на знаци. Според него за разлика от Сосюр, който разглежда единството между акустичен образ и понятие като устойчиво и независещо от волята на говорещите, думата не е поначало свързана с никакво определено понятие. Не съществува никаква естествена връзка между дадени артикулирани звуци и дадени идеи, а по свое желание говорещият съвсем произволно прави от определена дума

знак за определена своя идея. Така думите получават винаги само непосредствено значение и не могат да бъдат използвани като знаци за нищо друго освен за идеите в главата на говорещия.

Такова разбиране за езиковия знак не взема под внимание проблема, който неминуемо се поражда от напрежението между частния характер на мислите и идеите на отделния говорещ и публичния характер на думите. То има за следствие поставянето под въпрос на комуникативната способност на езика и с това не отстъпва на деконструктивисткото схващане, според което изобщо не можем да разчитаме, че едно и също означаващо всеки път и за всички говорещи даден език ще препраща към едно и също означавано. По-скоро можем да сме сигурни в обратното.

За разцепването на знака (чието двуединство без друго никога не е било неуязвимо) и за снемането на означаваното допринася и Ролан Барт в по-късния си период, определян като постструктуралистки. По думите на Жерар Женет, ако при Сосюр обособяването на означаващото от означаваното е просто „техническа и методологическа рутинност", то при Барт се превръща „в оръдие на една своеобразна аскеза, в спасителна земя, защото привилегията на семиолога е да се отвърне от означаваното, за да се посвети на изучаването изключително и само на означаващото" (Женет 2001: 100).

Само по себе си това твърдение на Женет не може да се приеме еднозначно. То отразява една по-скоро временна практика, каквато е практиката на отделяне на полето на семиотиката от това на семантиката. Самият Барт печата през 60-те години свои трудове, в които не личи посоченото от Женет „отвръщане от означаваното". Например в студията му „Елементи на семиологията" не се поставя под въпрос нито двуединството на езиковия знак, нито равнопоставеността на двете му съставки. Там се говори за явлението, при което езикът „слепва" неразделно едни с други своите означаващи и означавани. Но ако се съди по други негови съчинения, Барт не задълго се е интересувал от това „слепване". В известното си критическо есе „От творбата към текста" той настоява, че полето на Текста (особено литературния) е това на означаващото. Текстът безкрайно се оттласква от означаваното, а безкрайността на означаващото не води до някаква идея за неизразимото, а до тази за играта. Означаващото вече не е корелат, а „противник" на означаваното (Barthes 1984: 72).

Съдейки по горното изявление на Барт, излиза, че историята на разделението на знака е по-драматична дори от тази на андрогините. Техните две половини поне се търсят и ако сполучат да се срещнат и съберат, за тях това е най-голямото щастие. Докато описаните от Барт отношения между половинките на знака се характеризират с взаимна несъвместимост. Твърдението, че означаващото е противник на означаваното, казва в основни линии следното: когато говорим или пишем, слушаме или четем, не трябва да го правим със старомодното очакване, че можем да разберем или да бъдем разбрани. Що се отнася до литературните текстове, необходимо е да се откажем от наивността да търсим смисъл в тях и трябва да проумеем, че всеки

текст е не друго, а „разгръщане на означаващото“. Той спори с означаваното, което понякога вироглаво се стреми да се завърне в него, но ако текстът отстъпи и означаваното отново тържествува, той престава да бъде Текст.

Оглеждайки се за предходници в утвърждаването на означаващото, което трябва да празнува избавлението си от означаваното, Барт благодари за „много хубавия подарък“, направен от Якобсон на литературата. Става дума за лигвистиката на Якобсон. Според Барт тя е „подготвила блестящо това, което днес можем да мислим за Текста“, а именно, че смисълът на даден знак не е нищо друго освен превода му в друг знак, оттам и смисълът изобщо се определя не като крайно означавано, а като друго ниво на означаващо[2].

Тези идеи на Барт се съгласуват напълно с оповестеното от Дерида отсъствие на трансцендентално означавано, в резултат на което полето на игра на значения се разпростира до безкрайност (Derrida 1967: 411). Разпадането на знака е непосредствено свързано именно с осъзнаването на това отсъствие. Разбира се, да се говори за отсъствие на трансцендентално означавано не е равнозначно на това да се твърди, че не съществува смисъл, който предхожда езика и е независим от езика[3]. Безизходицата е в това, че дори и да го има, този смисъл е непостижим. Знаците не само че не го разкриват, те го скриват. Всички опити да се тълкуват знаци, за да се достигне до окончателен смисъл, водят само до други знаци. Езиковите знаци всъщност се състоят само от означаващи, които препращат едни към други, а срещата им с означаваното е отлагана до безкрайност.

Това твърдение, поддържано от деконструктивистката теория, е изведено от анализа на писмената форма на езика. Писмеността (écriture) според убеждението на Дерида съдържа, обхваща и дори предхожда фонетичния език. Именно вглеждането в това как тя действа показва, че трябва да се преоцени представата за езиковия знак изобщо. Нашествието на писмеността ознаменува упадъка на двуединния модел на знака, а пред човека като езиково същество застава въпросът какво да прави или какво всъщност отдавна прави (но без винаги да го съзнава) с единственото, което му е останало от знака – означаващото.

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[2] Макар Якобсон да е привърженик на разбирането, че знаците отвеждат най-вече към други знаци, струва ми се, че във възгледа си за поетическия език и за функционирането на поетическия знак той не се придържа към такова крайно заличаване на означаваното, каквото Барт му приписва. Например в изследването си върху Пастернак той наистина говори за тенденцията в поезията на самия Пастернак и на поетите от неговото поколение да бъде доведена до крайност еманципацията на знака от предмета, но не разпростира тази тенденция върху литературата изобщо. Референцията в литературния език според него е не заличена или отсъстваща, а „двойствена“.

[3] За това говори казаното от Ричард Рорти – един от убедените привърженици на антиметафизичната насока в съвременната философия. Според него „да се твърди, че трябва да се откажем от идеята за истината, която се намира там отвън и очаква да бъде открита, не означава да се твърди, че сме открили, че там отвън няма истина“ (Рорти 1998: 32).

Ако продължа още малко шеговитата аналогия с андрогините, ще си позволя подмятането, че ролята на Зевс в историята на знака се играе от писмеността (écriture), защото именно тя се явява главният инструмент за разграждането на „силния" двусъставен модел на знака.

Писменият знак е знак на друг знак (звуковия). Неговото означавано е на свой ред означаващо. Но това, което според Дерида векове наред ни се е изплъзвало, е, че тази вторичност, „за която се вярва, че може да бъде запазена за писмеността, засяга всяко означавано изобщо, винаги вече го е засегнала още с влизането му в играта" (Дерида 2001: 17). Понятието *игра*, впрочем с много старо и разнообразно присъствие в историята на естетиката, активно участва и в реториката на деконструкцията. Отношенията между означаващите – единствените възможни отношения в езика според тази теория – лесно се поддават на метафориката на играта заради своята безцелност или самоцелност.

Писмеността (écriture), поне според начина, по който това понятие е семантизирано в граматологията на Дерида, се явява инструмент за две паралелни и взаимносвързани деконструкции – на класическата представа за знака и на конструкциите на метафизическото мислене. Това се налага от констатацията, че „знакът и божественото са родени на едно и също място по едно и също време", че „епохата на знака е същностно теологична" (пак там: 27). Критиката на платонизма и на метафизическата традиция след Платон води до заключението, че цялата тази традиция се основава върху идеята за различието между означаващото и означаваното (Derrida 1972: 127). Тя извежда увереността си в съществуването на означаваните от предпоставката за съществуването на един трансцендентен гарант за смисления на битието. Това може да е логосът или Бог, но във всички случаи се мисли и преживява като присъствие. Съприкосновението с това присъствие не ни е непосредствено дадено, но знаците на нашия език са мост към него. В епохата на метафизиката предназначението на знаците е да разкриват присъствие. Езикът прави това чрез звучащото, винаги тук-и-сега присъстващо слово.

Оценностяването на живото, произнасяно на глас слово е съпроводено с „принизяване" на писмеността, окачествена като „посредничество на посредничеството и пропадане във външността на смисъла" (Дерида 2001: 25). Това, което обаче векове наред е убягвало на логоцентричното мислене – а то неминуемо е и фоноцентрично, – е, че не само знаците на писмеността са „знаци на знаците".

В хода на разгръщането на своята теза, че като „знак на знака" трябва да бъде определен езиковият знак изобщо, Дерида тълкува идеи на различни учени – Пърс, Сосюр, копенхагенските лингвисти, Леви-Строс.

Понятието на Пърс за т.нар. *интерпретант* на знака наистина много добре обслужва деконструктивисткия замисъл. Според американския учен всеки знак изпълнява три функции – да замества нещо, да съобщава (предава) нещо и да предизвиква определена идея в съзнанието. „Знакът замества

нещо пред идеята, която поражда или доуточнява... Онова, което той замества, се нарича негов *обект*; онова, което предава – негово *значение*; а идеята, която поражда – негов *интерпретант*“ (цит. по Еко 1991: 140). Казано на всекидневен език, това определение би прозвучало приблизително така: „Значението е това, което казвам, интерпретантът е това, което другият разбира“. Самото наличие на двете различни понятия – значение и интерпретант – е вече сигнал, че изговорено и чуто, написано и прочетено не е задължително да съвпадат. Нещо повече, съвпадането им всъщност е осъдено да бъде безкрайно отлагано. Частта от дефиницията на Пърс за знака, в която се казва, че „интерпретантът на свой ред става знак и така до *безкрайност*...“, неслучайно е цитирана в „За граматологията“ (Дерида 2001: 78). Безкрайното препращане от знак към знак има за следствие безкрайното отлагане на означаваното, но също и това, че никое предполагаемо означавано не си е самотъждествено, а винаги се проявява като различие спрямо самото себе си. Тези два аспекта на действието на знаците – отлагане и различаване – Дерида събира в новоизкованото и почти непреводимо понятие différance.

И при Сосюр разграничението между устна и писмена реч е решително, дори ценностно. В „Курса“ писмеността е обект на нескрито недоверие. Обвинена е, че „забулва езика“. Тя не просто облича езика, тя го маскира, а тиранията ѝ стига дотам да се намесва в него, като влияе върху произношението. Затова за състоятелен предмет на лингвистиката трябва да бъде обявена единствено фонетичната материя на езика.

Уязвимото място на това противопоставяне между езика и писмеността се оказва обаче именно поддържаната от Сосюр теза за произволността на връзката между означаващото и означаваното в езиковия знак. Тъкмо тази теза всъщност „би трябвало да забрани радикалното разграничаване между езиков и графичен знак“. Няма естествено обусловена връзка между понятието (означаваното) и неговия акустичен *образ* (означаващото), но няма такава връзка и между изговорената дума (le mot parlé) и написаната дума (le mot écrit), която е неин *образ*, няма такава връзка между звука и буквата. Това твърди самият Сосюр в дефинициите и на двата вида знаци. Да отбележим впрочем, че и в двете дефиниции той употребява твърде неясната дума *образ*, чиято неяснота изпъква веднага щом се постави въпросът дали между дадено нещо и даден негов образ връзката може да е напълно произволна, или все пак между нещото и неговия образ трябва да има някакви сходства.

Тезата за произволността на знака наистина води до спорни последствия. Ценностното противопоставяне между звучащото и писменото слово също предизвиква основателна критика, на каквато Дерида подлага разглежданите от него твърдения на Платон, Русо, Сосюр и Клод Леви-Строс за изкуствения или насилническия характер на писмеността.

От друга страна, деконструктивисткото преобръщане на това противопоставяне в полза на писмената форма на езика е не по-малко спорно. Писменият знак е обявен за архетип на езиковия знак въобще с довода, че

при него най-ясно се вижда това, което всъщност важи за всички знаци – да бъдат знаци на други знаци. С това е оправдан и реторическият ход езикът да се представи като „винаги вече" писменост, като някакъв вид „архиписмо" (archi-écriture).

Реториката на деконструкцията несъмнено е силна, но това, разбира се, не прави неоспорими нейните тези. Например настоящият текст с готовност се усъмнява в твърдението, че писането не произвежда и не може да произведе нищо друго освен знаци на знаци.

Обсъждането на това твърдение изисква по-нататъшно разширяване на теоретичния хоризонт, очертан от проблематиката на езиковите знаци и особено от онази нейна част, която засяга отношението им към извънезиковата действителност, тяхната обвързаност или автономност спрямо тази действителност.

Въпросът за отношението между езика и света, или между думите и нещата, е древен. Дългата история на този въпрос може да се опише като неспирно колебание между два философски мита: на Парменид, който отстоява тъждеството на слово, мислене и битие, и на Горгий, според когото, ако битието съществува, то не може да бъде схванато и познато от човека, ако пък е познаваемо, то не може да бъде изречено и съобщено.

В Платоновия диалог „Кратил" основната задача е да се разбере дали чрез имената могат да се познават самите неща. За тази цел трябва да се отговори дали имената са правилни по природа, или са резултат от споразумение. Сократ показва, че за тях важи и едното, и другото. Те могат да бъдат правилни и да посочват вярно истината, могат да бъдат и условни и следователно да подвеждат. Твърдението на Кратил, че „който знае имената, ще знае и нещата", не издържа на проверката, на която го подлага Сократ. Доводите на Сократ са следните. Имената са само образи на нещата, а за достоверността на образа на истината не можем да съдим, без да познаваме *самата истина*. Освен това „множество имена сочат към едно и също нещо" (Платон 1982: 334), поради което винаги съществува опасност да ни заблудят. Изводът е, че нещата могат да се познават по-скоро чрез самите тях, отколкото чрез имената. Този извод насочва към същината на есенциалисткия възглед за отношението език – мислене – действителност, чието начало води към времената на Парменид и Платон. Той се опира върху предпоставката за тъждеството на битие и мислене: трети фрагмент на Парменид гласи: „защото едно и също е мислене и битие".

Това тъждество обуславя възможността за едно независимо от опита познание, което е познание за същности. Например за „красивото само по себе си". Значенията в езика трябва да отговарят именно на тези същности. Затова в системата на есенциалистката философия езикът не е и не може да бъде автономен. Той може да бъде средство за познание, но от гледна точка на висшите цели на познанието се разкрива, че като такова средство той е несъвършен. Според „Седмото писмо" на Платон слабостта на словото се изразява в това, че имената са в състояние да разкрият по-скоро качествата

на всички неща, отколкото битието им. Проникновено тълкуване на тази Платонова мисъл е предложено от Касирер:

> Езикът и словото се стремят да изразят чистото битие, но те никога не постигат това, защото в тях към обозначаването на това чисто битие винаги се примесва обозначаването на нещо друго, на едно случайно „свойство" на предмета. По тази причина това, което съставлява същинската сила на езика, винаги обозначава и неговата същинска слабост, която го прави неспособен за представянето на висшето, истински философско познавателно съдържание. (Касирер 2000: 79)

Тук вече е повдигнат с цялата му острота въпросът за границите на езика, който ще се превърне в един от централните и за аналитичната философия, развита през XX в. от учени като Фреге, Ръсел и Витгенщайн.

С аргументите не на есенциализма, а на своя „логически атомизъм" и в духа на позитивизма Бъртранд Ръсел е сред философите, които са силно скептични към автономизирането на езика. Той заявява, че никога не е могъл да се съгласи с авторите, които разглеждат езика като автономна област: „винаги съм считал езика за прозрачен, т.е. за средство, което може да бъде използвано, без да му се обръща отделно внимание" (Russell 1989: 15). Открито е несъгласието му с „философите и книжните хора", които се стремят

> да живеят живот, доминиран от думите, и дори да забравят, че основната функция на думите е да се намират в един или друг вид връзки с факти, които са предимно неезикови. Тези философи стигат дотам да твърдят, че думите не бива никога да бъдат съпоставяни с фактите, а че трябва да пребивават в чист, автономен свят, където могат да бъдат сравнявани само с други думи. (ibid.: 185)

Това, което според Ръсел прави особено абсурдна подобна позиция, е, че „тя не държи сметка за мястото на езика в света на фактите", докато в действителност „езикът се състои от сетивни феномени също като храненето или вървенето" и, както други усвоени начини на поведение, „от полезни привички". Колкото до нещата, които не могат да бъдат изразени чрез езика, винаги е възможно да се конструира друг език от по-висок ред, който би позволил тези неща да се изкажат[4].

Привържениците на аналитичната философия споделят датиращата от времето на Лайбниц мечта за създаване на изкуствен логически език[5]. Те вярват, че такъв език може да избегне несъвършенствата на естествения,

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[4] Ръсел припомня, че е отстоявал тази идея за конструирането на друг език в предговора си към Витгенщайновия „Логико-философски трактат" (на който предговор, както е известно, авторът на „Трактата" сериозно е възразил), в противовес на тезата на Витгенщайн, че невъзможното да бъде казано може да бъде само показано.

[5] Такъв е планът на Лайбниц за създаване на универсална „азбука" – characteristica universalis.

каквото например е неговата многофункционалност. Тъй като не е предназначен единствено за изпълнението на задачата да бъде най-точен израз на мисълта (а често е използван и за противоположната цел), естественият език съдържа много пречки за реализирането на тази задача.

Същото важи за езиковата многозначност. Синонимията, омонимията, често неясната логическа структура на фразата в естествения език замъгляват нейната реална „логическа форма". Както казва Витгенщайн, „езикът облича мисълта. И то така, че по външната форма не може да се заключи за формата на облечената мисъл; защото външната форма на дрехата е образувана за съвсем други цели от тази да позволява да се разпознава формата на тялото" (Витгенщайн 2003: 193).

Съзнанието, че „възможността за лъжа" се корени в самата същност на словото, посочва от своя страна Юрий Лотман, е „също толкова постоянен фактор на човешката култура, колкото и преклонението пред мощта на словото" (Лотман 1991: 188). Независимо дали е преценяван от есенциалистки или от позитивистични позиции, авторитетът на езика като надежден инструмент за познанието на света или за себеизразяването на човека никога не е спирал да бъде много уязвим.

Една от възможностите за справяне с огромната проблематичност на връзката между езика и света е всъщност отказът от изследването на тази връзка. Сосюровата лингвистика просто ѝ обръща гръб, ограждайки си като единствено изследователско поле синхронната система на езика.

Опит за дефиниране на „границите на езика" провежда Витгенщайн в „Логико-философски трактат". Сърцевината на неговия замисъл е събрана в цитата от Кюрнбургер, избран за мото на трактата: „И всичко, което човек знае, а не е просто шум и врява, може да се каже с две думи."

От това какво може да се каже ясно и за какво не бива да се говори, защото никога не може да бъде изказано ясно, ще се определи границата на мисленето, която следователно не може да бъде никъде другаде освен в езика. Това е постановено още в предговора към съчинението на Витгенщайн. Към очертаването на търсената граница в езика той тръгва от очертаването на границите на света, разглеждан като „съвкупност на фактите". „Трактатът" се придържа към схващане за света, в което изпъква категорията *случайност*[6].

[6] Българският преводач Евгени Латинов уточнява, че първото изречение в „Трактата": „Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist", буквално означава „Светът е всичко, което е случаят", но че е предпочел да го преведе като: „Светът е всичко това, как стоят нещата", именно за да избегне асоциацията със „случайност", която може да предизвика буквалният превод. Въпреки всичко обаче, изглежда, точно такава е идеята на Витгенщайн – че фактите, чиято съвкупност представлява светът, трябва винаги да се разглеждат като резултат на случая (или случайността) и като такива изреченията могат само да ги опишат истинно или неистинно, не и да ги обяснят. Заключението за истинност или неистинност на дадено изречение може да се направи само чрез съпоставяне с конкретното състояние на нещата, до което се отнася изречението. То не може да се изведе от друго състояние на нещата, нито от друго изречение, защото „няма каузална връзка" и „вярата в каузалната връзка е суеверие" (5.134–5.136).

Фактите, до които се отнася дадена вярна елементарна пропозиция, винаги случайно са такива, каквито са. Тяхното съществуване не може да се изведе от някакъв априорен принцип, може само да се удостовери чрез проверка, която да установи истинността на пропозицията. Невъзможността към огромната част от изказванията на философията да се приложи такъв верификационен критерий, който да докаже тяхната истинност или неистинност, е основание те да се окачествят като безсмислени. Традиционната философия, която за Витгенщайн съвпада с метафизиката, се опитва да говори за „неизразимото", а то, тъй като е „мистично", може само да бъде показано, но не и изказано (6.522). Същото важи за етиката и естетиката, които говорят за ценности. Ценностите се отнасят до смисъла на света, но този смисъл „лежи извън света" (6.41). Езикът обаче няма достъп до това, което е отвъд границите на света. Затова „границите на моя език означават границите на моя свят" (5.6). Те позволяват да се каже само *как* е светът, но това, че той *е*, е мистично, т.е. недостъпно за езика. Бог не се открива в света (6.432). Смисълът на света остава скрит. Но понеже светът и животът са едно (5.621), смисълът на живота също не може да бъде изказан. Така че „решението на проблема за смисъла на живота се вижда при изчезването на този проблем" (6.521).

Чрез посочването на границите на езика Витгенщайн се стреми да докаже невъзможността за метафизика по един, по собствените му думи, „неопровержим и окончателен начин". Извършеният от него „лингвистичен обрат" многократно е сравняван с Кантовата „коперниканска революция" във философията. Кант също стига до граница – до невъзможността на чистия разум да се избави радикално от трансценденталната илюзия, която е неразделно свързана с човешкия разум и която, и след като сме разкрили нейната илюзорност, все пак няма да престане да го подмамва и да го тласка неспирно към моментни грешки, които винаги ще трябва да бъдат премахвани.

Но защото съществуват „*неизбежни проблеми на чистия разум, каквито са бог, свобода и безсмъртие*", затова „дори с опасност да се заблудим, ще се осмелим по-скоро на всичко, отколкото да се откажем от такива важни изследвания поради каквото и да е основание за съмнение или поради пренебрежение и равнодушие" (Кант 1992: 78).

Двата опита – на Кант и на Витгенщайн – свидетелстват за два от възможните, а може би за двата единствено възможни пътя пред човешката мисъл, когато тя се сблъска със своите и на езика граници. Единият е колкото трагичен, толкова и възвишен в Кантовия смисъл на понятието. Това е пътят на волята да бъдат продължени усилията да се мисли немислимото и непредставимото въпреки съзнанието за невъзможността да се отиде отвъд границите. Другият път е повече трагичен, отколкото възвишен, но в него също има достойнство – достойнството на признатото безсилие. Този път води главно към едно – към това да се изнамират нови и нови основания за отказа от предварително обречени усилия.

Колкото до начините, по които се решава въпросът за отношението между мисленето и света, между езика и света, те до голяма степен зависят

от това какво се разбира под „свят“. Можем да приемем заедно с Витгенщайн, че светът – това са фактите и че не сме в състояние да говорим смислено за нищо, което е извън света на фактите и което наричаме именно с думи като *бог, свобода, безсмъртие*. Тогава обаче възниква въпросът какво правят тези думи в езика ни. Какво правим ние с тях?

В известен смисъл точно на тези въпроси се опитва да отговори Витгенщайн във „Философски изследвания“, с които изиграва главна роля в една, според изследователите му, втора революция във философията (първата той извършва с „Логико-философски трактат“). Разликата във възгледите, която става видима при съпоставката между двете съчинения, е съществена, но въпреки коренно променения му подход към езика, остава неизменна постановката за границите на езика. В по-късния труд обаче тези граници получават друго определение.

Тезата на „Трактата“ е, че критерият за смисленост на езиковите изрази се задава от действителността, до която те се отнасят. Ако истинността на казаното за действителността е проверима, изразът е смислен, ако не е проверима – е безсмислен.

Тезата на „Философски изследвания“ е, че смислеността в езика се определя от произволните правила на граматиката, които регулират употребата му. Той вече не се разглежда като система от знаци, чиито логически връзки отразяват структурата на действителността[7], а като всекидневна социална дейност. Значенията на имената не се определят от статично съотнесени към тях обекти, а са функция от употребите на съответните имена във всекидневието. Витгенщайн въвежда понятието „езикови игри“, за да означи взаимовръзката на езика с дейностите, с които той е преплетен. Следователно верификационният критерий е заменен с контекстуален. Съгласно него трябва да се приеме, че разбирането не само на най-всекидневни думи, но и на думи като *бог, свобода, безсмъртие* предполага не да се определят някакви обективни, независещи от условията на езиковата дейност същности, на които тези думи отговарят, а да се опишат различните ситуации, в които ги употребяват хората. Как тези думи биват употребявани, а не какво означават, е и въпросът, с който в действителност трябва да се занимава философията. Тя трябва да стане чисто дескриптивна: „Трябва да се отстрани всяко обяснение и на негово място да се постави само описание“ (Витгенщайн 1988: § 109).

Само така според Витгенщайн философията ще съумее да поведе „борба срещу омагьосването на разума със средствата на езика ни“ (пак там) – омагьосването, в плен на което векове наред метафизиката държи разума на човека, като го подмамва да мисли, че може да си обясни себе си, живота и света от гледната точка на една всъщност напълно непроницаема и недости-

[7] В „Логико-философски трактат“ (4.01) се казва: „Изречението е образ на действителността. Изречението е модел на действителността така, както ние я мислим“.

жима за него отвъдност. Метафизиката, разбира се, заблуждава съвсем добросъвестно, защото до голяма степен надценява възможностите на езика.

Но наред със защитаваното с различни аргументи твърдение на едни мислители за непреодолимите граници на езика никога не е преставало от други да се поддържа убеждението в изключителността на възможностите, които той осигурява на човешкия разум и дух.

Оптимистичните теории за езика обикновено са оптимистични и по отношение на въпроса за смисъла на битието. Това означава, че от тяхна гледна точка си струва този въпрос да се поставя и че езикът не затваря, а отваря вратите към духовното.

Безнадеждно начинание е да се обхване нещо толкова необозримо като историята на размисъла за *езика* в неговото отношение към *света* или към *истината за света*, особено като се имат предвид цялата неопределеност и неопределимост на самите понятия „истина“ и „свят“. Все пак като че ли по-настойчиво се налага впечатлението, че този размисъл е бил и е повече скептичен, отколкото оптимистичен. Многократно е препотвърждавана представата, че съществува непреодолима граница на езика. Разликите са главно в дължината на разстоянието, което според едни или други мислители ни дели от тази граница. Дали изглежда, че тя все пак позволява някакво частично проникване чрез думите в света на нещата, или този свят е абсолютно недостъпен за нашия език.

Да припомним отново какво казват някои от скептиците.

- Светът е несъобщим. Разменяме си думи, но чрез тях не проговарят нещата (Горгий).
- Границата на езика съвпада с тази, която дели „външното“ от „вътрешното“, явлението от същността. Думите надеждно описват качествата на предметите в света, но не могат да прекрачат отвъд тях, за да разкрият чистото битие (Платон).
- Езикът разбулва, но и забулва истинското битие, той е едновременно тъждествен и противоположен на битието (Хераклит).
- Езикът е като дрехата – предназначен повече да скрива, отколкото да разкрива (Витгенщайн).
- Ние се нуждаем само от това да отхвърлим завесата на думите, за да съзрем ясно и чисто дървото на познанието, чийто плод е прекрасен и достижим за нашите ръце (Бъркли).

Прекъсвам редицата от цитати с призива на Бъркли. Историята на теориите за езика предоставя материал и за „алтернативна“ редица от изказвания на мислители, които виждат в езика много повече неговата сила, отколкото неговата слабост. Сред тях е прочутото *veritas in dicto, non in re consistit* („истината се състои в думите, а не в нещата“), изречено от друг представител на английския емпиризъм – Томас Хобс.

Езикът във формулата на Хобс е оценен от гледна точка на категорията „истина“. Въпросът е в това дали целта на познанието за света, спрямо която се разкриват и възможностите на езика, се определя като *представяне*

или като *конструиране* на истината за света. Езикът може да не ни позволява да представим (или посочим) в нейното единство и завършеност тази истина, но той и само той ни позволява непрестанно да я конструираме или реконструираме, тъй като тя се състои не в съвкупността от всички единични предмети или факти, съществуващи в света, а във взаимовръзките между тях, които могат да се разкрият само по дедуктивен път. Идеята на Хобс, изтълкувана от Касирер, е, че „нашият дух може да придобие дедуктивен възглед само за онези съдържания, които не са му дадени отвън, подобно на нещата или на сетивните усещания, а които той самият сътворява и свободно изявява от самия себе си“ (Касирер 2000: 91). И това може да става единствено благодарение на всеобщността на понятията и съответстващите на тях думи в езика.

В дилемата *представяне* или *конструиране* се сблъскват два критерия за надеждността на езика. Отговорът на въпроса за способността или неспособността на езика да бъде мост към истината за света в решаваща степен зависи от това кой от тези два критерия ще бъде приложен. Ако тезата „езикът може да представя истинно света“ е лесно оборима, то другата – „езикът може да конструира истинно света“ – е като че ли по-неуязвима. При първата от тях мярата за истинност е вън от езика, при втората – в самия него. Езикът като представящ е пасивен, но като конструиращ е активен, или може би по-точно, креативен. Видян по такъв начин, той се показва – така както се е показал на Шелинг – като „най-адекватния символ на абсолютния акт на познанието“ (Шелинг 1980: 308), съответстващ по своята природа на целите на „истинското познание“. Заради неограничения си *конструктивен* потенциал, който се проявява както в полето на науката, така и на изкуството, езикът е характеризиран от Шелинг като „най-съвършеното художествено произведение“.

Утвърждаването на езика, вярата, че именно чрез него човекът се доближава, а не се отдалечава от същностното, определят основния патос в идеите и на Хумболт. Подобно на Шелинг и той съизмерва езика с изкуството, доколкото езикът „се стреми в някаква сетивна форма да изобрази невидимото“. Разбирането на Хумболт дори за „границите на езика“ е оптимистично: „Човекът не се побира цял в границите на своя език; той е повече от това, което може да изрази с думи; но му е необходимо да заключи в думи неуловимия си дух, за да го скрепи с нещо и да използва словото като опора за постигане на това, което излиза от неговите рамки“ (Гумбольдт 1985: 348).

А „първият природен закон“, формулиран от Хердер в неговия „Трактат за произхода на езика“, гласи: „Човекът е създание на езика“. Въображението на Хердер рисува оня безкрайно далечен момент в началото на времето, когато човекът, „сам и самотен във вселената“, е дочул властна повеля: „Бъди или нищо, или монарх на вселената чрез своя ум! Или загини, или си създай език!“

В „Хьолдерлин и същността на поезията“ Хайдегер говори за езика като за „най-висшата изява на човешкото битие“. В светлината на собст-

вените си философски тези той тълкува думите на Хьолдерлин, че езикът е „най-опасното от всички блага“. Опасността е в това, че в езика може да се изкаже „както най-чистото и съкровеното, така и най-обърканото и абстрактното“, без словото „като дума“ да позволява със сигурност да се отсъди дали е съществено, или е измамно (Хайдегер 1993: 55). Същевременно, когато заговаря за благото на езика, с някаква безвъпросност, твърде впечатляваща, когато се открие у мислител, който се е прочул с това, че е преобърнал цялата предходна философска традиция, Хайдегер изтъква именно способността на езика да „служи за разбиране“. Донякъде е озадачаваща липсата дори на намек за резервираност към тази способност точно след като е казано, че езикът може опасно да смесва същинското и привидното, но не за да обсъждам това евентуално противоречие се спирам на този текст на Хайдегер. Спирам се заради категоричността, с която в него са съположени *език*, *свят* и *история*: „Само където има език, има и свят, което значи постоянно променящ се кръг от решение и дело, действие и отговорност, а също – произвол, упадък и обърканост. Само където има свят, има и история. Езикът е благо в един първичен смисъл. Той облагодетелства, сиреч осигурява възможността човек да бъде историчен“ (пак там).

Доколко човекът трябва да се чувства облагодетелстван от своята историчност, също е въпрос, на който са давани неоднозначни отговори. Достатъчно е само за илюстрация да се припомни например наблюдението на Мирча Елиаде, че не само митологичните ритуали, но и голяма част от религиозните и от философските учения представляват различни форми на опит за бягство от историята, за преодоляване на историчността на човешкото съществуване („Митът за вечното завръщане“). За Хайдегер обаче именно в историчността (или като историчност) се проявява това, което той нарича „битие на съществуващото“, и именно езикът осигурява възможността то да се прояви.

Битието на съществуващото очаква от нас „съответствие“, твърди Хайдегер. В духа на неговите етимологически игри философският смисъл на тази дума може да се долови, когато се постави сред поредица от асоциативно привлечени около нея думи, които са ѝ морфемно или смислово близки: *съ-от-вет-ствие – от-вет – от-говор – говор*. Връзката между първата и последната от думите в тази верига прозира или, както би казал Хайдегер, *просветва*, когато се съпоставят следните му две изказвания: „съответствието с битието на съществуващото е вечният ни престой“ – „съответствието е говор“. Този говор – и това е говорът на битието – „стои в служба на езика“. Тук се разкрива и дълбокото несъответствие между изповядваната от Хайдегер представа за езика и тази, която той нарича „нашата обичайна представа за езика“. Обичайната представа за езика е, че той е инструмент за изразяване. Според нея езикът служи на мисленето, докато в действителност „мисленето като съответствие служи на езика“ (Хайдегер 1986: 26–27).

На другия полюс на инструменталното схващане за езика застава Хайдегеровото осмисляне на езика като „дом на битието“. Бих добавила, че

макар и невинаги особено уютен, този дом е единственият, който духът ни има на този свят.

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HABET SUA FATA LINGUA

Miryana Yanakieva

Abstract

The article deals with some crucial moments in the new history of the theory of linguistic signs. After Saussure, the sign becomes a key concept in the humanities field. However, it turns out that the "power" of its theoretic position is largely dependent on the strength of the link between its two components – the signifier and the signified. According to the post-structuralist way of thinking, the integrity of the sign is lost and the relationship between its two constituents becomes questionable, if not impossible. The signified undergoes a deep crisis. It begins to seem unattainable or simply uninteresting. Losing its integrity, the sign loses also its strength. As Derrida says, the sign depreciates completely, but the present article tries to show some debatable aspects of this statement.

'SIGNIFYING EXPRESSIONS' IN ARISTOTLE'S *DE INTERPRETATIONE*

Anita Kasabova and Vladimir Marinov[*]

It is a great pleasure for us to honor
Ivan Mladenov and dedicate this paper to him!

Aristotle's short treatise named '*Perì hermēnéias*', better known by its Latin name '*De Interpretatione*' (hereafter *Int.*), was included in the *Organon*, so-called by Aristotelian commentators who compiled Aristotle's works on logic and placed the short text between the *Categories* and the *Prior Analytics*[1]. Unlike the latter, however, *Int.* has been discounted in recent scholarship, with two notable exceptions. C.W.A. Whitaker (1996, chs. 1–2) makes a detailed analysis of Aristotle's conception of signifying expressions. In 2009, a group of researchers at the CNRS published a collection of papers examining the place and objective of *Int.*, raising the question whether this text belongs to logic or grammar, although these divisions of the sciences were derived in the Aristotelian tradition rather than originating with his work (Husson 2009).

Taking our cue from these works, we propose a new reading of the first four chapters of '*Peri Hermeneias*'[2], showing that they deal with the basic elements of verbal communication. Using Waitz's (1844: 324) rendering of the title as *De communicatione sermonis*, we argue that it is a first attempt at making a grammar or presenting the system and rules of natural language. As linguist E. Coseriu (1967: 87, 112) remarked, Aristotle proposes a manual of general linguistics long before F. de Saussure. We note some parallels between Aristotle

[*] The materials in this paper were discussed in a research seminar on Aristotle's *Int.* we organized at the New Bulgarian University during the spring semester of 2013. We thank Borislav Gueorguiev, Lilia Gurova, Mariana Malinova and George Tsonev for their comments and discussion.

[1] Ammonius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Int.*, 4.17-24 Busse; cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, V. 28–29. On the history of Aristotle's *Organon* and the alleged position of the *Int.* in it see Frede 1987: 18–21; Sorabji 1990: 1–2, 64–66; Barnes 2005: 51–57; Aubenque 2009: 37–38; Husson 2009: 20–21.

[2] In this paper we follow the standard edition of the Greek text of the *Int.* by Minio-Paluello 1949: 47–72, unless otherwise stated.

and later theories of language and logic without considering him as their precursor because, in our view, there are important contextual and conceptual differences between classical texts and their reception, on one hand, and modern theories and their contemporary derivations, on the other (see Ax 1978: 246–247; Polansky and Kuczewski 1990: 51). We merely wish to point out that Aristotle explains the basic elements of language by considering linguistic signs as arbitrary and introduces the notion of convention in language use[3]. Analogous to later phoneticians, he distinguishes between inarticulate sounds (noises) and articulate sounds (utterances). The latter designate thoughts through phonetic articulation. Aristotelian thoughts are not mental phenomena but *senses* or modes of presentation with an internal structure[4].

1. Aristotle's account of convention in language use

From the arbitrary nature of signs follows the notion of convention for delimiting mental and linguistic items and their relation to things. Aristotle examines what naming is, what names and verbs are, and how they relate to thoughts and things. According to him, words are not directly related to things, but relate to thoughts, which in turn relate to things[5]. Names refer to things via senses and they stand for things. Aristotle uses the word *sēméion* for designating *signs* and when describing the relation between signs and thoughts[6]. He uses the word *sýmbolon* for designating the linguistic relation between thoughts, words and things, which is arbitrary and conventional. Thus a ticket serves as symbol or token of our right to use the subway. Symbols are mediums of exchange, like money, whereas signs are distinctive marks of an object, as smoke is the sign of fire.

Aristotle begins his treatise by defining the parts of speech and determining how natural language is used: "First we must settle what a name is and what a verb is, and then what a negation, an affirmation, a statement and phrase are" (*Int.* 16ª1-2). Then he distinguishes between spoken sounds (literally 'those

[3] Cf. Aubenque 2009: 41: "ce qui intéresse ici Aristote est l'interprétation des signes linguistiques: dans quelle mesure les signes linguistiques, écrits ou parlés, reflètent-ils adéquatement les représentations et, à travers elles, les choses?"

[4] Cf. Carson 2003: 322, *pace* Irwin 1982: 265 who defends the 'metaphysical' reading of the initial chapters of *Int.*: "An inquiry into the signification of words is not concerned with sense, communication, translation or linguistic competence, but with the discovery of the real properties there are and their relation to the world."

[5] The claim is best summarized by the Neoplatonist Ammonius in his *Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione* (see, for example, 17.24-26 Busse) but can also be seen in Porphyry (*In Int.* 78F Smith, preserved in Boethius, *Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione* ii, 25.15-29.29).

[6] The authors of the *Port Royal Grammar* (1660: intro, 5; 2.i, 28) have taken up the Aristotelian notion that signs signify thoughts and thoughts are articulated in words: "Thus we can define words as distinct and articulate sounds of which men have made signs to signify their thoughts."

in the voice', *tà en têi phōnêi*) and written marks (*tà graphómena*): "Spoken sounds are tokens of affections in the soul and written marks are tokens of spoken sounds. Just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds" (16ª3-5). Since he explicitly ties *sýmbolon* to convention, we translate *sýmbolon* as *token*: "I say *by convention* (*katà synthêkēn*) because no utterance is a word (*ónoma*)[7] by nature, but only when it becomes a token (*sýmbolon*) of something" (16ª26-28)[8]. Tokens are conventional because they are adopted to stand for or refer to what they signify by agreement. Aristotel's explanation of convention is that an utterance is not a word by nature but only when it becomes a *sýmbolon* of something, i.e. when it denotes an object in a vocal or visual medium of exchange. On Aristotle's view, a linguistic token (*sýmbolon*) can be simple or compound. Such a token can be a word, phrase or sentence; whereas the former is significant by itself, the latter comprise at least one part significant by itself (16ᵇ33-17ª1; 24ᵇ1-2).

He emphasizes the role of convention in oral and written language use by distinguishing between mere noises, sounds and names by adding that even animals make noises, which indicate (*dēloûsi*) something, but none of those utterances is a name (16ª28-29). Unlike utterances, names are linguistic expressions, which stand for something and express a sense, whereas "beasts' inarticulate noises" (*agrámmatoi psóphoi*) merely signal or indicate, without referring to anything. Nor do animals express noises according to a convention (16ª28). Thus a dog's growl is a natural sign of anger without expressing a sense, although that sense [anger] is inferrable from the growl[9]. Signs show and signal, but tokens tell. Accordingly, Aristotle defines signs as something from which something else may be inferred: "a demonstrative premise which is necessary or generally accepted (*éndoxos*); that which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else happened, is a sign of that something's having happened or being" (*APr* II.27, 70ª7-9, trans. H. P. Cooke). If there is a sign, then there is some object of which it is a sign. If smoke is a sign, this is because it is an indicative mark of fire.

1.1. Aristotle on the relation between signs, thoughts and words

Spoken sounds or utterances (*phōnái*) and written marks or letters (*tà graphómena*) are 'not the same for all men', precisely because they are not 'likenesses' of things but arbitrary conventions or signs which say and tell:

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[7] We translate *ónoma* as *word* or *name*, depending on context.

[8] Cf. *De Sensu* 1, 437ª12-15. The same applies to any other complex significant unit such as a phrase or a sentence (*lógos*: *Int.* 16ᵇ33-17ª1; 24ᵇ1-2).

[9] For more details see Ax 1978; Whitaker 1996: 45–51. For other passages by Aristotle, where articulated human speech is distinguished from animal noises, see *De An.* II.8, 419ᵇ4-421ª6; *HA* I.1, 488ª31-ᵇ1; IV.9, 535ª27-536ᵇ23; *Poet.* 20, 1456ᵇ22-34; *Pol.* I.1, 1253ª9-18; *GA* V.7, 786ᵇ20-22.

"And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are utterances. But the affections of the soul which these are primarily signs (*sēméia*) of are the same for all. And what these affections are likenesses (*homoiômata*) of – actual things (*prágmata*) – are also the same." (16ª6-8). Spoken sounds and written marks are primarily signs (*sēméia*) of affections in the soul, and these latter are 'likenesses' of things[10].

We reconstruct Aristotle's argument in 16ª3-8 as follows: spoken marks are tokens of affections in the soul, and written marks are tokens of spoken marks. But the first things of which these tokens are signs are affections in the soul. Whereas tokens stand for something or refer to that thing via a sign, signs directly signify or show that thing. Aristotle carefully determines linguistic signs (*sēméia*) as tokens (*sýmbola*) of 'affections in the soul' (*tà en têi psykhêi pathêmata*) (cf. 24ᵇ1-2). The question is: what are 'affections in the soul'? Aristotle tells us they are 'likenesses of things' and, at 16ª8-9, refers to his treatise *On the Soul*, where he discusses these issues in more detail. Commentators usually locate the passage in question at *De An.* I.1, 402ª9 and 403ª3-ᵇ19 (esp. 403ª7-11), where 'affections of the soul' (*páthē* or *pathêmata tês psykhês*) are related to thinking (*tò noéin*). On this reading, affections in the soul are thoughts, which is confirmed at *Int.* 16ª13-15, where Aristotle relates isolated names and verbs to a simple thought (*nóēma*), as well as at 23ª32-33, where he says that "things in the voice follow things in the thought (*toîs en têi dianóiai*)". The next question is: how can *thoughts* be likenesses of *things*?

Consider another passage in the *De Anima*: "for the thinking soul mental images (*phantásmata*) take the place of perceptions (*aisthêmata*); and when it asserts or denies that they are good or bad, it avoids or pursues them. Hence the soul never thinks without a mental image" (III.7, 431ª15-17, trans. W. S. Hett). In this passage, Aristotle explains that affections in the soul are not merely sensory perceptions. *Phantásmata* are appearances or mental images, produced by the imagination (*phantasía*) which, for Aristotle, is either sensory or deliberative (III.3, 427ᵇ17-20). Consequently, the appearances it produces are either sensory and depictive, or non-sensory and descriptive (III.3). In the latter case, mental images have what we would call a conceptual content. "So the thinking soul thinks (*noéi*) the concepts (*éidē*) in mental images (*en phantásmasi*)" (III.7, 431ᵇ2). *Thoughts* are thus affections in the soul, which are likenesses of things or concepts, although they are not pictorial, as Ackrill (1963: 113) suggests. For Aristotle, these likenesses are forms (*éidē*), which are non-linguistic, and hence they are not conventions. Thoughts relate to *éidē* as senses of words, which leave an imprint on the soul and thus *affect*

[10] In the *Sophistical Refutations* (165ª4-17), Aristotle considers words as tokens of *things*, manipulated by a thinker like pebbles used in calculation, whereas in *Int.* he regards words as signs and tokens of *thoughts* (affections in the soul). Cf. Whitaker 1996: 9–25.

thinking (III.4-5)[11]. Hence they are non-pictorial and expressible through words (linguistic conventions) and, more importantly, they are truth-evaluable when expressed in a proposition. While the simple expressions 'man' or 'white' express an isolated sense or thought, they are neither true nor false, "for both falsity and truth imply combination and division" (16ª10-12).

2. Aristotle on 'signifying expressions' and the role of '*is*'

For example, the *éidos* of a man is a non-linguistic and natural concept or form, which is the same for all humans. It is expressible in words and refers to a thing (a man) by means of the name 'man'. That name can be simple ('man') or complex ('horseman'), just as a noun can be simple or complex (*Int.* 16ª23-24). We suggest that in distinguishing between different kinds and uses of words, Aristotle puts forward a semantic theory allowing parallels with Frege in regard to explaining what linguistic expressions are, how names and verbs are combined 'to say something of something' and when linguistic expressions are truth-evaluable. Unlike Frege, Aristotle does not formalize natural language but uses natural language for describing the different functions of names and words, showing how they signify and how they refer[12]. For the latter, an expression is truth-evaluable if it refers to a thought which, in turn, designates a concrete referent as well as denoting a general notion[13].

Aristotle and Frege both distinguish between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*), claiming that an expression can have sense but lack reference[14]. According to Aristotle, by themselves, 'man' or 'white' are neither true nor false, unlike the assertion 'S is white', which is truth-evaluable because it has a referent. Besides, even names without a referent have a sense or signify something, but by themselves they are not referring. The first chapter of *Int.* concludes:

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[11] Cf. Whitaker (1996: 9), who argues that thoughts are formal likenesses of things: "thinking of a dog means conceiving a formal likeness of a dog in one's mind". On this view, *éidē* function as Kantian schemata or Locke's general triangles. Like them, *éidē* have an abstract and a material aspect and thus exemplify or resemble a general notion as well as designating a concrete referent. For further discussion of the *homoiômata* question see also Polansky and Kuczewski 1990: 53–57; Carson 2003: 322–334.

[12] Cf. Barnes 1996: 184–186, esp. 185: "Aristotle rarely shows any interest in regimentation. He does not suggest that the sentences should be rewritten in the technical style. … He uses more or less normal Greek." The opposite view is advocated by Whitaker (1996: 59).

[13] Our reading differs from Whitaker's, who argues that words signify, or correspond to, *things* (1996: 25, 58). We suggest that words signify thoughts and refer to things.

[14] For Frege (1892: 100), a *sense* is "a mode of presentation of a *Bedeutung* (referent)". Unlike Irwin (1982: 243 ff.), we do not attempt to correlate signification to meaning, but follow Frege's distinction between sense and reference. According to Frege (1891: *letter to Husserl*), unsaturated expressions such as 'white' have no sense in isolation, unlike proper names. Here the two authors differ, since for Aristotle, both adjectives and proper names signify a sense.

> Just as, in the soul, a thought is sometimes neither true nor false, and sometimes must be either true or false, so is in the speech. For both falsity and truth imply combination and separation. Nouns and verbs by themselves are like thoughts without combination or separation, such as 'man' or 'white' when nothing is added; so far they are neither true nor false, but are only signs of this or that[15]. Even the word 'goat-stag' signifies something, but is not, as yet, anything true or false, unless 'is' or 'is not' is added, either in the present or in some other tense. ($16^{a}10$-18)

In this passage, Aristotle begins elaborating the distinction between attributive and affirmative signs – the first philosopher to do so. The expressions 'man', 'white', even 'goat-stag' signify (*sēmáinei*), but they are not referring expressions unless they are combined with a verb (either in the present or another tense), so as to assert something of a name. The expression 'the horse is running' is a referring statement or affirmation (*katáphasis*), where something is said or predicated of something else. Running is said of the horse, but not because the two words are related by 'is', which does not play the role of a predicate and is merely attributive. According to Aristotle and Frege, the verb 'is' cannot act as a link between signifying expressions in an affirmation, because it is not significant by itself. In an affirmation, as Frege shows in the *Begriffschrift* (1879: §§2–4), the judgment stroke is applied to the semantic content 'the horse is running' (or 'the horse runs'):
⊢ running(horse).

Aristotle makes this point in *Int.* 3 when he says that 'is' does not signify anything true or false, because "'is' cannot be thought without the composing parts of the proposition." ($16^{b}24$-25). Unlike medieval logicians on one hand and the logicians of *Port Royal* on the other, Frege and Aristotle do not consider 'is' as the logical, semantic or psychological copula. The latter is neither affirmed of the semantic content, nor a psychological relation between name and verb (Aubenque 2009: 45–46; Barnes 2009: 159). To use a different example, according to the scholastics, 'is' affirms that "Sam is white", and according to the influential *Grammar* and *Logic* of *Port Royal*, the copula expresses the relation of affirmation we make in our minds between the subject 'Sam' and the predicate 'white'. Arnauld *et al.* (1660, 1662) write:

> The *main use of the verb is to signify an affirmation* [...] the verb itself should have no other use than to mark the connection we make in our minds between the two terms of a proposition. But only the verb 'to be', called the substantive, retains this simplicity, and properly retains it only in the third person, present, *is* [...]. (*Port Royal Logic*, II.ii, 109; *Grammar*, ch.2.xii, 90, our translation)

As a result, a proposition was traditionally considered as consisting of three terms: subject, predicate and the 'is', signifying an affirmation by connecting the two:

[15] In translating line $16^{a}16$ we accept the re-punctuation proposed by Whitaker (1996: 34).

the judgment we make of things, as when I say: "*the earth is round*", is called *proposition*; and thus every proposition necessarily comprises two terms, one called *subject*, which is that of which one affirms, such as *earth*; and the other called *attribute*, which is what is affirmed, such as *round*; and in addition the connection between these two terms, *is*. (*Grammar*, ch.2.i, 28–29, our translation)

By contrast, according to Aristotle and Frege, 'is' is not a necessary component of a proposition, since "white belongs to Sam" is an attribution, which is the semantic content of the judgment:
⊢ white(Sam)

2.1. Aristotle on the signification of names and verbs

Aristotle explains that a verb is "a sign of things said of something else" (16^b7). A term in the predicate position plays a different role from a term in the subject position. This is how he distinguishes between names and verbs: they have different grammatical functions. "A name (*ónoma*) is an expression signifying by convention, without signifying time" (16^a18-19). A verb (*rhêma*), on the other hand, "is that which additionally signifies time [...] and it is a sign of things said of something else" (16^b6-7)[16]. Aristotle seems to have been the first author to attach time (or tense) to verbs (Whitaker 1996: 53–54; Barnes 2007: 8–9). In addition, he classifies verbs as attributive signs, thus distinguishing them from names: "I say that a verb is always the sign of attributes, for example of things one says of a subject" (16^b10).

Similarly to Frege, Aristotle distinguishes between expressions expressing a sense and referring expressions. If a verb is combined with the name 'goat-stag', as 'the goat-stag runs', 'running' is said or asserted of the goat-stag: 'running *belongs to* the goat-stag'. This statement expresses a sense, but it does not refer because, as far as Aristotle knew, there are no such items. Frege would agree that statements with fictitious entities have a sense whilst lacking a referent, although we can make true or false judgments about statements about such items.

There seems to be a parallel between Aristotle and Frege's accounts of signifying expressions, which may or may not refer. From a contemporary point of view, this parallel may be of interest in highlighting two semantic principles we have come to know as the context principle and the compositionality principle, for the formulation of which Frege is credited today. According to Frege (1884: §62), "never [...] ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition." On this view, words mean something only in the context of a statement. This is the well-known context-principle, as stated in *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*[17]. In *Sinn und Bedeutung*, Frege applies this principle to

[16] On Aristotle's distinction between names and verbs see also the *Poetics* 20, 1457^a10-18.
[17] "... nur im Zusammenhang eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" (1884: §62). Z.G. Szabó (2012: 1.6.4) construes Frege's context principle as a compositionality principle: "the meaning of an expression is determined by the meanings of all complex expressions in which it occurs as a constituent."

proper names: "The sense (*Sinn*) of a proper name is grasped by anyone with a sufficient knowledge of the language or the whole of significations (*Bezeichnungen*) he belongs to."[18]

It would seem that Aristotle also subscribes to the context-principle. In *Int.* 2, he states that no part of a noun is significant in isolation:

> A noun, then, is an utterance (*phōnê*) that is meaningful (*sēmantikê*) by convention and timelessly, of which no part in isolation is significant (*sēmantikòn kekhōrisménon*). In the name 'Good-horse' (*Kálippos*), the component '-horse' ([*h*]*ippos*) signifies nothing by itself (*kath'hautó*), as it does in the phrase (*lógos*) *good horse* (*kalòs híppos*). (16ª19-22)

When distinguishing between simple and complex nouns, Aristotle advances context principle with a compositionality constraint: complex expressions are constructed from simple expressons, but the signification of the lexical component parts of a complex experssion depends on context. For example, as a component part of the proper name '*Goodman*', the lexical item *-man* does not signify anything, but this constraint only applies to the constitutive parts of this expression. By contrast, the word *man* does signify something as a component part of the phrase *good man*. In our view, Aristotle subscribes to a moderate contextualism by saying that simple nouns have no significant components, whereas complex nouns do, but the signification of their parts is context-dependent. Aristotle writes: "The case is not the same with simple nouns as it is with complex ones. In the former, the parts do not signify in any way, whereas in the latter, they do, in a way, but not of anything in isolation: for instance '*kélēs*' in the word *pirate-ship* (*epaktrokélēs*)." (16ª22-26; cf. 16ᵇ30-33).

Aristotle claims that the component part '*kélēs*' does not signify by itself (*kath'hautó*), independently of the context of the compound *epaktrokélēs*, in which it contributes to the sense '*pirate-ship*'. R. J. Hankinson (1987: 220–221) reconstructs an amusing reading of the noun *kélēs*, which besides designating '*horse*' or '*boat*' also denotes a sexual position, of a woman 'doing the horseman'. On his reading of 16ª24-26, '*kélēs*' is restricted to and determined by the context of the complex noun *pirate-ship*, indicating that the context principle is correlated with the compositionality constraint.

2.2. Aristotle on verbs: from attributive signs to logical predicates

In addition, Aristotle emphasizes the major role played by verbs in producing signifying expressions, which are truth-evaluable. He expounds his view on linguistic signification by determining verbs along the same lines as names. Hence the beginning of ch. 3 omits the main part of the general definition of names proposed in ch. 2: "an expression signifying by convention" (16ª19-20; repeating

[18] „Der Sinn eines Eigennamens wird von jedem erfasst, der die Sprache oder das Ganze von Bezeichnungen hinreichend kennt, der er angehört" (Frege 1892: 27).

only "of which no part in isolation is significant"). Instead, at 16^{b}6-7, Aristotle stresses two further elements: "a verb is that which additionally signifies time (*tò prossēmáinon khrónon*), [...] and it is a sign of things said of something else (*tôn kath'hetérou legoménōn sēméion*)." Let us begin by examining the latter.

Like names, verbs are simple signifying expressions, but unlike names, they have additional grammatical functions. By themselves, verbs serve as names signifying something (16^{b}19-20). However, when combined with other names in a sentence, they also function as attributions of something else (16^{b}13). In simple indicative sentences, their attribution turns into logical predication, which affirms or denies something (a predicate) of something else (a subject), thus making the statement either true or false (17^{a}2-4, 20-26; cf. 16^{a}9-16)[19]. For that reason, Aristotle claims that each proposition "must consist of a name and verb, [...] and without a verb, there is no affirmation or negation." (19^{b}10-12; cf. 17^{a}9-10).

This claim entails that the 'syntactic' role of verbs (particularly of the verb 'is', to which the text pays constant attention) may be considered a middle term in *Int.*'s transition from the 'semantics' of simplest signifying expressions (chs. 1–3) to the 'logic' of complex assertions as truth-bearers (ch. 4 to the end). According to Aristotle, when spoken in succession, names by themselves do not form a statement; rather verbs bring about 'combination' or 'separation' in all propositions. On this account, truth and falsity bear on the class of 'signifying expressions' only when a verb, besides signifying *stricto sensu* something said of something else, 'additionally signifies' that the attribution it makes holds of the subject (cf. Whitaker 1996: 137–138)[20]. Likewise, each verb 'additionally signifies' time: it is not that 'time' is part of its semantic content, but rather that in the indicative mode the verb indicates the period of time for which its attribution holds true of the subject.

3. The scope and background of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*

Taking up the issues of truth and falsity in simple propositions, in the subsequent chapters of *Int.* Aristotle develops the basic classification of assertions set in contradictory pairs. Hence the treatise was viewed as a logical work by the later tradition. Probably in the 1st or 2nd century AD, it was incorporated into the so-called *Organon*, the corpus of Aristotelian logical writings used in late antiquity[21]. Since the *Organon* was compiled almost exclusively for teaching

[19] However, as stated below, 'verbs' are not to be confused with 'predicates', nor are they linguistic 'signs' of predicates, as some ancient and modern commentators tend to claim. On verbs and predicates in ancient logic and grammar see Barnes 2007: 100–114, esp. 113: "a predicate is a predicate of a subject in a proposition: a verb is not a verb of a name in a sentence – it is a verb *full stop.*"

[20] On ancients debate over 'co-signification' see Barnes 2007: 247–250.

[21] See above, note 1.

purposes, it was built on the idea that Aristotle's logic is a progressive whole, the main elements of which are respective key themes of a treatise included in the compendium. As a result, students of philosophy were taught that Aristotle's logic first examines terms, then expands to propositions, and concludes by a theory of the syllogism and its various kinds. Hence, in the fixed order of the *Organon*, *Int.* is positioned second, after the *Categories* and before the *Prior Analytics*, and is credited with presenting Aristotle's doctrine of the proposition. The 'linguistic' chapters, as well as other aspects of the treatise, are considered inferior (or at best auxiliary) to its logical achievements.

Despite its enormous influence exerted on the philosophical tradition, this account of the scope of Aristotle's *Int.* is actually quite doubtful. Recent research shows that the *Organon* is a later artificial construction and that the works included in it are not meant to fit together or build a consistent *corpus* of Aristotelian logic[22]. In addition, the title *Int.* neither conforms to the doctrine of propositions nor is it likely to have been Aristotle's[23]. The text refers to several other works by Aristotle, which suggests that the scope of the *Int.* should be considered in a broader context[24]. Restraining it exclusively to the domain of 'formal logic' fails to account for its unity.

A scrutiny of the supposed main topic of the treatise shows that the standard classification of logical propositions is closely related to rules of grammar and semantics, which, in turn, are rooted in natural language. Despite its increasingly technical use by logicians, the term 'assertion' (*apóphansis*) in *Int.* is allotted an equal share in the semantic and linguistic function of the human *lógos*[25]. Therefore its basic kinds, affirmation and negation, reside in our speech as much as in our thought: "affirmations and negations in the voice are tokens of those in the soul" (24^{b}1-2). Unsurprisingly, Aristotle adopts a semantic criterion for the unity of an assertion. At 17^{a}25-26, he defines affirmation as "an assertion that asserts something of something else", and in ch. 8 he notes: "A single affirmation is that which *signifies* (*sēmáinousa*) a single thing of another single thing" (18^{a}12-13; cf. 17^{a}8-22). In the subsequent lines (18^{a}18-27; cf. 20^{a}16-17), he claims that the unity of predication depends entirely on the semantic unity of its terms: a single assertion has to express a single sense for a single subject, for otherwise it disperses into many assertions (cf. Whitaker 1996: 75–76).

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[22] See for example Barnes 2007: 106–107: "The *Int.* neither builds on the *Categories* nor lays the foundations for the *Analytics*. [...] The *Organon* was jerry-built – and jerry-built long after Aristotle's day."

[23] On the title of the treatise and the history of its interpretation see Husson 2009: 20–35 and Aubenque 2009: 38–39, who does not rule out its authenticity.

[24] The list includes the *De Anima* (at 16^{a}8-9), the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* (17^{a}5-6), the *Prior Analytics* (at 19^{b}31), the *Topics* (20^{b}26), and perhaps the *Sophistical Refutations* (17^{a}35-37): see Minio-Paluello 1949: 73.

[25] On the varied use of *lógos* in *Int.* see the *Index* entry in Minio-Paluello 1949: 85-86. 'Assertion' is defined at 17^{a}23-24.

As for the so-called ancient linguistic theory, the much-debated relation between *Int.* and the early Academic 'philosophy of language' remains problematic. Usually commentators try to link Aristotle's 'semantics' from chs. 1-4 to Plato's dialogue *Cratylus*, containing the earliest preserved large-scale discussion on whether names exist by nature or are given by convention[26]. Scholars agree that Aristotle sides with the conventionalist theory by contrasting natural 'voice' with arbitrary 'language', as discussed above (see also 17^{a}1). Nonetheless, this does not explain why he deals with assertions and other logical issues in the next chapters. In our view, the argument over the title, scope and unity of *Int.* is at least partly resolved by comparing Aristotle's observations to Plato's *Sophist*, rather than the *Cratylus*. In a famous passage of the *Sophist* (261D-264B), Plato makes some important points, which seem to provide a more suitable background for clarifying the general plan of Aristotle's treatise. Let us examine them more closely.

In the conversation reported in the dialogue, the example of the Greek alphabet appears in order to show how letters (*tà grámmata*) blur the difference between vowels and consonants by their uniformity. The expertise of combining (*synarmóttein*) them into readable words is left to the art of literacy called *grammatikê* (253A). On that model, Plato also shapes the division of words into names and verbs. Both kinds are vocal signs with a certain reality (*tà têi phōnêi perì tèn ousían dēlômata* [...] *sēméion tês phōnês*): verbs express actions (*práxeis*), whereas names stand for their agents (261D-262A). Supposedly, a certain craft or science would be charged with binding them together as meaningful sentences.

However, human language is a voice (*phōnê*), or some continuous stream of sounds. Conveying a linguistic message involves making sense of the material 'parts' of speech as they are uttered. Words spoken in random succession (*têi synekhéiai*), one after another (*ephexês legómena*), do not automatically fit together (*synarmóttein*) so as to form a sentence. In order to do so, they have to meet certain syntactic criteria, mainly the requirement of bringing together name and verb. This is what Plato calls 'the primary interweaving' (*hē prôtē symplokê*; cf. 259E) of words into a sentence and it is the first and simplest kind of *lógos* in language (262BC).

Unlike mere naming (*onomázein*) which only denotes this or that, a *lógos* of that sort already 'speaks' (*légei*) of something. By weaving together verbs with names, people usually start making statements about states of affairs, trying to describe how things are actually related to each other (262DE). As a speech *of something*, a sentence is necessarily *either true or false*, since it either speaks of the thing as it is or misrepresents it in a way it is not (263B-D). By introducing truth and falsity, Plato turns the simplest kind of sentence into the simplest kind of truth-evaluable proposition: it is a grammatical 'combination' (*sýnthesis*) of

[26] On the argument of Plato's *Cratylus* see Barney (2001).

names and verbs, bearing a certain semantic value and expressing a certain truth by affirming or denying something of something else (263DE).

According to Plato, this interweaving of verbs and names also undermines the distinction between speech (*lógos*) and thought (*diánoia*). They are distinct insofar as the latter takes place entirely 'within the soul' (*entòs tês psykhês* or *en psykhêi*) and remains 'voiceless' (*áneu phōnês*), while the former receives a vocal expression (*metà phthóngou*) by exiting through the mouth (263E-264A). What we call a 'belief' (*dóxa*) leads a silent life in our thought defined as 'the inner conversation of the soul with itself', but can also be expressed as a spoken 'affirmation' or 'negation' in verbal communication with other people (264AB). When correctly 'translated', complex thoughts convey the same truth as their linguistic expressions. Hence we may plausibly consider the latter as the mere physical signs of what goes on in the mind. By drawing this conclusion about the relation between linguistic and mental events, Plato can advance the issue of things themselves (264B).

Although Aristotle disagrees with many details from this passage, it seems that the order of the chapters and the general course of discussion in *Int.* follow the scheme proposed in the *Sophist* (261D-264A)[27]. This would seem to tell us more about the domain of the Aristotelian treatise. What Plato tries to build up throughout is that dialogue is no logical method or linguistic theory; rather, as in all other cases, he suggests a philosophical approach to a common issue by following the rules of Socratic conversations. Roughly speaking, that peculiar way of doing philosophy is vaguely called 'dialectic', and the method of *diáiresis* elaborated in the *Sophist* is no exception. Rather than hinting at any separate 'domain', it shows how theories from different philosophical branches interact to the point of being almost indissoluble from one another. In our view, the same conclusion might be drawn regarding Aristotle's *Int.* The unity of its scope and structure is clearly seen only upon recognizing its dialectical background (Whitaker 1996: 2–4). The audience addressed by Aristotle was still versed in doing philosophy by engaging in Socratic conversations and dialectical debates, and little use would have been made of any later demarcations between grammar, logic and linguistics[28].

Concluding remarks

In this paper, we reconstruct Aristotle's theory of signification by extracting the Greek text from its traditional context in Aristotle's *Organon*. We argue that this treatise concerns ordinary language use rather than what commentators have classified as Aristotle's logic, because the text deals with the elements and

[27] For the close link between the *Sophist* passage and *Int.* see Barnes 1996: 176–196.

[28] See for example Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics*, 27.12-18 Wallies.

compounds of linguistic expressions and how we can account for their signification. We provide textual proof in our translation of the first few chapters. By relating *Int.* to Plato's *Sophist*, we advance an explanation that differs from the commentators as well as from ensuing logical and grammatical issues in the reception of Aristotle's treatise, such as the rationalist Grammarians and Logicians of *Port Royal*. By contrast, we remark on a few similarities between Aristotle and Frege, which make for an interesting contribution to the current discussion on signifying, asserting, affirming and making sense when we say something about something.

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Abstract

Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* is one of the first systematic texts on language and its basic signifying units. Aristotelian commentators incorporated the treatise into their compilation of Aristotle's 'logical' works, the *Organon*, and consequently the theory was obscured. We argue that Aristotle's text eludes scholarly classifications such as 'logic', 'philosophy of language' or 'semiotics' because it precedes these disciplines in investigating how natural language works. Our aim in this paper is to reconstruct Aristotle's views on signs, symbols and signification, as well as his distinction between signifying expressions and affirmations. We show that, based on his claim that language is conventional, Aristotle provides an explanation of how signifying expressions are combined to say something of something, which puts *Int.* in the vicinity of Plato's *Sophist* and Frege's account of linguistic expressions and their content.

КОТКАТА НА ШРЬОДИНГЕР И СИМВОЛИСТИЧНИЯТ СИМВОЛ

Пламен Антов

Котката на Шрьодингер отдавна се е превърнала в научно клише – перфектен образец на този особен фолклорен жанр. Една от онези „готови истини", които са любим предмет на френското остроумие от Флобер до Данинос.

Тук ще се опитам да предложа поредната метафорична употреба на бедната котка.

Но първо да припомня все пак същността на този мисловен експеримент въпреки широката му известност. Експериментът е предложен от Ервин Шрьодингер в публикация от 1935 г. (Schrödinger 1935: 807–812, 823–828, 844–849). В общи линии и в плоскостта, в която тук ще ни интересува, експериментът се свежда до следното. Жива котка се затваря в непрозрачна кутия, в която е поставено и устройство, което може да я убие – малък детонатор, който трябва да разбие стъкленица с отровен газ. Устройството се активира чрез радиоактивен разпад, който, както се знае, е напълно случаен процес. Ако се състои, той ще бъде регистриран от гайгеров брояч, който от своя страна ще задейства детонатора. Така вероятността за протичането или за непротичането на ядрения разпад, а следователно и за задействането или не на смъртоносния механизъм, е еднаква. При това положение, твърди Шрьодингер, вероятността котката да бъде убита също е 50:50. Проблемът е, че всичко това се случва или не в една херметически затворена кутия, до която наблюдателят няма сетивен достъп, той може само да предполага. Експериментът дискутира основни положения на квантовата механика. Описан с нейните термини, той предпоставя суперпозиция едновременно на двете състояния на котката, или по-точно – състоянието ѝ е смес от равни количества живо и мъртво състояние. Това може да бъде изразено чрез уравнение, чиято външна простота всъщност описва същината на квантовия свят: *състояние на котката = живо състояние + мъртво състояние*.

Целта на експеримента е да полемизира с произволния волунтаризъм на квантовата теория. Първо – това, че при липса на възможност за емпирична (сетивна) верификация тя предпоставя реалност на вероятности. Или по-просто казано – че борави с вероятности, а не с реалности: реална-

та котка в кутията ще е или жива, или мъртва, но не и двете едновременно, както предписва квантомеханичното описание. Котката съществува в това двойствено състояние, докато не отворим кутията и не видим какво е състоянието на реалната котка.

Тъкмо това е вторият аспект на квантомеханичната теория, който уравнението на Шрьодингер дискутира – решаващото значение на външното наблюдение върху процесите в квантовия свят; значение, стигащо до *пряко* въздействие върху тях. Случващото се в самия акт на взаимодействие между събитието и регистриращия го акт на верификация. Единственият начин да се установи коя от двете възможности се е реализирала, е да се отвори кутията и да се види дали котката е жива или мъртва; дотогава тя ще е едновременно и двете, но и нито едно от двете. Както ще обобщи един интерпретатор на Шрьодингер, „според теорията *нито една* от двете вероятности за радиоактивния материал, и следователно за котката, не е реална, ако не е била наблюдавана"; изобщо „нищо не е реално, ако не е наблюдавано" (Gribbin 1984: 2). До момента, в който отворим кутията и погледнем, разпадането на атома нито се е състояло, нито не се е състояло, отровният газ нито е убил котката, нито не я е убил, следователно котката нито е мъртва, нито е жива и заедно с това – тя е едновременно и мъртва, и жива: quius contrarum verum est. В хипотетичния свят на квантомеханиката е налице абсолютно тъждество между двете противоположни и взаимноизключващи се състояния.

Бедната котка отдавна е напуснала полето на квантовата теория, с нея непрестанно се злоупотребява в най-различни научни области, в подкрепа на една или друга теория. Удължавайки редицата на тези злоупотреби, ще изтъкна още една аналогия – със символистичния символ. Неговата същност е подобна на херметически затворената кутия на Шрьодингер (и следователно – на квантомеханичния свят), а състоянието на котката – това е неговото значение.

С риск да степенувам злоупотребата се изкушавам да подхвърля още една аналогия – с т.нар. космическа черна дупка: както тя не изпуска навън светлина, която да придаде видимост за наблюдателя към случващото се в нея, така и символистичният символ не изпуска смисли (значения) навън, към рационално детерминираното съзнание на читателя, които да подпомогнат интерпретативните му усилия. И в крайна сметка да реши дали котката в кутията на символистичния символ е жива или мъртва.

Блокирането на рационалната верификация, основана на всекидневния опит, разтваря множество вероятни възможности, паралелни и еднакво реални.

Впрочем точно такава е същността на езотеричния шаманski тип говорене: пребиваването му в състояние на пределна омекотеност на езика. Недопускащо какъвто и да е „твърд", ясен, единствен и *реален* смисъл, то предполага замяната му с безкрайно раздипляща се мрежа от множество равноценни, еднакво възможни и еднакво реални смисли. Профетичното

шаманско говорене съдържа в себе си *всички* (*възможни*) събития, които са се случили или предстои да се случат, точно защото старателно отбягва да артикулира един-единствен ясен смисъл. Събития, които слушателят е готов да инвестира в него.

Бинарната алтернативност на Шрьодингеровия експеримент (или–или: котката е или жива, или мъртва) се мултиплицира вътре в себе си до безкрайност: твърдата определеност на дезюнкцията *или–или* се оказва тъждествена на една разтворена към безкрая аглутинираща конюнкция: *и–и–и–и–и…* Това тъждество, лишено от парадоксализма си, е практически проявено в особената икономика на кибернетичния език, който, разполагайки само с два символа, антитетично напрегнати помежду си, е способен да изрази практически неограничено количество значения.

Тъй като символистичният символ не води към един-единствен „истински" смисъл, еднакво „истински", реални са всичките *възможни* смисли, които възникват или биха могли да възникнат в съзнанието на читателя, т.е. на свидетеля.

Тъкмо това е и дълбинното основание на неразбиращи критици на символизма, по-точно на природата на символистичния език, като Стефан Младенов по отношение на Траянов и „Млада България", като П. П. Славейков или Вазов преди него – фундаменталното основание на всички обвинения към символистите, неизменно оперирaщи с термини от речника на клиничната психопатология: душевноболни, умопобъркани маниаци, производители на безсмислици, обитатели на лудницата и пр.

Символистичният символ, за разлика от обикновения, притежава уникалната способност да съдържа и предлага аргументи в подкрепа на *всички* интерпретации, затова на едно фундаментално равнище той *наистина* съдържа, носи всички техни значения. И в същото време, за разлика от обикновения, несимволистичния символ, не се вмества в нито едно от тях: не може да се приеме само едно като привилегировано по отношение на всички останали, елиминиращо ги. По уникален начин символистичният символ съвместява множество паралелни значения и следователно *гради* множество паралелни светове. В своята пределна смислова аморфност, недопускаща едно-единствено, „твърдо" значение, Димчо-Дебеляновата разблудна царкиня е едновременно всичките си възможни значения, потенциално съдържащи се в образа и *реални* за читателя в акта на четенето.

При това тук не става дума за затруднена, саботирана интерпретация от страна на една съпротивляваща се, затваряща се в себе си творба, а още по-малко за творба, неподдаваща се на интерпретация. В крайната си степен неподатливостта на интерпретация е тъждествена на максимална отвореност към такива. Вътрешната, органична *същност* на символистичния символ е тъкмо неподатливостта-на-интерпретация и едновременно твърде лесната податливост-на-интерпретация – едното и другото в тяхната абсолютна съвпадналост. Диалектика на тъждеството между всичкото и нищото, пълното и празното.

На какво се дължи това уникално свойство на символистичния символ? Отговорът е – на неговата компактност, т.е. на неразчленимостта му. По самата си същност символистичният символ, за разлика от обикновения, е такъв (т.е. именно *символистичен*) само докато е компактен – в своята абсолютна множественост. Функционира като такъв само в своята цялост, в съвкупността от всичките си възможни и *истинни* в собствения му модус значения. В ненакърнимата си цялост той стои винаги *над* и *отвъд* всяка интерпретация, която е именно опит да се превъзмогне тази цялост, да се разруши, да се сведе до *само* една част от себе си. В момента, когато верифициращата интерпретация реши да привилегирова едноединствено значение, символистичният символ престава да бъде такъв и кривва към алегоричното. Всяка *крайна* интерпретация е опит за рационализация на „умопобърканото" шаманско бръщолевене, което е истинно само в небулозността си. В мига, в който постановим, че разблудната царкиня, това е например поетовата душа, *ние* превръщаме символистичния символ „разблудна царкиня" именно в алегория на поетовата душа. Или иначе казано – мъчим се да дисциплинираме безкрайните вселени на квантомеханичния свят, като ги натъпчем обратно в тясната торба на Нютоновата триизмерност.

Вчетен в антологията „Млада България", Стефан Младенов е един Нютон, възкръснал четири века по-късно. Проникването в смисленост-та на символистичния език предполага на първо място отказ от критерия „смисленост", също както квантовата механика означава отказ от детерминизма на класическата физика, от всички удобства на причинно-следствените отношения, които изграждат „нашия" всекидневен, сетивно удостоверим свят.

Преход, който можем да определим като акт на секуларизация.

Разстоянието между света на символистичната езиковост и класическия свят от вазовски тип би означавало низхождане от една надчовешка, божествена логика, индетерминистка по самата си същност, свободна, необвързана от каузалните зависимости, ограничаващи нашия триизмерен човешки свят.

Напуснал сферите на Нютоновата физика, детерминизмът на квантовия свят е от компетенциите на самия Бог, чиято логика е от друг порядък. Бог, който, въпреки опасенията на Айнщайн, все пак обича да си играе на зарове. По-точно – чийто абсолютен, „божествен" разум е основан на абсолютния произвол, съвпаднал е плътно със самата случайност. Бог, както твърди една будистка притча, е играещо си дете, а човекът – „западният", „класическият" Декартов човек – е този, който търси и вменява смисли в абсолютния произвол на тази игра.

Това – при цялото функционално тъждество, изтъквано от Клод Леви-Строс – е фундаменталното различие между примитивното магическо мислене, инфантилно и затова пребиваващо изцяло в сакралното, и научния, модерно-рационален тип мислене, профанен по природата си. За разлика

от западното модерно-научно знание, основано на линейната причинно-следствена връзка между явленията, магическото знание не разчленява, а остава в параметрите на общото, в целостта на света, съществуващ като хоризонтално и вертикално раздипляща се мрежа от взаимносвързани събития. Мрежа, в която абсолютният детерминизъм (всяко събитие е свързано с всички останали) е съвпаднал с индетерминизма на случайността.

Основана на случайността, акаузалността на квантовия свят е просто *друга* каузалност – от божествен, не от човешки порядък.

И тук отново се връщаме към изходния модел на Шрьодингер. През 1957 г. един ексцентричен мултимилионер, конструктор на оръжия и между другото учен – Хю Евърет (1930–1982) – предлага идея, която, макар и изложена по доста объркан начин (Everett 1957), ще се окаже извънредно продуктивна. Това е идеята за множествените светове, предизвикателно нехаеща за каузалната логика, на която по вкоренена традиция се основава нашият модерен, произведен от Просвещението свят. В строго математическата си конкретика твърдението на Евърет се отнася до това, че уравнението на Шрьодингер определя промяната, която настъпва във вълновата функция ψ в момента на взаимодействие между ядрената частица и гайгеровия брояч, т.е. зависимостта на събитието от регистриращия го уред. Но идеята съдържа потенциал, който постмодерната теория впоследствие ще доразгърне нашироко и извън сферите на математиката. Използвайки, или можем да кажем – злоупотребявайки с уравнението на Шрьодингер за двойствената суперпозиция на котката, едновременно жива и мъртва, идеята на Евърет води до замяна на Декартовия (или Лайбницовия) свят, единствено възможен и реален, с мрежа от множество паралелни светове: всички вероятности, изразени с вълновата функция ψ, се реализират (т.е. котката е едновременно жива и мъртва). А това, както пише един популяризатор, „разделя Вселената на безброй паралелно съществуващи светове (един с мъртва котка и един с жива) всеки път, когато се извършва измерване“ (Аткинс 2005: 247).

Иначе казано, всеки прочит (интерпретация) на символистичния символ поражда паралелни стихотворения. Но всяко едно от тях е валидно само в неразделната си *съвпадналост* с всички останали. Самостойната, парциална валидност би означавала излаз от символистичното в посока към вазовското.

Аналогията може да изглежда случайна или пресилена, но тя има своите дълбоки културно-исторически основания. В своята посткартезианска позиция, отхвърляща единствения, линейно-каузално обвързан свят, реален и познаваем, квантовата физика активизира основополагащи закони на дорационалния митологичен тип мислене. Постмодерното (разбирано тук не в строго терминологичния, а в широкия си културно-исторически смисъл) колабира *назад* в сферите на предмодерното – към предмодерното, ирационално и акаузално съзнание, описващо света чрез силно омекотения език на митовете, символен в същността си.

Митът, за разлика от историческия детерминизъм на западната модерност, линеен и каузално разгръщащ се, е множествен. Леви-Строс проницателно антропологизира тъкмо основни постулати на квантовата теория: един мит, казва той, е съвкупността от всичките си варианти, паралелни и често взаимноизключващи се; не съществува една-единствена „истинска" версия, спрямо която всички останали да се мислят като преразкази или деформирани варианти (Леви-Строс 1988: 142, 143). Тоест, котката в един мит във всеки един момент е едновременно жива и мъртва.

Също както и в символистичния символ.

Вследствие на всичко това можем да постулираме един интерпретативен парадокс: перфектната интерпретация – онази, която единствена успява да съхрани целостта на обекта си, да удържи констелацията на *всичките* му смисли – е отказът от интерпретация.

Интерпретацията е разомагьосване, Entgötterung.

Всеки опит за интерпретация наподобява усърдието, с което децата чупят или разглобяват играчките си, за да видят как те функционират, да открият *рационалното* зрънце на магията им. Но в момента, в който го направят, когато разглобят играчката, магията мигом изчезва; играчката се превръща в купчина дезинтегрирани парчета материя, които те никога повече не ще могат да сглобят отново в играчка. Играчката, както би казал великият гуру Робърт Пърсиг, е от функционално (т.е. магическо) естество.

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SCHRÖDINGER'S CAT AND THE SYMBOLICAL SYMBOL

Plamen Antov

Abstract

This essay discusses in a quite free form some deep analogies between the quantum-mechanical world, disclosed and debated in the famous Erwin Schrödinger's "imaginary experiment", and the symbolical symbol. It focuses on the similarity situated

in theirs post-relationship to the Modernity (in the largest culture-historical sense) and based on the *plurality* of their worlds and interpretations. A wide range of antitheses are included, such as *uniqueness – pluralness*, *determinism – arbitrariness/fortuitousness*, *sacred – profane*, *modern* (*western*, *"white"*) *– primitive*, in order to be postulated the essencial likeness between quantum-mechanical world and symbolical symbol: post-Cartesian and post-Newtonian, both regressing *backwards* to the primitive, magic type of mentality and world-building.

Thus, we reach the provocative idea that the perfect interpretation – the one, which is able to "catch" all the meanings of its subject – is the "zero" (blank) interpretation, the refusal of interpretation.

ИДЕАЛИ, ЗНАЦИ, ИСТОРИИ И ИЛЮЗИИ НА ТОЧНОСТТА
(Математически, количествени и статистически методи в литературната наука в края на XIX – началото на XX в.)

Яни Милчаков

Скептицизмът на Роман Ингарден

На 19 юни 1967 г. Роман Ингарден изнася пред Комисията по история на изкуството в Краковското отделение на ПАН обширен доклад под заглавие „Въпросът за прилагането на статистически методи при изследване на произведение на изкуството“[1]. Повечето съвременници – биографи, колеги, ученици и познати на големия краковски феноменолог и хуманитарен мислител, отбелязват в спомените си неговата деликатност не само като човешки характер, но и като полемист. Когато различни обстоятелства са му налагали такава роля (неизбежна за сцената на научния живот изобщо, но доста тягостна в моноидеологическата конюнктура през първите години на „народна“ Полша), Ингарден я е приемал неохотно. Бурната дискусия с чужди концепции и текстове не е негова стихия, макар че оставя доста критични обзори за състоянието на полската философия, естетика и изкуствознание[2]; участва (задочно!) в една от най-важните като международен обхват и тематична дълбочина литературоведски дискусии на XX в. с Рене Уелек и Пражката школа[3]. В редки случаи Ингарден е смай-

[1] Пълният текст на доклада е публикуван в: Ingarden 1968. Други студии на Р. Ингарден по проблема са: Ingarden 1966, 1972.

[2] „…Тук-там се информираха [...] по твърде повърхностен начин, обикновено от втора и трета ръка, избягвайки упорито сблъсъка с основните философски принципи на онова време, окупирайки се в терена на доста повърхностни психологически или семантични анализи“ – описва Ингарден полските философи от междувоенния период (Ingarden 1963: 646–647).

[3] Съвсем наскоро тази дискусия беше припомнена и задълбочено интерпретирана и в българската литературна наука (Григоров 2012: 250–255).

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вал своите студенти, когато с нервно почукване с пръстен по катедрата е отправял хапливи реплики по адрес на догматични марксисти или тесногръди (нео)позитивисти. Сам герой на добродушни академични пародии под името проф. Юберпарк (модификация на „градинското“ фамилно име), Ингарден с неподражаема светска щедрост в неформални ситуации е преливал от великолепно чувство за хумор и ирония към другите и към самия себе си[4]. Критичните размисли на феноменолога върху проблема „философска естетика и математическа статистика“ обаче внасят особена интрига в точно доловена интелектуална конюнктура. Има своето значение и биографичният факт, че математиката заедно с философията е другото студентско амплоа на младия Ингарден. В годините на хитлеристката окупация на Полша с всички смъртоносни рискове той тайно обучава по математика осиротели полски и еврейски деца в изумителната по своята хуманна организираност система на „подземното“ нелегално образование. До края на живота си по свидетелства на негови колеги Ингарден води чести професионални разговори с математици и физици и следи новостите в точните науки. 1967 г. в историята на литературната наука отбелязва момент, когато на Запад и на Изток амбициите на математическата поетика отиват много далече. Същата година в Нитра е основан Кабинетът по литературна комуникация, който се възприема с право като възраждане на Пражката школа. През 60-те – 70-те години на XX в. под заглавието „Поетика и математика“ се появяват известната книга на румънския математик Соломон Маркус (Marcus 1970; книгата скоро е преведена на немски (Markus 1973) и сърбохърватски (Маркус 1974), сборникът, съставен от М. Р. Майенова в Полша (Mayenowej, red. 1965)[5], и специалният тематичен брой на сп. „Поетика“ (Poetics 1974); в СССР с първата вълна на колебливата хрушчовска либерализация в културата и хуманитаристиката, с препълнените зали и изпълнените вестници от дискусията „Физици или лирици?“ и идеологическите напрежения около кибернетиката на Н. Винер започва серията изследвания на Тартуско-московската семиотична школа. Силната математическа насока в нея (Левин 1964; Жолковский и Щеглов 1976) (с категорични резултати преди всичко в стихознанието и наратологията) полагат работите на големия математик с универсални философски и литературни интереси А. Колмогоров по алгоритмичната теория на информацията (Колмогоров 1997). В неподражаемия научен и литературен жанр на „Семотичните послания“ – особен епистолографски „тетралог“

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[4] „…като декан в годините 1958–1960, прочут с либерализма си към студентите, …Ингарден беше толерантен (например всеки можеше да работи заедно с него, независимо от политическите си възгледи)“ – пише в спомените си негов някогашен студент. „Професорът […] имаше своите философски симпатии и антипатии [...] Не понасяше неопозитивизма и се „наежваше“, когато трябваше да каже нещо за това направление“ – отбелязва друга студентка (Makota i Woleński 2003).

[5] Най-последователното като статистическа методика изследване на българския стих от Ат. Славов беше публикувано също в Полша (Sławow 1974).

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между Колмогоров и Кибернетика, Литературоведа и Философа (фигури с прозрачни прототипове Вл. А. Успенски, В. Вс. Иванов и М. К. Поливанов) вероятностните модели на ямба и наративните схеми се преплитат с дълбоки рефлексии върху мисията на науката, нейния културен смисъл и пътищата пред човешкото познание. Математизирането на лингвосемиотичната поетика, която като „формализъм“ и „структурализъм“ е хладно толерирана и често нападана от разнорангови идеологически блюстители в СССР, обаче среща и вътрешни непреодолими блокади. Представа за тях дава дори един откъс от изследване на А. Жолковски с начална дефиниция на понятието „поетически свят“ (съчетание, което иначе много често се среща във всяко ученическо съчинение и във всяка импресия на литературен критик есеист).

> **1.0.** В работите по модела „Тема $\overset{\text{ПВ}}{\longleftrightarrow}$ Текст“ беше въведено понятието поетически свят (ПС) като система $\widetilde{\Theta}^{\widetilde{T}}_{\text{инв}}$ – инвариантни мотиви, характеризиращи текстовете $\widetilde{T}$ на един автор. Във връзка с това понятие нека направим следващите допълнителни бележки.
>
> **1.1.** $\widetilde{\Theta}^{\widetilde{T}}_{\text{инв}}$ – не е нещо друго освен система инвариантни реализации – $\Theta^{\widetilde{T}}_{\text{инв}}$ централноинвариантна тема на автора, единна за всички $\widetilde{T}$. Казано другояче, ПС представлява откроените по определен начин общи части на изводите на текстовете $\widetilde{T}$. Доколкото са възможни различни прочити на един и същ текст от различни читатели, различни описания на един прочит с помощта на извод и различни начини на обособяване на общите части, очевидно е, че и комплексът $\widetilde{\Theta}^{\widetilde{T}}_{\text{инв}}$, характеризиращ ПС на автора, може, най-общо казано, да представлява множество. (Жолковский 1979: 3)

Известно е отдавна, че нито единичният литературоведски текст, нито литературнотеоретичните концепции и школи, възниквали през вековете под различни имена, не могат да представляват абсолютно автономни познавателни и терминологични системи. Философизиращо разширяване на проблема с класически цитати от Р. Декарт, Г. Лайбниц, Л. Витгенщайн и Р. Карнап тук не е необходимо. Отделни „пробиви“ на функционално разнородни елементи от други класове познават и терминологиите на точните науки, физиката например оперира с „тяло“, логическата алгебра – с „лъжа“, математиката – с „верига“. Литературоведският текст обаче, както посочи в една интересна студия В. Томашик, никога не е свободен от някаква степен на „лудичност“. Като че ли по силата на своята езиково-комуникативна и социална природа този тип текст е подвластен на една от основните стратегии на собствения си предмет и на игровите човешки действия – подражанието (Tomasik 1990). Границата обаче никога не е ясно зададена, защото литературоведският текст практически съществува само в една рецептивна среда – на самите литературоведи, на отделни литератори и (в различни степени) на обучаваните по литература. Помнят

се забавни скандали с писани тенденциозно като пародии, но печатани в сериозни научни издания и възприемани съвсем сериозно „литературоведски студии“. Следващият хипертрофиран и пародиен пример е вдъхновен от – без съмнение! – исторически най-древната (не само като класическо антично гръко-римско наследство, но и като древноиндийско, арабско, древноирландско и древноисландско възприемане и описание на стиха), количествено най-богатата, „най-референтната“ и най-унифицираната терминологична система сред всички литературоведски (суб)дисциплини изобщо – стихознанието. Историята на стиховедската терминология, разбира се, има свои „мъртви пластове“ от несполучливи решения и причудливи неологизми (отдавна за „мъртво“ например се смята стиховедското словотворчество на В. Брюсов (вж. Гиндин, съст. 2007). В речника на стихознанието обаче няма никакъв термин, който визира чисто умозрителна категория или елемент; няма понятие, което да не е определено, емпирично посочено като езикова даденост и често пъти – статистически доказано. Доказателство за тази репутация е, че вече хилядолетия и столетия в европейския културен кръг пълноценно функционират термини като „ямб“, „хорей“, „цезура“, „строфа“, „сонет“, „рима“; „дротквет“ и „хендинг“ значат за нас същото, каквото и за древните викинги; както арабско-персийско-тюркския „аруз“ или малайско-далекоизточните строфи „пантун“ и „муххамаса“, и няма изгледи да се деактуализират. Откъсът по-долу обаче ни убеждава през смях, че 100-процентово строгата терминологична чистота превръща дори стиховедския анализ в смислово и стилово чудовище и дискредитира дисциплината като гръмка пародия на самата себе си:

> Хвалебнологични антиспасти, състоящи се от епитрити, заемащи четвърто място в първата сизигия, на прост език наричани фалектични единайсетостъпници, триметрични каталектики с антиспастични асклепиадови стихове, триметрични акаталектики, съставени от две дактилически коми, които някои учени наричат хориямби, където и двете са дистрофхични, риторични и хиперритмични, както и амфиболически… (Гилилов 2002: 359)

В сходно звучене и цитираният по-горе свръхсциентичен анализ на А. Жолковски получава точна обща кризисна диагноза в появилото се тези дни много ценно изследване на Б. Риж върху концепцията за литературно-теоретичния език на структурализма.

> Литературоведската интерпретация – пише авторът, – от една страна, е операция, която не се вмества в основната теоретична конструкция на структурализма. От друга обаче, тя е представяна като задължителна задача за всеки литературовед. Интерпретацията навлиза в структурализма, така да се каже, с услужливостта на инвентар. **Това предизвиква нарастване на елементите, които все по-трудно могат да бъдат свързани в мрежа от релации с елементите, които за структуралистичния език представляват естествена основа** [...] **Включването на интерпретацията в сферата на структу-**

ралистичния език е другият важен елемент, предрешаващ по-късната дезинтеграция на системата. (Ryż 2013: 9, подч. м. – Я. М.)

В полемиката си със статистическите методи в изкуствознанието Р. Ингарден практически се ограничава до несъгласия с теорията на знака у Ч. Морис, информационната естетика на М. Бензе и неназована „дадена студия" върху синтаксиса на прозата на М. Домбровска с установен дял на простите изречения в нея 74,5% като знак за „достъпност". Без да отрича ничие право да извършва подобни изследвания, феноменологът твърди, че те всъщност: 1) се вместват в неговата концепция за многопластовия строеж на литературното произведение; 2) че най-често са наукообразна увертюра към банални и елементарни изводи; 3) че не стигат до интегралното художествено ядро на творбата; 4) че са безсилни пред индивидуалния художествен стил и естетическото преживяване, което не се влияе от атомарния сегмент, описван статистически. Впечатлява, че в тази работа на Р. Ингарден (освен споменаването на Ч. Морис) по нищо не личи и най-малко внимание не само към вече солидната традиция на математическата поетика, но изобщо към структурно-семиотичните школи „на Запад и на Изток от Берлинската стена" – Американска, Френска, Пражка, Тартуска, Варшавска, Московска, Букурещка, Нитрянска, повечето обстойно представени и задълбочено коментирани в серията изследвания на Иван Младенов (Младенов, съст. 1991). Възможно е още възторгът на младия пражки структуралист Р. Уелек – първия авторитетен критик на Р. Ингарден – пред таблиците и статистиките в изследването на Р. Якобсон и Я. Мукаржовски върху чешкия стих да е породил хладината у феноменолога спрямо цифровата аргументация на литературоведски идеи изобщо. Най-странно обаче е друго разминаване. Точно 20 години преди критичния обзор на Р. Ингарден върху количествените методи в хуманитаристиката, през 1946 г., отново в Краков и в същата зала (!), доклад на същата тема изнася световно признатият „баща" на статистическия анализ на стила и авторството Винценти Лютославски. 50 години след своето откритие, наречено „стилометрия" (Lutosławski 1946), Лютославски обобщава постигнатите от него и последователите му резултати. Ще се спрем на него по-подробно след бегъл поглед в миналото.

Ретроспекция в движение

Двукратното преброяване на синовете на Израил по пътя им през пустинята, което заповядва Йехова, точно приведените цифрови данни за родовата структура и заетите с различни дейности юдейски племена и групи[6] са любими доказателства на социолозите за древността на тях-

[6] „Пребройте цялото общество израилтяни по семействата им, по бащините им домове, като броите по име всички от мъжки пол един по един…" (Числа 1:2 и сл.; 2, 3).

ната дисциплина и описателни методи. Със сигурност посочените в Стария Завет числа като 46 500 от Рувимовото племе, 74 600 – от Юдовото, 54 400 – от Исахаровото (Числа 1:21, 27, 29) и т.н. са носили освен количествена информация и някаква друга символика. Гротескните бройки от романа на Рабле „удавени в урина“ 260 418 и „събрани на дворцовия площад 1 856 011 (без жените и децата!)“ въздействат различно от 660-те „погубени от Пантагрюел рицари“. От библейските, античните, средновековните и ренесансовите числа обаче до технологиите на съвременните социологически сондажи приложимостта на математическите модели и методи в социалните науки предопределя двупосочни възможности и ограничения. Такива, от една страна, съдържа самата математика. Ученитe, за които тя е призвание и професия, могат да формулират чрез математически модели и алгоритми всичко в живота – от биологичната клетка, турбулентното движение и сеизмичните цикли до социалната динамика, биографичната траектория, ритъма на стиха и честотите на метафората. Няма да могат да формулират обаче с цифри самия живот на индивидуалния човек и писателя с всички възможни негови обрати и драми, както и съдбата на едно художествено произведение през различните епохи. От друга страна, ограничения налагат автономните познавателни резултати, които внасят отделните „науки за духа“ в цялостния интелектуален климат на дадена епоха. Ясно илюстрира това например в средата на XX в. силната експанзия на структурната и математическата лингвистика извън собственото ѝ филологическо поле върху естетиката, антропологията, етнографията, социологията и политическата теория (Кл. Л.-Строс, Н. Чомски) (Lehr-Spławiński 1987). Коя от страните в този епистемологичен процес може да изглежда „по-видима“ и „по-активна“ като „доминация“ и „трансфер“, зависи от много сложни видими или дълбинни напрежения и исторически констелации. Те протичат между сферите на езика като социално явление, науката, културата, художественото творчество, религията, философията, политиката, властта, образователните системи, морала, усещането на човека за миналото, поведението му в настоящето, страховете и надеждите му пред бъдещето и всички други условни единства, които Новият историзъм свързва като „ментални конюнктури“ и дори „интелектуални епидемии“. Създателите на тези атрактивни френски термини от школата Анали признават по същество еднаквия им смисъл с класическия немски *Weltanschauung*. Трудовете им обаче конкретизират как историкът може да му придаде на практика познавателна ценност (Mandrou 1961: 347–348).

Във всеки случай общи констатации от рода на: „литературната наука на XIX в. изпитва силното влияние на Дарвиновото учение за еволюцията на биологичните видове и позитивисткия социологизъм на О. Конт“, „теориите за мита и архетипа дължат развитието си на прелома в психиатрията, извършен от З. Фройд и К.-Г. Юнг“, „Вторият закон на термодинамиката, наричан и „Закон за ентропията“ с кинетичната теория на топли-

ната и топлинните движения в газовете, дава метафизично вдъхновение за философията на Анри Бергсон“, „модерната теория на стиха през 60-те години на XX в. прилага в максимална степен кибернетиката, теорията на вероятностите и формалните модели на информацията“ и т.н., изискват повече прецизност в детайлите на своята аргументация поради ред причини. В конкретния случай с отношението математика↔поетика може да бъде спомената мимоходом една от тях. В строго литературоведски смисъл тя отвежда още към числата като важен клас знаци в митопоетическите системи (Топоров 1982). В тази линия са древногръцкото възприемане на астрономията като „изящно изкуство“ и интегралната естетико-математическа рефлексия на Питагор („не само в живота на боговете и демоните се разкрива могъществото на числата“). Неговите последователи през Средновековието и Ренесанса развиват в детайли учението за реда, числовите пропорции, хармонии и симетрии на света, небесните сфери и красотата. Според св. Августин тя представлява „числово равенство“, а култът към „златното сечение“, към което водят числата на Фибоначи и рефлексиите над тайнствените зависимости в алгоритъма **1**/1, **1**/2, **2**/3, **3**/5, **5**/8, **8**/13, **13**/21, **21**/34..., са голяма тема не само за изкуствознанието. Редът на Фибоначи и пряко производната му представа за спиралата от средата на XVIII в. нататък отварят пътя към важни технически изобретения (например корабния винт), както и към трудно изброими естетски съзерцания, емпирични изследвания, философски спекулации, идеологически доктрини и всевъзможни продукти на поп културата. С числата на Фибоначи и със спиралата от времето на Ш. Боне и Й. В. Гьоте до бестселъра на Дан Браун „Шифърът на Леонардо“ се обясняват спираловидните цикли и тенденции в природата и генетиката, обществото и историята, законите на естетиката и правилата на различните видове изкуства – до козните на световни конспиративни планове. Митопоетичната линия личи в мистичната традиция на Кабалата с нейната „магия на цифрите“ и „гематрия“[7]. Вече в ново време я изразяват предимно в афористична, мемоарна или есеистична форма някои велики физици и математици. „Теорията на Айнщайн за относителността – твърди Т. Кун в „Структура на научните революции“ – дори и днес [...] привлича хората главно по естетически причини“ (Кун 1975: 173). Точно обратно на разпространеното мнение за литературната наука като покорна, пасивна и благодарно „приемаща страна“ за иновациите в „точните науки“ – много учени физици и математи-

[7] В огромната литература по кабалистична нумерология и гематрия с видимо внимание към нейните влияния върху различни сфери, включително музикалната естетика и криптографията (Zeitler 2013; Clawson 1999; Davis 1968, и др.), прави впечатление слабата и затихваща в хода на времето традиция в използването ѝ като инструмент за тълкуване на строго литературни и стилови похвати в други литератури извън юдаистичните и библеистичните студии (рядък пример представлява статията на Weintraub 1980).

ци (сред тях няколко почитани като гении и аплодирани като нобелисти) признават значението на художественото въображение и изкуствата, на литературни импулси и дори на литературоведски идеи в своите търсения и открития. Тук можем да отнесем метафоричното, афористичното, есеистичното, естетизиращото, анекдотичното и изобщо – всяко фикционално проблематизиране на математиката в нематематически символи и категории. Към такива рефлексии са склонни немалко математици с литературни заложби и таланти. „Не можеш да си математик, без да бъдеш поет по душа“ – казва С. Ковалевска, а известна мисъл на Б. Ръсел гласи, че „математиката [...] съдържа не само истина, но и висша красота – красота студена и строга, без великолепните атрибути на живописта или музиката“ (Успенский 2009).

Жреци и жертви на числата в литературата: Хлебников и Маларме

Числа

Мечтатели, сибили и пророци
по пътища на забранени мисли,
отвъд, през разума далеч проникват,
където греят царствените цифри.

Предчувствието ще разкрива тайни,
като водач най-предан ще ни свети:
щом само прозвучи случаен намек,
обзема ни неописуем трепет.

Покланям ви се, искам ви, числа!
Свободни и безплътни, като сенки,
вий извисихте свързваща дъга
от размисъл към висше вдъхновение…
(Брюсов 1997, подч. м. – Я. М.)[8]

В далечен от художествеността, но близък до дословността работен превод това стихотворение на В. Брюсов може да се чете като автономна поетизация на числата в символизма. В художествената система на направлението те са сред сериите търсени от направлението програмни „съответствия“ – от звуци, цветове и аромати – до еротични техники и културни реминисценции („мечтатели, сибили и пророци“ например в културна ретроспекция на типовете, надарени със свръхестествен смисъл, означава „Ново време→Античност→Библейска древност“). Както при всички сим-

[8] Показателно за силата на числовия код е заглавието на последната концептуална книга върху българския символизъм (Ефтимов 2012).

волистични *correspondances*, и в числата естетският култ и рационалната рефлексия са свързани в трудно разчленимо единство. Изграждат го напреженията между точния графичен израз и „отвъдколичественото съдържание на всяко число, което се възприема задължително в реда на останалите числа. Така то винаги дискретно означава… и „безкрайност". Всички „обикновени" числа с появата си в художественото произведение не само автоматично придобиват „необикновени" ореоли с надредни значения. Вече споменатото 1 856 011 у Рабле например може да съществува с най-голяма вероятност в гротеската като хиперболизирано множество хора; в реалистичния „балзаковски" или в криминалния роман като дължима, спечелена на борсата или получавана като рента, изгубена на карти или откраднатата от банка сума; като космическо разстояние 1 856 011 може да отброява светлинни години във фантастиката, но не можем да си го представим в романтичната лирика или в най-известната Елин-Пелинова повест. Тримата братя в нея, 40-те години труд и трупане на имоти от стария Герак, 4-те тополи, „3-те аршина мустаци" и 5000 лева напомнят, че обикновените числа в литературата изграждат особени дискретни отношения със сакрализирани числови универсалии като 1, 3, 4, 7, 12, 13. Те могат да съществуват без задължителна връзка с обекти (вж. Топоров 1982: 630; „ще има Аз, когато неговото делимо бъде единица" у В. Хлебников). На свой ред техните регистри и модификации варират според числовите параметри на света в различните религии и култури (универсалията „четно/нечетно", тройката в християнството, 11-ицата за древните келти и дори такова значещо само за познавачите на Кабалата трудно смилаемо число като… 142 857).

В изключителната си студия „Нумерологическият проект на Хлебников като феномен на Сребърния век" Л. Панова ревизира традиционното разбиране за аритметиката на Хлебников като манифестация на неговия пророчески дар, от една страна, и уникалността на неговия художествен експеримент, от друга – в полза на третото, интертекстуалното разбиране за цялото „математическо стопанство" на Хлебников като закономерен продукт Сребърния век:

> В ръцете на недоучилия математик, историософ-любител и словоизпитател като Хлебников математиката с нейните най-елементарни операции се оказва ключ към ритъма на възникване на войните и техния характер, живота на народите и на отделния индивид, езиците изобщо и руския в частност – общо казано – към всичко. Извършвайки съответните измервания, Хлебников сумира данните в „закони" на времето (по-правилно: на историята) и езика с далечна цел: да се предсказват бъдещите войни и така да се изтръгнат от съдбата мир и щастие за човечеството. Хлебников осъществява своята нумерологична дейност не само от позицията на пророк, но и на законодател. В това качество той учредява две нови институции, насочени към обединение на човечество: 317 Председатели на Земното Кълбо и „звезден" език, и размишлява за ново държавно устройство в мащабите на Земята и Космоса. (Панова 2008: 393–394)

Хлебниковата математика с всички нейни фантастични формули, таблици и уравнения често е свързвана в паралел с нумерологичния проект на Стефан Маларме. Изглежда, че именно посветеността на двамата поети на символичните съотношения между числата и думите влияе решаващо върху тяхното възприемане като „пророци“. Съвременниците приписват на Хлебников пророчески дар; Гео Милев нарича Маларме „пророк“ с усещане за някаква надинтелектуална надареност на френския символист и изключителност на неговата поезия отвъд техниките и ефектите на „чистото изкуство“. Сходна рецепция на Маларме личи и у рационалния читател на френската лирика С. Радев. Още един паралел очертава „магическо-пророческото“ у двамата поети и митологизиращи математици: привързаността към архаичната експресия на заклинанието. Емблема на Хлебниковото творчество завинаги остава „Заклинание със смях“. Сходна особеност в експресивна оценка изтъква и български тълкувател на Маларме. „Понякога чрез необичайни [...] съчетания от думи, чрез музикалността и изумителната им наситеност този тъй чужд на първичностите поет ни дава представа за най-въздействащото в изначалната поезия: заклинанията“ (Константинов 2005).

Предположенията, че прочутата поема на Маларме „Хвърляне на зарове“ („Coup de dés“) е построена изцяло върху някакъв нумерологичен модел, се потвърдиха в неотдавнашното изследване на Кантен Мейасу „Числото и Сирената“ (Meillassoux 2011)[9]. В него (според френските коментатори) тайният код на поемата от 1897 г. най-после е дешифриран. „Хвърляне на зарове“ е енигматичен текст, в който мнозина отдавна търсят дълбоко закодирана метафизика и тайнствено противопоставяне на Ницшевото „Бог е мъртъв“. Според Мейасу Маларме се надява, че нова религия е възможна и тя не би могла да бъде никоя друга освен самата Поезия. Така се заражда аналогия между смъртта на Бог и смъртта на александрина, напълно изтласкан от *vers libre* – „свободния стих“. Културният катаклизъм, наричан в етнологията „аномия“, е разбираем за всеки запознат с практически монометричния облик на френската поезия. След Средновековието с неговите два размера (10-сричник с преобладаващо цезурно деление 4+6 и безцезурен 8-сричник) от края на XVI до края на XIX в. тя не познава друг размер освен александрина 6+6 (!) (Гаспаров 2003: 111). След като той като код на поезията подлежи на изчезване, то и тя самата не е в състояние да заеме мястото на обществено значим ритуал. Тогава Маларме решава, че единственият начин да се приеме смъртта на александрина, без да се жертва метрическата същност на поезията, е да се изобрети нов принцип, скрит в най-абсолютизираната форма на

[9] Дължа голяма благодарност на колегата Миряна Янакиева, която ме запозна с тази нова интерпретация, цитирана почти дословно тук, както и на българския преводач на Маларме – поета Кирил Кадийски.

свободния стих. В търсене на този принцип Мейасу констатира, че два от най-прочутите сонети на Маларме – „Тъй както голота гнети“ („A la nue accablante…“) и „Наздравица“ („Salut“) – съдържат съответно 70 и 77 думи. Изследователят си дава труда да преброи от колко думи се състои поемата „Игра на зарове“. Установява, че те са точно 707, където 7 е Бог, 0 е небитието и 7 е новият Бог. Така вместо в една-единствена Книга, търсеният от Маларме божествен принцип се въплъщава в едно-единствено Число („unique Nombre“).

Все пак във френската литература жертва на числовите тайнства са културните ореоли на един стихотворен размер, докато нумерологията на В. Хлебников има своя кошмарна реализация, чиято логика очертаха известната книга на Б. Гройс и други изследвания върху партньорството между художествения авангард и тоталитарния социален ред (Groys 1992). „Самите ние сме Правителство на планетата Земя – възвестява Хлебников – …и сега пеем, крещим, изтръгваме от себе си страшната истина. Правителството на планетата Земя не съществува. Ние сме това Правителство!“ (Хлебников 1933: 162).

Във вселенските властови амбиции на числово програмираното „Правителство“ детето чудо на руския футуризъм не спира дотук. То с инфантилна невинност и откровеност посочва сред методите и целите на „Правителството“ още една цифра. Това е задължителното рутинно умъртвяване на всички негови поданици, надхвърлили 30-годишна възраст. Сякаш точно нумерологията на Хлебников, който умира едва надхвърлил 30-те през 1922 г. – т.е. във времето на още необуздания от Сталин модернистки екстаз, – подрежда номерата, заличили човешките имена на хората в ГУЛАГ. В лагерната проза на Ал. Солженицин и в спомените на други автори те се появяват като „зекове“ Х-123, Б-219, Щ-854 и т.н. „Зековете“ – вече непредсказана в „нумерологията“ подробност – обитават също така „номерираното“ пространство на закодираните като А-52, Л-143 и в още безброй числови комбинации концлагери, затвори, „места за превъзпитание“, „етапни разпределители“, „секретни зони“ и „обекти със специален режим“. След това поучително допълнение отново се връщаме към хипотезата на Л. Панова и я разширяваме с твърдението, че релациите поезия–математика не са само експериментална ексцентрика на наистина ексцентрични поети мислители като Хлебников и Маларме, а паралелна линия в по-обща интелектуална и научна тенденция. Очертават я автори и изследвания, които заслужават да бъдат припомнени.

Хекзаметри, стилометрия, „златно сечение“, елипси, вероятностни вериги

В прегледна хронология партньорството между математиката и литературната наука в края на XIX и началото на XX в. изглежда така:

Година	Автор, образование и основно амплоа	Съчинения с използване на статистически методи върху литературни феномени	Обща методика	Актуализации*
1866–1868	**Проф. М. Дробиш** (математик, философ, психолог, музиковед)	„Статистическо изследване върху формите на латинския хекзаметър“	Изчисляване на съотношенията между дактили и спондеи в творчеството на Омир, Вергилий, Хораций	3
1885	**Б. Прус** (писател, публицист, незавършено математическо и селскостопанско образование)	„Фарис“ от А. Мицкевич“ (отделни статистически наблюдения върху стиловите особености на И. Тен и Ч. Дикенс съдържат и други статии на Прус)	Статистически характеристики на стила, геометрични зависимости, аргументирани в духа на „златното сечение“ чрез елементи от теорията на множествата и опозицията „лъжа/истина“ в алгебрата на Бул	0/1
1890–1898	**Проф. В. Лютославски** (химик, философ, полиглот класик и ориенталист)	„Принципи на стилометрията“	Дефинирани и статистически детайлизирани в диахрония характеристики, количествени разпределения и йерархии на елементарни езикови и графични единици (т.нар. стилеми)	2
1913	**Акад. А. А. Марков** [старши] (математик)	„Пример за статистическо изследване над текста на „Евгений Онегин“, илюстриращ връзката изпитания във веригата“	Последователна зависимост на случайни величини (марковски вериги), приложени върху фонетичната организация	2

* Отразява относителната честотата на позоваване, цитиране, преводи на чужди езици, използване на данни, континуации в специализирани дисциплини на литературната наука и издания по квантитативна лингвистика: „Glottometrics Journal, Quantitative Anlaysis of Texts and Language“; Těšitelová 1992; Strauss, Fan and Altmann 2008 и др. по условната скала **0** – няма; **1** – епизодично отбелязване; **2** – задължително коментирани в ретроспективни обзори по темата; **3** – активно разработвана научна традиция.

Хронологията може да бъде допълвана с още имена и заглавия с необходимото *memento*, че не всяка числово илюстрирана емпирика означава приложение на математически методи в изследването на литературата. Не липсват и отделни куриози. Популярният литератор и политик по времето на Френската революция Пиер-Жан-Батист Шосар (Публикола) (1766

–1823) изброява във френския стихотворен превод на Вергилиевите „Георгики“ – дело на академика Жак Делил – и подрежда в педантични таблици 643 повторения, 558 антитези, 2157 „несъвършени“ стиха от общото количество стихове 2642 (Chaussard 1801)[10]. Близки до посочените съчинения по своите математически – и по-точно геометрични – инспирации са работите на стиховеда англицист Макс Дойчбайн от началото на XX в. върху древноанглийския алитерационен стих (Deutschbein 1902). На геометрични съответствия между елипсовидната сюжетна форма на Шекспировия „Макбет“ и елипсовидните йерархични равнища в архитектурата на бароковите църкви, установени от Дойчбайн, между другото се дължи и първата характеристика на Шекспир като „бароков“ драматург (Deutschbein 1936). Друг академичен англицист със сходни интереси – Бернхард Фер, също аргументира бароковия характер на Шекспировата драма със синтактична „геометрия“ – орнаментална статистика на подчинените изречения. Въпреки декларираната точност и в двете концепции звучат доста неубедителни аналогии, които предизвикват критиката на Р. Уелек в дългата международна дискусия върху барока.

Не е такава съдбата на няколкото музиковедски (Drobisch 1846) и стиховедски студии (Drobisch 1866, 1868) на М. Дробиш. Математик, философ, психолог и музиколог, той присъства в историческите обзори на квантитативната лингвистика (Best 2008). До днес стиховедското наследство на учения е коментирано и използвано с акцент върху статистическите параметри в сравнителния анализ на хекзаметъра (Cancik et al. 1979). Дробиш описва ритъма на Омировия стих в латинска версия у няколко поети като комбинирани пропорции между дактили (**d**) и спондеи (**s**) с обобщени данни като:

dsss 15,8	**ddss** 11,4	**sdss** 9,8	**ssss** 5,9
dsds 12,0	**ddds** 6,2	**sdds** 5,1	**ssds** 5,4
dssd 7,0	**ddsd** 4,8	**sdsd** 4,0	**sssd** 2,6
dsdd 3,6	**dddd** 2,2	**sddd** 1,9	**ssdd** 2,4

Като цяло Дробиш изпитва познавателната драма на всички стиховеди класици от своето съвремие. Възпитани в класически образци, те търсят античните размери и стъпки и там, където ги няма в „новите езици“. Линията на „стъпковата теория“ е почти ненарушима до началото на XX в. в руското (особено у В. Брюсов, макар остро критикувана вече в началото на 20-те години от Р. Якобсон (1922: 229) и в английското стихознание, което илюстрира тритомният труд по история на английския стих на Дж. Сейнтсбъри (Saintsbury 1906–1910); разколебаването ѝ идва от експериментално-фонетичните подходи на френски учени като

[10] П.-Ж. Шосар пише в нормативен класицистки дух като повторение на Н. Боало „Послание за някои жанрове“ („Epitre sur quelques genres“, 1811, преработена като „Poetique secondaire“ (1817).

Пол Верийе (Verrier 1909–1910), чийто „приро́ден“ и „ро́ден“ в културен смисъл силабически слух не е „деформиран“ от класическите стъпки и силаботоничните им субститути в английски, немски и руски. Качествено предимство на Дробиш обаче е самият факт, че той подхожда към стиха не като филолог и естет, а като математик, заинтересован от моделирането на стиховия ритъм. Таблиците на Дробиш предвещават много по-късен облик на стиховедските изследвания.

dsss	Ca.	P.	M.	Ci.	Ge.	Lz.	J.	Ln.
15.0	23.8	18.2	16.6	16.4	15.9	15.7	15.2	14.8
dsds	Fl.	Cl.	Ln.	St.	Ge.	Ca.	J.	O.
11.8	20.5	18.2	17.5	14.8	13.1	11.9	11.4	11.2
ddss	P.	Cl.	Ci.	Lz.	Ca.	Ae.	Fl.	O.
11.0	14.8	14.8	13.2	12.9	12.8	12.5	11.7	10.7
sdss	Ca.	Ci.	M.	J.	Cl.	Si.	Lz.	Ge.
10.0	15.1	13.7	12.0	12.0	12.0	11.25	11.2	10.8
ddds	St.	Lz.	Fl.	Ae.	O.	Cl.	H.	J.
6.7	10.2	10.0	10.0	8.1	8.0	6.8	6.4	6.2
dssd	O.	Fl.	H.	P.	J.	G.	Ln.	Lz.
6.5	13.9	8.1	7.9	7.4	7.1	7.0	7.0	6.4
ssss	E.	Ci.	Ca.	Si.	M.	Ae.	Lz.	H.
6.1	15.5	13.2	10.0	9.5	8.6	7.3	7.0	6.2
ssds	Si.	Cl.	E.	Sc.	H.	J.	Ci.	Ae.
6.0	9.6	9.1	8.5	7.7	6.8	6.8	6.2	6.2
ddsd	O.	Fl.	St.	M.	P.	Ge.	Ln.	J.
5.0	10.2	8.4	7.0	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.2	5.2
sdds	Ci.	Lz.	Cl.	Ae.	H.	St.	E.	Ge.
4.8	7.1	6.6	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.2
sdsd	H.	Si.	P.	E.	J.	Cl.	Ln.	M.
4.11	6.8	5.7	5.4	4.6	4.6	4.3	4.1	3.9
dsdd	O.	Fl.	St.	H.	P.	Ge.	Ae.	M.
4.08	9.6	7.7	7.1	5.4	4.9	3.8	3.6	3.4
sssd	Si.	F.	H.	Ge.	Lz.	Ci.	Ae.	J.
2.6	6.1	6.0	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.2	2.4	2.3
dddd	O.	E.	Fl.	St.	Ge.	Ln.	J.	P.
2.4	5.9	4.8	3.7	3.0	2.7	2.3	2.3	2.2
sddd	H.	E.	J.	Ge.	Ae.	O.	Ln.	Lz.
2.0	3.9	3.6	3.6	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8
ssdd	H.	Si.	M.	St.	J.	E.	Ge.	Ci.
1.9	3.6	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.0	1.8

Tabelle 1: "Generaltabelle"
(Abkürgunzen: Ae. – Aenesis; Ca. – Catull;
Ci. – Cicero; Cl. – Claudian; E. – Ennius;
Ge. – Georgica; H. – Horaz; J. – Juvenal;
Ln. – Lucan; Lz. – Lukrez; M. – Manilius;
O. – Ovid; P. – Persius; Si. – Silius Italicus;
St. – Statius; Fl. – Valerius Flaccus)

(Drobisch 1866: 126f.)

В момента на появата си през 1890 г. като термин и изследователска методика стилометрията добива силен международен отзвук чрез преводи на основните европейски езици и без преувеличение изглежда като експлозия на научна мода. Макар тя да отшумява с годините и да се прилага рядко, интересът към личността на нейния създател – големия полски филолог Винценти Лютославски – трае до днес (Głowiński et al., red. 1988: 497; Pawłowski 2004: 79–80).

Стилометричният анализ дефинира и статистически систематизира в характеристики количествени разпределения и йерархии на елементарни езикови и графични единици (т.нар. стилеми) на стила на даден писател, на дадена творба (или група творби), които служат основно за да доказват или отхвърлят хипотези около установяването на нечие спорно авторство и хронологията на индивидуалното творчество (Lutosławski 1890, 1897a, 1897b, 1898). Практическото приложение на стилометрията, съчетано с ексцентричния образ на учения – революционер, радикален абстинент, йогист и източен мистик, донася слава на Лютославски. Той открива авторството на Джордано Бруно на неизвестен ръкопис и успява да реконструира хронологията на късните диалози на Платон.

Развитието на изследванията под термина „стилометрия" или със сходен апарат „преди и след В. Лютославски" може да бъде ретроспективно проследено в цялата филологическа технология на авторската атрибуция. Тя става особено злободневна през Ренесанса с неговото изобилие от фалшиви текстове и официални документи, мними герои и амбициозни самозванци във всякакви, включително и най-престижни, политически роли (папи, династически претенденти, дипломати и т.н.); като първа победа на науката над фалшификата се смята *Declamatio* на Лоренцо Вала (1407–1457), който доказва, че император Константин не е автор на спорен документ. Последва подем на ред ерудитски помощни дисциплини – архивистика, палеография, дипломатика, текстология, епиграфика, хронология. Техният смисъл днес виждаме в контекста на зараждащата се културна и ценностна категория на авторството и на стиловите канони, според които най-старият текст е не само най-верен по дух и буква, но и най-безпогрешен в езиково отношение, по-късните редакции са се приемали като „упадък" на класическия латински. Актуалните стилометрични насоки под знака на компютърната лингвистика последно представят продукцията на

Специализирания уъркшоп „Стилометрия“ (Expert workshop „Stylometry@ Kraków“, 9–11 October 2013) и други издания.

Изследването на А. Марков-старши от 1913 г. по общоприето мнение представлява най-ранен пример за подход към художествения текст като статистически предмет в категориите на теорията на вероятностите. Марков проследява последователността и комбинаториката на 20 000 букви в началната глава на „Евгений Онегин“ според вероятностите в редуването „гласна/съгласна“ (Марков [старший] 1913). В случая текстът на стихотворния роман е използван само като материал. Истински литературоведски ренесанс Марковите вериги дочакват половин век по-късно. Известните работи на Р. Коларов върху фоничната организация на художествената проза остават несравнимо по-високо по своите познавателни качества, отколкото пряко и дословно вдъхновената от А. Марков изследователска насока в СССР и Русия.

„Маргинални подходи“ или асимилирана научна традиция

Краткият обзор на математическата поетика от края на XIX – началото на XX в. подсказва няколко основни извода. Те внасят нюанси в общата оценка на П. Лер-Сплавински (Lehr-Spławiński 1987: 101) за приложението на математическите методи като „израз на сциентичните стремежи на позитивизма към точност, обективност на познанието и откриване на всеобщи закони“, от една страна, и като следствие от априорни философски (в общ смисъл – „питагорейски“) представи за всеобхватността и тайнствата на числовия свят, от друга.

1. Макар действително повлияни от позитивизма на XIX в., математическите методи в литературното изследване не са изолирани от цялостната художествена и хуманитарна култура на своето време. То носи ореолите на символизма, декаданса, модернизма и *Belle Époque*. Така те отразяват раздвояването между точността и красотата на математическите обекти, т.е. тяхното свойство да съществуват като символи независимо от човешкото съзнание.
2. Цялата културна, научна и литературна история, включително съприкосновенията между математика и литература от описвания период, учат, че условните линии на „математическата поетика“ и „поетизираната математика“ не се „пораждат“ една от друга и не ги свързва нито „праволинейно“, нито „сребрено“, а функционално „родство по избор“. В него (както при повечето бракове и сродявания) просто нечий глас в някои моменти звучи по-високо и по-силно. Броенето на дадени елементи в мита, в литературата и в изкуствата може да бъде инструмент на мистичен транс или на рационална програма, на спонтанно хрумване или на строго изграждана научна

система, на помощна хипотеза и на цялостна концепция, на вярата или на разума.

3. Твърдението, че първите предмети на литературоведски статистики изобщо са избирани изключително сред „външните“ спрямо писателя и творбата реалии за сметка на „вътрешните“ стилови характеристики и повествователни елементи (Warneken 1971: 98), е неубедително дори от формално-хронологична и фактологична гледна точка. Литературносоциологическата и библиотековедската статистика като обобщения върху различни показатели от регионално-демографски, комерсиално-потребителски, възрастов, хобистичен, професионален, образователно-културен, ценностно-психологически или друг характер се развиват синхронно в същите години, включително и в българската наука (Милчаков и Енчев 2010).
4. Знаменателното фокусиране и видимите резултати на първите математически методи в литературните изследвания върху стиха и стила остават най-вероятно поле за приложението им не само за тяхното време.

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IDEALS, SYMBOLS, STORIES AND ILLUSIONS OF THE PRECISION (Mathematical, statistical and quantitative methods in the literary studies – the end of the 19th – early 20th century)

Yani Milchakov

Abstract

The article deals with the earliest mathematical-oriented approaches to the literary text. It presents the problems concerning the subject, goals and cognitive limits of the mathematical-oriented poetics. Mathematical inspirations of the modern poetry that illustrate some numerological concepts are also analyzed, especially the obvious ones in the works of Stéphane Mallarmé and Velimir Khlebnikov. The paper recalls the theoretical heritage of rarely mentioned today researchers from the late 19th and early 20th century, such as Moritz Drobisch and Wincenty Lutosławski. Drobisch wrote the first statistical description of the ancient prosody. Lutosławski set up the basics of stylometry and by means of 500 items, called *stylemmas*, used this method to reconstruct the chronology of Plato's *Dialogues*. Generally speaking, the first mathematical approaches to the literature did not constitute an integral scientific trend. They were rather individual practical insights partially included in the overall methods of positivism, based on the ideal of precision and rationality. They presupposed that literature must be studied and interpreted by empirical experiments, accurate data and provable definitions of universal regularities. Although undoubtedly influenced by the positivism of the 19th century, mathematical methods in literary studies were not isolated from the overall artistic culture of that time. The aura of symbolism, decadence, modernism and Belle Époque were born. They all together showed the split between the limitation of accuracy of the mathematical data and the *beautiful infinity* of the mathematical objects and symbols. Therefore, the article emphasizes the role of mathematical methods among the first structural-semiotic interpretations.

ТЕЛЕПАТИЯ И РАЗБИРАНЕ: ПОЛЕМИЧНА РЕПЛИКА КЪМ ХЕРМЕНЕВТИКАТА И СЕМИОТИКАТА

Морис Фадел

Човек избира домашното животно поради същата причина, поради която влиза в брак. И вземането на домашно животно, и бракът изглеждат продиктувани от много твърди, обективни, независещи от нас необходимости: изхранването, работата на полето, отглеждането на деца, редовният секс, любовта, финансовия просперитет. Но напоследък всички тези необходимости бяха поставени под съмнение. Работата на полето може да се осъществява и без помощта на животните. И преди мнозина са решавали да живеят без животинско месо. Отглеждането на децата, редовният секс, любовта, както и финансовото благополучие са възможни и без брак.

И *въпреки това* хората продължават да извършват брачни церемонии и да съжителстват с домашни животни. Защото причината за тези две неща не е в някакви обстоятелства извън нас, а *във* нас. Как мога да получа сигурни гаранции, че съществувам? По никакъв друг сигурен начин, освен ако няма някой, който да потвърждава, че ме има, а *не се самозаблуждавам* във факта на наличието си; освен ако няма свидетел на моя живот, който да ми дава знаци, че съм тук. Изолиралият се в къщата си стопанин от Далчевото стихотворение с право заключава: „И сякаш аз не съм живеел никога / и зла измислица е мойто съществуване!“ (Далчев 1998: 30 – „Повест“). Как да разбере той, че е живеел, а съществуването му не е „зла измислица“, сън, ако няма удостоверение от другиго за това?

Нуждата от *свидетел* на живота ни идва от обстоятелството, че не сме в състояние от себе си да докажем собственото си присъствие. Както мъртвият не може да произнесе „Аз съм мъртъв“, така живият не може да каже „Аз съществувам“, без тази фраза да звучи нелепо, иронично или метафорично. Защото не само че не е необходимо да декларираме съществуването си (то е видно за всеки около нас), но и не сме в сила да го направим. Страхът, че може и да си въобразявам, че съм налице, не би могъл да се приглуши от инцидентни връзки с другите. Трябва едно по възможност *постоянно потвърждение*, че ни има – продължителни приятелства и любови, бракове, домашни животни, които да ни очакват, когато се прибираме.

Необходимостта от такова потвърждение е толкова силна, тъй насъщна, че се изгражда не като равенство между нас и съпруга или съпругата и домашното животно, тъй като равенството предоставя правото на всеки от участващите в него да прекрати отношенията си с другия. За да не се случи това и съответно да не възникне идентичностна криза, ние предпочитаме да възприемаме брачния партньор и животното като подвластни на нас, като обвързани с форма на власт върху живото, *биовласт*, която съществува под егидата на *собствеността*. Да, поне в Европа бракът вече не се осъзнава като собственост, но все още казваме „Моят мъж", „Моята жена" – остатък от една архаика, когато съпрузите буквално – телесно и душевно – са се притежавали. При домашното животно обаче собствеността не е поставена под въпрос. Не само наричаме кучето или котката, с които живеем, „наши", но и действително ги мислим като такива – като част от дома, немного различаващи се от вещите, които имаме.

Бидейки собственост, домашните животни са обект на покупко-продажба. Животните в стопанството са предназначени да служат, включени са в трудовия процес; техният статус е като този на роба – същества без свободен избор, получаващи храна и грижа срещу труд, подлежащи на наказание, ако не изпълняват съответните изисквания. Функцията на животните, с които съжителстваме, е естетическа – не служат за нищо, освен за любуване. Ала така е само на пръв поглед – тези животни всъщност нямат естетическа функция, а *екзистенциална* – те изпълняват в оголен вид задачата да удостоверяват съществуването ни.

В центъра на Йовковия цикъл с разкази „Ако можеха да говорят" е не дивото животно, както е у Емилиян Станев, а домашното, животното в стопанството. Даже когато става въпрос за дивеч, както е в разказа „Вълчицата", повествованието не се занимава с неговия автономен начин на живот, а със съприкосновенията му с хората. А и повечето текст е посветен на човешките преживявания и действия спрямо поведението на вълчицата. Също така цикълът е фокусиран не върху насилническото, типично властово отношение към живото, а върху екзистенциалната потребност от обективизиране на съществуването ни, която се реализира чрез собствеността. Всъщност тази потребност се изпълнява не само от домашните животни и брачните партньори, а и от всяка собственост, която имаме. Ясно е, че повечето предмети, които притежаваме, по-голямата част от т.нар. движимо и недвижимо имущество не е абсолютно необходима. И въпреки това продължаваме да трупаме собственост не толкова за да станем по-богати, а ставаме по-богати, за да можем някак да се справим с вероятността и да ни няма, да покажем, че не сме фантоми, измислица, а че сме тук, налице, видими за себе си (най-вече!) и за другите. Неслучайно опитът от страна на комунизма да отнеме или ограничи частната собственост доведе до тежки изменения. Лишени от опората на обективизирането на съществуването, което осигурява собствеността, хората загубиха и вяра в себе си, станаха повсеместно податливи на морални компромиси, по-лесно управляеми. От

друга страна, вещоманията, на която ни учат модерността и съвременният капитализъм, показва колко все по-трудно постижима е тази вяра. И колко все по-важни са предметите за психологическата и екзистенциалната ни стабилност – когато изпаднем в депресии, практикуваме „шопинг терапия".

Животните в „Ако можеха да говорят" служат, ако мога да се възползвам от израза на Жан-Люк Нанси, като „протези" на идентичността на героите-хора. Те се оглеждат в тях, за да се уверят в своята самоличност, своето „себе си". Животните са своеобразно продължение на човешкото, но по друг, неезиков начин. Така и може да се тълкува заглавието на цикъла. Ясно е, че „Ако можеха да говорят" означава „Само езикът им липсва, за да бъдат като нас". Щом „добитъците" са като „нас", не сме самотни, няма нужда да се съмняваме в себе си, нашето „себе си" се стабилизира, защото намира едно друго „себе си", което е същото като него. Галунка от „Дивачка" обича сивата патица, понеже ѝ прилича на самата нея. Тоест героинята обича себе си, понеже има някой като нея, който да утвърждава тази любов. Самовлюбеността непрекъснато изисква такъв „някой", за да не изглежда патологична, без основания, за да се избави от въпроси като: „Сигурен ли съм в това, какво е моето „себе си", за да го обичам; не е ли моето „себе си" илюзия, нещо, което съм си измислил, нямащо общо с реалността ми; какво в действителност обичам аз?"

В разбирането за животното като продължение на човешкото се вижда неагресивният антропоцентризъм на цикъла. Това не е антропоцентризмът, който йерархично поставя животното под човека, а който придърпва животинското в човешкото „нас". Казвам „на цикъла", защото имам предвид не само героите-хора, но и авторовата позиция. Разказът „Скитник" завършва с изречението „И (кучето – бел. моя – М. Ф.) се свиваше, затрепваше с цялото си тяло и гледаше чича Митуша със скръбни, човешки очи" (Йовков 1967: 263). Изразът „скръбни, човешки очи" излиза извън сюжетния контекст на произведението, представя чисто авторовото отношение. Пишейки за животното, Йовков влага своето усещане за човешко в него. Очите на кучето са скръбни, тъй като в тях се отразява възгледът, преминаващ като лайтмотив през множество произведения на автора, за тъжната, страдалческа съдба на човека. Животното просто подкрепя този лайтмотив. То е като патерица, чрез която Йовковата визия за човешкото, т.е. самият Йовков, се установява, също както ние очакваме от познатите и приятелите си да чуем за себе си онова, което бихме искали, за да се убедим, че не се заблуждаваме относно собствената си идентичност. Едва ли Йовковото писане е изключение. Не е ли писането, когато не преследва инструментални, приложни цели, когато не е например подготовка на административен документ, опит за обективизиране на присъствието ни, както са купуването на дрехи и коли, бракът и вземането на домашни любимци? Защо иначе хората продължават да пишат, а и броят на пишещите се увеличава с възможностите, които предлага интернет, след като читателите намаляват? Писането *няма* отношение към публичността, макар да

изглежда, че е обратното. *Тайната* мечта на авторите е да намерят читатели като самите себе си, защото оправданието, че писането е предназначено за някого, е маска, зад която се крие разбираемата нужда от утвърждаване на самоличността на пишещия. Другият, към когото се стреми писмото, е *самият автор*, който трябва да се представи пред себе си като читател, като мечтания читател, за да се затвърди неговото „себе си".

При Йовков не работи разпространеният стереотип за животинското като среда на инстинкта, на който е подвластен Станев. Йовковите животни не са втренчени в разгръщането на нагоните си; не са ръководени от жаждата за оцеляване и от сексуалността, не са фигури на непознаващата себе си, безсъзнателна, но въпреки това побеждаваща обстоятелствата стихия на живота, както много често бива представяно животинското в модерната култура. Не, те са някак примирено-пасивни, *статични*, неовладени от слепата воля да бъдеш, да си. В „По-малката сестра" кобилката Айа, за разлика от сестра си, е описана като неспокойна и дива. Ала тя не се съпротивлява, когато трябва да я убият. Напротив, покорно и дори с лекота се освобождава от живота: „Два-три пъти тя дълбоко пое въздух и силно изпръхтяваше, като че снемаше нещо тежко от себе си" (пак там: 274). Следващото изречение я показва в ситуацията, когато вече се е освободила от това „нещо тежко", когато „заиграва като дете", сякаш радвайки се, че ще умре.

Приносът на Йовков към виждането за животинското е може би тъкмо в това разделяне на животното от живота, което си е разчупване на едно доста здраво клише. Думата „живот" е формирала в българския език „животно". Животното се мисли като същество, в което пряко се е отразил животът, което е самият живот. Човекът – обратно – се разглежда като малко или повече дистанциран от живота, встрани от него. Широко приета е представата, залегнала и в Хайдегеровия Dasein, че само човекът има отношение към смъртта – само тя стои като перспектива и хоризонт за него, единствено ние знаем, че ни предстои умиране.

Откъснати от мощното клише, че животното е репрезентативно за живота, Йовковите герои-животни са вдадени в едно качество, което обикновено се възприема като човешко: разбирането. „Как мислиш ти – чичо Митуш убеждава Аго – те (добитъкът – бел. моя – М. Ф.) всичко разбират..." (пак там: 328 – „При своите си"). „Никаква грешка не ставаше, никакво прежеване" – се казва за воловете в чифлика от „Ако можеха да говорят" (пак там: 245 – „Всеки с името си"). Животните без съпротива изпълняват дадените им команди. Те разбират и знаят имената си: „От тях (воловете – бел. моя – М. Ф.) тръгваше, като че неочаквано оживяваше, само тоя, който си чуеше името, другите не мърдаха" (пак там). (Само домашните животни имат имена – признак за приобщаването им към човешкото, за необходимостта от неговото утвърждаване в другия поради собствената му несигурност в себе си.) Воловете разбиращо съпровождат ковчега на чичо Митуш: „Нямаше нужда да ги (воловете – бел. моя – М. Ф.) карат: те сякаш сами знаеха какво правят и къде отиват" (пак там: 330 – „При своите си").

Разбирането при Йовковите животни *не* става посредством езика, не се базира на него. Макар че обстоятелството, че животните знаят имената си (един от разказите – „Всеки с името си“ – явно набляга на това), може да доведе до обратното заключение: че именно езикът е това, което свързва хората и животните в цикъла. Ала какво е да знаеш името си? Същото ли е като да разбираш името си? Личното име има повече отношение към знаенето, отколкото към разбирането. Ако разбирам значението на своето лично име, това какво ще ми каже за мен – неговия носител? Нищо, защото при личното име не е важно значението му, а връзката между него и наименования, връзка, определяна от механичното, лишено от каквато и да била смислова основа помнене, че именно еди-кой си се нарича така. Името разделя езика от разбирането. Но и нещо повече – то *разделя езика от самия него*, то е изкривен език, който не ме открива към останалите структури на езика, а по-скоро затваря достъпа ми до тях, насочвайки ме към реалност, която е извън езиковите параметри – мен самия, носещия името. От това, че зная името си, не значи, че имам езикова компетентност, че мога да общувам посредством думи. Защото името малко се подчинява на правилата на езиковата система. То е закостенял, аконтекстуален, най-малко изменчив, най-консервативен елемент от езика; симптом е, че езикът не може да побере и „преработи“ в себе си света, че той не е свят, а само част от свят, която не може да претендира да е вместилище на цялото.

В „Ако можеха да говорят“ се наблюдава силно неглижиране на езика във функцията му на привилегироващ разделителен белег между човека и животното, която е един от жалоните на антропоцентризма – човекът, за разлика от животното, е говорещо същество, ние стоим по-горе от животните, защото можем да говорим, а и чрез говоренето и в него имаме всичкото на света. Твърдението на чичо Митуш: „Ако добитъците знаеха да говорят, те щяха да бъдат като нас“ (пак там: 328), означава, че езикът не е определящ разделителен признак между нас и останалите обитатели на планетата. Да говориш не е важно. Комуникацията в нейната най-съществена част – разбирането – не се нуждае от езика. Макар че си заслужава да се отбележи и една може би немалко съществена разлика между това изказване на чичо Митуш и свързаното с него заглавие на цикъла. Названието отрежда на говоренето позицията на природна способност, то е свързано с моженето. Чичо Митуш разпознава езика като обикновено знаене. Ако за заглавието и оттам за автора езикът е органична бариера между нас и животното, той разкрива нещо специфично за човека, за героя то е просто умение, както шофирането на кола, в него не се откроява никаква човешка особеност. В позицията си спрямо езика и неговата роля за конституирането на човешкото чичо Митуш е по-радикално негативистичен от Йовков.

Снизяването на езика влече и друго следствие освен опита за заличаване на една от традиционните разлики между човека и животното. В разказа „Скитник“ чичо Митуш, търсейки загубилите се волове, без да иска, се оказва на границата. Случаят е емблематичен за „Ако можеха да говорят“.

Героите на цикъла са вгледани само в своето лично стопанство. Чифликът съществува сякаш извън историята. Той пази незнайно откога създадени порядки, които нямат отношение към държавноподдържаната юридическа система. За Йовковите персонажи политическото е без значение. В „Ако можеха да говорят“ протича неговото отхвърляне, това е *произведение на аполитичността*. Елиминирането на политическото не би било възможно без потискането на ролята на езика, с помощта на който се реализира управлението и се коват идеологиите. *Доколкото човекът е езиково същество, той е политически.* Тъй като животните не говорят в пропозиционалния смисъл на думата, в смисъла на произвеждането на самостойни изказвания, на изречения, те нямат политическо. Неглижирането на езика в „Ако можеха да говорят“ фиксира отпадането на една от фундаменталните делитбени линии между нас и тях.

Ала това *не* значи, че „Ако можеха да говорят“ е неантропоцентрично произведение. Разбирането на хората от страна на животните и тяхното безропотно покорство пред въведения от човека ред е резултат от обстоятелството, че над тях се упражнява биовласт, че те са в робската позиция на собственост. Робът трябва да бъде точно такъв, каквито са Йовковите животни – *пасивен*, както в смисъла на телесно покорство, така и в този на разбиране, тъй като разбирането е пасивен акт. Собствеността за Йовков *няма* връзка с политическото и историята. Защото тя изхожда от една друга, основна предпоставка: нуждата на човека да потвърди себе си в другия. Чичо Митуш казва, че макар и неговорещи, животните в „Ако можеха да говорят“ все пак са като хората.

Че разбирането е робска дейност, занимание на онези, които са подвластни, говори и обстоятелството, че същият този чичо Митуш не е собственик, господар на чифлика, а работещ в него. Както животните, той не е активен, внасящ нови сюжетни линии персонаж, а претърпяващ случващото се. Като тях той пасивно понася смъртта и не се натъжава, че ще умре, приема го като облекчение. Като тях съответно той е вдаден в разбирането. Когато чета „Ако можеха да говорят“, имам чувството, че погледът на чичо Митуш е навсякъде в текста, че той е постоянният скрит свидетел на всичко, което става там. Неговото задкулисно присъствие усещам дори в разказите, които описват чифлика след смъртта на героя. Чичо Митуш е като че другият автор, не твърде идентичен с изписания на кориците, защото, както видяхме, Йовков и неговият герой се различават по отношение на това дали езикът е природна способност, или не е. И авторът, сякаш за да запази своята уникална позиция спрямо текста, убива персонажа. Ходът не ми се вижда много успешен, след като въпреки смъртта на героя неговото присъствие продължава да се чувства.

Има обаче една обща особеност на разбирането на чичо Митуш и на животните. Чичо Митуш се откроява сред останалите персонажи по това, че докато другите се отдават на битови разговори, той изведнъж, без връзка с тях, се издига на по-високо смислово ниво и произнася генерални за-

ключения. В първия разказ, след като е извикал имената на воловете и е запалил по цигара заедно с Аго, чичо Митуш обобщава: „Аз, да ти кажа ли, държа добитъка по-горе и от чиляка“ (Йовков 1967: 246 – „Всеки с името си“). Твърдението идва изненадващо, то няма пряко отношение към случилото се преди това, а и Аго не го разбира. Или, когато в „По-малката сестра“ се казва: „В такива случаи чичо Митуш се поспирваше на вратата и усещаше жалост: той знаеше добре, че конете правят тъй не от нужда, а от нежност и от дружба едни към други“, не се дават никакви разяснения за това въз основа на какво героят „знае добре“ (пак там: 273). Такива са генералните твърдения на чичо Митуш – *аконтекстуални като личните имена, извънсюжетни, немотивирани, разкъсващи причинно-следствената връзка*. Не е ясно как и защо те са се появили, по какъв начин героят е стигнал до тях. Нещо повече – не е и ясно *дали самият той разбира какво говори*, дали *разбира разбирането, което е заложено в думите му*. Такова е и разбирането на животните. Воловете, които пренасят ковчега на чичо Митуш, неизвестно как и защо „знаят“ „какво правят и къде отиват“.

Време е да се опитаме да назовем точно за какво иде реч – *телепатия*. Телепатично, немотивирано, неконтекстуално разбират не само чичо Митуш и животните. В момента, когато всички се нахвърлят върху другоселеца от едноименния разказ, Торашко изведнъж (тази дума е употребена и в текста) осъзнава неговата драма: „Изведнъж стана нещо неочаквано. Торашко скочи, бутна масата пред себе си и извика: „Оставете човека бе! Какви хора сте вий!“ (пак там: 123). „По жицата“ започва с изречението „Още докато го бранеше от кучетата, Петър Моканина разбра, че тоя непознат селянин не се е отбил при него току-тъй, а го гони някаква беда“ (пак там: 69). Как е разбрал Моканина – не се разбира. Не става ясно и дали Моканина разбира онова, което разбира. Разбирането му го спохожда изведнъж, той внезапно прониква във вътрешния свят на непознатия. Не по-малко внимание заслужава и другата мисъл на героя за човека отсреща. „Инак да го гледаш – човек планина, но Моканина набързо го претегли в ума си и реши, че е от ония меки, отпуснати хора, за които се казва, че и на мравята път струват“ (пак там). Тук разбирането не е толкова внезапно – Моканина „набързо претегля в ума си“ другоселеца, но учудващо е на какво се основава това разбиране. Забележете: изводът на Моканина е напълно противоположен на външния вид на госта, той не може да е повод за него.

Опосредстващата реалност на знака е *елиминирана*. Йовковите герои не само разбират, но и се разбират без нея. Дошлият разказва на Моканина своята трагична история, но това е хватка за нас, за четящите. Иначе гостът *вече е разказал* на Моканина за мъката си – още когато Моканина го е бранил от кучетата. Телепатично, без причинно-следствена връзка, без рационалност е и прочутото изказване в края на произведението: „Боже, колко мъка има по тоя свят, Боже!“ (пак там: 73). Прибързано би било да се утвърждава, че изречението е резултат от съпреживяването от страна на Моканина на историята на другоселеца. Не, то възниква изведнъж, без

героят да го очаква. „Но нещо го подпираше в гърдите, мъчеше го“ – се казва, преди Моканина да произнесе твърдението си за мъката по света (пак там). Думата „нещо“ откроява тъкмо внезапността на разбирането, както и факта, че героят не осъзнава какво се случва в него и какво ще изкаже, т.е., че *не разбира своето разбиране*.

Телепатично общуват и хората, и животните в „Ако можеха да говорят“. В разказа „Вълчицата“ Давидко казва: „Нека доде (вълкът – бел. моя – М. Ф.)… нека доде…“ (пак там: 289). Следващото изречение: „Вълкът като че го чу и дойде“ (пак там: 290). „Като че“ тук не значи само дистанция от онова, което се твърди по-нататък. То е и в смисъл, че няма как вълкът да е чул твърдението на героя и все пак е чул и е дошъл – чул е, без това да е възможно, чул е не така, както се чува обикновено. В края на „Скитик“ четем: „Кучето искаше да се хвърли от радост върху му (на чичо Митуш – бел. моя – М. Ф.), но за да не го изцапа, чичо Митуш го изхока“ (пак там: 263). Как чичо Митуш разбира, че кучето иска да се хвърли върху него – не се съобщава. Не е ли, понеже самото куче без глас и език му казва „Искам да се хвърля върху теб“?

Телепатичната херменевтика и комуникация у Йовков са в разрез с всяка позитивистична и рационалистична херменевтика, семиотика и теория на комуникацията. При него го няма нито причинно-следственото отношение между предразсъдък и ново познание, както е у Гадамер, в което съществена роля играе езикът, тъй като предразсъдъкът, както и новото знание са езиково структурирани, нито е налице рационално-познаваемата и позитивна база на общуването – знакът, както е в семиотиката. Тъкмо избягването на знаковостта и езика, което се среща неведнъж у Йовков, е основание авторът да се обърне в „Ако можеха да говорят“ (в чието название звучи изразът „Езикът не е важен“) към темата за животните, където речта няма как да е определяща. Животните са закономерна спирка за Йовков и защото неследването на езика и рационалността означава неследване на най-твърдата представа за човека като същество, притежаващо рационалност и език. Заедно с това, доколкото се противопоставя на езика и знака, Йовковото творчество е в конфликт с една от водещите идеи в литературното мислене през XX в.: че литературата е езикова, знакова дейност. Йовковото наследство *не е изкуство на езика*, по-скоро то е *изкуство на преодоляването на езиковостта*, и то в широкия смисъл на думата – като знаково опосредствано познание и общуване. Всички възхищения от езиковите дрехи на този автор, най-разпространените сред които са хваленето на поетичния му стил и на фигуративните подплънки на текстовете му, на умението му да загатва скрития смисъл, са спорни.

Естествено възражение срещу това би било изтъкването, че борбата на Йовков срещу езика, а и моите наблюдения върху тази борба все пак се осъществяват посредством езика. Не става ли дума за възправяне на езика срещу себе си, при което езикът бива утвърден? Не бих казал. Йовковите текстове, разбира се, са езикови построения, но, както виждаме, в тях на

места липсва мотивировка, повествованието се разцепва от едно необяснимо „изведнъж“, разказът спира да разказва; спира в буквалния смисъл, а не прави опит да разкаже неразказваемото, да възтържествува над него с езиковата си „опаковка“ или пък разказването се използва формално, външно, а всъщност е налице невъзможност за разказ. Тези места не са маловажни за Йовковите текстове. Като че въпросните текстове съществуват, за да може именно те да бъдат откроени, за да може езиковото да се продъни. Стремя се моята интерпретация да не избягва това продъняване, да не доразказва и да не търси обосновки, а да извади обобщенията и обясненията си тъкмо откъм неговото присъствие, опитвайки се да го удържи.

Телепатичната комуникация и херменевтика у Йовков са пробив в оформилия се през Новото време възглед за модерната личност като владееща своите действия и познаваща мотивите за тях. Именно понеже чичо Митуш не управлява своите разбирания, той прави несъответстващи помежду си твърдения за човека и животното. Определило най-устойчивите представи за „Ако можеха да говорят“ е изказването „Ако добитъците знаеха да говорят, те щяха да бъдат като нас“, ала героят настоява и на друго: „Аз, да ти кажа ли, държа добитъка по-горе и от чиляка“. В първото изречение животните и хората са изравнени, във второто животните са поставени по-високо от нас. Също така след първото изречение идва разклащащото внушенията му уточняване „И по-добри дори“ (пак там: 328 – „При своите си“). То като че изравнява съдържанието на двете изказвания, но думата „дори“ внася несигурност – чичо Митуш не е наясно дали животното е същото като човека, или е по-добро от него и дали човекът изобщо може да бъде мяра за добро. В следващо изказване животните са издигнати до божественото: „По тези места, дето съм роден… на воловете казват Ангели“ (пак там), или са приравнени с децата: „Да удариш добитък, все едно е да удариш дете“ (пак там). На едно място чичо Митуш твърди за животните: „И разбират, всичко разбират“ (пак там: 246 – „Всеки с името си“), а на друго: „То (добитъка – бел. моя – М. Ф.) не знае, не разбира, ти го поучи“ (пак там: 328 – „При своите си“). Настояването за неразбирането на „добитъците“ е опровергано след няколко изречения: „Как мислиш ти, те (добитъците – бел. моя – М. Ф.) всичко разбират…“. Животните ту са по-ниско от човека и се нуждаят от властово-родителска намеса, ту са на нивото ни, ту са по-висши. Героят не контролира онова, което казва, защото казваното от него не изразява някаква стабилна, аргументирано-промислена позиция. Както животните, той е *изцяло аполитичен, лишен от всякаква властовост – не е господар нито на труда, нито на речта си*, даже не разбира какво говори – посочените различни твърдения са осъществени, без да се осъзнава несъвместимостта им.

Именно понеже става въпрос за телепатия, т.е. за познание и общуване, което се реализира без посредник и не е волево и съзнателно, не зависи от извършващия го субект, когато изчезне неезиковата комуникация с животните, чичо Митуш започва да греши в разбиранията си. „По-малката сес-

тра“ го представя как се заблуждава относно болестта на кобилката Айа. Или настъпва неувереност в разбирането, както е с белия гълъб от разказа „Гълъбът на прозореца“, за който чичо Митуш се чуди дали е онзи гълъб, който е щял да бъде убит от бабата, или не е. Или пък разбирането съвсем прекъсва. Поведението на жълтото куче от „Скитник“ остава загадка за героя. Неразбрана е и любовната мъка на „малко слабоумния“, както го нарича Йовков, Аго. „Малко слабоумен“ значи същество, което не покрива напълно традиционната норма за човешко – „ума“, „раз-ума“. Бидейки малоумен, т.е. не напълно човек, Аго е най-близо до животните, сякаш е на междата между животинското и човешкото; неслучайно той е характеризиран с „животински“ сравнения: „Като някое куче, което е изгубило господаря си, той (Аго – бел. моя – М. Ф.) поглеждаше дълбоките дири... и все тичаше напред“ (пак там: 252 – „Сватбата на Василена“), „Изпокапаха всички от смях, Аго виеше като вълк“ (пак там: 261 – „Скитник“).

Извън телепатията връзките между животното и човека се разпадат. Универсализмът, единството между човека и животното, за което се застъпват чичо Митуш и авторът, тяхното братство („Те са ти като братя – казва чичо Митуш за „добитъците“ – разбери. Като нас работят, като нас ще умрат“), не може да се осъществи (пак там: 328 – „При своите си“). *Животното е чуждо и непонятно за нас същество.* Отношението на собствеността, чрез което то бива привличано към човека като утвърждаващо и укрепващо идентичността му, е само човешко отношение. *Животното не може да бъде надежден свидетел*, то само формално би могло да е „наше“.

Доколкото описва грешките в разбирането на животното или представя неразбирането му, „Ако можеха да говорят“ *не е* антропоцентрично произведение. Не по-малко неантропоцентрично е то и що се отнася до телепатията. Наистина, там се постигат универсализъм и братство, но те са между същества, които не управляват взаимодействието помежду си, които не знаят как и защо се свързват – същества без име и определение. Докато разбира животните и общува с тях, чичо Митуш не е човек, защото познанието му и комуникативните му действия не са му подвластни. Докато разбират чичо Митуш, животните не са животни според устойчивото клише за тях, защото е прието разбирането да се смята за проява на посочените за човешки качества „разумност“ и „рационалност“.

„Ако можеха да говорят“ обаче разколебава не само универсализиращото събиране между човека и животното, но *и* универсализиращото понятие „животно“. Чичо Митуш говори не за животните изобщо, а само за „добитъците“. „Той беше един много особен вол“ – тази фраза от разказа „Шутият вол“ може да бъде отнесена едва ли не към всяко от животинските същества в цикъла (пак там: 293). Всяко от тях е с нещо различно: жълтото куче – с непонятния си променлив нрав, Айа – с непокорството си, белият гълъб – със странното си, контрастно на останалите гълъби в разказа поведение. Търсейки уникалното, единичното, несводимото, Йовков всъщност

разрушава антропоцентричния стереотип, че тези качества не са присъщи на животното, че животните, за разлика от човека, са предвидими, калкулируеми и следователно управляеми, че знаем какво ще се случи с котката, когато тя се роди, но не и когато се роди човек. Понятията „животно“ и „животинско“ са *хегемонизираща* и *идеологизираща синекдоха* в смисъла на Ернесто Лаклау, която заради собствените ни нужди фалшифицира и мистифицира едно множество от същества, контактът ни с които не сме в състояние да знаем как се случва и не можем да контролираме.

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TELEPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING: A POLEMICAL REMARK ON HERMENEUTICS AND SEMIOTICS

Maurice Fadel

Abstract

The article aims at inflaming controversy over the hermeneutic and semiotic understanding of literature. According to this understanding the investigation of literature should be based on the sign and language nature of the literary work. Through an analysis of the collection of stories *If They Could Talk* by Yordan Yovkov the article attempts to challenge this conception. It tries to prove a point that literary thought should make a step beyond the dominating during the 20th century view of literature as sign and linguistic phenomenon.

Част III
ФИКЦИОНАЛНОСТ – ОБЕКТИВИРАНА

Part III
FICTIONALITY – OBJECTIFIED

ИМАМЕ ДВЕ ОЧИ НА ДУШАТА. РАЗУМ И ОТКРОВЕНИЕ СПОРЕД ИСИХАСТИТЕ НА XIII И XIV В.

Георги Каприев

Тривиалното схващане за исихазма и особено за неговото разгръщане след втората половина на XIII в. гласи, че той е тотално посвещаване на чистото съзерцание на Таворската светлина и единението с Бога посредством постоянното упражняване на сърдечната молитва. Че цели тотално отхвърляне на всеки сетивен опит и всяка мисъл, за да се постигне мистичното единение с Божествената светлина, тоест с екзистенциалната Божия енергия, откровявана непосредствено от Бога. От тази перспектива се заявява като нещо саморазбиращо се, че разумът не може да играе никаква позитивна роля в тази програма, поради което се цели неговото безостатъчно изолиране. Това мнение обаче не можа да бъде доказано чрез свидетелства на източниците. Следва по-скоро да се твърди, че в тази традиция на разума се придава сериозна значимост във връзка с постигането на истинно богопознание. За доказването на тезата се обръщам към съчиненията на двете водещи фигури в тази традиция. Имам предвид Григорий Синаит († 1346) и Григорий Палама († 1357).

Григорий Синаит е големият мисионер на исихазма през XIII и XIV в. Той не е нито откривателят на исихасткия начин на живот и молитвен метод, нито е авторът на Иисусовата молитва, а е този, който системно представя и практикува исихасткото учение. Неговата система обхваща обаче изключително аскетическата практика, богосъзерцанието, исихасткия живот изобщо, но не и съответното спекулативно богословие. При него не могат да бъдат прочетени специализирани метафизични експликации и консеквенции. Тази стъпка се прави от Григорий Палама, който се приема за големия систематик на исихазма и последния засега учител на православието.

Позицията на Григорий Синаит

Григорий наистина насочва към духовната екстатична любов като състоянието на единение с Бога. Той различава два вида такава любов, при което единият е присъщ само на просветлените, а другият – на съвършени-

те. Както първият, действащият в сърцето, така и вторият, екстазът в собствен смисъл, отдалечават движения от тях ум (νοῦς) от сетивата и съответните релации (Sinaites, Capita, 59, 1256B). Истинното място на светостта, постигана още преди бъдния живот, е сърцето, пребиваващо свободно от помисли на разума (λογισμοί) и задвижвано от духа, така че всичко в него протича и се изрича духовно (Sinaites, Capita, 7, 1241A). Дори при състоянието на екстаз обаче става дума за едно „мислене според природата" (μέθη πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν φρενῶν) (Sinaites, Capita, 59, 1256B). Разумът не се изолира, а играе съвсем решаваща роля.

Истинското православие не е според Григорий нищо друго, а истинно знание (γνῶσις) за видимите и невидимите неща: за сетивните, мислимите, разумните, духовните и божествените едновременно (Sinaites, Capita, 25, 1248A). От перспективата на тази комлексност не е трудно да бъде открито основанието за определянето на истинното разбиране (δόξα) като познание, духовно съзерцание и точно схващане на догмите или истинно познаване на вярата (Sinaites, Capita, 57, 1256A). Истинното схващане за Бога и нелъжовното знание за биващото (γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἀψευδής) формират съвършеното учение на православните догми (Sinaites, Capita, 136, 1297D). Полагането на разумното схващане на нивото на висшето богопознание не е случайност и има своето системно основание. Става дума за своеобразието на човешката душа.

Душата е сътворена разумна и умна (λογική καὶ νοερά) (Sinaites, Capita, 80 et 81, 1263A et 1264B). Тези природни свойства на душата, разумът и умът, имат изцяло позитивен характер във всички възможни модуси на съществуването. Слепотата на ума се сравнява със слепотата на телесните сетива и се обяснява чрез недостига на божествена светлина, правеща възможно виждането и видимостта на човека (Sinaites, Capita, 5, 1240B). Разумът е необходим компонент за възприемането на истината. Познанието на истината се определя по-точно като приемане на благодатта, при което веднага се добавя, че останалото, свързано с истината, трябва да се дефинира като изразявания на умствените действия и доказателства за даденото в действителността (νοὴσεως ἐμφάσεις καὶ πραγμάτων ἀποδείξεις) (Sinaites, Capita, 3, 1240AB).

Тясно свързано с това е изброяването на основните предмети, съзерцавани от ума (νοῦς), постигащ чрез благодатта съвършена чистота. След триединния Бог, причината на всичко, и реда на духовните сили се нареждат устройството на биващите (ἡ τῶν ὄντων σύστασις) и икономийното снизхождане на Бога Логос (Sinaites, Capita, 130, 1294D-1296A). С това ясно се слага ударение върху значението на разума и разумния дискурс.

Григорий, застъпникът на мълчанието и сърдечната молитва, заявява еднозначно, че словото и речта (λόγος) са дадени на цялата разумна природа за полза (εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν δέδοται πάσης λογικῆς φύσεως) и разнообразно удоволствие (ἡδονή). Първият споменат вид е „научният логос" (ἐπιστημονικὸς λόγος), който като педагог формира етоса на душата. Позитивно се изброя-

ват още логосите на четенето, практиката и благодатта. Всяка слово, казва той, което излиза от устата, е слово Божие: както думите, които се изричат от светците благодарение на Светия Дух, така и онези, които се вдъхват чрез енергията на Светия Дух, на които се наслаждават обаче не всички, а само достойните. Така е, продължава Григорий, защото всички разумни същества се наслаждават на словото, но онези, които се изпълват с радост от словата на Духа, са само малцина (Sinaites, Capita, 95–96, 1269CD).

Въпросът за строежа и смисъла на недуховната разумна мъдрост се обсъжда многократно от Григорий. Той заявява съвсем отчетливо, че материалният и многословен дух на мъдростта на този свят е само според името си всезнание. Тя се прикрепя към най-грубите идеи и си създава там обиталище, чрез което сама се отказва от въипостасираната, тоест съществената мъдрост, и се лишава от съзерцанието и познанието на неделимото и едното (Sinaites, Capita, 2, 1240A). Този, който се опитва да разбира повелите чрез разума, без да ги следва, а да ги постига само чрез представа и четене, е подобен на човек, който си въобразява някаква сянка на мястото на истината. Словата – λόγοι, на истината са принадлежни на онези, които сами са причастни на истината. Онези, които не са причастни на истината сама по себе си и не са посветени в истината, се стремят да получат своите λόγοι от мъдростта, основана върху глупост. Тъкмо те са определени от апостола като „душевни“ и „нямащи дух“ (πνεῦμα), „макар да се бият в гърдите, че имат в притежание истината“ (Sinaites, Capita, 22, 1245CD). Думите на онези, които говорят от своите си разумни действия (λογισμοί), от своите помисли, преди да са постигнали пречистването, са нерадващи и не просветляват, защото те черпят от собственото си сърце, а не от живия извор на Духа, вследствие на което водата на тяхното познание е горчива, тинеста и хладна (Sinaites, Capita, 128, 1294AB).

Следва да се заключи, че Григорий Синаит гледа с подозрение не активността на разума изобщо, а само онези ефекти от дейността на разума, които протичат дистанцирано от фундамента на духовността и чиято самостоятелност се състои най-вече в тяхното противопоставяне на този фундамент. Независимостта от такъв тип се определя като нездрава и непотребна. Разумът служи на истината и е в състояние да постигне истината, ако се опира върху съзерцанието на божествената светлина, тоест на природната екзистенциална енергия на Бога. Тази позиция е валидна и при оценяването на прочутите помисли (λογισμοί).

Според едно масово разпространено мнение основна грижа на исихаста е принципно и безостатъчно да отхвърля помислите и представите (φαντασιαί). Твърдения от такъв тип могат да бъдат прочетени на няколко общи места и при самия Григорий. Когато обаче се захваща специализирано с тази тема, очертава се една много по-сложна картина.

Помислите – λογισμοί, заявява Григорий най-общо, са слова на демоните и предшественици на страстите (λόγοι τῶν δαιμόνων καὶ τῶν παθῶν πρόδρομοι), както думите и мислите са предшественици на делата (τῶν

πραγμάτων οἱ λόγοι καὶ τὰ νοήματα). Никой – продължава той – не може да стори нещо добро или зло, без преди това да насочи натам съответните помисли. Помисълът – λογισμός, е движението на без-образната насоченост (προβολῆς ἀνείδεος κίνησις) към всяка, безразлично коя, действителност (Sinaites, Capita, 67, 1258AB). На това място веднага трябва да бъде забелязано несъответствието между първото и следващите изречения, в които Григорий обяснява, че помисълът сам по себе си следва да се гледа като по-скоро неутрален и наличен във всеки жизнен акт. Тази линия се разгръща в последващите размишления.

Материята на нещата (ἡ ὕλη τῶν πραγμάτων) поражда прости помисли, продължава Григорий, докато диаболичното насочване към тях съгражда злите помисли. Затова той прокарва разлика между естествени (φυσικοί), противоестествени (παρὰ φύσιν) и свръхестествени (ὑπέρ φύσιν) λόγοι и λογισμοί (Sinaites, Capita, 68, 1258B). Освен това обръща внимание, че различните λογισμοί преминават един в друг и демоничните въздействия могат да атакуват дори свръхестествените помисли (Sinaites, Capita, 69, 1258BC).

Като начало и причина на злите помисли се определя разломяването на единовидната и проста памет (ἑνοειδὴς ἁπλῆ μνήμη), следващо от преходността на човека. Вследствие на това разломяване се губи паметуването за Бога, при което човешката памет, която от проста и моноейдетична се превръща в съставна и многообразна, е задвижила това разрушение със собствените си сили (Sinaites, Capita, 60, 1256B). По този начин се добива не познание, а тъкмо незнание, стоящо в тясна връзка с греховете и страстите. По внушителен начин нощта на страстите се равнополага с невежеството: „Νύξ τῶν παθῶν τῆς ἀγνοίας τὸ σκότος ἐστὶν“ (Sinaites, Capita, 73, 1260B).

Първото разклонение на детайлно изработената от Григорий схема на страстите е разделението между телесни и душевни страсти, при което страстите на разума (λογιστικά) формират една особена група, която от своя страна съдържа страстите на въображението и мисленето (φανταστικὰ καὶ διανοητικά), или – според едно друго разчленение – на ума и мисленето (τοῦ νοὸς καὶ τῆς διανόιας) (Sinaites, Capita, 77–78, 1260CD). Под натиска на страстите човекът се превръща в същество, подобно на добитък, което е неразумно и неумно (ἄλογον καὶ ἄνουν) (Sinaites, Capita, 82, 1264C). Чрез страстите развалата (πλάνη, славянски: прелест), големият враг на истината, въдворява в душите на лекомислените господството на невежеството. Мракът на невежеството отчуждава човека от Бог (ἐκ θεοῦ ἀλλοτριώσασα αὐτούς) (Sinaites, Capita, 135, 1297C).

При Григорий Синаит далеч не става дума за изолиране или унищожаване на разума и неговата дейност, защото тъкмо това е пътят, по който човекът става подобен на добитъка, а за предотвратяване на развалата на ума и разума. С това се има предвид възстановяването на първоначалното състояние на човека, включително на неговия разум. Става дума за състоя-

нието, което той определя като устроеност (κατὰ φύσιν), постигано чрез пречистване и безстрастие (Sinaites, Capita, 1, 1240A), в което чистият разум (καθαρὸς λόγος) има своето решаващо място (Sinaites, Capita, 2, 1240A). В това състояние се побеждава сатанинската съпротива и се постига единението с естествените душевни сили, при което те стават моноейдетични, съзерцават непосредствено и съществено божественото и човешкото и доколкото е възможно, провиждат самата една причина на всичко, тоест Троицата (Sinaites, Capita, 98, 1272AB).

Пречистеният ум достига първозданото си достойнство. Той съзерцава Бога и получава от Бога божествените мисли (Sinaites, Capita, 23, 1245D). Умът и разумът, разбирането и мисленето са необходими свойствености на онзи, който съзерцава светлината. Тъкмо той има право и е дори задължен да съставя и книги за полза на онези, които дирят λόγοι-те на истината. Всяка друга мотивация за писмовна изява, каквито са например желанието да се харесваш на хората, преследването на слава или стремежът да се изложиш на показ, не носи полза нито на този, нито на онзи свят и такъв писател бива укорим като суетник и лукав фалшификатор на божественото слово (Sinaites, Capita, 137, 1300AB).

Позицията на Григорий Палама

„Δύο ψυχικοὺς ἔχομεν ὀφθαλμούς“ (Palamas, Triades II, 3, 15 – I, 551, 15–16): имаме две очи на душата. Чрез това позоваване на Исаак Сирин Палама обръща внимание на двете необходими сфери на човешкото познание. С едното „око“ виждаме скритата в природните неща сила и мъдрост Божия, а с другото – славата на собствената Божия природа. Всеки от двата вида зрение вижда една светлина, оставаща невидима за другия вид. Знанието за биващите води до познания за Бога чрез опосредствани рационални заключения, докато притежаването на божествената светлина в непосредственото и издигащо над всичко съзерцание прави видим самия Бог (Palamas, Triades II, 3, 15–17 – I, 551, 15–16; Capita 150, 114 – V, 98, 23–27; Contra Acindynon, I, 6 – III, 42, 1–2).

Палама говори за „умствената и разумна природа (νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις) на душата, която единствена притежава ум, разум и животворящ дух“ (Palamas, Capita 150, 39 – V, 56, 26–28), и в този контекст – за една „троична природа“ (τριαδικὴ φύσις) на човешката душа (Palamas, Capita 150, 40 – V, 57, 19–21). От нея произтичат обаче два вида познание: естествената (φυσικὴ) и духовната (πνευματικὴ) γνῶσις, при което първата включва чисто човешкото познание за биващото (γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων) (Palamas, Capita 150, 123 – V, 104, 17–20), тоест рационално-дискурсивното знание.

Бог се познава чрез тварите, подчертава многократно Палама. Всички, включително светците, получават първоначалното си богопознание чрез наблюдаване на биващото. Всички, с изключение на светците, съзерцават

свойствената на Твореца благодат, сила, мъдрост само посредством творението (Palamas, Theophanes, 27; 30; 32 – II, 255, 14–17; Triades, II, 3, 71 – I, 604, 4–21). Чрез творението се вижда творческата Божия енергия (ἡ δημιουργικὴ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια) (Palamas, Capita 150, 150 – V, 119, 11–12). Това познание е достъпно на всички хора по природа. По този начин човек познава Бог като причина на биващото. С това обаче той го познава само частично и не същински, както се познава изкуството в произведенията на изкуството (Palamas, Triades, II, 3, 67; II, 3, 71; III, 1, 33 – I, 600, 12–24; 604, 4–10; 644, 23–645, 2). Този тип познание обхваща само онова, което по никакъв начин не надвишава тварния разум. Значимостта на това знание не бива обаче да се подценява. Този дар Божи е условието и основата на всяко познание (Palamas, Triades, II, 3, 42; III, 1, 30 – I, 575, 29–576, 4; 642, 10–12).

Неопосредената отнесеност към Божествеността е действителната причастност към Бога. Според източната традиция Бог бива причастен не по своята същност, а само по своите извънтринитарни същностни проявления, тоест по своите екзистенциални енергии (Palamas, Contra Akindynon, I, 6 – III, 42, 6–10). Причастността е съзерцанието на божествената енергия. Богопознанието чрез вечните енергии е свръхестествено в собствения смисъл на думата. В него природата на човека се просветлява от една свръхестествена светлина и бива издигната над собствените ѝ граници, така че човекът надхвърля своята природа (Palamas, Theophanes, 21; 29 – II, 247, 14–17; 256, 23–257, 8). Палама слага ударение върху позитивния екзистенциален опит (πεῖρα) и непосредствената мъдра практика (πρᾶξις) в общението с Бога (Palamas, Triades, 1, 3, 13; II, 1, 9 – I, 423, 3–424, 2; 479, 24–473, 12). Тази причастност в опита предполага единението на целия човек с Бога отвъд рационалното знание и интелекта. Не става дума за следваща познавателна фаза, а за друга познавателна сфера, която е „пространството“ на позитивната и действителна среща с живия Бог, който (защото е абсолютен) бива недостъпен за дискурсивното мислене.

Палама различава строго истинното богопознание от богословието, схващайки последното в рамките на по-тясното понятие, вече доминиращо по онова време и определящо теологията като дискурсивно знание за божественото. В сравнение със съзерцанието теологията стои по-скоро близо до философското знание. Тя не напуска пространството на думите, на логическия дискурс (Palamas, Epistula I ad Barlaam, 52 – I, 290, 5–28; Triades, I, 3, 42 – I, 453, 8–9), а дискурсивното знание (γνῶσις) се определя от Палама като силата (δύναμις), свързваща интелекта с творението (Palamas, Triades, II, 3, 48 – I, 581, 31–32). Той не се обявява против дискурсивното богословие. Неговото значение е да артикулира истинното богопознание и да го направи разбираемо за онези, които нямат този опит и въпреки това се стремят към него.

Почти със същите думи се изказва той за философията. Вярно е, че има и глуповата философия. Такава е философията, която неглижира богопознанието. Това се случва винаги, когато философията се отдава на илю-

зията за абсолютната своя меродавност. Философията трябва да отстъпи от претенциите си, че може от самата себе си да осигурява сигурно знание за божественото. Постигне ли обаче естествената си цел, тогава тя влиза в хармония с мъдростта на Светия Дух (Palamas, Triades, I, 1, 12; II, 1, 23 – I, 374, 24–375, 1; 485, 32–486, 10).

Палама подчертава, че философията е ползотворна за упражняване на остротата на душевното око. Тя осигурява истинно знание за биващото като биващо и е в състояние да открива действителните му закони. Палама често формулира философията като метафизика, но не е чужд и на схващането, представящо я като обхващаща цялото рационално-дискурсивно знание (ἐπιστήμη). И в двата случая тя се схваща като възможен инструмент за постигане на спасителната истина на Светия Дух (Palamas, Triades, II, 1, 7; II, 1, 42 – I, 471, 5–7; 503, 24–504, 13; Capita 150, 123 – V, 104, 21).

Философията, взета сама по себе си, е дар Божи, даден ни от Твореца, за да се освободим от мъчителното невежество. Заедно с това Палама настоява, че философията е природен (φυσικόν), следователно общодостъпен дар, с което се различава от онази мъдрост, която е духовен дар (πνευματικόν δῶρον) (Palamas, Triades, I, 1, 22; II, 1, 12 – I, 385, 29–30; 474, 25–28). Поради това той заявява, че едва дарът на Светия Дух и духовните слова на Светото писание преобразяват философията в ползотворно знание (Palamas, Triades, II, 1, 6 – I, 470, 9–14). Истинният философ (ὁ ἀληθὴς φιλόσοφος) (Palamas, Triades, 1, 1, 17 – I, 380, 9) е обученият чрез опита (Palamas, Theophanes, 32 – III, 260, 14–16), който познава Бог в Бога (ἐν θεῷ θεόν) (Palamas, Triades, II, 3, 12 – I, 690, 26–27) и прогласява своето свидетелство за този опит. Философията добива своята истина и същинския си фундамент от приетата мъдрост на Светия Дух.

Двете сфери на знанието, разумното познание и опитът от божественото, тълкуван като непосредствено преживяване на откровението, са различни и отделени, но не и конфронтирани. Те са по-скоро строго субординирани, при което субординирането на познавателните сфери има естествен характер и тъкмо в това степенуване секуларното знание получава реалната си ценност. Палама утвърждава по този начин устойчивата йерархия на познанието, структурирана едновременно от перспективата на човешката природа и на човешкото спасение. Следва да се види, че успоредно с това и от същата перспектива той акцентира координирането на двете познавателни сфери в човешкото тяло.

Заключение

Противно на обичайното мнение, основните авторитети на исихазма през XIII и XIV в. не отхвърлят разума и неговите постижения. Вярно е наистина, че основната цел на исихасткия живот е причастността към вечната Божия енергия, чрез която животът на самия Бог се живее още в

този свят. Тъкмо в този непосредствен опит от откровението се състои и обожението. В тази връзка следва отривисто да се подчертае, че и в обожението си човекът остава човек по своята природа. След грехопадението тя не е променена, а накърнена. Възстановяването на изначалното състояние на човешката природа се гледа като важно условие за възможност за спасението на човека. От този хоризонт значимостта на ума и разума става очевидна.

Ако в тази традиция се чуват гласове, строго отхвърлящи помислите, то според Григорий Синаит тук става дума еднозначно за злите и противоприродни помисли и свързаната с тях недуховна мъдрост. Григорий Синаит не отхвърля активността на разума като такава, а само тези ефекти от дейността на разума, които протичат сепарирано от фундамента на духовността и чиято самостоятелност се състои принципно в противодействието срещу този фундамент. Независимостта от такъв тип се определя като нездрава и непотребна не само с оглед на християнската благочестивост, но и по принцип. Напротив, естествените и свръхестествените помисли са важна съставна част на живота на духовния човек. Разумът е необходим компонент при възприемането на истината. Под натиска на страстите в падналия човек е било изгубено неговото първоначално природно единство. По този начин той е загубил и истинното богопознание, което е било свойствено на ума и разума. Исихасткият начин на живот цели възстановяването на това природно единство и постигането на самата истина. Основаните върху духовността разумна действеност и разумно познание са неотменна част от човека, живеещ още в този свят живота на Бога.

Тези базисни идеи намират потвърждение и разгръщане при Григорий Палама. И той подчертава естественото място на разума в троичната структура на човешката душа и заедно с това акцентира върху двата типа познание, свойствени за тази структура: рационално-дискурсивното и духовното. Духовното познание (или по-скоро духовната практика и духовният опит) са непосредственото съзерцание на божествените екзистенциални енергии и живеенето на самия божествен живот. Рационалното познание са знанието за Бога чрез творението и знанието за биващото като биващо. Тъкмо с тази база на всяко познание са свързани философията и спекулативното богословие. Те не се противопоставят на опита на теологията на откровението, а биват субординирани спрямо нея. Става дума за ред, едновременно природен и спасителен, който утвърждава и двете познавателни способности като необходими: душата има две очи.

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WE HAVE TWO EYES OF THE SOUL. REASON AND REVELATION ACCORDING TO THE HESYCHASTS OF 13TH AND 14TH C.

Georgi Kapriev

Abstract

In contrast to the popular view, the main authorities of hesychasm of the 13th and 14th century do not reject reason and its achievements. Indeed, the main goal of the hesychastic life is participation of the eternal divine energy, through which the life God is to be lived even in the present world. In this immediate experience of Revelation deification takes place, whereby man retains human nature. Restoring the original state of human nature is considered as opportunity for salvation of man. Hence, intellect and reason are of great importance.

Although some followers of this tradition do reject thoughts, Gregorios Sinaites specifies that this rejection is related only to the thoughts that are evil and opposing nature, as well as to the unspiritual wisdom, resulting from them. He does not reject the activity of reason, but only its effects. In this case, the effects develop regardless of the spiritual foundation and their independence implies opposing to this foundation. On the contrary, the natural and the supernatural thoughts are an important element of the life of a spiritual person. Reason is an indispensable factor for grasping the truth. The fallen man, who lost the initial unity of human nature, did also lose the true knowledge of God, which was proper to intellect and reason. The goal of hesychastic life is the restoration of the unity of nature and attaining truth itself. The operation of reason and rational knowledge are an essential part of it.

These basic ideas are developed by Gregory Palamas. He also underlines the natural function of reason in the triadic constitution of human soul and emphasizes the two types of knowledge proper to it: rational/discursive and spiritual. Spiritual knowledge (the spiritual practice and the spiritual experience) is an immediate contemplation of the divine existential energies. Rational knowledge is knowledge of God through the creatures, as well as knowledge of being *qua* being. It is the base of any knowledge and philosophy and speculative theology are focused on it. Philosophy and speculative theology do not oppose the experience of the theology of revelation but are subordinate to it. An order of knowledge is at stake – natural and salvific at the same time, in which the two cognitive faculties are indispensable: the soul has two eyes.

ИДЕАЛНОТО ТЯЛО. ОПИТ В НЕПРЕДСТАВИМОТО СПОРЕД БИБЛЕЙСКИЯ ТЕКСТ

Милена Кирова

Винаги, когато говорим за човешкото тяло и за библейската интерпретация на неговото земно присъствие, рискуваме да се озовем насред един неразрешим проблем. Още в началото на Битие текстът недвусмислено и незабравимо е заявил:

> След това рече Бог: да сътворим човека по Наш образ и по Наше подобие...
>
> И сътвори Бог човека по свой образ, по Божий образ го сътвори; мъж и жена ги сътвори. (1: 26–27)

Това навярно е най-известната ситуация, която може да бъде приведена като доказателство за антропоморфизма на еврейския Бог[1]. Описанието съдържа два ключови термина: *образ* (*целем*) и *подобие* (*демут*). Според някои изследователи (Wenham 1987: 32; Sarna 1989: 12) те са използвани синонимно и са взаимозаменяеми; според други основното понятие е *целем*, а *демут* е негова допълваща вариация[2]. Във всеки случай и двата термина, особено недвусмислено първият, подсказват идеята за физическа прилика между Създателя и неговото творение[3]. Именно по този начин те са използвани в голям брой други случаи от различни места на Еврейската Библия, включително в първите глави на Битие, все още в контекста на най-ранните отношения между човек и Бог (1: 26, 5: 3, 5: 5, 9: 6). Особено показателна е ситуацията в началото на Пета глава:

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[1] Не по-малко интересен е въпросът за пола на този бог, чието земно подобие обхваща едновременно и мъжа, и жената. Това обаче е предмет на друга дискусия, вж. по-подробно в: Кирова 2005: 25–30.

[2] Ето например влиятелното твърдение на Герхард фон Рад: „Съществената дума, с която се назовава идеята за Божия образ, очевидно е целем (образ), което се появява без демут (подобие) в тържествения стих 27, както и в 9: 6“ (Von Rad 1973: 58).

[3] „Физически образ е най-обичайното и често срещано значение на tselem в Еврейската Библия“, пише и Стивън Муър (Moore 1996: 84).

Адам живя сто и трийсет години и роди син по свое подобие и по свой образ. (5: 3)

Макар че ще доживее близо хилядагодишна възраст, Адам е изцяло човек и трудно може да има съмнение, че с думите *образ* и *подобие* текстът се опитва да означи именно кръвно-телесната връзка между Адам и Сет, между баща и син, като основополагащ механизъм на родството за една/всяка цивилизация от патриархален тип. В същото време обаче на всички е известно, че (наистина, в определени свои части) Еврейската Библия настоява върху идеята за нетелесност и невидимост на Бог, тръгвайки от заповедта, формулирана в думите на Мойсей:

И Господ ви говори (на планината) изсред огъня, гласа на думите (Му) чухте, но образ не видяхте, а чухте само глас.
[...] Дръжте твърдо в душите си, че вие не видяхте никакъв образ в оня ден...
Да не би да се развратите и си направите дялан образ, лик на някой кумир, който да представя мъж или жена.
(Втор. 4: 12, 15–16)

И макар че самата книга Второзаконие е далече от онази последователност, с която би трябвало да отстоява възгледа за нетелесната, неантропоморфна същност на Бог[4], точно тази идея ще залегне в основите на юдаизма[5] и ще продължи да се развива с не по-малка категоричност в християнската религиозно-философска система. На прага с новата ера еврейските коментатори вече се чувстват неуютно от присъствието на телесно-антропоморфни пасажи и се опитват да решат проблема със заклинателно звучащи твърдения като това на Филон Александрийски: „Стараем се да не извършим с думи чудовищното престъпление да представим Господ в човешка форма“ (Philo). Проблемът ще продължи да занимава класическите равини (III–VII в.), които отново и отново ще търсят решение в лабиринта на своите коментари. Бащите на християнската църква развиват догмата за безтелесната същност на божественото с изключителна настоятелност. Те всички отричат физическия аспект на подобието между човек и Бог; Ориген например твърди, че „формата на тялото не съдържа образа на Бог“ (Origen); на Августин принадлежи реторичният аргумент: „Бог не е тяло. Как тогава едно тяло може да получи Неговия образ?“ (Augustine).

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[4] Можем да срещнем поредица от случаи, в които Бог е представен чрез извършването на действия, специфични за човешкото тяло и човешкото поведение, например: „Господ, Бог ваш, върви пред вас; той ще се сражава за вас...“ (1: 30); „и в тая пустиня, дето, както ти видя, Господ, Бог твой, те носеше, както човек носи сина си, по целия път“ (1: 31); вж. също 1: 34, 1: 37 и пр.

[5] Тя заема централно място в ученията на някои юдейски секти през последните два-три века преди нашата ера, например в сектата на есеите, станала известна през XX в. чрез нейната библиотека от свитъци, намерени край Мъртво море.

Оформилата се ситуация може да ни послужи – освен всичко друго – и като доказателство за валидността на една стара антропологическа теза: културата не може да бъде единна, тя съществува само в разнообразието на нейните вътрешни противоречия; единни и последователни са идеологиите, религиите и философските учения. В културата на Древния Израел противоречивите образи на божественото присъствие са били действителност; за нейните интерпретатори обаче телесно-антропоморфната образност на Яхве става все по-голям проблем. И те я опровергават с нарастващо ожесточение може би защото в най-големия възможен проблем се е превърнало самото човешко тяло с неговата непобираемост в догмите на идеалната принадлежност към една или друга религия.

Ако се върнем отново към Еврейската Библия, ще открием многобройни следи от представите за антропоморфна телесност на израелския бог въпреки многовековните усилия на „редакторите". Само в Битие например Яхве ходи „низ рая по дневната хладина" (3: 8), шие кожени дрехи, за да облече Адам и Ева (3: 21), слиза от небето, за да види отблизо Вавилон и вавилонската кула (11: 45), с удоволствие помирисва „приятното благоухание", което се носи от жертвеника на Ной (8: 21). Примерите продължават по-нататък в Тора, след това в Историческите книги и при пророците[6].

Очевидно е, че в древноизраелската религиозна традиция е имало направления, които никак не са били чужди на идеята за един телесен (антропо- или зооморфен) бог, подобен на огромното множество богове в Ханаан, Египет, Месопотамия, изобщо в целия Плодороден полумесец. С налагането на юдаизма, с превръщането на яхвисткия монотеизъм в неиконична религия и в съответствие със забраната за всякакъв вид визуализирано изображение на божественото присъствие рязко се засилва нагласата да се отричат физическите аспекти в понятията *целем* и *демут*.

Така се оформя един радикален и онтологически непреодолим (поне не и със средствата на логиката и научния разум) проблем. Човек прилича на Бог, затова е създаден като комбинация от тяло и дух, но Бог в същото време не прилича на него и няма тяло. Дълга задача би било описанието на

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[6] Ще приведа само някои между най-известните примери: Изход 24: 10, където се говори за нозете на Бога; Изход 33: 3, където Яхве отказва да върви между своя народ, за да не го изтреби, ядосан от твърдоглавието му. След това идва поредицата от описания, направени от различни пророци, например в 3 Царст. 22: 19 пророк Михей разказва как е видял Господ „да седи на своя престол"; нещо подобно разказва и пророк Амос: „Видях Господа да стои над жертвеника..." (Ам. 9: 1). Много известни са описанията на пророк Йезекиел: „И видях като че светнал метал, като че огнен изглед вътре в него наоколо – от бедрата му и нагоре; от бедрата му и надолу видях нещо като огън..." (Иез. 1: 27); на пророк Исая: „...аз видях Господа, седнал на престол висок и издигнат, и полите на одеждите Му пълнеха целия храм" (Ис. 6: 1); и на пророк Даниил: „...облеклото Му беше бяло като сняг и космите на главата му – като чиста вълна" (Дан. 7: 9). От тях именно черпи образност християнската иконична традиция, в която Бог е представен като белокос и белобрад възрастен мъж, седнал величествено на огнен трон, макар че тази традиция е в пряко противоречие с твърдението за непредставимата безтелесност на Бог.

различните реторични похвати и философски стратегии, които си поставят за цел да преодолеят очевидния парадокс. Грубо казано, преобладават онези решения, които извеждат на преден план термина *прилика*, разбирайки го само в духовен аспект. Следват случаите, в които равнопоставено се интерпретира и терминът *образ*, само че притиснат в измеренията на нетелесното посредством някакъв телеологически, нескриваемо садистичен ход.

Пристъпвайки отвъд пространството на религиозната философия и опитите да бъде постигнато някакво разумно решение на въпроса как изглежда юдейско-християнският Бог, попадаме пред друг – пак философски, но този път светски – проблем на битието в библейския свят. Говорейки за човека, можем ли да разположим традиционната релация тяло–дух в онази остро дихотомична рамка, която познаваме от философското мислене в Древна Елада например? Това е труден и сложен въпрос, затова предлагам да тръгнем към него с една развлекателна притча, разказана в частта *Агада* на вавилонския Талмуд.

> Някой си Антонин се обърнал към рави Йехуда Княза с един сериозен въпрос: как е възможно и тялото, и душата да се избавят от наказание в отвъдния свят? Нали тялото е способно да каже: душата е виновна, тъй като от деня, в който ме напусна, останах да лежа в гроба неподвижно като камък. Душата пък може да отговори: тялото е виновно, защото от онзи ден, в който го напуснах, все хвърча във въздуха като птица и не съм в състояние да греша.
>
> Рави Йехуда му отговорил със следната притча. На какво бихме оприличили това положение? На един цар от плът и кръв, който имал прекрасна градина с узрели плодове. За да я опази, той назначил двама надзиратели – единия куц, другия сляп. Куцият казал на слепия: виждам хубави плодове в градината, хайде, качи ме на гърба си, за да ги стигнем и да похапнем. Речено-сторено. Куцият се качил на гърба на слепия, двамата си набрали плодове и яли. След няколко дена дошъл собственикът на градината и казал: къде са хубавите плодове? Хромият отговорил: нима имам крака да ги стигна? Слепият казал: нима имам очи да ги видя? Какво направил тогава царят? Той накарал куция мъж да се покатери на гърба на слепия и ги наказал заедно. Ето, така и Светия, да бъде благословен, взема душата, поставя я в тялото и ги наказва заедно. (B. Sanh. 91 a–b, преразказано по Patai 1980: 218–219)

Притчата илюстрира добре онзи възглед за отношенията между тялото и душата, който доминира в Еврейската Библия и навярно е бил най-широко разпространен в литературата на Древния Израел[7]. И тук, както и по-къс-

[7] В духа на нейното послание пише и Питър Браун: „За евреите ежедневният конфликт между тяло и разум е засенчен от по-могъщ и важен дуализъм. Цялото човечество стои пред величието на Бог като различно и подчинено Нему. Тяло и душа са изправени заедно пред Него: Той ги е създал заедно и заедно ще ги съди“ (Браун 2003: 59). Браун впрочем твърди също така, че „в юдаизма има малко място за благосклонния дуализъм [тяло–разум], обобщаващ така уместно моралното здравомислие на управляващите класи в езическия свят“ (пак там: 58). В този случай той има предвид юдаизма от последните векове преди новата ера, чиято идеология на сексуалното въздържание силно преуве-

но, в писанията на класическите равини, няма да срещнем острия онтологически дуализъм тяло–душа, типичен за гръцките философски традиции. Причината едва ли се крие в нещо, което бихме дефинирали като системен отказ от възможността да се мисли светът по принципа на бинарното мислене, принцип, характерен за всяка цивилизация от патриархален тип. (Всъщност етиологическият наратив в началото на Битие ни дава идеален пример за това как от „хаоса“ се създава космос чрез конструиране на поредица от опозитивни двойки: небе–твърд, вода–земя, светлина–тъмнина и т.н.) По-скоро става въпрос за разлика, която засяга точно и специфично релацията тяло–душа; тя се изразява в липсата на силно опозитивно напрежение между тях, в нагласата да се възприема създанието човек като изначално телодушевна цялост[8].

Изглежда съблазнително да помислим, че в това отношение Еврейската Библия проявява някаква особена склонност към независимост и отличеност спрямо съвременните ѝ ментални традиции, но по-скоро става въпрос за нейната вписаност в друга, не така популярна на Запад традиция, специфична за древния Близък изток. Влиянието на християнската религиозна доктрина ни пречи да забележим, че според Еврейската Библия сексуалността например (типично „телесна“ функция) не се появява в резултат на „падение“, а на познание; че тялото не е маловажно в сравнение с душата, а единствената възможност да се изпълни свещеният договор, постулиран многократно от Бог в срещите му с избрани мъже, като се почне с Ной: „плодете се и се множете, и пълнете земята...“ (Бит. 9: 1). За Древния Израел сексуалният аскетизъм по принцип не представлява традиция; според всичко, което знаем, той е започнал да се практикува сравнително късно, в последните векове преди новата ера, при това като изключение, в отделни юдейски секти, подобни на общността от Кумран. Отношението към тялото, искам още един път да подчертая, е преобладаващо положително; неговото благосъстояние (здраве, сила и красота) се възприема като награда от Бога, спечелена с подходящи помисли и дела[9]. Библейският човек, с други думи, по принцип е здрав и красив тогава, когато съблюдава Божиите разпоредби за човешкото битие. Отклоненията се появяват с повествователна и символична цел – щом наративът (като всеки литературен разказ) се опита да използва контраста (или парадокса, или внезапното преобръщане) като похват за конструирането на интересна и въздействаща фабула.

личава, тъй като черпи своите заключения почти изцяло от едно изключение, каквото е общността в Кумран. Наблюденията му на практика не засягат библейския текст, както и философията на класическа Елада.

[8] И така пак се връщаме към проблема за „образ“ и „подобие“ на абсолютната цялост Бог.

[9] Добруването на тялото принадлежи към категорията на Божиите дарове, или, както казва Клаус Вестерман, то е резултат от „дара на благословията“, защото „благословията означава изобилие, богатство, разцвет, успех, щастие; и всяка от тези категории включва в себе си красотата по най-различни начини“ (вж. Westermann 1997: 586).

Тази философия на телодушевната цялост намира отражение и вербален израз в библейския текст. Дейвид Клайнс е описал конкретна дискурсивна стратегия, наречена от него „език на свързването“ (language of conjunction). Тялото и душата, изречени в определени понятия, или части от тях са представени в естествено сътрудничество помежду им; липсва противоречие или напрежение в техните отношения; сговорът им напомня за поведението на двамата пазачи от притчата на рави Йехуда Княза[10]. Тази ситуация, в която „тялото и Азът [the self] са в хармония“ (Clines 2001: 153), Клайнс посочва като „норма“ и „обичайна реторика на тялото“ (ibid.: 152) в древноеврейската книжнина.

И все пак увлечението да се говори за еврейското мислене като за изключение от някакво правило, даже ако това е само правилото на западната философска традиция с корени в Древна Елада, не трябва да надхвърля определени граници. В Библията можем да срещнем и дискурсивни ситуации, които изразяват съзнание за отделност, независимост и дори конфликтност между тялото и душата. В почти всички случаи противопоставянето дава предимство на душата над тялото, макар че идеята за душа също се появява по специфичен начин. Ще илюстрирам това твърдение с пример, взет от Глава 32 в *Книга на Йов*. Самата стратегия за означаване на опозицията тяло–душа можем да наречем заедно с Дейвид Клайнс „език на разделянето“ (language of disjunction).

„Завет направих с очите си да не помислям за девица“ – така започва една от най-известните оправдателни речи на многострадалния Йов. И понататък пледоарията му продължава да се разгръща чрез имплицитното позоваване на дуализма като естествено състояние на всеки човек и на човешката природа по принцип:

...ако ногата ми е бързала към лукавство (31: 5);
...Ако стъпките ми са се отклонявали от пътя и сърцето ми
е следвало очите ми... (31: 7);
...Ако сърцето ми се е прелъстявало от жена... (31: 9)
...щях да си мълча и не щях да излизам вън от вратата (31: 34).

Ясно виждаме границата между тялото, метонимично представено с негови характерни части (крак, очи, сърце), и една друга инстанция на човешкото пребиваване в света, която можем да наречем душа, но най-вече заради западното си възпитание. По-скоро става въпрос за „себе си“, за психическа идентичност, която може да бъде сюзерен на тялото, щом човекът е добродетелен, но и негов васал. Подобна диалектика на политическите отношения впрочем ясно подсказва самият текст. Заветът във фразата „завет направих с очите си“ е типичният *берит*, или договор, който се е сключвал в множество ситуации с търговски, политически и битов харак-

[10] Подробно, с множество примери вж. Clines 2001: 152–156.

тер. Тялото е представено като относително самостоен агент на човешкото битие, то е склонно да кривва от правия път. Азът на добродетелния мъж има за задача да го наблюдава и контролира не толкова в конкретни моменти и ситуации, колкото в резултат на един „вечно“ сключен договор помежду им, подобен на договора между Бог и човек. В нормалния случай отношенията между Аза и тялото нямат войнствен характер; те приличат на добре изработен пакт за мирно съвместно съществуване, според който двете страни могат да се съветват помежду си и да договарят условията на взаимноизгодния мир[11].

Тук бих искала да вметна една забележка, която може да ни послужи в по-нататъшните разсъждения върху телесните аспекти в поведението на библейския мъж. Сърцето (лев) в древноеврейското символично мислене не съвпада със западната литературна идея *сърце*, формирана от романтизма насам. *Лев* не означава нито „душа“, нито дори място на чувствата и емоционалното преживяване. Сърцето според Еврейската Библия е седалище на разума, онази инстанция, която мисли и взема решения, полезни за цялата личност. Така се оформя една тройна инстанция за реализация на човешкия опит: тяло–сърце–Аз/душа. Виждаме я открито обрисувана в Псалм 15:

> Затова се възрадва **сърцето** ми, и се възвесели **езикът** ми;
> а още и **плътта** ми ще почива в надежда,
> защото Ти не ще оставиш **душата** ми в ада...
> (15: 9–10, подч. м. – М. К.)

Освен с реториката на договорните отношения тялото на библейския човек се появява описано и с дискурса на ритуалните практики; то е главният обект на съграждане, дисциплиниране и усъвършенстване в безбройните закони и норми, които регулират битово-религозното поведение на мъжа и жената в Древния Израел. Книги като *Левит* и *Второзаконие* са ис-

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[11] Подобна сговореност е характерна както за „добрия“, така и за „лошия“ библейски човек. Ето няколко примера за втория случай, взети от псалмите:

„...устата си отваряш за злодумство и езикът ти коварство плете“ (49: 19);

„...с езика си ще поразят сами себе си“ (63: 9).

или от книга *Притчи Соломонови*:

„Ленива ръка докарва сиромашия, а ръката на прилежните обогатява“ (10: 4);

„Горделиви очи и надуто сърце, с които се отличават нечестивците, е грях“ (21: 4).

Във всички случаи прави впечатление добрата координация между двете инстанции на човешкия опит; тя ни напомня за генеричното същество *адам*, което получава последователно тяло и дух, но бързо се научава да ги използва стратегически едновременно, както в сложното сетивно-познавателно действие, извършено от Ева: „Видя жената, че дървото е добро за ядене и че е приятно за очите и многожелателно, защото дава знание, взе от плодовете му и яде... Тогава се отвориха очите на двамата и разбраха...“ (Бит. 3: 6–7).

тински механизъм за управление на човешкото тяло, те му предписват една толкова изчерпателна и детайлна стратегия на чистота и съвършенство, че биха могли да им завидят всички държавни политики за профилактика на населението в модерния свят. Библейският човек е здраво въдворен в изложените там норми на поведение: какво да яде и какво да отделя, как да се очиства и лекува, как да се пази от зарази, да се облича, да се бръсне и т.н. Ако сглобим норма по норма, правило по правило дискурса на указанията, пред нас ще се появи идеалното мъжко тяло.

Тук обаче би трябвало да си зададем няколко логични въпроса. Защо се налага такава подробна система от регулации? Какви са причината и целта на този стриктен надзор? Кое налага неговото вместване в сърцевината на еврейското Свещено писание?

Най-краткият и обобщен отговор се крие в природата на завета, сключен между Бог и Аврам, а оттам нататък между Бог и всеки нов патриарх/водач на еврейското племе. Избирайки Израел за своя народ, Бог го сакрализира; изборът осветява всеки настоящ и бъдещ израелтянин, както и цялата общност във всяка епоха на нейното съществуване. Да бъдеш свещен (кадош) обаче не е просто даденост, състояние, което навличаш като дреха веднъж и завинаги. То е най-вече процес, който изисква несекващи грижи и задължения да бъде опазена свещената чистота. Статутът *кадош* се превръща в реалност единствено чрез умението да се практикува дълга поредица от норми и правила[12]. Сред тях важно място заема и поддържането на тялото. За разлика от християнския отшелник светец, който пренебрегва своето тяло за сметка на душата и така се чувства/възприема все по-достоен и възвисен, идеалният мъж на Еврейската Библия трябва да се грижи едновременно и за тялото, и за душата си. Телодушевното съвършенство е единственият възможен начин да бъде опазена изначалната, райски блажена прилика с Бог; само чрез него човек може да постигне земното битие „по образ и подобие“ на своя създател.

С особена стриктност са задължени да бъдат *кадош* хората, които се намират най-близо до Бога, тези, които могат да общуват с него от името на цялата общност – свещениците (коеним) и левитите:

> Те трябва да бъдат свети пред своя Бог и не бива
> да безчестят името на своя Бог; защото пренасят жертви Господу,
> хляб на своя Бог, и поради това трябва да бъдат свети. (Лев. 21: 6)

Книга *Левит* излага сложна система от правила за тяхната чистота, на първо място като чистота от телесен порядък. Потомците на Аарон не бива да се „оскверняват с допиране до кого и да е от народа си“ (21: 4), не

[12] Навярно най-известната книга, която се занимава с „кода на чистота и омърсеност“ в Еврейската Библия, е *Purity and Danger* на Мери Дългас (Douglas 1966).

бива да бръснат главите си, да подстригват края на брадата си и да правят резки по тялото си (21: 5)[13]. Свещеник не може да бъде човек, който има някакъв телесен недостатък (21: 18); никой със „строшена нога“ или „строшена ръка“ не бива да пристъпва към жертвеника (21: 19), нито пък гърбав, дръглив, кастав, келяв и белязан с бяло в окото (21: 20), както и прокажен, и човек, който се е докоснал до „нечиста гад“ или има течение (22: 4–5).

Разбираемо е да се почудим какъв е смисълът на тази откровена дискриминация по телесен статус. И дали не става въпрос за някакъв особен, свещен егоизъм, с който Яхве заделя за себе си най-добрите мъжки тела? Донякъде всъщност отговорът на втория въпрос може да бъде и положителен: хората, които са най-близо до него, трябва да бъдат съвършени, защото тяхното съвършенство е доказателство за собственото му умение да извае човека безгрешен, при това по свой образ и подобие. Казано в обратен ред, красивият, здрав и силен мъж е доказателство за красотата и силата на Бога, макар че сравнението може да бъде само типологическо и напълно невъзможно по степен или едновременност на всички идеални качества. Всеки недостатък, от гърбица до течение, накърнява естествената цялост на тялото, дадено на човека в Еден; всяка дисфигурация подрива Божия замисъл. Подобна пряка зависимост може да ни се стори твърде елементарна или принизено буквална, но тя се старае да изрази не нашето, нито пък християнското по принцип мнение за съотнасянето между божествено и човешко. Става въпрос за цивилизация, която по принцип мисли света като магическо единство на всички видове възможно присъствие с пряка зависимост между появата на едно и изчезването на друго нещо, включително в плана на материално-телесното. Достатъчно е да си припомним онази част от Божиите наредби, която може да бъде наречена и код на прякото съотнасяне между две тела:

> Който убие човек, да бъде умъртвен...
> На оногова, който причини повреда върху тялото на ближния си, да се направи също каквото той е направил:
> строшено за строшено, око за око, зъб за зъб;
> както той е причинил повреда човека, тъй и нему да се направи.
> (Лев. 17: 19–20)

Lex talionis, законът за адекватното възмездие, може да изглежда жесток, примитивен и „нецивилизован“ от гледната точка на модерния свят, но

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[13] По това те приличат на назореите, или посветените на Бога, които споделят същите правила. Да си спомним какво се случва със съдията назорей Самсон: щом изгубва косата си, той изгубва и връзката с Бог, а оттам и силата на своето тяло, породена чрез тази връзка. Историята на Самсон е чудесен пример за магическата неразделимост на душата от тялото в битието на библейския мъж.

той всъщност е безотносителен към (нашата) идея за нравствени ценности; характерът му е преди всичко религиозен. Както всички закони от Кодекса на Мойсей, и той е насочен към опазване на първичния ред, въдворен още по време на Сътворението. Тялото тук е сцена, върху която се разиграва човешкото битие. Да нарушиш съвършенството на тялото, дарено от Бог (и прилично Нему), означава да посегнеш върху (замисъла на) самия Бог. Възмездието, което връща същото действие в обратна посока, поправя нарушеното равновесие, възстановява нещата по техните първични (идеални) места.

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THE PERFECT BODY. IMAGINING THE UNIMAGINABLE IN THE HEBREW BIBLE

Milena Kirova

Abstract

Usually, when speaking about the human body in the context of its biblical representation, we face a dilemma which seems to have no rational solution possible. According to Genesis, the human being(s) has been created "in the image of God", yet God has no physical body/image. The paper first focuses on various interpretations of this logical discrepancy, then proceeds to a much larger array of problems, beginning with the debate on the anthropomorphism of the Hebrew God. Among the problems discussed are also the lack of acute ontological dualism body-mind in the Hebrew Bible, the specific appreciative attitude towards the human body, the strategies of its representation in the narrative, and the rules of its normalization in the legal discourse of the Bible.

АВТОПАРОДИЯТА У КАФКА: ДИАЛОГЪТ МЕЖДУ „ПРОЦЕСЪТ“ И „ЗАМЪКЪТ“

Радосвет Коларов

Автопародията може да бъде определена като особен тип автополемика, състоящ се в това, че отрицанието на прицеления текст (target text) от текста модификатор се изразява по-специално във формата на комично снижаване. Тук използвам дефиниция на пародията в най-общоприетия ѝ вид, напр. „критическо рефункциониране на преформиран литературен материал с комичен ефект“, „асимилиране на текста B в текста A като негов втори код и след това [...] иронизиране и критикуване на текста B и използването му понякога като маска за пародиста“ (Rose 1979: 35, 50).

Съществуват възгледи за невъзможността или безсмислието на автопародията. Философът Джилберт Райл например твърди, че „самокоментарът, самоосмиването и самопоучаването са логически осъдени на вечна предпоследност“, „думата не може да бъде пародия на себе си“, и дава за пример пеещия учител, който може да пародира своя ученик, но не и себе си (ibid.: 82).

Жерар Женет определя ироничния автопастиш (който за него е другото название на автопародията) като „акцентиране [от страна на автора] на своя идиолект чрез умножаване или преувеличаване на характерни черти“ (Genette 1982: 136) и дава за пример стихотворението на Верлен „По маниера на Пол Верлен“, в което се подчертават стилистични характеристики на автора – разместени ритми, алитерации, преднамерено несръчен синтаксис, както и тематични алюзии – Сатурн, лунна светлина, романси без думи, прошка на любимата. Той дава за пример и случай, когато се преувеличава не ансамбъл от похвати, а се изолира и лишава от своята структурална характеристика по отношение на целостта на творбата един от тях – например влагането в устата на Албертина от „Затворничката“ на Пруст писмения стил на нейния приятел Марсел (ibid.: 137–138). Женет обаче смята автопародията за „фантомно понятие“ и отбелязва „трудността, за да не се каже невъзможността на жанра: „да се пише по маниера на себе си“, не означава нищо, или по-точно нищо изключително [...] Автопастишът [...] не се различава по нищо от коя да е друга страница на същия

автор. Съществуването му се свежда до неговото *деклариране* чрез (авто) миметичния пакт, съдържащ се в заглавието (автопастиш или някакъв друг вариант)“ (ibid.: 135, 139–140).

В отговор на тезите на Райл и Женет за несъстоятелността на автопародията може да се каже следното. Авторът имитира своето „себе си“ не като нещо абстрактно, а посредством текстове – механизмът на автопародията е междутекстов и в този смисъл не се различава от която и да е пародия, освен по това, че „критикувайки“ и развенчавайки свой предишен текст чрез инкорпорирането му в друг следващ текст, авторът се представя в „различна роля“, „дава различна картина“ на себе си, която служи за „експанзията на това себе си“, предлага „история на авторовия стил [...] „археология на субекта“ (Rose 1979: 82, 94). Колкото до невъзможността авторът да представи себе си и критика на себе си в едно и също време, М. Роус въвежда модела на двойственото изображение в известната картина на Джоузеф Джастроу, в която в определена перспектива на гледане се очертават контурите на патица, а в друга перспектива – контурите на заек. По сходен начин литературната пародия дава възможност да се видят „две неща едновременно“ (ibid.: 92). Автопародията, от друга страна, не е, разбира се, равносилна на коя да е страница на автора, защото предлага стратегия на критично реконструиране на прицеления текст от вътрешността на пародиращия; съчетавайки, както отбелязват много автори, импулсите на деструкцията и креативността, целейки не само „деконструкцията“ на това, което е фалшиво в по-ранните прозаични творби, но показването на онова, което е *латентно* (курс. мой – Р. К.) и се нуждае от „реконструкция“ (ibid.: 105). Думата „латентно“ ни насочва към поетиката на потенциалността, „дискурсивното желание“ – подсказва, че автопародията е момент от гъвкавостта на това, което може да наречем „матрица“ – свидетелство за нейния вътрешен обем и вписаност в един широк диапазон от значения, включително карикатурно отстоящи от вече артикулираните семантични структури.

Ще илюстрирам работата на автопародията с по-усложнен неин вариант, при който пародираната творба сама по себе си представя автопародия, така че в крайна сметка пародирането стъпаловидно се задълбочава като двойно пародиране. Тук определителят „авто“ се разбира в два различни смисъла. В единия случай кръговостта се отнася до авторовия субект – насочването на пародията към самия автор – към негови собствени текстове; във втория случай тя се отнася до отделния текст – обръщане на значенията му против самия него. Това е случаят, който Клео Протохристова определя като „вътрешнотекстова пародийност“, автопародийност, при която, без да има пародираща творба, „самото произведение спонтанно поражда пародийно напрежение спрямо себе си“ (Протохристова 1985: 88).

Ще представя пример за автопародия от творчеството на Франц Кафка. Твърдя, че двамата помощници в романа „Замъкът“ са пародия на двамата екзекутори, които идват да изпълнят смъртната присъда във финала на ро-

мана „Процесът“. Сам по себе си образът на екзекуторите съдържа елементи на автопародийност. Те са гротескови фигури, чиито действия внушават едновременно страх и комизъм, комичното произтича от кукловидността, механичността на техните движения, които са винаги в синхрон и в симетрия, изразяващи някаква безстрастна самовглъбеност в съзнанието за своята мисия, което пародира ситуацията „съвестно изпълняване на поставена задача“. „Господата кимнаха и всеки посочи с цилиндъра в ръка към другия“[1]; „След кратка формалност пред вратата на жилището кой от двамата да влезе пръв същата формалност се повтори по-продължително пред вратата на К.“; „Противните учтивости започнаха повторно, единият подаде – над главата на К. – ножа на другия, този му го подаде обратно пак над главата на К.“; „Господата видимо не знаеха какво да отговорят, та почакаха с *увиснала свободна ръка* – (mit den hängenden, freien Arm) досущ като *болногледачи* (курс. мой – Р. К.), щом болният пожелае да отпочине.“ (В оригинала болногледач е в единствено число, Krankenwärter, както и ръка – тънък нюанс в изразяването на симетрията и синхрона, представящи двамата персонажи като един организъм.) Този комичен ефект от единството, синхрона в действията на екзекуторите се появява в неразривна връзка и с най-трагичния момент от финала, екзекуцията на Йозеф К.: „Но единият господин обви с две ръце шията на К., а в същото време другият заби ножа дълбоко в сърцето му и го завъртя два пъти там. С вече оцъклящи се очи К. смогна да види как господата, наведени ниско над лицето му, *опрели буза до буза* (Wange an Wange aneinandergelehnt, курс. мой – Р. К.), наблюдаваха развръзката.“

Мартин Валзер подчертава, че Кафка „премества границата между живо и неодушевено“, подлага героите си на „процес на деперсонализация“ (Walser 1980: 97). Заслужава да се обърне внимание върху трайния интерес на писателя към машината, върху кукловидните му рисунки на човешки силуети (Gandelman 1991: 58, 64). Тази деперсонализация, механичност в скрепеността, сякаш „занитеност“ на частите на тялото или неестествено изопнатите пози и вдървени движения, както и откровеното представяне на двамата екзекутори като „механично направени“ пролича-ват в описанията им, представени през погледа на К. „ Бяха охранени, но бледи, облечени в черни сюртуци, а на главите си носеха цилиндри, *които сякаш не можеха да се отместят от там* (mit sheinbar unverrückbaren Zylinderhüten, курс. мой – Р. К.)“; „Погнуси се от чистотата на лицата им. Просто виждаше още почистващата ръка, която бе човъркала в ъглите на очите им, бе търкала горната устна и заглаждала бръчките по брадичките им.“ Механистичният принцип, по който е концепиран образът на двамата, проличава още от следното описание:

[1] Преводът на български език на романа „Процесът“ се цитира по Кафка 1993а. Тълкуването на отделни изрази ще бъде съпроводено с привеждане на оригиналния текст по Kafka 1966.

Но още пред пътната врата те го хванаха по много особен начин под мишница – К. никога досега не беше ходил така с някого. Двамата почти долепиха раменете си зад неговите, не свиха мишниците си в лактите, а ги използваха да обгърнат ръцете на К. в цялата им дължина; долу пък стиснаха ръцете му с добре заучена, школувана, непреодолима хватка. К. вървеше съвсем изпънат между тях, тримата образуваха сега едно такова цяло, че ако случайно разбиеха едного от тях, щяха да разбият и тримата. Подобно цяло можеха да образуват сигурно само *неодушевени предмети* (…wie sie fast nur *Lebloses* bilden kann, курс. мой – Р. К.).

В оригинала е казано буквално *безжизненото,* прилагателното – *leblos*, е субстантивирано и с това чрез самата си граматическа форма претопява трите тела в единна субстанция. Преводът („неодушевени предмети"), от друга страна, директно изразява идеята за опредметяването на човешкото.

„Неодушевеността" на двамата герои има още един важен аспект – те не говорят, сякаш са лишени от този естествен човешки дар, езика, казано е, че са „полунеми". Юрий Лотман има една интересна мисъл, че психическата основа на престъплението е разрушаването на комуникацията – третирането на жертвата като предмет, с който е невъзможно да се установи диалог (Лотман 1980: 98). Такава комуникация не може да се осъществи и между К. и двамата екзекутори – тримата вървят в пълно безмълвие от страна на двамата, прекъсвано от опитите на К. да подхване разговор: „Защо изпратиха именно вас? – не само попита, но и извика той. Господата видимо не знаеха какво да отговорят..."; „По-далеко не отивам – каза К. за опит. Господата не сметнаха за нужно да отговорят, достатъчно беше да продължават да го стискат здраво за китките"; „Другият направи някакви особени движения – също като няма човек, който се бори с най-опърничав организъм. „Те не са подготвени да отговарят на въпроси" – каза си К."

Двамата убийци не са външно враждебни към К. Те спират, когато той спре, предоставят му да избере пътя, церемониално вежливи са в своята безмълвност и некомуникативност, двукратното пренасяне на ножа над главата на К. прилича на някакъв древен ритуал. В каменоломната, където извършват екзекуцията, господата проявяват странна грижа за К. („За да не подлагат К. неподвижен на доста хладния въздух, той го улови под мишницата и започна да се разхожда с него напред-назад"), проявяват някакво комично чувство за естетика, когато в желанието „да изпипат работата" търсят възможно най-удобната поза, в която да поставят К., преди да забият ножа в гърдите му:

Господата накараха К. да седне на земята, облегнаха го на камъка и наместиха главата му върху него. Въпреки всички усилия, полагани от тях, и цялата отзивчивост, проявявана от К., неговата поза оставаше *твърде насилена и неубедителна* (blieb seine Haltung eine sehr gezwungene und unglaubwürdige, курс. мой – Р. К.). Ето защо единият господин помоли другия да предостави

само нему работата около полагането на К., но и това не доведе до нещо похубаво. В края на краищата те оставиха К. в положение, което не беше най-удобното от всички опитани досега.

Тук шества в пълния си блясък запазената марка на кафкианския абсурд. Филип Томпсън определя ефекта от наподобяването на човешкото същество на марионетка или робот като „едновременно комичен и плашещо объркващ" и припомня „общото описание на мъртви тела: „Тялото лежи в гротескова поза", т.е. в поза, нормално заемана от марионетка или играчка, с крайници и глава в неестествено положение" (Thomson 1972: 36).

Нагласяването на К. в удобна поза има няколко иронични прицела. В светлината на коментара на Томпсън двамата екзекутори абсурдно се стремят с всички сили да нагласят в удобна, т.е. *жива* поза тялото на К., което скоро ще умъртвят и което ще попадне в регистъра на неудобните пози; от друга страна, тази сцена е в иронично напрежение със странната изопнато-вдървена и твърде неудобна хватка, в която водят К. от дома му до каменоломната. Рисунките на Кафка, за които стана дума, представят черни човечета със силно изопнати крайници и неестествено прегънати торсове. Очевиден е импулсът да се заличи границата между живото и марионетъчното, което има отпратки и към машинното и механистичното. Роналд Грей открива интересна връзка между, тъй да се рече, машинната естетика на „В наказателната колония" и машината на съдопроизводството и екзекуцията в „Процесът" и по-специално със сцената на пренасянето на ножа над главата на К., в която той внезапно е обладан от порив на саморазкаяние сам да забие ножа в гърдите си:

> Това, което се случва с К., е твърде близко до онова, което се случва с офицера във „В наказателната колония": смъртта на К. трябва да се разглежда в тази линия. И докато офицерът е изненадан от внезапното задвижване на машината, от която е очаквал с такова доверие да докаже правотата му, К. фактически вижда, че машината на Съда изисква от него сам да дръпне лоста. (Gray 1973: 122)

К. умира, защото „не успява да интерпретира своята ситуация успешно, което води до неговата гибел в текста. Екзистенциалният извод от неуспешната херменевтика е смъртта" (Bernheimer 1977: 367).

Може да приемем твърдението, че финалният епизод на романа „Процесът" е пропит от „потискащата атмосфера на безмилостна враждебност, съчетана с комична гъвкавост" (Gray 1973: 123), с уговорката, че е по-добре да се каже „комична ригидност". Двамата екзекутори действат като програмирани машини, лишени са от сетива и способност за разбиране смисъла на ситуацията, в която участват, затова действията им са нелепо несъобразени с обстановката, неподатливи са на автокорекция. Те изразяват синекдохично ирационални сили, действащи отвъд тях, представят се като техни оръдия, с безстрастна неумолимост и педантичност. „Херме-

невтичната недостатъчност“ на двамата персонажи по странен начин се оказва съзвучна с херменевтичната неуспешност на К. Комичните акценти, свързани с облика на героите, по обратен път засилват зловещото им излъчване. „Вмъкването на комичен елемент, съвсем не на място и неподходящ, служи да задълбочи читателското чувство за плашещия характер на тези сцени“ (Thomson 1972: 8). Това е казано за „Метаморфозата“. Но то важи с пълна сила и за „Процесът“.

В изоморфна връзка с дистанцираността на двамата екзекутори е безстрастната, отчуждена позиция на повествователя. Той никъде не изразява оценки, симпатии, не взема страна. Цялата финална сцена се извършва на леко преекспонирано лунно осветление: „Тримата минаха сега в пълно единодушие по един мост, залян от лунната светлина“; „Блещукащата и трепкаща в лунната светлина вода се раздвояваше около един малък остров“; „Лунната светлина заливаше всичко със своята естественост и покой, несвойствени на никаква друга светлина“. На пръв поглед лунният мотив създава противодействие в посока на уталожване, снемане на страшното. Всъщност е точно обратното – покоят на лунната светлина е покой на отчуждението, „покой на безразличието“ (Gray 1973: 123), на изоставеността на героя от автора и засилва тягостното чувство.

Нека да разгледаме как образът на двамата помощници в романа „Замъкът“ пародира образа на двамата екзекутори от романа „Процесът“. Предварително ще очертая някои съответствия между двете двойки персонажи, които са предпоставка за възникване на пародийни апострофи. Главният герой К. пристига в селото, намиращо се в подножието на замъка, откъдето е поканен за работа в качеството на земестер; той получава от замъка в свое разпореждане двама помощници, чиято идентичност от самото начало е поставена под въпрос (което кореспондира с отсъствието на самоличност у двамата екзекутори). Още при първата среща между К. и помощниците му се провежда абсурден разговор за това дали те са старите му, добре познати помощници или не:

– Кои сте вие? – попита той и заразглежда ту единия, ту другия.

– Вашите помощници – отвърнаха те.

– Помощниците са – тихо потвърди гостилничарят.

– Как? – попита К. – Вие сте старите ми помощници, на които наредих да ме последват и които очаквам?

Те потвърдиха.

– Хубаво – рече К. след малко, – хубаво е, че дойдохте... Впрочем – каза той след нова пауза – много закъсняхте, доста сте нехайни.

– Пътят бе дълъг – рече единият.

– Пътят бил дълъг! – повтори К. – Но аз ви срещнах, когато идвахте от замъка.

– Да – казаха те без повече обяснения.

– Къде са приборите ви? – попита К.

– Нямаме – отговориха те.

– Приборите, които ви поверих – рече К.

– Нямаме – повториха те.

– Ама що за хора сте вие?! – рече К. – Разбирате ли нещо от зememерство?

– Не – отвърнаха те.

– Но ако сте моите стари помощници, трябва да разбирате – рече К. и ги побутна през себе си, за да влязат в къщата[2].

Към времето, през което се води този разговор, за двамата е казано, че са „млади мъже“, но броени дни по-късно, когато К. изгонва двамата, външният вид на единия от тях драстично се променя:

– Ама ти кой си? – внезапно рече К., тъй като този човек сякаш не беше помощникът. Изглеждаше по-стар, по-изморен, по-сбръчкан, но с подпухнало лице, а походката му съвсем се различаваше от чевръстата, сякаш наелектризирана походка на помощниците – беше бавна, леко накуцваща, достолепно болнава.

„Не съм вече в първа младост“ – е странното обяснение на помощника на въпроса защо се е променил, и добавя: „Това е, защото съм сам [...] Сам ли съм, веселата младост ме оставя.“

С други думи, загубвайки службата си, героят загубва младостта си.

Мартин Валзер коментира загубата на идентичността при загубата на ролята, която героят изпълнява, с твърдението, че „фигурите на Кафка придобиват своята идентичност чрез своята функция“ (Walser 1980: 97).

Двамата помощници имат освен това странно еднакви лица, поради което К. не може да ги различи един от друг и предлага да ги нарича с едно и също име: „Ще се отнасям към вас като към един човек и ще наричам и двама ви Артур. Изпратя ли някъде Артур, ще идете и двамата, дам ли на Артур работа, ще я свършите заедно.“ Сдвоеността, невъзможността да се раздели групата, която наблюдаваме в „Процесът“, има еквивалент в това претопяване на двамата помощници в едно лице. Темата за неживото присъства и в представянето на персонажите в „Замъкът“. Наблюдавайки преждевременно и необяснимо състарилия се бивш помощник Йеремия, К. разсъждава „...достатъчен беше дори този не особено привлекателен слуга, тази плът, която придобиваше такъв вид, *сякаш не беше съвсем жива*“ (als sei es nicht recht lebendig, курс. мой – Р. К.).

За синхронизираните движения на помощниците ще стане дума, когато се навлезе в същността на пародията, но ето засега за пример първата среща с двамата герои: „Откъм замъка идеха двама млади мъже, средни на ръст, и двамата много стройни, с тесни дрехи, почти еднакви и в лицата. [...] Те се придвижваха учудващо бързо за състоянието, в което се намираше улицата, и *мятаха стройните си нозе в такт*“ (warfen im Takt die schlanken Beine, курс. мой – Р. К.).

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[2] Преводът от немски на романа „Замъкът“ се цитира по Кафка 1993б.

Съществува още един емблематичен признак, по който помощниците се доближават, имитират двамата екзекутори, и точно в тази имитация се очертава един от елементите на автопародията. Помощниците често се стараят да *застанат от двете страни на К., притискат се плътно до него* и по този начин пародират сцената „*арестант върви между конвоиращи го екзекутори*“ (автопародията придобива допълнителен привкус от обстоятелството, че К. се държи грубо с двамата, хока ги и им крещи и понатупва Артур и Йеремия, използвайки юмрука и пръчката): „След това тримата седнаха в салона на странноприемницата на чаша бира, около малка масичка, без да приказват, К. – в средата, а вдясно и вляво от него – помощниците му“; „Светнете! – каза той на помощниците, които *плътно се притиснаха към него отляво и отдясно* (die sich rechts und links eng an ihn drückten, курс. мой – Р. К.) и вдигнаха фенерите си“; „помощниците пък продължаваха да се притискат към него“; „навсякъде беше тъмно, свещите във фенерите бяха догорели, *воден от помощниците* (von den Gehilfen geführt, курс. мой – Р. К.), които познаваха обстановката, К....“

В един от случаите се възстановяват съпътстващи сцената „конвоиране на арестант“ мотиви. Във финалния епизод на „Процесът“ е споменато, че тримата герои минават под фенери („Когато минаваха под фенери, К. неведнъж се опитваше [...] да разгледа по-подробно своите придружители“), както и по мост („Тримата минаха сега в пълно единодушие по един мост“). В една от сцените на „Замъкът“, в която двамата помощници са притиснати от двете страни на К., се появяват и фенери: „Те се сгушиха зад Барнабас, ала не бяха чак толкова уплашени, че да не *поставят фенерите върху лявото и дясното рамо на своя закрилник*“ (daß sie nicht ihre Laternen rechts und links auf die Achseln ihres Beshützers gestellt hätten, курс. мой – Р. К.). А на отстояние една страница в разговора се мярва и странноприемницата „При моста“. Възможно е този детайл да се появява случайно, но за наблюдателния читател той дава своя малък принос в разиграването на пародийното сближаване-дистанциране.

Принос в това разиграване дава и травестийното разменяне местата на субекта и обекта в мотива „съблечане/обличане на дрехи“. В „Процесът“ един от екзекуторите съблича дрехите на К.: „...единият пристъпи до К. и му съблече палтото, жилетката, а накрая и ризата. [...] После грижливо прибра на едно място дрехите му, както се прибират предмети, които ще се употребяват и занапред, макар и не в най-близко време.“ В една от сцените на романа „Замъкът“ К. и неговата годеница Фрида са принудени да *обличат* двамата помощници: „те бяха полузашеметени от събитията, та се наложи отчасти дори собственоръчно да ги обличат“. Едната творба иронизира другата, като премества в комичен регистър трагичния смисъл на нейна сцена.

И така, ролята на слугите пародира ролята на убийците. Но има още един по-специален пародиращ ход, отнасящ се до онова, което само по себе си в „Процесът“ съдържа автопародийни нотки – вече разгледаната

ригидност, марионетъчната скованост и автоматизъм в действията на двамата екзекутори. В „Замъкът“ тази зловеща, вглъбена в себе си скованост се пародира чрез неизтощима, буйна и весела подвижност, чрез игрова гъвкавост и хаотично сменящи се пози в държането на двамата помощници. Те са изпратени от заместник-кастелана на замъка с мисията не да работят, а да „развеселяват“ К., който според властите гледа твърде сериозно, „присърце“ на своята роля, и се справят много добре с тази мисия, предизвиквайки у околните впечатлението за „смешни, неугледни, невъздържани хлапаци“, „млади момчета, смешни и донякъде глуповати“, проявяващи „смахнато хлапашко поведение“, вършещи „лудории“. Те се гонят като деца и се блъскат, намират игра във всяка поставена им задача. Но има един по-специален акцент, който е свързан с пародийността на образа, и това е посочената „гъвкавост“, „еластичност“ в движенията на двамата. Вече стана дума за тяхната „*наелектризирана от ставите походка*“ (in den Gelenken wie elektrisierte Gang, курс. мой – Р. К.). При първата среща те заприличват на К. на змии. Ето един фрагмент от змиевидната, трескава непрестанност на движенията на помощниците: „За тях, както често споделяха с Фрида, беше въпрос на чест [...] да заемат колкото може по-малко пространство, затова опитваха най-различни пози и непрекъснато шушукаха и се кикотеха, кръстосваха ръцете и нозете си, сгушваха се един в друг, в полумрака човек забелязваше в техния ъгъл само *едно голямо кълбо*“ (ein großes Knäuel, курс. мой – Р. К.).

В разказа на Кафка „Гладният художник“ е представен образът на анорексичен тип, показван пред публиката, със странни гърчовидни движения: „Импресариото [...] го повери на грижите на дамите, разтърсвайки го сурово, така че неговите крака и тяло се заклатушкаха и разлюляха. Сега художникът се подчини изцяло, неговата глава се отпусна върху гърдите му... Краката му в спазъм на самосъхранение се притиснаха един до друг в коленете и се сплетоха на пода, сякаш той не беше в действителност твърд под“ (цит. по Gandelman 1991: 58). Цитирайки този текст, Клод Ганделман определя поведението на героя като „кукловидно“ (pupetlike). За гърча на краката му напълно подхожда определението за „наелектризираност“ на ставите, отнесено към двамата помощници. Само че при тях това не е кукленската ригидност на двамата екзекутори, по-скоро става дума за безсмислена, хаотична, опияняваща се от собствения си автоматизъм подвижност. *Ригидният автоматизъм* от „Процесът“, който е сериозен и плашещ, защото носи смъртта, се пародира от *пластичния автоматизъм* в „Замъкът“, който е комичен и снизяващ.

При това навсякъде се запазва синхронът на движенията, служещ за канава на съпоставката:

> Скоро те се появиха под прозорците на гимнастическия салон, затропаха по тях и закрещяха; ала думите им вече не се разбираха. И там не се задържаха дълго – не можеха да подскачат в дълбокия сняг така, както ги караше тях-

ната възбуда. Затова изтичаха до желязната ограда на училищната градина, скочиха върху каменната ѝ основа, откъдето – макар и само отдалеч – можеха да гледат по-добре вътре в стаята; придържаха се за железата и тичаха насам-натам, после пак спираха и умолително протягаха преплетените си ръце към К.

В романа „Замъкът“ е налице, струва ми се, пасаж с кодово значение за травестийната функция на образа на двамата помощници: „Във всеки случай те [помощниците – бел. моя – Р. К.] не бяха придирчиви, бяха се разположили *върху две стари женски фусти* (auf zwei alten Frauenröcken, курс. мой – Р. К.) на пода в един от ъглите му.“ Ролевото преобличане се проектира върху комичната смяна на постилката с неподходяща дреха.

И така, помощниците в романа „Замъкът“ пародийно снижават, иронично апострофират образите на двамата екзекутори от романа „Процесът“. При доста тематични сходства двата романа са в много отношения в състояние на преобърнатост един спрямо друг. И двата романа изразяват драмата на индивида, изправен срещу бюрократичната машина, играят с „абсурдите на съществуването“ (Кайзер), но показват по различен начин тази драма. В „Процесът“ героят е жертва на ирационалната власт на закона, в „Замъкът“ той сам се стреми да проникне в бюрократичната машина – да овладее механизмите ѝ, за да може да получи разрешението – да се потопи саморазрушително в „нивелиращата стихия на колектива“ (Затонский 1972: 52).

Много са приликите и различията между двата романа, така че пародирането на двойка персонажи от единия чрез друга двойка персонажи от другия едва ли може да изненада. И все пак – какво изразява тази автопародия? И каква е ролята на двамата помощници, които, за разлика от екзекуторите, са образ със значително по-голяма многозначност и възможност за противоречиви интерпретации? Коментирайки склонността на двамата да шпионират своя господар, Бернхаймер смята, че „това шпиониране би могло да е подтикнало К. да погледне на себе си отстрани, иронично, игрово, предизвиквайки в своето собствено съзнание процес на удвояване, който би стигнал до включването на самите помощници като негови потенциални заместители“ (Bernheimer 1977: 376). Нека да пробваме друг път към ироничното, игрово удвояване. Може да заподозрем следната последователност в ходовете на пародийното. В „Процесът“ са пародирани разумността и действията на двамата екзекутори, които внушават ирационална отвъдност (неизвестни сили, от чието име действат), както и разумното начало на закона и неговата машина. От друга страна, двамата герои изразяват пълната липса на спонтанност, несвободата в изпълнение на делегираните им задължения. Според Шепард „помощниците са тези, които екстернализират спонтанните, ирационални страни на неговата [т.е. на К. – бел. моя – Р. К.] личност“ (Sheppard 1977: 405). Ако се съгласим с това мнение, трябва да приемем, че в този случай ирационалното означава

необяснимост, нелогичност, но откъм другата, „веселата“ му страна. Абсурдът у Кафка има различни лица. Най-напред в „Процесът“ разумното начало е представено самоподривно като плашеща, вглъбена в себе си ирационалност; по-нататък, в „Замъкът“, ирационалността получава допълнително развенчаване чрез вторично пародиране – ригидната ирационалност приема лицето на пластично-игрова алогичност.

Вижда се, че посредством деструктивното имитиране на текстови отрязъци пародията всъщност насочва своята интерпретация отвъд тях, насочва се към по-широки и абстрактни категории. Прицел на пародийна деструкция може да бъдат светоусещане, жанр, стил (Маргарет Роус включва тук и дискурса на епистемата) (Rose 1979: 134).

Автопародията силно активизира една функция, адресирана най-общо до пародията – възможността „да изнесе на повърхността историята на авторовия стил […], при което може да се сравни с „археологията на субекта“ (ibid.: 94). Тя префункционализира миналия художествен опит, едновременно отместваики се от него и същевременно намирайки в самия него онова, което е било латентно заложено като засенчена страна, отпаднала от борбата за избор в пакета от възможности, отворен пред дискурсивното желание. Може да се каже и така: показва как чрез повторение с обратен знак се извършват сътворения – появява се ново художествено качество.

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THE SELF-PARODY IN KAFKA: THE DIALOG BETWEEN THE NOVELS *THE TRIAL* AND *THE CASTLE*

Radosvet Kolarov

Abstract

The article discusses the case of self-parody, i.e. a type of self-polemics in which the negation of the target text from the modifying text is expressed in the form of a comic downplay. It is shown how the two assistants from Kafka's novel *The Trial* parody the two executioners of K. in the finale of the novel *The Castle*. Self-parody retools the past literary experience, both stepping aside from it and at the same time finding in it what had been latent as a shadowed side in the first approach in the creative process.

ELIAS CANETTI, A DIFFICULT CONTEMPORARY

Galin Tihanov

Canetti's place in the Western canon seems unassailable yet not unproblematic. At the heart of this peculiar status is Canetti's own evolution from a high modernism displaying, especially in *Die Blendung* (1935), some avant-garde features, to a realism that in the 1960s–1980s looked increasingly out of date and place. Despite recent attempts to recover or discern postmodernist dispositions and techniques in Canetti's *Die Stimmen von Marrakesch* and in his three-volume autobiography, these remain works alien to the postmodern spirit of narrative scepticism, nor do they exhibit any affinity with modernist experimentation. Unlike some of his contemporaries, who chose various versions of realism more or less from the start of their careers (Heimito von Doderer with his social realist novels, Ernst Jünger with his at times allegorical realism), Canetti practiced realism *after* his own modernism[1]. There might be a logic to this transition, insofar as he believed that this 'modern realism' – understood as more than a bundle of artistic devices – should be the guiding method of contemporary writing. Canetti claimed – not unlike Hermann Broch who thought the novel to be the art form best suited to communicate the "disintegration of values" ('Wertzerfall') in the interwar world – that the task of realist literature was to convey the reality of a "split" ('gespaltene') and no longer homogenous future[2]. Measured by this standard, even *Die Blendung* could be seen as a work with a realist substratum, despite the salient birthmarks of modernism, expressionism, and 'neue Sachlichkeit' (New Sobriety) recognisable in its narrative fabric. Be that as it may, Canetti's abandonment of modernism and the avant-garde in favour of realism in the 1960s meant a very conscious self-removal from the contemporary scene of aesthetic innovation, a journey back into the past, coinciding with, and perhaps facilitated by, his determination to retrace his own roots in his autobiography. Not by chance does he repeatedly tell us that his great examples, in terms of style, come from writers poised between the realist and the romantic: Stendhal and Gogol. This elected affinity with aesthetic

[1] On the 'return' of realism in the midst of, and after, European modernism, see Fore 2012.

[2] See Canetti's essay "Realismus und neue Wirklichkeit" (1965), in Canetti 1975: 66–71.

modes hailing from the nineteenth century chimes with what strikes the reader of today as an unmistakeably conservative outlook. His shunning of the Left-Right divide, of communism and fascism alike, his unspoken but transparent endorsement of liberal values, at the heart of which is his re-examination and uneasy re-validation of individualism in the face of the seemingly unstoppable growth of mass culture and the utopian charge of living-in-the-crowd, all appear to be an outward manifestation of self-professed neutrality, of timeless wisdom, promoting an underlying and very clear intellectual commitment to a conservative agenda. This fiercely asserted neutrality stands for independence of judgement, for the ability to attain and uphold equilibrium; but it also stands for a perpetuation of a larger set of cultural and social status quos.

Canetti's reputation rests above all on his novel *Die Blendung*, translated into English as *Auto da Fé* (Canetti 1981) and his essayistic treatise *Crowds and Power* (1960); his autobiographical prose, his essays, and his slender book on Kafka are still a source of fascination for many, while his plays interest solely the specialist. *Die Blendung* ('Blinding' would be the literal translation) is a novel written in the early 1930s but left largely unnoticed until its 1965 republication when the publication of *Crowds and Power* had already made Canetti visible, also as an intellectual. The novel has thus often been read retrospectively, under the shadow of the treatise, as a narrative about the complex negotiation of individual (mental) space vis-à-vis a rising tide of vulgarity, of crowd-like instincts, of roguery, deceit, and encroachment on one's privacy in pursuit of material wealth and power. This, coupled with the undertone of misogyny, so instantly recognizable in the novel, has given rise to accusations of elitism and detachment from reality, even when Canetti clearly documents the untenability of the delusional condition which he refers to as "head without world" (*Ein Kopf ohne Welt*).

Canetti's novel has a deeper cultural subtext that has not yet been heeded or appreciated in sufficient measure, despite the fact that the novel has enjoyed enormous critical attention. *Auto da Fé* is a satire on the humanistic ideals of universalism. It is a counter-Enlightenment novel which punishes the hybris of believing in pure reason and boundless humanity. Unnoticed so far has remained Canetti's subtle mockery of the idea of 'world literature' (*Weltliteratur*), a notion coined about half a century before Goethe by Schlözer and Wieland but given currency by the Weimar sage in the final years of his life[3]. Especially relevant here is Schlözer's usage. Having returned from St. Petersburg after a long stay there, August Schlözer (1735–1809)[4] was appointed Professor of Russian literature and history at Göttingen (1769). It was while holding this Chair that Schlözer, whose spectacular – from today's perspective – range of scholarly interests mirrored the common standards of the age, published a volume on

[3] On this, see Tihanov 2011, esp. pp. 142–143.

[4] On Schlözer's life and career, see most recently Peters 2003.

Icelandic literature and history (1773), in which he concluded that mediaeval Icelandic literature was "just as important for the entire world literature" (*für die gesamte Weltliteratur ebenso wichtig*) as the Anglo-Saxon, Irish, Russian, Byzantine, Hebrew, Arabic, and Chinese literatures[5]. Schlözer's notion of 'world literature' reflects the Enlightenment exploratory drive and the ambition to expand the pool of available cultural evidence. This entailed inclusion of that which had previously been regarded as peripheral or simply non-extant. The revision of the Eurocentric cultural model that was to become the ultimate – not immediate – outcome of this process underpins our modern idea of "world literature", in which the Western canon is but a constituent part of a larger and much more diverse repertoire[6].

Enlightenment and Romanticism constituted in this regard a continuum, in which the exotic and unfamiliar gradually populated literature and the arts, often confronting the artist with the question of how to portray difference so that it becomes comprehensible, while retaining its irreducibility to Western cultural norms. Only slightly later than Schlözer, Herder's *Volkslieder*, in their first version of 1778/89, comprised samples of oral poetry from as far afield as Peru; the second edition, *Stimmen der Völker in Liedern* (1807), extended this curiosity to Madagascar. It is important to realise that the prism through which Schlözer spectated the growth of literature was that of the individual peoples of the world: in Schlözer's view, 'world literature' is a cumulative, aggregate entity, whose completeness is a matter of augmenting the list of nations whose literatures are represented in the catalogue of cultural wealth. An appreciation of cultural difference, in the collective agency of the people/nation, was thus on the agenda, as an extension of the notion of solidarity with an – empirically attestable – wider humanity. But despite all this, Schlözer was less concerned with promoting a dialogue between these literatures, and their dynamic interaction hardly claimed his research ambitions.

Canetti's *Auto da Fé* cannot be grasped outside this framework of a boundless humanity that offers its cultural gifts to the discerning and appreciative European. Not by accident is Peter Kien a sinologist, Chinese literature having been recognized as a constituent part of 'world literature' both by Schlözer and Goethe, who tells Eckermann of his delight in reading a Chinese novel. "Keine menschliche Literatur war ihm fremd" ('No branch of human literature was unfamiliar to him' (Canetti 1981: 15); this is how Kien is introduced to the reader early on, with an added remark on his knowledge also of Sanskrit (no doubt a jibe at the Romantic preoccupation with ancient India), Japanese, and the Western European languages. Kien, in other words, is a philologist per excellence, a

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[5] The quote is from Schamoni 2008: 289; it was first adduced in Lempicki 1968: 418.

[6] On current debates around "world literature", see especially Damrosch 2003 and Pizer 2006. See also Sturm-Trigonakis 2007; Knauth 2004; and Ette 2003. For a stimulating account that still foregrounds a residually Eurocentric model, see Casanova 2004. For a recent consequential critique of "world literature", see Apter 2013.

model scholar of 'world literature' in its enticing totality. The fact that he carries "another", invisible library in his head, is a confirmation of his internalisation of culture: he has not succumbed to the recent fads of superficially praising Japanese and Chinese art, which had been so much part of European middle-class demeanour since the late 19th century; instead, he walks around as a veritable encyclopaedia of Chinese and other Eastern cultures to which he relates with genuine understanding and informed restraint.

And yet Kien himself gives the lie to this humanistic embrace of otherness. 'Literature' to him is the dead sum total of manuscripts and old inscriptions rather than the living word of, say, a novel. For Kien, novels furnish pleasure at a prohibitive cost; they "crack open" the otherwise monolith personalities of their readers by enticing them into sympathising with characters who hold dear values that may well differ from theirs. This turns the novel into a rather dangerous genre, an instrument of unhinging and dislocating the reader from a space of moral certitude into a zone of unfamiliarity, dizziness, and perilous self-reliance. For that reason, just as in Plato's "Republic", Kien believes that literature, exemplified in his mind by he novel, should be "prohibited by the state" (ibid.: 37). Canetti thus ultimately parodies the humanistic idea of culture – and the Enlightenment notion of 'world literature' as one of its indispensable manifestations.

The novel parodies not just Enlightenment beliefs[7]; it also abounds in subversive references to clichés of Romantic provenance. Unnoticed so far has remained the special attention Canetti pays to the cultural mythology that had accrued around the colour blue. In Novalis's famous *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, blue stands for an ever receding ideal, a dream as difficult to turn into reality as it is to wake up from. In the 1960s, Anna Seghers in *Das wirkliche Blau* (True Blue) gives the colour a new semantic aura; it now begins to symbolise the just social order that communist class struggle aspires to, thus translating the Romantic utopia into lived reality. But earlier than Seghers, in the 1930s, Canetti revives the Romantic myth of the colour blue with a rather dissonant suggestion of cruelty, menace, and violence. Blue – now degraded from Novalis's ideal realm of longing to the brutality of the everyday – is, to recall, the colour of Therese's skirt which comes back to haunt Kien: "Scarcely has he thus expelled everything blue from the room when the walls begin to dance. Their violent movement dissolves in blue spots. They are skirts, he whispers and creeps under the bed. He had begun to doubt his reason" (ibid.: 362). It is vital to trace in this passage the transformation of blue from an index of serenity into a harbinger of madness; the Romantic is thus resurrected and estranged in the same breath: insanity makes a return conjoined with a swath of misogynist associations attached to blue. That Canetti must have had in mind precisely the Romantic genealogy of blue as a zone of longing and unreachable perfection transpires in a

[7] On Canetti's implicit dialogue with Western philosophy in *Die Blendung*, see especially Schneider 2010.

later passage, in the penultimate section of the novel, where blue is stigmatised as "the colour of the uncritical, the credulous, the believers" (ibid.: 420, E); ironically, Kien himself is an example of this attitude, blinded as he is by his dedication to a world of knowledge detached from reality.

These are not the only parodic gestures in *Auto da Fé*. The novel is equally poised between asserting and undermining the tenets of the European avant-garde. Cultural memory looms large as a central theme in the novel; Peter Kien and his library are indeed cast as repositories of cultural capital, knowledge, and tradition. At the same time, in the spirit of the German *neue Sachlichkeit* (New Sobriety), the novel confronts the reader with a coldly detailed and fascinatingly grotesque examination of the relationship between knowledge and life, culture and the everyday. The lofty and the quotidian clash in a novelistic composition built on the tension between "a head without a world" and a "headless world". *Auto da Fé* is a novel about the failing mediation between these two conditions; it thrives on an unmistakably parodic radicalization of the avant-garde directive to reject cultural tradition. Kien, as if following Marinetti's call to burn down and do away with libraries and museums, sets his prized book collection on fire. But in a significant departure from the Futurist recipe for cultural rejuvenation, in which Marinetti envisaged the destruction of museums and libraries as a release of creative energy previously suffocated by the baggage of tradition, Kien's decision to set on fire his own library – and also himself – is a confirmation of the elitist cultural ethos of High Modernism, now filtered through loud Nietzschean laughter. Kien burns his books so that they don't fall in his brother's hands (recognizable here is Kien's paranoia of suspecting everybody, including his brother, of seeking to "extract a will" or to simply lay hands on his greatest asset); with this, Kien reasserts himself as relentless believer in high culture, a hero who manages to save his books from becoming the property of an unenlightened bourgeois. This sacrificial gesture allows him to reoccupy the centre-stage as defender of, and humble servant to, tradition (against Futurism's calls to throw away tradition); by negating himself as an individual he attains radical self-fulfillment as the guardian of a threatened cultural status quo (against Futurism's calls for radical innovation).

To appreciate the depth and subtlety of *Auto da Fé*, we must see it in the context of Canetti's renewal and challenge of the Central-European Jewish literary patrimony, especially the work of Kafka. Canetti has often acknowledged his fascination with Kafka (in his essayistic work and also in his little book of 1969, *Der andere Prozess*, translated into English as *Kafka's Other Trial: The Letters to Felice*, 1974), but nowhere so vividly than in his novel. Beneath the surface, *Auto da Fé* is a novel about metamorphosis and transmutation. George, Peter Kien's brother and a famed psychiatrist, lives through a Kafkaesque moment when he observes one of his patients: "he saw himself as an insect in the presence of a man" (Canetti 1981: 369). What is more, the doctor is said to be in possession of a very special power: he can change his patient back from his adopted persona (a gorilla in this case) into the disinherited brother of a banker

(ibid.: 370). The theme of metamorphosis, more often than not tragically coloured, runs through the entire novel; George Kien is just as much enveloped in this discourse as is Fischerle. Yet Canetti gives this journey of transformation a different spin. Unlike Kafka, he is not interested in the labyrinth of institutions that instill in us quiet despondency vis-à-vis the impenetrable machinery of authority. Canetti's sovereign territory is the absurd that flows not through the invisible channels of institutional authority – rather the absurd that is begotten in the fold of failed interpersonal communication. *Auto da Fé* is riddled with (sometimes hilarious) misunderstandings that attribute to the other features s/he does not possess. Canetti, who believed that Kafka never surpassed *The Metamorphosis* (so "great and perfect" was this work of poetic imagination) (Canetti 1974: 20), has himself written a novel of metamorphosis: desired and imagined, yet misrecognized and ultimately failed. Peter and Therese constantly misrepresent and misrecognize each other. Peter, readers of the novel will recall, begins to envision his own self as having mutated from scholar to murderer. Fischerle, equally, dreams himself into the glory of a world chess champion, to mention just one of his many imagined transformations. The world Canetti's protagonists inhabit is a figment of their displaced consciousness; most of the time they misread their environment and their fellow human beings. Peter Kien, in particular, attributes to Therese, Fischerle, and just about anyone else he encounters (but not to his brother) gallantry and honorable intentions. Kafka is here met by Cervantes, in a great modern story of fantacized but frustrated metamorphosis, and of chivalry – grotesque, cruel, and residually romantic at the same time (witness the noble battles Kien wages to protect his books, and his insane philanthropic gestures).

Canetti is sometimes accused of endowing Peter Kien with misogynist features. This remains an uncomfortable reality, but I believe one could make sense of it precisely in the context of Canetti's appreciation of Kafka. "Of all writers", Canetti maintained, "Kafka is the greatest expert on power" (ibid.: 80). For Canetti, "fear of a superior power is central to Kafka"; the mode of resistance to such a power is "transformation into something small" (insect, in Kafka's famous story). One avoids violation by "removing oneself" from the potential consequences, or temptations, of power; "[o]ne becomes very small, or one changes oneself into an insect" (ibid.: 35) – "smaller, quieter, lighter, until one disappears" (ibid.: 36). Marriage, however, is not an auspicious institution in this respect; no situation, Canetti concludes, is less favourable to this "withdrawal", to the voluntary removal, and thus also resistance to the effects and seductions of power – through becoming "very small" – than marriage: "One must always be there, whether one wants it or not, for part of the day and part of the night – one's own magnitude corresponding to that of one's partner, a magnitude which may not change; otherwise it would be no marriage at all" (ibid.: 35). Even if there were some room for smallness in marriage, it is "usurped by the children", whose upbringing requires multiple employments of power and manifestations of authority. We should recall at this point that Kien's aversion to Therese develops within their marriage. It is the institution of marriage that confronts him

with the horror of being constantly prevented from living his previous life of *withdrawal* from reality, and thus also of *evasion* of power. Before Foucault, Canetti weaves together power and sexuality and examines them in the framework of a marriage that divides rather than unites the protagonists. It is through marriage that Kien is thrown into the field of power which he had been evading so successfully in his earlier life (or so he imagined). And it is in marriage that Therese's appetite for power – financial and sexual – grows in a way irreconcilable with Kien's own philosophy of life.

It is again with reference to Kafka that I suggest we could attain a more nuanced understanding of Canetti's choice to cast Peter Kien as sinologist. The mockery of the idea of 'world literature' is an important pointer, but there appears to be more behind Canetti's decision. In Chinese philosophy (a life-long fascination for Canetti) he discovered an apposite parallel to Kafka's art of "transformation" into "something small" (ibid.: 89), of disappearance into self-imposed insignificance as resistance to, or evasion of, power. In this sense Kafka, Canetti asserted unhesitatingly, was "the only writer of the Western world who is essentially Chinese" (ibid.: 94). Canetti invoked his conversations in London with Arthur Waley, the self-taught Orientalist and translator of *Monkey*, Chinese poetry, and the Confucian classics, as confirmation of his opinion. But the killer proof seems to have come from a passage in a postcard Kafka sent to Felice from Marienbad in which he avowed: "indeed I am a Chinese" (quoted in ibid.: 97), with all the ramifications of such a statement which Canetti then chose to read into Kafka's brief text: "[s]ilence and emptiness … receptivity of everything animate and inanimate – these are reminiscent of Taoism and of a Chinese landscape" (ibid.: 98).

Chinese philosophy and culture in Canetti's novel should not be taken at face value: Canetti deliberately skewed, misread, and manipulated his sources[8], but the end result was a caricature emblem of cultural harmony and a deliberately debased ideal of "world literature", emptied, as we have seen, of its core notion of diversity and difference. Part and parcel of this parodying of "world literature" is the very motif of the "battle of the books", a topos in European literatures that goes back to Cervantes and Swift[9]. Revealingly, in order to enhance their endurance in the new "war" regime, Kien re-orders his books with their spines turned to the wall, introducing anonymity and obliterating any trace of difference. The novel, then, is a celebration not of the uniqueness of singular cultures, nor indeed of their supposed interaction; rather it is reconfirmation of skepticism vis-à-vis the very possibility of cultural dialogue.

The idea of transformation (*Verwandlung*) is also the cornerstone of Canetti's other major book, *Crowds and Power* (*Masse und Macht*, 1960). Often

[8] See Zhang 2007: 148–149. Further on China in Canetti's novel, see Košenina 1998 (with a good bibliography of earlier scholarship).

[9] On this, see Hölter 1995.

accused of not engaging with Marx, Freud, and other trend-setters in analyzing power, Canetti would rebuff his critics by pointing to the need to de-historicise and de-psychologise the way we think about power. Freud would come under particularly persistent attack in Canetti's later interviews, for Freud's psychoanalysis was based on the recognition of the death drive, something Canetti never accepted. In fact, Canetti's entire theory of power rests on the opposite instinct: the survival instinct that underwrites domination and transforms the survivor into someone who accumulates and seeks to augment his power by rejoicing and celebrating his survival of an ever increasing number of people. Totalitarian regimes, Canetti believes, are born out of the allure of survival taken to the extreme by fallible human individuals whose ambition in life is to walk over a see of dead bodies, of humans survived by them[10]. War, therefore, is the most manifest and efficient instrument of power; it endorses and actualizes the ability of power-holders to send others to their death and survive them.

Canetti's treatise is a very uneasy mixture of a phenomenological, timeless approach to power (that has enraged many, especially on the Left) and an equally rich and intriguing hypothesis that seems to anchor power – and especially the rise of totalitarianism – in the vicissitudes of German history. Although he often had to confront the skepticism of those who believed (not always without reason) that his narrative was strangely sanguine vis-à-vis the disasters of Nazism and World War Two, Canetti does offer his version of the events that came to mark indelibly twentieth-century history. Versailles and the prohibition of universal military service in Germany are seen as "the *birth* of National Socialism" (Canetti 1981a: 212). Begotten in the days of August 1914 and sealed through the Treaty of Versailles (ibid.: 211), National Socialism offered a substitute for the missing opportunity to participate in that archetypal German crowd formation, the army: "Every single German could become a National Socialist. He was probably even more anxious to become one if he had not been a soldier before, because, by doing so, he achieved participation in activities hitherto denied him" (ibid.: 212). The problem with all this is that a specific, in Canetti's view, crowd formation (the army) is indeed seen in archetypal light, largely lifted beyond the historical framework of economic, political and ideological factors. Earlier in his book, Canetti produces a telling parallel between the army and the forest as emblems of German mass identity: "The crowd symbol of the Germans was the *army*. But the army was more than just the army; it was the *marching forest*. In no other modern country has the forest-feeling remained as alive as it has in Germany. The parallel rigidity of the upright trees and their density and number fill the heart of the German with a deep and mysterious delight. To this day he loves to go deep into the forest where his forefathers lived; he feels at one with the trees. […] For the German, without his being clearly aware of it,

[10] See in this respect Canetti's attempt to explain Hitler as a phenomenon of power and survival, in "Hitler, nach Speer" (1971), in Elias Canetti 1975: 163–189, esp. 172–174.

army and forest transfused each other in every possible way. [...] He took the rigidity and straightness of trees for his own law" (ibid.: 202). Canetti's take, then, is a strange amalgamation of historical interpretation (Versailles) and archetypal symbolism; for the latter, he seems indebted to a long tradition of conservative German glorification of the forest (often of post-romantic provenance) which one finds in Werner Sombart and, with growing frequency, throughout the 1930s. In his 1903 book *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, Sombart, foreshadowing Heidegger's much later essay "Why do we remain in the provinces?", indulges in painting a picture that doubles on some unmistakably Romantic motifs which survive in Canetti's treatise: "The old German culture as it was still basically maintained in the beginning of the nineteenth century had actually derived from this ideal of a forest; the murmuring brook, the rustling oak tree are synonymous with the German soul, which in those very days when our imagination travels through the German countryside created the romantic notion of the magic *blaue Blume* ("blue flower"). The sensitive, the fragile, the feelings of dread, the deep sentimental disposition and whatever else differentiates the Germans from all other nations: Its primary cause lies in the forest, in the untended wild grown forest, where the birds sang in the bushes during springtime, where fog moved across clearings in the fall" (Sombart 2001: 195–196).

The symbol of the forest is not Canetti's only debt to the political discourse of German conservatism. In his taxonomy of the "double crowd", one of the axes of differentiation is that between "friend and foe" (Canetti 1981a: 73), no doubt a clear, if silent, reference to Carl Schmitt's (in)famous theory of the political in his *Der Begriff des Politischen*. A further trace of this conservative discourse is Canetti's distinction between the invisible crowds of the living and the dead (ibid.); here he reproduces Edmund Burke's and, in Germany, Adam Müller's well-known definition of the nation as a bond between the dead, the living, and those yet to come. Canetti does not expand on this in the book, but in a later conversation with Rupprecht Slavko Baur (May 1971) he offers an insightful elaboration. In the past, Canetti submits, the reign of the great world religions meant that our existence was largely regulated by the invisible mass of the dead, the ever-growing sea of predecessors that governed the affective economy of our lives. But today we live in a new, "peculiar condition" where the notion of posterity, the power of those yet to be born begins to co-shape the present. This historical distinction is, in a move typical of Canetti's treatise, swiftly eroded by claiming that the invisible mass of the dead and that of the still unborn are potent factors that have always been at work simultaneously in every human being. From here, Canetti swerves again to offer a broad-brush typology of ideologies: in nationalism, he avers, decisive is the sense of the invisible multitude of the dead – we live by the example of our forefathers (the 'fatherland' is the land of our *fathers*), our lives are regulated by the force of tradition and duty, not least to their memory; in socialism, on the contrary, the emphasis is on the invisible cohort of those yet to be born: the notion of sacrifice in the name

of a brighter future rules life under socialism. There should then be historical constellations in which the two ideologies, resting as they do on the ever co-existing "nuclear sentiments" (*Kerngefühle*) associated with the invisible crowd of the dead and with that of the still unborn, could grow together to form a whole (Canetti 2005: 275). This is Canetti's breathtakingly speculative hypothesis of how National Socialism became possible in the first place. Canetti here joins his illustrious contemporary Hannah Arendt in essaying to understand totalitarianism and National Socialism. Unlike Arendt, he has little to say about the deterioration of the traditional nation state as the guarantor of rights, which leads to the characteristic disregard for humanity displayed by totalitarianism. Canetti seems to interpret totalitarianism as a symptom of the self-imposed malaise of democracy. In *Masse und Macht* (Canetti 1981a: 221) he disparagingly talks of parliamentary life as a crowd phenomenon, in which the crowd has descended into a quasi-war confrontation without real peril, and thus also without real stake (this itself is a recurring theme in the Weimar conservative political discourse, not least Carl Schmitt's). Whatever the diagnosis he opts for, the simultaneous affective mobilisation of the past and the future, which Canetti points to, can indeed be attested in the ideology of National Socialism; and he also appears to be right when singling out the flexibility of this ideology: "through shifting emphasis" nationalism and socialism alternate in strength and prominence as the master components of this baleful ideology.

Canetti's treatise, as already mentioned, has attracted significant criticism over the years (Adorno comes to mind amongst Canetti's distinguished contemporaries[11]), yet it continues to exude a beguiling sense of breadth and visionary suggestiveness. Sometimes its recipes for social amelioration sound naïve. In an interview with Karl Diemer from 1973 Canetti recommends, for example, echoing Marx's critique of the division of labour (but without acknowledging Marxism; Canetti always sought to distance himself from it), that in order for power to be distributed more evenly and for hierarchy to be dispersed and softened, we all have to embrace different professions, leaving behind the habit of concentrating on, and excelling in, a single occupation. Canetti himself believes this to be a revolutionary thought "that turns the world upside down" (*weltumstürzender Gedanke*) (Canetti 2005: 296–297). Nor can Canetti be trusted in his anthropological posture; after all, what he does throughout the book is to marshal second-hand evidence, garnered from other writers' accounts of events. As Ritchie Robertson has noted, Canetti works with a strained combination of "culturalist and biologistic models" (Robertson 2007: 224), plausible at times, incongruous at others. What consolidates and holds together his narrative of power is a thick layer of relentlessly recurring representations of frozen habitus,

[11] See his conversation with Canetti of March 1962, in which Adorno seeks to confront Canetti with his disturbing lack of interest in history and to warn him that images and notions of reality (rather than reality itself) are insufficiently solid ground on which to build theories (cf. Canetti 2005: 140–163).

torn away from the realities of an evolving and striving society steeped in historically locatable antagonisms.

But it is often precisely this representation of timeless habitus distilled from a stupendous mass of anthropological and religious sources that invites the reader to follow Canetti's "basic idea" (*Grundeinfall*), the condition sine qua non, in his words, for a successful drama, novel, or essay. That "basic idea" in the case of *Crowds and Power* is the identification of the fundamental fear of being touched, which the mode of being offered by the crowd overcomes. The crowd is here cast in utopian light (Canetti is certainly also aware of its menacing potential): it produces equality by erasing boundaries and effacing hierarchies: "A head is a head, an arm is an arm, and differences between individual heads and arms are irrelevant. It is for the sake of this equality that people become a crowd and they tend to overlook anything which might detract from it" (Canetti 1981a: 32). Most importantly, the new communal body engendered by the crowd begets courage rather than apprehension: "Suddenly it is as though everything were happening in one and the same body. [...] The more fiercely people press together, the more certain they feel that they do not fear each other" (ibid.: 16). This "reversal" of fear is one of the great themes of *Crowds and Power*. Canetti is, of course, alert to the danger that the "discharge" of the crowd could be replaced once more by inequality and hierarchy; the remedy he envisages in order for the moment of bliss to persist is *repetition* (ibid.: 18) through growth: "the crowd always wants to grow" (ibid.: 32). Unbeknownst to Canetti, in the 1940s and 1950s another thinker, the Russian Mikhail Bakhtin, in his ideologically controversial book on Rabelais, was celebrating the power of the communal body to grow and surmount "cosmic fear" through grotesque acts of discharge (Bachtin 1984). Like Canetti, Bakhtin analyses the collective body, whose identity is shaped not by drawing a boundary between the self and the other, but through the experience of transgressive togetherness. Significantly, laughter and eating are vital topoi in both Canetti's and Bakhtin's narratives of collective bodily courage. The whole of the Rabelais book is centred on those human features, which, while exclusively human, manifest themselves without tragically separating humans from the totality of the universe. For Bakhtin it is the laughing human body that becomes the emblem of this longed-for harmony between culture and nature.

What really matters in all this is the fact that both Canetti and Bakhtin, through their portrayal of the communal body of the crowd (or the "people", in Bakhtin's case), abandon the classic humanistic notion of man, celebrating instead the basic functions of the body which make it indiscernible among other bodies. The deeper man sinks into the abyss of the organic, the brighter the redemptive star of utopia shines above him; deprived of individual dignity, he appears to be granted in exchange a guarantee that his every breath and every strain of his muscles will inevitably produce culture and freedom in the warm embrace of community. In this respect, *Crowds and Power* is diametrically opposed to *Auto da Fé*: the utopia of life in the crowd, before it descends into the

dystopia of anarchy and aggression, is the ultimate disproval of Kien's elevated (and intensely tested) sense of individuality which appears to survive, time after time, the multiple trials of de-individualisation in his encounters with the world outside.

All this seems to be suggestive of the wider significance of the grotesque in Canetti, both in *Crowds and Power* and in his novel. For Canetti the grotesque is not just an aesthetic category; it is a more encompassing mode of conceiving and interpreting the world. The grotesque becomes for him a vantage point from which a different version of humanism arises, a humanism that is no longer bound to a belief in the individual (pace *Auto da Fé*) and is no longer underpinned by an embrace and promotion of the virtues of measure, proportion, or reason (which *Auto da Fé* has also destabilized and critiqued). This is a humanism that manages to incorporate and process in the same breath not just the utopian but also the 'darker side' of humanity[12], the aggressive and unpredictable modes of action characteristic of the crowd. The grotesque, in other words, sponsors in Canetti a humanism without subjectivity (or at least without subjectivity understood in the classic identitarian sense). This is an odd humanism, decentred, cold, revolving not necessarily around the individual but rather around the generic abilities of the human species to resist and endure in the face of cataclysms. Canetti is amongst the most gifted and persuasive exponents in the twentieth century of that particular strain of humanism without unqualified belief in the individual human being at its core, a distant cosmic love for humanity as the greatest survivor. This new brand of decentred, indeed dislocated, humanism without subjectivity is what aligns Canetti with Ernst Jünger. In their later work, they both exhibit a factual, empirical fascination with nature and biology underpinning an abiding curiosity for the elusive metaphysics of human existence. Jünger's fascination with butterflies (shared by Nabokov, another exponent of what I have termed "dislocated humanism") and Canetti's excitement over the invisible crowd of the devils imagined as *bacilli* (Canetti 1981a: 53) are highly suggestive of this new epistemology of the human in their work.

In both *Crowds and Power* and *Auto da Fé*, Canetti offers his responses, sometimes tantalizingly and only obliquely, to modernity and some of its underlying problems and defining crises[13]. His reflections on Jewishness, too, have to be interpreted as a facet of this sustained, if not always direct, engagement with modernity. In *Crowds and Power*, Canetti avails himself of the stereotypical image of Jews as resilient wanderers. He attempts to explain the fate of the Jewish people in Nazi Germany by establishing a controversial link between inflation and anti-Semitism. In this passage of *Crowds and Power* Canetti is at his most acute as a critic of Nazism. His explanation is,

[12] I paraphrase here the titles of Walter Mignolo's well-known books *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* (1994) and *The Darker Side of Western Modernity* (2011).

[13] Michael Mack (2001), for example, has read *Crowds and Power* as a response to the Holocaust.

however, open to objections: "In its treatment of the Jews National Socialism repeated the process of inflation with great precision. First they were attacked as wicked and dangerous, as enemies; then they were more and more depreciated; then, there not being enough in Germany itself, those in the conquered territories were gathered in; and finally they were treated literally as vermin, to be destroyed with impunity by the million" (Canetti 1981a: 219–220). The claim that anti-Semitism and the extermination of the Jews was a mere replication of inflation as a "crowd experience" (ibid.: 220), shifted onto the Jews, appears to be mired in psychologism and to neglect the historical dynamics of anti-Semitism after 1933; it also verges on naturalising anti-Semitism as a healing strategy – admittedly the wrong one – which assists the recuperation of a nation that had been collectively traumatised by the experience of inflation. Of course, it would be implausible, nay absurd, to see in Canetti an intellectual who seeks to extenuate or blur the evils of anti-Semitism by insisting on understanding them. Canetti has given ample evidence, not least in his autobiography, especially in its first volume, *The Tongue Set Free*, of his deep rootedness in Jewish culture. His daring to write of Jewishness in a way that at times mobilises parodic energies and subversiveness – to the point where even his explanations of anti-Semitism become potentially insightful and precariously flippant at the same time – stems, it seems to me, from his resolve to probe into inherited (and uncontested) claims to cultural identity, all the way to the logical conclusion of their dissolution. To understand this daring, we also need to keep in mind the fact that Canetti gained his first direct experience of anti-Semitism relatively late, only in Vienna (which he recollects in *The Tongue Set Free*), after the formative years of what he remembered to be a rather comfortable childhood in Ruschuk (now Rousse) and the difficult but still safe time he spent in Manchester. Born in Ruschuk to a family of Sephardic Jews who had been settled there at least since 1869 (Angelova and Antonova 2006), in his autobiography Canetti glorifies the town as a place of genuine multiculturalism, of easy interaction between various ethnic groups and mutual curiosity. After the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule (1878), Ruschuk became the site of the first cinema screening, the first Bulgarian bank and insurance company were set up there. The Danube connects the town to Central Europe, upriver to Budapest and Vienna, the city on which Ruschuk liked to model itself architecturally (all differences in scale considered). Ruschuk offered Canetti a space for observation in which he registered the daily encounters between Balkan and Central-European manners, tastes, and aspirations. Pictured by Canetti as a paradise on earth, Ruschuk did not arouse mystical longings or feverish visions of social justice and restored Jewish pride; as Dagmar Lorenz (2004: 5) incisively remarks, the experience of Hasidic Jews, Jewish Socialists, or Zionists is nowhere to be found in Canetti's writings. Canetti returned to Ruschuk only once after that, in the summer of 1924, as if to take stock of his own life so far: "anything I subsequently experienced had already happened in Ruschuk" (Canetti 1979: 4).

Note, in this context, the way in which Canetti talks about language. Ruschuk afforded the very young Canetti a glimpse into a polyglot environment marked by the effortless coexistence of Bulgarians, Jews, Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Armenians, Romanians, Russians, Gypsies: "on any one day you could hear seven or eight languages" (ibid.). This plurality of languages will have material consequences for the mature Canetti. German, his language as writer, is only his fourth language: after Ladino (the language of the family in Ruschuk), Bulgarian (the language of the servants and of the children he plays with), and English (the language he learns as a boy in Manchester). German is not presented by Canetti as an identity marker, certainly not in the sense of group identity; even in exile in England, Canetti continues to write in German, thus signalling his determination not to be seen as just another (German-)Jewish exile who has abandoned the language of Hitler. Instead of being a badge of identity, for Canetti German is, above all, a secret, a language spoken initially by his parents when they wanted to communicate without being understood by the children. Thus language is not a way of assuming and solidifying an identity, it is a way of partaking of a secret, to which one needs to be admitted (not least as a precondition of becoming a writer). What is more, the acquisition of German is portrayed as a particularly painful process: "it was a belated mother tongue, implanted in true pain" (ibid.: 70). That pain is then followed by happiness and bliss, but the constitutive feature of this entire process is denaturalisation (by experiencing intense pain) through language. This estrangement (denaturalisation) through language is at the heart of Canetti's cosmopolitanism; it is the reason why – while living as writer exclusively in the cosmos of the German language – Canetti is never indifferent to the prospect of a thriving rather than failing polyglossia. He is ambivalently poised in relation to this old dream: sometimes extoling it (in his autobiography), sometimes interpreting it sceptically, even ironically (in his novel). The Tower of Babel (by which title his novel was translated into French, and also in its first American edition) is doomed in Canetti's narrative not as much as a project of polyglossia, but rather as a project of heteroglossia: it is the different discourses within a seemingly single yet socially stratified and irreconcilably divided language that are bound to remain in a state of mutual isolation and hostility. If anything, it is heteroglossia – the linguistic condition of modernity with its relentless social differentiation – that corrodes the entire edifice of polyglossia: the Tower of Babel crumbles not because it cannot be constructed within an individual (Kien has successfully mastered a stupendous number of languages and all branches of "human literature"), but because individuals find it impossible to communicate with one another in what is meant to be their only (and shared) language (German, in the case of the novel). The novel starts on an optimistic note: the young Frantz Metzger, innocent, smart, and open to the world, wants to travel to India and China, mentioning with bated breath, and secret hope, the Great Wall of China that no one yet seems able to climb over. A journey is about to begin that should push back boundaries and cross cultural frontiers as a matter

of course. Yet this beautiful start is frustrated by mistrust on the part of Kien (including later considerations of class and social status[14]), who in turn is mistrusted and misunderstood by others in the novel. The Great Chinese Wall between the characters never disappears. One wonders whether its mention at the beginning is not another open reference to Kafka, whose allegory of universal discourse and its intrinsic difficulties permeates his story "The Great Wall of China" (published posthumously in 1931, just a few years before the publication of Canetti's novel). Kafka, we recall, insisted on the Wall being a necessary foundation for the Tower of Babel; he welcomed the redeeming power of the fragmentary (the Wall is never completely built in his story) which enables a salutary notion of totality without totalitarian implications.

When discussing Canetti's attitude to Jewishness, and to cultural identity more generally, we should also think of the way in which Canetti refers to himself in the many speeches of gratitude during his long career: he never talks of himself as an Austrian, German, English, Swiss, or even Jewish writer; rather, he consistently chooses to describe himself according to the city whose culture he shares: a citizen of Vienna, of London, Zurich, Berlin. On his chair in the hall of the Nobel laureates, no country name appears: only the name of Rousse, his native town (Dimitrova and Angelova 2004: 275). It is this refusal of identification through race or nation that puts to the test his ability to discern in the Holocaust, especially against the monumentally timeless backdrop he elects to operate with in *Crowds and Power*, a unique event. (A reference to the collective traumas of another nation would not do here: as we have seen, Canetti's own attempt to discuss the Holocaust in *Crowds and Power* in terms of national identities and national crises (German inflation and the consequent infliction of diminishment and suffering upon the Jews) failed.) Nowhere is Canetti's deep probing of Jewishness as a frozen label of identity more captivating, disturbing, and irreducibly complex than in his novel. Fischerle, the hunchback Jew, is depicted as repulsive rather than attractive; the parodic tone is here unmistakeable. But at the same time he is portrayed as an epitome of vigour and energy, and as a dreamer. Oscillating between a case of Jewish self-hatred and a glorification of Jewish resilience, Fischerle is a wonderful example of Canetti's ultimate determination to retain a playful distance from any notion of identity (to confuse things further and introduce another parodic demobilisation of identity, Fischerle erroneously takes Kien for a Jew).

Canetti thus emerges as our contemporary, albeit a difficult one: he hovers between cultural individualism and fascination with the life of the crowd; he is caustic, noncommittal, refusing to be bound by identity-based thinking, for

[14] Dagmar Lorenz (2004: 4) has pointed out that throughout Canetti's writing, beginning with *Die Blendung*, "Austrian dialect as well as Yiddish-accented German, both associated with the lower classes and popular culture, are used in a derogatory manner and ascribed to more or less despicable characters".

ever determined to interrogate sacrosanct categories of belonging, declining the comfort of established ideologies (be it Socialism or Zionism). And at the same time he is wryly humanist in his inimitably grotesque and intensely dislocated manner, a writer at the close of High Modernism who begins to lift the curtain that reveals the ordeals of our own age.

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Abstract

In this essay I seek to reinterpret two of Canetti's most important texts, his novel "Die Blendung" and his treatise "Crowds and Power". "Die Blendung" positions itself vis-à-vis Enlightenment, Romantic, and Futurist notions of high culture, 'world literature', and tradition. Vital for its understanding is Canetti's dialogue with Kafka, not least on the significance of Chinese culture. In "Crowds and Power" Canetti advances his new brand of humanism: grotesque, wry, dislocated, and non-identitarian. I conclude by considering Canetti's attempt to comprehend the Holocaust and his flight from the constraints of Jewishness as a mere label of identity.

ПИСТОЛЕТЪТ ОТ СТЕНАТА
(„Когато гръм удари, как ехото заглъхва“)

Цветан Ракьовски

В моя текст ще става дума както за последната пиеса на Яворов, така и за неговото културосъздаващо усилие да утвърди образа и художествената легитимност на българския театър.

Пейо Яворов пише и налага поставянето на такива драми, които нямат националностроителна история, т.е. нямат предистория и непосредствен национален контекст. Неговата роля като човека, който се грижи за репертоара (и не само), е странна, необичайна, че и парадоксална. Той трябва да полага основите на една театрална култура, работейки за Институцията *Народен театър* чрез репертоарни иновации от типа:

- да ограничи разрастването на вазовската сянка и родилните петна по лицето на българския театър;
- да свие до пълното им изчезване такива чужди „образци“ като „Йезуитът и неговият наставник“ на М. Крьогер;
- да охранява Народния театър и репертоара му институционално-рецензентски: всяка постъпила пиеса се назначава за преглед, одобряване и рецензия от външен автор. Това би спасило сцената от заиграванията с вече поизносената към 1910 г. традиция от типа на „Луди-млади“ (Ц. Церковски) или „Кърджалии“ (Ал. Кипров).

От друга страна, културосъздаващата амбиция на Яворов се зарежда от модерни за началото на XX в. драми като „Вуйчо Ваньо“, „Саломе“, „Зидари“, „В полите на Витоша“, „Великият Галеото“, „Когато гръм удари, как ехото заглъхва“. Тях драматургът цени, налага, внушава тяхната безукорна стойност и извисяваща роля, достойна за биографията на всеки национален театър, който държи на своя академизъм.

Само че тук, в тази си роля, Яворов допуска една грешка – грешка и на артистическия секретар, и на новатора, който иска да наложи промяна. Като драматург на Народния театър поетът Яворов (към средата на 1908 г., когато е назначението му на тази позиция, той все още е предимно поет[1])

[1] П. Яворов многократно (в писма и в частни разговори) споделя, че поезията го ограничава (вж. Ракьовски 1998: гл. 1, 2).

не може да се откъсне и да излезе изпод опеката на литератора, на литературността въобще – навсякъде в неговите драматургични разбори, правени пред трупата на Народния театър или в рецензии за периодиката, преливат литературоцентристките бележки.

До 1908 г., когато пише своите театрални рецензии, както и в 1910 г. (когато превежда „Саломе“), и в 1911–1912 г. (когато създава двете си драми), Яворов е склонен да неглижира драматургизма (сценичността) в името на кристалната литературност. Това обаче причинява нисък коефициент на полезна напрегнатост на конфликта в неговата диалогична мотивираност. С други думи – стига се до нисък визуален ефект на словото. Тогава, за да ентусиазира действието, зрителския интерес, а и градуса на напрегнатост, драматургът измества и/или стеснява миметичния ъгъл – пренася диалога из гробищата („В полите на Витоша“), вади незнайно из чии джобове неясно защо появил се пистолет, който гръмва („Когато гръм удари…“), или сплита неумело любовни многоъгълници и пр.

Подобни подробности от техниката на модерната драма обясняват защо Яворов предпочита „Вуйчо Ваньо“ пред „Към пропаст“, защо „Зидари“ според него е по-исторически мотивирана от историческата драматургия на Вазов: миналото за Яворов е длъжно да носи единствено „материя за въплощението на художническите видения“ (Яворов 1979: 100). Но това ще подкрепи и пристрастията му към един току-що удостоен нобелист като Хосе Ечегарай (неговата пиеса „Великият Галеото“ се играе по това време в София[2]), както и анемичния интерес на Яворов към М. Крьогер (за чиято пиеса „Йезуитът и неговият възпитаник“ той не се изказва особено ласкаво).

На пръв поглед този интерес на Яворов към обновяване може да се нарече и стремеж към интелектуализъм[3]; а и опит да се вдигне равнището на художествената условност чрез философско-умозрителното проблематизиране на „вечните“ теми (любов, вяра, хуманизъм, патриотизъм). Само че във всяко от драматургичните пристрастия на Яворов „вечните“ теми са особено проблематични – независимо от тяхната универсалност. В пиесите на драматурга има дъх на феминистки поклон, има психологически и психоаналитични извивки и предчувствия към Фройд; в края на краищата го има и хиперзнакът „Париж“ като всеяден контекст (падението, спасението, бягството, забравата). Яворов ще засвидетелства на живо чрез собствените си драми как се осъществява резкият обрат в езика на драмата – как се преминава от националноидентификационния еклектизъм (за началото на

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[2] Хосе Мария Ечегарай-и-Ейсагире е носител на Нобелова награда за литература за 1904 г. (заедно с Федерик Мистрал). На българския читател и зрител е познат с две от близо шейсетте му пиеси – „Синът на Дон Жуан“ и „Великият Галеото“.

[3] След Д. Войников и Вазов българската драма обяснимо е водена от онзи „либерализъм на художествените качества“ (вж. Гиргинова 2002), който е характерен за всички преходящи национални театри и драматургия.

XX в. това, което пишат Вазов, А. Страшимиров, К. Христов, Ал. Кипров, е вече еклектизъм) към универсалния денационализиращ интелектуализъм.

В този ред на мислене „Когато гръм удари…“ естествено се явява първата, а не втората Яворова драма. Но замислена още в 1908 г., две години по-рано от „В полите на Витоша“, тя няма как да се появи и изиграе най-напред. Яворов трябва да разчисти пътя към интелектуалната драма (както той я разбира), като първо сценографира как се счепква интимният свят с политическите трусове, как демагогското в неговото обществено битие се обръща срещу любовния дискурс и го изтрива, убивайки участниците в него. Заради това „В полите на Витоша“ е „трагедия“; тя се явява първата Яворова драма, за да може да приключи с все още активния националнопредставителен код на българските пиеси. Едва след това ще стане възможна ролята, културосъздаващата роля на „Когато гръм удари, как ехото заглъхва“.

В своите пътувания по Европа след 1904 г. въпреки резервите си особено към френския театър Яворов научава една важна истина – че независимо от своята генетична обремененост с либерализъм и демократизъм театърът е институция, която не бива да става и да се ползва като „трибуна, катедра или амвон“ (Яворов 1979: 91). Тези социални назначения на театъра са само част от историята, театърът е играл роля на „трибуна“ или на „амвон“. Но това са периоди, които в началото на XX в. би трябвало да са вече минало. Би трябвало драматургичният сюжет вече да е изживял остросъбитийното и високозрелищното действие – то неизбежно превръща драматическите фигури в лостове на драматическото действие. И вдига градуса на зрителския интерес.

Именно тази връзка Яворов иска да елиминира. И елиминирайки, да преодолее… Какво иска чрез своите драми да преодолява? Ами да преодолее сценичността, която открай време се основава на визуално ефектното и ефективно обръщане на диалога в действие. Яворов преследва друго – той е заслепен от човешката психика, от това да даде човешката психическа агония след събитийната катастрофа (Яворов 1908: 109). Ето поради тази причина той високо цени Чехов и неговата модерна пиеса „Вуйчо Ваньо“, уважава психологизма на Хосе Ечегарай и Петко Тодоров, а е саркастичен към И. Вазов, Ц. Церковски и Ото Ернст. Последните трима са показателни с грешката си, гледана откъм 1910 г.: Вазов натоварва историята със свръхфункции, Церковски – фолклора, а Ернст – изкуството. А към дадения момент нито един от трите езика не може да изпълнява тези свръхфункции.

И в трите формàта (история – фолклор – изкуство) зрителските очаквания се моделират от познатия хоризонт на зрелищността, от активния, завързан и препълнен с обрати сюжет. Яворов се опитва да смени регистъра на драматургичното, залагайки на пиеси на Чехов, който прониква дълбоко в човешката душа, за да покаже как калта на ежедневието смазва амбицията и изтрива различията. Не е случаен и интересът на Яворов към Аугуст Стриндберг и Морис Метерлинк, защото именно те проблематизират ежедневния трагизъм, тривиалното блуждаене в очакване на някаква неясна

и химерична висша цел. А това са силно „недраматургични“ елементи от идеологията и технологията на драмата. Но Яворов потиска и динамиката на действието, когато във втората си пиеса позволява епическото, романовото да погълне драматургизма, разбиран най-вече като сценичност.

Маркер за този висок епически описателен и недействен модел на изграждане на драматургичното битие е сериозната роля на ремарките в „Когато гръм удари…“ – те преливат и доминират над диалога в края на първо действие; ремарките съвсем по романов модел приключват второ действие. В същата логика се вписват и несценичните, но твърде романови психологизации на словото от типа:

Данаил говори „болезнено“ или „ранено“ с Олга;

Попович разговаря със сина си „с разкъсано сърце“;

Данаил „бясно“ му отвръща;

Витанов се опитва „вкрадчиво“ да мотивира присъствието си в трето действие.

Това са характеристики, които няма как да се изиграят, по никакъв начин те не са за сцена. Но пък стават за роман, държат се съвсем като обяснителни психологически знаци за героите.

Излиза, че Пейо Яворов модернизира драматургизма, като се опитва да преодолее чисто сценичния реализъм (миметичност). Тогава, в 1912 г., Народният театър все още не е готов да промени, т.е. да стесни блендата на миметичното. Някак като предписание от близо 5 години все още тегне вазовската оратория „Славата на изкуството“ (Пролог в 3 картини, 1907 г.), изпълнена като завет при откриването на Народния театър. Изкуството, респективно театърът, има за основно свое предназначение националния идеал. И ако само за момент се опитаме да изолираме фразата „национален идеал“ от фигурата на Вазов, ще стане ясно защо „Божана“ на Евгения Марс е по-аплодирана от „Когато гръм удари…“. Ученичката на Патриарха, въпреки определено женския дискурс и женската тема, си е останала в светлината на патерналистичното гледане към света и към жената в него. Може би заради това Лора Каравелова е убедена, че в 1912 г. публиката, която аплодира „Божана“, няма да аплодира и Яворов[4]. Драматургът на Народния театър е сигурен обаче, че, тъй като театърът е единствен, той неизбежно трябва да бъде и по своему еклектичен, жанрово хибриден – да съчетава класика и забавление, високо и ниско, та чак и „ултрамодерни работи“ (Яворов 1909: 1–2).

И все пак, когато пише втората си драма, Яворов е по-скоро в дискурса на модерното, феминисткото *a la Lora Karavelova* разбиране за жената. По-долу ще се върна пак на повишеното внимание на Лора към семейната и личната драма на Бистра от „Когато гръм удари, как ехото заглъхва“.

[4] Ето точния цитат: „…и не мисли, че същата публика, която аплодира „Божана“, ще аплодира и тебе“ (писмо на Лора до Яворов от края на март 1912 г. – Париж) (Найденова-Стоилова 1983: 240).

Тук обаче трябва да отбележа, че Яворов следва не класическите (традиционните) въплъщения на жената в житейските сюжети на любовта и брака. Българският драматург следва своя любимец О. Уайлд („A Woman of No Importance“, 1893), споделя идеите на Габриеле д'Анунцио („Невинният“), на Х. Ибсен („Дивата патица“) и А. Стриндберг („Бащата“) (Яворов 1913).

Но Яворов разказва/дискутира в 1913 г. интертекста, сводим към посочените автори, и то година и три месеца след като драмата „Когато гръм удари…“ вижда бял свят като книга (литература). Драматургът е принуден от предимно негативните рецензии, които го съпътстват след 1911 г., да свали текстовите граници на литературния сюжет, за да присъедини драматургичния си сюжет към вече формирания контекст за Любовта – Изневярата – Майчинското. В какъв ред ще бъдат тези три понятия, зависи от автора – така втората Яворова пиеса може да се чете в примерно следния ред: „Невинният“ (Г. д'Анунцио) > „Когато гръм удари“ > „Жена без значение“ (О. Уайлд).

Но ако видим Бистра и Лора (или Екатерина?) Каравелова в прототипна връзка, редът би бил Ибсен > О. Уайлд > Яворов. Все едно: гледните точки са повече, отколкото позволява тук чисто драматургичната логика, защото е силно влиянието на литературната „логика“. Никак не е случайно, че отрицателната рецензия на Людмил Стоянов напипва този интертекстуализъм като „безогледен натурализъм“, който води автора и така той „не създава ценности, той купува на вехто“ (Стоянов 1914: 59).

В тази сложна прототипна и междутекстова игра е пострадал, разбира се, сценичният логичен образ на словото (диалога). Ето защо съвременниците на премиерата (октомври 1913 г.) обвиняват драматурга Яворов, че в „Когато гръм удари…“ няма единство – т.е. липсва „една фундаментална мисъл или идея“, а драмата „се движи от една сляпа случайност“ (Тумпаров 1913: 1248). Критиката не долавя, че Яворов играе с интертекста, той лавира между авторитетите в модернисткото драматургизиране на човешката съдба с нейните жестове на самоопределяне, примирение или отчаяние.

Когато през март 1912 г. Яворов праща все още суровия литературен текст на „Когато гръм удари…“ в Париж на Лора, тя я дава на сестра си Виола и зет си Илия. Оформя се нещо като читалня и читателски оценки, и то преди сценичното битие на драмата. Читателите от семейство Каравелови някак инерционно решават „единодушно, че това (Бистра?) била майка ни“. Тоест Екатерина Каравелова е влязла в текста като alter ego на главната героиня Бистра.

Сложната прототипна схема Лора – Екатерина спрямо Бистра Попович не е случайна, нито пък е плод на объркване или недоглеждане. Яворов съвместява в Бистра **миналото на Екатерина** (достолепие, върховенство на мъжа, на семейството) и **сегашното на Лора** (бунт, прекрачване на семейството, изоставяне на дома и сина). Но пък в това „сегашно“ на Лора го има твърде много ибсенисткото влияние и моделиране на жизнените роли (от „Куклен дом“, но и от „Хеда Габлер“). За пореден път Лора играе

литературни сюжети, пòказно вкарва себе си, а и всички около себе си в сюжета „Ибсен“ и модернизмът, който е далечният прародител на феминизма. Имам предвид и това, че Лора също като Нора или Хеда става жертва на войната с викторианските ценности.

Но нека прекрача „отвъд“ логиката, защото е време това да стане. Ако Бистра е литературна проекция на Екатерина (Каравелова) и Лора (Яворова), то Петко Каравелов и Петко Дренков са двата полюса на оста Бистра – Олга. Сложно е само на пръв поглед… Мъжете като прототип (дядо – внук, които никога не са се виждали) и техните литературни проекции (на Петко Каравелов – „Бистра“; а на Петко Дренков – „Олга“) всъщност са въведени в следите на европейската драматургия.

Само че Яворов, имайки пред очи портрета от стената (Екатерина), хвърля воала на свенливостта върху сценичните си герои и Бистра, въпреки недвусмисленото 50:50 (желание – протест) в греха ѝ отпреди 22 години, все пак остава в ролята на потърпевша, без вина виновна. Драматургът Яворов е насочил текста си из литературните потайности, но винаги на повърхността започват да прозират връзки с реалния биографичен сюжет на семейството. Първо, връзката с Париж: Данаил се връща от Париж, а после Бистра се готви да замине за Париж, за да се оттегли в „Нотр Дам де Сион“ – там е католическият пансион, където е обучавана след смъртта на баща си (1903) подрастващата все още Лора Каравелова. След това: Витанов е из биографичните детайли на Петко Каравелов – и двамата имат участие във Февруарския (Русенския) бунт през 1887 г. И двамата са потърпевши от него. На трето място: подпоручик Друмев, който в „Как ехото заглъхва“ е важна фигура за кръговото затваряне на сюжета, е свързан с македонските потайности, дошли в текста от автора Яворов.

Вижда се колко трудоемко и объркващо става интертекстовото битие на „Когато гръм удари, как ехото заглъхва“. Уважаемите зрители, дошли на 12 октомври 1913 г. или на някое от последвалите още десетина представления, едва ли са имали готовност да сглобят асоциативно пиесите на О. Уайлд, Ибсен, Д’Анунцио в сюжетите на семейство Каравелови-Яворови. Първият прочит на „Когато гръм удари…“ не затруднява, но ако добавим писмата на Лора, ще се получи непредсказуема принадена стойност на значенията. Според Лора действията на Бистра извикват например такива въпроси: „Защо един мъж да е готов на престъпление заради любовта на една жена (…) А защо също една жена да не е готова на престъпление, за да запази любовта на един мъж? (…) Не виждам на какво се чуди Шишманов?“ (Найденова-Стоилова 1983: 235). А Шишманов не се чуди – просто в рецензията си съветва Яворов да направи „греха“ на Бистра по-реален: да има изневяра, и то видима за зрителя, а не изневяра тогава, изневяра при странни обстоятелства, омесили морални, политически, социални и какви ли още не причини.

Когато не разбира трудностите на Яворов с развръзката на сценичното действие, Лора отсича: „Обеси Бистра – за да удовлетвориш българската

нравственост!“ (пак там: 239). Според първия вариант драматургът има намерение развръзката да дойде радикално (Бистра се хвърля в Дунава, но е спасена), а опитът за самоубийство да подейства като нравствено очищение.

Този сериозен интертекстов образ на „Когато гръм удари, как ехото заглъхва“ има и свое иронично-пародийно битие във в. „Реч“ (1913). Там излиза във формàта на цялата трета страница „драма“ пародия от анонимен автор – заглавието е „Когато гръм удари бащата под стария дъб“. Тук се намесват силуети на три заглавия – „Бащата“ на А. Стриндберг, едно от работните заглавия на Яворов „Под стария дъб“ и официалното заглавие. Интересно е и как анонимният автор е реорганизирал текста – пародията започва с трето, следва първо и накрая второ действие. В „Когато гръм удари бащата под стария дъб“ има ред интересни действащи лица – Ал. Паскалев, Ст. Иванов, А. Страшимиров, д-р Тихов, Ал. Константинов (като портрет от стената), Ив. Иванов (директор на Народния театър), Ивановски (режисьор), Иванович (елтехник), бай Иван (прислужник). В текста на пародията, след като са изредени Попович, Бистра и Витанов, Данаил е посочен като „син на първите трима“.

В текста на пародията настават всеобщ „мъжки рев“ и пъшкане под усмихнатия поглед на Алеко Константинов от стената. В края става ясно, че Яворов е отишъл на Дунава, за да се удави. Сигурно от смях, защото и това е такъв жанр – пародия.

Но тук става интересното натрупване на заглавия – освен „Бащата“ в текста на пародията се споменава и „Майката“, драма от младия автор Стефан Иванов. Позната на малцина, драмата „Бащата“ на Аугуст Стриндберг повдига завесата на тази тема откъм другия край: това са майчинският сюжет и бламирането на бащинството като рефлекс на уязвената жена и нейната роля не само на майка. Но в това време редом със силуетите на Стриндберг, Ибсен, Чехов вече става дума и за влияния от друг характер. В публичното пространство добиват гласност тиражираните от Антон Страшимиров съмнения, че Яворов не е съвсем независим и от българската мелодрама „Майката“ на Стефан Иванов. Заради подобни съмнения се стига до искова молба по закона за авторското право, подадена в Окръжния съд. Само че тази връзка със Стефан Иванов не издържа в публичното пространство колкото подозренията, че Яворов просто пренася на българска територия Стриндберг. И все пак спрямо „Бащата“ на Стриндберг българската пиеса има по-скоро идеологически отличия: при шведския автор психологическите изпитания са за мъжа, бащата (капитан Адолф), а съпругата, жената Лаура е спекулативно и провокативно настроена да отмъщава чрез съмненията, които посява у мъжа. В българската пиеса сценичното действие е насочено към гърчовете на майката (колкото и да се хапе и да си пуска кръв, Попович е пасивен герой, докато Бистра реално вади отнякъде револвер и прави реален опит да се убие).

Офицери, семейна тайна, незаконни деца, проблематична изневяра (в минало време), отмъщение – това са, общо взето, сюжетните слухове, кои-

то витаят около „Когато гръм удари…“. И защото точно тук Яворов се е отклонил, разминал се е и със Стриндберг, и със Стефан Иванов, а това не е доразбрал както редовият зрител, изкушен от литературното битие на скандалите, така и Страшимиров, та точно заради това се появява и бележката в сп. „Седмична илюстрация“: „Яворов за своята нова драма“ (Яворов 1913). Бележката е от 5 октомври, т.е. в неделния си първи брой списанието (т.е. Яворов) предварва с една седмица (премиерата е на 12 октомври) евентуалните нездравословни въпроси около интертекстовото пространство, формиращо територията между „Когато гръм удари…“ и всички останали автори (европейски или български).

И сега да се върна пак към текста. Според мен толкова сложните междутекстови следи и автореминисценции (те са автобиографични, независимо дали засягат семейството на Лора или Яворов, все пак след 19 септември 1912 г. става дума за едно семейство) неизбежно слагат белези по тялото на драмата – по-точно върху снагата на сценичната ѝ реализация. Текстът на сцената, изговарян от действащите лица, сякаш се „замисля“ по коя от следите да поведе зрителя. И замлъква. Техниката на мълчанието, открита от Морис Метерлинк, е и форма на отчуждаване, самоизолация на персонажа. Мълчанието обаче (особено на сцената) „се приравнява със спиране на времето“ (Зонтаг 2008). Защото, замлъквайки, действащото лице изолира действието, игнорира словото като действие.

В структурата на драмата „Когато гръм удари…“ мълчанието разсича действието с изрично авторово указване. Паузите, означени с ремарката „мълчание“, са на 10 места: два пъти в първо действие, три пъти във второ действие и пет пъти в трето действие. Най-съобразителен би бил доводът, че колкото отива пò към края си, драмата става по-безизходна, защото мълчанието е бездействие, а „драо“ значи „действам“. Иначе казано, мълчаливците вече не са действащи лица, а лица в ситуация, която свързва мотивите им да бъдат активни (всички мотиви) и ги умножава по нула.

Със страшна сила остава да виси/стърчи въпросът: мълчанието структурен елемент ли е? Ако „да“, значи това е драматургията на модерното писане, измислено от Метерлинк, Хауптман и всички останали учители на българските модернисти по въпроса как се пише нетрадиционна пиеса. Бидейки структурен драматургичен елемент, мълчанието не може да бъде литературен елемент, защото четенето няма как да регистрира мълчаливите сцени така, както би ги регистрирало гледането в зрителната зала.

И сега пак да се върнем към допускането, че Яворов, печатайки „Когато гръм удари…“ година по-рано[5], е воден от убеждението, че неговото дело „е в текста, а не в онова, което изпълнителите дават на сцената“ (Яворов 1979: 202). Но интертекстуалният натиск завръща текста на пиесата на сцената. Заради това му е бил и онзи гърмящ револвер в края на третото

[5] Планът не е бил такъв, но войната раздалечава датата на издаването на книгата от датата на премиерата на драмата.

действие, който никого не убива – револверът трябва да спаси Бистра от нелицеприятната, недраматургична и безсмислена сцена с давенето в Дунава (според първия замисъл); но гърмящият револвер трябва да присъедини пиесата към драматургизма, завещан от Чехов, че пушката на стената (също като портрета на Екатерина Каравелова) трябва да гръмне до края на трето действие. Е, ами гръмва!

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THE GUN FROM THE WALL
(When Thunder Strikes How the Echo Fades Away)

Tsvetan Rakyovski

Abstract

The article discusses the second play of the Bulgarian writer Peyo K. Yavorov *When Thunder Strikes How the Echo Fades Away* (1912). The analysis focuses on the intertextual connections between this drama and West European dramaturgy, especially with several plays by Henrik Ibsen, August Strindberg and Gabriele D'Annunzio.

СЛУЧВАНЕТО НА МОДЕРНОСТТА В ЯВОРОВАТА ПИЕСА „КОГАТО ГРЪМ УДАРИ“ – РЕКОНСТРУКЦИИ НА ПЕРСОНАЖА

Мариета Иванова-Гиргинова и Елизария Рускова

През 2013 г. в рамките на Яворовите дни в Поморие се проведе миниконференция дискусия върху втората Яворова драма. Под вдъхновената „палка“ на проф. Михаил Неделчев част от изследователите на Яворовото творчество дискутираха тази пиеса, останала в сянката на първата му драма, именно откъм нейната сложна и модерна за времето си конструкция, чиито дълбинни послания остават неразчетени за дълъг период от нашата сцена, а и от нашето литературознание и театрознание. Защото години наред интересът е фокусиран към голямата фигура на модерния поет Яворов, към театралната и дори към режисьорската му дейност и към скандалния за времето си текст „В полите на Витоша“, предизвикал множество прочити още с появата си на първата ни сцена.

Предлаганият прочит ще се съсредоточи върху странната положеност на тази драматургична творба „отвъд“ големия текст Яворов. Втората пиеса на твореца сякаш излиза от познатите и очаквани Яворови интертекстуални полета, далеч от разиграваната демонстративност на публичното му битие, на припознавани социални и литературни роли и маски. „Когато гръм удари“ е моделирана изцяло в ключа на модерната европейска пиеса, поради което надскача контекста на своето време, а това поражда проблеми в театралната ѝ интерпретация и естетически припознавания.

Яворов в типичния за него стил предговаря и тази своя пиеса, като изтегля възможни нишки на прочит и рецепция в полето на модерността. Сам определя новата си драма като „експеримент“, сложен текст, „алгебрическа задача с много неизвестни“, опит „във висшата математика“ на драматургичната техника, за да подчертае дълбинната референциалност на привидно баналния любовен триъгълник и заложените подводни камъни в него. Психологическият експеримент е кодиран в ранномодерната драма. Една от пиесите, към които българският писател препраща за съпоставка и съизмерване на неговата творба – „Бащата“ (1888) от Стриндберг, – лежи изцяло в плана на хипотезата за възможна извънбрачна връзка, чийто плод

е дъщерята. Подобно предположение не само разрушава патриархалния модел на общуване в семейството, но и отключва фундаментален архетипен конфликт между мъжа и жената като антагонистични полове. Сходна е ситуацията и при другата световноизвестна драма, която Яворов цитира – „Дивата патица“ (1884) от Ибсен. В нея психологическият експеримент се извършва от едно от действащите лица, носител на свръхидеалистичния стремеж да внесе собствената представа за истина, която да просветли семейния живот на персонажите. Резултатът е самоубийство на нароченото за извънбрачно дете. Експериментът при Яворов е научен и в частност – психологически. А това е част от самата доктрина на ранномодерната драма на натурализма, формулирана от Зола, като последователно изучаване на съвременния живот в общите и в индивидуалните му прояви, както и на закономерностите, на които се подчинява. Българският драматург провежда локален експеримент в своята лаборатория за разгръщане на характерите, за да потвърди, че в съвременния свят е невъзможно връщането назад към традиционното патриархално семейство. По логичен и красноречив начин пресъздава фрагментарността на модерния индивид и изследва формирането на неговата идентичност – ключов момент от разбирането на модерността.

Драматургът обръща изрично внимание върху универсалната конфликтна ситуация лъжа–истина, конкретизирана в мотива за истината, излизаща наяве. Писателската задача, която поставя пред себе си, е да покаже „как засегнатите ще изживеят всеки своето поражение… и нищо повече от това. Аз не съм нито социолог, нито моралист – и искам да бъда само поет и художник“ (Яворов 1960: 257). Сложността на драматургичното повествуване е налице: от една страна застава изпробването на нова драматургична техника, а от друга страна се проявяват познатата двойственост и многоплановост на Яворовата мисъл. Втората линия работи под първата – като умело скриване, закодиране на истинската конфликтност в по-дълбинните нива на драматургичния разказ. Двете линии от своя страна трябва да бъдат психологически и ментално реконструирани и отново преподредени с оглед на невидимата фактологичност и явната конфликтност в пиесата. Как драмата реализира тази амбивалентна и сложна претенция? И дали това не е заблуждаващ ход на автора, тъй като чрез развоя на драматургичното действие Яворов се самоопровергава, като изпуска поетично-художествената визия на конфликта и задълбава повече в морална проблематика, в социоанализа и психоанализа? Идеята ни е да сблъскаме различни нива в конструирането на пиесата, на видимите смисли и на това, което се крие зад тях – плана на референциалните значения, като, от една страна, разгледаме моралния казус в пиесата и неговото драматургично разиграване чрез двата класически мотива – за изневярата и за незаконороденото дете, характерни за по-големите наративи от втората половина на XIX в. („Мадам Бовари“ (1856) от Флобер, „Анна Каренина“ (1878) от Толстой, „Ефи Брист“ (1895) от Теодор Фонтане и т.н.), – а от друга страна, рекон-

струираме културно-историческия и политическия контекст от началото на XX в. и разтълкуваме случващото се в чифлика на неговия фон.

И така, в предговора към пиесата Яворов споменава седем драматурзи: Ибсен, Стриндберг, Уайлд, Д'Анунцио, Р. Брако, Пол Ервио и Анри Бернщайн, чиито пиеси са в набелязания конфликтен модел. Тази директна препратка към творчеството на негови съвременници свидетелства за натрупана драматургична култура и опит[1], които му позволяват да създаде една „модерна европейска пиеса", лишена в много по-голяма степен от лични страдания и пристрастия, от поетически интертекст и автобиографизъм, вечно търсен от Яворовите изследователи, и съсредоточена върху аналитичността като драматургичен подход, характерен за пиесите на Ибсен и Стриндберг. Акцентът на Яворов е към реакциите на участниците в събитието, „тайната, която излиза наяве" – майката, съпруга, сина и биологическия баща. Как осмисля греха всеки от тях?

Известен на всички е методът на аналитичната композиция, позната още от античната драма чрез образцовия пример на Софокъловия „Едип цар" и отново открит за модерността от Ибсеновия реалистичен цикъл. Чрез същия метод на ретроспекцията Яворов структурира действието във втората си пиеса. Видима е липсата на асоциативната разфокусираност от първия му драматургичен текст. Конфликтът е центростремителен и компактен. Разкриването на извършения преди двайсет и две години грях в добруджанския чифлик на Попович от майката, в пиесата Бистра, отеква в съдбата на цялото семейство. Искрата е запалена от физическия баща на Данаил, военния човек Витанов, носител на идеята за лишения от индивидуалност персонаж. Замислен е като обобщен образ на Мъжа, който не се вписва в класическия модел на любовника – изкусител и прелъстител. В пиесата е представен като необходимия елемент в уравнението, героя, който постига целта (неслучайно той е военен), прелъстява/насилва младата съпруга на своя приятел Сава Попович и изчезва за дълги години от живота на семейството, за да се върне по-късно и да инициира разпознаването си като биологичен баща. Витанов се очертава като сериозен протагонист не само в рамките на любовния триъгълник, но и в самото действие. Кой всъщност е Витанов? През действието на пиесата от подпоручик стига до чин генерал, сирак, чиито родители са убити от турците, със сестра, убита или отвлечена в харем (неизяснен – случайно или съзнателно – елемент в пиесата). Изпълнява две функции – да играе ролята на мъжа оплодител и на военния човек, „участник в две войни и една революция" – носител на порядъка и стабилността, на реда в обществото, но парадоксално оказал се

[1] В работата си като артистичен секретар и драматург на Народния театър (август 1908 – февруари 1914 г.) Яворов натрупва завидна теоретична култура и творчески опит в коментиране, рецензиране и анализиране на разнороден драматургичен материал от национални и чуждестранни пиеси, което безспорно развива таланта на драматурга.

рушител на семейството като обществена ценност. Неговата лична драма е загатната, но неизяснена докрай. Витанов е катализатор на процесите, носител на тайната за общността, изживяващ своята вътрешна драма на отхвърлен любовник и баща. Всъщност образът му е далеч по-сложен от натрапващите се в пиесата събития. Той е поредният Яворов самотник, направил опит да овладее своите безпътици. В младостта си Витанов е бил привлечен от топлината и хармонията на семейното щастие на своя приятел, от красотата и тайната на Бистра и съвсем естествено е пожелал да присвои чуждия живот, но, категорично отхвърлен от героинята, той се подчинява в присъщия си военен стил и изчезва от живота на приятелското семейство. Следват израстване в кариерата, компенсаторно на несъстоялото се лично щастие, и подсъзнателно постоянно очакване на това отложено в годините и мечтано семейство. Цялостното му поведение и безпътицата му са плод на двойствената ситуация, в която се озовава – да е носител на обществения порядък, въплъщение на военна чест, насилник под напора на мъжката си страст и любов (най-вероятно) и живеещ с травмата на несъстоялото се семейство и отхвърлеността. За избистряне на латентната драма на този Яворов неудачник ще привлечем някои от направените съкращения на репликите на Витанов в първо действие. Големият монолог от първо действие – разбит впоследствие на отделни реплики и размиващ драмата на героя, загатва, че в първоначалния вариант на пиесата той е бил основен персонаж, а впоследствие е станало изместване на фокуса към Попович. Защото и двамата герои са построени върху символни ядра като „гласа на кръвта“ и „дълга към рода“ и обществената значимост на името и неговото наследяване.

> И никой няма да носи моето име в бъдеще… Аз ще умра за себе си и за другите, за целия свят. Струва ми се, че с мене ще умрат всички ония, които са живели преди мене и чиято кръв тече в моите жили […] Кръвта на умрелите вика в мене […] аз принадлежа на едно по-друго поколение, което вярваше в гласа на кръвта, дълга и в още някои неща, на които днешните хора се смеят. Имам ли аз кому да оставя едно име и един завет?... И да умра спокоен, че съм предал другиму, моя плът и кръв, като сам аз, роден наново или прероден в своите най-хубави сънища, в своите най-съкровени мечти, да ги досънува и да ги види сбъднати или да ги обогати, разшири и да ги предаде напред в поколенията… Бистра, слушаш ли ме, разбираш ли ме?

От този редуциран от драматурга монолог на Витанов, разкриващ началния замисъл за същността на образа, се налагат няколко тези: патриархалният модел за възпроизводството на рода тежи еднакво силно върху всички персонажи в пиесата, което сближава в голяма степен образите на Витанов и на Попович. Различното в двата персонажа е, че при Попович духовното е поставено като приоритет и продължение на интелектуалния и духовния опит, който се утвърждава в комуникацията и дебатирането, докато Витанов е военният човек, залагащ на гражданската сила на името,

на продължението на рода като наследствен процес. Проблемът с наследствеността има две ипостаси и се репрезентира от двата персонажа, изградени с различна драматургична техника. Става въпрос за открояващо се противоречие – видимо по-модернистичният от двата персонажа без съмнение е Попович, но той е решен в по-традиционната драматургична техника – чрез словесното саморазкриване, докато Витанов е изграден чрез техниката на „празните места“ (Р. Ингарден), в един цялостно оформен текст се заличават определени смислови моменти, така че словото да има неясен референт, да поражда повече конотации и да активизира читателя и зрителя. Самата тази техника е практикувана от модерни драматурзи като Ибсен например, докато образът на Попович е изграден по правилата на традиционната психологико-аналитична аргументативност. Затова единият е изплъзващ се и неясен, а другият е разпознаваем и монолитен. Укрепналото драматургично майсторство на Яворов превръща Витанов в действената фигура в драмата. При него се наблюдава припокриване между рационалност и загадъчност, между пълнота и непълнота, което трябва да провокира херменевтичните способности на възприемателя. Витанов се стреми да наложи своето познание за истината, но тя се оказва ограничен, личен, частен вариант на знанието, което персонажите ще реконструират според собствените си психически необходимости. Неговата действена натура ще отключва драматичните ситуации и героите ще се разполагат по оста активност – пасивност, борбеност – съзерцателност, природа – условности на морала. Личното минало на всеки от тях ще се превърне от статична в динамична величина, изложена на болезнена дискусия, в която индивидите ще бъдат подложени на натиска да направят избор, който може да доведе до тяхната себепромяна.

Вторият морален проблем, отново свързан с казуса за бащинството и наследствеността, принадлежи на съпруга и духовния баща Сава Попович, който има силно персоналистично присъствие в пиесата. Неговата драма е от мисловно-духовен порядък. Получил образование в Русия, хуманитарист и просветител, героят носи съзнанието за своя нетолстоизъм: „Аз се старая да бъда просто човек, да живея в доброто, за да живеем в доброто, ние трябва да познаем истината в себе си и у другите: а това значи… да разгадаем велика тайна... не „да не се противим на злото“, а как да го третираме човешки.“ Интелектуалец, той осъзнава проблема, но не може да го реши. Неговият мироглед – смесица от толстоизъм и антитолстоизъм, е и неговата драма. Земевладелец с уклон към философизиране, Попович се оказва фантаст. Такава позиция е безизходна, по същество тя е апория, която се отключва в момента на узнаване на истината. Търсач на абстрактната истина, Попович е абсолютно беззащитен в житейското ѝ овладяване. Той опознава страданието, неговия „сладострастен привкус“, но си остава в плен на една абстрактна доброта, която не може да умиротвори развихрилите се конфликти в семейството му: „До днес аз не познавах страданието. Моите понятия за него бяха твърде смътни. Днес забелязвам, че то има

вкуса на някакво сладострастие… Като че сега душата ми е по-пълна и по-реална. Сякаш по-рано съм я пълнил само с дим; разбира се, с дима на измислиците…“.

Попович също не се развива, както и Витанов, остава затворен в абстрактността на доброто и изпада в самотата на своя съперник. Героят не изпълнява конотациите, заложени в името, да бъде духовен наставник, действащ морален авторитет, да прости и подаде ръка на изнемогващите в своето страдание близки, да намери път към повторното, този път истинско единение на семейството. Резоньорството и в двата мъжки образа – на Витанов и на Попович – е твърде видимо. Героите излагат тези, но реално не влизат в истинска дискусия. В западноевропейските образци бунтът на персонажите е ориентиран срещу ценностната система на обществото, докато в Яворовата пиеса страданието на героите е твърде личностно, независимо от социалната им ситуираност[2]. От втората Яворова драма отпадат проблемите на общественото мнение, предразсъдъците, социалното напрежение и тя се затваря в изключително камерна среда, в която дисекциите върху Аза са в чист вид, в резултат на което семейството се разпада окончателно, сякаш 22-годишният съвместен живот не е съществувал. Тягата към модерната европейска драма се носи от мотива за отчуждението, който изпълва изцяло реакциите и поведението на героите. Докато в първата пиеса на Яворов драматургичните образи успяват да преосмислят своите житейски ценности и да видят себе си и останалите в нова светлина чрез мотива за проглеждането, във втората персонажите опознават единствено собствената си екзистенциална самота и отчуждение. Драматургичният фокус е пренасочен към дебрите на Аза и мъчителните противоречия, в които докрай остава затворен. Но от един момент на действието следва прелом в развитието на персонажите – започват опитите на Бистра и на Попович да преминат „отвъд“ своите метафизични страдания. Попович компенсаторно ще потърси полето на обществената изява с връщане към земята, по-точно – към патриархалната селска общност. По чисто възрожденски маниер героят издига училище, поправя черквата, образова селяните в земеделство, дори им подарява гората си. Всичко, което не може да направи за малката общност, семейството си, се пренасочва към голямата общност – селото. Но отчуждението и след тези дарителски жестове продължава да владее персонажа. В този план прави силно впечатление мотивът за чуждостта в пиесата и в тази посока една неочаквана чеховска атмосфера пуска своите филизи в действието. Попович е роден в Бесарабия, учи в Русия и закупува чифлика си от турчин след Руско-турската война. Бистра е учила в Белгия, в същия католически пансион като Лора – „Нотр Дам дьо Сион“ (Антверпен). Данаил следва в Париж, а периферният персонаж поручик Друмев

[2] Тази засилена субективност като линия на развитие на персонажа тръгва от първата Яворова драма, за да стигне до непредвидима дълбочина във втората му пиеса.

заминава за Турска Македония. Както разбираме от думите на Витанов, семейството по-често посещава Букурещ, отколкото София. Българските топоними съзнателно са избегнати като знак за обръщане на пиесата към една по-универсална среда, с европейски привкус. И първите актуални рецензенти на пиесата забелязват този факт: „... действащите лица са толкова българи, колкото французи, немци или руси“ (Тумпаров 2012: 835), което имплицитно означава, че персонажите са еманципирани от връзката със средата, съсловието и са потопени изцяло във вътрешните преживявания на обсебилия ги психологически проблем.

Най-ярко решение на моралния казус в пиесата се посочва единствено в персонажа на Бистра, но и останалите правят своя нелек избор. Ако се вгледаме в символиката на имената и ги интерпретираме в по-свободен контекст, прави впечатление загатването за четирите универсални елемента в името и поведението на героите. В Бистра е видим акцентът към избистряне, търсене на чистота, прозрачност. А в плана на поведението ѝ откриваме сълзи, плач, препратка към елемента вода – постоянно страдание, съпътстващо укриваната от нея в продължение на двайсет и две години тайна. Витанов се свързва с елемента на живота – огъня, пламъка, който се появява в неговите реплики. Попович гравитира към елемента земя и свързаната с нея уседналост и стабилност, а синът Данаил може да се свърже с елемента въздух. Известието за неговата незаконороденост се превръща в гърма, който разтърсва привидното спокойствие на „застоялата вода“ на семейния живот, съпроводен „с отровно гниене“ и „скрити процеси на вътрешно разложение“, според Яворов.

Образът на Бистра стои най-близо да западноевропейската парадигма на жената страдалка, емоционално крехка, ранима и депресивна. Търсенето на решение на моралния казус тече при нея вече двайсет и две години и в края на краищата тя се оказва най-подготвена за развръзката на събитията. Признаците на тлеещия в съзнанието ѝ морален конфликт са: намразването на чифлика и отказът ѝ да го посещава като място на престъплението, нервните ѝ изблици, непрекъснатата тревожност и постоянното мълчаливо обговаряне на греха, което я кара да живее един паралелен живот, подчинен на отчуждението. В образа ѝ се пренапрягат двата архетипа – на жената майка и на жената съпруга и любовница, желанието за продължаване на рода и желанието за съхраняване на семейството: „Аз съм измервала своя грях безброй пъти, питам се и сега: понеже не извиках, когато оня човек беше толкова смел, не съм ли сама искала да бъда насилена и победена?! Това всякога ми е било много тъмно, но все пак мисля, че е непременно тъй!“ Любимият на модернистите конфликт „природа – култура“ намира израз в нейното поведение. С един век отстояние и културни натрупвания и промени може би ни е трудно да доловим какъв шок предизвиква погледът в най-интимните и съкровени кътчета на човешката душа, когато социалните условности падат и с откровеност се говори за онова, което се е смятало за непристойно, неблагоприлично, непозволено в едно външно

свенливо патриархално общество, а именно – за сексуалността. Критици като Андрей Протич разпознават вътрешния глас на Бистра като израз на сексуалността (Протич 2012: 820), а д-р Н. Тумпаров коментира вече цитираната реплика на Бистра: „Тия думи са в духа на Вайнингер доказателство за оная постоянна зависимост у жената от нейния пол, която Бистра съзнава като нещо неизбежно и непреодолимо. Затова нейната „съвест мълчи пред Бога“, укрепяна от природата“ (Тумпаров 2012: 836). В целомъдреното патриархално българско общество, където сексуалността е покрита с мълчание, забрана за изказване, сякаш не съществува, Яворов оголва тайната на едно легитимно съпружество. Словото влиза в една забранена територия. Това е удар право в сърцето на патриархалното общество с представянето на възпроизвеждането не като радост и наслада от живота, а като принуда, породена от властващия механизъм на патриархалната нравственост и табуираност, чиято последица е травма и раздвоение на персонажа. Официалният рецензент на пиесата в Народния театър д-р Иван Шишманов (2012: 860–861) предугажда опасностите, които грозят пиесата в лицето на консервативното обществено мнение, и я защитава със следния аргумент: „един мъчителен психологически случай в духа на Ибсена“, като се опира на авторитета на скандинавския писател в българската му рецепция и назовава случилото се между Бистра и Витанов „сделка“, прехвърля сексуалността в посока към социалното и икономически разбираемото и бърза да предпази персонажа на Бистра от типичните за пуританските общества квалификации на жената като „душевноболна“ или „хистерична“, опит да се изтласка сексуалността в лоното на анормалното, осъденото от обществото и опитите да бъде изолирано от него. Чрез персонажа на Бистра и предизвиканите от него дискусии Яворов подрива видимо стабилния и подреден социално и емоционално свят на семейството, кара зрителя да разсъждава върху възприеманата традиционно като греховна природа на сексуалността и го полага в атомизирания свят на модерността. Показателно е, че драматичният конфликт не нарушава социалния статус на персонажите, но променя техния поглед към живота и те не могат да се върнат към стария семеен стереотип.

Поставен в сърцевината на конфликта, персонажът на Бистра бива натоварен и с допълнителни драматургични функции, които произтичат от чувството ѝ за идентичност и автентичност. За разлика от образите на Попович и Витанов този на Бистра няма разработена пълна предтекстова биография, с изключение на важното за сюжета фабулно събитие отпреди двайсет и две години. И това не е случайно. Драматургичният текст показва, че идентичността на Бистра е формирана от Попович, от човека, когото обича, като приема безусловно неговите възгледи за живота. В случая идентичността ѝ е неосъзната от нея, тъй като не е направила усилия да разбере себе си. Вместо съдбовната ѝ принадлежност към любимия мъж да внесе хармония в душата ѝ, тази неавтентична идентичност, проявила се по време на парадоксалната изневяра, която трябва да съхрани целостта

на семейството ѝ, я принуждава да си зададе въпроса „Коя съм аз?“. Така установява болезненото разцепление вътре в самата себе си, защото е нарушила стародавното понятие за чест и не може да търси признание, нито защита на своето достойнство сред останалите герои. С тази стъпка, стремяща се да поддържа патриархалното статукво с продължението на рода, персонажът на Бистра се превръща в антагонист на самия себе си в продължение на двайсет и две години и влиза като такъв в сюжета на пиесата. Обигравaнето едновременно на две функции, протагонист и антагонист, от един персонаж показва сложността, с която Яворов възприема конфликтите в модерността, чието адекватно отразяване закономерно разрушава конвенционалните драматургични схеми и изисква прилагането на нови подходи в драматургичната техника.

В тази посока ще се спрем и на определения от автора като драматичен разказ послеслов на събитията „Как ехото заглъхва“. Обикновено вниманието се съсредоточава върху сцената между Олга и поручик Друмев като подсказваща и наподобяваща случилото се някога между Бистра и Витанов. Сходен модел се разгръща в Ибсеновите драми, когато фабулата буквално се визуализира в сюжета, и така многопластово концентрира човешки взаимоотношения в единица време. Визуализираната сцена припомня житейското противоречие на дадения герой, установява повторението на миналото в настоящето като неусвоен житейски урок, който се изпречва пред персонажа с разрушителна сила. Яворов променя Ибсеновия модел и завършва по друг начин експеримента си. Бистра не наблюдава минал епизод от живота си. Олга не отговаря на привличането и на самотата на подпоручика, въпреки че отношенията ѝ със съпруга не се отличават с някогашната нежност и привързаност. Разкриването на произхода на детето, така многостранно дискутиран в предходната пиеса, отхвърля повторението на миналото, повторението на лъжата в семейните отношения. Персонажите са преодолели един конфликтен сблъсък, принадлежащ на модерния свят, и вероятно в последвал драматургичен текст на Яворов биха били изправени пред нови изпитания на модерността.

В хода на драматургичното действие Бистра избира страната на сина и неговата драма, макар че, когато прави опит за самоубийство, се аргументира със запазване на любовта на съпруга си. Противоречивостта на мотивите е отново характерна черта за безизходността, в която се лута модерният герой. Неуспешният опит за самоубийство със същия револвер, принадлежал някога на Витанов и могъл да спаси честта ѝ, само временно отлива натрупания драматизъм. В типичния за нея стил героинята бяга от проблема, като сменя пространството – в миналото напуска чифлика и не се връща вече в него, а сега напуска мъжа си и страната и заминава със сина си във Франция. Характерният чеховски мотив за бягството и търсенето на спасение другаде проблясва и в развръзката на Яворовата пиеса. Но в „България няма пътища, по които човек може да следва душата си, ако тя е като моята… Само че тук те не живеят, а се

давят, за да не полудеят, или след като полудеят…“. Тези разсъждения на Бистра препращат към образа на чужденката Амели от първата Яворова драма, която също противопоставя тук и там, България и другия свят в контекста на цивилизация и варварство. Но втората пиеса измества темата към полето на екзистенциалната проблематика и нейното модернистично обговаряне от литературата.

Интересен и изненадващ (в контекста на Яворовото творчество) е пътят към Бога, по който тръгва героинята. Противопоставянето между тук и там е подсилено от нейния избор да приеме католицизма, и то в една особена негова разновидност, а не православието. Бистра поема по пътя на духовното уединение, постъпва в ордена на Société des Solitaires de la Retraite Chrétienne – общност, в която участващите носят монашески дрехи, но не дават обети, работят, подражавайки на Исус, и разговарят рядко, предимно вечер. „Религията я успокои“, казва нейната снаха. И докато съпругът ѝ се превръща в духовен баща за селската общност, тя избира Бога като път за възстановяване на изгубената хармония и посвещаване на душата си на съпруга светец. Финалът на пиесата разчупва втвърдения за модерниста Яворов травматичен субективистичен модел. Герои като Бистра и Попович преодоляват субективистичната насоченост в мисленето и поведението си и се отварят към една надличностна кауза, свързват се с метафизични величини като Бога и служенето на другите. Това по някакъв начин опровергава думите на самия Попович, че смисълът на брака се състои не в благословията на попа, а на природата. Героите надмогват природния модел, за да оживеят културният и духовният модел. В последната си пиеса Яворов дава знак за извеждане на метафизичната проблематика в творчеството на друго ниво, необичайно за цялостното му творчество дотогава.

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THE HAPPENING OF MODERNITY IN THE PLAY BY YAVOROV *WHEN THUNDER STRIKES HOW THE ECHO FADES AWAY* – RECONSTRUCTIONS OF CHARACTERS

Marieta Ivanova-Girginova and Elizaria Ruskova

Abstract

The aim of the article is to show how modernity happens in the second play of Peyo Yavorov *When Thunder Strikes...* in the context of the most current patterns of the early modern European drama. For achieving the aim, we use the method of modeling characters in the play as well as the articulation of modern mechanisms set in their construction and reconstruction. The psychoanalytical experiment in Yavorov's play is interpreted in the context of the dramas by his contemporaries H. Ibsen and A. Strindberg. We emphasize also the fragmentariness of the modern individual and the formation of his/her identity in order to reveal the inevitable disintegration of the values of the former family stereotype. Yavorov underlines the role status of his characters, their split personality and the traumas caused by this process. As a result of the dissections of the ego in its purest form, the motive of alienation arises. The analysis of Yavorov's characters shows that their development is concentrated on their own existential loneliness and alienation only. They are completely detached from the society and its conventions. The play transforms the concrete topoi to more universal ones, which have European aura. The author's main task is to reveal the inaccessible aspects of the ego and the painful contradictions it lives in.

The paper also pays attention to the symbolic meaning of the names and behaviour of the characters that allude to the four universal elements – earth, water, fire and air. The three main characters in the play – Vitanov, Popovich and Bistra – function as both protagonist and antagonist at the same time, which unveils the complexity of the characters and the conflicts in modernity. The epilogue, called "How the Echo Fades Away", which is also a dramatic account of the play, has been interpreted by researchers as an Ibsen analog. According to our analysis, however, it is rather its invalidation. Yavorov consciously changes Ibsen's model, since he ends the experiment in a different way and opens new perspectives for modern self-determination of his characters. The thorough study confirms that the end of the play breaks the traumatic subjective model typical of Yavorov as a modern author. Characters like Bistra and Popovich move to a transpersonal deeds, which lead to metaphysical values such as God and doing good to other people.

In his last play, Yavorov uses the instruments of the modern dramaturgical expression perfectly and raises Bulgarian drama to a level comparable with the achievements of the Russian and West European early modern drama.

ЗАЛЕЗЪТ НА „ХИПЕРИОН“. ПОГЛЕД ВЪРХУ ПОСЛЕДНАТА ГОДИШНИНА НА СПИСАНИЕТО

Надежда Александрова

След десетилетно елитарно присъствие в литературния ни живот сп. „Хиперион“ преустановява съществуването си. Следата, която то оставя след себе си, е значима – един безспорно голям поет в българската литературна традиция – Теодор Траянов.

Популяризирането на неговата поезия и личност е мисия и на списанието, и на задругата със същото име, която го издава.

В десетилетието на своето съществуване „Хиперион“ е „крепост на индивидуализма и символизма“. „За неговите сътрудници – отбелязва Иван Богданов (1972: 169–171) – изкуството е не само най-висша, но и единствено важната проява на живота. Това поставя изданието в положение на културна изолация, която довежда до спирането му.“

Последната годишнина на сп. „Хиперион“ (X, 1931) се открива със статия на Иван Радославов, произнесена като сказка на 25 октомври 1930 г. в Пловдив на литературно четене на задругата „Хиперион“. Заглавието ѝ в списанието е „Хиперион“ и българската литература“. Иван Радославов е убеден:

> „Хиперион“ не е едно случайно литературно явление.
> „Хиперион“ е един символ…
> „Хиперион“ извиква в съзнанието един едър литературен и културно-обществен факт…
>
> (Радославов 1931: 3)

Ако подходим съответно през символиката на числата и се опитаме да разчетем символния код на числото 10 – то бележи своеобразно връщане към изходната точка на развитието. Би могло да се превърне в ново начало, но със сп. „Хиперион“ това не се случва. Не съм веща в символиката на числата, по-скоро интуитивно търся кодирания смисъл във формулировката на Иван Радославов *символизма на „Хиперион“*.

През 1922 г., когато се поставя началото на списанието, символистичната доктрина е все още жива, но и достатъчно разроена, за да се развива свободно и без конкуренция на литературния пазар. Разбира се, „пазар“ е понятие, чуждо на възвишената естетика на двамата лидери – поета Теодор

Траянов и критика Иван Радославов. Но той е действителността, от която бягството е невъзможно. Достатъчно е да се зачетем в спомените им и тези на техните съвременници. (Реализмът е не просто предпочитана естетика в българската литература. В повечето случаи прилича на неизбежна принуда.) И така, пътят на развитието, белязан от числото 10, не успява да се формира като възходяща диалектическа спирала, оформя се като парабола, устремена към своето начало. Развитието на сп. „Хиперион“ може да се опише като кръгово. В центъра на кръга е поетът, натоварен с много функции – водач, учител, месия – всички останали сътрудници начело с критика Иван Радославов са „спътници“, ако употребим, струва ми се уместно в случая, това понятие на Иван Богданов от книгата му „Спътници на първенците“.

Тези „спътници“ обикновено и в случая не са случайни хора. Повечето от тях са с автономни литературни биографии, със свой принос за съществуването на задругата и списанието, но те са останали без собствена светлина в културното ни пространство, без значение за литературната ни история. Поетите на списанието в неговата последна годишнина са: Иван Буюклийски, Люба Касърова, Петър Кишмеров, Янка Митова, Павел Павлов, Константин Стефанов, Христина Стоянова, Мирослав Минев, Илина Петрова и Теодор Дюлгеров. Техният общ брой е десет, като шестима от тях не присъстват в Речника на българската литература, имената им фигурират в сп. „Хиперион“ и спорадично – в някои други издания след спирането му.

В сравнение с последната през изминалите години палитрата на участниците в списанието е доста по-богата на известни и до днес имена. В „Хиперион“ стихове са публикували и Емануил Попдимитров, Иван Грозев, Иван Хаджихристов, Иван Мирчев, Николай Хрелков, Людмил Стоянов, Коста Тодоров, Димитър Пантелеев, Атанас Далчев, Магда Минева (Петканова), Светозар Димитров (Змей Горянин).

Автори на проза са Вера Бояджиева, Гьончо Белев, Теодор Дюлгеров, Вичо Иванов, Александър Карпаров, Мирослав Минев, Тихомир Павлов, Ал. Паничерски, Константин Стефанов; като критици се изявяват Вера Бояджиева, Дам. Ст. Димов, Николай Дончев, Вичо Иванов, Илина Петрова, Константин Стефанов, д-р Мих. Стоянов, Асен Балкански, д-р Ж. Драгнева, Соня Вичева, В. Каратеодоров, Павел Спасов. Фигурира и жанрът драма с автор Светослав Камбуров-Фурен.

През годините до стартирането на сп. „Хиперион“ Теодор Траянов вече е написал и издал по-голямата част от своето поетическо творчество. Своеобразен връх в него са „Български балади“, появили се след войните през 1921 г. и белязали промяната в неговата символистична поетика, която критиката и читателите посрещат възторжено. В годините на „Хиперион“ поетът написва и издава „Песен на песните“ (1923) и „Романтични песни“ (1926). Издава и книгата си „Освободеният човек“ през 1929, която в послеслова нарича своята „книга съдба“, „романа на един живот“ – книга, в която сам заявява, че е подредил хронологично цялото си поетическо творчество: отделни стихотворения, пръснати из литературната периоди-

ка, и целите си книги „Regina mortua“ (1909) и „Химни и балади“ (1911). В този период на организация и осмисляне на изминатия път Теодор Траянов създава своя „Пантеон“ и подготвя „Земя и дух“. Той замисля да представи цялото си творчество в своеобразна поетическа трилогия в поредицата „Освободеният човек“, „Земя и дух“ и „Пантеон“. „Пантеон“, макар да е запланувaн като трета книга, се появява през 1934 г., преди втората – „Земя и дух“. Според заявеното му намерение „Земя и дух“ е трябвало да включва „Български балади“, „Песен на песните“ и „Романтични песни“. Но през 1941 г. „Земя и дух“ излиза с подзаглавие „Български балади“. Може само да предположим защо не са били включени другите две заглавия. Липса на средства е възможната причина, но и литературни съображения – също.

Теодор Траянов умира през 1945 г., а 11 години след смъртта му се появяват негови избрани стихотворения с предговор и под редакцията на Людмил Стоянов, който през 1968-а, година преди смъртта на Иван Радославов, написва предговор и към подбор от негови статии.

Последното звучи като метафора на окончателно разпадналата се органическа връзка между поета и неговия апологет. Разбира се, разпаднала се по причини вън от тях, подобно на незапланувания от двамата залез на сп. „Хиперион“, когато в желанията си са чертаели неговото бъдеще.

Съзнателно отказвам да определя спирането на „Хиперион“ като „изчерпване“ или като знак за „упадък на българския закъснял символизъм“. Защото ми се иска да го прочета като изпълнена духовна мисия, такова, каквото е било в съзнанието и мечтите на неговите създатели. Защото „Хиперион“ наистина изпълнява мисията си, превръщайки се в трибуна на един поет, и залязва заедно с появата на неговия „Пантеон“. В него той присъства незримо, но осезаемо до великите си избраници.

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THE WANE OF *HYPERION*. A VIEW ON THE LAST YEAR OF THE MAGAZINE

Nadezhda Alexandrova

Abstract

Whether Teodor Trayanov (1882–1945) would have been as important to the Bulgarian literature as he is, without *Hyperion* magazine (1922–1931), is probably a rhetorical question. But *Hyperion* without Teodor Trayanov would have hardly had the meaning of a magazine with a clear mission. And that's the underlying theme of the essay, dedicated to the contents of the last year the magazine was in publication.

БЪЛГАРСКАТА АНТИТОТАЛИТАРНА ЛИТЕРАТУРА ПРЕЗ 60-ТЕ – 80-ТЕ ГОДИНИ НА XX В.

Вихрен Чернокожев

В академичните изследвания върху историята на най-новата българска литература през 60-те – 80-те години на XX в. понятието **антитоталитарна литература** доскоро не съществуваше. Пръв опит за въвеждането му в научно обращение у нас беше организираната в Института за литература при БАН през 2009 г. научна конференция с международно участие „Антитоталитарната литература – преодоляване на тоталитарния мантализъм". На този форум бяха изнесени 36 доклада; участваха учени от всички университетски центрове в България, както и от Германия, САЩ, Турция. Резултатите от конференцията бяха публикувани в сборник (Чернокожев, Кунчев и Сугарев, ред. 2009), издаден в края на 2009 г. с подкрепата на Фондация „Конрад Аденауер" и посветен на 20-годишнината от падането на Берлинската стена. Амбицията ни беше да търсим нови посоки в осмислянето на автентизма на българската литературна и културна история.

Днес, почти четири години по-късно, понятието **антитоталитарна литература**, макар и вече възприето като работно понятие в отзивите за споменатия сборник, както и в изследванията на някои млади литературоведи например върху румънския политически роман от 70-те – 80-те години (Атанасов 2009; Донев 2012; Иванова 2009; Йорданова 2010; Трифонова 2009; Славчева 2010: 26; Али 2011), разбира се, не е безпроблемно. На първо място възниква въпросът за **историческия смисъл и границите на българската антитоталитарна литература**. Признаването ѝ като литературноисторически факт означава и нелесното признание, че в Народна република България е съществувала и съществува **тоталитарна литература**. Ярък, почти христоматиен образец на тоталитарна литература е например „Ода за СССР" от Орлин Орлинов, която с изпреварващо усърдие възхвали нахлуването на съветските танкове в Чехословакия през август 1968 г. и смазването на Пражката пролет. Образец на тоталитарна литература е четиритомната антология „Априлски сърца", издание на Съюза на българските писатели, в която мнозина български поети написаха оди за господството на една партия – Българската комунистическа партия, и една каста

над цялото общество. Дитирамби за вожда, партията държава, държавата партия, която само по име се наричаше „Народна република".

Проблематизирането на българската антитоталитарна литература започва с очертаването на нейния исторически смисъл и граници. Дори националсоциалистическата тоталитарна доктрина – доколкото изобщо в България я е имало – не успя така тотално налудничаво да се разпростре над целия обществен, личен и частен живот на човека, както тоталитарната доктрина в НРБ по времето на тоталитарсоциализма. Авторитарният режим в България през 1934–1944 г. запази частната собственост. Народнодемократичната република я ликвидира насилствено. Когато тук говоря за антитоталитарна литература, имам предвид преди всичко периода от ликвидирането на парламентарната опозиция в България през 1947 г. до падането на Берлинската стена в 1989 г. Интелектуалният протест срещу комунистическия режим в България през този период може да бъде доловен не само във вече христоматийно известните примери: изгорените „Люти чушки" на Радой Ралин, анатемосаното „Лице" на Блага Димитрова, поезията на Константин Павлов, Борис Христов, карикатурите на Тодор Цонев и на Борис Димовски, „Фашизмът" на Жельо Желев. Недопрочетени, недоосмислени остават цели пластове българска антитоталитарна литература – която не винаги, не задължително е и дисидентска.

Що е антитоталитарна литература? Антитоталитарният отговор изключва всяка еднозначна дефиниция, която по принцип ще е непълна и оспорима. Още повече че у нас липсва елементарното, първичното, дори школското знание за българската тоталитарна литература и култура и българската антитоталитарна литература и култура, онзи необходим първоначален, ясно различим христоматиен свод от текстове, който бележи техните радикално различни ценностни хоризонти. За антитоталитарната литература човешкото съществуване в свобода и достойнство е собствена отговорност, а не чужда грижа. Тя не възлага – както идеологически съчинения соцреализъм – отговорността си, своята всекидневна житейска задача, другиму – на Партията, идеята, Вожда, класата, колектива, бригадата, светлото бъдеще.

Проблемът тоталитарна – антитоталитарна литература обаче съвсем не е еднозначен. Автори, които през 50-те години защитаваха идеите на тоталитарсоциализма за литературата и изкуството, през 80-те са на категорично антитоталитарни позиции. Никой не се ражда с антитоталитарни рефлексии; те се придобиват мъчително трудно. Пътят на Борис Делчев например от типичен ортодоксален комунист, автор през 50-те години на „Фашизмът в нашата литература", до автор с разбиране за дисидентството не като случаен „бунт на честолюбци", а като израз на обективни и необратими обществени процеси през 80-те в неговия „Дневник" е истинска не само критическа, но и житейска Голгота.

Разполагането на антитоталитарната литература изцяло в сферата на политическото ще е най-малкото едностранчиво. Нейният ценностен сми-

сăл е преди всичко в **етичната ѝ памет**; тя е много по-всеобхватна и последователна в защитата на насилствено, престъпно потъпквани базисни човешки ценности. Не в миналото е нейната отговорност, а заради бъдещето. Антитоталитарната литература е преди всичко непоносимост към живота в лъжа. Тук ще предложа една от възможните работни дефиниции за антитоталитарна литература.

Антитоталитарна е оная литература (във възможно най-широкия смисъл на понятието „литература"), която, инакомислейки, със свои специфични художествени и/или документални изразни средства, защитава насилствено потъпкваните граждански права и свободи (Чернокожев 2009). Антитоталитарната литература е **литературата въпреки**, която принадлежи единствено на самата себе си. Литературата **въпреки** (а не просто покрай) всеобщия, тоталния контрол над всички сфери на обществения и личния живот на човека; литературата въпреки преследването, репресиите, терора, страха, всеобщата старателно култивирана подозрителност; въпреки свръхидеологизацията, въпреки свръхполитизацията, милитаризацията и централизацията на властта.

Макар и да изглежда обща и оспорима, предложената работна дефиниция възстановява автентизма и разширява вътрешните и външните граници на най-новата българска литература (Кирова 2009); предлага литературноисторическа периодизация, различна от досегашните; проправя път за нелесното завръщане в България на емигрантската антитоталитарна литература на Георги Марков, Христо Огнянов, Димитър Бочев, Стефан Попов, Димитър Инкьов, Стефан Маринов, Стефан Маринов Йовев, Жерминал Чивиков, Любомир Канов. Както и завръщането на изгническата транснационална антитоталитарна художествена и документална литература на мюсюлманските общности за „възродителния процес" в НРБ през 70-те – 80-те години. За нея ще стане дума по-нататък в изложението.

Една от най-представителните творби на българската антитоталитарна литература през 70-те години на XX в. е **„Задочни репортажи за България"** от **Георги Марков**. Вгледана повече в изгническата Голгота на Георги Марков, българската литература все още не знае поради що той е не просто голям, а значим писател. Георги-Марковите „Задочни репортажи за България" и до днес са в графата поповодна „очеркова журналистика". Често писана по принуда и цензурирана под натиска на чиновници в Би Би Си, „Дойче Веле" и „Свободна Европа". Те всъщност първи превърнаха тези репортажи от биография на политическия режим, „пропагандна атака", „пропагандна литература" на факта в ясно изговорена, но все още недоразбрана **поетологическа и в същото време документална метафора на разчовечаването**. Метафора, която не само провокативно преобърна идеологическите аргументи на тоталитарсоциализма, показвайки го не като всекидневно, обикновено „банално", а като радикално зло, доведено до някаква абсурдна, тотална ирealност и насочено срещу самите устои

на човешкото. Метафора, която преобърна и традиционната представа за художественост. Мисля, че няма да сбъркам, ако кажа: „Задочни репортажи…“ са **истински документален антитоталитарен многоперсонажен роман**, документална сага за абсурдизма на най-българското безвремие. „Суверенна република без никакъв суверенитет, както пише Георги Марков, народна демокрация без никаква демокрация, безличен обществен живот, скован от тежка полицейщина“ (Марков 2008: 10).

„Задочни репортажи за България“ разрушиха старателно отглежданото в НРБ безразличие, грижливо поддържания **тоталитарен идеал за единственост**; за народното „единство“ и за единствено правата, винаги правата комунистическа партия. Те показаха „реалния социализъм“ в НРБ като радикално зло далече отвъд рамките на нормалността. Тъкмо безумната утопия, че в някакъв „единен строй“ е възможно изграждането на общество **без различия**, роди не само безразличието и безразличните, но и лагерите, в които бяха физически унищожавани хиляди инакомислещи. „Един народ, една държава, един водач“ – не е ли това лозунг от времето на националсоциалистическа Германия през 1933–1944 г.?

Малцина знаят, че оригиналното заглавие на „Задочни репортажи...“ далече преди да се появят в първото задгранично двутомно издание (1981, Цюрих, Швейцария) на Йосиф Загорски е „Задочни репортажи за **задочна** България“. У безспорен търсач на думите като Георги Марков това натъртване „задочна България“ никак не е случайно. То изважда наяве онази, тайната, до невероятност, до фантастичност гротескна гоголевска соцреалистична България; мрачната, с десетилетия грижливо, планомерно обезличностявана, отсъстваща от картата на цивилизования свят лагерна Задунайска губерния, която трудно забравя бляна си по авторитарно управление.

В „Задочни репортажи за България“, които са своеобразно и съвсем естествено продължение на концептуалистката модерна проза от 60-те години на XX в. в повестите „Портрет на моя двойник“ (1966) и „Жените на Варшава“ (1968), Георги Марков всъщност е събрал пъзела на неосъществените ни животи. Пъзела на пропуснатите ни животи. От профанните катадневни реалии на тоталитарсоциализма, проследявайки грижливо безбройните чугунени фигури на неговия език, стил, манталитет, Георги Марков изгражда една действена, неизненадващо актуална и днес метафора на тоталното разчовечаване; метафора на върховното зло (без ни най-малко да го героизира), отвъд което просто повече като че ли не може да се отиде. По „Задочни репортажи…“ би могло нагледно да се изучава фикционалността на факта. Довчерашните уж борци срещу националсоциалистическия терор се превръщат в класово-партийно убедени и вдъхновени извършители на терор; довчерашните жертви се преобразяват в палачи на собствения си народ – уж в името на народа.

Струва ми се, че днешните сравнения на репортажите с „Архипелага ГУЛАГ“ на Александър Солженицин и „Записки по българските въстания“ на Захари Стоянов са набързо и наедро изречени. Делниците и

празниците, двумирието и двумислието, култът, цитатничеството, цензурата на соцреализма, страхът, омразата, фанатизмът, безразличието, безчовечността, всеобщо разпространяната забрана да бъдеш, да си личност са само малка част от безкрайната верига абсурдистки сюжети на тоталитарсоциалистическата НРБ епоха, разгърнати по неподражаем начин в „Задочни репортажи за България". Всеки от тези сюжети сам по себе си е достоен за романов епос.

Казват, че същинската българска антитоталитарна литература можело да бъде създавана единствено и само в емиграция, далече извън границите на тоталитарния свят, на свобода. **„Покривът"** на **Георги Марков**, роман, мислен и писан още през 1964 г. в България, но публикуван едва през 2007 г., е своеобразна репетиция за „Задочни репортажи...". Четиридесетгодишното гузно колективно мълчание около „Покривът" си има солидни основания. Първоначалният вариант на романа под заглавие „Великият покрив" е завършен през 1964 г., даден за печат в издателство „Народна младеж" и тутакси отхвърлен. Не се осъществява и идеята за филмов сценарий заедно с режисьора Вили Цанков. Имало защо: „Покривът" всъщност предвиди саморазрушаването, рухването на социалистическата система под тежестта на собствената ѝ конструктивна сгрешеност – тъкмо когато тя изглеждаше всевластна, вечна и нерушима.

„Покривът" рязко и категорично се разграничи от маршовите производствено-строителни епопеи на 60-те. Този роман отказа да се присъедини към езика на властта, не! – той направо въстана срещу превръщането на литературата във винаги удобна за (зло)употреба властова метафора, в активен инструмент за репресии. Ярък пример в това отношение е измисленото „априлско поколение". Георги Марков – който в творческата си биография записа през 60-те години и необяснимо по собствените му думи участие в сценарния екип на чугунената партизанска сага „На всеки километър" – през 70-те имаше куража да не бъде част от култовото хорово пеене на соцреализма. Той имаше куража да изговори като документална метафора и тогавашните, и бъдещите ни зарази с робства и несвободи. В романа заводът не е възторжен „завод на живота", а неудържимо саморазрушаваща се под напора на изначалната си конструктивна сгрешеност система. Система, както подчертава Георги Марков, „извратена още в зачатието си":

> От тук нататък всичко е само последствие. Равновесието на силите е нарушено и процесът трябва да отиде до край, до своята физическа невъзвратимост или по-ясно – до своята смърт. Тласъкът е толкова силен, че дори в краткото време на мигновеността разрушението ще получава все по-голям замах, то ще бъде поощрявано от всичките детайли на конструкцията, които при нарушеното равновесие на силите не биха могли да съществуват другояче, освен като агенти на смъртта.

Накърненият „принцип на градивността" неизбежно се превръща в „принцип на разрухата" (Марков 2007).

„Покривът“ е първият български модерен антитоталитарен роман, който така мащабно показа тоталитарсоциализма като чудовищна историческа лъжа, чудовищен театрален спектакъл, човеконенавистен рушител на общочовешки ценности. Впрочем предчувствие за това беше още Талевият роман „На завой“, писан през 30-те години. Димитър Подвързачов, Райко Алексиев, Трифон Кунев, Димитър Шишманов, Йордан Бадев, Данаил Крапчев и неговият вестник „Зора“ пак по това време на висок глас коментираха репресиите в Съветския съюз, посочвайки единосъщия корен на националсоциалистическата и комунистическата тоталитарна доктрина. Заради което платиха с живота си или в най-добрия случай – със забвение.

Инакомислието всякога е неудобен свидетел. В началото на 90-те години почти незабелязана от критиката мина повестта „**Хроника на жестоките дни**“ от **Филип Дахилов** (писана „за чекмеджето“ още в началото на 60-те, скривана буквално под земята, без никаква надежда да види бял свят, и публикувана 40 години по-късно – едва в 1992 г.). В тази повест Филип Дахилов видя някогашната гордост на социалистическата ни индустрия като внимателно планиран концентрационен лагер. В „Хроника на жестоките дни“ „Кремиковци“ е знакова емблема на лагерна България, „завод на смъртта“, а не „завод на живота“. Концлагер за планово пречупване на съдби и отровител на души. И черно на бяло изрече: „Това е общество без истини“. В концлагера „Кремиковци“, назован директно Бухенвалд – умален модел на тоталитарсоциалистическата лагерна България – „веднъж се родиш, цял живот умираш“. Там знамената са „пиратски флагове“, плющящи като камшици, а пътят между общежитието и затвора е няколкостотин крачки (Велчев 2011: 6).

Тук искам да обърна внимание върху още една недопрочетена „книга за чекмеджето“. Във фантастичния роман гротеска на **Румен Шомов „Ускорителят на растежа“**, писан през 1983 г. след смъртта на Брежнев, но публикуван в 1994 г., съвсем директно са посочени механизмите на авторитарната власт, които усърдно произвеждат тоталитаризъм. Езоповският език на т.нар. научна фантастика, често използван през този период като възможен прорез към истината, тук е изоставен; авторовият слог е директно публицистичен. Според Великия пастир на планетата Селения (ударението в българския език е подвижно!) и неговия официален говорител „Добрият копач е по-ценен от всяка тълпа инженери, да не говорим за друга брадясала паплач“.

> Въпросът беше не КАК да се управлява, а КОЙ! КАК – беше ясно – диктатура и централизъм! С други думи – демокрация на диктуващия и диктат над изпълняващите. Планетата и обществото трябва да бъдат безотказен, добре смазан механизъм, който да може да завива с лекота, накъдето пожелае Кормчията. Всеки има място в него – според способностите си. Но не способности в онзи отвлечен смисъл. Тази дума също отвращаваше Великия кедър. Той

ценеше най-важното – да сведеш личностното у себе си до минимума, нужен за работа в полза на механизма. (Шомов 1994)

„Ускорителят на растежа“ е роман гротеска за това как в „социалистическото общество“ обществото всъщност престава да съществува, то е направо ликвидирано от „демокрацията на диктуващия“.

Българската антитоталитарна литература е подчертано персоналистична, плуралистична; тя е извън матрицата на авторитети и йерархии; съзнателно, волево **се отграничава от литературния канон на НРБ и от канона на соцреализма**. Крум Кюлявков, Георги Караславов, Андрей Гуляшки могат да бъдат заедно с Димитър Подвързачов, Райко Алексиев, Змей Горянин, Трифон Кунев, Йордан Бадев, Данаил Крапчев само сред академичната търпимост на един многотомен „Речник на българската литература“. Обяснимо беше чувството на враждебност, дори на омраза, към категоричния отказ на българската антитоталитарна литература да бъде партийна, единна, масова, класова. Тя търси собствена идентичност и едва ли би могло да се каже, че просто допълва, доукрасява литературата на НРБ. С основание може да се твърди, че антитоталитарната литература е не просто различната, а **другата българска литература на XX в**. Матрицата на соцреализма заслужава дълготърпеливо изследване и за да се види, че всичко стойностно в българската литература след 1944 г. е създадено от класиците на българската словесност Димитър Талев, Емилиян Станев, Ивайло Петров, Йордан Радичков, Генчо Стоев пряко компромисите; не благодарение на, а **въпреки социалистическия реализъм**.

Работеща дефиниция за антитоталитарна литература не може да се изгради само върху противопоставянето. **Житейската задача на антитоталитарната литература е проактивна** и съвсем не се свежда до поредното революционно прекрояване, пренаписване, пренареждане на литературната и културната ни история. Това вече сме го живели. Антитоталитарната литература има друг манталитет, друга нравствена отговорност. Житейската задача на антитоталитарната литература е да ни приближи до **погубения автентизъм на собствения ни живот**. И чак на второ и трето място – до автентизма на литературната и културната ни история, до нейното същинско, интензивно, всекидневно битие в отговорността. Автентизмът на човешката идентичност; автономността на индивида и автономността на колектива тук не са празна надежда. Тук – за разлика от естетиката на соцреализма – паметта не е превърната в институция, която постановява кое задължително да помним и кое задължително да забравим. Антитоталитарната литература възстановява човешкото достойнство, усилието на човека да избере, осмисли и изрече онези културни универсалии, по отношение на които животът му има стойност; да не участва в предварително разчертаната тоталитарна геометрия, бидейки хем жертва, хем съучастник. Усилието на човека да бъде свободен дори и в условията на тотална несвобода.

Затова и антитоталитарната литература, която с основание може да бъде наречена другата българска литература на XX в., беше маргинализирана. Не само защото съзнателно, волево отхвърли материалистическия, комунистическия възглед за света. Впрочем българската антитоталитарна литература не начева след нашествието на Червената армия в България през септември 1944 г. Нейното начало, както вече отбелязах, е още в 30-те години, когато писатели като Димитър Подвързачов, Райко Алексиев във в. „Щурец", Димитър Талев например в романа „На завой" на висок глас коментират Сталиновите репресии в Съветския съюз. За тях, а и за критици като Йордан Бадев, Данаил Крапчев, не беше никаква тайна единосъщият корен на националсоциализма и социализма по съветски образец.

Изолацията и премълчаването на стиховете на Александър Вутимски, Атанас Далчев, на стиховете от каторгата на Змей Горянин, Йосиф Петров, на Трифон-Куневата публицистика или публицистиката на Румяна Узунова, прозата на Йордан Вълчев, Дянко Марков, Асен Христофоров, Георги Заркин, поезията на Йордан Русков също бяха форма на репресия. Форма на репресия е и идеологическата принуда над романа „Тютюн" на Димитър Димов, прекрояването на историческата романистика на Фани Попова-Мутафова или лириката на Никола Фурнаджиев. Преди малко съвсем съзнателно не отделих Александър Вутимски и Атанас Далчев от лагерниците Йосиф Петров, Йордан Вълчев, Йордан Русков, Дянко Марков, Георги Заркин. Оставям други да делят българската антитоталитарна литература на художествена и документална, на класическа и маргинална.

Тук възникват възражения, че Атанас Далчев например или Асен Христофоров не попада в дихотомията тоталитарен – антитоталитарен автор (Аретов 2009: 73). Но те – и разбира се, не само те – са автори с подчертано антитоталитарни рефлексии, които няма как да останат незабелязани, пренебрегнати. **Гръбнакът на антитоталитарната литература не е непременно политически, макар да е по съвест, не по партийна принадлежност, антикомунистически**. Гръбнакът на антитоталитарната литература, както вече отбелязах, е преди всичко **етически**. Зазиданият „железен, каменен" „Балкон" на Атанас Далчев „без никаква врата" не е ли всъщност предчувствие за тоталитарния свят, свят, в който човекът може да избере – да бъде или да не бъде зазидан, да бъде или да не бъде духом свободен. И най-много да преживява скитнически долу, в низините на тоя като че ли завинаги зазидан балкон, който „стопаните дори не подозират".

Отчетливи антитоталитарни рефлексии могат да бъдат разпознати например и в Далчевото стихотворение „Александър Невски" в мъгла" (1972). Там църквата отдавна вече не е Божият храм, безмълвно потъващият кораб на вярата е в тиня. И това – уви! – не е метафора, а жива и жилава днешна реалност (вж. Аврамов 2011: 448). Далчевите философски „Фрагменти" не са ли по самата си природа антитоталитарни? Случайно ли Радой Ралин

казваше, че със своите „Фрагменти“ поетът създава „универсална философия за изход от злото“ (Далчева и Кунчев 2013).

В настоятелно обявяваната за „тиха“ лирика на Първан Стефанов например има едно стихотворение „Сняг в Берлин“, написано през 1980 г. – девет години преди да рухне Берлинската стена:

Пресечени улици. Пресечени вени.
Пристегнати здраво. И пак кърви.
И болката някак подземно стене.
Или с патерици върви.

Бих включил без колебание това антитоталитарно стихотворение в бъдещата – все още неналична – „Антология на българската антитоталитарна литература“. Ето го пак старият ужас на тоталитарното мислене и тоталитарното действие, разделящ света на лагери. Тоталитаризмите на XX в. неведнъж насилствено, престъпно пресичаха и пресичат свободния обмен на идеите, пътя от човек до човека.

Асен Христофоров може да не е типичен антитоталитарен автор, но в творчеството му също има отчетливи антитоталитарни акценти. Ако соцреализмът у нас през втората половина на XX в. е силово наложена и строго охранявана тоталитаризираща метафора, метафора на тоталитарната власт, то Христофоровият роман „Мацакурци“ (1958) съзнателно разгради тази клиширана метафора, която имаше претенциите всевластно да инженерства над човешките души. Асен Христофоров, интелектуалецът от Роберт колеж, от Лондонския икономически институт, знае, че в края на краищата всякое клише на масовата монументална пропаганда, имаща налудничавите претенции да се разпростре върху целия обществен и личен живот на човека, неизбежно се изражда в кич.

Пак казвам: работеща дефиниция за антитоталитарна литература не може да се изгради само върху противопоставянето. Антитоталитарната литература не е просто литература против тоталитарната литература, а **литературата, преодоляваща тоталитарния манталитет**, тоталитарното мислене и тоталитарното действие. Антитоталитарната литература няма място в литературния канон на НРБ; тя по природа е откровено **антиинституционална, неканонична, в немалко случаи подриваща дори самата идея за литературност.** Затова не се и стреми да формира някакъв свой алтернативен литературен канон. Защото самата идея за канон вече е тоталитаризираща. Канонът е канон – винаги прав, безпрекословен владетел на вярата, той не допуска другост. В канона всички гласове изпълняват една и съща мелодия. Антитоталитарната литература наистина има друг манталитет. Неслучайно родовият белег на тази литература с протестен корен – която, повтарям, с основание може да бъде наречена другата българска литература на XX в. – е етически в постоянното и напрегнато усилие да преодолее типичното, силом наложената колективистична щампа, в

която човешката индивидуалност изчезва, става опасно, че и войнствено неразличима.

Новата българската литература още преди „Под игото“ на Иван Вазов е по рождение изгнаническа. Писателите емигранти Георги Марков, Димитър Инкьов, Христо Огнянов, Стефан Попов, Стефан Маринов, Стефан Маринов Йовев, Иван Михайлов, Димитър Бочев, Цветан Марангозов, Любомир Канов, Красимир Дамянов, Николай Сарафов, Димитър Динев, Иван Бързаков, както и онези, които съзнателно, протестно живяха като вътрешни емигранти в България – Радой Ралин, Александър Геров, Блага Димитрова, Борис Христов, Константин Павлов, Николай Кънчев, Иван Теофилов, Димитър Коруджиев, Иван Цанев, Биньо Иванов, Георги Рупчев, Данила Стоянова, Златомир Златанов, Ани Илков, Кирил Мерджански, Едвин Сугарев, Георги Господинов, имаха куража не само да се противопоставят на лъжата соцреализъм, но и да създадат литература с друг генетичен паспорт. Коренно различен от канона на соцреализма, своеобразна контракултура, която генерира повече гражданственост. Това е наистина друга литература, друга култура на паметта, от която днешна България е все още далече. Тук само пътьом ще вметна: българската постмодерна литература от края на 80-те – 90-те години на XX в. според мен също носи в деконструкциите си отчетливи антитоталитарни белези.

Съществува един немалък масив от до неотдавна старателно скривана, почти непроучвана **лагерна и затворническа художествена и документална литература след 1944 г**. Тепърва предстои лагерните текстове на Стефан Бочев, Дянко Марков, Йордан Русков, Йосиф Петров, Йордан Вълчев, Георги Заркин, Стефан Попстефанов, Васил Зафиров и други да добият своето десетилетия наред съзнателно потискано литературноисторическо въздействие, своята естествена, макар и непретенциозна, литературноисторическа представителност. Заслуга е на Дянко Марков и на Борислав Скочев, създател на електронния сайт „Декомунизация“ – http://www.decommunization.org/index.html – че обърнаха вниманието ни към тази литература (Скочев 2009). Непроучена, почти напълно непозната остава и **изгнаническата транснационална литература на българските граждани** с турски етнически произход, принудително въдворявани в лагера „Белене“ заради съпротивата срещу „преименуването“, насилствено изселвани от България по време на „голямата екскурзия“ през 1989 г., **литературата на малцинствата, българският самиздат през 1945–1989 г**.

Тук бих искал да сложа особен акцент върху напълно непознатата у нас художествена и документална литература на мюсюлманските общности за „възродителния процес“ в НРБ през 70-те – 80-те години. Тя е предмет на изследване в международния научен проект „Идентичност и асимилация“, осъществяван от Института за литература при БАН и Факултета по хуманитарни науки в Анкарския университет под ръководството на доц. д-р Вихрен Чернокожев и проф. д-р Зейнеп Зафер. Като първи етап от про-

екта в началото на 2015 г. излезе антологията „Когато ми отнеха името“. В нея за пръв път са издирени и събрани представителни за литературата на мюсюлманските общности художествени и документални текстове от 30 автори за „възродителния процес“ през 70-те – 80-те години. Ще цитирам само част от стихотворението на Сабахаттин Байрамьоз **„Когато ми отнеха името“**, което даде названието на антологията:

ЗАГУБИХ ЗРЕНИЕТО СИ.
Просветна кървава светкавица
и всичко стана равно, плоско.
Арестуваха гласа ми на улицата,
а гордостта ми се превърна в срам,
когато загубих зрението си.
...
ЗАГУБИХ СЛЕДИТЕ СИ.
Времето потъна във незнайна пропаст,
звезди се отрониха от зодията на честолюбието ми.
Идентичността ми – във вериги окована;
дори баща ми в гроба чужд ми стана,
когато загубих следите си.

ЗАГУБИХ ЗРЕНИЕТО СИ,
ЗАГУБИХ ТАЙНИТЕ СИ,
ЗАГУБИХ СЛЕДИТЕ СИ,
КОГАТО МИ ОТНЕХА ИМЕТО.
(прев. от турски проф. Зейнеп Зафер)

Предстои ни внимателно вглеждане в една абсолютно непроучена в по-голямата си част транснационална, мигрантска литература на травматичния опит. Не просто алтернативна на соцреализма литература, а антитоталитарна литература на съпротивата срещу насилствената смяна на имената и прогонването на нашите сънародници с турско етническо самосъзнание. Съпротива срещу подмяната на самоличности, заличаването на самоличности. Заличаване по-престъпно дори от крайния акт на насилие – убийството. Това е литература, създавана от някогашни по конституция „пълноправни“ граждани на НРБ, които живяха като дисиденти в България; мнозина живяха и живеят днес като изгнаници в Турция.

Системното литературноисторическо проучване на тази **литература на „отхвърлените приобщени“**, създадена от автори като Ахмед Шериф Шерефли (Зафер 2009), Мехмед Карахюсеинов, Свилен Капсъзов (Кяшиф Ахмедов Капсъзов), Реджеп Кюпчю, Сабахаттин Байрамьоз, Ибрахим Камбероглу, Лятиф Али Йълдъръм, Ахмед Атасой, Фаик Исмаил Арда, Захит Гюней, Невзат Дениз, Сюлейман Адалъ, Ниязи Бахтияр, Небие Ибрахим Акбъйък, Мехмед Тюркер, Ислам Ерди, Юмер Осман Ерендорук, ще запълни една съществена, съзнателно поддържана празнина в знанието ни за тази антитоталитарна транснационална изгнаническа литература.

Потресаващ е пейзажът на насилието например в стиховете на Мехмед Карахюсеинов[1], който при насилствената смяна на имената на българските турци се самозапалва на 1 февруари 1985 г. Преди да почине от раните си в болницата, когато вече е в безсъзнание, „възродителите“ правят опит да му натрапят измислено от тях ново име. Отнемането, насилственото заличаване на рожденото име на човека е патологично криминално деяние, несравнимо дори с убийството. Все едно да лишиш от памет, да изтръгнеш от корен, да унижиш и унищожиш не само конкретния човек, но и паметта за целия му род векове назад.

Горят гърдите ми! Горя, горя…
това не е насън, а е наистина.
Като дърво, откъснато
от своята гора
след мълния,
сред пламъци увисвам.

В предговора към стихосбирката на Мехмед Карахюсеинов „Не по ноти“ (1999) Константин Павлов нарече самоубийството му „крайно отрицание на патологията“. „Защото живяхме в система, казва Константин Павлов, където законите за физическото оцеляване заповядваха да се откажеш не само от име и род, но и от собствената си личност“ (Павлов 1999).

Литературата на мюсюлманските общности за „възродителния процес“ в НРБ през 70-те – 80-те години на XX в. е тема, която заслужава специално самостоятелно изследване. Тепърва предстои – в рамките на проекта „Идентичност и асимилация“ – да аргументираме самостоятелното и специфично място на тази литература и в българската антитоталитарна литература; да предложим систематичен и идеологически необременен анализ на статута и ролята на тази литература както спрямо традицията на българската, така и спрямо традицията на турската литература от втората половина на XX в. Както и да очертаем ключовата ѝ роля при формиране на национална идентичност, затруднена в случая от разполагането си между две етнически и езикови групи; да предложим механизми за вписване на една „друга“, с оглед надетническата, религиозната и дори езиковата принадлежност на авторите ѝ, литература, в общото русло на националната, „своята“ литература. Изследването на литературата на мюсюлманските общности за „възродителния процес“ в България през 70-те – 80-те години ще е принос и етап от цялостното му осмисляне, като открито и ясно артикулира вината и травмата.

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[1] Мехмед Карахюсеинов е син на известния в близкото минало поет Хасан Карахюсеинов, доброволно приел от „възродителите“ името Асен Караханов-Севарски.

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BULGARIAN ANTI-TOTALITARIAN LITERATURE OF THE 1960s–1980s

Vihren Chernokozhev

Abstract

The study offers and establishes a working definition of *anti-totalitarian literature* and shows its conceptual difference from the literature of The People's Republic of Bulgaria in 1960s–1980s. It traces out the "boundaries", historical meaning, general characteristics and genre variety of this literature like "alternative canon", and also fixes its own specific place in the history of Bulgarian literature. The current study analyzes unexplored fields by presenting the other literature that opposes to the socialist realism in Bulgaria in the 20th century. It overcame the totalitarian thinking and totalitarian action, but remained inadaptable to the canon of the socialist realism and, to a great extent, out of national literary history.

Anti-totalitarian literature, which was persecuted, censored, forbidden, unexplored during the period of the "real socialism" in The People's Republic of Bulgaria, reveals today little known or unknown figures in Bulgarian culture, restores their memories about the authenticity of Bulgarian social life.

СФИНКС: „ДОБРОДУШНИТЕ СМОКОВЕ“ НА ЙОРДАН РАДИЧКОВ КАТО МИТИЧНА АНТИДРАМА

Николай Кирилов

Целите на настоящата работа са три. Първата е частично да се попълни известната метатекстова празнина по отношение на един драматически текст на Йордан Радичков, радиопиесата „Добродушните смокове“ (1998)[1]. По неизвестни причини (вероятно заради отсъстващата претенция за проксемно-кинетичната възможност на сцената и за възможната интимност на четенето) тази изключителна творба често остава несправедливо засенчена в тълкувателските „офанзиви“ спрямо Радичков от интерпретации върху останалите му шест драматически текста. Втората цел е да се постави това произведение в контекста на едно разбиране за жанра на абсурдистката драма, при което *абсурдното* и *безсмислицата* в един драматически текст се формират като *отсъствие на (очаквано) свързване*[2]. Третата цел е да се погледне към многократно обговаряния „митологизъм“ на Радичковото творчество – как той присъства в „Добродушните смокове“, съвместява ли се или не с абсурдисткото (доколкото го има) и в крайна сметка действително ли става въпрос тъкмо за „митологизъм“.

В своята най-разпространена, „идеална“ форма абсурдистката драма се съпротивлява на митологичните сюжети. Едва ли някой би открил в „антисемейна“ пиеса като „Плешивата певица“ на Йонеско или в „отсъстващата епифания“ на „В очакване на Годо“ на Бекет кой знае какви отпратки към „класическите истории“; всеки паралел на абсурдистки сюжет или мотив с такъв от митовете – например на летящия труп в края на „Амеде или как да се отървем от него“ на Йонеско с мита за Икар или на преобразяването на героите от „Носорози“ на Йонеско с метаморфозите от старогръцката митология – е твърде условен, твърде несигурен; дори да има подобно наративно прехождане, трансформациите са изключително съществени.

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[1] Радиопостановката на този текст на Радичков с реж. Иван Добчев и с участието на самия Радичков е достъпна в интернет: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94ZqnB9Crsk> (20.06.2015).

[2] На едно такова разбиране се основава книгата ми за абсурдизма (Кирилов 2015).

Обясненията за преобладаващото дистанциране на абсурдизма спрямо Мита могат да се крият в различни негови вътрешноприсъщи принципи, тематични ориентации, светоустройствени представи: в това, че в митологичното мислене симулирането или откриването на кръговрата предпазва от „ужаса на историята“ (Елиаде 1994: 161–188), а антидрамата открива „ужаса на кръговрата“; в това, че за митологичното мислене е присъщо търсенето на „свръхдетерминизъм“[3], а за антидрамата – отчаянието пред невъзможността да се открива причинност; в това, че митологичното мислене оценностява един абстрактен отминал период („Великото време“, „някога“, *Illud tempus*), а антидрамата подценява стойността и възможностите на каквато и да било памет; в това, че митологичното мислене е свързано с идеята за „нормалността на страданието“ и „в нито една архаична цивилизация болката и страданието не се считат за „слепи“ и *безсмислени*“ (Елиаде 1994: 111), а антидрамата се гради върху тезата за нецелесъобразността на нещастията; в това, че митологичното мислене предполага дихотомията *дух/душа–тяло* (Тайлър 1992), а антидрамата преобладаващо не се интересува от нея; в това, че митологичното мислене „коригира“ света чрез въвеждането на сакралното, а визията на абсурдистката драма е принципно антиаксиологична; в това, че Митът има (и) социално регулативна функция, а антидрамата не намира никаква оптимистична опора в колективното (но и в индивидуалното, както е при ранния модернизъм), и т.н.

Каквито и да са причините за несъвместимостта на Мит и абсурдизъм обаче, Радичковата драма като че ли предлага някакво преодоляване на тази несъвместимост. Затова нека се опитаме да хвърлим светлина върху тройното отношение *митологично мислене–Радичков–антидрама*.

Първо да отбележим, че Митът безспорно има участие в драматическите текстове на Радичков, но не само по начина, който най-често се регистрира – външно, наративно или ономастично загатване на сюжети. Прекомерността при търсенето на *конкретен* архаичен разказ крие опасността да започнем да виждаме зад Софрона от „Януари“ само Ариадна или мойра (прочити, които са в непрекъснато обращение), зад Лазар от „Лазарица“ – единствено евангелския Лазар, зад полета в „Опит за летене“ – само мита за Икар, зад Йоната от „Кошници“ – само библейския Йона[4] и

[3] Клод Леви-Строс пише: „Но нали магическото мислене (…) се отличава от науката не толкова по някакво непознаване или пренебрежение на детерминизма, колкото по едно по-настойчиво и по-непримиримо изискване за детерминизъм, което науката може в най-добрия случай да оцени като неразумно и прибързано?“ (Леви-Строс 2002: 24).

[4] Да споменем мимоходом и Радичковата драматическа ономастика. Голяма част от героите носят библейски имена – Исус, Лазар, Гаврил, Исай, Ангел, Софрона (отпращащо към църковното Софроний), Аврам, Матей, Петър и Павел, Давидко, Бай Гаврилов, Йоната. От друга страна стоят антономазиите – Зеленото дърво и Шушляка от „Суматоха“, Флигорната от „Януари“, шестте „тоги“ от „Образ и подобие“ – и прякори – Иван Га-

прочие редукции, несъобразяващи се със сложното съжителство на модели у Радичков. Методологията на директно отпращане на текста към определени „утвърдени“ истории в повечето случаи възпрепятства откриването на действителните прояви на митологичната ментална нагласа.

Същевременно много от изследователите обвързват концепциите си и с търсенето на „универсални символи“, една сякаш позакъсняла стратегия от псевдоюнгиански тип, която приема, че мисленето на всички народи се прикрепя към един устойчив набор от обекти, от абстрактни концепти – например винаги *вълк* = ‘смъртта, отвъдния свят’. Тези разбирания често са приковани към предпочитанията на изследователя и неговите познания относно една или друга митология – Радичковите „символи“ безразборно са били съпоставяни със старогръцките и римските митове, скандинавските, тези на алхимията, индуизма, тюрко-монголските вярвания, християнството и пр. (В такива случаи можем да запитаме – несъвсем несериозно – какъв „символ“ са *гамашите* и към коя митология отпращат.) На този подход ще противопоставим разбирането на Клод Леви-Строс, който в анализа си на примитивната „логика“ отбелязва, че тя може да употребява почти всичко[5] и че „постоянни са не елементите, а само отношенията между тях“ (Леви-Строс 2002: 72). С други думи казано, не е задължително обработените от митологичното мислене обекти да са непременно познатите от различните митологии (подвластно на „архаизирането“ може да е не само понятието *вълк*, но и понятието *телевизор*) и не е „по правило“ например черният цвят да символизира смъртта, а белият – живота, може да е точно обратното, а може и двете дихотомии въобще да не са успоредни и черният цвят да символизира живота, а смъртта да се символизира, да кажем, от червения. Във всеки случай анализът трябва да оперира с конкретния текст или наратив, а не със случайни отпратки към една или друга митологична система.

Нека се обърнем към „Добродушните смокове“. Тъй като този текст, както споменахме, не е сред най-популярните, първо да припомним съдържанието му. Две селски жени – Тетка Анастасия и Черната Станка, отиват

маша, Торлак, Аврам Опитомителя, Петлето, Матей Нищото, Аврам Совалката, Игото, Бабина душица, Куче влачи. В тази линия „собствеността“ върху името е оценена като несъществена – то или отпраща към *другиго* (популярните библейски фигури), или към *друго*, като същностно по-близо до „архаичното“ мислене са не толкова библейските имена, колкото антономазиите и прякорите. Нека добавим и една паронимна алюзия: имайки предвид, че „Добродушните смокове“ е единствената Радичкова радиопиеса, като че да има известно (тъкмо радичковско) „намигване“ в името *Черната Станка* („черната станция“).

[5] За да илюстрира това, Леви-Строс цитира етнографски данни за открити в Африка тотеми *бръснарско ножче* и *монета* (Леви-Строс 2002: 156), в Северозападна Австралия – *бял Човек, моряк* (Леви-Строс 2002: 195), на о. Бикертон – *кораб*; съществували дори тотемни песни за самолетите тип „Каталина“ (Леви-Строс 2002: 196). Тоест примитивното мислене не работи с „наръч символи“, с какъвто често се случва да работи мисленето на интерпретаторите.

да берат липов цвят на една поляна извън селото. Там заварват Цино от съседното село – той също бере липов цвят, но се държи твърде странно – изобщо не отговаря на поздрава, а на въпросите им отвръща единствено с кимане. Двете жени започват работата си, но в един момент решават да отидат на кладенчето да се напият със студена вода. Тръгват, а по пътя, докато обсъждат напоследък навъдилите се смокове, Черната Станка и Тетка Анастасия са принудени непрекъснато да избиват многобройните изпречили им се влечуги. На кладенчето селянките срещат Ковача Реджо. Той им разказва фантастичната история за това, как преди няколко дни се сражавал с огромен смок, отсякъл му главата, тя се спуснала да бяга и се покачила на близкото дърво, откъдето започнала да съска и да се заканва. Скоро тримата се разделят, а двете жени тръгват обратно към поляната. Но по пътя забелязват, че избитите от тях смокове необяснимо са изчезнали, а когато стигат до поляната, откриват, че и Цино го няма. Докато се чудят какво се е случило, към тях приближават три каракачанки от селото на Цино. Като ѝ споменават за Цино, едната каракачанка заявява, че не е възможно да са видели съселянина им, тъй като той отдавна е умрял. Когато трите каракачанки се отдалечават, Черната Станка и Тетка Анастасия забелязват облак мушици да се издига над набрания от Цино липов цвят и с ужас разбират, че всъщност това не са никакви мушици, а душата на Цино, която се възнася към небето. Уплашени, двете жени побягват, задъхано произнасяйки молитви към Господ[6].

И това Радичково произведение се поддава на „символна“ и „наратологична“ интерпретация, следваща утъпкания път на споменатата критическа традиция. Не е трудно да се открие архаичната (присъща и за Емпедокловия плурализъм, запазила се в астрологията) онтология, в която светът е изграден от четири елемента – огън (Ковачът Реджо), вода (кладенчето, „Пеперудата за дъжд“ на двете жени), въздух (Свраката, ангелът от разказа на Реджо), земя (смоковете). Известна е и изключителната употребяемост в „примитивната“ символика на образа на *змията* и е удивително как Радичковият текст обилно приема митологеми (и то не само с юдео-християнски произход), свързани с него. Мирча Елиаде свидетелства за редицата митологични женски образи със змии вместо коси (Горгона, Ериниите), за суеверията от Централна Европа, според които, ако в земята се заровят коси от жена, намиращи се под влияние на Луната (т.е. в менструален цикъл), то те се трансформират в змии, както и за бретонската легенда, според която косите на вещиците се превръщат в змии (Елиаде 2012: 189–191). Творбата на Радичков активира тази представа, снабдявайки трите каракачанки

[6] Сюжетът на радиопиесата, изглежда, не е в такава степен подвластен на, да го наречем, „лабиринтното“ писане на Радичков, където мотивите прехождат от творба в творба, варирайки, а понякога срещайки се след многократни преобразувания. Сюжетът на „Добродушните смокове“ има един-единствен ясен първоизточник в разказа „Смокове в ливадите“ от едноименния сборник на Радичков (1995).

„самодиви“ с „плитки като змии“. Отново Елиаде говори за това, че змията като живееща под земята зооморфизира духовете на мъртвите (пак там: 190), а в радиопиесата също се говори за духове. Фрейзър отбелязва, че в редица примитивни култури змията се асоциира с безсмъртието (коварно откраднато от човека), с регенерацията именно поради това, че циклично сменя кожата си (Фрейзър 1989: 35–36). Имплицитно тази версия преминава и през Радичковата творба:

> СМОКЪТ СИНОРНИК. (…) И когато земята го (Адам – Н. К.) надви, той легна в нея, в самата бразда, друг орач дойде след него, взе ралото и започна да оре и да се бори със земята, докато тя и него надви и го прибра в пазвата си, а на негово място друг орач се появи и тръгна и той да оре земята и да се бори с нея, *а аз стоех в синора, според както повеляваше господнята повеля, и пазех нивата. Не помня вече колко години съм тук и колко съблекла съблякох... в този синор* (курсив – Н. К.)[7].

Ако приемем, че двете жени отиват да берат липата като билка, денят, в който се развива действието, е Еньовден (24 юни), ако съдим от появата на змиите – Йеремия (1 май, но малко вероятно, тъй като периодът за бране на липата е юни–август), ако съдим от това, че в един момент героините запяват „Пеперуда за дъжд“ – Илинден (20 юли) или, по-малко вероятно – Гергьовден (6 май). Етимологията на „пеперуда“ е свързана с „Перперуна“, наричана още „Перепуна“ и „Пеперуна“, която в митологията на древните славяни била другарка на Перун. От праславянския корен *per- се образуват редица славянски думи, съдържащи семата ‘удрям’ (както и названията за мълния, камък, планина, гора, дъб) (Гейщор 1986: 55–56, 76–77), а (ако си позволим да мистифицираме семантичните връзки в езика на произведението) двете жени именно *бият* смоковете. Перун е бил владетел на мълнията и вероятно това е причината за участието му в „пеперуда за дъжд“, като в християнизираните славянски митологии той се явява тъкмо като св. Георги или св. Илия, а един от антагонистите му е змей-смок, заключил водите (Гейщор 1986: 70–73). Обичаят „пеперуда“ за дъжд се изпълнява при бедствена суша, избира се момиче сираче, за да се изпроси милост от божеството, и понякога танцът му е съпроводен с имитативна магия, изобразяваща преследване на змия (пак там: 78). Подсвиркването на смоците, което непрекъснато се чува около двете жени, е разбираемо като „акустичен код“ на съблазняване, анализиран от Леви-Строс в митологията на юж-

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[7] „… Съблекла съблякох…“ е типично Радичково тавтологично словосъчетание, изградено чрез неологизъм („съблекло“). Макар и да изглежда съвсем „спонтанно“, то има свой художествен смисъл. От една страна, за разлика от „облеклото“ (което е *човешко*), смокът може да има единствено „съблекло“ (което не може да „облече“). Същевременно „съблеклото“ е разбираемо и в контекста на библейската история за грехопадението и узнаването за *голотата* (за която сигнализира споменаването на Адам).

ноамериканските индианци (Леви-Строс 2000/II: 259), но тук термините са преобърнати – „позивните“ се подават не от жената, а от животното.

Не по-малко архаично „зареден“ е и образът на *ковача*. Елиаде отчита изключителната позиция на ковача у древните (като Герой-Просветител, шаман, магьосник и пр.) и специфичната обвързаност (която в случая достига и до идентификация) между Ковача и Бога-Воин, надделяващ над „Водния Дракон“ (Елиаде 2000: 87). Схватката на Реджо с хтоничния смок „укрива“ устойчивото епично сражение на героя със силите на хаоса (у Проп шестнайсета функция (Проп 1995: 69–70), както и типичното обезглавяване на „ламята“, като зад този персонаж отново можем да видим сянката на Перун (Гейщор 1986: 75).

Духът на Цино се явява като двойник на живия Цино, той е реликт от култа към мъртвите и в съответствие със старите вярвания продължава да се нуждае от неща, от които се е нуждаел приживе (липа). Фактът, че е счупил клона, от който бере, нещо, което двете жени внимават да не правят, го асоциира към силите на хаоса и разрухата, но пък това, че душата му се издига *нагоре,* е митологема с по-млад произход и по-скоро отпраща към юдео-християнската кодифицираност и преселението на душите на праведниците.

През един наратологичен подстъп към текста се разкрива и една преобразена форма на сюжета за търсенето в ходенето на двете героини до кладенчето („жива вода“?), относимо и към древните водни култове към извора, а изтребването на смоковете – като „преминаване през изпитания“ (дванайсета функция у Проп (1995: 55–58). Показателно е това, че за митологичния стереотип в повечето случаи търсенето е свързано с предотвратяване на смърт, разруха, нещастие, а тук завръщането предоставя на Тетка Анастасия и Черната Станка *узнаване* за нечия смърт.

Могат да бъдат извлечени още редица подобни съпоставки. Но те явно не дават достатъчно възможности за изясняване спецификите на Радичковия „митологизъм“. Става видимо единствено многопосочното и непоследователно преплитане на символики и функции, както и някои спорадични тенденции да се опровергава митологичната канава, но не и какво е принципно съотношението между *нелепостта* и *архаизма* в пиесата. За тази цел нека потърсим някакъв принцип на това съотношение, като прибегнем към модела на Леви-Строс за разкриване на митологичната логика. Френският структуралист фиксира като определящо за примитивното съзнание деленето на опозиционни двойки, като основната е *култура–природа* (Леви-Строс 2000/I). Освен *култура–природа* Леви Строс (а и Елиаде, Ернст Касирер, Елеазар Мелетински и др.) предлага и други опозиции, влизащи в „редове“ спрямо нея: *сакрално–профанно, сурово–готвено, горе–долу, свое–чуждо, близко–далечно, вътре–вън, център–периферия* и пр. Към това „сдвоение“ на света според тази хипотеза Митът прибавя функцията на *медиатора*, чиято цел е да преодолее регистрираните противоречия.

Редица опозиции са несъществени за текста на Радичковата творба (например *вътре–вън*, която е съществена за „Януари“), но успоредна на опозицията *култура–природа* е например опозицията *полезно–вредно*, която е активирана по няколко начина, а и е зададена чрез централния образ на смока. Прави впечатление, че освен негативните конотации на *вредност*, за които споменахме, смокът и змията носят и точно противоположните – позитивните, на *полезност*. Мирча Елиаде свидетелства за това, че в редица архаични култури почитали змиите не само като осигуряващи човешкото потомство, но и въобще като „разпоредители на плодородието“ (Елиаде 2012: 190), а на много места в България дори се вярва, че убиването на смок носи нещастие. В радиопиесата подобна алюзия съществува в монолога на Смока-синорник, където той разказва как бил изпратен от Господ, *за да пази нивата* на Адам (вероятно тази роля е свързана с това, че смокът „мишкува“ и по този начин „охранява“ посевите). Самото заглавие на творбата извежда на преден план „безобидността“, която пък настойчиво се конфронтира с враждебното поведение на двете жени и ковача Реджо. Така, разполагайки се от двете страни на опозицията *полезно–вредно*, Смокът в пиесата на Радичков започва да добива очертанията на *медиатор*.

Свраката, която непрекъснато се обажда някъде около двете жени, също е с традиционно медиаторска роля в дихотомия, която засега изглежда несъществена за творбата – тъй като тази птица се храни с мърша, тя заема междинна позиция спрямо противопоставянето *хищно–тревопасно* или *месо–растителна храна*. Към тези два образа ще добавим и Стомната, която двете жени забелязват в близост до изоставена колиба и която също като Смока и Свраката е снабдена с дар-слово.

Трите образа – Смокът, Свраката и Стомната, са с медиаторска функция в една твърде съществена за произведението опозиция: (*Велико) минало – настояще*. В монолога си Смокът разказва история от библейските времена, включваща непосредствената му *комуникация* с Бог, Свраката също е била свидетел на изгонването на човека от рая („Когато Бог изгони човека от рая, аз още тогава му съчувствах любезно…“), а Стомната, въпреки че отсъства при сътворяването на човека („Ако Бог направи човекът от глина, то човекът от глина направи стомната, за да му бъде спътница и да утолява жаждата му“), говори тъкмо за идеализираните, изгубени времена, когато човек никъде не тръгвал без стомна и при нейното присъствие той знаел, че *не е сам*. „Някогашното време“, това на общението с Бог, на хармонично съжителство, е представено от тримата посредници.

Но тези трима „посредници“ нижат монолозите си, *без да бъдат разбирани от двете жени*. Това, което те казват, остава недостъпно за Черната Станка и Тетка Анастасия. Дори „диалогът“ между Свраката и Черната Станка към края не е категоричен, че героинята *разкодира*, че разбира сврачия език:

СВРАКАТА. Кяааа!… Мълча!
ЧЕРНАТА СТАНКА. Мигар те пита някой тебе, сврако, та се обаждаш!
СВРАКАТА. Кяааа, мълча!
ЧЕРНАТА СТАНКА. Ще мълчиш!

Така митичните същества говорят „по човешки“, но само за реципиента, това означава, *че медиаторската им роля е разколебана*. По някакъв начин творбата казва: „Ето, това е *медиатор*, така както става в митологията“, и същевременно: „Да, но той не може да изпълни отредената му роля“.

Всъщност, ако се вгледаме в текста и положим една негова част на фона на „речовитостта“ на трите образа-не-хора, ще забележим нишката, с която се задава митичната медиаторска функция на Смока и в същото време се опровергава успеваемостта на тази функция. Според Елиаде едно от древните поверия за змията е, че който хапне месото ѝ, започва да разбира езика на животните (Елиаде 2012: 190), а самият Смок в пиесата разказва един свой спомен за това, как някакво дете се опитвало *да отхапе* опашката на змийче. Но Черната Станка и Тетка Анастасия нито се възползват от тази магична полезност на змията, нито разгадават казаното от животните. Пиесата задава опозиции – в случая *минало–настояще*, задава и медиаторски функции, но опозициите *не биват неутрализирани*; персонажите, които са призвани да изпълнят „високата“ си митична предназначеност, не осъществяват отредената си роля *да свързват* във или чрез себе си представите, изглеждащи несвързваеми. Тъкмо това е, изглежда, абсурдисткото в този тип „митологизъм“.

Чрез Цино пиесата задава и друга опозиция – поставен в кохерентното цяло на произведението с двете жени (които като че ли изглеждат най-убедително живите), той въвежда опозицията *живо–мъртво*, или *отсамно–отвъдно*. Интересното е, че *отсамно–отвъдно* е зададена и по друг, „скрит“ начин от текста. Когато героините започват да берат липа, Тетка Анастасия напътства Черната Станка: „Мини сега на *отсамната страна*, ще придърпам с куката ей оня клон“; когато пък се появяват каракачанките, наред със „самодивските“ им подвиквания едната пита, без да е много ясно по отношение на какво: „От отсамната ли страна беше?“, а другата ѝ отговаря: „Не, от оттатъшната“; подобен диалог двете каракачанки провеждат и преди да се отдалечат от Черната Станка и Тетка Анастасия. Въобще съжителството на живи и мъртви в Радичковата драма – макабрическото хоро в края на „Януари“ или срещата на селяните от „Опит за летене“ с починалите им близки, не е съвсем чуждо на антидрамата, поне ако съдим от „Пътувания при мъртвите“ на Йонеско. Но в „Добродушните смокове“ и друго е важно. Опозицията *тревопасно–хищно*, чийто медиатор е Свраката, укрива тъкмо опозицията *живот–смърт*, а Свраката се явява обичайно и неин медиатор (Георгиева 2006: 58–59). Но

когато двете жени се завръщат при липовите дървета и не откриват Цино, те са изправени пред загадка. Тази загадка разделя живота от смъртта, а репликата на посредника Сврака експлицира една пасивна, категорично *немедиаторна* позиция:

ЧЕРНАТА СТАНКА. Кой ли го (Цино – Н. К.) знае къде се денал!
СВРАКАТА. Кяааа!… Мълча!

Езикът се себеизразява като неуспеваем инструмент на медиаторите. Каракачанките в края действително се проявяват като междинния термин в дихотомията *знание–незнание,* но дали той преодолява антиномията *живот–смърт*?

В заключение нека кажем, че в предложения ракурс радиопиесата „Добродушните смокове" може да бъде видяна като ключ към жанровата своеобразност на Радичковата драма, някак си непрестанно изплъзваща се от поетически определения. Изглежда, че инертното натрупване на констатации относно този автор като „фолклорен", „митологичен" или „митотворчески" подвежда в посока, където остава незабелязано това, че той може и да е *миторазграждащ*, че при него Митът се реконструира само и само за да бъде подложен на деконструиране. В подобна хипотеза хармоничната кохерентност на „примитивния" наратив се явява като мотивни или символни единици, но без да носи иманентната структурна същност на митологичното мислене. С други думи казано, това, което Митът реализира като *свързване*, у Радичков експлицира като *несвързване*, оставяйки след себе си загадката на жанров сфинкс, която се опитахме отгатнем.

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SPHINX: YORDAN RADICHKOV'S RADIO PLAY *THE PEACEABLE GRASS SNAKES* AS A MYTHICAL ANTI-DRAMA

Nikolay Kirilov

Abstract

The article focuses on the genre specificity of Yordan Radichkov's dramaturgy and, in particular, on his radio play *The Peaceable Grass Snakes*. This almost unknown text by the significant Bulgarian writer is realized as a 'key' with regard to the genre enigma of Radichkov's dramatic works. The 'archaic' plane of the radio play is interpreted through the concept of 'mythological thinking' and Claude Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology method. Using these tools, we see that some of the characters (such as The Caspian Whipsnake, The Pitcher, The Magpie) are mythical 'mediators' that function in oppositions, which, however, fail in their mediation function. Thus, the radio play is decoded as literary work which reconstructs the Myth so as to deconstruct it. The protagonists in the play (Aunt Anastasia and Stanka The Black) turn out to be examples of 'homo absurdus' in a 'disconnected' fictional and pseudo-mythological world.

„ТУРСКОТО ВРЕМЕ“ В КУЛТУРНАТА ПАМЕТ НА БЪЛГАРИТЕ

Анна Алексиева

Всеки национален метаразказ е съставен от опорни сюжетни ядра, които имат претенцията в някаква хронологическа последователност да представят важните събития в живота на нацията. Такива сюжетни ядра обикновено са повествованията за основаването на държавата и културния ѝ разцвет, за предците и владетелите ведно с водените от тях войни. Значими са не само събитията, предизвикващи национална гордост, но и моментите на поражение, които захранват мотивите за саможертвата, претърпяното страдание, мъченичеството. В този смисъл не е случайно, че периодът на османското владичество се превръща във фундамент на българския национален разказ. С травматичния си потенциал този период активизира крайно емоционални оценки, които се ползват с обществена чуваемост. Нещо повече, стъпвайки върху някои определения за национ налните митове, можем да кажем, че тези оценки придобиват статута най-авторитетна, „парадигматична истина“ (Lincoln 1989: 24–25; Тодоров 2009: 214). И макар че в постсоциалистически условия се правят опити за усъмняване в този статут, за разколебаване на твърдите националистични възприятия, наративът за „турското време“ продължава да функционира в културната памет на българите с конотации предимно от сферата на ужасно-трагичното.

Тези конотации се задействат сравнително късно. Откъслечни сведения за първите векове на османска власт черпим от някои жития, служби и приписки, които имат за цел не толкова да осмислят политическото статукво, колкото да утвърдят превъзходството на християнската религия. Затова в житията на някои новомъченици, предпочели смъртта пред промяна на вярата, основният акцент е върху твърдостта в отстояването на страданието, а не върху националния маркер. В житието на Георги Софийски, написано през XVI в. от поп Пейо, героят непоколебимо заявява на своите мъчители: „Рекох ви веднъж и дваж, че аз от своята вяра няма никога да се откажа, та ако щете хиляди мъчения да ми нанесете.“ Понасянето на изтезанията задейства идентификации с фигурата на Исус Христос. Затова ненапразно един от героите в текста – съдията турчин, който осъжда на смърт мъченика, се обръща към събралата се тълпа с думите: „нека грехът

за него легне върху вас и вашите души“ (Динеков, съст. 1967: 496) – думи, които очевидно повтарят изреченото от Пилат Понтийски пред евреите. И макар че в последвалите столетия подобни извори се тълкуват като знак за противодействие срещу османската власт от позицията на формирано национално съзнание, в тези текстове всъщност личи най-вече отстояване на религиозната принадлежност по модела на евангелския сюжет.

По-отчетливи рефлексии върху периода на османското владичество се наблюдават в историографските текстове от XVIII в. В „История славянобългарска“ на Паисий Хилендарски този период за първи път е назован „робство“ (Данова 2010), като тази метафора запазва учудваща дълголетност чак до съвременността. „Поробителите“ от своя страна са наречени „турци“ – понятийна неточност, която се възпроизвежда и в днешните български популярни представи, безразборно смесващи думите „турски“ и „османски“. Според Паисий турците „държат в робство и угнетяват българската земя“. В текста накратко са споменати и най-неприемливите им деяния: превръщането на църкви в джамии, убийството на „първите и предни християни“, ограбването на имотите им. Същевременно тези посегателства са ситуирани предимно в миналото, когато, пише Паисий, българите имали „скръб върху скръб и жалост върху жалост“. С времето свирепостта на турците намаляла, те усвоили „много от християнския ред и право“ и дори се засрамили от предишния си нрав. За Паисий далеч попроблемно се оказва поведението на сърбите, които преиначават фактите от българската история; на русите, които омаловажават българските постижения; и особено на гърците, които заплашват българите с културна асимилация. Нещо повече, според Паисий тъкмо гърците са причина за идването на османците на Балканите. От коварство и завист техният „цар Мануил повикал изпърво турците против България и ги пуснал през море и по сухо срещу България. Така се почнала войната най-напред чрез гърците против България и цар Шишман“ (Паисий Хилендарски 1972: 142–147). Същата версия – за предателството на гърците, довело до османското владичество – се появява и в „История во кратце о болгарском народе словенском“ от йеросхимонах Спиридон. В нея се актуализира и популярният мит за злосторния гръцки патриарх, който посъветвал султан Селим II да избие българския политически и интелектуален елит – действие, определено като „второто опустошение на България“. Така, чрез историографските текстове от XVIII в., се утвърждава митологемата за „двойното робство“ на българите. Веднъж *политическо*, причинено от османците, което обаче, при все че е констатирано, през този период не поражда каквито и да било идеи за съпротива или за преначертаване на геополитическата карта. И втори път – *духовно робство*, което е по-голямата беда, защото е причинено от гърците, които подмолно се стремят да наложат своя език и култура.

През следващото столетие тази двойствена митологема се разполовява ту към единия, ту към другия си полюс в зависимост от типа публичност, който я излъчва. В легалната публичност, намерила израз най-вече в

българските издания, отпечатани в Цариград, се откроява представата, че периодът на османското владичество, особено във времето на Танзимата, предоставя възможност за прогресивно обществено развитие. Една част от българските интелектуалци виждат в Хатишерифа и в Хатихумаюна реализация на просвещенските идеи, а във фигурата на султаните Махмуд II и Абдул Меджид I те разпознават стереотипа на просветения монарх. В областта на литературата се създава цяла поетическа линия – т.нар. даскалска поезия, – която ентусиазирано възхвалява проведените реформи в империята, приема със задоволство обещанието за справедливо законодателство и равни граждански права и като цяло утвърждава представата за спокоен и хармоничен обществен живот под мъдрото управление на султана. Само един детайл нарушава социалната идилия и той е свързан с действията на Цариградската патриаршия, която възпрепятства създаването на самостоятелна българска екзархия. Силно критична към поведението на гръцкото духовенство, легалната българска публичност упорито отбягва понятието „турско робство", но затова пък охотно говори за „задушливия гнет на фенерското иго". Петко Славейков например е убеден, че „нашето съвършено пропадане като народ може да ни дойде от тези, с които имаме религиозно сродство", тоест от гърците, от проводниците на „духовното робство". И обратно, „нашето спасение лежи при тези, с които нямаме никакво язично, ни религиозно сходство", тоест турците, които поради крайната си различност не могат „в нищо да нарушат основата на народността ни" (цит. по Хранова 2011: 416). На турците впрочем в лицето на султана се възлагат немалко надежди за избавление от гръцките посегателства, както се вижда от следните стихове, вписващи се в жанра на споменатата даскалска поезия: „Славний Абдул Меджид Хан / той от гърците ще ни избави / и що ще просими ще ни подари / като на верни подданници" (Пазете ся, мили братия 1860). По правило легалната публичност е силно загрижена за просветното и църковното развитие и открито се противопоставя на набиращите актуалност през 60-те – 70-те години на XIX в. възгледи за промяна на политическото статукво. В издателската платформа на излизащия с подкрепата на правителството вестник „Турция" се пропагандират „братството и съгласието помежду децата на същият баща – султана" и необходимостта от противодействие на „революционерните и безнравствените идеи" (Уводна статия 1864). А списанието с просветителски профил „Читалище" категорично се отграничава от поривите за въоръжена борба против властта и призовава към „тихо и законно обществено възраждане чрез науката" (Обявление 1870).

Поривите за въоръжена борба идват от полето на емигрантската публичност, която оценява периода на османското владичество от съвсем различна перспектива. Разбира се, в говоренето на тази конспиративна спрямо властта среда мотивът за „двойното робство" продължава да е актуален. Георги Раковски твърди, че гръцките духовници „горят непрестанно български книги", „силят българи да говорят гръцки" и ги „държат

във всегдашно духовно робство“ (Раковски 1983: 390). Любен Каравелов е категоричен, че „в последнйото време почти сичките гръци [...] са станале турски шпионе“, а „който е приятел на турците, той не може да бъде наш брат и съюзник“ (Каравелов 1873: 1). Дискурсът на идеолозите на национализма изобщо е доста враждебен спрямо съседите, както личи от изказванията на Христо Ботев, според когото Гърция е „традиционна неприятелка на сичко, щото е славянско“, Сърбия „иска да оплете своята собствена кошница и не иска да знае за съществуването на българският народ“, а Румъния „препятствува на нашата емиграция да помогне на своето потъпкано и поробено отечество“ (Ботев 1875а: 1). В реда на враждебните образи често попада и Европа, чиято проблематичност се търси в отстъплението от просвещенските ценности, които сама е изобретила: от една страна, тя прокламира човеколюбие и толерантност, а от друга, безучастно наблюдава кръвопролитията на Балканите. В някои случаи (вероятно като контраотговор на прокарвани в публичността русофилски нагласи) панславистките амбиции на Русия също са дискредитирани и в определени емигрантски среди се заговорва за „руската убийствена политика за българите“ (Раковски 1861).

Сред многобройните мултипликации на вражеските сили обаче фигурата на османците безспорно взема превес. Така че независимо че реториката на революционерите включва говорене за „духовното фанариотско робство“, за „европейското туторство“, за руската заплаха или за натиска от страна на съседите, очевидно най-големият проблем остава османското владичество, чиято негативност е осмислена в два глобални плана. Първият е свързан с буквалната, физическата агресия, която „поробителите“ упражняват върху българите. Немалко публицистични и художествени произведения представят ужасяващи картини на посечени деца, обезчестени жени и подлагани на неимоверни мъчения мъже. Тази нескончаемост на страданието се откроява още на равнище заглавие: „Страници из книгата за страданията на българския народ“ се нарича най-представителната книга на Каравелов, публикувана в Русия (1868). В редица случаи изобразените мъчители са делибашии или пък кърджалии, а както изтъква Васил Друмев в предговора на „Нещастна фамилия“, последните са били не само „нам“, а и на „нашето честно правителство големи врази“ (Друмев 1960: 17). Независимо от това обаче акцентът върху етническата им другост и върху нехристиянското им вероизповедание задейства лесно идентификацията им с образа на представителите на властта, на османците като цяло, така че в текстовете на революционерите понятията „кърджалии“, „разбойници“, „турци“, „поробители“ функционират като синоними. От една страна, издевателствата на „турците“ са представени като ритуална демонстрация на тяхната надпоставеност, което ги приближава към фигурата на политическото чудовище, описана от Мишел Фуко (2000: 96–125). От друга страна обаче, техните действия носят белега на необяснимия с нищо произвол, което ги превръща във всекидневно, банализирано зло. И това делнично,

сляло се с бита зло според идеолозите на национализма определя живота на българите в продължение на пет столетия.

Отвъд физическите посегателства вторият план на негативизиране на османското владичество се прицелва в неговата цивилизационна безперспективност. Според революционно настроената българска интелигенция Османската империя е духовно и политически изчерпана реалия, която носи всички варварски белези на Ориента и е напълно неспособна на модернизиращи реформи. В дискредитираща перспектива се показват конкретни ситуации на отстъпление от европейските просвещенски ценности, прояви на беззаконие, културна изостаналост и религиозен фанатизъм, като отделните случаи се представят за общо правило, за цялостно провеждана политика. Популяризират се текстове, тематизиращи пикантни и сензационни детайли от т.нар. турски начин на живот. Особено внимание се отделя на сюжета за цариградските хареми, представени в аморална светлина. Неслучайно Христо Ботев се кани да преведе книгата „Турците и техните жени, султанът и неговият харем“ от Осман бей, както и мемоарите на майка му Мелек ханъм „Тридесет години в турските хареми“, за да докаже нетолерантното и ретроградно отношение към жената в Империята. Цивилизационната изостаналост на Турция се тълкува като пагубна за подчинените ѝ южни славяни, за които единственият възможен изход, поне за националните идеолози, е революцията. Според Ботев „сляп тряба да бъде онзи, който не види, че Турция умира и че за да можеме да живееме ние, то не ни остава друго нищо, освен да извикаме [...] „време е!“ и да повдигнеме и нашият многострадален народ на оръжие“ (Ботев 1875б: 1).

И така, през периода на Българското възраждане съществуват две противоположни оценки на османското владичество: едната, произхождаща от българските интелектуални кръгове в Цариград, оценява позитивно османската политика, а другата, свързана с революционните среди, изтъква нейната неадекватност и призовава към въоръжена борба. Трудно е да се каже коя от двете идеологически линии взема превес през самото възрожденско време. Но доколкото революционната позиция е актуална повече в емигрантски контекст, извън който е цензурирана и „тайна“, вероятно тя получава по-малка обществена видимост. За сметка на това след Освобождението на България от османска власт, когато започва целенасоченото конструиране на българския „голям“ исторически разказ, който трябва да легитимира националната идентичност, тогава тъкмо гледната точка на революционерите постига отчетлива идеологическа преднина. Процесът на крайното дискредитиране на османското владичество, разбира се, е постепенен и разгърнат във времето. Тази постепенност се откроява дори и в текста, сочен за пръв български роман – „Под игото“, – написан от Иван Вазов с интенцията да се покаже нерадостното битие на българите през османския период. Наред със сцените на страдание обаче в текста издайнически присъстват и мотивите за празнуването, за идиличния бит и за народното веселие. „При другите си лошавини игото има и една привиле-

гия – четем в романа – да прави народите весели [...]. Един народ поробен, макар и безнадеждно, никога не се самоубива; той яде, пие и прави деца. Той се весели“ (Вазов 1975: 78).

Безспорно зад подобни констатации се крие и разочарованието от следосвобожденската действителност, изпълнена с политически сблъсъци, социални конфликти и нестабилни държавни институции. Проблемността на тази действителност задейства носталгични погледи назад, към отминалото „турско време“, което се освобождава от негативните си робски конотации и се представя в романтично-утопична светлина. В разказа на Михалаки Георгиев „Разкумил кума си!“ то е идеализирано в плана на законността: „у турско време – твърди героят в текста – ще се случи, и то редко, у годината веднъж, по некоя ата, та се убие, я нарани човек и никога не е оставал убиецът неуловен, макар че турците имаха по-малко заптии, отколкото сега има началници“. В същия разказ османският период носи характеристиките на безкористните духовни стремежи: „у турско време имахме даскали [...]. Хем децата учеха, хем черковния ред държаха“. Най-сетне според цитирания текст периодът се отличава с висок морал: „У турско време хората гледаха преди всичко своя хърз, своята чест, па после всичко друго!“ Тези възвишени ценности обаче се представят като безвъзвратно загубени в следосвобожденската ситуация. Поради това в текста реторично се поставя въпросът: „И за какво ли му требваше на руския цар да бие толкова път, да троши толкова аскер, да разсипва толкова злато – да ни освобождава!“ (Георгиев 1980: 434–437). В някои произведения фигурата на „поробителя“ се реабилитира, снабдява се с положителни качества за сметка на деидеализирания образ на „своето“. В друг текст на Иван Вазов – „Дядо Нистор“ – героят ненапразно заключава: „Не, не, имаше човещина у турците. Биеха, ама и милуваха... Милостив народ бяха. Ние сме зверове, боже, прости!“ (Вазов 1956: 188).

Носталгията към „турското време“, откроима в първите следосвобожденски десетилетия, започва целенасочено да се потиска. Още през 90-те години на XIX в. романът на Иван Вазов „Под игото“ получава сериозни критики и поради обстоятелството, че не илюстрира достатъчно категорично „робството“ със сцени на насилия и жестокости. Васил Балджиев например е крайно недоволен, че в това произведение „ние не виждаме в що се състои игото на българите, нито виждаме в що се състои тиранията на турците“ (Балджиев 1896: 49). Възраженията срещу романа не пречат в следващите години той да се утвърди като каноничен текст. Представата, че бележи жанрови начала и образци, съчетана с интерпретация, пропускаща неудобните моменти и наблягаща върху героиката, спомага за поместването на текста в раздела класика. Не така стоят нещата с цитирания разказ на Михалаки Георгиев, със стихотворенията, попадащи в обхвата на даскалската поезия, с публикациите в изданията „Турция“ и „Читалище“, които биват маргинализирани и с времето забравени. Някои автори, които през Възраждането не са потискали въодушевлението си към султана, след

Освобождението променят реториката си и заговарят за непоносимостта на османското владичество, наричайки го с вече институционализираното понятие „робство“. Изследователката Албена Хранова проследява промяната на политическия речник по отношение на Петко Славейков, който сякаш забравя предходните си, утвърждаващи османската власт изявления и в речта си пред Учредителното събрание говори за „най-тежките и лоши времена на турското иго“ (Хранова 2011: 417). Веднъж институционализиран, този дискурс все по-успешно се налага като безалтернативен в последвалите десетилетия. Особено в позициите на ляво ориентираните автори от 20-те и 30-те години на XX в., които най-категорично твърдят, че „туркофилската линия от епохата на Възраждането не е оставила завети, които да заслужат днес почит“ (Бакалов 1983: 103).

Ала османският период не е само „най-тежкото и лошо време“. Или по-точно, той е такова време само в едната си понятийна и ценностна оптика – тази на „робството“. В битието си на „робство“ османският период е символ на страданията, на петвековните кланета, на насилствените потурчвания и страшните еничарски корпуси. Освен че е „робство“ обаче, османското време е и Възраждане. Във втората си ипостаса този период се характеризира с героика, революционна масовост („Хайдутството, пише Г. Бакалов, е било масово явление“ (Бакалов 1983: 105), с извънредна смелост и жертвоготовност от страна на българите. Така чрез една на пръв поглед странна темпорална тъждественост османският период е едновременно и най-ужасното, и най-възвишеното време; той е епоха както на упадъка (реферираш към кризата в Империята), на крайното унижение, така и на раждането на българската нация, тоест, своеобразен Златен век.

Тази двойна перспектива към османското владичество се радикализира още повече след настъпването на социалистическия режим в България през 1944 г. Чрез строго контролиране на издателската политика от съществуващите възрожденски текстове се преиздават най-вече онези от тях, които принадлежат към революционната идеология. Тогава окончателно се стабилизира и националният героичен пантеон, в който по правило, особено в ранните години на режима, не попадат възрожденските дейци за църковна независимост (те са определени като туркофили) за разлика от участниците в борбата за политическо освобождение, които заемат челните места в героичната йерархия. В някои случаи постфактум революционни идеи се приписват на личности (като Паисий Хилендарски, Софроний Врачански и пр.), които пряко не са заявявали принадлежността си към идеята за въоръжена борба срещу османската власт. Целта на социалистическата пропаганда обаче е да създаде представата за всеобща и повсеместна революция, взривила мрака на „робството“.

„Робството“ от своя страна е показано с най-апокалиптични черти. Според учебник по история от 60-те години на XX в. завладяването на българските земи от турците (завоевателите са наречени обезателно „турци“) е свързано с масово унищожаване на цели региони, с „избиване, поробване

и прогонване“ на местното население. Набляга се на предходния културен разцвет на тези региони, който спира с османското нашествие. „Цветущи дотогава градове и села били превърнати в развалини – твърди учебникът, – а земята – в пустиня.“ Единствената положителна черта на османското владичество е това, че то атакува „старата българска феодална класа“. Ала и тук успехът е частичен, тъй като тази класа се отличавала с конформизъм, започнала да сътрудничи на властта и се „претопила в турско население“, тоест не била напълно унищожена, както би се харесало на социалистическата историческа трактовка. Като най-потърпевши от „турския гнет“ се представят обикновените български селяни, които постоянно са облагани с данъци, използвани са за безплатен труд, въобще експлоатирани са по „най-жесток и варварски“ начин (Косев, съст. 1962: 78–80).

Едно от измеренията на варварството, върху което социалистическата пропаганда поставя особен акцент, е насилственото ислямизиране, довело до появата на помашкото малцинство. Особеният акцент е не защото социализмът приветства запазването на религиозната принадлежност – в марксическите интерпретации, както знаем, „религията е опиум за народите“. А защото актът на религиозно посегателство, от една страна, разгръща възможност за натуралистично описание на османските злодейства, а от друга, той е в състояние да обслужи определени идеологически стратегии на режима спрямо мюсюлманското население в България. Тези стратегии, известни под името „възродителен процес“, са аргументирани с понятия, възкресяващи революционната реторика на XIX в.: думата „възродителен“ би следвало да събуди асоциации с „възрожденското“ време, а самата репресивна за мюсюлманите кампания да се схване като „исторически акт“, опитващ се да заличи „последния белег на турското робство“ и да утвърди „чистите извори на българския национален дух“ (ЦДА 1985: 328). В помощ на пропагандата (разгърнала се особено интензивно през 80-те години на XX в. във връзка със завоя на режима в подчертано националистична насока) очаквано се ангажира и изкуството. Погледът към тази сфера няма как да подмине един от най-дискусионните сюжети (актуален впрочем и към днешна дата[1]), заформил се около филмовата продукция „Време разделно“ (1987), нейната литературна първооснова (романа на Антон Дончев от 1964 г.) и изворов фундамент (хрониката на поп Методи Драгинов, сочена от Илия Тодоров (Тодоров 1984: 56–75) за мистификация от XIX в.). Демистифицирането на извора обаче, както и усъмняването в идеологическата безкористност на базираните върху него художествени произведения, почти не променя масовата възприемателска нагласа, според която въпросните творби (и книгата, и филмът) са исторически достоверни (а не фикционални) изображения, репрезентативни за насилията, които българите търпят през целия османски период.

[1] Вж. напр. наскоро публикуваната статия на Мариела Балева с показателно заглавие „Гавра с Антон Дончев и „Време разделно“ (Балева 2014).

След падането на социалистическия режим през 1989 г. наред с критиките към тоталитарната идеология и евроинтеграционните амбиции започват и първите опити за деконструкция на утвърдените стереотипи за османското владичество. Симптоматично е, че най-радикалните от тях идват от страната на чуждестранни изследователи на българската история и култура. Така например най-критична към натуралистично представената жестокост в романа на Антон Дончев се оказва френската изследователка на българската литература Мари Врина-Николов. Тя подозира, че книгата „Време разделно" и заснетият по нея филм са поръчкови произведения, които обслужват възродителния процес. Това е така, защото те излъчват „силно послание на нетърпимост"; показват турците в едностранчива, силно негативна светлина; превръщат всичко в „кръв и насилие", в една „касапница", която актуализира крайни националистически митове (Врина-Николов 2002). Макар и да е по-умерена към творчеството на Антон Дончев, макар и да определя книгата му като „един от най-добрите български исторически романи", Мария Тодорова, която също работи в чужбина, все пак обръща внимание на това, че историческият контекст, в който това произведение е създадено, и още повече времето, в което е популяризиран филмът „Време разделно", неминуемо провокират възможността за етническо напрежение (Тодорова 2001: 7–30).

Срещу подобна възможност и изобщо срещу апокалиптичните обертонове, които обгръщат наратива за османското владичество, настояват и други чуждестранни българисти, като Бернар Лори например, който изтъква необходимостта от понятийно прецизиране в няколко насоки. Първо, по отношение на наложения термин „робство", който възхожда от романтическата традиция и не отразява действителна историческа ситуация. Второ, по отношение на определянето на владичеството като „турско", при положение че то очевидно е османско. Не на последно място Бернар Лори настоява за ревизиране на мита за петвековните трагедии и кланета, тъй като според изследователя те всъщност продължават трийсетина години, по време на т.нар. кърджалийски размирици (Лори 1997: 92–98). С това, че тъкмо тези размирици неправомерно създават негативна представа за целия османски период, се съгласява и холандският учен Махиел Кил. Според него тъкмо паметта за кърджалийското време, слята по-късно с впечатления от събитията около Априлското въстание (1876), които наистина са ожесточени, задават стереотипа за османското владичество. По този начин се утвърждава своеобразна синекдоха, една *pars pro toto*, която би следвало да се подложи на научно преосмисляне (Кил 2002).

Дали такова научно преосмисляне се състоя в българската академична наука, е въпрос, на който трудно може да се отговори еднозначно. Някои от учените, вписващи се в набиращото актуалност в постсоциалистическите условия либерално академично поле, на които не е чужд деконструктивисткият импулс, категорично се противопоставят на твърдия националистичен дискурс и особено на крайно травматичното понятие „робство". „Как да си

обясним парадокса – пита се Румен Даскалов, – че тъкмо националистичното съзнание не желае да се откаже от едно толкова унизително понятие? Може би с това, че заедно с термина „робство“ ще си отидат и героиката на съпротивата, патосът на страданието, а и оправданието с „тежкото положение“ (Даскалов 1994: 34). Цитираното изказване илюстрира разгърналите се през последните десетилетия оживени дебати за адекватността на понятието „робство“, при които се откроява и позицията на националистично настроената историография. Тя не само се оказа привързана към робската теза, но и обвинява учените, които не я поддържат, в чуждопоклонство и национален нихилизъм. Марко Семов например смята, че османският период в българската история протича именно като робство, което при това е не само политическо, а и цивилизационно: една цивилизация (азиатска) унищожава друга цивилизация (европейска) (Семов 2003: 22).

С годините подобни радикални реторики сякаш позагубват интензивността си в академичната сфера. В учебниците по история понятието „робство“ постепенно бива заменено с по-неутралния термин „владичество“. Въпреки това публичното пространство периодично е „взривявано“ от изказвания и декларации на авторитетни учени, които актуализират травматичния образ на „турското време“. През 2013 г. например тридесет и трима български учени и общественици изготвят открито писмо, адресирано до Народното събрание. Поводът, упоменат в писмото, е „110 години от Илинденско-Преображенското въстание и 100 години от зверските клания (1913 г.) на мирното българско население в Одринска и Беломорска Тракия“. Настояването на интелектуалците е парламентът да приеме „специална декларация в памет на десетките хиляди българи“, избити по онова време от османската войска; така както по-рано същият този парламент е приел декларация „в памет на 19 жертви на т.нар. възродителен процес“. В писмото изрично се посочва, че мащабът на упражненото върху българите насилие е равносилно на „геноцид“. Неговото признаване от върховния орган на българската държавна власт е особено належащо „днес [...], пред лицето на засилващите се неоосманистки амбиции на ислямските сили в Турция да фалшифицират истината за робството, да обявят своите убийци за жертви, а християнските народи за палачи“ (faktor.bg 2013).

Сред подписалите писмото е историкът Пламен Митев, който през същата 2013 г. по друг повод (годишнина от Освобождението на България от османска власт) актуализира темата за статута на българите по време на османския период. На журналистическо питане как следва да се назове този период – „турско робство“ или „османско владичество“, Пл. Митев отговаря, че макар коректният научен термин да е „владичество“, понятието „робство“ също не бива да се игнорира, защото носи „силен емоционален заряд“. „Поколение след поколение – твърди той – нашите предци са били третирани като „рая“ (стадо), целият им живот е преминавал в борба за оцеляване, в страх и унижения, в насилие и беззаконие. Това не може и не трябва да се забравя“ (Митев 2013).

Изказването на Пламен Митев очаквано подхваща мотива за паметта. За културната памет, можем да добавим, ако следваме концептуализацията на Ян Асман. Той разграничава два типа памет: комуникативна, която е сравнително краткотрайна, защото обхваща спомените на съвременниците и си отива заедно с тях; и културна, която не отразява генерационни спомени, а митове. Културната памет надхвърля автобиографичното времетраене и делничната събитийност, обвързва се със символни фигури и празнични ритуали и фундира общностната идентичност (Асман 1997: 48–51). Очевидно наративът за османското владичество в битието му на робство заема основополагащо място в културната памет на българите. За този вид памет няма значение, че въпросното робство не е точно робство в историческия и политическия смисъл на думата; няма значение, че ужасяващите насилия не са еднакво интензивни през всичките пет столетия или че през самия XIX в. част от обществото симпатизира на османската власт. Културната памет не се интересува от фактическата събитийност, а от нейната митологична трансформация. Понятието „митологичен" в случая не е използвано в пейоративната му конотация на непременна „неистина". Обхватът му най-общо маркира постепенното производство на несвидетелски разкази и смисли за османския период, случило се след отмирането на комуникативната (поколенческата) памет. Чрез прононсиране на гледната точка на революционерите и маргинализиране на позицията на „еволюционистите"; чрез различни церемониали, чествания и издигане на паметници за героите; чрез оказване на нужното институционално внимание към последните (отразено в учебните програми и издателската политика) и пр., тези смисли започват да се втвърдяват в единен, лишен от противоречия наратив, в който „турското време" символизира ужаса, насилието, срама и спрялото развитие, чиито последици се усещат валидни и днес.

Този наратив, врязан дълбоко в българската културна памет (и обезателно със статута на „парадигматична истина"), се оказва по-устойчив дори от академичния метаразказ. Последният се отличава и с националистичен уклон (защото традиционно е „призван" да охранява националната идентичност), и с консервативност, която го прави трудно податлив на алтернативни идеологически атаки и опити за пренаписване. Неслучайно българският исторически и литературен канон е почти непроменяем от времето на социализма, което е съществен аргумент за способността му да удържа на политически промени и катаклизми. Ала дори и този консервативен институционален конструкт в последните десетилетия е обкръжен от партикуларни академични дискурси, които го обсъждат, критикуват, проблематизират. Съмнително е, че това обкръжаващо дискусионно поле в българска среда може да доведе до разпада на „големия разказ", прогнозиран от Лиотар. Но може, доколкото е възможно, да намали неговата националистическа радикалност, да овладее патоса му, да притъпи афекта от по-травматичните му сюжети.

Понеже е изтъкана от емоции, културната памет, обратно, страни от неутрализирането на тона, постоянно „съпреживява" тези сюжети в цялата

им драматичност и, нерядко в последно време, открито се противопоставя на опитите за научното им обективизиране. Добър пример в тази насока е обществената полемика, случила се през 2007 г. по повод проекта „Батак като място на паметта", инициран от Улф Брунбауер и Мартина Балева. Ще припомня, че академичната общност тогава се разделя на „пазители" и „проблематизатори" на „гранд наратива". Първите (в лицето на тогавашния председател на Българската академия на науките Иван Юхновски, директора на Националния исторически музей Божидар Димитров, бившия директор на Института по история Георги Марков и др.) остро критикуват проекта и със съответни институционални механизми възпрепятстват определени негови активности: Етнографският институт при БАН например оттегля предложението си да бъде домакин на замислената изложба и конференция. От другата страна са някои либерално настроени изследователи (Иван Еленков, Александър Везенков, Румен Даскалов, Диана Мишкова и др.), които заговорват за упражнена „политическа цензура" и за преформатиране на „едностранчивия официален популистки дискурс" от времето на социализма в „необятна националистическа шир" (Култура 2007). Двата академични лагера очевидно не са равностойни по политически и институционален ресурс, но наличието на втората група изследователи е знак за известно плурализиране на академичната среда и за усъмняване в хегемонията на метаразказа.

Това усъмняване обаче се приема като лична обида от жителите на Батак, като незачитане на жертвите и кланетата през „турското време"; предизвиква крайни националистически реакции, включително и заплахи за физическо посегателство, и в крайна сметка показва, че опитите за рационализиране на драматичния исторически сюжет, прокарани, макар и трудно, в иначе консервативната академична сфера (или в определени зони от нея), са напълно невалидни пред лицето на редовия българин, чиято памет непрекъснато захранва ужаса на „турската черна прокуда".

Напрежението между академични и популярни възприятия стои в основата и на друга провалена инициатива, свързана отново с темата за „турското време". През същата 2007 г. в Софийския университет е направена изложба със снимки от учебна практика на студенти, специализиращи история на България от османския период. Кадрите съдържат „информация за османското наследство, отношението към него, (пре)употребите му днес" (Атанасов 2011: 557). За съжаление още на втория ден, въпреки охраната в сградата на Ректората, експозицията е поругана, а забележителните фотоси – облепени с лозунги, призоваващи към етническа разправа.

Както изглежда, никакви либерални послания или рационални академични аргументи не са в състояние да се справят с бушуващите националнни енергии, особено на популярно, всекидневно ниво. Асман твърди, че в културната памет всякога има нещо тържествено, неделнично и сакрално. Наистина, в своя мъченически и героичен образ „робството" е обгърнато с трансцендиращи импулси, довели в някои случаи и до реални кано-

низиращи практики (например обявяването на Левски за светец от т.нар. алтернативен синод през 90-те години на XX в. или съвсем официалното провъзгласяване на жертвите от баташкото клане за православни новомъченици през 2011 г.). Това не означава обаче, че ритуализираната, сакрална памет остава изолирана от „профанното“ ежедневие. Тъкмо обратно, тя се опитва да премоделира това ежедневие, задавайки му морални императиви; образци на вяра, доблест и отстояване на страданието, които следва да изпълнят живота „тук и сега“. В някои случаи свеждането на култа до обозрим, делничен хоризонт провокира изблици на т.нар. популярен, „фенски“ (Дичев 2012), „банален“ (Billig 1995) национализъм. Той се изразява в силно пристрастие към „своето“ и враждебно отношение към „чуждото“; в постоянно възпроизвеждане на етнически стереотипи; в радикални послания, закодирани в улични графити, субкултурни прояви, футболни сблъсъци и пр. Този тип национализъм вероятно стои в основата на поруганата студентска изложба за османското наследство и също така може би активира най-крайните обществени реакции по повод случая „Батак“.

Струва си да се запитаме тогава дали е възможно този тип делничен национализъм, „помнещ“ най-интензивно трагичните образи на „турското време“, да бъде смекчен, вкаран в някакви нормализирани рамки, подобно на все по-„омекващите“ твърди тези на официалния национализъм. Тъй като по правило той слабо се повлиява от нормативни изисквания и институционални вмешателства, изглежда, само в собствената му популярна, всекидневна среда можем да открием определени трансмисии, които да разколебаят радикалността му. Туристическите дестинации в Турция, османската кухня, музиката с ориенталски ритми, турските сериали и пр.[2] едва ли са в състояние да трогнат най-коравосърдечните националистически сърца, но могат да създадат усещане за близост и сходен манталитет, един особен балкански комфорт, който в някои случаи изтласква образа на вражеското в друга (западна, европейска) насока. Разбира се, налице е възможността някои от споменатите символи на османското наследство изобщо да не бъдат разпознати като такива, да бъдат мислени като българска „изконност“, а в случаите, когато това разпознаване се състои, да бъдат драстично отхвърлени. И все пак струва ми се, че тъкмо те, а не официалните дискурси, биха ревизирали част от стереотипите за „турското време“.

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[2] Повече за тези явления на популярната култура вж. у Дечев, съст. 2010; Alexieva 2011; Atanassov 2013.

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"TURKISH TIMES" IN CULTURAL MEMORY OF BULGARIAN PEOPLE

Anna Alexieva

Abstract

The paper traces the Bulgarian representation of the Ottoman dominion in wide chronological perspective. The analysis begins with the first images of the period, found in the hagiography from the 16th century. Reflections of it from the 18th century historiography are also taken into account. During the 19th century various conceptualizations of the Ottoman dominion were forged. A significant part of the intelligentsia were supporters of the political status quo, while distinctive groups of intellectuals were against the official authority. After the Liberation (1878), the anti-Ottoman position became prevalent gradually. Therefore, the "Turkish times" were installed into the national meta-narrative, being marked with the sign of "slavery". During the socialist regime (1944–1989), this negative image of the epoch were additionally radicalized. In post-socialist context, academic debates over the correctness of "slavery" as a concept indicates that a tendency to neutralize the nationalist hardcore ideas emerged. However, this revisionist projects have limited influence on the academic mainstream, so they are almost incapable of changing the predominant representation of that time in cultural memory in wide social framework. The Ottoman dominion image, as present in wide publicity strata, remains emotional focus of the terror and trauma, impossible to be rationalized.

БЪЛГАРИЯ – ДВА РАКУРСА В „ÜBER LAND UND MEER“ 1879

Николай Чернокожев

Българите и България не са най-често срещаните визуални присъствия по страниците на едно от особено популярните и утвърдени сред масовата четяща публика периодични издания от втората половина на XIX в., характеризирано и в немската Уикипедия като „илюстрован лист за развлечение/събеседване“ (вж. Wikipedia).

Подобно ограничено присъствие е напълно естествено, тъй като обхватът на изданието е зададен с неговото название „Über Land und Meer“, т.е. светът може да бъде обхванат, ако бъде физически преброден и обгледан „над земи и моря“, а България и Балканите са несъмнено само малка частица от страните и моретата.

Съвсем естествено интересът към дадени кътчета, та дори и разположените в Европа, се засилва по време на изключителни, ексцесни събития – въстания, войни, въоръжени трусове (Baleva 2012).

Мен обаче ме интересува другата показаност на България и българите – не като жертви, мъченици или като бунтовници и герои, а като хора, обитаващи свой свят, имащи свой делник с определени характеристики и ритъм на живот, свят, който се е сдобил с визуални проекции благодарение на западноевропейските пътешественици и художници. А те и техните творения изразяват, проявяват особеностите на определена култура на гледане и виждане, въз основа на която откриват и (въз)произвеждат непознат на широката публика свят в различни по своя характер издания (Wiese 2011).

Разбира се, това показване на непознатото почти винаги се основава и разчита на някакви познати елементи (от всекидневието), и то такива, чрез които могат да бъдат възвеждани малки групи хора към по-големи етнически и културни масиви.

Само че случаят с българите е особен, тъй като в най-популярните повествувания те са един (фински/тюркски) народ, който днес принадлежи на славянството, и това разминаване между преди и сега води до пораждане на редица колебания и в сектора на визуалното представяне.

Констатации като „Българите са стар народ, сега те са славяни“ (Anton 1783: 29) привидно налагат, утвърждават определени тези, обхващат раз-

лични точки в изясняването на процеси в тяхната положеност във времето, но и поставят или оставят въпроси: Какви са били българите, преди да станат славяни? Как и защо са станали славяни? Какви са последиците от това ставане?...

Що се отнася до гледането и виждането, интересно е както каква сегашност, но също и какви остатъци от минало съзират и (на)рисуват пътуващите, доколко и как потребността от континуитет е запълвана във визуалните изображения, тъй като, от една страна, пътешественикът може да вижда онова, което очаква да види, онова, за което окото и съзнанието му са готови, а от друга, да подмине онова, което се оказва неочаквано за погледа му, освен ако не е прекалено ярко във всеки един смисъл на тази дума.

Тук само ще посоча, че не единствено острият интерес при катаклизми, а и спокойният интерес към хора, живеещи на Балканите, в Европейска Турция, в Ориента на Европа, има своята по-продължителна и стабилна, макар и не толкова количествено обемна или плътна като вдълбоченост традиция. Все пак обаче именно екстремумите активират и катализират трескав интерес и трескаво рисуване.

1879 г. предлага на немскоезичната публика различни текстови и визуални представяния на България и българите.

Освен в претърпялата в много кратко време две издания книга, посветена на съвременна Турция (Hellwald und Beck 1878–1879) – тук посочвам само първата част, посветена на „Европейска Турция“, която съм разглеждал в друг текст, България се появява и в други, периодични издания, като тук ще се вгледам в двете илюстрации и съпътстващи ги текстове в том 42 на „Über Land und Meer“ от 1879 г. В предходния том на изданието има откъс от Ф. Каниц под заглавие „Дунавска България“ и панорамно изображение на Шумен (Über Land und Meer 1879a: 446, 452). Иначе в по-голямата си част илюстрациите от Балканите са от Босна и Херцеговина или са по някакъв начин свързани със събитията там.

Онова, което е казано и показано чрез труда на Каниц, трябва да подчертае стойността и ценността на шестнадесетгодишната издирвателска (отбелязва се, че по това време, 1879, излиза третият том на „Дунавска България и Балканът“) и проучвателска работа, нейната информационна наситеност и издържаност в стила на най-представителните английски/англоезични трудове от този сектор, а предлаганите текстови откъси и илюстрацията на Шумен само трябва да онагледят това.

Спецификата на общуването на текста от с. 446 с панорамата на „Градът-крепост Шумла“ от с. 452 е повече от интересна, тъй като текстът вписва в панорамата детайли, които трудно могат да бъдат съзрени в илюстрацията. Иначе казано, читателят има възможността да разполага получените от текста знания в дошлото след няколко страници визуално представяне, изправен е пред интелектуалното предизвикателство да открива/намира прочетеното в показаното.

По-интересни обаче са следващите две показвания на България и българите, тъй като те сближават традиционността на българския селски живот с портрета на новопровъзгласения княз – Александър I Български.

Първата илюстрация на/из българския живот е на с. 524 (Über Land und Meer 1879b: 524):

а текстът към нея се явява след 10 страници (Über Land und Meer 1879b: 534), като в случая е видима обратна на посочената преди малко стратегия – не вграждане на текст във визуален образ, а осигуряване на възможност картината да се сдобие със словесни опори, а донякъде и с контекстуална рамка от думи, които могат да отвеждат и в други, различни от фиксираното в изображението времена[1].

Българска селска къща

Българската селска къща, която най-често заедно с няколко други образува стопанство/стопански двор, в което постройките се групират около покритата с керемиди и каменни плочи къща на старейшината, или главата на фа-

[1] Тези разполагания/подреждания, естествено, могат да имат чисто издателски или печатарски, ситуативни основания.

Bulgariſches Bauernhaus.

(Hiezu das Bild S. 524.)

Das bulgariſche Bauernhaus, das meiſt mit ein paar anderen ein Gehöft bildet, indem ſie ſich um das mit Ziegeln und Steinplatten gedeckte Haus des Stareſchnia oder Familienoberhauptes gruppiren, bietet Menſch und Thier das gleiche Obdach: der Stall iſt meiſt mit dem Wohngemach ſo eng verbunden, daß die Thiere ungenirt ſich unter den Menſchen hin und her bewegen. Und der Bauer hat alle Urſache, ſein Vieh ſo nah als möglich bei ſich zu haben, da er immer von jenen furchtbaren Viehräubern, den Tſcherkeſſen und Cirkaſſiern, in ſeinem Beſitzthum bedroht iſt. Um den Keſſel, der über dem Feuer hängt, ſammelt ſich die Jugend, während die Großmutter Märchen erzählt, unbekümmert um Kalb und Schwein, die ſich dazwiſchen drängen. Von dem Firſt ſehen wir die vollen Maiskolben herabhängen, welche die Hauptnahrung der Bauern bilden.

милията, предлага на човек и животно еднакъв подслон: оборът е най-често толкова тясно свързан/близо с/до стаята за живеене, че животните съвсем непринудено се движат насам-натам сред хората. А селянинът има всички основания да държи добитъка си възможно най-близо до себе си, тъй като той и неговата собственост са все още заплашени от онези страховити крадци на добитък – черкезите и циркасийците. Около котела, който виси над огъня, се събират децата, докато бабата разказва приказки, непритеснена за телето и прасето, които се набутват между хората. От тавана виждаме да висят пълни кочани царевица, които са основната храна на селяните.

На с. 524–525 илюстрацията е разположена в следния контекст: над разглежданата илюстрация е портретът на „ф. Краус, председател на имперския съд“, а на съседната страница са представени „кадри“ – пет на брой, от авария в мините в Теплиц.

Сега обаче няма да привеждам предходни визуални представяния на българското село в немскоезични текстове, а ще се вгледам в наличния в списанието разказ, който не само укрепва образа, но го доразкрива и тълкува.

На читателя е предложена възможността да види отпечатаната сцена не само като част от някакъв пъзел, от някаква цялостна картина, но и да я оцени като възможност за надникване в привидно най-скритата част от къщата – огнището. След уговорката, че селските къщи в България са гру-



пирани около къщата на главата на рода, което може да припомни „задругата“ като специфична форма на организиране на общностен живот в Европейския славянски югоизток, са подчертани строителни белези, характеристики на самия център – той е монолитен, крепък, а от някаква гледна точка – и укрепен (покрит с керемиди или каменни плочи). Тези подробности не са за подценяване, тъй като в изобразеното са важни други неща – човешките фигури и присъствие, а не самата постройка, загатната с огнището, крепящата провесената царевица греда и предполаганият покрив, под който е сложена царевицата.

В сцената прави впечатление още нещо, независимо от възможните обяснения на факта – отсъствието на мъже. Така къщата става детско, женско и на домашните животни място и всички те са скрити и скупчени едни в други, за да се пазят и опазят добитъка от черкези и циркасийци (Grimm 2004: Bd. 31, Sp. 1582, 59)[2].

Самите човешки фигури в композицията са центрирани около огнището и висящия над него котел – този елемент от интериора е подчертаван и в илюстрации, които са вгледани в други балкански култури[3].

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[2] Думата „Zirkasse, Zirkassier, Circassier“ е обяснена и като общо назоваваща хора, принадлежащи към различни кавказки племена.

[3] Интересни и показателни са илюстрациите в представителния във всяко отношение и сдобил се за кратко време с естествен успех, споменат по-горе том (Hellwald und Beck 1878–1879).

Разказът около огнището е напрегнат, интересен или поне вдигнатите ръце на възрастната жена предполагат особеното акцентуване върху „изпълнението“ в даден, конкретен момент от повествуването – вдигнатите ръце обаче несъмнено могат да бъдат интерпретирани в още посоки. А занимателността на повествуването е укрепена, подсказана и от притихналите три седящи деца (момиче, седящо гърбом, и до него двете момчета, едното от които е босо), както и от извърналата своята глава в посока на разказвачката жена, носеща на ръце малко момиченце. Жените и момичетата са с кърпи на главите, а момчетата – гологлави. Именно композиционната затвореност (окръгленост) и манифестираната погълнатост на групата около огъня от разказваното сякаш отместват, а като чисто светлинен ефект оставят в сянка по-едрия добитък: свинята и кравата са разположени в дясната част на илюстрацията, отделени са от подпорния дирек, а малките животинки вляво от него са сякаш също вслушани в приказката. Държащата момиченцето жена също е от „словесната“ страна на границата, очертана от дирека.

Илюстрацията не е наситена с покъщнина, освен малкото и в по-голямата си част малки предмети край групата около огъня/огнището.

Текстът не коментира облеклото – може да се каже, че то е традиционно, че отговаря изцяло на зададени от по-рано представи за „стандарта“ на обличане на българската жена в нейното всекидневие, тъй като в илюстрацията липсва анфасно разположена женска фигура, така че да има възможност да бъдат загатнати цветовете, а и да се видят особеностите на националната носия – шевици, елек, „на́китка“[4] и т.н.

Облеклото е несъмнено всекидневно, а и вързаните на върха на главата забрадки не предполагат украсеност. Така българската селска къща е показана в обикновеността на трудовото ежедневие, в съвместността на обитаването на едни и същи пространства от хора и животни.

И още нещо привлича вниманието на зрителя и на читателя – царевицата, която изпълва/запълва цялата горна част на изобразеното, а в текста е отбелязана като „основната храна на селяните“.

Това не е първият немскоезичен текст, в който царевицата и мамалигата, в някои изписвания „мамелига“, са посочени като основна и традиционна храна на българите (Чернокожев 2012).

Така че битовото българско небе неслучайно е царевично.

В случая изображението на българската селска къща акцентува върху обикновеното, изглеждащо дори примитивно всекидневно живеене, което намира центъра на домашния свят в източника на топлина/огнището, край който властва приказката, т.е. словото на жената/бабата.

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[4] Използвам дума – „на́китка“, – която Каравелов използва в „Българи от старо време“ за назоваване на комплекса, украсяващ женската глава.

Интересно е, че от българска/балканска гледна точка край огнището често е мястото на разгръщане на героическия дискурс, когато се пеят юнашки песни или се разказват/споделят преживени борби. Така вижда нещата не само Ботев в известната си статия „Народът: вчера, днес и утре“:

> Но и при тия страдания, при това страшно насилие, в кое и камъкът би се стопил, българинът се затвори от турчина вкъщи с челядта си и, както и днес, пял е и слушал е вместо византийската литургия свойта елегическа юнашка песен, вместо стрелата и сабята, хвана ралото и сърпа, ходил е по сборове и по седенки, по тлаки и по черковища – и щом варваринът е погазвал огнището му, кое, както и днес, е било обиколено със снахи и дъщери, със синове и унуци – той е оставял ралото и сърпа, гегата и кавала, хващал е бащина сабя, братова пушка и с „дружина вярна и сговорна“ отивал е в Стара планина да мъсти за обиди от турци и чорбаджии, да им отнима грабено имане и да пази село и сиромаси. (Ботев 1871: 6)

Ситуацията „певец край огнището“ е визуално представяна и в „Über Land und Meer“ през 70-те години на XIX в., но през други балкански народи и етноси, а е налице и в споменатата вече книга на Хелвалд и Бек. Когато обаче има възпяващ подвизите мъж, има и мъжка публика, а в разглежданата илюстрация ситуацията е друга.

Мъжкото отсъствие също е показателно, като то може да се свърже с труденето извън дома, с поставения знак на равенство между домашната и женската работа (стандартизираната представа за неуморно и неспирно трудеща се жена е свързана с преденето, като е показателно количеството предящи жени по страниците на списанието, независимо от етническия им произход и мястото на тази трудова дейност, или ръкоделието, а последното може да бъде предположено в ръцете на разположеното гърбом момиченце) и традиционното разделение на функциите: жената владее пространството на дома, а мъжът овладява света извън дома (Чернокожев 2001: 149–155).

Мъжкото отсъствие придобива особен смисъл във връзка с материала, представящ новия български владетел, тъй като владетелят е най-значимото мъжко присъствие в общността, първият мъж, господарят. А в българския случай тази поява е особено значеща, тъй като идва след петстотингодишен дисконтинуитет, след като фигурите на българските владетели са станали известни като имена, но не и като лица, и в този смисъл появата на портрета на българския княз може да бъде сравнена, без ефектите да са идентични поради различните културни равнища на немската и българската публика, с указаното от първата ремарка във Войниковата „Райна княгиня“: „Цар Петър седи на престол със скиптър в ръка.“

Портретът на княз Александър I Български е естествено разположен на първа страница на броя (Über Land und Meer 1879c: 661):

Über Land und Meer.

№ 34.

42. Band.
Einundzwanzigster Jahrgang.
Oktober 1878—1879.
Zweiter Band.

Allgemeine Illustrirte Zeitung.

Preis vierteljährlich
Mark 3. —
Mit Post-Aufschlag Mark 3. 50.
Erscheint jeden Sonntag.

Inhalts-Uebersicht.

Der Rezensent.

Novelle
von
Victor Klüthgen.
(Fortsetzung.)

II.

Die schöne, gefeierte Tragödin, Klara Rapprecht, der Liebling des Publikums, lag in bequemer Morgentoilette auf einer Chaiselongue und spielte mit ihrem Papagei. Ein türkisch gemusterter Schlafrock umschloß in großen Falten ihren prachtigen Bau; an den weißkrallenhaften, fein geformten Füßen hatte nur einer der zierlich gestickten Pantoffeln sich zu behaupten vermocht, während der andere zu Boden gefallen war und dort wie ein Hecht auf dem Trockenen den Mund aufsperrte. Das Raubschwarze Haar der Schauspielerin war in einfachen Flechten über den Kopf gelegt; es würde in Verbindung mit den dunklen, an der Nasenwurzel nahe zusammenlaufenden Brauen und den fast schwarzen Augen, deren Glanz der lässigen Ruhe des Körpers widersprach, ihr einen südländischen Anstrich gegeben haben, wenn nicht ihr Teint von seltener Weiße und — etwas bei ihren Kunstgenossinnen nicht eben Häufiges — Frische gewesen wäre.

Der Papagei, ein Jako, von jener graugefiederten, rothgeschwänzten Art, welche die besten und gelehrigsten Sprecher liefert, saß auf ihrer erhobenen Hand und beugte sich zu ihr nieder, um sie auf den gespitzten Mund zu küssen; er wiederholte diese Prozedur von Zeit zu Zeit mit sicht-

Fürst Alexander I. von Bulgarien. Originalzeichnung. (S. 665.)

lichem Vergnügen, während er dazwischen Gelegenheit fand, mit rauher Kehle die freundartig klingenden Wörter und Redensarten auszustoßen, die man ihm beigebracht hatte.

Dasjenige, was am meisten in dem mit viel Comfort ausgestatteten Raum, der das Wohnzimmer der Schauspielerin bildete, in's Auge fiel, war ein offenstehender Flügel von prachtvoller Arbeit. Bunt durcheinander lagen auf demselben Noten, Roben und einige Garderobestücke, zwischen denen die Hand einer kühlen, hübschen Blondine Ordnung zu schaffen bemüht war. Diese, die jüngere Schwester der Schauspielerin, mochte gleich der Letzteren im Anfange der zwanziger Jahre stehen und hatte eine entschiedene Aehnlichkeit in Gesichtsschnitt und Körperbau mit jener, nur ohne das wunderbare Ebenmaß und die geschmeidige Grazie der Schauspielerin und ohne den Reiz ihrer Farben. Es war jedenfalls gefühlsloß für die — übrigens ein wenig schlapp gelassene — junge Dame, sich in der Nähe der dunklen, sprühenden Schönheit ihrer Schwester zu bewegen, neben welcher sie dem matten Abbild glich, welches von der Sonne im Auge bleibt, wenn man die Lider schließt. Vielleicht daß sie selbst unter diesem Bewußtsein lebte und davon den etwas verdrießlichen, ungnädigen Zug im Gesicht erhalten hatte, der ihr die schwellende Unterlippe herabdrückte und die grauen Augen noch matter und glanzloser machte, als sie ohnehin schon waren.

„Jako," sagte die Schauspielerin, indem sie eines der prachtvollen Bouquets aus seiner Vase hob, welche von der grünen Rückwand eines

Текстовият материал от своя страна е не само доста по-обемен, което е лесно обяснимо, в сравнение с разказа за селската къща, но е и разположен в непосредствена близост до портрета (Über Land und Meer 1879c: 663):

Nr 34 Ueber Land und Meer. Allgemeine Illustrirte Zeitung. 663

das ich mir gewählt. Ich habe Anbeter die Menge gehabt und alle vertrieben, denn sie hatten den Muth nicht, bei mir auszuhalten. Sie, Olten, sind mir treu geblieben. Sie wagen viel. Was wollen Sie von mir?"

Ihr dunkles Auge ruhte mit ungewöhnlich weichem Ausdruck auf dem Dragoner, welcher abwechselnd erröthete und erblaßte. Er ging auf die schöne Verführerin zu, welche ihm ihre weiche, volle, runde Hand reichte; diese führte er an seine Lippen und sprach mit leicht vibrirender Stimme:

„Ein ein Gedanken, gnädiges Fräulein, trage aber keinen Augenblick Bedenken, Ihnen meine Hand anzubieten. Wird zwar voraussichtlich noch harte Kämpfe geben, denn meine Familie ist unverwüstlich stolz. Aber — habe im Nothfall genug mütterliches Vermögen, um auszukommen, und wäre Ihretwegen im Stande, mit meinem Vater zu brechen."

Ueber das Gesicht der Schauspielerin glitt ein leises Lächeln des Triumphes.

„Nun, das nenne ich ehrliches Spiel," erwiederte sie, indem sie dem von Glück Durchbebten die Hand leise wieder entzog. „Aber wir wollen die Sache nicht übereilen, mein lieber Freund. Ich kann nicht beurtheilen, wie weit Sie Ihr Herz mit Ihrem Kopf auseinandergesetzt haben, — bitte, machen Sie keine Einwendungen," unterbrach sie ihn rasch, als er die Lippen zu einer Gegenrede bewegte. „Zunächst halte ich die Saison aus, und bin auch für den Sommer bald und halb entschlossen, mir die Freiheit zu wahren. Sie haben also vollkommen Zeit, Ihren Entschluß zu prüfen und auszureifen zu lassen. Vorderhand gebe ich Ihnen das erste Anrecht an meine Person, wenn Ihnen damit gedient ist, und erneune Sie zu meinem Kavalier."

„O," stammelte Olten mit leuchtendem Auge, — „gnädiges Fräulein machen mich zum glücklichsten Sklaven —"

„Nicht so," unterbrach sie ihn hastig, „ich brauche keinen Sklaven; das ist eben die Art, die ich aus meiner Nähe verjagen wollte. Gegen Sklaven bin ich Tyrann. Ich will einen Kavalier, einen Mann, der mein Beschützer ist, — hören Sie, Olten, einen Mann, der mich vor solchem Nothanglfe zu beschützen* — und wieder blitzte ihr Blick in aufsiedendem Zorn und ihr Fuß stieß den Zeitungsschemel, der neben ihr auf dem Boden lag, gewaltsam auf die Seite. „Erkennen Sie mich, Olten; schaffen Sie mir Genugthuung für die Stunden des Ingrimms und Aergers, welche mir durch diese verdammten Lumpen geworden sind. Wollen Sie das, Olten?"

Ihre Lippen zuckten wie in verhaltenem Weinen und ihre Wangen färbten sich mit warmer Röthe. Mit unbeschreiblichem Lächeln reichte sie wieder dem glücklichen Offizier die Hand, der sich in glühender Erregung ihr zu Füßen warf.

„Gnädiges Fräulein sind ein Engel; will Alles thun, was Sie wollen —"

„Nur nicht übertreiben, mein Freund," sagte sie schalkhaft warnend, indem sie ihn emporzog. „Noch Eins." fügte sie plötzlich hinzu, „Sie sollen sehen, daß ich nicht dankgierig und rachsüchtig bin. Wenn Sie den Herrn bewegen können, ein Versprechen abzugeben, daß er seine bisherige Art, mich zu traktiren, künftig unterlassen will, so will ich ihm ohne Genugthuung verzeihen aber bleibende jenes Versprechen als eine solche betrachten. Es wäre ja möglich. Es gibt solche Maul- und Federhelden, die den Muth nicht haben, ihr Gewerk mit männlicher Hand zu vertreten, vielleicht gehört er dazu. Nun aber adieu, mein Freund, und der Himmel segne Ihre gute Sache. Gießen wir Weihe zunächst etwas Oel über diese Wellen der Aufregung, indem wir uns trennen. Ich will Ihnen einen Vorbeerkranz bereit halten, wie er schöner nur wenigen Siegern auf das Haupt gedrückt wurde."

Zum letzten Male beugte sich die lange Gestalt des Dragoners auf ihre Hand zum Kusse nieder, noch einmal sah er ihr in die verführerisch glänzenden Augen, deren Lider sich vor seinem Blicke leicht senkten. Dann griff er in halbem Traume nach Mantel und Mütze und ging nach der Thür.

Im Augenblicke, wo er diese öffnete, schnierte ein graues Etwas mit Blitzgeschwindigkeit durch die Luft auf ihn zu. Der Offizier wehrte ein Kreischen und Flattern auf seiner Schulter und spürte einen empfindlichen Schmerz am Kopfe und rechten Ohre. Es war der Papagei, der bisher andrachtlos auf seiner Stange die geschlechtlichen und mit Erfolg gekrönten Bemühungen verwandt hatte, seinen Fuß aus dem Ringe zu befreien, der ihn umschloß. Der so innerwartet Angegriffene schüttelte erschreckt mit dem Kopfe und schlug mit der Faust hinter sich. Die Schauspielerin eilte mit dem Rufe: „Jolly! Du Nichtsnutz!" herbei und zog den sich sträubenden Vogel vom Gegenstande seiner Abneigung fort, wobei derselbe, in ihrer Hand zappelnd, unaufhörlich und mit gellender Stimme schrie: „Spitzbube! Du Narr! Schafskopf! Ich bin der schöne Jolly!"

Draußen im Vorzimmer schall ein helles Auflachen und die blonde Mathilde eilte mit kurzem Gruße an dem eilig sich entfernenden Offizier vorüber in die Stube.

„Das ist doch ein einziger Abschied! Wenn darnach ein Anbeter, und wenn er selbst ein erhörter wäre, noch Muth behält, so hat er wahrhaftig Ueberfluß daran!"

„Hast Du wieder gehorcht?" fragte die Schauspielerin scharf, indem sie sich bemühte, den Vogel zu beruhigen.

„Nun, und wenn ich gehorcht hätte?" sagte keck die blonde Mathilde. „Das Vergnügen wirst Du mir doch bei Deinen Liebschaften gönnen! Du sorgst ja dafür, daß ich von eigenen Genüssen in diesem Punkt verschont bleibe."

„Du bist heraus und boshaft. Ich habe noch Niemand verhindert, Dich zu sehen und sich in Dich zu verlieben."

„Natürlich. Sie gehen von selbst lieber bei Dir zu Gast, und darnach schmeckt es ihnen freilich aus meiner Hand nicht mehr."

„Schweig'!" rief Klara Ruppprecht mit Heftigkeit. „Du weißt so gut wie ich, daß Du mir nichts vorzuwerfen hast. Aber daß Du ein undankbares Geschöpf bist, laß Dir von mir sagen."

„Verzeihe, gütige Wohlthäterin!" war die spöttische Antwort.

(Fortsetzung folgt.)

Fürst Alexander I. von Bulgarien.

(Hierzu das Portrait S. 661.)

Zum dritten Male gebenkt ein Prinz aus deutschem Fürstenhause sich aufwärts zu ziehen, um als Pionnier nationaler Bildung und Gesittung einem lang getrennten Bande und Volk der Freiheit und des Friedens Segnungen zu bringen und zu bewahren. Vom Mittelmeer aus dem Hohenzollern weist ein Prinz aus dem großherzoglichen Hause von Hessen sich an, die durch den Vertrag zu Berlin neugeschaffene Fürstenkrone von Bulgarien anzunehmen, welche durch die Wahl des Landes, vollzogen am 29. April 1879, dem Geburtstage des Kaisers Alexander von Rußland, ihm zugefallen ist.

Fürst Alexander I. von Bulgarien, Fürst Prinz Alexander von Battenberg, ist am 5. April 1857 in Verona geboren als der zweite Sohn, das dritte Kind, des damaligen Oberstleutnants, Generals Prinzen Alexander von Hessen, Bruders der Kaiserin von Rußland, und dessen Gemahlin, der Prinzessin Julie von Battenberg, geborner Gräfin von Haucke, deren Vater sieben Jahre als letzter königlich polnischer Kriegsminister verwaltet worden war. Die mit zwei Jahre alte Tochter wurde auf kaiserliche Kosten erzogen, kam später an den Hof und fesselte, als Hofdame der Kaiserin durch Geist und Schönheit besonders gefährlich, ihren nachherigen Gemahl, welcher sich 1851 in russischen Landen fand und am 28. Oktober desselben Jahres als Gatte sie heimführte. Prinz Alexander von Hessen zählt 1850 mit Auszeichnung im österreichischen Heere; er gehört zu den wenigen bevorzugten Fürstlichen, die gleichzeitig deutscher, österreichischer, russischer General und Ritter des militärisch hohen Ordens pour le mérite, Maria-Theresien- und Georgen-Orden sind. Alle drei hier erwähnten Verhältnisse, die Geburt auf österreichisch-italienischem Boden von einer russischen Mutter und einem deutschen Vater, die nationalen Neigungen des fürstlichen Elternpaares, sowie später die an den ersten Interessen im Vaterlande sich anschließende Erziehung im k. sächsischen Kadettenkorps zu Dresden und der Eintritt als Offizier 1875 in ein hessisches Dragonerregiment, all dies hob dem Prinzen Alexander von Battenberg eine gewisse Internationalität des Empfindens, die ihn den Werth jener Nationalität doppelt schätzen lehrte.

Zu Bulgarien, dem nun von ihm zu beherrschenden Lande, trat Prinz Alexander zuerst während des russisch-türkischen Krieges 1877 in direkte Beziehungen. Der Prinz war in seiner Eigenschaft als Lieutenant à la suite des russischen Alexeregiments, dessen Chef sein Vater ist, in das Hauptquartier seines kaiserlichen Vetters, des Kaisers Alexander von Rußland, berufen worden, wo er sich durch sein ruhiges, mäßvolles Wesen, Ihrer Vertrauen, wie er sich durch sein ruhiges, mäßvolles Wesen, Ihrer Vertrauen, verschiedentlich den der Generaladjutanten Fürst Wittgenstein und v. Werder, erwarb, welche in ihren Berichten an ihren Monarchen gerne dem Gedanken Ausdruck gaben, daß der junge Prinz wohl geeignet sein könne, eine Hauptrolle im Orient zu spielen. Prinz Alexander nahm bald thätig an dem Feldzug Theil. Namentlich bei Gelegenheit warm er, bei denen sein Name mit Auszeichnung genannt, sein Benehmen gerühmt wurde. Er machte den Uebergang über die Donau mit und erwarb sich den Militair-Orden mit Schwertern; er war unmittelbar betheiligt am Sturm von Nicopolis, der bulgarischen Erhebungsstadt, in der zum ersten Mal zum Fürsten des Landes erkoren ist; und nachdem er längere Zeit im Hauptquartier des Fürsten Carl Eitel Friedrich Zephyrinus Ludwig von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen verweilt und dort den Fall von Plewna gesehen hatte, begleitete er sich aus als Ordonnanzoffizier des Generals Gurko, Zeugen bei dem Aufsuchen der Silvestrowerbindung Arabanopol-Philippopel, bei welcher Gelegenheit der deutsche Prinz die bisherige Freundlichkeit des russischen Hauptquartiers in vollständiger Weise teilte. Mit dem Georgenkreuze geschmückt, kehrte der Prinz in das deutsche Vaterland zurück, um hier sogleich die höhere Klasse einer preußischen Kriegsakademie zu erhalten.

Gleichzeitig trat Prinz Battenberg auf den hessischen Dragonerregiment in das Regiment der Garden du Corps des deutschen Kaisers und Königs von Preußen über, in welchem er, wie in der Hofgesellschaft von Potsdam und Berlin, sehr bald zu den beliebtesten Erscheinungen gehörte. Eine edle Gestalt, ein Ritter und doch wohlbewußter Blick, ein ganz schwierigen Verhältnissen gewachsener Verstand, große Liebenswürdigkeit, der Frohsinn der Jugend, das sind die Eigenschaften, die hoher den Prinzen auszeichneten, der die Aussichten auf eine sorgenfreie, glückliche Zukunft mit dem ungewissen Schicksal eines Fürsten von Bulgarien vertauscht.

Fürst Alexander I. tritt in seinen fürstlichen Beruf auf der Basis des Vertrages zu Berlin 1878, auf dem er nächstdem steht, mit dem festen Willen, sich mit durch eine Propaganda seines zu fassen, welche seinem Lande der innern Frieden reichen könnte, ohne denselben nach außen zu bedrohen. Fürst Alexander will die Kunstführung aller Verhältnisse des Landes, er will dessen Wohlfahrt und Gedeihen, will Recht und Gesetz in dem Lande wieder zu Ehren bringen, damit es aufathme im Gefühle des Wiederbesitzes seiner Nationalität, die es in jahrhundertlanger Knechtschaft fast verloren hatte. Nationale Bildung und Gesittung sind das Endziel des Strebens, dem Fürst Alexander I. von Bulgarien von nun an seine Zukunft und sein Leben zu weihen gedenkt.

Ein Fuchsbau.

(Hierzu das Bild S. 665 und 668.)

Meinecke, dieses Symbol aller thierischen Schlauheit, vor dem alle Gründtiere und Dichter erzittern und dessen Treiben viele Maler und Zeichner verherrlicht haben, dieser Schelm hat sicher ein arglosen Hasenbalg überlistet und trägt dieses Opfer niederträchtiger Hinterlistigkeit jetzt in den Eingang des Baues hineingeben Spitzbuben zu. Gemächlich kann sie nun an der Jagd, meint diese tandere Gesellschaft, so gütlich sie werden, der alten Füchsin bei zu schaffen und sie hat mit dem „Kampf um das Dasein" alle Hände voll zu thun, was sie aber auch mit unübertroffener Mütterlichkeit aufzuführen weiß, denn kein Hase, kein Rebhuhn aber Waldkauz an den Orte ist vor ihrer feinen Spürnase sicher. Ganze Haufen abgemagter Beine umgeben nicht selten die Eingänge solcher Baue, während sie selbst sich mit Mäusen, Fröschen und Gerüchen aller Art begnügt, die sich natürlich für den Transport bis zum Bau kaum berechnen. — Es ist ein überaus anziehendes Naturschauspiel, wenn man sich in Abendstunde des Baues, in sicherer Stelle bis in die Nähe eines solchen Baues anschleichen kann, um diese kleinen Kobolde in ihrem Treiben zu beobachten, welche, wenn alles ruhig erscheint, einer nach dem Andern ihre schlauen Köpfe mit den bösartigen blaugrauen Augen und den Nüßer hervorstecken, bei jedem Rucken rasch Blattes zurückziehen und in nachsten Augenblick wieder erscheinen. Scheinen sie genug, daß Alles sicher ist, wagen sie sich dann auch weiter heraus, um mit einander zu spielen, aber jeden Augenblick sahren sie bei der geringsten Veranlassung wieder blitzschnell in ihren dunklen Bau zurück, kommen dann wieder heraus und werden immer kecker und dreister, bis ein langentbehrtes Locken der Beobachters sie auf Kommerodenerschen hineinzudrängen in ihren unterirdischen Palast. — Wenn die jungen Füchse ihre graue Farbe verlieren und sich dann mehr in das Gelb der Alten verwandeln, was etwa in der sechsten Woche stattfindet, so verreisen sie viel länger von dem Baue und streifen an, die Mäuse auf einige Schritte zu begleiten, was meistens Verdachten zu anfangs strafend zurückgehalten werden. Später jedoch gibt diese Vorsicht der Mutter nicht mehr und die Füchsen unter ihren Schutzen sich gern verstehen sich, indessen die Schwächeren noch das Haus hüten. Jetzt beginnt das freie Tagesumherstreifen und die Lehre der Mutter verschwindet sich, denn sie weiß die die Gefahren im Fangen von Insekten, Fröschen und Mäusen unterrichten und die Lebensmittelkammern mit Futter versorgen. Ihre Arbeit tritt sie demnach auf und macht sie soll ganz Ernst, das nur mit Hunt und Horchen bedeckt ist, während ihre Kinder lustig gedeihen. Sobald alle Jungen den Bau verlassen können, beginnen die Eltern sonen, welche anfangs in kleinen Umkreisen des Baues stattfinden und sich weiter immer weiter ausdehnen. Vor dieser Zeit hört man denn nicht selten die alte Füchsin bellen, was sich wie ein Gekell eines Spitzhundes klingt, und entweder dem Zusammentreffen der kleinen Familie gilt oder aber um ein junges Hündchen den verstellt liegenden jungen Streifen zugedacht, die es dann mit schon gelber Räuberwanne überfallen und verjagen, und so lebt diese Rotte den Sommer hindurch fort. Bis aus jenem dieser kleinen Tagesrichte ein wohlgenährter Fuchs hervorgeht, der sich auch seinem Schicksal im „Kampf um das Dasein" alle Ehre macht.

Luftkuren und Luftkurorte.

Von

Dr. H. Reiner.

Unter den Existenzbedingungen des Menschen hat unzweifelhaft die atmosphärische Luft die wichtigste Stelle. Mit den ersten Athemzügen saugt sie uns in unser Dasein ein, und in den letzten Zügen begleitet sie uns; in ihr leben und weben wir, und nur wenige Minuten braucht sie uns zu fehlen und wir sind dem Tode verfallen. Luft in genügender Menge und von immer gleicher Güte enthalten einzuathmen, das ist die sicherste Grundlage einer unerschütterlichen Gesundheit. Und doch ist gerade in dieser Hinsicht in Folge unserer klimatischen und sozialen Verhältnisse Verblendung und Verstockung das Gewöhnliche. Seitdem wir aus Menschen

Княз Александър I Български

За трети път принц от немска княжеска династия възнамерява да отиде на югоизток, за да може като пионер на националното образуване и цивилизованост да занесе и съхрани благословията на свободата и мира на страна и народ, били дълго време под робство. След Вителсбах и Хоенцолерн идва ред на принц от династията на великото херцогство Хесен, който да заеме новосъздадения чрез договора от Берлин княжески трон на България, който чрез избора на страната, проведен на 29 април 1879, рождения ден на император Александър Руски, беше отдаден нему.

Княз Александър I Български, досега принц Александър фон Батенберг, е роден във Верона на 5 април 1857 като втори син и трето дете на тогавашния австрийски генерал принц Александър фон Хесен, брат на императрицата на Русия, и неговата съпруга, принцеса Юлия фон Батенберг, родена графиня фон Хауке, чийто баща навремето е бил убит като последен кралски полски военен министър. Едва двегодишната дъщеря бива възпитана на императорска издръжка, идва по-късно в двора и като особено ценена за своя ум и красота придворна дама на императрицата увлича (буквално „оковава" – бел. моя – Н. Ч.) своя бъдещ съпруг, който до 1851 г. е на руска служба и на 28 октомври същата година я отвежда в дома си като своя спътница в живота. Принц Александър фон Хесен блясва през 1859 г. с отличие в австрийската войска; той принадлежи към малкото фаворизирани княжески персони, които едновременно е немски, австрийски и руски генерал и рицар на високия военен орден pour le mérite (за заслуги – бел. моя – Н. Ч.), орден „Мария Терезия" и орден „Св. Георги". Всички тези споменати тук отношения/връзки, раждането на австрийско-италианска земя от майка славянка и баща немец, националните наклонности/влечения на княжеската родителска двойка, както и по-късно дошлите, след уроците в бащиния дом, възпитание в кралския саксонски кадетски корпус в Дрезден и включването като офицер през 1875 г. в хесенски драгунски полк – всичко това дава на принц Александър фон Батенберг една положителна интернационалност на чувстването, което го научава да цени два пъти повече значението на всяка националност.

С България, страната, чийто владетел предстои да стане, принц Александър влиза в непосредствена връзка по време на руско-турската война от 1877 г. В качеството си на лейтенант à la suite на руския полк улани, чийто командир е неговият баща, принцът е извикан в главната квартира на своя царствен кръстник, император Александър Руски, където той със своя спокоен, достоен нрав си спечелил всеобщо одобрение, особено това на генерал-адютантите Витгенщайн и ф. Вердер, които в докладите до своите монарси за първи път дават израз на мисълта, че младият принц би могъл да е особено подходящ да носи княжеска корона в Ориента. Принц Александър скоро взема участие в похода. Главно три бяха епизодите, при които името му беше споменато, за да бъде отличено, а поведението му – възхвалено. Той участва в преминаването на Дунава и получава/сдобива се/награден е с ордена „Владимир" с мечове; пряко участва в щурма на Търново, българския Царевград, в който се осъществи изборът му за княз на страната; и след като дълго време пребивава в главната квартира на княза на Румъния, който оттогава е близък

негов приятел, и там вижда падането на Плевен, той се отличи като офицер за свръзка на генерал Гурко, особено при прекъсването на железопътната връзка Адрианопол–Филипопол, при който случай немският принц спаси хесенското семейство на един тамошен гаров служител с максимум доброна-мереност. Декориран с Георгиевски кръст, принцът се завърна в немското си отечество, за да получи там по-високата степен на един пруски военен орден.

Същевременно принц Александър премина от хесенския драгунски полк в гвардейския корпус на немския император и крал на Прусия, в кой-то много скоро, както и в дворцовото общество в Потсдам и Берлин, вече принадлежеше към най-обичаните фигури. Благороден вид, смел и все пак благ(осклонен) поглед, справящ се със сложни взаимоотношения ум/инте-лект, голяма любезност, веселият нрав на младостта, това са качествата, кои-то до този момент отличаваха принца, който замени изгледите за безгрижно, щастливо бъдеще с несигурната съдба на княз на България.

Княз Александър I встъпи в своите княжески обязаности на основата на договора от Берлин 1878, зад който безрезервно стои, с твърдата воля да не се остави да бъде заблуден от пропаганда, която би могла да ограби вътреш-ния мир на неговата страна, без да укрепи същия навън. Княз Александър желае консолидирането на всички отношения в страната, той желае нейното благоденствие и напредък, иска да възстанови почитта към правото и закона в страната, за да си поеме последната дъх в усещането на новопритежанието на своята националност/същност, която тя е била почти изгубила в дългове-ковното робство. Националното образуване и цивилизованост са крайната цел на стремленията, на които княз Александър I Български от сега смята да посвети своето бъдеще и своя живот.

Определено в материала за българския княз са стабилизирани три ас-пекта:

1. Трети представител на немска династия отива в Югоизточна Европа (немският фактор) – именно в Европейския югоизток, а не на Балканите или бившата Европейска Турция, тъй като в разказа за немския принц име-на като „Балкани“ и „Турция“ остават маргинални, сякаш със самото му отиване там те отстъпват, изпразват се от властността да именуват места и културни позиции.

2. Принцът отива с мисия на пионер за постигане на „национално об-разуване и цивилизованост“ (пионерската мисия: цивилизоване или коло-низиране) – за тази мисия той сякаш се е готвил от самото си раждане, та дори и отпреди това, тя е заложена, програмирана, а експортирането на нация и цивилизация е свързано с неизречената констатация за тяхното отсъствие у българите, които освен това трябва да се сдобият и с „благо-словията на свободата и мира“, които принцът трябва да занесе, но и опа-зи, като техен гарант; по този начин текстът на Берлинския договор става градивен, конструктивен, цивилизоващо-приобщаващ страдалите с векове страна и народ, към ценностите, донесени като дар от принца.

3. Добродетелите на самия принц, който подобно на приказен герой е близък до идеалната представа за владетел (идеалният владетел) – тези

добродетели, които принцът е показвал и доказвал през целия си живот, са унаследени и доразвити, забелязани са от всички, за да се оформи още преди края на войната схващането на двамата аташирани в руския щаб генерали, че „младият принц би могъл да е особено подходящ да носи княжеска корона в Ориента“, наред с това принцът участва в битките, героизмът му е възнаграден с ордени, а той се явява „благонравен и добронамерен“ спасител на семейството на гаров служител, преди да поеме ролята на спасител на българите.

Несъмнено важен е и биографичният разказ, като той проследява как един живот се изпълва постъпателно със смисъл, как младият благородник заживява в руслото на предопределеността, как предопределеностите на неговата мисия са свързани и с дълга да превърне България в просперираща новоучредена държава, проникната от „почитта към правото и закона“, които са единствената възможна основа на осъществяването на този проект за държава.

По този начин в рамките на седем броя, т.е. по-малко от два месеца, тъй като илюстрованото издание излиза всяка неделя, читателят има възможността да сглоби някакъв образ на България през две визуални представяния, които имат различен статут в съзнанието на немскоезичната публика – едното е етноопознавателно, другото е персонално-представително, едната картина е на жени и деца, другата – на млад принц, едната е затворена в традиционния бит, другата е отворена в европейските пространства на политика и династически обвързаности и т.н.

В тази посока на разсъждения са изключително важни мисията на принца и възможната множественост на роли и идентификационни проекции, които неговата фигура обема в себе си, защото той е не само владетел, той е цивилизатор, той трябва да внесе европейските характеристики на социално сглобяване, тъй като самият той е тяхно въплъщение. Младият царствен спасител е видян като неизбежно потребна персона, в която са проектирани различни по своята емоционална напрегнатост, а и по степента на тяхната осъзнатост, желания на българите. Последните особености на представянето на българския княз са само потенцирани, без да се разгръща другата гледна точка – на страната и народа, чийто суверен става той. Но пък са подсказани редица функционални хоризонти, в които князът може да бъде вписан не само като фигура на социалната светлост, но и като притежаващ магичната сила да превърне един изостанал ориенталски свят в друг. Отново искам да подчертая, че маркираните потенциали са актуални от гледна точка на българите, но биват предполагани и в гледната точка на немскоезичната публика, която е осъществила културен дар, изпращайки такъв млад благородник на югоизток.

Портретът на княз Александър I Български е изцяло оформен в традицията на портретуване на значимите фигури – излишно е да се подчертават смело устременият поглед, завъртяната леко надясно глава и издаденото

напред дясно рамо, все белези на водача, телесни жестове, които сякаш отправят апела: „След мен! Напред!“, маркери на себеотдаване на поверената от Европа (Берлинския конгрес) мисия.

Въз основа на двете илюстрации са възможни и разгръщания на интерпретации през отношението женско–мъжко, които да вплетат княза в почти любовна обвързаност с младата (като новоосвободена) балканска страна; неговата харизма следва да се превърне в почти магически фактор на променяне на българския свят, тъй като проблемите пред конституирането на българската държава са посочени още в материала на В. ф. Д. „Една бъдеща държава“ (Über Land und Meer 1878: 559–560).

Така че „българският сюжет“ бива моделиран в ясна текстова рамка, която описва не само изчистените връзки с днешния политически ден на Европа, но и очертава релефа на българското минало посредством включената в този текст историческа информация.

Когато в годишнините 1878/1879 на „Über Land und Meer“ към наличните репортажи от войната се добавят и илюстрациите – не само от театъра на военните действия, – а след тях дойдат и предосвобожденските вглеждания в българския живот от страна на Феликс Каниц и накрая се яви скромното представяне на българска селска къща и светлия, устремен към бъдещето портрет на княза, всичко постига една относително висока степен на съчлененост, която обаче невинаги е свързана с оцелостеност и дълбочина.

Така в крайна сметка България се сдобива със своя двуизмерен образ – от една страна, битовите наличности на традиционната култура, а от друга – блестящата поява на младия княз, който има мисията да преобрази страната, да я сдобие с нация и цивилизация. А лицето, легитимиращо държавата, е изключително важно за сдобиването на самата държава с образ[5]. А в случая образът на владетеля е образът на промени на българския свят, а и образът на бъдещето.

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[5] В споменатата вече книга за съвременна Турция частта за Румъния завършва с герба на страната, частта за Сърбия е уплътнена от портретите на Милош Обренович и Милан Обренович, а в книгата читателят бива въведен от портрета на султана. Липсата на (визуален) образ на водач, на различни движения е донякъде възможно основание да не може да се консолидира български образ в немскоезичната периодика на XIX в.

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BULGARIA – TWO VIEWS IN *OVER LAND AND SEA*, 1879

Nikolay Chernokozhev

Abstract

The article "reads" two illustrations of Bulgaria and Bulgarians, published in the popular German illustrated magazine in the year of the constitution of the new Bulgarian state. It aims to outline the effects and the results of the communication between these illustrations, as well as to trace out the special characteristics of the image of Bulgaria that created a certain ideas in the minds of the German audience. The analysis problematizes some aspects of the communication between verbal text and visual image.

ЗА АВТОРИТЕ
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Otto Kronsteiner is Emeritus, O. Univ.-Professor Dr. phil. Dr. h.c. in Slavic Studies and History. He became Professor Emeritus of the University of Salzburg in 2007 after 25 years of leading the Institute of Slavic Studies at the same university. During his career he was editor-in-chief of *Wiener Slavistischen Jahrbuches* (1970–1975); *Österreichische Namenforschung* (1973–1986) and *Die Slawischen Sprachen* (1982–2001). He was also founder and leader of the *Salzburger Slawistengespräche* (1982–2001). Professor Kronsteiner has published over 15 monographs and dozens of articles in the area of Slavic studies, South European history and literature. His chief research interests remained Old Bulgarian language, onomastic and orthographic. During the political changes in Southern Europe he was actively involved in the democratic transition and was decorated the highest Bulgarian order for exclusive merits.

Nathan Houser is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Indiana University in Indianapolis (IUPUI) and President of the Charles S. Peirce Foundation. He has served as Director of the Peirce Edition Project and the Institute for American Thought and as President of the Charles S. Peirce Society and the Semiotic Society of America. From 1993 to 2009 he was General Editor for the Indianapolis critical edition of Peirce's writings and he co-edited the two-volume *Essential Peirce* and *Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Peirce*. He is the author of many articles on Peirce including "The Scent of Truth" (2005), "Peirce in the 21st Century" (2005), "Peirce's Contrite Fallibilism" (2006), "Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics" (2009), "Action and Representation in Peirce's Pragmatism" (2010), "Signs and Survival" (2013), "Peirce's neglected Views on the Importance of the Individual" (2014), and "The Intelligible Universe" (2014).

Winfried Nöth was Professor of Linguistics and Semiotics and Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of Kassel until 2010 and is now Professor of Cognitive Semiotics at the Postgraduate Program "Tecnologias da Inteligência e Design Digital" of the Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC). His 300 articles and 31 authored or edited books are on topics of English linguistics, semiotic aspects of language, literature, the image, maps, the media, systems theory, culture, and evolution. Nöth's *Handbook of Semiotics*

(transl. into Bahasa, and in rev. transl. into German and Croatian) was awarded the *Choice Outstanding Academic Book* prize. Among his books are *Dynamik semiotischer Systeme*, *Literatursemiotische Analysen – zu Lewis Carrolls Alice-Büchern*, *Origins of Semiosis*, *Semiotics of the Media*, *Crisis of Representation* (with C. Ljungberg), *Self-Reference in the Media* (with N. Bishara), *Imagen: Comunicación, semiótica y medios*, *Comunicação e semiótica*, and *Estratégias semióticas da publicidade* (all three with L. Santaella). Nöth received the 2011 Mouton d'Or Award for his article 'Self-referential postmodernity'.

Vincent Colapietro is Liberal Arts Research Professor at the Pennsylvania State University (University Park, Pennsylvania, USA). He is the author of the books *Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* (1989), *A Glossary of Semiotics* (1993, translated into Bulgarian by Ivan Mladenov, 2000), *Fateful Shapes of Human Freedom: John William Miller and the Crisis of Modernity* (2003), *Reason, Subjectivity, and Agency* (forthcoming), and has published numerous of articles on Charles Sanders Peirce, pragmatism, semiotics, subjectivity, and other topics. His research interests include also American Philosophy (especially the classical period – Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Santayana, and Whitehead); philosophy of culture (including theories of discourse and, above all, *literary* discourse); aesthetics; history of modern thought and culture; philosophy of religion; philosophy of mind; logic; ethical theory. Email: vxc5@psu.edu

Michiko Arima is Professor of Linguistics and Semiotics at Kyoto Women's University in Kyoto, Japan, Rtd. She is a member of the board of directors of the Japanese Association for Semiotic Studies and also a member of the board of directors of the Edward Sapir Society of Japan. Her major fields of interest are semiotics, English linguistics, and poetics. Some of her major books are *Monowasure-to kioku-no kigoron* (*Semiotics of Memory and Memory Loss in Aging*) (2012); *Peirce-no shiso* (*An Introduction to Charles S. Peirce: Semiotics and Cognitive Linguistics*) (2001); *Kotoba-to seimei* (*Speech and Life*) (1995); *Kokoro-no katachi, bunka-no katachi* (*Types of Mind, Types of Culture*) (1990); *Kigo-no jubaku* (*Spellbound by Signs: Schizophrenics and Text Interpretation*) (1986). Her complete translations include I. Mladenov, *Conceptualizing Metaphors: on Charles Peirce's marginalia* (2012); J. Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (2004); E. H. Lenneberg (ed.) *New Directions in the Study of Language* (1985); J. M. Penn, *Linguistic Relativity versus Innate Ideas* (1980); B. L. Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf* (1978). Email: arimam@jcom.zaq.ne.jp

Ivo Assad Ibri is full Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUCSP), Brazil. He got his PhD in philosophy from the University of São Paulo in 1994 and worked on a post-doctoral research in 2004–2005 at the Indiana University (IUPUI) – USA, sponsored by the IUPUI Institute

for Advanced Study. He is the founder and director of the Center for Pragmatism Studies of PUCSP and editor of *Cognitio* – Journal of Philosophy. His main research interest is American pragmatism, especially the work of Charles Peirce, as well as its connections with German idealism. He has published several essays on pragmatism and a book on Peirce's metaphysics, called *Kósmos Noétos*. He is researcher of the Brazilian agency CNPq (National Counsel of Technological and Scientific Development) and member of the board of consultants of the Peirce Edition Project at Indiana University. He has also been elected as President of The Charles Sanders Peirce Society for the period of 2014–2015. Email: ibri@uol.com.br

Eero Tarasti is Professor of Musicology at the University of Helsinki (chair) since 1984. Director of the International Semiotics Institute at Imatra, Finland in 1988–2013; President of the IASS/AIS (International Association for Semiotic Studies), 2004–2014. Founder and President of the Semiotic Society of Finland since 1979. He studied music in Sibelius Academy, Helsinki, and then in Vienna, Paris, Rio de Janeiro and Bloomington.

He got his PhD from Helsinki University (1978) after studies in Paris with Claude Lévi-Strauss and A. J. Greimas. He is one of the founders and the director of the international research group Musical Signification since 1984. Tarasti has become Honorary Doctor at Estonian Music Academy; New Bulgarian University, Sofia; Indiana University, Bloomington, and Université Aux-Marseille; he is also Honorary Fellow of Victoria College at University of Toronto; he has got decorations such as White Rose Order, Finland, Palmes Académique, France, and Ordem Rio Branco, Brazil.

Tarasti has published over 400 articles and edited tens of anthologies on musicology and semiotics. He is the chair of publishing series Acta Semiotic Fennica. His major monographs are: *Myth and Music* (1979, also in French), *A Theory of Musical Semiotics* (1994, also in French), *Heitor Villa-Lobos* (1996), *Existential Semiotics* (2000), *Le secret du professeur Amfortas* (novel, 2002), *Signs of Music* (2003, also in French and Italian), *Fondements de la sémiotique existentielle* (2009), *Fondamenti di semiotica esistenziale* (2010), *Semiotics of Classical Music* (2012), *Le retour à la Villa Nevski* (novel, 2014) and *L'eredità di Villa-Nevski* (novel, 2014); *Sein und Schein* (2015). Email: eero.tarasti@helsinki.fi

Dinda L. Gorlée is a semiotician and multilingual translation theorician with research interests in the philosophy of language and interarts studies. With a dual PhD in semiotics and translation theory from the University of Amsterdam, her most recent academic function was as Visiting Professor at the University of Helsinki. Gorlée is Research Associate of Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and Associate Editor of *American Book Review* at University of Houston, Victoria, TX. Gorlée is widely published internationally. Her books include: *Semiotics and the Problem of Translation: With Special*

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Drude von der Fehr is Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Oslo, Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages. Her publications include: "Experience in a Peircean View: A Key to Feminist Research?", *European Journal for Semiotic Studies*, 1997; *Interpretazione e violenza. La Storia di Elsa Morante*. Pisa, Roma: Istituti Editoriali Poligrafici Internazionali, 1999; A. Henault, D. von der Fehr et al. (eds.) *La Semìotiqùe*, Paris: PUF, 2002; "Literature and the Somatic Body: Autobiographical Identity and Indexical Pain", *RSSI* (Canadian Semiotic Association: C. S. Peirce and the Study of Literature), 2004, vol. 24, no. 1–3; *Når kroppen tenker (When the Body Thinks)*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2008; "Clinical Tales and the Artlike Creativity of the Body", in K. Stene-Johansen and F. Tygstrup (eds.) *Illness in Context*, Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2010; "Art", in D. Favareau, P. Cobley and K. Kull (eds.) *A More Developed Sign*. Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2012. Recent books: D. von der Fehr and E. Løvlie, *Tro på litteratur* (*Faith in Literature*). *Fra Dante og Derrida til Fosse og Knausgård.* Oslo: Vidarforlaget, 2012; D. von der Fehr (ed.) *Den levende kroppen* (*The Live Body*) Oslo: Vidarforlaget (forthcoming). Email: d.v.d.Fehr@ilos.uio.no

Andrey Tashev, PhD is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He is the author of the book *Pragmatism and Ivan Sarailiev. Toward the Roots of Semiotic Thought in Bulgaria* (2013) (in Bulgarian) and co-author of three books on Bulgarian literature. His articles have been published in philosophical and literary journals in Bulgaria and abroad, such as *Filosofski alternativi* (*Philosophical Alternatives*) *Literaturna misal* (*Literary Thought*), *Littera et Lingua*, *Sjani* (Georgia), *Sign Systems Studies* (Estonia) and in collections on literary theory. Tashev is the editor of the book *Aristotle* by Ivan Sarailiev (2013) and co-editor of the collection *Out-of-literariness* (2012). In 2011 he was awarded the "Ivan Evstratiev Geshov" Prize at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Email: and_tashev@abv.bg

Mihály Szívós, PhD, is Senior researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. He studied Sociology, Philosophy, History and Mathematics at the University ELTE. He received his MA diplomas in Sociology and History in 1977, and obtained his PhD degree in Philosophy in 1992. He works in the field of philosophy, the sociology of science and semiotics. In philosophy, his research fields include the theory of tacit knowledge, the history of philosophical thinking in the 20th century in Hungary, Charles Sanders Peirce's philosophy and some areas of Classical German Philosophy. In semiotics, he

deals with theoretical semiotics, the theory of sign-acts and literary semiotics. He published papers in English, French, German and Hungarian languages and six books. His recent publications include the following books: *The History of Appearance. From the Beginning Until the Middle of the First Century BC* (2000), *The Theory of Personal and Tacit Knowledge* (2005), *From the Sign to the Code. Systematic Semiotics* (2013), *The Theory of Sign-acts* (2014).

Vesselin Petrov is Professor of Philosophy at the Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He is a DSc since 2011. The area of his research interests comprises process philosophy, contemporary philosophy (including pragmatism), ontology, epistemology and philosophy of science. He is the author of three monographs in Bulgarian (two of them with a second edition), and of more than 100 papers, a great part of which are published in English abroad. Prof. Petrov is the editor of 18 books in English and in Bulgarian. He is also the editor-in-chief of the international academic periodical journal *Balkan Journal of Philosophy* and is the Executive Director of the *International Process Network* Board. Prof. Petrov is Head of the Department of Knowledge and Reality: Models, Methodologies and Heuristics, and also Deputy Director of the Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge.

Reni Yankova is Assistant Professor at the South-East European Center for Semiotic Studies at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia. Her increasing interest in Charles Peirce's work started with the quotation "How do we know?" and that made her think about the problems of mind evolution, knowledge and habits. In 2014 she successfully defended her PhD thesis, entitled "Semiotics and pragmatism. Habit, norm and ritual in Charles Peirce's philosophy". She is the author of several articles on Peirce including "Being in Order. Ritual and Habit in Charles S. Peirce's Philosophy" (2012).

Raya Kuncheva, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. She is the author of two books in the field of poetics and verse theory: *The Verse as a Possibility of Choice* (1988) and *Metrics, Free Verse, Sonnet. Verse Theory Before and Now* (2000) (both in Bulgarian), and co-editor of several volumes, including, most recently, *Memory and Text: Cognitive and Cultural Aspects* (2005), *Word and Images. Iconicity of the Text* (2008), *Tzvetan Todorov – Theoretician and Humanist* (2009), *Vision and Cognition* (2011).

Nikolay Ivanov got his PhD in Philosophy in 2009. He has been dealing with the classical pragmatism of Charles Peirce and William James, particularly their philosophy of religion and epistemology. He has received grants for research projects in Austria (2007) and Germany (2012). Ivanov is not affiliated with any scientific institution, rather working as an independent scholar.

Marie Vrinat-Nikolov is Professor of the Bulgarian Language and Literature at the Institut National des Langues et Cultures Orientales, Paris. She is a former graduate of the École Normale Supérieure de Sèvres and holds an agrégation degree in Classics. She wrote several course books for students in Bulgarian language, as well as numerous articles and books on the history of Bulgarian literature, history of translation in Bulgaria and literary translation. She translated into French a number of Bulgarian writers, such as Yordan Yovkov, Yordan Raditchkov, Tzvetan Stoyanov, Vera Moutaftchieva, Ivailo Petrov, Kiril Kadiyski, Ivan Borislavov, Sevda Sevan, Viktor Paskov, Gueorgui Gospodinov, Emilia Dvorianova, Alek Popov, Theodora Dimova, Zahary Karabashliev. She won several awards in Bulgaria and in France for popularization of Bulgarian culture in France and for her numerous translations.

John Deely is currently Philosopher in Residence at Saint Vincent Seminary & College, Latrobe, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Previously he has held professorships in philosophy at the University of St. Thomas Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, Texas; St. Joseph's College, Rennselaer, Indiana; St. Mary's College, South Bend, Indiana; and Loras College, Dubuque, Iowa. Prior to assuming the Chair of Philosophy at Loras College, he was a Senior Research Fellow at Mortimer J. Adler's Institute for Philosophical Research, Chicago. He has held university professorships in Canada at the University of St. Thomas, Fredericton, New Brunswick, and the University of Ottawa. He has published over 35 monographs and 300 articles on topics of semiotics and philosophy, together with numerous edited volumes – most notably, perhaps, the Annual Volumes of the Semiotic Society of America, 1981–2003 & 2008. Among his books is *Four Ages of Understanding* (2001) which provides semiotic perspective on the development of philosophical thought from ancient Greece to the present; *Basics of Semiotics* (1990), which has so far been translated into 9 languages; and his bilingual edition of John Poinsot's Latin *Treatise on Signs* which contains the earliest demonstration of the irreducibly triadic nature of sign relations. The third volume of his Poinsot trilogy (*Augustine & Poinsot, the protosemiotic development*, 2009; *Descartes & Poinsot, the crossroad of signs and ideas*, 2008), *Peirce & Poinsot, the action of signs from nature to ethics*, is in contract with Marquette University Press for publication in 2017. His teaching experience, besides the United States and Canada, includes visiting professorships in Mexico, Brazil, Finland, Estonia, and Bulgaria. He is a member of the International Association of Semiotic Studies and a founding member of the Semiotic Society of America.

Alfred Nordmann is Professor of Philosophy and History of Science and of Technoscience at Darmstadt Technical University. He held a professorship at the Philosophy Department at the University of South California (1988–2002) and remains affiliated with this university. Regarding the his-

tory and philosophy of science, his historical interests concern conceptions of scientific objectivity in the formation of fields of knowledge such as theories of electricity and chemistry in the 18th century, mechanics, evolutionary biology, and sociology in the 19th century, nursing science and nanoscale research in the 20th century. His epistemological interests concern the trajectory that leads from Immanuel Kant via Heinrich Hertz to Ludwig Wittgenstein and 20th century philosophy of science. Since 2000 Nordmann has been studying philosophical and societal dimensions of nanoscience and converging technologies, also of synthetic biology and climate engineering. Among his books are *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction* (2005) and *Technikphilosophie zur Einführung* (2008). From 2003 until 2009 he was President of the Georg Christoph Lichtenberg-Society.

Harri Veivo is Professor of Nordic Studies at the University of Caen and Adjunct Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Helsinki. In 2010–2015, he was Visiting Professor of Finnish Studies at the University of New Sorbonne – Paris 3, and in 2005–2009, Professor of Semiotics at the University of Helsinki. His research interests cover the Finnish, Nordic and Central European literary avant-gardes, theory of avant-garde, urban literature and semiotics of literature and culture. He has published several articles on his research topics in Finnish, English and French and edited the volumes *Transferts, appropriations et fonctions de l'avant-garde en Europe intermédiaire et du Nord* (2012), *Redefining Literary Semiotics* (2010, with Christina Ljungberg and Jørgen Dines Johansen) and *Avant-Garde and Experimental Literature* (2007, in Finnish with Sakari Katajamäki).

Anissava Miltenova is Professor, Dr. Habil. and Chair of the Department of Old Bulgarian Literature at the Institute of literature, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS). She graduated in Bulgarian Philology at the Faculty of Slavic Studies, Sofia University (1974). She received PhD (1982) and Dr. Habil. (2005) at the Institute for Literature, BAS. Her PhD thesis entitled "Towards the Late Medieval Literature: Miscellanies with Mixed Content" and Dr. Habil. dissertation: "Erotapokreis: Short Questions and Responses in Old Bulgarian Literature". Recent and current research areas: text transmission in the Slavia Orthodoxa; typology of the macrostructure of Medieval Slavic Miscellanies; apocryphal and popular literature in the Byzantine-Slavic tradition; Repertorium of the Balkan Cyrillic Manuscripts (encoding with computer tools). Since 1994 she coordinated several projects on computer processing of medieval Slavic manuscripts (joint with Pittsburgh University, USA; University of Gothenburg, Sweden; British Library, London, England; Institute of Russian language, Moscow, etc.). Grants: Thessalonica, Center of Balkanology (1984); Vienna, Cultural Institute "Witgenstein" (1986); Fulbright (2003); Hilandar Research Center (2012).

Miryana Yanakieva is Associate Professor, PhD, at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The main fields of her interest are contemporary theory of literature, text interpretation, intertextuality, relationships between literature and philosophy, literature and music. She is a co-author of the book *Theory of Literature: from Plato to Postmodernism*. Her newest monograph, entitled *From the Native Place to the Grave*, deals with works of Pencho Slaveykov, one of the most important figures of the Bulgarian modernism.

Anita Kasabova is Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy at Sofia University "St. Kliment of Okhrid". She is the author of a book *On Autobiographical Memory* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009) and has published numerous papers on various topics in the history of logic and philosophy, memory studies, semiotics and narratology. Email: anita.kasabova@gmail.com

Vladimir Marinov is Assistant Professor of Classics at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia. He has published many articles on ancient Greek philosophy and its Byzantine reception, and is the author of the book *Porphyry: The Cave of the Nymphs* (in Bulgarian) (Sofia: 'Bibliotheca 48', 2000). Email: vlado.marinov@gmail.com

Plamen Antov, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, poet and writer. He has published a number of reviews, articles and studies in periodicals in Bulgaria and abroad, as well as two monographs: *Yavorov–Botev: Modernism and Myth. The Atavistic Memory of Language* (2009) and *The Poetry of the 1990s: Bulgarian and Postmodern* (2010) (both in Bulgarian). His research interests cover Bulgarian national Revival, Lumiéres and Aufklärung; modernity and modernism; modernism and postmodernism; symbolism and secession; mythology and philosophy, etc. Antov is fellow of the Bulgarian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies and of the Bulgarian Writers' Association. Email: plamenantov@mail.bg

Yani Milchakov is literary theorist and historian, Professor at the University of Library Studies and Information Technologies (ULSIT) – Sofia, Shumen University "Episkop Konstantin Preslavski" and Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". He holds a PhD from Jagellonian University in Krakow, Poland, since 1990. His research interests are in the field of Bulgarian, Slavonic, and Balkan studies. Milchakov is the author of the books *Verse and Poetry* (1990), *Sociology of Literature, Language and Politics* (2001), *Bulgarian Poetic Culture 17th–20th Century* (2006), *Social Fields of Literature* (2009), *Paraliterature: Sociology, Textology, Mediators* (co-author, 2009) (all of them in Bulgarian), as well as of series of other publications in the research areas indicated above. He was Bulgarian Ambassador in Poland (1992–1996), Slovakia (1998–2001), Serbia and Montenegro (2001–2005). Email: jani_mil@dir.bg

Maurice Fadel is Associate Professor of Literary Theory at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia. He is the author of the books *Paul de Man: Experiments with the Impossible* (2002) and *The Animal as a Literary Provocation* (2010) (both in Bulgarian), as well as of the articles in different literary media. His areas of experience include literary theory, history of modern literature, and philosophy of language.

Georgi Kapriev, PhD and DSc, is Professor of the History of Philosophy at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". He has specialized in Cologne and Paris. He is a member of the International Society for Study of the Mediaeval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), of the Society for Study of the Philosophy of the Middle Ages in Germany (GPMR) and a co-founder of the European Graduate School for Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy (EGSAMP). Kapriev was Visiting Professor at the University of Cologne in 2005/6 and 2013 and visiting lecturer at the universities of Amsterdam, Bari, Berlin, Bonn, Bochum, Cologne, Hannover, Karlsruhe, Lausanne, Lecce, Münster, Würzburg, Zürich etc. He is the author of 20 books and editor of 21 editions. Editor-in-chief of www.philosophia.bg. Co-editor of: *Archive for Mediaeval Philosophy and Culture*, *Bibliotheca Christiana*, *Christianity and Culture* etc. He translates from Latin, Ancient Greek, German and Russian.

Milena Kirova, PhD and DSc, is Professor at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". She teaches Bulgarian Literature and Biblical Studies. She is the author of eleven books and of a great number of reviews, articles and studies in different collective publications, in scientific and cultural periodicals, as well as editor of many books on Bulgarian literature and Gender Studies. Among the books written by her are: *The Dream of the Meduze. Towards Psychoanalysis of Bulgarian Literature* (1995), *The Problematic Realism* (2002), *Biblical Femininity. Mechanisms of Construction, Strategies of Representation* (2005) and *David, The Great. History and Masculinity in the Hebrew Bible* (2011) (all of them in Bulgarian). Currently, she is President of the Bulgarian Association of University Women.

Radosvet Stefanov Kolarov, PhD and DSc, is Associate Professor at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1986). Ha was editor-in-chief of the academic journal *Literaturna Misal* (*Literary Thought*) (1992–2012), lecturer in Bulgarian Language and Literature at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London and at the Faculty of Mediеval and Modern Languages and Literature in Oxford (1979–1981). He was also Deputy Director (1989–1999) and Head of Literary Theory Department (1990–2010) at the Institute for Literature. Member of the Bulgarian Writers' Union (since 1993). He is the author of the books *Sound and Meaning. Observations on the Phonic Strucrures in Fiction* (1983); *In the Artistic World of the*

novel 'Horo' (1988); *Literary Analyses* (1995); *Elin Pelin* (1995); *Repetition and Creation: Poetics of Autotextuality* (2009) (all of them in Bulgarian).

Galin Tihanov is the George Steiner Professor of Comparative Literature at Queen Mary, University of London. He was previously Professor of Comparative Literature and Intellectual History and founding co-director of the Research Institute for Cosmopolitan Cultures at the University of Manchester. His most recent research has been on cosmopolitanism, exile, and transnationalism. His publications include four books and nine (co)edited volumes. Tihanov is winner, with Evgeny Dobrenko, of the Efim Etkind Prize for Best Book on Russian Culture (2012), awarded for their co-edited *A History of Russian Literary Theory and Criticism: The Soviet Age and Beyond* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011). He is Honorary President of the ICLA Committee on Literary Theory (since 2008) and elected member of Academia Europaea (since 2012); in 2014 he became member of the Advisory Board of the Institute for World Literature (IWL) at Harvard. He sits on the editorial/advisory boards of eleven journals and five publication series. Tihanov has held visiting professorships at Yale University (2007), St. Gallen University (2012), University of Sao Paulo (2013), and Peking University (2014). In 2012, he delivered the Mihály Babits Lectures.

Tsvetan Rakyovski is Professor of Literary Theory at the South-West University "Neofit Rilski", Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. He graduated from Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" in 1985. Rakyovski is the author of the books *Paratext of Literature Work* (1997), *P. Yavorov and Bulgarian Poetic Silhouettes* (1998), *Bulgarian Contexts in the Literature* (1999), *Beyond the Canons* (2001), *Images of Bulgarian memory* (2004), *After the Classics. "The Double" and "Egyptian Mark"* (2006), *Non-canonical Bulgarian literature* – Part 1 (2010) and Part 2 (co-author, 2011), *The Literature and the Language* (2014) (all of them in Bulgarian; *After the Classics* also in Russian in 2006).

Marieta Ivanova-Girginova, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Department of New and Contemporary Bulgarian Literature at the Institute for Literature, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Her major research interests are in the field of dramaturgy: pre-modern and modern drama, symbolism, avant-gardism, contemporary drama, literary and theatre periodicals. She is the author of the books *The Labyrinth of drama. The transformation of the Ego in the Bulgarian drama of the 20th century* (2002) and *Dreams of Modern Drama. The Drama Project of Petko Todorov* (2010) (both in Bulgarian). Ivanova-Girginova was lecturer in Bulgarian Language, Literature and Culture at the Saint Petersburg State University (2003–2007) and supervisor of the Bulgarian-Russian research project "Literature in the paradigm of the cultural dialogue Bulgaria – Russia" (2009–2011). She has been teaching at Plovdiv University "Paisii Hilendarski",

New Bulgarian University and Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". Since 2012 she has been a lecturer at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.

Elizaria Ruskova, PhD, teaches Scandinavian Drama, Theatre and Film at the Department for German and Scandinavian Studies at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". She has published a number of articles on the reception of Scandinavian drama in Bulgaria, on comparative literary analyses of Scandinavian and Bulgarian early modern drama as well as on Bulgarian drama in a larger European context.

Nadezhda Alexandrova is Bulgarian literary historian. She worked at the National Literary Museum (1978–1995) and at Sofia City Library (1995–1998). From 1998 to 2011 she worked at the Centre for Documents and Archives at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia, and taught Literary Archivistic. She has published a number of articles and archival documents on Bulgarian literary history, especially for the period 1878–1944.

Vihren Chernokozhev, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, literary critic and historian. He was Deputy Director of the Institute (2000–2012) and head of Boyan Penev Publishing Centre (2002–2012). Chernokozhev is one of the very few scholars studying Bulgarian literary humour and satire. He is the author of the books *The Relentless Dreamer. Pages on Dimitar Podvarzachov* (1986); *The Bulgarian Laughter* (1994), awarded "Rayko Alexiev" National prize; *Anthology of Bulgarian Laughter* (with Rositsa Chernokozheva, 1995); *Gateways to the Meaning* (2000), *The Other Coast of Words* (2002) (all of them in Bulgarian). He is the editor of the following books: (with Rositsa Chernokozheva) *Epigrams* by Zmey Goryanin (2001); *The Right to Be Disappointed* by Radoy Ralin (2003); *Selected Works* by Dimitar Podvarzachov (2009); (with Bozhidar Kunchev and Edvin Sugarev) *Anti-totalitarian Literature* (2009). He is the author of the projects "Anti-totalitarian Literature", "The Other Bulgarian Literature of the 20th Century" (publishing series) and "Identity and Assimilation. 'The Revival Process' in 1970s–1980s in the Literature of the Moslem Communities" – with Professor Zeynep Zafer from Ankara University.

Nikolay Kirilov Hristozov graduated from Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" with a subject of Bulgarian Philology. In 2011 he obtained a PhD degree with a thesis entitled "The Absurdism in Yordan Radichkov's and Stanislav Stratiev's plays. The reflections of a neo-avant-garde genre on the contemporary Bulgarian drama". Kirilov is the author of critical and theoretical articles on the contemporary Bulgarian literature and on analysis of drama in literary periodicals, collections and encyclopaedic editions. Since 2009 he has worked at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

Anna Alexieva, PhD, is Senior Assistant Professor at the Institute for Literature at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Her research interests are focused on the problems of Bulgarian literature during the period of National Revival, its Slavic and Balkan context. In 2012 she published her first monograph research, entitled *Bulgarian Poetry from 1840s and 1850s. Roles of the subject.* Her papers are published in Bulgarian and foreign periodicals. She is also a member of The Bulgarian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies and Academic Circle for Comparative Literary Studies. Recently, she was awarded "Prof. Marin Drinov" Prize for young researchers' achievements by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

Nikolay Chernokozhev, Dr. habil., is Professor at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". He teaches Literature of the Bulgarian Revival, Bulgarian Literature after the Independency and in various graduate programs. He specialized in the Universities of Hamburg and Manheim, and was a lecturer at the Cologne University. His research interests are in the field of the Bulgarian literature, comparative literary studies, "the other" and his images, cultural anthropology, and, more recently, of visuality and comics. He is the author of the books *Bulgarian Literature – Dialogic Readings* (co-author, 1994); *Lyuben Karavelov and the Bulgarian Revival Period* (1995); *From Revival to Rebirth* (2003); *Bulgarian Literature in the 18th–19th Century. An attempt for a history* (with Nikolay Aretov, 2006); *Bulgaria: Stereotypes and Exotics: Modeling Techniques and Uses of the Image of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians in the German-speaking Culture in the 19th century* (2012) (all of them in Bulgarian).

БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ НА ПУБЛИКАЦИИТЕ НА ПРОФ. ИВАН МЛАДЕНОВ[1]

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[1] Заглавията са подредени хронологично по годината на публикуване, а в нея – по азбучен ред.

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Съставил: *Андрей Ташев*

СТАТУИТЕ НА МИСЪЛТА
В чест на професор Иван Младенов

Българска
Първо издание

Рецензенти *проф. д-р Амелия Личева, доц. д-р Ирен Александрова*

Редактори *Борислав Кременски, Катя Тошева*
Художник на корицата *Александра Кунчева*
Графичен дизайнер *Ваня Кривокапова*

Формат 167 × 237 mm
Печатни коли 31,50

Тираж 300
Цена 18,00 лв.

Печатница на Издателство на БАН „Проф. Марин Дринов“
1113 София, ул. „Акад. Г. Бончев“, бл. 5

www.baspress.com

ISBN 978-954-322-832-4
ISBN 978-954-8712-96-5